
2 6 JU. 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Clandestine Listening Devices



- 1. This memorandum is for information only.
- 2. On 25 June, Mr. J. Patrick COYNE, NSC Representative for Internal Security, called a meeting of representatives of interested agencies to take steps to develop recommendations concerning the threat to the security of classified information of clandestine listening devices. A member of this office attended at the request of Mr. COYNE.
- 3. Suggestions were informally explored by the participants whether this function of security counter-measures should be performed by existing Committees or Boards such as the USCSB, the IIC, an IAC sub-committee, or a separate NSC Committee. No decision was reached although all participants were aware and concerned by the threat.
- 4. A draft of a paper by Mr. COYNE proposing an NSC Committee to handle this problem was circulated to all participants for comment at the next meeting or the submission of substitute proposals if the draft was unacceptable to the participating agencies.
- 5.~ Our proposed reply will be developed in coordination with DD/P.

Snearerd Edwards
Director of Security

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16 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Patrick Coyne

NSC Representative for Internal Security Room 386. Executive Office Building

SUBJECT:

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Clandestine Listening Devices

I concur in your draft directive of 31 July 1956 concerning a proposed NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures.

SELLE STATE

G. P. CABELL Lieutenant General, USAF Deputy Director

CONCUR:

\_\_\_\_\_ (9 Aug 56) RETYPED: O/DDCI/JSE:km (Now DDCI signature) (16 Aug 56)

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Sgd/H. Gates Llpyd Asst DD/S - 16 Aug 56

NSC review(s) completed. CIA-RDP80B01676R001100070038-4

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MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Patrick Coyne

NSC Representative for Internal

Security

Room 386, Executive Office

Building

Washington D. C.

SUBJECT

Clandestine Listening Devices

I concur in your draft directive of 31 July 1956 concerning a proposed NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures.

> ALLEN W. DULLES Director

CONCUR:

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OS/DD/PPS/I (9 Aug 56)

H. Gates Lloyd

Acting Deputy Director (Support)

16 aug 56

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MEMERANCIM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT** 

: Proposed NSC Special Committee on

Fechnical Surveillance Countermeasures

i. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph 5.

- 2. For the past several months, representatives of the FBI, OSI, G-2, ONI, State and this office have been meeting as an Ad Hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative for Internal Security. The purpose of these meetings has been to develop recommendations on the subject of clandestine listening devices as a result of a memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, and from Secretary of Defense to the National Security Council pointing out the need for a focal point for the receipt of all information pertinent to the development of a national integrated program of countermeasures to the security threat posed by clandestine listening devices.
- 3. The Ad Hoc Committee recommends the establishment of an NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures with a charter as shown in the attached draft (TAB C). This draft is a revised version of a charter which started out by proposing an NSC Committee on Counter-intelligence but which your representative, upon the continuing advice of Deputy Director (Plans), strongly objected to as being outside the scope of this group. TAB B is a proposed memorandum from Mr. Coyne to the Executive Secretary, NSC for our information. TAB A is a memorandum of transmittal from Mr. Coyne to CIA.

SUBJECT: Preposed NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures.

- 4. General Truscott has been kept informed on the discussions and feeling of the Committee members with respect to the need for a national counterintelligence policy. The Deputy Director (Plans) has been briefed on the discussions of this Ad Hoc Committee in the field of counterintelligence and countermeasures and concurs in the proposed NSC Committee and its charter.
- 5. It is recommended that you concur in the establishment of this special committee and its charter by signing the attached concurrence memorandum.

Sheffield Edwards Director of Security

#### Enclosures:

- 1. Memo to Mr. Coyne fr DCI. Subj: Clandestine Listening Devices.

  (ER 8.5394/a agd by DACI. 8/16)
- TAB A. Memo of Transmittal fr Mr. Coyne to CIA dtd 7 Aug.
- TAB B. Proposed Memo fr Mr. Coyne to Exec Sec. NSC. undtd.

4. TAB C Charter dtd 31 Jul.

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SUBJECT: Preposed NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures.

CONCURRENCES:

-tasa-tagan-	Deputy Director (Plans)	Jake			
SIGNED 	Deputy Director (Support)	AUG 1 F 1956			
	APPROVED:	L6 AUG 1956			
		Signed C. P. CABELL			
Di:	tribution: ER w/Encls as noted	Dep. Director			
	1 - DD/P w/Encls, 2;3;4.				
os,	1 - DD/S w/Encls. 1 - CI Staff w/o Encls. 9/1/2 OS w/Encls 1 - OS Stayback w/o Encls. 1 - DP c/	e forly.  56)			

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TAB A

The state of the s 

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middanDUM FOR: The Director of Security, Department of State The Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Soccial Operations)

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice

The Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

the Director of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force

the Director of the National Security Egency

HERIEGT:

Clandestine Listening Devices

is an outgrowth of meetings recently held with your repreandatives the following documents are enclosed:

- 1. Undated memorandum to be submitted to the Executive decretary, ASC, by the writer,
- 2. Draft directive of July 31, 1950 concerning a proposed and Special Committee on Sechnical Surveillance Countermeasures.

The first enclosure is forwarded for informational purposes wal will be utilized in transmitting the draft directive of Day 31, 1955 to the Executive Secretary, ASC.

he second enclosure was unanimously approved by your representatives (names listed below) at a meeting held in this office on July 31, 1956. In line with an understanding reached that meeting, however, the second enclosure is being forwarded with for formal concurrence by you prior to submitting it to who Executive Secretary, NSC.

It is requested that your comments on the draft directive of July 31, 1956 be furnished to this office by August 15, 1956. in the event you concur in the draft directive proposed by your to aresentatives it will thereupon be submitted to the Executive

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recretary. In the event proposed changes in the draft directive recommended by any of the addressees of this memorandum, all will be notified thereof in order that such changes may be jointly considered by you prior to the submission to the Council of a draft directive on the subject:

J. Patrick Come

Ar. filliam L. Wanna -- State

Ar. Robert E. Drake -- ASD (090)

Colonel Sheffield Edwards -- CTA

Ar. Graham A. Day -- FBI

Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Downia -- G-2

Commander J.O. Johnson -- FBI

Mr. Gilbert R. Levy -- 091

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TAB E

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COMPANY OFFICE OF THE PHONE HAS A MADERNAL STRAIGHT COUNCIL.

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HEHORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES E. LAY, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TEBJECT:

Clandestine Listening Devices

EMERENCE:

Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, NSC dated May 28, 1956, from the Secretary of Defense

- 1. In the referenced memorandum the Secretary of Defense:
  (a) concurred in the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation that
  group be created directly under the National Security Council
  to serve as a focal point for the receipt of all information
  pertinent to the development of a national integrated program
  of countermeasures to the security threat posed by clandestine
  listening devices; (b) requested that action be initiated by
  you looking to meeting the substance of the JOS recommendation.
  Pursuant thereto, and in line with the JCS suggestion, a group
  was convened, under the chairmanship of the writer, to study and
  develop recommendations on the subject.
- 2. The group comprised representatives of the Director of Security, Department of State; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations); the Directors of CIA, FBI, ONI, OSI G-2, and NSA. In addition, the group consulted with AEC on certain technical aspects of the subject.

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SECRET 25X1 The presumed compromise of U.S. classified information resulting from penetrations of this sort constitutes a grave problem requiring the prompt development and application of both technical and nontechnical countermeasures. (In most instances such compromise is presumed, rather than established, since all of the agencies concerned have not heretofore required that damage assessments be made following discovery of such penetrations. In a few instances it has been established that U.F. classified information of a high order of sensitivity and of direct interest to several departments and agencies has been compromised through the installation of clandestine listening devices in key installations occupied by senior representatives the H & Covernment Tilustrative of the latter 25X1 25X1 Although clandestine listening devices have not been found to be in use domestically thusfur, the subject has both foreign and domestic implications from the standpoint of: (1) safeguarding the classified information and operations of departments and agencies in both domestic and foreign areas; (2) counterespionage; (3) bringing to bear on the problem the combined capabilities, experience

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and information of all agencies responsible for both foreign and domestic aspects of the subject to the end of achieving a coordinated program to maximize both technical

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and nontechnical efforts to detect, neutralize, counteract and exploit such devices, thereby minimizing their threat to U.S. national security.

- 4. Appreciating the desirability of avoiding, if possible, the creation of a new mechanism to deal with the subject, the Troup examined the feasibility of assigning the problem to such bodies as the IIC, the IAC, the USCAB, and the USEB. Its examination reflected that there is no joint Governmental body suited that the contract of the USEB. by charter or membership to assume responsibility for achieving the development and coordinated application of the various countermeasures required to defend against this threat.
- 5. Accordingly, the group agreed unanimously to recommend adoption by the Council and approval by the President of the enclosed draft directive which proposes the establishment of an C special committee to deal with the subject and which spells out terms of reference designed to cope with the problem. The draft directive has been approved for submission to the Council oy:

The Director of Security, Department of State The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director, federal areau of Investigation, Department of Justice

The Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the

The Director of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force

The Director of the National Security #gency.

J. Patrick Coyne:

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CONTIDENTION

July 31, 1956

### Draft Directive Establishing The

## LIC SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON TECHNICAL TURVEILLANCE COUNTERLES LAE

- On the recommendation of the National Security Council, purquant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the President hereby authorizes and pirects that:
- 1. There be established under the National Security Council pecial Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) which shall act in accordance with the provisions of this Directive.
- 2. The Committee shall be composed of one representative of each of the following: The Secretary of State; The Secretary of Defense; The Director of Central Intelligence; The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; The Director of Laval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; The Director of Secial Investigations, Department of the Air Force; and The Director of the Mational Security Agency.
- 3. The heads of other departments and agencies (e.g., the atomic Energy Commission) shall participate in the activities of the Committee to the extent required by the Committee in surrying out its responsibilities and shall lend such support as may be made available within their respective capabilities. In a representative of the National Recurity Council, the PSC Representative on Internal Security shall participate as an observer and adviser in all meetings of the Committee.
  - 4. It shall be the responsibility of the Committee:
- a. To conduct a continuing study and review of the domestic and foreign aspects of the threat to the security of classified defense information of the United States presented by the installation and operation of clandestine technical surveillance devices in quarters or facilities occupied or used by personnel of the United States Government.
  - b. To establish and coordinate policies with respect to countering such threat, for the purpose of insuring:

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- of information, with respect to research and development, technical equipment, sacurity indoctrination and training (both technical and non-technical), search techniques and other related aspects of countermeasures to defend against clandestine technical surveillance devices.
- agencies of procedures to be followed upon the discovery of such devices, including prompt notification thereof to the heads of interested departments and agencies, as well as exploitation by the agencies concerned.
- (3) Prompt notification to the Committee concerning the discovery or suspected presence of such devices, and a damage report on the extent and nature of known or presumed compromise of M.S. classified defense information, for coordinated consideration of the effect upon the national security.
- plementation of policies relating to countermeasures designed to meet the threat described in Paragraph 4. A., above, with a view to instituting and maintaining effective coordination among United States departments and agencies primarily concerned.
- d. To review the extent to which disclosures concerning clandestine technical surveillance devices or countermeasures thereto have been made by the United States Government to foreign governments or international organizations in which the U.S. Government participates and to establish policies and procedures concerning such disclosures.
- 5. The lommittee shall meet once each month or more often as may be necessary to effect full compliance with the terms of this Directive.
- annually by majority vote. Other decisions of the Committee and policies established pursuant to the provisions of this and policies established pursuant to the provisions of this Directive, shall require unanimous agreement of the members. Questions of policy upon which the Committee may fail to reach agreement in pursuance of its assigned responsibilities reach agreement in pursuance of its assigned responsibilities as set forth in this Directive shall be promptly referred to the pational Security Council for resolution.

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- 7. The Committee shall submit annual progress reports to the mational Security Council, and in the interim shall submit to the MSC any reports or recommendations respecting policy matters falling within the scope of this Directive which may require consideration by the Council.
- o. Secretariat services shall be supplied by the members of the Committee.

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