Christopher A. Kojm

BOSCH PUBLIC POLICY FELLOW - CLASS OF SPRING 2001

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

American Academy Project: European Perceptions and Responses, and Implications for American Policy

Current Location: Washington, DC

BIOGRAPHY

Christopher Kojm is Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, a post he assumed in 2009.

Kojm received an AB from Harvard College in 1977 and an MA from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University in 1979. From 1979 to 1984 he was a senior editor at the Foreign Policy Association in New York City, and from 1984 to 1998 he was a staff member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee under Lee H. Hamilton, the ranking member, then chairman of the committee. Kojm was Deputy Director of the National Intelligence Council from 1998 to 2001.
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Exclusively for: | CHRISTOPHER KOJM

Bank of America

Online Banking Alert
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Remember: Always look for your SiteKey® before entering your Passcode.

To: CHRISTOPHER KOJM
Account: CUSTOM SAVINGS ending in 6669
Date: 05/21/2013

The most recent statement for your account is now available to view online.

View your statement online today. For your protection, you will be asked to enter your Online ID and Passcode.
Hi Chris,

Lee and Tom spoke with Philip this morning; Lee called right after to fill me in.

Lee used points from the memo I drafted yesterday. (I copied you.)

Lee called it a "good conversation." Philip accepted each of the points Lee made.

With respect to the paras on Iraq, Philip said he's not sure they're very important. He said he'd revise or get rid of them.

He agreed to send the revised version to all commissioners for their review.

He also said that he would put up front in the text that the Afterword represents his views.

Lee found the exchange productive and believes this is now on a better track.

My own view is that the successive drafts have gotten somewhat better. The most important thing is that we now have a process in place and all Commissioners will have a chance to influence the end product.

Best,

Mike
thanks, will pass that on

Mike

>>> <LBCalvert@aol.com> 3/13/2011 10:19 AM >>>
Mike: The name of our contact is Matt Fulgham. The records are maintained by the Legislative Center at Archives and our contact is Matt Fulgham (202 357-5193). Dianna

In a message dated 3/10/2011 11:10:33 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, cakojm1@msn.com writes:

Mike -- He should be in touch with Legislative Affairs at the National Archives. I am forgetting the name of our POC there, but the Commission's own documents person, the highly capable and wonderful Dianna Campagna, is copied on this note.

Best, Chris

Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2011 09:32:22 -0500
From: mike.vandusen@wilsoncenter.org
To: cakojm1@msn.com
Subject: query for a scholar here

Rick Whittle, a former reporter whom you might remember, is here researching for a book he is writing on the advent and public policy implications of weaponized UAVs.

Rick wanted to know about where the documents backing up the 9-11 Commission report are located and whether they are accessible. Can I put him in touch with someone, some place? He has seen several references to some of the documents.

thanks
From: deborahn@dni.gov
Sent: Tue 12/22/09 7:32 PM
To: cakojm1@msn.com; CHRISKZ@dni.gov

Chris,

Here's the info on new phone line for SCIF

The phone or cable company has to bring the new line to the OUTSIDE of the house. You shouldn't have to be there for this. You'll need to pay for the cost & then be reimbursed.

SCIF electronics (Rick Jenkins 703-263-1605) can bring it from outside into the house. New line will be used for phone, fax & monitor alarm system. This will eliminate problems with your home phone. Rick's group did some of the initial work. He's pretty sure you have a 4 pair cable, so this would only take about 2 hrs to do the work. Someone would need to be at home.

Deb Nizer

Executive Assistant to Chairman, National Intelligence Council

703-482-6724

deborahn@dni.gov
Thank you

From: Barack Obama (info@2013pic.org)
Sent: Mon 1/21/13 5:38 PM
To: Christopher Kojm (cakojm1@msn.com)

Friend --

I just renewed my oath of office to serve as your president for four more years.

Thank you for making this possible. It’s an honor to be your president.

Now it’s time to finish what we started -- let’s get going.

Barack
Christopher Kojm  9/05/12  Photos

To: Annette Prand

From: Christopher Kojm (cakojm1@msn.com)
Sent: Thu 9/05/12 1:55 AM
To: Annette Prand (drannetteprand@lambchambers.co.uk)

Annette -- My flight gets in about 10:30 and my hotel is near Marble Arch. How about we try to meet for a late lunch at 1:30? My blackberry # is 703-424-3844. Just pick a place and let me know where to meet you.

best, Chris

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Subject: Re: Visit to London
From: drannetteprand@lambchambers.co.uk
Date: Sun, 26 Aug 2012 21:46:50 +0100
To: cakojm1@msn.com

Sounds like a plan Chris. Let's do lunch on that Sunday. What part of town are you staying in? Will then think of a suitable place to meet.

A

Sent from my iPhone

On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:29, "Christopher Kojm" <cakojm1@msn.com> wrote:

    Annette -- Not sure exactly when my flight gets in but I am sure I could meet you by Noon or so on Sunday.

    best, Chris
Dr Annette Prand
Called 1995

Practice groups

Commercial Property

Education

MA Philosophy and Law, Cambridge University
Dr. iur., European Law, Tubingen University, Germany
The Inner Temple Pegasus Scholarship to San Francisco 2000

Practice

Advisory and court work in all areas of civil law, in particular commercial and property work

Experience

Experience in all areas in which Chambers specialises, in particular contractual and commercial disputes, company law and property disputes including landlord and tenant. In addition advising in...
July 19, 2010
Leslie McAdoo, Esq.
McAdoo Gordon & Associates, P.C.
1140 19th St. NW
Suite 602
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Ms. McAdoo,

I am pleased to write on behalf of Elana Broitman’s application for a U.S. Government security clearance. I have had the opportunity to review the Statement of Reasons raising a concern of foreign influence in her case. I believe Elana has taken steps, and is prepared to take other reasonable steps, to demonstrate her loyalty to the United States and her trustworthiness with classified information.

My current office and title is Chairman, National Intelligence Council, and I have held this position for just over a year. I hold a TS/SCI clearance, and am read into numerous compartments necessary for the conduct of this office. Previously I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (1998–2003), where I also held a TS/SCI clearance. I have held security clearances since 1984.

I have known Ms. Elana Broitman since 1993, when I participated in hiring her for the position of Deputy Counsel of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. Elana was promoted to Minority Chief Counsel in 1998, and at the end of that year both she and I left the Committee when Ranking Member Hamilton retired from the Congress.

As Deputy Director of the staff under Mr. Hamilton, I participated day-to-day in supervising and reviewing her work. Elana’s work was superb in every respect, and she devoted great energy and commitment to fulfillment of her assignments. She held a SECRET level clearance at that time, and I never had reason to question her loyalty to the United States government or her trustworthiness. She closely followed rules for the safe and responsible handling of classified materials. Her Ukrainian birth and background made no difference in her conduct. In fact, she was a better employee of the Foreign Affairs Committee because of her international background and
From the standpoint of the Intelligence Community, the most important lesson from 9/11 to this very day is the importance of information sharing. The 9/11 Commission identified 10 key instances where the sharing of intelligence between agencies could have made a critically important difference in disrupting the 9/11 plot. Its recommendations were aimed at improving unity of effort across the Intelligence Community and across the US government, particularly the sharing of all terrorist-related information.

Since that time, the culture of the Intelligence Community has changed in significant and positive ways. Promotion to senior assignments now depends on joint duty – working in a position outside one’s home agency, and learning how to make the whole equal more than the sum of its parts. As Director of National Intelligence has said, no one had to order agencies to work together in the effort leading up to the May 1st raid in Abbottabad. The mission required close collaboration among many partners, and it happened seamlessly.

While information sharing has improved dramatically since 9/11, important information in many cases is still not shared in a manner so that all who work in a pertinent community of interest can collaborate in addressing common problems. The wikileaks episode further complicates the challenge of information sharing: how do we share effectively, and yet minimize the risk of massive and damaging unauthorized disclosures? The sense of mission and purpose in the Intelligence Community is clear. The unfinished work of information sharing, however, still remains before us.
Vaughn Bishop is off to an outstanding start as Vice Chair of the NIC.

First, we have established a close and trusting relationship. There is no question on which I do not seek his perspective and input. He has deep and extensive knowledge of the DI, and strong relationships with the DO. His experience benefits the NIC and complements my own background and abilities. He has my total confidence.

Second, Vaughn manages the NIC effectively. He is a top-notch reviewer and superbly critiques drafts and chairs review panels. He took the lead in streamlining NIC product lines, a step greeted with enthusiasm by the DNI. He also established more effective ties with the PDB staff. For example, he negotiated the nature of NIO review of PDB drafts, and established a channel for more timely NIO communication to PDB staff on evolving policy issues. Both steps contribute to a more relevant and community-integrated PDB.

Third, Vaughn correctly notes that he has taken a “proactive and positive role in building and maintaining NIC morale during an uncertain period of reorganization.” He has been a rock of stability and a source of wise counsel, keeping the NIC focused on a positive, constructive course. When I have faltered, he has gently nudged me back to the path that he and I agree the NIC must pursue on behalf of mission success. In addition, he has been a stalwart and articulate defender of NIC perspectives in Tiger Team reorganization meetings.

Fourth, no discussion of Vaughn’s contribution is complete without mention of his role as the IC representative on the Sudan Small Group, formed at the specific direction of the President and chaired by the Deputy National Security advisor. He has briefed the President on Sudan – winning high praise from the DNI and the DNI/II – and has been the point person for community production, including a forthcoming Special NIE on Khartoum’s reaction to secession by southern Sudan. The DNI/II even shared one of his carefully argued e-mails directly with the President. Because of his central role on this issue rising so quickly on the President’s agenda, he has been asked to serve once again as the Africa NIO and also as the Africa NIM.
Status of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Unity of Command

The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that even the most robust emergency response capabilities can be overwhelmed if an attack is large enough. Teamwork, collaboration, and cooperation at an incident site are critical to a successful response. We therefore recommended that emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS).

Our government has made progress on this. DHS incorporated ICS and the National Response Framework into the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides nationwide guidance to clarify the roles of federal, state and local governments, NGOs, and the private sector in protecting against, responding to and recovering from, disasters. It has trained first responders throughout the country in the operation of NIMS.

NIMS was implemented during last year’s *British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon* oil spill. Its goal was to provide a unified, coordinated response under the leadership of DHS, with the Coast Guard as lead agency, and with BP as the responsible party. It divided the response into four main categories of effort: command, planning, operations and logistics. Each team was able to grow rapidly as more people arrived to respond to the spill. The management of the disaster was not without flaws—in particular it needed to be more open to local expertise and input—but in general it was an improvement over the often-fragmented approaches taken in response to previous disasters.

Radio Spectrum

The inability of first responders to communicate with each other was a critical
element at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Pennsylvania crash sites. Compatible and adequate communications systems were lacking and this resulted in needless loss of life. To remedy this, the Commission recommended Congress should enact legislation providing for the expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes.

To date, this recommendation has not been accomplished. This is unacceptable, because quite literally lives are at stake. The political fight has been over whether to allocate the D block directly to public safety or auction it off to wireless bidders who would then be required to pay for a nationwide public safety communications network.

The overwhelming majority of our nation’s police chiefs and first responders support the allocation of 10 MHz of radio spectrum—the D block—to the existing and adjacent 10 MHz of spectrum already allocated to public safety. Public safety agencies would be able to use the D block spectrum to build a nationwide interoperable broadband spectrum, allowing diverse agencies to communicate with each other, and supporting mission critical voice, video, text, and other data transmissions.

In his State of the Union address, President Obama called for allocating the D block spectrum to public safety. He also supports allocating $7 billion in federal funding to support a build out of the network to ensure it reaches cash-strapped localities, especially rural communities.

We support the allocation of the D-block spectrum to public safety. We have acted as though these urgent matters can be dealt with at a leisurely pace. We don’t know when the next attack or disaster might occur and we need to be prepared for it. We urge the Congress to give this legislation a high priority.
Transportation Security

In the field of transportation security, 9/11 Commission objectives have been significantly advanced over the past two years in the areas of airline passenger pre-screening – with full implementation of Secure Flight fulfilling our recommendation that TSA take over from the airlines the administration of the “no fly” and “automatic selectee” lists – and in checkpoint explosives detection and checked bag in-line screening – where additional funding, especially through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, has lead to a major increase in the deployment of more advanced screening equipment.

The Department of Homeland Security has improved international sharing of flight information substantially. The U.S. and the European Union now share information about passengers as soon as tickets are purchased, rather than after the plane has taken off, as was the case only a few years ago. This and other enhanced international cooperation should produce major gains in air and maritime cargo security.

On the other hand, progress has continued to be limited in setting priorities, defining roles and establishing a budget plan for transportation security; GAO continues to identify serious holes in virtually every security layer; and the absence of a functioning Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is hindering security efforts across a wide range of important undertakings.

Border Security

Before 9/11, there was little concept that borders and national security were related. Since 9/11 and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the primary mission of our border security apparatus has been to prevent and intercept terrorist travel.
Our border security recommendations, while taken seriously by both Congress and the Executive Branch, have not been fully implemented. This is regrettable because there is an indisputable nexus between terrorist operations and terrorist travel. In the near decade since 911, foreign born terrorists have continued to exploit our border vulnerabilities to gain access to the United States, study here, overstay their length of stays, shop visas at various consular offices, gain citizenship, and even attempt to use – in the case of the 2009 Christmas Day bomber – travel itself as a weapon.

**Terrorist Travel Intelligence**

We recommended that the “United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.” Unless a foreign terrorist chooses anonymous entry between our ports of entry on our physical borders, the only way for terrorists to move across international borders is to use our legal immigration system to embed, plan, train, and carry out their operations. Every time terrorists travel they make themselves vulnerable to detection and interdiction. Yet for a variety of reasons, our system is missing opportunities to prevent terrorist travel aimed directly at U.S. shores. Examples include overriding a denied visa, issuing a visa, and then failing to revoke the visa issued to Nigerian would-be Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab; detect and deport visa over-stayers such as the 2009 Dallas unsuccessful Saudi bomber Hosam Smadi; and deny citizenship to Pakistani-born attempted Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad.

The U.S. government has the legal authority and infrastructure to secure against terrorist travel in a manner it did not prior to 9/11. Yet what is strikingly lacking is
that the latest terrorist attempts against the U.S. had even more intelligence attached to them to stop the plots earlier than the U.S. Government had on the 9/11 hijackers. Yet, with all the improvements, none of these events were prevented by a more robust border system. That is unacceptable. Instead, we need a better, more streamlined terrorist watchlisting capability; a priority and willingness to revoke visas; better search, analysis, dissemination and connection between known intelligence and travel authorities; and person-centric travel files that enable a one-stop-shop for analyzing intelligence against prior encounters with the U.S. immigration system. Person-centric immigration data would highlight indicators of terrorist travel in much the same manner that we have recommended for analysis of travel documents that contain physical terrorist indicators.

**Biometric Entry-Exit Screening System**

There are a handful of immigration programs that are an undeniable success, including the biometric entry system known as US–VISIT. The system checks all those applying for entry at air, land and sea ports of entry to assure the person that is applying for entry into the U.S. is the same person that applied for the visa (if a visa-holder); logs in entry with a biometric photograph and takes ten fingerprints, then querying that data against law enforcement information, watch lists and Interpol terrorist Red Notices. Such analysis prior to entry enables US–VISIT to prevent identity theft and use of fraudulent documents, as well as prevents entry of criminals and immigration violators, including terrorists.
US-VISIT is also used by the Department of State to determine visa eligibility; Immigration and Customs Enforcement to determine overstays; the U.S. Coast Guard to identify, apprehend and prosecute alien smugglers and migrants at sea with mobile devices; by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to establish identities of those applying for immigration benefits; the Department of Justice and state and local law enforcement on arrested foreign born nationals to verify immigration records; and the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community to help identify known or suspected terrorists, including matching against latent fingerprints collected from terrorist safe houses. In addition, US-VISIT supports intelligence and law enforcement functions across the board, and is extremely active in supporting the security of global travel by helping countries create biometric identification immigration systems.

However, despite the outstanding work of US-VISIT to go beyond its original mandate of simply supporting the visa and application to the U.S. during the admission process, there still is no exit system in place. We still rely on the airlines for air exit, and despite the success of two pilot programs to establish a biometric exit conducted in the summer of 2009, we continue to lack an operational framework for exit. As important as it is to know when foreign nationals arrive, it is also important to know when they leave. It does not appear that an exit system is a priority for the current Administration. It should be one. If our law enforcement and intelligence community had known for certain in August and September of 2001 that 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar had not left the U.S. because there was no exit data for them, they likely would not have given up
searching for them so easily when a watch list notice was issued for them in August 2001.

Standardize Secure Identifications

Eighteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers obtained 30 state-issued IDs amongst them that enabled them to more easily board planes on the morning of 9/11. Due to the ease with which fraud was used to obtain legitimate IDs that helped the hijackers embed and assimilate in the U.S. for the purpose of carrying out a terrorist act, we recommended that “The federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as driver’s licenses.”

The REAL ID Act (PL-103) established these standards by statute. In 2008, detailed regulations were issued setting standards and benchmarks for driver license issuance. While nearly one-third of the states have complied with the first tier of benchmarks—which include the tough identity verification requirements we are most concerned about—the deadlines for compliance have been pushed back twice to May 2011, and a recent announcement pushed back compliance again until January 2013, absolving this Administration from encouraging compliance with the statute, which in fact the Secretary of Homeland Security actively tried to repeal in 2008.

In addition, there are still no birth certificate regulations in place as required under PL 108-458, despite having been drafted in 2005. Why does this remain important? The February 23, 2011 Criminal Complaint of Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari states that Saudi national Aldawari not only used the student visa process to enter the U.S. with the intent to commit jihad against various high-impact targets, he also obtained a forged birth certificate, applied for a U.S. passport and driver’s license, traveled to New York, rented cars via the internet (using different driver’s licenses
for each rental), and prepared bombs for remote detonation.

As we stated in the our Final Report, terrorists rely heavily on abusing legitimate border and ID systems to enter and remain in the U.S. Without a standardized birth record system in place nationwide, Aldawsari could very well have been successful in obtaining legitimate U.S. passports and multiple driver licenses, especially since REAL ID is also only partially implemented. However, even without regulations in place, a small nonprofit known as the Electronic Verification of Vital Events has been working on behalf of the U.S. government to install and standardize vital records (both birth and death records) across the nation since 2005 even without regulations. Today, 28 states are connected to this system which provides matching and interoperability between the states and the U.S. government. All Social Security and passport offices around the nation are checking these 28 states’ birth records against applicant-supplied data now, substantially reducing fraud and containing terrorist mobility at a federal level. However, digitized birth records are still not being used by driver license issuing authorities, and some large states are resisting implementation. Without encouragement from the U.S. government, the standardization process could languish and terrorists like Aldawsari would be successful.

The Intelligence Community
DNI
FBI
CIA – drones. We don’t have transparency into how these are working. Intelligence reforms.
Information Sharing – 72 state and local fusion centers, dhs funded, 340 million since 2004
Civil Liberties and Executive Power
The 9/11 Commission recommended the creation of a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to look across the government at the actions we are taking to protect ourselves to ensure that privacy and liberty concerns are considered. Congress enacted this recommendation. We commend the dedicated work of the privacy officers in each of the respective agencies with national security responsibilities; they are doing their work with professionalism. In particular, the assessment statements they have authored on the impact on civil liberties of policies, regulations, and directives issued by their respective departments have been strong. But the government-wide board has been a disappointment. In fact, for more than two years it has been dormant. The Obama administration recently nominated two members for the Board but they have not yet been confirmed and the Board has not met.

If we were issuing grades, the implementation of this recommendation would receive a failing mark. We urge the Administration and Congress to address this failure in a speedy fashion. There are an array of security-related policies and measures, which have raised significant privacy and liberty concerns; these must be evaluated and their effects on core values balanced against the security objectives they advance.

Congressional and Administrative Reform
Nonproliferation
Our Commission was deeply alarmed by Osama bin Laden’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in the late 1990s. We said, “the greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.” We
recommended that “Preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort—by strengthening counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.”

President George Bush concurred that “the biggest threat facing this country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist network.” President Obama shares this assessment saying that “the prospect of nuclear terrorism is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.”

There are currently nearly 2000 tons of highly enriched uranium in dozens of countries around the world, enough to make 60,000 nuclear weapons. Given this threat, in April 2010 President Obama hosted a Nuclear Security Summit of 47 nations. The Summit focused on the need to intercept trafficking in nuclear materials, enhance international cooperation and improve the security of stockpiles. The Obama administration announced a new initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials by 2013. In FY 2010 the administration asked for significant funding increases for all nonproliferation programs.

Congress has not yet approved the FY 2011 budget. There are proposals to slash the National Nuclear Security Administration’s budget for nonproliferation by as much as 22 percent. We must guard against any underfunding of this highest priority security need.

*Develop Coalition Standards for Terrorist Detention*

We recommended that the “United States should engage its friends to develop a common coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists” and that new principles might draw upon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
Within days of his inauguration, President Obama signed a series of executive orders on the treatment of detainees and barring the CIA from using any interrogation methods not already authorized in the U.S. Army Field Manual. This ended CIA’s authority to use harsh interrogation methods. The Administration is still grappling with how to close the Guantanamo prison facilities.

By bringing the U.S. into compliance with the Geneva Conventions and with international and customary law on the treatment of prisoners, the executive orders have substantially fulfilled our recommendation. Looking forward, however, we are concerned that the issue of how prisoners are to be treated has become so highly political, with rancor breaking out along party lines, giving rise to the possibility that the recommendation and executive orders could be reversed under a future administration.

This, we believe, is not good for the country or to our standing in the world. Showing that bipartisan agreement is possible, and intending to reaffirm our values, the five Republicans and five Democrats on the Commission unanimously agreed on this recommendation, believing our country’s emphasis on the rule of law and long tradition of advocacy of human rights and humane treatment demanded it. In our strong view, it would be a shame if there were ever retrenchment.
MEMORANDUM
To:      Lee Hamilton
From:    Stephanie Kaplan
Re:      Report Afterword

Per your request, below please find an analysis of the proposed afterword and recommendations for moving forward.

Summary
If an afterword is attached to the Commission report, it effectively becomes a Commission document. The average reader will assume that the afterword is authorized by the Commission, regardless of any bylines, caveats, or footnotes to the contrary. As written, the afterword represents a departure from the original report in terms of scope, style, and substance. In particular, its treatment of some controversial issues is unbalanced, risking a public split of the Commission on the eve of the tenth anniversary. Before the publication process proceeds any further, the afterword should be revised and circulated to all of the Commissioners for comment.

General Concerns
Scope Exceeds the Mandate. The stated purpose of the chapter is to "carry the story forward to 2011." This amounts to a history of U.S. foreign and security policy since September 20, 2001. Such an expansive task might be better suited for a separate article or book. Some of this material falls outside the Commission's mandate. It also tackles some of the controversial issues that the Commission tried to avoid, particularly the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The chapter should focus tightly on reviewing the status of the report's historical narrative and recommendations. Many people will expect the afterword to revisit the 9/11 story and defend, update, or revise it as appropriate. The discussion of the historical narrative (pp. 3–6) comes across as somewhat cursory, and more in-depth assessment might better serve the Commission's legacy. Furthermore, the status of the recommendations could also be represented more precisely and concisely, in a manner reminiscent of the Chair and Vice
Chair's recent testimony.

**Style and Substance are Unbalanced.** The afterword not only strays beyond the Commission's mandate, but it also parts ways with the original report in terms of voice. At times, it reads like an opinion piece or personal memoir. And in some instances, particularly with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan, it treats divisive issues in summary fashion and does not adequately air alternative viewpoints. This approach is inconsistent with the tone of the report that has served the Commission so well.

Ø *An example of this can be seen in Section 12.3.* The discussion of the Iraq War (on pp. 15–16)—from rationale to conduct, costs to consequences—is perhaps the most problematic in this regard. Substantively, the afterword seems to place a disproportionately positive focus on the Bush administration. In contrast, there seems to be limited recognition of new policy initiatives pursued by the Obama administration.

Ø *An example of this can be seen in Section 12.4.* This section skillfully surveys some of the recent developments in the Arab world. It could use some additional analysis about how the Arab spring specifically refutes the al Qaeda narrative. But, to the extent it mentions U.S. policy, it almost exclusively focuses on the previous administration's speeches and policies. There is virtually no mention of the Obama administration's innovative programming efforts in this area, including but not limited to establishing a new forum for multilateral engagement, countering violent extremism, building partner capacity, and online counterpropaganda.

To the extent that Obama policies are mentioned, they are often characterized as an "extension" or "intensification" of Bush policies. A limited number of new developments are mentioned with little to no supporting explanation, which at times comes across as tepid at best.

**Recommendation**

Circulate revised version of chapter to all ten Commissioners for review. Establish timeline and process for Commissioner input. Incorporate Commissioner comments. Ensure that the