TOP SECRET
STATUS OF ACTIONS ON
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT STUDY GROUP ON
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TOP SECRET 21 August 1961
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REPORT

BY

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ON

IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF
JOINT STUDY GROUP ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

REFERENCES:


1. The status of actions taken to date in implementing all of the recommendations of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government (Reference A), as approved by the President on 18 January 1961, are reported in the following pages.

2. This report brings up to date the first report on this subject, dated 1 May 1961 (Reference B).

Prepared by
The Coordination Staff
of the Director of Central Intelligence

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MORI/CDF
Recommendation No. 1


Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The Secretary of Defense on 1 August 1961 issued DOD Directive 5105.21 which established the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and provides that guidance to the Director, DIA, will be furnished by the Secretary of Defense, by the JCS acting under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense and by the U.S. Intelligence Board. The effective date for activating DIA is 1 October 1961 at which time the assumption of responsibility for its assigned functions will be initiated on a graduated basis. The Director, DIA, has been designated as agent to monitor Defense's full compliance with all approved Joint Study Group Recommendations applicable to the Department other than those which fall within the National Security Agency area of responsibility.

It is considered that the objectives of Recommendation No. 1 will be met when the DIA has assumed the specific functions and responsibilities assigned by the directive.

Recommendation No. 2

Resources required by reorganization under Recommendation No. 1 to be drawn from existing resources.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. It is considered that the concept embodied in the directive creating the Defense Intelligence Agency is generally consistent with the objectives of this recommendation.
Recommendation No. 3

Closer control of intelligence budgeting procedures by the Secretary of Defense.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. Consolidation and coordination of budget procedures for intelligence operations and activities throughout all elements of the Department of Defense will be effected on full implementation of the directive creating the Defense Intelligence Agency. Effective procedures combining the cryptologic budgets have been operating for three years.

Recommendation No. 4

Improvements in selection, training and rank of personnel assigned to intelligence duties.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. At the request of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), the military departments have made available a comprehensive statement of policy governing each department's provision for career development of officers who are more than ordinarily involved in intelligence and related activities. These statements, together with related background material, have been analyzed in the Office of Special Operations, and discussions have been initiated with the Office of Manpower, Department of Defense, to explore approaches to improved management principles, including selection and training, which might enhance the career status and improve the professional competence of individuals assigned to intelligence duty.

It is considered that the Defense Intelligence Agency or assumption of its functions as provided in the directive will take the necessary action to meet the objectives of this recommendation.

Recommendation No. 5

Encouragement of the military services to maintain and develop clandestine collection capabilities.

Action Responsibility: Defense

- 2 -

TOP SECRET
Status. The military services have been indirectly encouraged to maintain and develop clandestine collection capabilities by the implementation of other Joint Study Group recommendations, namely, those which concern Service personnel selection and career development, training of Service personnel for clandestine intelligence work by CIA, and improved field coordination procedures. More direct encouragement will depend upon the impetus given by the Defense Intelligence Agency in carrying out its assigned responsibilities with respect to plans, programs, policies and procedures for Department of Defense collection activities. The military departments have already been requested by the Department of Defense to study means of implementing this recommendation and submit their findings.

Recommendation No. 6

Improvements in the Special Security Officer system.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The Department of Defense has investigated and taken corrective action in accordance with this recommendation, insofar as it is applicable within the Special Security Officer system itself. The possibility of duplication of service to non-military consumers as between the Special Security Officer system and the Central Intelligence Agency cryptologic service is now being considered by the Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Recommendation No. 7

Re-examination of feasibility of placing more electronic intelligence resources of unified commands under control of Director National Security Agency (NSA).

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The Director, NSA, has established a group including representation from the Joint Staff to study the requirements of commands and the allocation of U.S. Eavesdropping resources, and where improvements can be made.
TOP SECRET

Recommendation No. 8

Strengthening control of Director, National Security Agency, over service cryptologic agencies.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. Even before the issuance of the Joint Study Group Report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had been concerned about developments in the concept of partnership between the National Security Agency (NSA) and the service cryptologic agencies. As a result of the efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the operational control line from the Director, NSA, to field collection units has been strengthened and made more direct, while still retaining the organizational relationship between the service cryptologic agencies and those offices in the National Security Agency concerned with Army, Navy, and Air Force matters. In an analogous instance, the Joint Processing Center has been brought directly under the control of the Director, NSA.

Recommendation No. 9

Reappraise adequacy of research and development for electronics intelligence.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. A group composed of representatives from the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) and the National Security Agency, has studied approaches to the implementation of this Recommendation. This group has: (a) reviewed with the National Security Agency the capabilities and limitations of existing research and development programs for electronics intelligence (ELINT) purposes; (b) determined that major deficiencies now appear to center on ELINT data processing, analysis and dissemination; (c) discussed the Strong Report of 1958 in the light of current activities and studies now in progress; (d) generally agreed that qualitative and quantitative aspects of ELINT collection and processing capabilities be kept under constant review to ensure proper assignment of priorities and consistency with the current strategic situation.
TOP SECRET

Recommendation No. 10

Reappraisal of security standards for foreign born translators to alleviate translator shortage.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. On 23 May 1961, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) approved a report by its Committee on Communications Intelligence, in coordination with the Security Committee and the Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications, containing the following major findings:

a. In fields other than communications intelligence, there are no linguist problems which require alleviation by modification of security procedures and practices.

b. In the field of communications intelligence, policy previously established by USIB concerning use by the National Security Agency (NSA) of foreign born voice linguists in the United States is sufficiently flexible to permit their use to satisfy current requirements contingent upon the availability of such linguists and funds for their employment. In order to meet a lack of voice linguists in the Service cryptologic agencies for use in overseas facilities, particularly in areas where situations of emergency or hostilities are most likely to arise, the Director, NSA, proposes to use non-U.S. linguists under the emergency provisions of existing directives and subject to certain safeguards which would tend to minimize the risks involved.

Recommendation No. 11

Greater emphasis on intelligence responsibilities in the indoctrination of State Department personnel.

Action Responsibility: State

Status. Pursuant to this recommendation, the Department of State is placing increased emphasis on intelligence indoctrination of State Department personnel, primarily through:
(a) a more active program of briefing Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Mission; and (b) an effort to direct greater attention to this factor in the Department's general training programs, such as the Foreign Service Institute. The problem is a long-term, continuing one, and the Department's approach to the task is clearly responsive to the objectives of the recommendation.

- 5 -
TOP SECRET

Recommendation No. 12

Improved career management for intelligence personnel in military departments.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. This recommendation is closely related to Recommendation No. 4 on improved personnel selection and training, and both have been studied jointly by the Department of Defense. The Office of Special Operations has initiated discussions with the Office of Manpower to develop management, selection and training principles to enhance the career status and improve the professional competence of individuals assigned to intelligence duty. The further implementation of this recommendation will now be assumed by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Recommendation No. 13

Central Intelligence Agency's clandestine training facilities as a service of common concern.


Status. Representatives of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are engaged in a detailed examination of the clandestine training facilities courses and material controlled by the CIA and the Department of the Army. Similar arrangements with respect to the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Navy are in abeyance pending completion of the Army Study.

The Secretary of Defense, in connection with the recently approved actions to establish the Defense Intelligence Agency, has directed the Director of the Office of Organizational and Management Planning Studies, to submit to him by 1 October 1961 recommendations for the assignment of Defense-wide responsibilities for specialized types of intelligence training, to include consideration of those specialized intelligence training programs which can be provided to Defense by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Based upon these studies, recommendations will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence as to actions to implement this Joint Study Group recommendation.

- 6 -

TOP SECRET
Review compartmentation of sensitive information to insure adequate dissemination.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. On 21 February 1961, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) assigned to its Security Committee, in coordination with the Committee on Communications Intelligence and the Committee on Documentation, responsibility for developing recommendations for the implementation of this recommendation. Within this committee structure, an ad hoc working group chaired by the National Security Agency and composed of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, Army and Air Force, is studying the compartmentation of broad categories of intelligence, has reviewed related activities of the Watch and Overhead Reconnaissance Committees of the USIB, and is now preparing its report.

Recommendation No. 15

Determine the adequacy of staffing level of the National Indications Center and ensure the committee's access to necessary sensitive information.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. With respect to the manning of the National Indications Center (NIC), the Watch Committee considers the present authorized manning level to be adequate and notes that the Duty Officer complement will be fully manned within a month. With regard to ensuring that all information pertinent to the NIC's mission reaches the Center promptly, USIB is being requested to assist Watch members in improving channels for operational information within the intent of NSC 5438, and to concern in an allocation to Watch Committee members and the National Indications Center of such special clearances as are required for the full use of any information bearing on the Watch Committee mission.
TOP SECRET

Recommendation No. 16

Establishment of a National Photographic Interpretation Center.

Action Responsibility: Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Status: National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 8, approved on 18 January 1961, established the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). The Center is functioning and is administered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a service of common concern, with personnel provided by CIA and the military services consistent with available space and facilities.

Current plans provide for the establishment of NPIC in permanent quarters in Building 213 in the Naval Weapons Plant not sooner than fourteen months. While the establishment of NPIC in Building No. 213 will provide centralized photographic interpretation facilities during peace time, there is no provision for relocation of this facility during periods of national emergency.

Recommendation No. 17

Central Intelligence Agency use of non-official cover.

Action Responsibility: Central Intelligence Agency

Status: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is making realistic efforts to expand the effective use of non-official cover. CIA published on 1 March 1961 an excellent analysis of the problems and pitfalls in the use of non-official cover, based upon Agency experience over the years, to assist in the expansion of the use of non-official cover in a well-planned and operationally sound manner. The Cover and Commercial Staff of CIA is currently making a detailed analysis in great depth of the non-official cover possibilities in four countries as a "pilot" study. The proposal from the CIA Stations in each of these four countries for further non-official cover are being studied in Washington by this Staff and conclusions and recommendations are presently being prepared. These studies have derived increased importance and timeliness in view of the current re-examination by the Department of State and CIA.
of the need for existing official cover with a view to an orderly reduction. Such re-examination will require a careful appraisal of the possibilities of non-official cover in order to ensure that the over-all clandestine collection capability is not impaired.

Recommendation No. 18

Greater Community attention to counterintelligence and security overseas.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. On 28 February 1961, the United States Intelligence Board assigned responsibility to its Security Committee, in coordination with the Committee on Communications Intelligence, for the preparation of recommendations for the implementation of this recommendation. An ad hoc working group chaired by the Central Intelligence Agency and composed of representatives of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force and State, has undertaken this task. The principal efforts of the group are concerned with personnel and physical security standards and procedures relating to overseas installations and the relationship of the counterintelligence function to this program. The group is exploring proposals to promote uniformity in overseas security programs and a fuller exchange and use of counterintelligence information by Security Officers responsible for such programs.

Recommendation No. 19

Continuing exploitation of intelligence opportunities by Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGS) and military missions.


Status. As a result of recent actions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there is now a greater awareness of intelligence requirements on the part of MAAG and Mission personnel, resulting in greater contributions of intelligence information.
TOP SECRET

Recommendation No. 20

Increased intelligence support to unified and component
commands by information reports from Central Intelligence Agency
field stations.

Action Responsibility: Central Intelligence Agency

Status. For the past several years the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) has, through the lateral dissemination to CINCPAC and component commands all telegraphic
and dispatch information reports originating with the stations
in the Far East, as well as direct dissemination from CIA
Washington of reports such as the daily Central Intelligence
Bulletin. Within the past year the following actions have been
taken to provide intelligence support of a similar nature to
other commands: (1) Instructions have been issued and facili-
ties established for lateral dissemination of selected
Agency telegraphic information reports to EUCOM through the
CINCSOUTH through the CIA representative

and to CINCLEM through the

to CINCLANT through CIA Headquarters to the Agency representative
at CINCLANT Headquarters in Norfolk; (2) procedures have been
established for CIA Headquarters to pouch to the

all intelligence reports received from Agency stations
throughout Latin America, for passage to CINCARIB; (3) the
JCS has solicited the views of all unified and component
commanders concerning the present level of CIA intelligence
support being received and additional support required.

Recommendation No. 21

Establishment of a central requirements facility.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Recommendation No. 22

Use of Central Intelligence Agency Office of Central Reference
as a reference facility.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.
Recommendation No. 23

Integration of collection requirements manuals, and creation of integrated country requirements guides.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. Efforts to implement these three recommendations have made little progress because of the uncertainty and differing views in the intelligence community as to the meaning and intent of these recommendations, and reservations as to the need for the particular kind of remedial action which they seem to call for. In addition, implementation of these three recommendations depends to some degree upon the ultimate organization of intelligence within the Department of Defense. (The Defense Intelligence Agency which is now being established will coordinate requirements which are generated within the Department of Defense and should thereby facilitate community-wide coordination in this field.)

A number of steps have been taken in exploration of possible implementation procedures: At the suggestion of the DCI's Coordination Staff, the Office of Central Reference of Central Intelligence Agency has examined the feasibility of controlling, recording, and indexing requirements on punch cards, and has reported that this is feasible, and that the primary problem lies in whether the intelligence community can agree on the kind of service which is wanted from the punch cards. The Coordination Staff also suggested that the Department of State make an effort to determine whether it is feasible to expand the annual intelligence reporting guidance program for overseas posts to include the interests of other agencies, and thus serve as the basis for "integrated requirements guides on a country-by-country basis." The Coordination Staff prepared a draft outline of requirements procedures and placed it in the hands of representatives of each agency in the intelligence community for study and comment, but reactions to this outline have been so divergent that the Coordination Staff concluded that some form of pilot project should be undertaken first.

The United States Intelligence Board on 11 July requested the Director of Central Intelligence assisted by his Coordination Staff to develop terms of reference for an ad hoc committee concerning requirements for Southeast Asia, as a pilot project in implementation of these three recommendations, taking into account the experience gained by an ad hoc SIB committee established on 5 July to examine into collection capabilities on southwest Communist China, North Vietnam, and Communist-
controlled areas of Laos. As a basis for making recommendations to the DCI and USB, the Coordination Staff is undertaking an examination of current requirements for a selected country to analyze the problems involved in preparing a coordinated community-wide requirements guide.

Despite the lack of community consensus as to the precise meaning of these recommendations, the individual departments have been reviewing and seeking means for improving their own requirements procedures. As indicated above, under present plans, the Defense Intelligence Agency will be charged with responsibility for coordination of all requirements originating within the Department of Defense. The Department of State has initiated, on a limited scale, a program of annual guidance to Foreign Service posts for reporting in fields of primary interest to the Department. Several offices within CIA are experimenting with new requirements formats.

Recommendation No. 24

Coordination of overt and clandestine requirements by chiefs of mission.

Action Responsibility: State, Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies carrying on intelligence activities abroad.

Status. The DCI's Coordination Staff has prepared a draft procedure for implementing this recommendation which was designed to provide the basis for transmitting comprehensive and coordinated guidance for our chiefs of mission abroad and the various agencies carrying on foreign overt and clandestine intelligence activities. Consideration of this draft procedure has not yet been completed since a final determination with respect to the coordination of overt and clandestine requirements awaits a decision on the more difficult question as to the duties and functions of our chiefs of mission abroad with respect to foreign clandestine activities.

Meanwhile, however, much progress has been made on this latter subject and a preliminary guidance table, coordinated with the Department of State, has been sent to all Central Intelligence Agency Field Stations.

As soon as a final determination has been made with respect to clandestine activities, it is believed that the coordination question, covered by Recommendation No. 24 can rapidly be resolved.

- 12 -
TOP SECRET

Recommendation No. 25

Annual evaluation report to the National Security Council to pay specific attention to collection, and similar evaluations to be requested from each chief of mission and military commander.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. The President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs has, by memorandum dated 11 July 1961, advised the Director of Central Intelligence that it is no longer necessary to submit the Annual Report on the Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program. The need for such information will hereafter be covered by current and ad hoc reports as necessary. This action, however, is not interpreted as eliminating the need for improved means of evaluating intelligence collection activities. Accordingly, the Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence through its augmented membership has now undertaken an examination of existing systems within each of the agencies for evaluating collection efforts, as a basis for a report and recommendations to the DOI for United States Intelligence Board consideration.

Recommendation No. 26

Coordination of military requirements by Defense.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The directive establishing the Defense Intelligence Agency provides that it will be responsible for the assembly, integration and validation of military requirements, assignment of priorities thereto, and for the establishment of a Defense Collection Requirements Registry and Facility.

Recommendation No. 27

Transmission of political information overtly acquired by Central Intelligence Agency through mission's political section.

Action Responsibility: State and Central Intelligence Agency

Status. The substance of this Recommendation has been agreed Central Intelligence Agency and State policy for some time. The CIA regulation concerning the general subject of field
station reporting has recently been revised and contains a section covering this subject. In addition, the Office of the Deputy Director (Plans) of CIA has sent a dispatch to all field stations and bases calling this particular Recommendation to their attention and requesting full cooperation in its implementation.

Recommendation No. 28

Achievement by the Director of Central Intelligence of coordination through normal command channels.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence (Coordinator).

Status. The Director of Central Intelligence has continued to make increased use, whenever appropriate, of command channels in handling coordination problems. For example, these channels were used for exchanging views regarding Recommendation No. 1 (Defense organization), initiating action on Recommendations No. 13 (clandestine training) and 39 (Research and Development), and establishing the Coordination Staff pursuant to Recommendation No. 29.

Recommendation No. 29

Establishment of a Coordination Staff, separate from any agency, to support the Director of Central Intelligence in developing solutions to coordination problems.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence (Coordinator).

Status. The Coordination Staff currently consists of an Assistant for Coordination and Deputy Assistant appointed by the DCI, three members assigned from Central Intelligence Agency, and one member each detailed from State, Army, Navy, Air Force and National Security Agency. Consideration is being given within Defense to furnishing one additional staff member from Defense. Liaison arrangements have been made with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission. The principal activity of the Coordination Staff has been assisting the DCI in following up on implementation of approved Joint Study Group (JSG) Recommendations. In particular, the staff has taken the lead in
assisting the DCI and USIB regarding actions to implement certain JSG Recommendations relating to requirements, evaluations, USIB management role, annual program reviews, USIB committees, and cost and manpower data. In addition, the staff has actively participated in actions on many other JSG Recommendations, sought through consultations and briefings to identify and help solve other inter-agency coordination problems (e.g., space surveillance), and assisted in advising the DCI on specific coordination questions (especially regarding clandestine collection).

Recommendation No. 30

Reduction in membership of United States Intelligence Board, phased with Defense reorganization.

Action Responsibility: Defense - Director of Central Intelligence.

Status. When the above recommendation was considered by the National Security Council on 12 January 1961, the Secretary of Defense reserved his position as to the manner of reorganizing military intelligence under Recommendations No. 1 and 2, and the NSC Action stated that steps regarding the "organization and functions of the USIB should be taken in phase with the carrying out of the related internal adjustments within the intelligence components of the Department of Defense."

These internal adjustments are now being made and the new Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will be activated as of 1 October 1961. The directive setting up the DIA provided that it would be represented on the USIB. It did not resolve the question with respect to the possible representation on the United States Intelligence Board of other Defense elements.

It is understood that this matter will be the subject of discussion between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence before final action is taken.

Recommendation No. 31

Establishment by United States Intelligence Board of a management group to analyze and propose solutions to community problems of
non-substantive administration and management type. The National Security Council agreed that the functions proposed for the management group should be performed by the Coordination Staff of the DCI.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence - United States Intelligence Board.

Status. The Coordination Staff is still giving primary attention to administrative and management problems arising in the course of implementing recommendations of the Joint Study Group. It is, in addition, identifying and seeking solutions to problems involving two or more agencies which might require United States Intelligence Board attention, e.g., it is currently examining problems relating to space surveillance. Specifically, it has recommended, and USIB has approved, a procedure whereby the Coordination Staff will review all new plans for periodic intelligence publications in Washington to prevent duplication.

Recommendation No. 32

Annual review by United States Intelligence Board of intelligence plans and programs.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board jointly with the Director of Central Intelligence.

Status. The Coordination Staff of the DCI has completed and submitted to the United States Intelligence Board a report summarizing the over-all FY 1963 programs in comparison with FY 1962 programs. This report is based upon information submitted by each member of the Intelligence Community concerning its foreign intelligence program for FY 1963. While shortcomings exist in the initial effort, due largely to the short period of time allowed for development of a format and instructions, and for the preparation of the various program submissions themselves, the Coordination Staff believes that considerable valuable experience has been gained to facilitate future program reviews, and that certain useful comments and recommendations have evolved from the review just completed.

Recommendation No. 33

Review of committee structure of United State Intelligence Board.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence (Coordinator)

- 16 -
Status. At the 25 July United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting, the decision was made that the Communications Intelligence Committee and Electronics Intelligence Committee should be merged.

Augmentation of the membership of the Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has made it possible to initiate a review of the functions and activities of the other USIB committees on a selective basis. As the study progresses, reports with conclusions and any recommendations for changes will be submitted to the DCI for USIB consideration.

**Recommendation No. 34**

Transmittal of intelligence guidance to unified commands through channels directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (except National Security Agency communications).

**Action Responsibility:** Defense.

Status. It is noted that this function will now be assumed by the new Defense Intelligence Agency.

**Recommendation No. 35**

Control and command by unified commanders over intelligence activities of component commands.

**Action Responsibility:** Defense.

Status. The National Security Council deferred action on this recommendation.

**Recommendation No. 36**

Chiefs of mission to take positive steps to effectively coordinate all overt intelligence collection and reporting activities.

**Action Responsibility:** State.

Status. The Department of State has, since January 20, 1961, emphasized this recommendation in briefings of all chiefs of mission and other personnel departing for overseas posts.
The coordination role itself has long been outlined in the Foreign Service Manual. In addition, the Department has under consideration a circular instruction to all diplomatic missions abroad re-affirming and re-emphasizing previous directives concerning the affirmative responsibility of chiefs of mission to coordinate overt collection activities overseas.

Recommendation No. 37

Operational clandestine coordination continued by Central Intelligence Agency field stations, but referral to Director of Central Intelligence before proposed operation is rejected.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence (Coordinator).

Status. The Director of Central Intelligence sent a personal dispatch to all of his designated representatives abroad on 14 June 1961 calling Recommendation No. 37 to their attention and instructing them to make every effort to resolve differences locally; and pointing out that if there is disagreement between the designated representative and an agency concerning a problem under Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 5/1, which cannot be resolved in the field, the matter shall be referred to Washington for resolution by the Director of Central Intelligence, each agency using its own channels for referral. Copies of the dispatch were given to the military agencies prior to its being sent to the field and the military agencies were requested to issue complementary messages to military installations abroad. The Departments of the Navy, Army and Air Force have each sent complementary messages to appropriate commands abroad.

Recommendation No. 38

Determination as to activities which properly are foreign intelligence, and an improved system for utilizing dollar and manpower data in the entire U. S. foreign intelligence effort.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. Assistance to the United States Intelligence Board in determining which activities properly are foreign intelligence is being undertaken by the Coordination Staff in conjunction with the annual review of intelligence plans and
programs discussed above under Recommendation No. 32. The Coordination Staff will, in preparing subsequent instructions, develop an improved basis for appraising the level and allocation of effort in future program reviews, including appropriate utilization of dollar and manpower data. Implementation of the directive creating the Defense Intelligence Agency will assist these processes materially.

Recommendation No. 39

More effective coordination of research and development activities for intelligence purposes.

Action Responsibility: Defense and CIA.

Status. Representatives designated by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, together with a representative of the Coordination Staff, are studying means and procedures for achieving the objective of this recommendation. In the course of this study, two areas of coordination relative to research and development have been identified. The first area is concerned with coordination of scientific and technical efforts themselves; with respect to this area of coordination, the representatives are in agreement as to a proposed mechanism and procedure. The second area of coordination is concerned with community-wide evaluation or assessment of the intelligence usefulness of proposed research and development projects. Differences remain to be resolved by the representatives concerning the need and mechanism for this area of coordination.

It is recognized, however, that the extent and diversity of research and development activities within the Department of Defense create, in addition to the problem of obtaining continuous comprehensive knowledge of such activities, a further problem of achieving an awareness by the scientists and technicians of intelligence needs and recognition that a development originated for another purpose can be exploited to solve an intelligence problem.

Recommendation No. 40

Monitoring the development of automatic data systems for storage and retrieval of intelligence information.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.
TOP SECRET

Status. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) assigned this problem to its Committee on Documentation (CODIB) and approved the establishment of an ad hoc full time, community-wide staff to examine in detail the long-range information processing problems of the USIB agencies in the light of current and projected developments in the field of data handling. The tremendously increasing volume of information becoming available and the rapid development of new systems and concepts in this field, will make the solution of these problems one of the most difficult and important yet undertaken in the community, and require the wholehearted cooperation of departments and agencies.

Recommendation No. 41

Added attention to foreign developments in agent communications.

Action Responsibility: Central Intelligence Agency.

Status. The Central Intelligence Agency has well-established technical liaison channels with the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan to ensure current knowledge of any developments in these countries pertinent to the problem of agent communications. Developments in other countries possessing a potential in the field of telecommunications are also reviewed periodically for this purpose.

Recommendation No. 42

United States Intelligence Board to strongly support counter-audio surveillance efforts.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. On 28 February 1961, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) assigned to its Security Committee responsibility for recommending such action as would be necessary to implement this recommendation. The report of the Committee, which is awaiting USIB consideration, recommends positive actions to be taken to improve the counter-audio surveillance efforts of the departments and agencies, and further recommends that the USIB support the recommendations contained in the annual report of the National Security Council Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures. This latter mentioned report has not yet been acted upon by the National Security Council.

- 20 -

TOP SECRET
Establishment by the intelligence community of specific arrangements for planning its work and anticipating its problems.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. Activation of the Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence constitutes a specific arrangement for assisting the intelligence community to plan its work and anticipate its problems. At the request of the Staff, and with USIB approval, the members of the community have submitted statements outlining the principal variations of their planned fiscal year 1963 plans and programs from those of FY 1962, and the long-range implications of these variations. The Staff has analyzed these statements and prepared for USIB consideration a summary report together with certain recommendations. Experience in preparing this report and discussion and action by USIB thereon should assist the community in undertaking additional and more thorough examination of planning arrangements and procedures.