| h. (U) In addition to visiting the WLO website, I began following WLO
using an Instant Relay Chat (IRC) client called "X-Chat" sometime in early
January 2010. IRC is a protocol for real-time internet communications by
messaging or conferencing, colloquially referred to as "chat rooms" or "chats."
The IRC chat rooms are designed for group communication in discussion forums.
Each IRC chat room is called a "channel." Similar to a television, you can
"tune-in" to or "follow" a channel, so long as it is open and does not require
an invite. Once joining a specific IRC conversation, other users in the
conversation can see you have "joined" the room. On the Internet, there are
millions of different IRC channels across several services. Channel topics
span a range of topics, covering all kinds of interests and hobbies.
i. (U) The primary reason for following WLO on IRC was curiosity, particularly
in regards to how and why they obtained the SMS messages referenced above.
I believed collecting information on the WLO would assist me in this goal.
j. (U) Initially, I simply observed the IRC conversations. I wanted to know
how the organization was structured, and how they obtained their data. The
conversations I viewed were usually technical in nature, but sometimes switched
to a lively debate on issues a particular individual felt strongly about.
k. (U) Over a period of time, I became more involved in these discussions,
especially when the conversation turned to geopolitical events and information
topics, such as networking and encryption methods. Based on these observations
I would describe the WLO conversation as almost academic in nature.
l. (U) In addition to the WLO conversations, I participated in numerous other
IRC channels across at least three different networks. The other IRC channels
I participated in normally dealt with technical topics including the Linux
and Berkeley Security Distribution (BSD) Operating Systems (OS), networking,
encryption algorithms and techniques, and other more political topics such
as politics and queer rights.
m. (U) I normally engaged in multiple IRC conversations simultaneously, mostly
publicly but often privately. The X-Chat client enabled me to manage these
multiple conversations across different channels and servers. The screen
for X-Chat was often busy, but experience enabled me to see when something
was interesting. I would then select the conversation and either observe
or participate.
n. (U) I really enjoyed the IRC conversations pertaining to and involving
the WLO. However, at some point in late February or early March, the WLO
IRC channel was no longer accessible. Instead, the regular participants of
this channel switched to using a "Jabber" server. Jabber is another Internet
communication tool, similar, but more sophisticated than IRC. The IRC and
Jabber conversations allowed me to feel connected to others even when alone.
They helped me pass the time and keep motivated throughout the deployment.
6. (U) Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the SIGACTs.
a . (U) As indicated above, I created copies of the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SIGACTs
tables as part of the process of backing up information. At the time I did
so, I did not intend to use this information for any purpose other than for
back-up. However, I later decided to release this information publicly. At
that time I believed, and still believe, that these tables are two of the
most significant documents of our time.
b . (U) On 8 January 2010, I collected the CD-RW I stored in the conference
room of the T-SCIF and placed it into the cargo pocket of my Army Combat
Uniform (ACU). At the end of my shift, I took the CD-RW out of the T-SCIF
and brought it to my Containerized Housing Unit (CHU). I copied the data
onto my personal laptop. Later, at the beginning of my shift, I returned
the CD-RW back to the conference room of the T-SCIF.
c. (U) At t he time I saved the SIGACTs to my laptop, I planned to take them
with me on mid-tour leave, and decide what to do with them. At some point
prior to mid-tour leave, I transferred the information from my computer to
a Secured Digital memory card for my digital camera. The SD card for the
camera also worked on my computer, and allowed me to store the SIGACT tables
in a secure manner for transport.
d . (U) I began mid-tour leave on 23 January 2010, flying from Atlanta, GA
to Reagan National Airport in Virginia. I arrived at the home of my aunt,
[redacted], in Potomac, MD and quickly got into contact with my then-boyfriend
[redacted], then a student at Brandeis University in Waltham, MA, and I made
plans for me to visit in the Boston, MA area. I was excited to see [redacted],
and planned on talking to [redacted] about where our relationship was going,
and about my time in Iraq.
e. (U) However, when I arrived in the Boston area, [redacted] and I seemed
to have become distant. He did not seem very excited about my return from
Iraq. I tried talking to him about our relationship, but he refused to make
any plans . I also tried raising the topic of releasing the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A
SIGACT tables to the public.
f. (U) I asked [redacted] hypothetical questions about what he would do if
he had documents that he thought the public needed access to. [Redacted]
didn't really have a specific answer for me. He tried to answer the question
and be supportive, but seemed confused by the question and its context. I
then tried to be more specific, but he asked too many questions . Rather
than try to explain my dilemma, I decided to just drop the conversation.
g. (U) After a few days in Waltham, I began feeling that I was overstaying
my welcome, and I returned to Maryland. I spent the remainder of my time
on leave in the Washington, DC area.
h . (U) During this time, a blizzard bombarded the midAtlantic, and
I spent a significant period of time essentially stuck at my aunt's house
in Maryland. I began to think about what I knew, and the information I still
had in my possession. For me, the SIGACTs represented the on-the-ground reality
of both the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. I felt we were risking so
much for people that seemed unwilling to cooperate with us, leading to
frustration and hatred on both sides .
i. (U) I began to become depressed at the situation that we found ourselves
increasingly mired in, year-after-year. The SIGACTs documented this in great
detail, and provided context to what we were seeing on-the-ground. In attempting
to conduct counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations,
we became obsessed with capturing and killing human targets on lists, on
being suspicious of and avoiding cooperation with our host-nation partners,
and ignoring the second and third order effects of accomplishing short-term
goals and missions.
j. (U) I believed that if the general public, especially the American public,
had access to the information contained within the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A tables,
this could spark a domestic debate on the role of the military and our foreign
policy in general, as well as it related to Iraq and Afghanistan. I also
believed a detailed analysis of the data over a long period of time, by different
sectors of society, might cause society to re-evaluate the need, or even
the desire to engage in CT and COIN operations that ignored the complex dynamics
of the people living in the affected environment each day.
k. (U) At my aunt's house, I debated about what I should do with the SIGACTs.
In particular, whether I should hold on to them, or disclose them through
a press agency. At this point, I decided it made sense to try and disclose
the SIGACT tables to an American newspaper.
l. (U) I first called my local newspaper, the Washington Post and spoke with
a woman saying she was a reporter. I asked her if the Washington Post would
be interested in receiving information that would have enormous value to
the American public. Although we spoke for about five minutes concerning
the general nature of what I possessed, I do not believe she took me seriously.
She informed me that the Washington Post would possibly be interested, but
that such decisions are made only after seeing the information I was referring
to, and after consideration by the senior editors.
m. (U) I then decided to contact the largest and most popular newspaper,
the New York Times. I called the public editor number on the New York Times
website. The phone rang and was answered by a machine. I went through the
menu to the section for news tips and was routed to an answering machine.
I left a message stating I had access to information about Iraq and Afghanistan
that I believed was very important. However, despite leaving my Skype phone
number and personal email address, I never received a reply from the New
York Times.
n. (U) I also briefly considered dropping into the office for the political
commentary blog Politico. However, the weather conditions during my leave
hampered my efforts to travel.
o. (U) After these failed efforts, I ultimately decided to submit the materials
to the WLO. I was not sure if WLO would actually publish the SIGACT tables,
or, even if they did publish, I was concerned they might not be noticed by
the American media. However, based on what I read about WLO through my research
described above, this seemed to be the best medium for publishing this
information to the world within my reach.
p. (U) At my aunt's house, I joined in on an IRC conversation and stated
I had information that needed to be shared with the world. I wrote that the
information would help document the true costs of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
q. (U) One of the individuals in the IRC asked me to describe the information.
However, before I could describe the information, another individual pointed
me to the link for the WLO website's online submission system.
r. (U) After ending my IRC connection, I considered my options one more time.
Ultimately, I felt that the right thing to do was to release the SIGACTs.
On 3 February 2010, I visited the WLO website on my computer, and clicked
on the "Submit Documents" link. Next, I found the "submit your information
online link," and elected to submit the SIGACTs via the TOR Onion Router
(TOR) anonymizing network by a special link.
s. (U) TOR is a system intended to provide anonymity online. The software
routes Internet traffic through network of servers and other TOR clients
in order to conceal a user's location and identity. I was familiar with TOR
and had it previously installed on my computer to anonymously monitor the
social media websites of militia groups operating within central Iraq.
t. (U) I followed the prompts and attached the compressed data files of the
CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SIGACTs. I attached a text file I drafted while preparing
to provide the documents to the Washington Post. It provided rough guidelines
stating "it's already been sanitized of any source identifying information.
You might need to sit on this information, perhaps 90-180 days, to figure
out how best to release such a large amount of data, and to protect source.
This is possibly one of the more significant documents of our time, removing
the fog of war, and revealing the true nature of 21st century asymmetric
warfare. Have a good day." After sending this, I left the SD card in a camera
case at my aunt's house, in the event I needed it again in the future.
u. (U) I returned from mid-tour leave on 11 February 2010. Although the
information had not yet been published by the WLO, I felt a sense of relief
by them having it. I felt had accomplished something that allowed me to have
a clear conscience based upon what I had seen, read about and knew were happening
in both Iraq and Afghanistan every day.
7 . (U) Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of
"10REYKJAVIK13".
a . (U) I first became aware of diplomatic cables during my training period
in AIT. I later learned about the Department of State (DOS) Net-Centric Diplomacy
(NCD) portal from the 2-10BCT S2, [redacted]. [Redacted] sent a section-wide
email to the other analysts and officers in late December 2009 containing
the SIPRNet link to the portal, along with instructions to look at the cables
contained within and incorporate them into our work product. Shortly after
this, I also noticed that diplomatic cables were being referred to in products
from the Corps-level, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I).
b. (U) Based on direction to become familiar with its contents, I read virtually
every published cable concerning Iraq. I also began scanning the database
and reading other, random, cables that piqued my curiosity. It was around
this time, in early-to-mid-January 2010 that I began searching the database
for information on Iceland. I became interested in Iceland due to IRC
conversations I viewed in the WLO channel discussed an issue called "Icesave."
At this time, I was not very familiar with the topic, but it seemed to be
a big issue for those participating in the conversation. This is when I decided
to investigate, and conduct a few searches on Iceland to find out more.
c. (U) At the time, I did not find anything discussing the "Icesave" issue,
either directly or indirectly. I then conducted an open source search for
"Icesave." I then learned that Iceland was involved in a dispute with the
United Kingdom (UK) and Netherlands concerning the financial collapse of
one or more of Iceland' s banks. According to open source reports, much of
the public controversy involved the UK's use of "antiterrorism legislation"
against Iceland in order to freeze Icelandic assets for payment of the guarantees
for UK depositors that lost money.
d . (U) Shortly after returning from mid-tour leave, I returned to the NCD
to search for information on Iceland and "Icesave" as the topic had not abated
on the WLO IRC channel. To my surprise, on 14 February 2010, I found the
cable 10REYKJAVIK13 which referenced the "Icesave" issue directly.
e. (U) The cable, published on 13 January 2010, was just over two pages in
length. I read the cable, and quickly concluded that Iceland was essentially
being bullied, diplomatically, by two larger European powers. It appeared
to me that Iceland was out of viable solutions, and was now coming to the
U.S. for assistance. Despite their quiet request for assistance, it did not
appear we were going to do anything. From my perspective, it appeared we
were not getting involved due to the lack of long term geopolitical benefit
to do so.
f. (U) After digesting the contents of 10REYKJAVIK13, I debated on whether
this was something I should send to the WLO. At this point, the WLO had not
published nor acknowledged receipt of the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SIGACT tables.
Despite not knowing if the SIGACTs were a priority for the WLO, I decided
the cable was something that would be important, and I felt I might be able
to right a wrong by having them publish this document. I burned the information
onto a CD-RW on 15 February 2010, took it to my CHU and saved it onto my
personal laptop.
g. (U) I navigated to the WLO website via a TOR connection like before, and
uploaded the document via the secure form. Amazingly, the WLO published
10REYKJAVIK13 within hours, proving that the form worked and that they must
have received the SIGACT tables.
8. (U) Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the 12
July 2007 Air Weapons Team (AWT) video.
a. (U) During the mid-February 2010 timeframe, the 2-10BCT Targeting analyst,
then [redacted] and others discussed video found on the "T-Drive." The video
depicted a several individuals being engaged by an Air Weapons Team (AWT).
At first, I did not consider the video very special, as I had viewed countless
other "war-porn" type videos depicting combat. However, the recorded audio
comments by the AWT crew and the second engagement in the video, of an unarmed
bongo truck, troubled me.
b. (U) [Redacted] and a few other analysts and officers in the T-SCIF commented
on the video, and debated whether the crew violated the Rules of Engagement
(ROE) in the second engagement . I shied away from this debate, and instead
conducted some research on the event. I wanted to learn what happened, and
whether there was any background to the events of the day the event occurred,
12 July 2007.
c . (U) Using Google, I searched for the event by its date and general location.
I found several news accounts involving two Reuters employees who were killed
during the AWT's engagement . Another story explained that Reuters requested
for a copy of the video under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Reuters
wanted to view the video in order to be able to understand what happened,
and improve their safety practices in combat zones. A spokesperson for Reuters
was quoted saying that the video might help avoid a reoccurrence of the tragedy,
and believed there was a compelling need for the immediate release of the
video.
d. (U) Despite the submission of a FOIA request, the news account explained
that CENTCOM replied to Reuters, stating that they could not give a timeframe
for considering the FOIA request, and the video might no longer exist. Another
story I found, written a year later, said that even though Reuters was still
pursuing their request, they still did not receive a formal response or written
determination in accordance with the FOIA.
e. (U) The fact neither CENTCOM nor Multi-National ForcesIraq (MNF-I)
would not voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was clear
to me that the event happened because the AWT mistakenly identified the Reuters
employees with a potential threat, and that the people in the bongo truck
were merely attempting to assist the wounded. The people in the van were
not a threat, but "good Samaritans."
f. (U) The most alarming aspect of the video to me, however, was the seemingly
delightful bloodlust they appeared to have. They dehumanized the individuals
they were engaging, and seemed to not value human life by referring to them
as "dead bastards" and congratulating each other on the ability to kill in
large numbers.
g. (U) At one point in the video, there is an individual on the ground attempting
to crawl to safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of calling
for medical attention to the location, one of the AWT crew members verbally
asked for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so he would have a reason
to engage. For me, this seems similar to a child torturing ants with a magnifying
glass.
h. (U) While saddened by the AWT crew's lack of concern about human life,
I was disturbed by their response to the discovery of injured children at
the scene. In the video, you can see the bongo truck driving up to assist
the wounded individual. In response, the AWT crew assumes the individuals
are a threat. They repeatedly request for authorization to fire on the bongo
truck, and once granted, they engage the vehicle at least six times.
i. (U) Shortly after the second engagement, a mechanized infantry unit arrives
at the scene. Within minutes, the AWT crew learns that children were in the
van and, despite the injuries, the crew exhibits no remorse. Instead, they
downplayed the significance of their actions saying "well, it's their fault
for bringing their kids into a battle." The AWT crew members sound like they
lack sympathy for the children or their parents. Later, in a particularly
disturbing manner, the AWT crew verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of one
of the ground vehicles driving over the bodies.
j. (U) As I continued my research I found an article discussing a book "The
Good Soldiers," written by Washington Post writer [redacted]. In [redacted]
book, he writes about the AWT attack. As I read an online excerpt on "Google
Books," I followed [redacted] account of the event, along with the video.
I quickly realized [redacted] was quoting, I feel in verbatim, the audio
communications of the AWT crew. It' s clear to me that [redacted] obtained
access and a copy of the video during his tenure as an embedded journalist.
k. (U) I was aghast at [redacted] portrayal of the incident. Reading his
account, one would believe the engagement was somehow justified as "payback"
for an earlier attack that lead to the death of a Soldier. [Redacted] ends
his account of the engagement by discussing how a Soldier finds an individual
still alive from the attack. He writes that the Soldier finds him, and sees
him gesture with his two forefingers together, a common method in the Middle-East
to communicate that they are friendly . However, instead of assisting him,
the Soldier makes an obscene gesture, extending his middle finger. The individual
apparently dies shortly thereafter. Reading this , I can only think of how
this person was simply trying to help others, and then quickly finds he needs
help as well. To make matters worse, in the last moments of his life, he
continues to express his friendly intent, only to find himself receiving
this well known gesture of "unfriendliness." For me, it's all a big mess,
and I'm left wondering what these things mean, and how it all fits together.
It burdens me emotionally.
l. (U) I saved a copy of the video on my workstation. I searched for, and
found the ROE, ROW Annexes and a flowchart from the 2007 time period, as
well as an unclassified ROE smart card from 2006 . On 15 February 2010, I
burned these documents onto a CD-RW, the same time I burned 10REYKJAVIK13
onto a CD-RW.
m. (U) At the time, I placed the video and ROE information onto my personal
laptop in my CHU. I planned to keep this information there until I redeployed
in Summer 2010. I planned on providing this to the Reuters office in London,
UK to assist them in preventing events such as this in the future.
n. (U) However, after the WLO published 10REYKJAVIK13, I altered my plans.
I decided to provide the video and ROEs to them, so that Reuters would have
this information before I redeployed from Iraq. On about 21 February 2010,
as described above, I used the WLO submission form and uploaded the documents.
o. (U) The WLO released the video on 5 April 2010. After the release, I was
concerned about the impact of the video, and how it would be perceived by
the general public. I hoped the public would be as alarmed as me about the
conduct of the AWT crew members. I wanted the American public to know that
not everyone in Iraq and Afghanistan were targets that needed to be neutralized,
but rather people who were struggling to live in the "pressure-cooker"
environment of what we call asymmetric warfare.
p. (U) After the release, I was encouraged by the response in the media and
general public who observed the AWT video. As I hoped, others were just as
troubled, if not more troubled, than me by what they saw. At this time, I
began seeing reports claiming that DoD and CENTCOM could not confirm the
authenticity of the video . Additionally, one of my supervisors [redacted]
stated her belief that the video was not authentic. In response, I decided
to ensure that the authenticity of the video would not be questioned in the
future. On 25 April 2010 I e-mailed [redacted] a link to the video that was
on our "T-Drive" and to a copy of the video published by WLO from the Open
Source Center (OSC) so she could compare them herself.
q. (U) Around this timeframe, I burned a second CD-RW containing the AWT
video. In order to make it appear authentic, I placed a classification sticker
and wrote "Reuters FOIA Req" on its face. I placed the CD-RW in one of my
personal CD cases containing a set of "Starting out in Arabic." I planned
on mailing the CD-RW to Reuters after I redeployed so they could have a copy
that was unquestionably authentic.
r. (U) Almost immediately after submitting the AWT video and ROE documents,
I notified the individuals in the WLO IRC to expect an important submission.
I received a response from an individual going by the handle of "office."
s. (U) At first our conversations were general in nature, but over time ,
as our conversations progressed, I assessed this individual to be an important
part of the WLO. Due to the strict adherence of anonymity by the WLO, we
never exchanged identifying information; however I believed the individual
was likely [redacted] , or a proxy-representative of [redacted].
t. (U) As the communications transferred from IRC to the Jabber client, I
gave "office," and later "pressassociation" the name of "Nathaniel Frank"
in my address book, after the author of a book I read in 2009.
u. (U) After a period of time, I developed what I felt was a friendly
relationship with Nathaniel. Our mutual interest in information technology
and politics made our conversations enjoyable. We engaged in conversation
often, sometimes as long as an hour or more. I often looked forward to my
discussions with Nathaniel after work.
v . (U) The anonymity that provided by TOR, the Jabber client, and WLO's
policy allowed me to feel I could just be myself, free of the concerns of
social labeling and perceptions that are often place upon me in real life
(IRL). IRL, I lacked close friendship with the people I worked with in my
section, the S2 sections in subordinate battalions, and 2BCT as a whole.
For instance, I lacked close ties with my roommate due to his discomfort
regarding my perceived sexual orientation.
w. (U) Over the next few months, I stayed in frequent contact with Nathaniel.
We conversed on nearly a daily basis, and I felt we were developing a friendship.
The conversations covered many topics, and I enjoyed the ability to talk
about pretty much anything, and not just the publications that the WLO was
working on.
x. (U) In retrospect, I realize these dynamics were artificial, and were
valued more by myself than Nathaniel. For me, these conversations represented
an opportunity to escape from the immense pressures and anxiety that I
experienced and built up throughout the deployment. It seemed that as I tried
harder to "fit in" at work, the more I seemed to alienate my peers, and lose
respect, trust and the support I needed.
9. (U) Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of documents
relating to detainments by the Iraqi Federal Police (FP), the Detainee Assessment
Briefs (DABs), and the USACIC report.
a. (U) On 27 February 2010, a report was received from a subordinate battalion.
The report described an event in which the FP detained fifteen (15) individuals
for printing "antiIraqi literature." By 2 March 2010, I received
instructions from an S3 section officer in the 2-10BCT Tactical Operations
Center (TOC) to investigate the matter, and figure out who these "bad guys"
were, and how significant this event was for the FP.
b. (U) Over the course of my research, I found that none of the individuals
had previous ties with anti-Iraqi actions or suspected terrorist or militia
groups. A few hours later, I received several photos from the scene from
the subordinate battalion. They were accidentally sent to an officer on a
different team in the S2 section, and she forwarded them to me. These photos
included pictures of the individuals, palettes of unprinted paper, seized
copies of the final printed document, and a high-resolution photo of the
printed material.
c. (U) I printed a blown up copy of the high-resolution photo, and laminated
it for ease of storage and transfer. I then walked to the TOC and delivered
the laminated copy to our category 2 interpreter. She reviewed the information
and about a half-hour later delivered a rough written transcript in English
to the S2 section.
d. (U) I read the transcript, and followed up with her, asking for her take
on its contents. She said it was easy for her to transcribe verbatim since
I blew up the photograph and laminated it. She said the general nature of
the document was benign. The documentation, as I assessed as well, was merely
a scholarly critique of the then-current Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki.
It detailed corruption within the cabinet of al-Maliki's government, and
the financial impact of this corruption on the Iraqi people.
e. (U) After discovering this discrepancy between the FP's report, and the
interpreter's transcript, I forwarded this discovery, in person to the TOC
OIC and Battle NCOIC.
f. (U) The TOC OIC and, the overhearing Battlecaptain, informed me they didn't
need or want to know this information any more. They told me to "drop it"
and to just assist them and the FP in finding out where more of these print
shops creating "anti-Iraqi literature" might be. I couldn't believe what
I heard, and I returned to the T-SCIF and complained to the other analysts
and my section NCOIC about what happened. Some were sympathetic, but no-one
wanted to do anything about it.
g. (U) I am the type of person who likes to know how things work, and as
an analyst, this means I always want to figure out the truth. Unlike other
analysts in my section, or other sections within 2-10BCT, I was not satisfied
with just scratching the surface, and producing "canned" or "cookiecutter"
assessments. I wanted to know why something was the way it was, and what
we could do to correct or mitigate a situation. I knew that if I continued
to assist the Baghdad FP in identifying the political opponents of Prime
Minister al-Maliki, those people would be arrested, and in the custody of
this special unit of the Baghdad FP, very likely tortured and not seen again
for a very long time, if ever.
h. (U) Instead of assisting the special unit of the Baghdad FP, I decided
to take the information and disclose it to the WLO in the hope that, before
the upcoming 7 March 2010 election, they could generate immediate press on
the issue, and prevent this unit of the FP from continuing to crack down
on political opponents. On 4 March 2010, I burned the report, the photos,
the high resolution copy of the pamphlet, and the interpreter's handwritten
transcript onto a CD-RW. I took the CD-RW to my CHU and copied the data onto
my personal computer.
i. (U) Unlike the times before, instead of uploading the information through
the WLO websites' submission form, I made a Secure File Transfer Protocol
(SFTP) connection to a "cloud" dropbox operated by the WLO. The dropbox contained
a folder that allowed me to upload directly into it. Saving files into this
directory allowed anyone with login access to the server to view and download
them.
j. (U) After uploading these files to the WLO on 5 March 2010, I notified
Nathaniel over Jabber. Although sympathetic, he said that the WLO needed
more information to confirm the event in order for it to be published or
to gain interest in the international media. I attempted to provide specifics,
but to my disappointment, the WLO website chose not to publish this information.
k. (U) At the same time, I began sifting through information from the U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo, Cuba (GTMO).
The thought occurred to me, although unlikely, that I wouldn't be surprised
if the individuals detained by the FP might be turned over back into U.S.
custody and ending up in the custody of JTF-GTMO.
l. (U) As I digested through the information on JTF-GTMO, I quickly found
the detainee assessment briefs (DABs). I previously came across these documents
before, in 2009, but did not think much of them. However, this time I was
more curious and during this search I found them again. The DABs were written
in standard DoD memorandum format, and addressed the Commander, U. S. SOUTHCOM.
Each memorandum gave basic background information about a specific detainee
held at some point by JTFGTMO.
m. (U) I have always been interested on the issue of the moral efficacy of
our actions surrounding JTF-GTMO. On the one hand, I always understood the
need to detain and interrogate individuals who might wish to harm the U.S.
and our allies. I felt that was what we were trying to do at JTF-GTMO. However,
the more I became educated on the topic, it seemed that we found ourselves
holding an increasing number of individual s indefinitely that we believed
or knew were innocent, low-level "foot soldiers" that didn' t have useful
intelligence and would be released if they were still held in theater.
n. (U) I also recalled that in early 2009, the then-newly-elected [redacted]
stated he would close JTF-GTMO and that the facility compromised our standing
in the world and diminished our "moral authority." After familiarizing myself
with the DABs, I agreed.
o. (U) Reading through the DABs, I noted that they were not analytical products.
Instead, they contained summaries of tearlined versions of Interim
Intelligence Reports (IIRs) that were old or unclassified. None of the DABs
contained names of sources or quotes from Tactical Interrogation Reports
(TIRs) . Since the DABs were being sent to the U.S. SOUTHCOM commander, I
assessed that they were intended to provide very general background information
on each detainee, and not a detailed assessment.
p. (U) In addition to the manner the DABs were written, I recognized that
they were at least several years old, and discussed detainees that were already
released from JTF-GTMO. Based on this, I determined that the DABs were not
very important from either an intelligence or national security standpoint.
q. (U) On 7 March 2010, during my Jabber conversations with Nathaniel, I
asked him if he thought the DABs were of any use to anyone. Nathaniel indicated
that although he didn't believe they were of political significance he did
believe that they could be used to merge into the general historical account
of what occurred at JTF-GTMO. He also thought that the DABs might be helpful
to the legal counsel of those currently and previously held at JTF-GTMO.
r. (U) After this discussion, I decided to download the DABs. I used an
application called "WGet" to download the DABs. I downloaded WGet off the
NIPRNet laptop in the T-SCIF like other programs. I saved that onto a CD-RW
and placed the executable in "My Documents" directory of my user profile
on the DCGS-A SIPRNet workstation.
s. (U) On 7 March 2010, I took the list of links for the DABs and WGet downloaded
them sequentially. I burned the DABs onto a CD-RW and took it to my CHU and
copied them to my personal computer. On 8 March 2010, I combined the DABs
with the USACIC report on the WLO into a compressed "zip" file. Zip files
contain multiple files which are compressed to reduce their size. After creating
the zip file, I uploaded the file onto their "cloud" dropbox via SFTP. Once
these were uploaded, I notified Nathaniel that the information was in the
"x" directory, which had been assigned for my use.
t. (U) Earlier that day, I downloaded the USACIC report on WLO. As discussed
above, I previously reviewed the report on numerous occasions and, although
I had saved the document onto workstation before, I could not locate it.
After I found the document again, I downloaded it to my workstation and saved
it onto the same CD-RW as the DABs, described above.
u. (U) Although I my access included a great deal of information, I decided
I had nothing else to send to the WLO after sending them the DABs and the
USACIC report. Up to this point I sent them the following:
(1) The CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SIGACT tables.
(2) The "10REYKJAVIK13" DOS cable.
(3) The 12 July 2007 AWT video and the 2006 and 2007 ROE documents.
(4) The SIGACT report and supporting documents concerning the 15 individuals
detained by the Baghdad FP.
(5) The U. S. SOUTHCOM and JTF-GTMO DABs.
(6) The USACIC report on the WLO and website.
v. (U) Over the next few weeks, I did not send any additional information
to the WLO. I continued to converse with Nathaniel over the Jabber client,
and in the WLO IRC channel. Although I stopped sending documents to WLO,
no one associated with the WLO pressured me into giving more information.
The decisions that I made to send documents and information to the WLO and
website were my own decisions, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
10. (U) Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of other
government documents.
a. (U) On 22 March 2010, I downloaded two documents. I found these documents
over the course of my normal duties as an analyst. Based on my training and
the guidance of my superiors, I looked at as much information as possible.
Doing so provided me with the ability to make connections others might miss.
b. (U) On several occasions during the month of March, I accessed information
from a government entity. I read several documents from a section within
this government entity. The content of two of these documents upset me greatly.
I had difficulty believing what this section was discussing.
c. (U) On 22 March 2010, I downloaded the two documents that I found troubling.
I compressed them into a zip file named "blah.zip" and burned them onto a
CD-RW. I took the CD-RW to my CHU and saved the file to my personal computer.
I uploaded the information to the WLO website using the designated drop-box.
11. (U) Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the NCD
DOS cables.
a. (U) In late March I received a warning over Jabber from Nathaniel that
the WLO website would be publishing the AWT video. He indicated that the
WLO would be very busy and the frequency and intensity of our Jabber
conversations decreased significantly.
b. (U) During this time, I had nothing but work to distract me. I read more
of the diplomatic cables published on the DOS NCD server. With my insatiable
curiosity and interest in geopolitics, I became fascinated with them. I read
not only cables on Iraq, but also about countries and events I found interesting.
The more I read, the more I was fascinated by the way we dealt with other
nations and organizations. I also began to think that they documented backdoor
deals and seemingly criminal activity that didn't seem characteristic of
the de facto leader of the free world.
c. (U) Up to this point during the deployment, I had issues struggled with
and difficulty at work. Of the documents released, the cables are the only
one I was not absolutely certain couldn't harm the U.S. I conducted research
on the cables published on NCD, as well as how DOS cables work in general.
In particular, I wanted to know how each cable was published on SIPRNet via
the NCD.
d. (U) As part of my open-source research, I found a document published by
DOS on its official website. The document provided guidance on caption markings
for individual cables and handling instructions for their distribution. I
quickly learned that caption markings clearly detail the sensitivity level
of a DOS cable. For example, "NODIS" (No Distribution) was used for messages
of the highest sensitivity, and were only distributed to the authorized
recipients. The "SIPDIS" (SIPRNet Distribution) caption was applied only
to reporting and other informational messages that were deemed appropriate
for release to a wide number of individuals.
e. (U) According to the DOS guidance for a cable to have the SIPDIS caption
it could not include any other captions that were intended to limit distribution.
The SIPDIS caption was only for information that could be shared with anyone
with access to SIPRNet. I was aware that thousands of military personal,
DoD, DOS, and other civilian agencies had easy access to the cables. The
fact that the SIPDIS caption was only for wide distribution made sense to
me given that the vast majority of the NCO cables were not classified.
f. (U) The more I read the cables, the more I came to the conclusion that
this type of information should become public. I once read and used a quote
on open diplomacy written after the First World War, and how the world would
be a better place if states would avoid making secret pacts and deals with
and against each other. I thought these cables were a prime example of the
need for a more open diplomacy. Given all the DOS information I read, the
fact that most of the cables were unclassified, and that all of the cables
had the SIPDIS caption, I believed that the public release of these cables
would not damage the U.S. However, I did believe the cables might be
embarrassing, since they represented very honest opinions and statements
behind the backs of other nations and organizations. In many ways, these
cables are a catalog of cliques and gossip. I believed exposing this information
might make some within the DOS and others unhappy.
g. (U) On 28 March 2010, I began downloading a copy of the SIPDIS cables
using the program WGet described above. I used instances of the WGet application
to download the NCO cables in the background, as I worked on my daily tasks.
The NCO cables were downloaded from 28 March 2010 to 9 April 2010. After
downloading the cables, I saved them onto a CD-RW. These cables went from
the earliest dates in NCO to 28 February 2010. I took the CD-RW to my CHU
on 10 April 2010. I sorted the cables on my personal computer, compressed
them using the BZip2 compression algorithm described above, and uploaded
them to the WLO via the designated dropbox described above.
h. (U) On 3 May 2010, I used WGet to download an update of the cables for
the months of March 2010 and April 2010, and saved the information onto a
zip file and burned it to CD-RW. I then took the CD-RW to my CHU and saved
them to my computer.
i. (U) I later found that the file was corrupted during the transfer. Although
I intended to resave another copy of these cables, I was removed from the
T-SCIF on 8 May 2010, after an altercation.
12. (U) Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the Gharani
(Farah province), Afghanistan 15-6 investigation and videos.
a. (U) In late March 2010, I discovered a U.S. CENTCOM directory on a 2009
airstrike in Afghanistan. I was searching CENTCOM for information I could
use as an analyst. As described above, this was something that myself and
other analysts and officers did on a frequent basis.
b. (U) As I reviewed the documents, I recalled the incident and what happened.
The airstrike occurred in the Gharani village in the Farah Province of
Northwestern Afghanistan. It received worldwide press coverage during the
time as it was reported that up to 100 to 150 Afghan civilians, mostly women
and children, were accidentally killed during the airstrike.
c. (U) After going through the report and its annexes, I began to view the
incident as being similar to the 12 July 2007 AWT engagements in Iraq. However,
this event was noticeably different in that it involved a significantly higher
number of individuals, larger aircraft, and much heavier munitions. Also,
the conclusions of the report are even more disturbing than those of the
12 July 2007 incident.
d. (U) I did not see anything in the 15-6 report or its annexes that gave
away sensitive information. Rather, the investigation and its conclusions
help explain how this incident occurred and what those involved should have
done, and how to avoid an event like this from occurring again.
e. (U) After reviewing the report and its annexes, I downloaded the 15-6
investigation, PowerPoint presentations, and several other supporting
documents to my DCGS-A workstation. I also downloaded three zip files containing
the videos of the incident. I burned this information onto a CD-RW and
transferred it to the personal computer in my CHU. Either later that day
or the next day, I uploaded the information to the WLO website, this time
using a new version of the WLO website submission form. Unlike other times
using the submission form above, I did not activate the TOR anonymizer.
13. (U) This concludes my statement and facts for this providence inquiry.
The point of contact (POC) for this memorandum is the undersigned at HHC,
USAG, Joint Base MyerHenderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211.
[Redacted name and signature]
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