Philip D. Zelikow
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Philip David Zelikow (born September 21, 1954) is an American attorney, diplomat, academic and author. He has worked as the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, and Counselor of the United States Department of State. He is the White Burkett Miller Professor of History at the University of Virginia and was American Academy in Berlin Axel Springer Fellow, in the Fall 2009. Here he has been working on his newest book U.S. Foreign Policy: An Interpretive History.

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From: Michael Hurley (mihurley@hotmail.com)  This sender is in your contact list.
Sent: Fri 8/12/11 6:41 PM
To: aalbion@gmail.com; Scott Allan (sallan2004@yahoo.com); Chris Kojm (ccakojm1@msn.com); Barbara Grewe (bgrewe@starpower.net); Barbara Grewe (bgrewe@aol.com)

FYI.

mh

From: pdzbn@eservices.virginia.edu
To: mihurley@hotmail.com
Subject: Re: Contact Data
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 17:20:53 +0000

Mike,

Clarke's statements are pretty wild. This also feeds stuff in a new book by someone named Kevin Fenton, who has long been part of the 9/11 internet skeptic community, called "Disconnecting the Dots."

I'm surprised that Clarke said these things. It will lend an entirely different level of credence to some bad charges. This topic was picked over pretty carefully by us, by the Justice IG, and by the CIA IG. What puzzles me about Clarke's statement is that it is hard to believe he would say these things if he had actually read the pages in our report that discuss this topic. We and others pieced together a rather detailed and banal story. Are we to believe that all those details were concocted (by Tom Wilshire?). And no one can deny that the CIA was aware of and posed no objection to the FBI hunt for Mihdhar that began in late August 2001 (after some foolishness over the information sharing/"wall" misunderstandings). The CIA was not responsible for the lackluster quality of that hunt.

Thus, even if Clarke's theory was true, the FBI might have jumped out and found Mihdhar, or Dale Watson might have told Clarke about their hunt for him (what he complains the CIA did not tell him). But in fact, as far as I can remember, the case didn't even get up to the level of Dale Watson's attention. So I can't figure out how Clarke's theory could hang together.
Dear former commissioners,

I should be able to update the page proofs slightly in order to incorporate this good news. But as you will see, few changes will be needed. The argument in the new afterword fits well with this news in its (down)sizing of the core al Qaeda threat and in its discussion of the policies toward Pakistan and Afghanistan. I believe this event will reinforce the President's interest in a more rapid 'transition' in our policy toward Afghanistan, which is also the direction urged in the Afterword.

Abbottabad, where the President said Bin Ladin was hiding, is about 30+ miles NNE of Islamabad. (Remember that KSM was captured in 2003 in Rawalpindi, which is adjacent to Islamabad). It is about a hundred or so miles from the Afghan border. There has been standing authority for a US special operations raid deep into Pakistan for a purpose like this for a long time. Though President Obama was careful to protect the Pakistani government in his remarks, and though we will surely learn more about all this, the President's choice of words seem to indicate a unilateral operation.

pZ
Hi Philip,

I thought you might be interested in this exchange with RBV, who is currently conferencing in beautiful Aspen, evidently Mssrs Black and Berntsen are also participants.

Obviously, in my note to him, I meant to write 1999 (I left out one of the 9's below).

Mike

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Subject: Re: Help!
Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2011 10:26:49 -0500
From: RBen-Veniste@mayerbrown.com
To: mihurley@hotmail.com

Very helpful, Mike. I got into quite a set to with Cofer Black and Gary Bernsten who denied any such authority was provided CIA pre 9/11.

Many thanks,

Richard

Richard Ben-Veniste
Mayer Brown LLP
1999 K Street, N.W.
D: 202-263-3333
F: 202-263-5333
rben-veniste@mayerbrown.com
Afterword: "The Twilight War"

by

Philip Zelikow

12.1 THE ATTACK AS HISTORY

Up to this point, the 2011 edition has followed the text of the original 2004 Report, describing what happened and why. Supplementing the Report are four staff studies, or "monographs" that provide much more detail. These have now all been publicly released.

As the Commission’s Executive Director, I was a kind of CEO for this small,
converted to Islam or brought to ruin. All of its citizens are proper targets for murder.

This, the Commission concluded, ‘is not a position with which Americans can bargain or negotiate.’ With it there is no common ground—not even respect for life—on which to begin a dialogue. It can only be destroyed or utterly isolated.

The ‘global war on terror’ nomenclature has been largely abandoned. It is common now for officials and members of Congress to describe the conflict as a struggle against violent Islamist extremism. [The Obama White House prefers ‘violent extremism.’]

4. The struggle was not between the West and Islam. This was not a clash of civilizations. Instead, ‘the United States finds itself caught up in a clash within a civilization.’ Islamist movements have mainly killed fellow Muslims and preeminently focus on revolutionary change in their home societies. There are differences within the
Atlantic, using liquid explosives carried on board. The attack was disrupted, with the particular help of British security services. (It was after this episode that airplane passengers encountered new constraints on carrying liquids onto their flights.)

Alarmed, during 2008 the U.S. government decided to escalate its then-episodic, thinly veiled campaign of missile attacks against the Pakistani sanctuary. The Obama administration not only maintained that tempo; it greatly intensified it. Hundreds of al-Qaeda adherents and allies in Pakistan have been killed and the rest are hampered. In 2011 the organizational capability of ‘core’ al-Qaeda now seems to be at about the level it had during the mid-1990s, which we described in Chapter 2.

What the Commission called the ‘second enemy,’ the scattered fanatical adherents drawing inspiration from a shared creed, is no longer ‘gathering.’ It has crystallized. Cells of actual and would-be Islamist terrorists have drawn the attention of intelligence and law enforcement agencies on every inhabited continent. The most deadly attack on U.S. soil since 9/11 was actually carried out by a solo fanatic, an Army psychologist inspired by Islamist propaganda to murder 13 people at the base where he worked.

Comment [M3]: Are they all hampered? Would it be more accurate to say ‘many of the rest are hampered.’ Point is that probably not every single one of them is hampered.
Before 9/11 the Commission found a paradox in thinking about the terrorist
danger: "As we said in Chapter 11: 'It is hardest to mount a major effort while a problem
still seems minor: 'Once the danger has fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing
action is easier - but it then may be too late.' Al Qaeda was most vulnerable in the years
before 9/11. But before the catastrophic scale of the potential threat was manifest,
massive action to counter it - like really major U.S. military efforts against the Afghan
sanctuary - seemed so disproportionate as to be nearly inconceivable. This was a
genuine paradox, defying obvious solution."

That pre-9/11 paradox, a paradox of prevention, is gone. A different kind of
paradox has now taken its place: a paradox of adjustment.

The danger of global Islamist terrorism is greatly reduced from what it was on
9/11. The "core" al Qaeda organization in Pakistan is probably down to no more than a
few hundred reliable operatives. Richard Reid, the so-called "shoe bomber," was
overwhelmed by airline employees and passengers as he tried to ignite explosives in his
boots on an airliner preparing to land just before Christmas in 2001. Eight years later, on
The danger of global Islamist terrorism is greatly reduced from what it was on 9/11. The ‘core’ al Qaeda organization in Pakistan is probably down to no more than a few hundred reliable operatives. Richard Reid, the so-called ‘shoe bomber,’ was overwhelmed by airline employees and passengers as he tried to ignite explosives in his boots on an airliner preparing to land just before Christmas in 2001. Eight years later, on Christmas in 2009, trying somehow to attack the United States, the best al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen could do was to repeat the Reid operation, this time with an operative overwhelmed by airline passengers and employees as he tried unsuccessfully to ignite explosives in his underwear. The risk of a catastrophic terrorist attack is significantly lower than it was on 9/11.

But the risk is not zero. An attack could still happen at any time. Like the attempted destruction of an airliner on Christmas Day 2009, there have been other recent attempts — including a 2009 plan to bomb New York City subways (akin to the Madrid
subway bombings of 2004]] and a 2010 attempt to explode a car bomb in New York City’s Times Square. Any attack will be publicized sensationally.

Thus any president who downplays the danger, trying to right-size the enemy, invites humiliation if there is an attack. If there is no attack, the reassurance invites an unwanted dulling of concern. So there are good reasons not to give a reassuring message, one that would get the danger into a more normal proportion. The result in 2011 is the public image of the enemy that we described in 2004: ‘Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything.’ The American people are thus given the picture of an omnipotent, unslayable hydra of destruction. The paradox of adjustment is that efforts to right-size, to normalize, a reduced risk seem . . . too risky.

Yet the reality is that the most serious threats are posed by a relatively tiny number of people, fewer in number and less well organized than the crew organized for production of any one of Hollywood’s larger films. A handful of deluded zealots derive
government will be to manage a process of healthy adjustment to the kinds of risks that are endemic to this generation, developing systemic defenses to systemic threats.]

At the cultural level, a process of adjustment includes adjustment to failures. For there will be failures. The supreme measure of a mature, professional institution—or government—is how it handles failure: its capacity to learn and to be thoughtful, accountable. One reason my staff colleagues and I took a hard view of the poor quality of work exhibited by parts of the government in their initial reconstructions is that what happened on the morning of the 9/11 attacks was that we think this dimension of institutional integrity is, in the long run, so important to the country’s well-being.

In air travel, for example, where societies have adjusted to constant risks of catastrophic failures, maybe the greatest virtues of America’s National Transportation Safety Board are cultural and political. Aside from the particular talents of the Board’s employees, the NTSB represents a habit of thought and earned trust. Something goes horribly wrong; many people lose their lives. A respected institution will examine what
Before 9/11 the United States waited to be attacked and then countered, usually with the tools of law enforcement rarely supplemented by an intelligence operation or a cruise missile strike. Since 9/11, reinforced by congressional enactment of a formal authorization for the use of military force, the United States regards itself as in a continuing state of armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations. The U.S. and its allies attack these enemy combatants at will, killing or capturing them wherever possible, using the instruments appropriate to the circumstances.

The Commission firmly endorsed this policy. Military and intelligence operations were carried out during the remainder of the Bush administration. The Obama administration has intensified these operations. Though controversy about them has subsided, for the moment, within the United States, the policy does put several heavy burdens of moral as well as legal responsibility on the U.S. government, one of them being the identification of who will be regarded as an enemy combatant and thus subject to lethal attack or capture and \textit{indefinite detention}. Though the definition has sometimes
was the last successful operation on that scale, although more locally organized attacks have killed hundreds of people, as with the 2003 bombing of clubs in Bali and the 2004 attacks on subways in Madrid.  

Comment [M11]: Per previous comment, it was Madrid railway stations/trains that were attacked.  

- Sanctuaries are important because they give organizations more ability to plan and perform competent staff work, assembling needed people, money, and materials.

Comment [M12]: Remember the “Sinjar records,” a treasure trove of documents that the U.S. Army captured in Iraq? There was some sort of cover story in Time on this several years ago; records showed that al-Qaeda literally had a personnel office for recruiting Libyans, Egyptians, and others. Would make a good endnote here!  

Comment [M13]: True for organizations as you say, not true for individuals who have popped up in the U.S. in recent years.  

Comment [M14]: Suggest you note, somewhere in the discussion of sanctuaries, the fact that sanctuaries are not just territory but increasingly virtual. That’s where some planning but certainly recruiting, indoctrination, possibly even training is taking place. Need to find the right place to make the points, but I do see a relation to the sanctuary discussion.  

There is more room to recruit and train operatives. Networks of communication are more reliable. One reason the 9/11 attacks succeeded was because the attackers not only had a sanctuary in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also because they could safely stage and train inside the United States. [The United States is now a much more difficult place in which to deploy and prepare unnoticed.]

- But the focus on sanctuaries draws the power of the U.S. and its allies into the wilderness areas of the world. These can include a “no-go” neighborhood in a big city.  

This is truly a strange new way of mapping geopolitical priorities. “In the twentieth century, strategists focused on the world’s great industrial heartlands. “In the twenty-first, the focus is in the opposite direction, toward remote regions and failing states.” The United States should be finding new strategic white space at the limits of its power and influence.  

- Sanctuary is a way to think about where we are and where we are going. It rhymes with failure, irresponsibility, and the limits of the American identity.  

Comment [M15]: It’s interesting how this tie in with the Camp Ashraf photos.  

Comment [M16]: There’s a whole case for the sanctuary as a form of power. One example is the sanctuary in the United States for Afghan and Iraqi insurgents.  

Comment [M17]: Hmmm. The theme of sanctuary is单元化.
This is truly a strange new way of mapping geopolitical priorities. In the twentieth century, strategists focused on the world’s great industrial heartlands. In the twenty-first, the focus is in the opposite direction, toward remote regions and failing states. The United States has had to find ways to extend its reach, straining the limits of its influence. Experience since 2004 has reminded Americans about those limits.

Unfortunately, even as the Commission was issuing its report, Iraq had become another major base for al Qaeda. The Iraq war that began in 2003 was a product of 9/11. Not because the Iraqi government was responsible for the 9/11 attacks, though some U.S. officials retained suspicions about that. But because the 9/11 attacks profoundly changed attitudes in the United States about what sort of risks were tolerable. The 9/11 attacks resolved the paradox of prevention in favor of a greater willingness to countenance early
the last American combat troops will leave the country this year. During its peak years, between 2003 and 2008, the war was a principal recruiting vehicle and killing field for Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda launched attacks against Americans and other foreigners but most of its victims were Arabs, fellow Muslims, on the other side of sectarian warfare and fighting with rivals within the Sunni Muslim community. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is currently a broken force, repudiated even by most Sunni Arabs, though significant remnants still persist—especially in a few northern provinces of Iraq and in the city of Mosul (where enmity against the Kurds is another source of conflict).

While the war lasted, it was a source of consternation for many counterterrorism experts who believed that, at best, the Iraq war diverted attention and resources away from what they considered the main theater of conflict, in Pakistan and Afghanistan. That attention and resources were diverted is undeniable. But the conflict in Pakistan and Afghanistan has its center of gravity in Pakistan. The character of that problem may not be amenable to outside intervention of any kind. And even in Afghanistan, the outside interventions by the United States were originally deformed—more by problems of design...
Before 9/11 Pakistan was on friendly terms with the Taliban regime. Its government had nurtured. It tolerated the Taliban’s foreign friends, including al-Qaeda.
→ On the other hand, the Taliban regime’s remnants maintained a cordial relationship with a Pakistani government that regards them as future allies in securing a suitable Pakistani sphere of influence in Afghanistan. In its fight against al-Qaeda, the Pakistani forces, bloodied and exhausted by their frontier campaigns, signed local peace deals granting respite to al-Qaeda and its allies. And the Pakistani government continued to support the anti-Indian terrorists, organized in a group called Lashkar-e-Taiba, even as they launched a complex international terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008 in which high-trained teams of ten terrorists killed or wounded about 500 people, including several Americans and nationals of other countries.
revolutionaries are well-positioned to exploit the diseases that seem to be bringing Pakistan closer to destabilizing state failures. Politicians speaking out for tolerance are murdered, their murderers even applauded by some authorities. Other government officials are afraid even to attend the funerals. The obvious double-dealing in matters large and small, colored by a sense of deep corruption and selfishness among the Pakistani ruling elite, is more corrosive than ever.

In 2010 the U.S. made a renewed effort to base its aid program on a more durable compact of trust rather than a merely transactional basis, without evident success. The aid program may not be especially efficient or effective, but it is well intentioned and does some good. Yet anti-Americanism is the popular mode among Pakistanis, especially since America routinely carries out missile strikes in their country, a violent
Yemen has become even more important. The attempted airliner bombing of Christmas 2009 was organized in Yemen (using an operative from Nigeria) and several other operations have originated there. The U.S. had long struggled to develop a limited partnership with Yemen’s ruler, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to carry out more effective military and intelligence operations. In 2011, Saleh was overthrown by domestic opponents (not al-Qaeda).

All three of these situations—Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen—illustrate a more general strategic issue. In its effort to get at al-Qaeda and its allies, attacking them and denying them a sanctuary, the U.S. and its allies will forge working relationships with available local authorities. But the U.S. cannot, and should not, rely on a strategic concept that expects massive interventions of American ground forces to take on the job of directly pacifying and policing such areas of the world. Aside from issues of cost—human and financial—and feasibility, the apparent intrusion of U.S. forces on the ground...
on this board. As of mid-2011 only two of the five slots have nominees. Even if confirmed, they would not be able to make up a quorum.

→ Perhaps the White House regards the new Board as an ill-designed addition to an already unwieldy confederation of agencies. If so, the President and his aides should just recreate a suitable board of a kind they prefer, even the Bush administration model. Whatever form the Board takes, the Commission’s original concern has as much merit now as it did in 2004, to vest some more independent entity with broad responsibility to judge how various practices may impact the liberty of Americans.

→ The Commission was also very concerned with the quality of emergency response if defenses fail. Its recommendations focused mainly on trained reliance on an [Incident Command System], on needed improvements in the technology of emergency communications, and on private sector preparedness. Significant progress has been made. The Department of Homeland Security has developed a set of guidelines in its...
at home and overseas for effective joint action.

→ Immediately after the Commission issued its report in July 2004, Congress interrupted its traditional summer recess to hold hearings on its recommendations. Not waiting, President Bush began adopting many of its recommendations by executive order. And the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was passed and signed into law by the end of the year. This was a remarkable response. The law established the NCTC and placed it under the authority of the new Director of National Intelligence.

→ The NCTC was, and is, an unusual experiment in the organization of American governance. Perhaps the greatest paradox of the contemporary federal government, one that frequently puzzles Americans and foreigners alike, can be boiled down to this: strong institutions, weak government. The individual departments and agencies are well developed; they have big buildings, the administrative capacities to perform remarkable tasks, schools to train their people, organizational cultures and subcultures, and constituents in the public and in Congress. But somehow the sum is often much less than the parts.
The stated example was the flowering of the Armed Forces' Joint Staff (incarnated in Washington as part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the field as the joint staff of the major combatant commands), which — after decades of quarrels and tugs of war — began displaying its potential capabilities for joint analysis (J-2) and joint planning (J-3) by the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even some of the more serious planning failures, like those associated with the Iraq war in 2002-03, were less a condemnation of the Joint Staff model than a reminder of the costs of passing or overriding it. The unstated example was Britain's counterterrorism agency, the security service generally known as MI-5. The MI-5 model is sometimes misrepresented, misleadingly, as a model for handling domestic intelligence. In fact MI-5 bridges the foreign-domestic divide. It is organized functionally to track the terrorist enemy worldwide.

Both the Joint Staff and MI-5 are also interesting because they are more involved in conducting the orchestra, not playing the instruments. Both entities are relatively autonomous, relatively immune from political pressure, and relatively free to pursue their missions as they see fit.
Neither the President nor any other national policymaker sees much of the yield from all this collection hardware that consumes most of the money and people. Much is devoted for field operators, including targeters of terrorists and more stationary objects, and much of it goes for military priorities—for instance in exhaustively collecting on and cataloguing foreign military dispositions and weapons systems development. Ongoing wars create an unquenchable thirst for more data. Every platoon leader in Afghanistan would like to have his own dedicated [UAV] providing real-time images of the rooftops and alleys in his area of operations, complete with analysts and his own Pashto-speaking set of intelligence operators and interpreters. And, at times, during given operations, the platoon leader has gotten his wish.
The Commission recommended, and Congress created, a new Director of National Intelligence. There were basically three options. First was to keep the old loose confederation under the titular supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence who in addition to jawboning the other agencies (some quite large—the National Security Agency is larger than the CIA), also had to run the CIA itself, and be the analyst in chief for busy presidents. Second was to adopt the structure of a federation, retaining the day-to-day autonomy of all the agencies but putting them under stronger central authority. Third was to consolidate most of the agencies into a new federal department, a Department of Intelligence. In the creation of the Department of Defense the federation model was tried first, from 1947 to 1949, and then was replaced by the single department...
the DNI help manage effective sharing of needed information sharing across the
collection of agencies? These are just illustrations. To these four questions the answers
in 2007 and 2008 were showing promise. After that the picture has been less
encouraging.

→ The CIA, as an institution, still feels demoted by the creation of the DNI. The
CIA always felt that it belonged directly to the President. The resentments show up in
complaints about whether the DNI does too much foreign travel and liaison, or does he
spend too much time on briefing the President at the expense of his core management jobs,
and that he has added a needless layer of bureaucracy. But these are really problems that
the President needs to manage in the thoughtful selection of the personalities to inhabit
the two key jobs — DNI and D/CLA — to be sure they can find the right balance.

→ That relationship is especially important because in counterterrorism, as on other
subjects, the intelligence establishment will be most effective when it is plugged tightly
into policy and operations. Indeed, that is part of the story behind one of the finest
America’s leaders should not expect infallible predictive powers. They are entitled to rely on professional attention to craft, and to the highest standards of the craft. The intelligence agencies employ teams of professionals backed by unique and expensive resources, tools, and legal authorities. Above all, that is their comparative advantage.

The core-9/11 problem was not the mere failure to provide tactical warning of the attack. In addition to certain specific operational failures in case management, the real problem was the intelligence establishment’s failure to apply its own best practices for how to work problems of warning, a craft laboriously honed over 60 years of experience, yet not applied to the enemy that everyone knew was most likely to attack the United States. Similarly, the core indictment offered by the commission that examined the intelligence community’s analysis of Iraqi WMD capabilities was the failure to apply the best practices that were already developed and understood within the institutions.

The forecasting process can be more important than getting a forecast. The process of working the problem identifies the key warning indicators, debates, odd-
The contract can be stated in this way: ... We, on the outside, do not know what will go on in every surveillance operation, alley fight, precinct house, or desert compound.

We will grant extraordinary powers to thousands of people we do not know, people who will use these powers in situations we often will not be aware of or understand. So we have to be able to trust your organization and its professionals. To earn that trust you must convince outsiders that your organization will try hard to stay within lines the American people understand and accept. We need to see that you train people to respect those bright lines, respect them under terrible stress. We expect that abuses will be rare and will be dealt with in a way that retains our trust.

Such a social contract is an essential foundation to granting intelligence agencies with thousands of employees, conducting many operations around the world, extraordinary powers to intercept communications, break laws in other countries, and...
program, are operated by the CIA. The CIA has no comparative advantage for the organization and fielding of military forces. It plays this role to take advantage of special legal authorities. The authorities should be revised to follow function rather than the other way around, including provisions to facilitate joint CIA-military operations. The director of the CIA should not remain a surrogate combatant commander (one with no Joint Staff or Secretary of Defense). Nor, by the way, should the military feel obliged to build its own clandestine spy service.

→ The Commission also recommended that the overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence should be disclosed to the American people. Congress finally mandated this disclosure in 2007. In 2010 the complementary sums being spent in the military intelligence budget program began to be disclosed as well.

12.8 → UNITY OF EFFORT IN INFORMATION AND OVERSIGHT

The Commission’s 2004 Report placed great importance on doing a better job of sharing information. ‘In the 9/11 story, for example, we sometimes see examples of information
San Diego had communicated its concerns about Hasan to the Washington JTTF, where Hasan was then stationed, where a Defense Department employee detailed to that JTTF had looked into them and found insufficient ground for a more intensive investigation. The San Diego office thought this was not good enough, but the issue went away, until Hasan opened fire.

Like the Christmas Day 2009 airline bombing attempt, the Hasan case shows that the mere sharing of information is not good enough. Analysis needs to be effectively pooled. In the Hasan case the FBI Washington headquarters never got involved; neither did the NCTC. Misunderstandings between the JTTFs were not really resolved. The FBI’s own intelligence analysts in its local Field Intelligence Group were not consulted. The old, decentralized FBI culture of independent field offices prevailed. But, as one:
The young Department of Homeland Security is just beginning to develop some of the habits of a more mature institution—to develop doctrines, recruit and train professionals, and line up the equipment and capabilities they will need. Like the regular Department of Defense, theirs is a mission that will, in the best case, be well-exercised and rarely used. But in the 21st century world, as “unconventional” threats become conventional, the Department of Homeland Security may become a focal point for the way the U.S. government defends its citizens’ ways of life from systemic threats.

Before the Commission closed its doors in August 2004, my colleagues and I considered four of these studies, or “monographs,” in shape for public release. After declassification they were made public as follows:

(1) “9/11 and Terrorist Travel” (released in August 2004); at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf;