Ed Gresser joined PPI as Director of the Project on Trade and Global Markets in February, 2001, after a 10-year career in the U.S. Congress and the Clinton Administration.


Mr. Gresser's major research focuses have included economic relations between the west and the Muslim world, East Asian integration and American trade relations with China, the U.S. tariff system and its effects on low-income families and least-developed countries, as well as inter-American relations, competitiveness and worker adjustment, trends in American manufacturing, international finance and the relationship between trade, labor and environmental issues.

Before joining PPI, Mr. Gresser served as Policy Advisor to U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky. In this position, from April 1998 through the end of the Clinton Administration, he was the USTR’s principal policy advisor, speechwriter and research aide.
Sidney Rittenberg (Chinese: 李敦白; pinyin: Lǐ Dūn bái, born August 14, 1921) is an American journalist, scholar, and Chinese linguist who lived in China from 1944 to 1979. He worked closely with People's Republic of China (PRC) founder Mao Zedong, military leader Zhu De, statesman Zhou Enlai, and other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the war, and was with these central Communist leaders at Yan'an. He witnessed first-hand much of what occurred at upper levels of the CCP and knew many of its leaders personally. Later, he was imprisoned in solitary confinement, twice, for a total of 18 years. He was the first American citizen to join the CCP.

Rittenberg's connections and experience have enabled him to run a successful consultancy business representing some of the world's biggest brands, such as Intel, Levi Strauss, Microsoft, Hughes Aircraft and Teledesic.

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1 Early life
2 Yan'an
3 Interpreting for Mac
4 First imprisonment
5 Cultural Revolution
6 Second imprisonment
7 Present day
8 See also
Sebastian Veg

Researcher and Director, CEFC.

Research Professor (directeur d'études), EHESS, Paris (China Centre and Centre for Research on Arts and Language).

Honorary Assistant Professor, HKU Dept of Comparative Literature.

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Blogging on The China Beat (until 2012); on The China Story (since 2013).

- Research Topics

  Literature and politics in 20th century China, in particular the connection between literature, public space, and democracy; literature and political philosophy;

  Intellectual history of 20th century China, in particular of the May Fourth and “new culture” movement, Lu Xun and Republican literature;

  Contemporary Chinese fiction (literature, cinema) and politics (censorship, market pressure), intellectuals and cultural policy, cultural heritage, cultural rights.
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Chinese Government Institutionalizes People Against Their Will: Chinese Human-Rights Defenders

Every year, thousands of healthy Chinese are forcibly locked up and ‘treated’ in mental institutions, according to a new report by the Chinese Human Rights Defenders.
The EU has considerable diplomatic authority and activities, as it conducts more or less all negotiations at the WTO, as well as bilateral trade negotiations such as FTAs, on behalf of the 28 EU member states. Often its WTO negotiating positions are complementary to American goals, but sometimes – civil aircraft subsidy, agriculture, etc. - there are considerable divergences. There is also quite a lot of inherent American interest the progress of EU expansion to Central and Eastern Europe, and to Turkey. This interest is often very supportive, but the expansion negotiations often also touch on pretty important existing American relationships.
Turkey. This interest is often very supportive, but the expansion negotiations often also touch on pretty important existing American relationships.

When the U.S. agencies or administration say we aren't involved in commercial espionage, I take their meaning to be that they are not attempting to take company trade secrets or intellectual property and hand it over to U.S.-based companies, not that commercial diplomacy, trade negotiations, and export promotion policies (esp. if they include bribery) are per se beyond the bounds of intelligence.

On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 10:42 PM, Sebastian Veg <vegsebastian@gmail.com> wrote:

> Spying on EU institutions has generally been surmised to be for commercial purposes, as the EU has no military/defense/diplomatic activities. > See for ex the recent Spiegel article:
Le 17 juil. 2013 à 06:37, Sidney Rittenberg a écrit :

I have to accept that you may be right, Chris, since I cannot locate the story on which I based my comment. Meanwhile, I'll keep looking.

Sidney

Sent from my iPad

On Jul 16, 2013, at 15:32, Christopher Ford <fordchristoph@GMAIL.COM> wrote:

I have a vague thought that there was some news at some point -- and yes,
I know that's not a very helpful degree of specificity -- about possibly
using U.S. intelligence information to uncover the use of bribery by foreign firms which were competing (abroad) for contracts with U.S. firms (which have, at least since the Lockheed scandal of the 1970s, been subject to much more stringent restrictions on such, uh, "business practices").

That's not a straightforward commercial advantage issue, however, even if such collection did at some point occur; it would have been more about rectifying unfair/unlawful commercial disadvantage. The same might be said about collection, if any, against covert subsidization or other illicit...
if such collection did at some point occur; it would have been more about rectifying unfair/unlawful commercial disadvantage. The same might be said about collection, if any, against covert subsidization or other illicit advantage-giving by foreign governments to favored national firms -- which could perhaps include collection against foreign governments' efforts to engage in industrial espionage.

I still don't know of any U.S. analogue to China's global intellectual property theft machinery.

-- Chris

On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 6:11 PM, Sidney Rittenberg <srittenb@me.com> wrote:

Dear Paul,
I remember a revelation that we hack into Chinese telecom giants and give...
>> intel from this to US telcos. Not about technology, but about terms of
>> competition. Unfortunately, I can't exactly recall where I read it,
>> biit=
>> I
>> think it was from the guy that our US media have christened "the
>> Leaker"=
>> as though he was incontinent.
>> I apologize to non-American brethren and sisters for using "us" and
>> "our=
>> as though we were all Americans.
>> Sidney
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On Jul 16, 2013, at 14:55, Dune Lawrence <dunelawrence@GMAIL.COM>
> wrote:
>>
>> I too was wondering if I had missed this crucial element of the
>> Snowden
>> story. Did I miss reports about evidence of U.S. spying for
>> commercial
>> purposes on China?
>>
>> Dune Lawrence
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 5:51 PM, pjmooney <pjmooney@me.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Sidney,
Dune Lawrence

On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 5:51 PM, pjmooney <pjmooney@me.com> wrote:

Dear Sidney,

I'm not familiar with that claim by Snowden, so this is a sincere question. What kind of commercial secrets would the US be stealing? I'm just curious to know what China has of a commercial nature that the US doesn't have already. According to Snowden, or your counter-cyber officials, does the US share this information with US corporations?

Also, seems to me, and I have no real knowledge of this, that much of the US efforts would be for intelligence purposes, which I always assumed all the big powers did, right or wrong, and that the US effort was not aimed at Chinese citizens. I did hear that the US spied on Tsinghua University, but I'm not sure why.

China also attempts to steal information and to plant malware in the computers of foreign diplomats, scholars and journalists. I've long been a victim of this and I know of other cases.

I just wonder if we're not talking about apples and oranges here.
Best,

Paul

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