Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General

SPECIAL REVIEW

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

CIA LOAN COPY
DO NOT COPY

(US)(TS) COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES
(SEPTEMBER 2001 – OCTOBER 2003)
(2003-7123-IG)

7 May 2004
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genesis of post 9/11 agency detention and interrogation activities</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The capture of Abu Zubaydah and development of EITs</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOJ legal analysis</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notice to and consultation with executive and congressional officials</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance on capture, detention, and interrogation</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI Confinement Guidelines</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI Interrogation Guidelines</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Guidelines</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for Interrogations</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention and interrogation operations at Guantanamo Bay堡</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videotapes of Interrogations</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background and Detainees</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention and interrogation operations at Guantánamo Bay堡</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Guidelines</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines.......................... 39

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques...... 40

Handgun and Power Drill .................................... 40
Threats .................................................................. 41
Smoke .................................................................... 42
Stress Positions ..................................................... 43
Stiff Brush and Shackles ........................................ 44
Waterboard Technique ............................................ 45

Pressure Points ....................................................... 46
Mock Executions .................................................... 47
Use of Smoke ......................................................... 48
Use of Cold ........................................................... 49
Water Dousing ........................................................ 50
Hard Takedown ...................................................... 51

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques ..... 53
Pressure Points ....................................................... 53
Mock Executions .................................................... 54
Use of Smoke ......................................................... 55
Use of Cold ........................................................... 56
Water Dousing ........................................................ 57
Hard Takedown ...................................................... 58

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques ..... 60
Pressure Points ....................................................... 60
Mock Executions .................................................... 61
Use of Smoke ......................................................... 62
Use of Cold ........................................................... 63
Water Dousing ........................................................ 64
Hard Takedown ...................................................... 65

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques ..... 67
Pressure Points ....................................................... 67
Mock Executions .................................................... 68
Use of Smoke ......................................................... 69
Use of Cold ........................................................... 70
Water Dousing ........................................................ 71
Hard Takedown ...................................................... 72

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques ..... 74
Pressure Points ....................................................... 74
Mock Executions .................................................... 75
Use of Smoke ......................................................... 76
Use of Cold ........................................................... 77
Water Dousing ........................................................ 78
Hard Takedown ...................................................... 79
Abuse at Other Locations Outside of the CTC Program................................................................. 78

ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO INTERROGATIONS.......................................................... 82

EFFECTIVENESS................................................................................................. 85

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM................................................................. 91
   Policy Considerations.............................................................................. 92
   Concerns Over Participation in the CTC Program......................... 94

ENDGAME........................................................................................................ 95

CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................. 100

RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................. 106

APPENDICES

A. Procedures and Resources

B. Chronology of Significant Events

C. Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Re: Interrogation of an Al-Qa'ida Operative, 1 August 2002

D. DCI Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 28 January 2003

E. DCI Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the
   28 January 2003
F. Draft Office of Medical Services Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations, 4 September 2003
INTRODUCTION

2. (TS//SI) In November 2002, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that the Agency had established a program in the Counterterrorist Center to detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad ("the CTC Program"). He also informed OIG that he had just learned of and had dispatched a team to investigate [redacted] In January 2003, the DDO informed OIG that he had received allegations that Agency personnel had used unauthorized interrogation techniques with a detainee, 'Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, at another foreign site, and requested that
OIG investigate. Separately, OIG received information that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights. In January 2003, OIG initiated a review of Agency counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities and the incident with Al-Nashiri. This Review covers the period September 2001 to mid-October 2003.

SUMMARY

3. (TS) The DCI assigned responsibility for implementing capture and detention authority to the DDO and to the Director of the DCI Counterterrorist Center (D/CTC). When U.S. military forces began detaining individuals in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,

4. (TS) The Agency began to detain and interrogate directly a number of suspected terrorists. The capture and initial Agency interrogation of the first high value detainee, Abu Zubaydah,

1 (S) Appendix A addresses the Procedures and Resources that OIG employed in conducting this Review. The Review does not address renditions conducted by the Agency or interrogations conducted jointly with the U.S. military.

2 (U) Appendix B is a chronology of significant events that occurred during the period of this Review.
in March 2002, presented the Agency with a significant dilemma. The Agency was under pressure to do everything possible to prevent additional terrorist attacks. Senior Agency officials believed Abu Zubaydah was withholding information that could not be obtained through then-authorized interrogation techniques. Agency officials believed that a more robust approach was necessary to elicit threat information from Abu Zubaydah and possibly from other senior Al-Qa'ida high value detainees.

5. **(TS)*** The conduct of detention and interrogation activities presented new challenges for CIA. These included determining where detention and interrogation facilities could be securely located and operated, and identifying and preparing qualified personnel to manage and carry out detention and interrogation activities. With the knowledge that Al-Qa'ida personnel had been trained in the use of resistance techniques, another challenge was to identify interrogation techniques that Agency personnel could lawfully use to overcome the resistance. In this context, CTC, with the assistance of the Office of Technical Service (OTS), proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to use on Abu Zubaydah. All of these considerations took place against the backdrop of pre-September 11, 2001 CIA avoidance of interrogations and repeated U.S. policy statements condemning torture and advocating the humane treatment of political prisoners and detainees in the international community.

6. **(TS)*** The Office of General Counsel (OGC) took the lead in determining and documenting the legal parameters and constraints for interrogations. OGC conducted independent research.

---

4 **(TS)*** The use of "high value" or "medium value" to describe terrorist targets and detainees in this Review is based on how they have been generally categorized by CTC. CTC distinguishes targets according to the quality of the intelligence that they are believed likely to be able to provide about current terrorist threats against the United States. Senior Al-Qa'ida planners and operators, such as Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, fall into the category of "high value" and are given the highest priority for capture, detention, and interrogation. CTC categorizes those individuals who are believed to have lesser direct knowledge of such threats, but to have information of intelligence value, as "medium value" targets/detainees.
and consulted extensively with Department of Justice (DoJ) and National Security Council (NSC) legal and policy staff. Working with DoJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), OGC determined that in most instances relevant to the counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities, the criminal prohibition against torture, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340B, is the controlling legal constraint on interrogations of detainees outside the United States. In August 2002, DoJ provided to the Agency a legal opinion in which it determined that 10 specific "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" (EITs) would not violate the torture prohibition. This work provided the foundation for the policy and administrative decisions that guide the CTC Program.

7. By November 2002, the Agency had Abu Zubaydah and another high value detainee, 'Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, in custody and the Office of Medical Services (OMS) provided medical care to the detainees.

8. 
From the beginning, OGC briefed DO officers assigned to these facilities on their legal authorities, and Agency personnel staffing these facilities documented interrogations and the condition of detainees in cables.

10. There were few instances of deviations from approved procedures with one notable exception described in this Review. With respect to two detainees at those sites, the use and frequency of one EIT, the waterboard, went beyond the projected use of the technique as originally described to DoJ. The Agency, on 29 July 2003, secured oral DoJ concurrence that certain deviations are not significant for purposes of DoJ's legal opinions.
Agency efforts to provide systematic, clear and timely guidance to those involved in the CTC Detention and Interrogation Program was inadequate at first but have improved considerably during the life of the Program as problems have been identified and addressed. CTC implemented training programs for interrogators and debriefers. Moreover, building upon operational and legal guidance previously sent to the field, the DCI...
The DCI Guidelines require individuals engaged in or supporting interrogations be made aware of the guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have read them. The DCI Interrogation Guidelines make formal the existing CTC practice of requiring the field to obtain specific Headquarters approvals prior to the application of all BITs. Although the DCI Guidelines are an improvement over the absence of such DCI Guidelines in the past, they still leave substantial room for misinterpretation and do not cover all Agency detention and interrogation activities.

16. The Agency's detention and interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the identification and apprehension of other terrorists and warned of terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world. The CTC Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports and analytic products supporting the counterterrorism efforts of U.S. policymakers and military commanders.

17. The current CTC Detention and Interrogation Program has been subject to DOJ legal review and Administration approval but diverges sharply from previous Agency policy and rules that govern interrogations by U.S. military and law enforcement officers. Officers are concerned that public revelation of the CTC Program will seriously damage Agency officers' personal reputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency itself.

18. Recognized that detainees may be held in U.S. Government custody indefinitely if appropriate law enforcement jurisdiction is not asserted. Although there has been ongoing discussion of the issue inside the Agency and among NSC,
Defense Department, and Justice Department officials, no decisions on any "endgame" for Agency detainees have been made. Senior Agency officials see this as a policy issue for the U.S. Government rather than a CIA issue. Even with Agency initiatives to address the endgame with policymakers, some detainees who cannot be prosecuted will likely remain in CIA custody indefinitely.

19. (TS) The Agency faces potentially serious long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of EITs and the inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it will ultimately do with terrorists detained by the Agency.

20. (TS) This Review makes a number of recommendations that are designed to strengthen the management and conduct of Agency detention and interrogation activities. Although the DCI Guidelines were an important step forward, they were only designed to address the CTC Program, rather than all Agency debriefing or interrogation activities.
BACKGROUND

22. (S) The Agency has had intermittent involvement in the interrogation of individuals whose interests are opposed to those of the United States. After the Vietnam War, Agency personnel experienced in the field of interrogations left the Agency or moved to other assignments. In the early 1980s, a resurgence of interest in teaching interrogation techniques developed as one of several methods to foster foreign liaison relationships. Because of political sensitivities the then-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) forbade Agency officers from using the word "interrogation." The Agency then developed the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) training program designed to train foreign liaison services on interrogation techniques.

23. (S) In 1984, OIG investigated allegations of misconduct on the part of two Agency officers who were involved in interrogations and the death of one individual. Following that investigation, the Agency took steps to ensure Agency personnel understood its policy on
interrogations, debriefings, and human rights issues. Headquarters sent officers to brief Stations and Bases and provided cable guidance to the field.

24. (S) In 1986, the Agency ended the HRE training program because of allegations of human rights abuses in Latin America.

which remains in effect, explains the Agency's general interrogation policy:
DISCUSSION

GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES

25. (TS//SI) The statutory basis for CIA's involvement in detentions and interrogations is the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.7

26. (TS//SI) The DCI delegated responsibility for implementation to the DDO and D/CTC. Over time, CTC also solicited assistance from other Agency components, including OGC, OMS, and OTS.

7 (U//FOUO) DOJ takes the position that as Commander-in-Chief, the President independently has the Article II constitutional authority to order the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information.
28. (TS//SI) To assist Agency officials in understanding the scope and implications, OGC researched, analyzed, and wrote "draft" papers on multiple legal issues. These included discussions of the "draft" papers with Agency officers responsible.

29. 

THE CAPTURE OF ABU ZUBAYDAH AND DEVELOPMENT OF EIT'S

30. (TS//SI) The capture of senior Al-Qa'ida operative Abu Zubaydah on 27 March 2002 presented the Agency with the opportunity to obtain actionable intelligence on future threats to the United States from the most senior Al-Qa'ida member in U.S. custody at that time. This accelerated CIA's development of an interrogation program

TOP SECRET/
31. (TS/FOUO) To treat the severe wounds that Abu Zubaydah suffered upon his capture, the Agency provided him intensive medical care from the outset and deferred his questioning for several weeks pending his recovery. The Agency then assembled a team that interrogated Abu Zubaydah using non-aggressive, non-physical elicitation techniques. The Agency believed that Abu Zubaydah was withholding imminent threat information.

32. (TS/FOUO) Several months earlier, in late 2001, CIA had tasked an independent contractor psychologist, who had experience in the U.S. Air Force's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training program, to research and write a paper on Al-Qa'ida's resistance to interrogation techniques. This psychologist collaborated with a Department of Defense (DoD) psychologist who had SERE experience in the U.S. Air Force and DoD to produce the paper, "Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al-Qa'ida Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective." Subsequently, the two psychologists developed a list of new and more aggressive EITs that they recommended for use in interrogations.
33. CIA's OTS obtained data on the use of the proposed EITs and their potential long-term psychological effects on detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicited from a number of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the area of psychopathology.

34. OTS also solicited input from DoD/Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) regarding techniques used in its SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on students. DoD/JPRA concluded no long-term psychological effects resulted from use of the EITs, including the most taxing technique, the waterboard, on SERE students. The OTS analysis was used by OGC in evaluating the legality of techniques.

35. Eleven EITs were proposed for adoption in the CTC Interrogation Program. As proposed, use of EITs would be subject to a competent evaluation of the medical and psychological state of the detainee. The Agency eliminated one proposed technique—after learning from DoJ that this could delay the legal review. The following textbox identifies the 10 EITs the Agency described to DoJ.

---

14 According to individuals with authoritative knowledge of the SERE program, the waterboard was used for demonstration purposes on a very small number of students in a class. Except for Navy SERE training, use of the waterboard was discontinued because of its dramatic effect on the students who were subjects.
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

- The attention grasp consists of grasping the detainee with both hands, with one hand on each side of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the same motion as the grasp, the detainee is drawn toward the interrogator.

- During the walling technique, the detainee is pulled forward and then quickly and firmly pushed into a flexible false wall so that his shoulder blades hit the wall. His head and neck are supported with a rolled towel to prevent whiplash.

- The facial hold is used to hold the detainee's head immobile. The interrogator places an open palm on either side of the detainee's face and the interrogator's fingertips are kept well away from the detainee's eyes.

- With the facial or insult slap, the fingers are slightly spread apart. The interrogator's hand makes contact with the area between the tip of the detainee's chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe.

- In cramped confinement, the detainee is placed in a confined space, typically a small or large box, which is usually dark. Confinement in the smaller space lasts no more than two hours and in the larger space it can last up to 18 hours.

- Insects placed in a confinement box involve placing a harmless insect in the box with the detainee.

- During wall standing, the detainee may stand about 4 to 5 feet from a wall with his feet spread approximately to his shoulder width. His arms are stretched out in front of him and his fingers rest on the wall to support all of his body weight. The detainee is not allowed to reposition his hands or feet.

- The application of stress positions may include having the detainee sit on the floor with his legs extended straight out in front of him with his arms raised above his head or kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle.

- Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11 days at a time.

- The application of the waterboard technique involves binding the detainee to a bench with his feet elevated above his head. The detainee's head is immobilized and an interrogator places a cloth over the detainee's mouth and nose while pouring water onto the cloth in a controlled manner. Airflow is restricted for 20 to 40 seconds and the technique produces the sensation of drowning and suffocation.
DOJ LEGAL ANALYSIS

36. CIA's OGC sought guidance from DOJ regarding the legal bounds of EITs vis-à-vis individuals detained. The ensuing legal opinions focus on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention), especially as implemented in the U.S. criminal code, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A.

37. The Torture Convention specifically prohibits "torture," which it defines in Article 1 as:

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanction. [Emphasis added.]

Article 4 of the Torture Convention provides that states party to the Convention are to ensure that all acts of "torture" are offenses under their criminal laws. Article 16 additionally provides that each state party "shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to acts of torture as defined in Article 1."

38. (U//FOUO) The Torture Convention applies to the United States only in accordance with the reservations and understandings made by the United States at the time of ratification. As explained to the Senate by the Executive Branch prior to ratification:

Article 16 is arguably broader than existing U.S. law. The phrase "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" is a standard formula in international instruments and is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights. To the extent the phrase has been interpreted in the context of those agreements, "cruel" and "inhuman" treatment or punishment appears to be roughly equivalent to the treatment or punishment barred in the United States by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. "Degrading" treatment or punishment, however, has been interpreted as potentially including treatment that would probably not be prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. (Citing a ruling that German refusal to recognize individual's gender change might be considered "degrading" treatment.) To make clear that the United States construes the phrase to be coextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment, the following understanding is recommended:

"The United States understands the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,' as used in Article 16 of the Convention, to mean the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." [Emphasis added.]


17 (U//FOUO) S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 15-16.
39. (U//FOUO) In accordance with the Convention, the United States criminalized acts of torture in 18 U.S.C. 2340A(a), which provides as follows:

Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

The statute adopts the Convention definition of "torture" as "an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control." 18 "Severe physical pain and suffering" is not further defined, but Congress added a definition of "severe mental pain or suffering:"

The prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from-

(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;

(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;

(C) the threat of imminent death; or

(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. 19

These statutory definitions are consistent with the understandings and reservations of the United States to the Torture Convention.

18 (U//FOUO) 18 U.S.C. 2340(1).
40. (U / FOUO) DoJ has never prosecuted a violation of the torture statute, 18 U.S.C. §2340, and there is no case law construing its provisions. OGC presented the results of its research into relevant issues under U.S. and international law to DoJ's OLC in the summer of 2002 and received a preliminary summary of the elements of the torture statute from OLC in July 2002. An unclassified 1 August 2002 OLC legal memorandum set out OLC's conclusions regarding the proper interpretation of the torture statute and concluded that "Section 2340A prescribes acts inflicting, and that are specifically intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering whether mental or physical."20 Also, OLC stated that the acts must be of an "extreme nature" and that "certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section 2340A's proscription against torture." Further describing the requisite level of intended pain, OLC stated:

Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under Section 2340, it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.21

OLC determined that a violation of Section 2340 requires that the infliction of severe pain be the defendant's "precise objective." OLC also concluded that necessity or self-defense might justify interrogation methods that would otherwise violate Section 2340A.22 The August 2002 OLC opinion did not address whether any other provisions of U.S. law are relevant to the detention, treatment, and interrogation of detainees outside the United States.23

21 (U / FOUO) Ibid., p. 1.
22 (U / FOUO) Ibid., p. 39.
23 (U / FOUO) OLC's analysis of the torture statute was guided in part by judicial decisions under the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) 28 U.S.C. 1350, which provides a tort remedy for victims of torture. OLC noted that the courts in this context have looked at the entire course
41. (U//FOOU) A second unclassified 1 August 2002 OLC opinion addressed the international law aspects of such interrogations. This opinion concluded that interrogation methods that do not violate 18 U.S.C. 2340 would not violate the Torture Convention and would not come within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

42. (TS/FOUO) In addition to the two unclassified opinions, OLC produced another legal opinion on 1 August 2002 at the request of CIA. This opinion, addressed to CIA's Acting General Counsel, discussed whether the proposed use of EITs in interrogating Abu Zubaydah would violate the Title 18 prohibition on torture. The opinion concluded that use of EITs on Abu Zubaydah would not violate the torture statute because, among other things, Agency personnel: (1) would not specifically intend to inflict severe pain or suffering, and (2) would not in fact inflict severe pain or suffering.

43. (TS/FOUO) This OLC opinion was based upon specific representations by CIA concerning the manner in which EITs would be applied in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. For example, OLC was told that the EIT "phase" would likely last "no more than several days but could last up to thirty days." The EITs would be used on "an as-needed basis" and all would not necessarily be used. Further, the EITs were expected to be used "in some sort of escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard though not necessarily ending with this technique." Although some of the EITs

of conduct, although a single incident could constitute torture. OLC also noted that courts may be willing to find a wide range of physical pain can rise to the level of "severe pain and suffering." Ultimately, however, OLC concluded that the cases show that only acts "of an extreme nature have been redressed under the TVPA's civil remedy for torture." White House Counsel Memorandum at 22 - 27.

24 (U//FOOU) OLC Opinion by John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC (1 August 2002).
25 (TS/FOUO) Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, "Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative" (1 August 2002) at 15.
might be used more than once, "that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions." With respect to the waterboard, it was explained that:

... the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench .... The individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, the air flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood. This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces the perception of "suffocation and incipient panic," i.e., the perception of drowning. The individual does not breathe water into his lungs. During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of [12 to 24] inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated. The water is usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering can with a spout. ... [T]his procedure triggers an automatic physiological sensation of drowning that the individual cannot control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not drowning. [I]t is likely that this procedure would not last more than 20 minutes in any one application.

Finally, the Agency presented OLC with a psychological profile of Abu Zubaydah and with the conclusions of officials and psychologists associated with the SERE program that the use of EITs would cause no long term mental harm. OLC relied on these representations to support its conclusion that no physical harm or prolonged mental harm would result from the use on him of the EITs, including the waterboard. 26

26 According to the Chief, Medical Services, OMS was neither consulted nor involved in the initial analysis of the risk and benefits of EITs, nor provided with the OTS report cited in the OLC opinion. In retrospect, based on the OLC extracts of the OTS report, OMS contends that the reported sophistication of the preliminary EIT review was exaggerated, at least as it related to the waterboard, and that the power of this EIT was appreciably overstated in the report. Furthermore, OMS contends that the expertise of the SERE psychologist/interrogators on
44. OGC continued to consult with DOJ as the CTC Interrogation Program and the use of EITs expanded beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. This resulted in the production of an undated and unsigned document entitled, "Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel." According to OGC, this analysis was fully coordinated with and drafted in substantial part by OLC. In addition to reaffirming the previous conclusions regarding the torture statute, the analysis concludes that the federal War Crimes statute, 18 U.S.C. 2441, does not apply to Al-Qa'ida because members of that group are not entitled to prisoner of war status. The analysis adds that "the [Torture] Convention permits the use of [cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment] in exigent circumstances, such as a national emergency or war." It also states that the interrogation of Al-Qa'ida members does not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because those provisions do not apply extraterritorially, nor does it violate the Eighth Amendment because it only applies to persons upon whom criminal sanctions have been imposed. Finally, the analysis states that a wide range of EITs and other techniques would not constitute conduct of the type that would be prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments even were they to be applicable:

The use of the following techniques and of comparable, approved techniques does not violate any Federal statute or other law, where the CIA interrogators do not specifically intend to cause the detainee to undergo severe physical or mental pain or suffering (i.e., they act with the good faith belief that their conduct will not cause such pain or suffering): isolation, reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainees), deprivation of reading material, loud music or white

---

27 "Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel," attached to (16 June 2003).
noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detainees' hearing), the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap (insult slap), the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, the use of diapers, the use of harmless insects, and the water board.

According to OGC, this analysis embodies DoJ agreement that the reasoning of the classified 1 August 2002 OLC opinion extends beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the conditions that were specified in that opinion.

NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION WITH EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICIALS

45. (TS-30) At the same time that OLC was reviewing the legality of EITs in the summer of 2002, the Agency was consulting with NSC policy staff and senior Administration officials. The DCI briefed appropriate senior national security and legal officials on the proposed EITs. In the fall of 2002, the Agency briefed the leadership of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use of both standard techniques and EITs.

46. (TS-30) In early 2003, CIA officials, at the urging of the General Counsel, continued to inform senior Administration officials and the leadership of the Congressional Oversight Committees of the then-current status of the CTC Program. The Agency specifically wanted to ensure that these officials and the Committees continued to be aware of and approve CIA's actions. The General Counsel recalls that he spoke and met with White House Counsel and others at the NSC, as well as DoJ's Criminal Division and Office of Legal Counsel beginning in December 2002 and briefed them on the scope and breadth of the CTC's Detention and Interrogation Program.

47. (TS-30) Representatives of the DO, in the presence of the Director of Congressional Affairs and the General Counsel, continued to brief the leadership of the Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use of EITs and detentions in February
and March 2003. The General Counsel says that none of the participants expressed any concern about the techniques or the Program.

48. (TS//SI) On 29 July 2003, the DCI and the General Counsel provided a detailed briefing to selected NSC Principals on CIA's detention and interrogation efforts involving "high value detainees," to include the expanded use of EITs. According to a Memorandum for the Record prepared by the General Counsel following that meeting, the Attorney General confirmed that DoJ approved of the expanded use of various EITs, including multiple applications of the waterboard. The General Counsel said he believes everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA was doing with respect to detention and interrogation, and approved of the effort. According to OGC, the senior officials were again briefed regarding the CTC Program on 16 September 2003, and the Intelligence Committee leadership was briefed again in September 2003. Again, according to OGC, none of those involved in these briefings expressed any reservations about the program.

GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION

49. (TS//SI) Guidance and training are fundamental to the success and integrity of any endeavor as operationally, politically, and legally complex as the Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program. Soon after 9/11, the DDO issued guidance on the standards for the capture of terrorist targets.

50. (TS//SI) The DCI, in January 2003 approved formal "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees" (Appendix D) and "Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted..."
Pursuant to [redacted] (Appendix E), which are discussed below. Prior to the DCI Guidelines, Headquarters provided guidance via informal briefings and electronic communications, to include cables from CIA Headquarters, to the field.

51. [redacted] In November 2002, CTC initiated training courses for individuals involved in interrogations.

52. [redacted]

53. [redacted]
DCI Confinement Guidelines

57. Before January 2003, officers assigned to manage detention facilities developed and implemented confinement condition procedures.

The January 2003 DCI Guidelines govern the conditions of confinement for CIA detainees held in detention facilities.
59. (TS//SS) The DCT Guidelines specify legal "minimums" and require that "due provision must be taken to protect the health and safety of all CIA detainees." The Guidelines do not require that conditions of confinement at the detention facilities conform to U.S. prison or other standards. At a minimum, however, detention facilities are to provide basic levels of medical care:

Further, the guidelines provide that:
60. (S/NI) Prior to January 2003, CTC and OGC disseminated guidance via cables, e-mail, or orally on a case-by-case basis to address requests to use specific interrogation techniques. Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations to sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, or agreed to comply with the guidance provided. Nor did the Agency maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been briefed on interrogation procedures.

61. (S/NI) The DCI Interrogation Guidelines require that all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation of persons detained have reviewed these Guidelines, received appropriate training in their implementation, and have completed the applicable acknowledgement.

62. (S/NI) The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define "Permissible Interrogation Techniques" and specify that "unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Permissible Interrogation Techniques. Permissible Interrogation Techniques consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b) Enhanced
Techniques."33 EITs require advance approval from Headquarters, as do standard techniques whenever feasible. The field must document the use of both standard techniques and EITs.

63. (TS, [REDACTED]) The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define "standard interrogation techniques" as techniques that do not incorporate significant physical or psychological pressure. These techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful forms of questioning employed by U.S. law enforcement and military interrogation personnel. Among standard interrogation techniques are the use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours,34 reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation of reading material, use of loud music or white noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detainee's hearing), the use of diapers for limited periods (generally not to exceed 72 hours) and moderate psychological pressure. The DCI Interrogation Guidelines do not specifically prohibit improvised actions. A CTC/Legal officer has said, however, that no one may employ any technique outside specifically identified standard techniques without Headquarters approval.

64. (TS, [REDACTED]) EITs include physical actions and are defined as "techniques that do incorporate physical or psychological pressure beyond Standard Techniques." Headquarters must approve the use of each specific EIT in advance. EITs may be employed only by trained and certified interrogators for use with a specific detainee and with appropriate medical and psychological monitoring of the process.35

33 (TS) The 10 approved EITs are described in the textbox on page 15 of this Review.
34 (TS, [REDACTED]) According to the General Counsel, in late December 2003, the period for sleep deprivation was reduced to 48 hours.
35 (TS, [REDACTED]) Before EITs are administered, a detainee must receive a detailed psychological assessment and physical exam.
65. (TS//REL) OMS prepared draft guidelines for medical and psychological support to detainee interrogations.

Training for Interrogations

66. (TS//REL) In November 2002, [redacted] initiated a pilot running of a two-week Interrogator Training Course designed to train, qualify, and certify individuals as Agency interrogators.37 Several CTC officers,

36 (U//AUO) A 28 March 2003 Lotus Note from C/CTC/Legal advised Chief, Medical Services that the "Seventh Floor" "would need to approve the promulgation of any further formal guidelines... . For now, therefore, let's remain at the discussion stage... ."
including a former SERE instructor, designed the curriculum, which included a week of classroom instruction followed by a week of "hands-on" training in EITs.

Once certified, an interrogator is deemed qualified to conduct an interrogation employing EITs.
Students completing the Interrogation Course are required to sign an acknowledgment that they have read, understand, and will comply with the DCI’s Interrogation Guidelines.

69. (NS) In June 2003, CTC established a debriefing course for Agency substantive experts who are involved in questioning detainees after they have undergone interrogation and have been deemed "compliant." The debriefing course was established to train non-interrogators to collect actionable intelligence from high value detainees in CIA custody. The course is intended to familiarize non-interrogators with key aspects of the Agency interrogation Program, to include the Program’s goals and legal authorities, the DCI Interrogation Guidelines, and the roles and responsibilities of all who interact with a high value detainee.
74. TS psychologists/interrogators led each interrogation of Abu Zutaylah and Al-Nashiri where EITs were used. The psychologists/interrogators conferred with team members before each interrogation session. Psychological evaluations were performed by psychologists.

75. 

76. TS

2002. The interrogation of Al-Nashiri proceeded after the necessary Headquarters authorization.
psychologist/interrogators began Al-Nashiri's interrogation using EITs immediately upon his arrival. Al-Nashiri provided lead information on other terrorists during his first day of interrogation. On the twelfth day of interrogation, psychologist/interrogators administered two applications of the waterboard to Al-Nashiri during two separate interrogation sessions. Enhanced interrogation of Al-Nashiri continued through 4 December 2002.

Videotapes of Interrogations

77. Headquarters had intense interest in keeping abreast of all aspects of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation, including compliance with the guidance provided to the site relative to the use of EITs. Apart from this, however, and before the use of EITs, the interrogation teams decided to videotape the interrogation sessions. One initial purpose was to ensure a record of Abu Zubaydah's medical condition and treatment should he succumb to his wounds and questions arise about the medical care provided to him by CIA. Another purpose was to assist in the preparation of the debriefing reports, although the team advised CTC/Legal that they rarely, if ever, were used for that purpose. There are 92 videotapes, 12 of which include EIT applications. An OGC attorney reviewed the videotapes in November and December 2002 to ascertain compliance with the August 2002 DoJ opinion and compare what actually happened with what was reported to Headquarters. He reported that there was no deviation from the DoJ guidance or the written record.

78. OIG reviewed the videotapes, logs, and cables in May 2003. OIG identified 83 waterboard applications, most of which lasted less than 10 seconds. For the purpose of this Review, a waterboard application constituted each discrete instance in which water was applied for any period of time during a session.
OIG found 11 interrogation videotapes to be blank. Two others were blank except for one or two minutes of recording. Two others were broken and could not be reviewed. OIG compared the videotapes to logs and cables and identified a 21-hour period of time, which included two waterboard sessions, that was not captured on the videotapes.

79. OIG's review of the videotapes revealed that the waterboard technique employed at was different from the technique as described in the DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the detainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERE School and in the DoJ opinion, the subject's airflow is disrupted by the firm application of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency interrogator continuously applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency's use of the technique differed from that used in SERE training and explained that the Agency's technique is different because it is "for real" and is more poignant and convincing.

80. From December 2002 until September 2003, During this time, Headquarters issued the formal DCI Confinement Guidelines, the DCI Interrogation Guidelines, and the additional draft guidelines specifically
addressing requirements for OMS personnel. This served to strengthen the command and control exercised over the CTC Program.

Background and Detainees

81.

82.

83.
Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines

89. (TS//SI) The Agency was providing legal and operational briefings and cables that contained Headquarters' guidance and discussed the torture statute and the DoJ legal opinion. CTC had also established a precedent of detailed cables between and Headquarters regarding the interrogation and debriefing of detainees. The written guidance did not address the four standard interrogation techniques that, according to CTC/Legal, the Agency had identified as early as November 2002. Agency personnel were authorized to employ standard interrogation techniques on a detainee without Headquarters' prior approval. The guidance did not specifically

43 [7/11] The four standard interrogation techniques were: (1) sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours, (2) continual use of light or darkness in a cell, (3) loud music, and (4) white noise (background hum).
address the use of props to imply a physical threat to a detainee, nor did it specifically address the issue of whether or not Agency officers could improvise with any other techniques. No formal mechanisms were in place to ensure that personnel going to the field were briefed on the existing legal and policy guidance.

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques

90. (TS) This Review heard allegations of the use of unauthorized techniques. The most significant, the handgun and power drill incident, discussed below, is the subject of a separate OIG investigation. In addition, individuals interviewed during the Review identified other techniques that caused concern because DoJ had not specifically approved them. These included the making of threats, blowing cigar smoke, employing certain stress positions, the use of a stiff brush on a detainee, and stepping on a detainee's ankle shackles. For all of the instances, the allegations were disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritative determination regarding the facts. Thus, although these allegations are illustrative of the nature of the concerns held by individuals associated with the CTC Program and the need for clear guidance, they did not warrant separate investigations or administrative action.

Handgun and Power Drill

91. (NS) The interrogation team members, whose purpose it was to interrogate Al-Nashiri and debrief Abu Zubaydah, initially staffed. The interrogation team continued EITs on Al-Nashiri for two weeks in December 2002, they assessed him to be "compliant." Subsequently, CTC officers at Headquarters sent a senior operations officer (the debriefer) to debrief and assess Al-Nashiri.

92. (NS) The debriefer assessed Al-Nashiri as withholding information, at which point he reinstated hooding, and handcuffing. Sometime between
28 December 2002 and 1 January 2003, the debriefer used an unloaded semi-automatic handgun as a prop to frighten Al-Nashiri into disclosing information. After discussing this plan with the debriefer entered the cell where Al-Nashiri sat shackled and racked the handgun once or twice close to Al-Nashiri's head. On what was probably the same day, the debriefer used a power drill to frighten Al-Nashiri. With consent, the debriefer entered the detainee's cell and revved the drill while the detainee stood naked and hooded. The debriefer did not touch Al-Nashiri with the power drill.

93. (S//NF) The and debriefer did not request authorization or report the use of these unauthorized techniques to Headquarters. However, in January 2003, newly arrived TDY officers who had learned of these incidents reported them to Headquarters. OIG investigated and referred its findings to the Criminal Division of DoJ. On 11 September 2003, DoJ declined to prosecute and turned these matters over to CIA for disposition. These incidents are the subject of a separate OIG Report of Investigation.

Threats

94. (NS) During another incident the same Headquarters debriefer, according to a who was present, threatened Al-Nashiri by saying that if he did not talk, "We could get your mother in here," and, "We can bring your family in here." The debriefer reportedly wanted Al-Nashiri to infer, for psychological reasons, that the debriefer might be an intelligence officer based on his Arabic dialect, and that Al-Nashiri was in custody because it was widely believed in Middle East circles that interrogation technique involves

---

44 (S//NF) This individual was not a trained interrogator and was not authorized to use EITs.
45 (U//FOUO) Racking is a mechanical procedure used with firearms to chamber a bullet or simulate a bullet being chambered.
46 (S//NF) Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques 29 October 2003.
sexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainee. The debriefer denied threatening Al-Nashiri through his family. The debriefer also said he did not explain who he was or where he was from when talking with Al-Nashiri. The debriefer said he never said he was an intelligence officer but let Al-Nashiri draw his own conclusions.

95. [TS] An experienced Agency interrogator reported that the interrogators threatened Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. According to this interrogator, the interrogators said to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad that if anything else happens in the United States, "We're going to kill your children." According to the interrogator, one of the interrogators said, "Smoke provided to him of the threats that report did not indicate that the law had been violated.

Smoke

96. [TS] An Agency interrogator admitted that, in December 2002, he and another smoked cigars and blew smoke in Al-Nashiri's face during an interrogation. The interrogator claimed they did this to "cover the stench" in the room and to help keep the interrogators alert late at night. This interrogator said he would not do this again based on "perceived criticism." Another Agency interrogator admitted that he also smoked cigars during two sessions with Al-Nashiri to mask the stench in the room. He claimed he did not deliberately force smoke into Al-Nashiri's face.
Stress Positions

97. OIG received reports that interrogation team members employed potentially injurious stress positions on Al-Nashiri. Al-Nashiri was required to kneel on the floor and lean back. On at least one occasion, an Agency officer reportedly pushed Al-Nashiri backward while he was in this stress position. On another occasion, [ ] said he had to intercede after [ ] expressed concern that Al-Nashiri's arms might be dislocated from his shoulders. [ ] explained that, at the time, the interrogators were attempting to put Al-Nashiri in a standing stress position. Al-Nashiri was reportedly lifted off the floor by his arms while his arms were bound behind his back with a belt.

Stiff Brush and Shackles

98. An interrogator reported that he witnessed other techniques used on Al-Nashiri that the interrogator knew were not specifically approved by DoJ. These included the use of a stiff brush that was intended to induce pain on Al-Nashiri and standing on Al-Nashiri's shackles, which resulted in cuts and bruises. When questioned, an interrogator who was at [ ] acknowledged that they used a stiff brush to bathe Al-Nashiri. He described the brush as the kind of brush one uses in a bath to remove stubborn dirt. A CTC manager who had heard of the incident attributed the abrasions on Al-Nashiri's ankles to an Agency officer accidentally stepping on Al-Nashiri's shackles while repositioning him into a stress position.

Waterboard Technique

99. The Review determined that the interrogators used the waterboard on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in a manner inconsistent with the SERE application of the waterboard and the description of the waterboard in the DoJ OLC opinion, in that the technique was used on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad a large number of times. According to the General Counsel, the Attorney
General acknowledged he is fully aware of the repetitive use of the waterboard and that CIA is well within the scope of the DoJ opinion and the authority given to CIA by that opinion. The Attorney General was informed the waterboard had been used 119 times on a single individual.

100. (TS//NODIS) Cables indicate that Agency interrogators applied the waterboard technique to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.
The first session of the interrogation course began in November 2002. See paragraphs 64-65.
121.

Interrogators are required to sign a statement certifying they have read and understand the contents of the folder.
Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques

164. [REDACTED] was but one event in the early months of [REDACTED] Agency activity in [REDACTED] that involved the use of interrogation techniques that DoJ and Headquarters had not approved. Agency personnel reported a range of improvised actions that interrogators and debriefers reportedly used at that time to assist in obtaining information from detainees. The extent of these actions is illustrative of the consequences of the lack of clear guidance at that time and the Agency's insufficient attention to interrogations in [REDACTED].

165. [REDACTED] OIG opened separate investigations into two incidents: [REDACTED] and the death of a detainee at a military base in Northeast Afghanistan (discussed further in paragraph 192). These two cases presented facts that warranted criminal investigations. Some of the techniques discussed below were used with [REDACTED] and will be further addressed in connection with a Report. In other cases of undocumented or unauthorized techniques, the facts are ambiguous or less serious, not warranting further investigation. Some actions discussed below were taken by employees or contractors no longer associated with the Agency. Agency management has also addressed administratively some of the actions.

Pressure Points

166. [REDACTED] In July 2002, [REDACTED] operations officer, participated with another operations officer in a custodial interrogation of a detainee [REDACTED] reportedly used a "pressure point" technique: with both of his hands on the detainee's neck, [REDACTED] manipulated his fingers to restrict the detainee's carotid artery.
167. [REDACTED] who was facing the shackled detainee, reportedly watched his eyes to the point that the detainee would nod and start to pass out; then, the [REDACTED] shook the detainee to wake him. This process was repeated for a total of three applications on the detainee. The [REDACTED] acknowledged to OIG that he laid hands on the detainee and may have made him think he was going to lose consciousness. The [REDACTED] also noted that he has years of experience debriefing and interviewing people and until recently had never been instructed how to conduct interrogations.

168. (S//NF) CTC management is now aware of this reported incident, the severity of which was disputed. The use of pressure points is not, and had not been, authorized, and CTC has advised the [REDACTED] that such actions are not authorized.

Mock Executions

169. (S//NF) The debriefer who employed the handgun and power drill on Al-Nashir [REDACTED] advised that those actions were predicated on a technique he had participated in. The debriefer stated that when he was between September and October 2002, [REDACTED] offered to fire a handgun outside the interrogation room while the debriefer was interviewing a detainee who was thought to be withholding information. The incident, which included screaming and yelling outside the cell by other CIA officers and guards. When the guards moved the detainee from the interrogation room, they passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detainee, lying motionless on the ground, and made to appear as if he had been shot to death.
170. The debriefer claimed he did not think he needed to report this incident because he had openly discussed this plan several days prior to and after the incident. When the debriefer was later told he needed a non-traditional technique to induce the detainee to cooperate, he told he wanted to wave a handgun in front of the detainee to scare him. The debriefer said he did not believe he was required to notify Headquarters of this technique, citing the earlier, unreported mock execution.

171. A senior operations officer recounted that around September 2002, he heard that the debriefer had staged a mock execution. was not present but understood it went badly; it was transparently a ruse and no benefit was derived from it. observed that there is a need to be creative as long as it is not considered torture. stated that if such a proposal were made now, it would involve a great deal of consultation. It would begin with management and would include CTC/Legal, and the CTC.

172. The admitted staging a "mock execution" in the first days that was open. According to the the technique was his idea but was not effective because it came across as being staged. It was based on the concept, from SERE school, of showing something that looks real, but is not. The recalled that a particular CTC interrogator later told him about employing a mock execution technique. The did not know when this incident occurred or if it was successful. He viewed this technique as ineffective because it was not believable.
Four who were interviewed admitted to either participating in one of the above-described incidents or hearing about them. Described staging a mock execution of a detainee. Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the "body" in the aftermath of the ruse "sang like a bird."

174. revealed that approximately four days before his interview with OIG, stated he had conducted a mock execution in October or November 2002. Reportedly, the firearm was discharged outside of the building, and it was done because the detainee reportedly possessed critical threat information. Stated that he told the not to do it again. He stated that he has not heard of a similar act occurring since then.

Use of Smoke

175. A CIA officer revealed that cigarette smoke was once used as an interrogation technique in October 2002. Reportedly, at the request of an interrogator, the officer, who does not smoke, blew the smoke from a thin cigarette/cigar in the detainee's face for about five minutes. The detainee started talking so the smoke ceased. Heard that a different officer had used smoke as an interrogation technique. OIG questioned numerous personnel who had worked about the use of smoke as a technique. None reported any knowledge of the use of smoke as an interrogation technique.

176. admitted that he has personally used smoke inhalation techniques on detainees to make them ill to the point where they would start to "purge." After this, in a weakened state,
these detainees would then provide information.\textsuperscript{70} denoted ever physically abusing detainees or knowing anyone who has.

Use of Cold

\textsuperscript{177.}

\textsuperscript{178.} In late July to early August 2002, a detainee was being interrogated. Prior to proceeding with any of the proposed methods, headquarters authority to employ a prescribed interrogation plan over a two-week period. The plan included the following:

- **Physical Comfort Level Deprivation:** With use of a window air conditioner and a judicious provision/deprivation of warm clothing/blankets, believe we can increase the detainee's physical discomfort level to the point where we may lower his mental/trained resistance abilities.

CTC/Legal responded and advised, "[C]aution must be used when employing the air conditioning/blanket deprivation so that [the detainee's] discomfort does not lead to a serious illness or worse."

\textsuperscript{70} \textsuperscript{[C]} This was substantiated in part by the CIA officer who participated in this act with the
Many of the officers interviewed about the use of cold showers as a technique cited that the water heater was inoperable and there was no other recourse except for cold showers. However, explained that if a detainee was cooperative, he would be given a warm shower. He stated that when a detainee was uncooperative, the interrogators accomplished two goals by combining the hygienic reason for a shower with the unpleasantness of a cold shower.

In December 2002, cable reported that a detainee was left in a cold room, shackled and naked, until he demonstrated cooperation.

When asked in February 2003, if cold was used as an interrogation technique, the responded, "not per se." He explained that physical and environmental discomfort was used to encourage the detainees to improve their environment. observed that cold is hard to define. He asked rhetorically, "How cold is cold? How cold is life threatening?" He stated that cold water was still employed however, showers were administered in a heated room. He stated there was no specific guidance on it from Headquarters, and was left to its own discretion in the use of cold. added there is a cable from documenting the use of "manipulation of the environment."

Although the DCl Guidelines do not mention cold as a technique, the September 2003 draft OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations specifically identify an "uncomfortably cool environment" as a standard interrogation measure. (Appendix F.) The OMS Guidelines provide detailed instructions on safe temperature ranges, including the safe temperature range when a detainee is wet or unclothed.
Water Dousing

187. According to and others who have worked since early 2003 when officer introduced this technique to the facility. Dousing involves laying a detainee down on a plastic sheet and pouring water over him for 10 to 15 minutes. Another officer explained that the room was maintained at 70 degrees or more; the guards used water that was at room temperature while the interrogator questioned the detainee.

188. A review from April and May 2003 revealed that sought permission from to employ specific techniques for a number of detainees. Included in the list of requested techniques was water dousing. Subsequent cables reported the use and duration of the techniques by detainee per interrogation session. One certified interrogator, noting that water dousing appeared to be a most effective technique, requested CTC to confirm guidelines on water dousing. A return cable directed that the detainee must be placed on a towel or sheet, may not be placed naked on the bare cement floor, and the air temperature must exceed 65 degrees if the detainee will not be dried immediately.

189. The DCI Guidelines do not mention water dousing as a technique. The 4 September 2003 draft OMS Guidelines, however, identify "water dousing" as one of 12 standard measures that OMS listed, in ascending degree of intensity, as the 11th standard measure. OMS did not further address "water dousing" in its guidelines.
Hard Takedown

191. [NSA] [REDACTED] According to [REDACTED], the hard takedown was used often in interrogations at [REDACTED] as "part of the atmospherics." For a time, it was the standard procedure for moving a detainee to the sleep deprivation cell. It was done for shock and psychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase of the interrogation. The act of putting a detainee into a diaper can cause abrasions if the detainee struggles because the floor of the facility is concrete. The [REDACTED] stated he did not discuss the hard takedown with [REDACTED] managers, but he thought they understood what techniques were being used at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that the hard takedown had not been used recently. After taking the interrogation class, he understood that if
he was going to do a hard takedown, he must report it to Headquarters. Although the DCI and OMS Guidelines address physical techniques and treat them as requiring advance Headquarters approval, they do not otherwise specifically address the "hard takedown."

192. [Redacted] stated that he was generally familiar with the technique of hard take downs. He asserted that they are authorized and believed they had been used one or more times at [Redacted] in order to intimidate a detainee. [Redacted] stated that he would not necessarily know if they have been used and did not consider it a serious enough handling technique to require Headquarters approval. Asked about the possibility that a detainee may have been dragged on the ground during the course of a hard takedown, [Redacted] responded that he was unaware of that and did not understand the point of dragging someone along the corridor in

Abuse at Other Locations Outside of the CTC Program

193. [Redacted] Although not within the scope of the CTC Program, two other incidents [Redacted] were reported in 2003. [Redacted] As noted above, one resulted in the death of a detainee at Asadabad Base76 [Redacted]

194. [Redacted] In June 2003, the U.S. military sought an Afghan citizen who had been implicated in rocket attacks on a joint U.S. Army and CIA position in Asadabad located in Northeast Afghanistan. On 18 June 2003, this individual appeared at Asadabad Base at the urging of the local Governor. The individual was held in a detention facility guarded by U.S. soldiers from the Base. During

76 [Redacted] For more than a year, CIA referred to Asadabad Base as
the four days the individual was detained, an Agency independent contractor, who was a paramilitary officer, is alleged to have severely beaten the detainee with a large metal flashlight and kicked him during interrogation sessions. The detainee died in custody on 21 June; his body was turned over to a local cleric and returned to his family on the following date without an autopsy being performed. Neither the contractor nor his Agency staff supervisor had been trained or authorized to conduct interrogations. The Agency did not renew the independent contractor's contract, which was up for renewal soon after the incident. OIG is investigating this incident in concert with DoJ.77

195. (S//NF) In July 2003, officer assigned to assaulted a teacher at a religious school. This assault occurred during the course of an interview during a joint operation. The objective was to determine if anyone at the school had information about the detonation of a remote-controlled improvised explosive device that had killed eight border guards several days earlier.

196. (S//NF) A teacher being interviewed reportedly smiled and laughed inappropriately, whereupon used the butt stock of his rifle to strike or "buttstroke" the teacher at least twice in his torso, followed by several knee kicks to his torso. This incident was witnessed by 200 students. The teacher was reportedly not seriously injured. In response to his actions, Agency management returned the to Headquarters. He was counseled and given a domestic assignment.
ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO INTERROGATIONS

204. [NSSENTI] Directorate of Intelligence analysts assigned to CTC provide analytical support to interrogation teams in the field. Analysts are responsible for developing requirements for the questioning of detainees as well as conducting debriefings in some cases. Analysts, however, do not participate in the application of interrogation techniques.
205. (TS//) According to a number of those interviewed for this Review, the Agency's intelligence on Al-Qa'ida was limited prior to the initiation of the CTC Interrogation Program. The Agency lacked adequate linguists or subject matter experts and had very little hard knowledge of what particular Al-Qa'ida leaders—who later became detainees—knew. This lack of knowledge led analysts to speculate about what a detainee "should know," vice information the analyst could objectively demonstrate the detainee did know.

206. (TS///) When a detainee did not respond to a question posed to him, the assumption at Headquarters was that the detainee was holding back and knew more; consequently, Headquarters recommended resumption of BITs.
evidenced in the final waterboard session of Abu Zubaydah. According to a senior CTC officer, the interrogation team considered Abu Zubaydah to be compliant and wanted to terminate EITs. Believed Abu Zubaydah continued to withhold information at the time it
generated substantial pressure from Headquarters to continue use of
the EITs. According to this senior officer, the decision to resume use
of the waterboard on Abu Zubaydah was made by senior officers of
the DQ to assess Abu Zubaydah's compliance and witnessed the
final waterboard session, after which, they reported back to
Headquarters that the EITs were no longer needed on Abu
Zubaydah.

210.

EFFECTIVENESS

211. (TS.) The detention of terrorists has prevented
them from engaging in further terrorist activity, and their
interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the
identification and apprehension of other terrorists, warned of
terrorists plots planned for the United States and around the world,
and supported articles frequently used in the finished intelligence
publications for senior policymakers and war fighters. In this regard,
there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring the
effectiveness of EITs, however, is a more subjective process and not
without some concern.

212. (TS.) When the Agency began capturing
terrorists, management judged the success of the effort to be getting
them off the streets,
With the capture of terrorists who had access to much more significant, actionable information, the measure of success of the Program increasingly became the intelligence obtained from the detainees.

213. (TS) Quantitatively, the DO has significantly increased the number of counterterrorism intelligence reports with the inclusion of information from detainees in its custody. Between 9/11 and the end of April 2003, the Agency produced over 3,000 intelligence reports from detainees. Most of the reports came from intelligence provided by the high value detainees at

214. (TS) CTC frequently uses the information from one detainee, as well as other sources, to vet the information of another detainee. Although lower-level detainees provide less information than the high value detainees, information from these detainees has, on many occasions, supplied the information needed to probe the high value detainees further. The triangulation of intelligence provides a fuller knowledge of Al-Qa'ida activities than would be possible from a single detainee. For example, Mustafa Ahmad Adam al-Hawsawi, the Al-Qa'ida financier who was captured with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, provided the Agency’s first intelligence pertaining to—a participant in the 9/11 terrorist plot. Hawsawi's information to obtain additional details about role from Khalid Shaykh Muhammad

215. (TS) Detainees have provided information on Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. Information of note includes: the modus operandi of Al-Qa'ida, terrorists who are capable of mounting attacks in the United States,
Detainee information has assisted in the identification of terrorists. For example, information from Abu Zubaydah helped lead to the identification of Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammed—operatives who had plans to detonate a uranium-topped dirty bomb in either Washington, D.C., or New York City. Riduan "Hambali" Isomuddin provided information that led to the arrest of previously unknown members of an Al-Qa'ida cell in Karachi. They were designated as pilots for an aircraft attack inside the United States. Many other detainees, including lower-level detainees such as Zubayr and Majid Khan, have provided leads to other terrorists, but probably the most prolific has been Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. He provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including Sayfullah Paracha and his son Uzair Paracha, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muhammad planned to use to smuggle explosives into the United States; Saleh Almari, a sleeper operative in New York; and Majid Khan, an operative who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's information also led to the investigation and prosecution of Iyman Faris, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in Ohio.
217. **Detained**, both planners and operatives, have also made the Agency aware of several plots planned for the United States and around the world. The plots include plans to attack the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan; hijack an aircraft and fly it into Heathrow Airport; loosen track spikes in an attempt to derail a train in the United States; blow up several U.S. gas stations to create panic and havoc; hijack an airplane and fly it into the tallest building in California in a west coast version of the World Trade Center attack; cut the lines of suspension bridges in New York in an effort to make them collapse; and

This Review did not uncover any evidence that these plots were imminent. Agency senior managers believe that lives have been saved as a result of the capture and interrogation of terrorists who were planning attacks, in particular Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, Abu Zubaydah, Hambali, and Al-Nashiri.

218. **Detained**, judge the reporting from detainees as one of the most important sources for finished intelligence. Viewed analysts' knowledge of the terrorist target as having much more depth as a result of information from detainees and estimated that detainee reporting is used in all counterterrorism articles produced for the most senior policymakers.

In an interview, the DCI
said he believes the use of EITs has proven to be extremely valuable in obtaining enormous amounts of critical threat information from detainees who had otherwise believed they were safe from any harm in the hands of Americans.

220. Inasmuch as EITs have been used only since August 2002, and they have not all been used with every high value detainee, there is limited data on which to assess their individual effectiveness. This Review identified concerns about the use of the waterboard, specifically whether the risks of its use were justified by the results, whether it has been unnecessarily used in some instances, and whether the fact that it is being applied in a manner different from its use in SERE training brings into question the continued applicability of the DOJ opinion to its use. Although the waterboard is the most intrusive of the EITs, the fact that precautions have been taken to provide on-site medical oversight in the use of all EITs is evidence that their use poses risks.

221. Determining the effectiveness of each EIT is important in facilitating Agency management's decision as to which techniques should be used and for how long. Measuring the overall effectiveness of EITs is challenging for a number of reasons including: (1) the Agency cannot determine with any certainty the totality of the intelligence the detainee actually possesses; (2) each detainee has different fears of and tolerance for EITs; (3) the application of the same EITs by different interrogators may have
222. [TS] The waterboard has been used on three detainees: Abu Zubaydah, Al-Nashiri, and Khalid Shaikh Muhammad. With the belief that each of the three detainees possessed perishable information about imminent threats against the United States.

223. [TS] Prior to the use of EITs, Abu Zubaydah provided information for intelligence reports. Interrogators applied the waterboard to Abu Zubaydah at least 83 times during August 2002. During the period between the end of the use of the waterboard and 30 April 2003, he provided information for approximately additional reports. It is not possible to say definitively that the waterboard is the reason for Abu Zubaydah's increased production, or if another factor, such as the length of detention, was the catalyst. Since the use of the waterboard, however, Abu Zubaydah has appeared to be cooperative.

224. [TS] With respect to Al-Nashiri, reported two waterboard sessions in November 2002, after which the psychologist/interrogators determined that Al-Nashiri was compliant. However, after being moved, Al-Nashiri was thought to be withholding information. Al-Nashiri subsequently received additional EITs, but not the waterboard. The Agency then determined Al-Nashiri to be "compliant." Because of the litany of
techniques used by different interrogators over a relatively short period of time, it is difficult to identify exactly why Al-Nashiri became more willing to provide information. However, following the use of EITs, he provided information about his most current operational planning and as opposed to the historical information he provided before the use of EITs.

On the other hand, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, an accomplished resistor, provided only a few intelligence reports prior to the use of the waterboard, and analysis of that information revealed that much of it was outdated, inaccurate, or incomplete. As a means of less active resistance, at the beginning of their interrogation, detainees routinely provide information that they know is already known. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad received 183 applications of the waterboard in March 2003.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM

The EITs used by the Agency under the CTC Program are inconsistent with the public policy positions that the United States has taken regarding human rights. This divergence has been a cause of concern to some Agency personnel involved with the Program.
Policy Considerations

227. (U//FOUO) Throughout its history, the United States has been an international proponent of human rights and has voiced opposition to torture and mistreatment of prisoners by foreign countries. This position is based upon fundamental principles that are deeply embedded in the American legal structure and jurisprudence. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, for example, require due process of law, while the Eighth Amendment bars "cruel and unusual punishments."

228. (U//FOUO) The President advised the Senate when submitting the Torture Convention for ratification that the United States would construe the requirement of Article 16 of the Convention to "undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture" as "roughly equivalent to" and "coextensive with the Constitutional guarantees against cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment." To this end, the United States submitted a reservation to the Torture Convention stating that the United States considers itself bound by Article 16 "only insofar as the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the 5th, 8th and/or 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." Although the Torture Convention expressly provides that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, including war or any other public emergency, and no order from a superior officer, justifies torture, no similar provision was included regarding acts of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."

81 (U//FOUO) See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Sen. Treaty Doc. 100-20, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 15, May 23, 1988; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Report 101-30, August 30, 1990, at 25, 29, quoting summary and analysis submitted by President Ronald Reagan, as revised by President George H.W. Bush.
TO

229. (U//FOUO) Annual U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices have repeatedly condemned harsh interrogation techniques utilized by foreign governments. For example, the 2002 Report, issued in March 2003, stated:

[The United States] have been given greater opportunity to make good on our commitment to uphold standards of human dignity and liberty .... [N]o country is exempt from scrutiny, and all countries benefit from constant striving to identify their weaknesses and improve their performance .... [T]he Reports serve as a gauge for our international human rights efforts, pointing to areas of progress and drawing our attention to new and continuing challenges.

In a world marching toward democracy and respect for human rights, the United States is a leader, a partner and a contributor. We have taken this responsibility with a deep and abiding belief that human rights are universal. They are not grounded exclusively in American or western values. But their protection worldwide serves a core U.S. national interest.

The State Department Report identified objectionable practices in a variety of countries including, for example, patterns of abuse of prisoners in Saudi Arabia by such means as "suspension from bars by handcuffs, and threats against family members, ... [being] forced constantly to lie on hard floors [and] deprived of sleep ...." Other reports have criticized hooding and stripping prisoners naked.

230. (U//FOUO) In June 2003, President Bush issued a statement in observance of "United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture." The statement said in part:

The United States declares its strong solidarity with torture victims across the world. Torture anywhere is an affront to human dignity everywhere. We are committed to building a world where human rights are respected and protected by the rule of law.
Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right . . . Yet torture continues to be practiced around the world by rogue regimes whose cruel methods match their determination to crush the human spirit . . .

Notorious human rights abusers . . . have sought to shield their abuses from the eyes of the world by staging elaborate deceptions and denying access to international human rights monitors . . .

The United States is committed to the worldwide elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by example. I call on all governments to join with the United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating, and prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and unusual punishment . . .

Concerns Over Participation in the CTC Program

231. (S//NF) During the course of this Review, a number of Agency officers expressed unsolicited concern about the possibility of recrimination or legal action resulting from their participation in the CTC Program. A number of officers expressed concern that a human rights group might pursue them for activities. Additionally, they feared that the Agency would not stand behind them if this occurred.

232. (S//NF) One officer expressed concern that one day, Agency officers will wind up on some "wanted list" to appear before the World Court for war crimes stemming from activities. Another said, "Ten years from now we're going to be sorry we're doing this . . . [but] it has to be done." He expressed concern that the CTC Program will be exposed in the news media and cited particular concern about the possibility of being named in a leak.
The number of detainees in CIA custody is relatively small by comparison with those in U.S. military custody. Nevertheless, the Agency, like the military, has an interest in the disposition of detainees and particular interest in those who, if not kept in isolation, would likely divulge information about the circumstances of their detention.
245. (NS) Policymakers have given consideration to prosecution as a viable possibility, at least for certain detainees. To date, however, no decision has been made to proceed with this option.

246.

247.

83 (U//FOUO) Memorandum for the Record, dated August 15, 2002, added pursuant to the SSCI.
CONCLUSIONS

250. (TS/NOFORN) The Agency's detention and interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the identification and apprehension of other terrorists and warned of terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world. The CTC Detention and Interrogation Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports and analytic products supporting the counterterrorism efforts of U.S. policymakers and military commanders. The effectiveness of particular interrogation techniques in eliciting information that might not otherwise have been obtained cannot be so easily measured, however.

251. (TS/NOFORN) After 11 September 2001, numerous Agency components and individuals invested immense time and effort to implement the CTC Program quickly, effectively, and within the law. The work of the Directorate of Operations, Counterterrorist Center (CTC), Office of General Counsel (OGC), Office of Medical Services (OMS), Office of Technical Service (OTS) has been especially notable. In effect, they began with almost no foundation, as the Agency had discontinued virtually all involvement in interrogations after encountering difficult issues with earlier interrogation programs in Central America and the Near East. Inevitably, there also have been some problems with current activities.

252. (S/ANE) OGC worked closely with DoJ to determine the legality of the measures that came to be known as enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs). OGC also consulted with White House and National Security Council officials regarding the proposed techniques. Those efforts and the resulting DoJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002 are well documented. That legal opinion was based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experience and expertise of non-Agency personnel and academics concerning whether long-term psychological effects would result from use of the proposed techniques.
253. (S/NF) The DoJ legal opinion upon which the Agency relies is based upon technical definitions of "severe" treatment and the "intent" of the interrogators, and consists of finely detailed analysis to buttress the conclusion that Agency officers properly carrying out EITs would not violate the Torture Convention's prohibition of torture, nor would they be subject to criminal prosecution under the U.S. torture statute. The opinion does not address the separate question of whether the application of standard or enhanced techniques by Agency officers is consistent with the undertaking, accepted conditionally by the United States regarding Article 16 of the Torture Convention, to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."

254. (TS/SSCI) Periodic efforts by the Agency to elicit reaffirmation of Administration policy and DoJ legal backing for the Agency's use of EITs—as they have actually been employed—have been well advised and successful. However, in this process, Agency officials have neither sought nor been provided a written statement of policy or a formal signed update of the DoJ legal opinion, including such important determinations as the meaning and applicability of Article 16 of the Torture Convention. In July 2003, the DCI and the General Counsel briefed senior Administration officials on the Agency's expanded use of EITs. At that time, the Attorney General affirmed that the Agency's conduct remained well within the scope of the 1 August 2002 DoJ legal opinion.

255. (TS/SSCI) A number of Agency officers of various grade levels who are involved with detention and interrogation activities are concerned that they may at some future date be vulnerable to legal action in the United States or abroad and that the U.S. Government will not stand behind them. Although the current detention and interrogation Program has been subject to DoJ legal review and Administration political approval, it diverges sharply from previous Agency policy and practice, rules that govern interrogations by U.S. military and law enforcement officers, statements of U.S. policy by the Department of State, and public
statements by very senior U.S. officials, including the President, as well as the policies expressed by Members of Congress, other Western governments, international organizations, and human rights groups. In addition, some Agency officers are aware of interrogation activities that were outside or beyond the scope of the written DoJ opinion. Officers are concerned that future public revelation of the CTC Program is inevitable and will seriously damage Agency officers' personal reputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency itself.

256. (TS, 0) The Agency has generally provided good guidance and support to its officers who have been detaining and interrogating high value terrorists using EITs pursuant to . In particular, CTC did a commendable job in directing the interrogations of high value detainees at . At these foreign locations, Agency personnel—with one notable exception described in this Review—followed guidance and procedures and documented their activities well.

257. (TS) By distinction, the Agency—especially in the early months of the Program—failed to provide adequate staffing, guidance, and support to those involved with the detention and interrogation of detainees in

258. (TS) Unauthorized, improvised, inhumane, and undocumented detention and interrogation techniques were used referred to the Department of Justice (DoJ) for potential prosecution.
subject of a separate Report of Investigation by the Office of Inspector General.

Unauthorized techniques were used in the interrogation of an individual who died at Asadabad Base while under interrogation by an Agency contractor in June 2003. Agency officers did not normally conduct interrogations at that location. The Agency officers involved lacked timely and adequate guidance, training, experience, supervision, or authorization, and did not exercise sound judgment.

259. The Agency failed to issue in a timely manner comprehensive written guidelines for detention and interrogation activities. Although ad hoc guidance was provided to many officers through cables and briefings in the early months of detention and interrogation activities, the DCI Confinement and Interrogation Guidelines were not issued until January 2003, several months after initiation of interrogation activity and after many of the unauthorized activities had taken place.

260. Such written guidance as does exist to address detentions and interrogations undertaken by Agency officers is inadequate. The Directorate of Operations Handbook contains a single paragraph that is intended to guide officers. Neither this dated guidance nor general Agency guidelines on routine intelligence collection is adequate to instruct and protect Agency officers involved in contemporary interrogation activities.

261. During the interrogations of two detainees, the waterboard was used in a manner inconsistent with the written DoJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002. DoJ had stipulated that
its advice was based upon certain facts that the Agency had submitted to DoJ, observing, for example, that "... you (the Agency) have also orally informed us that although some of these techniques may be used with more than once [sic], that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions." One key Al-Qaeda terrorist was subjected to the waterboard at least 183 times and was denied sleep for a period of 180 hours. In this and another instance, the technique of application and volume of water used differed from the DoJ opinion.

262. (TS.) OMS provided comprehensive medical attention to detainees where BITs were employed with high value detainees. OMS did not issue formal medical guidelines until April 2003. Per the advice of CTC/Legal, the OMS Guidelines were then issued as "draft" and remain so even after being re-issued in September 2003.

263.

264. (TS.) Agency officers report that reliance on analytical assessments that were unsupported by credible intelligence may have resulted in the application of BITs without justification. Some participants in the Program, particularly field interrogators, judge that CTC assessments to the effect that detainees are withholding information are not always supported by an objective
evaluation of available information and the evaluation of the interrogators but are too heavily based, instead, on presumptions of what the individual might or should know.

265.

266. (NS) The Agency faces potentially serious long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of EITs and the inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it will ultimately do with terrorists detained by the Agency.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1.
Appendix A
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES

1. (NSI) A team, led by the Deputy Inspector General, and comprising the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, the Counsel to the Inspector General, a senior Investigations Staff Manager, three Investigators, two Inspectors, an Auditor, a Research Assistant, and a Secretary participated in this Review.

2. (NSI) OIG tasked relevant components for all information regarding the treatment and interrogation of all individuals detained by or on behalf of CIA after 9/11. Agency components provided OIG with over 38,000 pages of documents. OIG conducted over 100 interviews with individuals who possessed potentially relevant information. We interviewed senior Agency management officials, including the DCI, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Executive Director, the General Counsel, and the Deputy Director for Operations. As new information developed, OIG re-interviewed several individuals.

3. (NSI) OIG personnel made site visits to the interrogation facilities. OIG personnel also visited Abu Zubaydah to review 92 videotapes of interrogations
Appendix B
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001 Dec</td>
<td>Chairman Rice and Chairman Houghton begin research on interrogation issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Nov</td>
<td>CIA begins policy review on ERTs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Dec</td>
<td>Agency initiates use of ERTs on Abu Zubaydah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Feb-Mar</td>
<td>DC takes lead on Congressional oversight of Guantanamo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Apr</td>
<td>Nutall Shabani Mohamed captured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Jan</td>
<td>DCI issues Condition and Interrogation Guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Jan</td>
<td>ODB captures Boukhari, requires that subject poses a continuing serious threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Jan</td>
<td>Attorney General certifies death.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C
Memorandum for John Rizzo
Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency

Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative

You have asked for this Office's views on whether certain proposed conduct would violate the prohibition against torture found at Section 2340A of Title 18 of the United States Code. You have asked for this advice in the course of conducting interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. As we understand it, Zubaydah is one of the highest ranking members of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, with which the United States is currently engaged in an international armed conflict following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. This letter memorializes our previous oral advice, given on July 24, 2002 and July 26, 2002, that the proposed conduct would not violate this prohibition.

I.

Our advice is based upon the following facts, which you have provided to us. We also understand that you do not have any facts in your possession contrary to the facts outlined here, and this opinion is limited to these facts. If these facts were to change, this advice would not necessarily apply. Zubaydah is currently being held by the United States. The interrogation team is certain that he has additional information that he refuses to divulge. Specifically, he is withholding information regarding terrorist networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the United States or against our interests overseas. Zubaydah has become accustomed to a certain level of treatment and displays no signs of willingness to disclose further information. Moreover, your intelligence indicates that there is currently a level of "chatter" equal to that which preceded the September 11 attacks. In light of the information you believe Zubaydah has and the high level of threat you believe now exists, you wish to move the interrogations into what you have described as an "increased pressure phase."

As part of this increased pressure phase, Zubaydah will have contact only with a new interrogation specialist, whom he has not met previously, and the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape ("SERE") training psychologist who has been involved with the interrogations since they began. This phase will likely last no more than several days but could last up to thirty days. In this phase, you would like to employ techniques that you believe will dislocate his
expectations regarding the treatment he believes he will receive and encourage him to disclose the crucial information mentioned above. These ten techniques are: (1) attention grasp, (2) wailing, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard. You have informed us that the use of these techniques would be on an as-needed basis and that not all of these techniques will necessarily be used. The interrogation team would use these techniques in some combination to convince Zubaydah that the only way he can influence his surrounding environment is through cooperation. You have, however, informed us that you expect these techniques to be used in some sort of escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard, though not necessarily ending with this technique. Moreover, you have also orally informed us that although some of these techniques may be used with more than once, that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions. You have also informed us that Zubaydah sustained a wound during his capture, which is being treated.

Based on the facts you have given us, we understand each of these techniques to be as follows. The attention grasp consists of grasping the individual with both hands, one hand on each side of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the same motion as the grasp, the individual is drawn toward the interrogator.

For wailing, a flexible false wall will be constructed. The individual is placed with his heels touching the wall. The interrogator pulls the individual forward and then quickly and firmly pushes the individual into the wall. It is the individual’s shoulder blades that hit the wall. During this motion, the head and neck are supported with a rolled hood or towel that provides a collar effect to help prevent whiplash. To further reduce the probability of injury, the individual is allowed to rebound from the flexible wall. You have orally informed us that the false wall is in part constructed to create a loud sound when the individual hits it, which will further shock or surprise in the individual. In part, the idea is to create a sound that will make the impact seem far worse than it is and that will be far worse than any injury that might result from the action.

The facial hold is used to hold the head immobile. One open palm is placed on either side of the individual’s face. The fingertips are kept well away from the individual’s eyes.

With the facial slap or insult slap, the interrogator slaps the individual’s face with fingers slightly spread. The hand makes contact with the area directly between the tip of the individual’s chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe. The interrogator invades the individual’s personal space. The goal of the facial slap is not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting. Instead, the purpose of the facial slap is to induce shock, surprise, and/or humiliation.

Cramped confinement involves the placement of the individual in a confined space, the dimensions of which restrict the individual’s movement. The confined space is usually dark.
The duration of confinement varies based upon the size of the container. For the larger confined space, the individual can stand up or sit down; the smaller space is large enough for the subject to sit down. Confinement in the larger space can last up to eighteen hours; for the smaller space, confinement lasts for no more than two hours.

Wall standing is used to induce muscle fatigue. The individual stands about four to five feet from a wall, with his feet spread approximately to shoulder width. His arms are stretched out in front of him, with his fingers resting on the wall. His fingers support all of his body weight. The individual is not permitted to move or reposition his hands or feet.

A variety of stress positions may be used. You have informed us that these positions are not designed to produce the pain associated with contortions or twisting of the body. Rather, somewhat like walling, they are designed to produce the physical discomfort associated with muscle fatigue. Two particular stress positions are likely to be used on Zubaydah: (1) sitting on the floor with legs extended straight out in front of him with his arms raised above his head; and (2) kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle. You have also orally informed us that through observing Zubaydah in captivity, you have noted that he appears to be quite flexible despite his wound.

Sleep deprivation may be used. You have indicated that your purpose in using this technique is to reduce the individual’s ability to think and, through the discomfort associated with lack of sleep, to motivate him to cooperate. The effects of such sleep deprivation will generally abate after one or two nights of uninterrupted sleep. You have informed us that your research has revealed that, in rare instances, some individuals who are already predisposed to psychological problems may experience abnormal reactions to sleep deprivation. Even in those cases, however, reactions abate after the individual is permitted to sleep. Moreover, personnel with medical training are available to and will intervene in the unlikely event of an abnormal reaction. You have orally informed us that you would not deprive Zubaydah of sleep for more than eleven days at a time and that you have previously kept him awake for 72 hours, from which no mental or physical harm resulted.

You would like to place Zubaydah in a cramped confinement box with an insect. You have informed us that he appears to have a fear of insects. In particular, you would like to tell Zubaydah that you intend to place a stinging insect into the box with him. You would, however, place a harmless insect in the box. You have orally informed us that you would in fact place a harmless insect such as a caterpillar in the box with him.

Finally, you would like to use a technique called the “waterboard.” In this procedure, the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench, which is approximately four feet by seven feet. The individual’s feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water
is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, airflow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood. This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces the perception of "suffocation and incipient panic," i.e., the perception of drowning. The individual does not breathe any water into his lungs. During these 20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of twelve to twenty-four inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated. The water is usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering can with a spout. You have orally informed us that this procedure triggers an automatic physiological sensation of drowning that the individual cannot control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not drowning. You have also orally informed us that it is likely that this procedure would not last more than 20 minutes in any one application.

We also understand that a medical expert with SERE experience will be present throughout this phase and that the procedures will be stopped if deemed medically necessary to prevent severe mental or physical harm to Zubaydah. As mentioned above, Zubaydah suffered an injury during his capture. You have informed us that steps will be taken to ensure that this injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these methods and that adequate medical attention will be given to ensure that it will heal properly.

II.

In this part, we review the context within which these procedures will be applied. You have informed us that you have taken various steps to ascertain what effect, if any, these techniques would have on Zubaydah's mental health. These same techniques, with the exception of the insect in the cramped confined space, have been used and continue to be used on some members of our military personnel during their SERE training. Because of the use of these procedures in training our own military personnel to resist interrogations, you have consulted with various individuals who have extensive experience in the use of these techniques. You have done so in order to ensure that no prolonged mental harm would result from the use of these proposed procedures.

Through your consultation with various individuals responsible for such training, you have learned that these techniques have been used as elements of a course of conduct without any reported incident of prolonged mental harm. As reported, during the seven-year period that he spent in those positions, there were two requests from Congress for information concerning alleged injuries resulting from the training. One of these inquiries was prompted by the temporary physical injury a trainee sustained as result of being placed in a
TOP SECRET

confinement box. The other inquiry involved claims that the SERE training caused two
individuals to engage in criminal behavior, namely, felony shoplifting and downloading child
pornography onto a military computer. According to this official, these claims were found to be
baseless. Moreover, he has indicated that during the three and a half years he spent as
head of the SERE program, he trained 10,000 students. Of those students, only two
dropped out of the training following the use of these techniques. Although on rare occasions
some students temporarily postponed the remainder of their training and received psychological
counseling, those students were able to finish the program without any indication of subsequent
mental health effects.

You have informed us that you have consulted with [redacted], who has ten
years of experience with SERE training. [Redacted] has indicated that during those
ten years, to the best of his knowledge, none of the individuals who completed the program suffered any
adverse mental health effects. He informed you that there was one person who did not complete
the training. That person experienced an adverse mental health reaction that lasted only two
hours. After those two hours, the individual’s symptoms spontaneously dissipated without
requiring treatment or counseling and no other symptoms were ever reported by this individual.
According to the information you have provided to us, this assessment of the use of these
procedures includes the use of the waterboard.

Additionally, you received a memorandum from [redacted], who has experience with the use of all of these procedures in a course of conduct, with the exception of the insect in the confinement box and the waterboard. This memorandum confirms that the use of these procedures has not resulted in any reported instances of prolonged mental harm, and
very few instances of immediate and temporary adverse psychological responses to the training.

We have reported that a small minority of students have had temporary adverse
psychological reactions during training. Of the 26,829 students trained from 1992 through 2001
in the Air Force SERE training, 4.3 percent of those students had contact with psychology
services. Of those 4.3 percent, only 3.2 percent were pulled from the program for psychological
reasons. Thus, out of the students trained overall, only 0.14 percent were pulled from the
program for psychological reasons. Furthermore, although [redacted] indicated that surveys
of students having completed this training are not done, he expressed confidence that the training
did not cause any long-term psychological impact. He based his conclusion on the debriefing of
students that is done after the training. More importantly, he based this assessment on the fact
that although training is required to be extremely stressful in order to be effective, very few
complaints have been made regarding the training. During his tenure, in which 10,000 students
were trained, no congressional complaints have been made. While there was one Inspector
General complaint, it was not due to psychological concerns. Moreover, he was aware of only
one letter inquiring about the long-term impact of these techniques from an individual trained

TOP SECRET
over twenty years ago. He found that it was impossible to attribute this individual’s symptoms to his training. Concluded that if there are any long-term psychological effects of the United States Air Force training using the procedures outlined above they “are certainly minimal.”

With respect to the waterboard, you have also orally informed us that the Navy continues to use it in training. You have informed us that your on-site psychologists, who have extensive experience with the use of the waterboard in Navy training, have not encountered any significant long-term mental health consequences from its use. Your on-site psychologists have also indicated that JPRC has likewise not reported any significant long-term mental health consequences from the use of the waterboard. You have informed us that other services ceased use of the waterboard because it was so successful as an interrogation technique, but not because of any concerns over any harm, physical or mental, caused by it. It was also reported to be almost 100 percent effective in producing cooperation among the trainees. Also indicated that he had observed the use of the waterboard in Navy training some ten to twelve times. Each time it resulted in cooperation but it did not result in any physical harm to the student.

You have also reviewed the relevant literature and found no empirical data on the effect of these techniques, with the exception of sleep deprivation. With respect to sleep deprivation, you have informed us that is not uncommon for someone to be deprived of sleep for 72 hours and still perform excellently on visual-spatial motor tasks and short-term memory tests. Although some individuals may experience hallucinations, according to the literature you surveyed, those who experience such psychotic symptoms have almost always had such episodes prior to the sleep deprivation. You have indicated the studies of lengthy sleep deprivation showed no psychosis, loosening of thoughts, flattening of emotions, delusions, or paranoid ideas. In one case, even after eleven days of deprivation, no psychosis or permanent brain damage occurred. In fact the individual reported feeling almost back to normal after one night’s sleep. Further, based on the experiences with its use in military training (where it is induced for up to 48 hours), you found that rarely, if ever, will the individual suffer harm after the sleep deprivation is discontinued. Instead, the effects remit after a few good nights of sleep.

You have taken the additional step of consulting with U.S. interrogations experts, and other individuals with oversight over the SERE training process. None of these individuals was aware of any prolonged psychological effect caused by the use of any of the above techniques either separately or as a course of conduct. Moreover, you consulted with outside psychologists who reported that they were unaware of any cases where long-term problems have occurred as a result of these techniques.

Moreover, in consulting with a number of mental health experts, you have learned that the effect of any of these procedures will be dependant on the individual’s personal history, cultural history and psychological tendencies. To that end, you have informed us that you have
completed a psychological assessment of Zubaydah. This assessment is based on interviews with Zubaydah, observations of him, and information collected from other sources such as intelligence and press reports. Our understanding of Zubaydah's psychological profile, which we set forth below, is based on that assessment.

According to this assessment, Zubaydah, though only 31, rose quickly from very low level mujahedin to third or fourth man in al Qaeda. He has served as Usama Bin Laden's senior lieutenant. In that capacity, he has managed a network of training camps. He has been instrumental in the training of operatives for al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist elements inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. He acted as the Deputy Camp Commander for al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, personally approving entry and graduation of all trainees during 1999-2000. From 1996 until 1999, he approved all individuals going in and out of Afghanistan to the training camps. Further, no one went in and out of Peshawar, Pakistan without his knowledge and approval. He also acted as al Qaeda's coordinator of external contacts and foreign communications. Additionally, he has acted as al Qaeda's counterintelligence officer and has been trusted to find spies within the organization.

Zubaydah has been involved in every major terrorist operation carried out by al Qaeda. He was a planner for the Millennium plot to attack U.S. and Israeli targets during the Millennium celebrations in Jordan. Two of the central figures in this plot who were arrested have identified Zubaydah as the supporter of their cell and the plot. He also served as a planner for the Paris Embassy plot in 2001. Moreover, he was one of the planners of the September 11 attacks. Prior to his capture, he was engaged in planning future terrorist attacks against U.S. interests.

Your psychological assessment indicates that it is believed Zubaydah wrote al Qaeda's manual on resistance techniques. You also believe that his experiences in al Qaeda make him well-acquainted with and well-versed in such techniques. As part of his role in al Qaeda, Zubaydah visited individuals in prison and helped them upon their release. Through this contact and activities with other al Qaeda mujahedin, you believe that he knows many stories of capture, interrogation, and resistance to such interrogation. Additionally, he has spoken with Ayman al-Zawahiri, and you believe it is likely that the two discussed Zawahiri's experiences as a prisoner of the Russians and the Egyptians.

Zubaydah stated during interviews that he thinks of any activity outside of jihad as "silly." He has indicated that his heart and mind are devoted to serving Allah and Islam through jihad and he has stated that he has no doubts or regrets about committing himself to jihad. Zubaydah believes that the global victory of Islam is inevitable. You have informed us that he continues to express his unabated desire to kill Americans and Jews.

Your psychological assessment describes his personality as follows. He is "a highly self-directed individual who prizes his independence." He has "narcissistic features," which are evidenced in the attention he pays to his personal appearance and his "obvious efforts" to
TOP SECRET

He is "somewhat compulsive" in how he organizes his environment and business. He is confident, self-assured, and possesses an air of authority. While he admits to at times wrestling with how to determine who is an "innocent," he has acknowledged celebrating the destruction of the World Trade Center. He is intelligent and intellectually curious. He displays "excellent self-discipline." The assessment describes him as a perfectionist, persistent, private, and highly capable in his social interactions. He is very guarded about opening up to others and your assessment repeatedly emphasizes that he tends not to trust others easily. He is also "quick to recognize and assess the moods and motivations of others." Furthermore, he is proud of his ability to lie and deceive others successfully. Through his deception he has, among other things, prevented the location of al Qaeda safehouses and even acquired a United Nations refugee identification card.

According to your reports, Zubaydah does not have any pre-existing mental conditions or problems that would make him likely to suffer prolonged mental harm from your proposed interrogation methods. Through reading his diaries and interviewing him, you have found no history of "mood disturbance or other psychiatric pathology[,] ... enduring mood or mental health problems." He is in fact "remarkably resilient and confident that he can overcome adversity." When he encounters stress or low mood, this appears to last only for a short time. He deals with stress by assessing its source, evaluating the coping resources available to him, and then taking action. Your assessment notes that he is "generally self-sufficient and relies on his understanding and application of religious and psychological principles, intelligence and discipline to avoid and overcome problems." Moreover, you have found that he has a "reliable and durable support system" in his faith, "the blessings of religious leaders, and camaraderie of like-minded mujahedin brothers." During detention, Zubaydah has managed his mood, remaining at most points "circumspect, calm, controlled, and deliberate." He has maintained this demeanor during aggressive interrogations and reductions in sleep. You describe that in an initial confrontational incident, Zubaydah showed signs of sympathetic nervous system arousal, which you think was possibly fear. Although this incident led him to disclose intelligence information, he was able to quickly regain his composure, his air of confidence, and his "strong resolve" not to reveal any information.

Overall, you summarize his primary strengths as the following: ability to focus, goal-directed discipline, intelligence, emotional resilience, street savvy, ability to organize and manage people, keen observation skills, fluid adaptability (can anticipate and adapt under duress and with minimal resources), capacity to assess and exploit the needs of others, and ability to adjust goals to emerging opportunities.

You anticipate that he will draw upon his vast knowledge of interrogation techniques to cope with the interrogation. Your assessment indicates that Zubaydah may be willing to die to protect the most important information that he holds. Nonetheless, you are of the view that his belief that Islam will ultimately dominate the world and that this victory is inevitable may provide the chance that Zubaydah will give information and rationalize it solely as a temporary
Section 2340A makes it a criminal offense for any person "outside of the United States [to] commit[] or attempt[] to commit torture." Section 2340(1) defines torture as:

an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or control.

18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). As we outlined in our opinion on standards of conduct under Section 2340A, a violation of 2340A requires a showing that: (1) the torture occurred outside the United States; (2) the defendant acted under the color of law; (3) the victim was within the defendant's custody or control; (4) the defendant specifically intended to inflict severe pain or suffering; and (5) that the act inflicted severe pain or suffering. See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2346 at 3 (August 1, 2002) ("Section 2340A Memorandum"). You have asked us to assume that Zubayadah is being held outside the United States, Zubayadah is within U.S. custody, and the interrogators are acting under the color of law. At issue is whether the last two elements would be met by the use of the proposed procedures, namely, whether those using these procedures would have the requisite mental state and whether these procedures would inflict severe pain or suffering within the meaning of the statute.

Severe Pain or Suffering. In order for pain or suffering to rise to the level of torture, the statute requires that it be severe. As we have previously explained, this reaches only extreme acts. See id. at 13. Nonetheless, drawing upon cases under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which has a definition of torture that is similar to Section 2340's definition, we found that a single event of sufficiently intense pain may fall within this prohibition. See id. at 26. As a result, we have analyzed each of those techniques separately. In further drawing upon those cases, we also have found that courts tend to take a totality-of-the-circumstances approach and consider an entire course of conduct to determine whether torture has occurred. See id. at 27. Therefore, in addition to considering each technique separately, we consider them together as a course of conduct.

Section 2340 defines torture as the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering. We will consider physical pain and mental pain separately. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). With respect to physical pain, we previously concluded that "severe pain" within the meaning of...
Section 2340 is pain that is difficult for the individual to endure and is of an intensity akin to the pain accompanying serious physical injury. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 6. Drawing upon the TVPA precedent, we have noted that examples of acts inflicting severe pain that typify torture are, among other things, severe beatings with weapons such as clubs, and the burning of prisoners. See id. at 24. We conclude below that none of the proposed techniques inflicts such pain.

The facial hold and the attention grasp involve no physical pain. In the absence of such pain it is obvious that they cannot be said to inflict severe physical pain or suffering. The stress positions and wall standing both may result in muscle fatigue. Each involves the sustained holding of a position. In wall standing, it will be holding a position in which all of the individual’s body weight is placed on his finger tips. The stress positions will likely include sitting on the floor with legs extended straight out in front and arms raised above the head, and kneeling on the floor and leaning back at a 45 degree angle. Any pain associated with muscle fatigue is not of the intensity sufficient to amount to “severe physical pain or suffering” under the statute, nor, despite its discomfort, can it be said to be difficult to endure. Moreover, you have orally informed us that no stress position will be used that could interfere with the healing of Zubaydah’s wound. Therefore, we conclude that these techniques involve discomfort that falls far below the threshold of severe physical pain.

Similarly, although the confinement boxes (both small and large) are physically uncomfortable because their size restricts movement, they are not so small as to require the individual to contort his body to sit (small box) or stand (large box). You have also orally informed us that despite his wound, Zubaydah remains quite flexible, which would substantially reduce any pain associated with being placed in the box. We have no information from the medical experts you have consulted that the limited duration for which the individual is kept in the boxes causes any substantial physical pain. As a result, we do not think the use of these boxes can be said to cause pain that is of the intensity associated with serious physical injury.

The use of one of these boxes with the introduction of an insect does not alter this assessment. As we understand it, no actually harmful insect will be placed in the box. Thus, though the introduction of an insect may produce trepidation in Zubaydah (which we discuss below), it certainly does not cause physical pain.

As for sleep deprivation, it is clear that depriving someone of sleep does not involve severe physical pain within the meaning of the statute. While sleep deprivation may involve some physical discomfort, such as the fatigue or the discomfort experienced in the difficulty of keeping one’s eyes open, these effects remit after the individual is permitted to sleep. Based on the facts you have provided us, we are not aware of any evidence that sleep deprivation results in severe physical pain or suffering. As a result, its use does not violate Section 2340A.

Even those techniques that involve physical contact between the interrogator and the
individual do not result in severe pain. The facial slap and walling contain precautions to ensure that no pain even approaching this level results. The slap is delivered with fingers slightly spread, which you have explained to us is designed to be less painful than a closed-hand slap. The slap is also delivered to the fleshy part of the face, further reducing any risk of physical damage or serious pain. The facial slap does not produce pain that is difficult to endure. Likewise, walling involves quickly pulling the person forward and then thrusting him against a flexible false wall. You have informed us that the sound hitting the wall will actually be far worse than any possible injury to the individual. The use of the rolled towel around the neck also reduces any risk of injury. While it may hurt to be pushed against the wall, any pain experienced is not of the intensity associated with serious physical injury.

As we understand it, when the waterboard is used, the subject's body responds as if the subject were drowning—even though the subject may be well aware that he is in fact not drowning. You have informed us that this procedure does not inflict actual physical harm. Thus, although the subject may experience the fear or panic associated with the feeling of drowning, the waterboard does not inflict physical pain. As we explained in the Section 2340A Memorandum, "pain and suffering" as used in Section 2340 is best understood as a single concept, not distinct concepts of "pain" as distinguished from "suffering." See Section 2340A Memorandum at 6 n.3. The waterboard, which inflicts no pain or actual harm whatsoever, does not, in our view inflict "severe pain or suffering." Even if one were to parse the statute more finely to attempt to treat "suffering" as a distinct concept, the waterboard could not be said to inflict severe suffering. The waterboard is simply a controlled acute episode, lacking the connotation of a protracted period of time generally given to suffering.

Finally, as we discussed above, you have informed us that in determining which procedures to use and how you will use them, you have selected techniques that will not harm Zubaydah's wound. You have also indicated that numerous steps will be taken to ensure that none of these procedures in any way interferes with the proper healing of Zubaydah's wound. You have also indicated that, should it appear at any time that Zubaydah is experiencing severe pain or suffering, the medical personnel on hand will stop the use of any technique.

Even when all of these methods are considered combined in an overall course of conduct, they still would not inflict severe physical pain or suffering. As discussed above, a number of these acts result in no physical pain, others produce only physical discomfort. You have indicated that these acts will not be used with substantial repetition, so that there is no possibility that severe physical pain could arise from such repetition. Accordingly, we conclude that these acts neither separately nor as part of a course of conduct would inflict severe physical pain or suffering within the meaning of the statute.

We next consider whether the use of these techniques would inflict severe mental pain or suffering within the meaning of Section 2340. Section 2340 defines severe mental pain or suffering as "the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from one of several predicate
acts. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2). Those predicate acts are: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that any of the preceding acts will be done to another person. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(A)-(D). As we have explained, this list of predicate acts is exclusive. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 8. No other acts can support a charge under Section 2340A based on the infliction of severe mental pain or suffering. See id. Thus, if the methods that you have described do not either in and of themselves constitute one of these acts or as a course of conduct fulfill the predicate act requirement, the prohibition has not been violated. See id. Before addressing these techniques, we note that it is plain that none of these procedures involves a threat to any third party, the use of any kind of drugs, or for the reasons described above, the infliction of severe physical pain. Thus, the question is whether any of these acts, separately or as a course of conduct, constitutes a threat of severe physical pain or suffering, a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the senses, or a threat of imminent death. As we previously explained, whether an action constitutes a threat must be assessed from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the subject’s position. See id. at 9.

No argument can be made that the attention grasp or the facial hold constitute threats of imminent death or are procedures designed to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. In general the grasp and the facial hold will startle the subject, produce fear, or even insult him. As you have informed us, the use of these techniques is not accompanied by a specific verbal threat of severe physical pain or suffering. To the extent that these techniques could be considered a threat of severe physical pain or suffering, such a threat would have to be inferred from the acts themselves. Because these actions themselves involve no pain, neither could be interpreted by a reasonable person in Zubaydah’s position to constitute a threat of severe pain or suffering. Accordingly, these two techniques are not predicate acts within the meaning of Section 2340.

The facial slap likewise falls outside the set of predicate acts. It plainly is not a threat of imminent death, under Section 2340(2)(C), or a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality, under Section 2340(2)(B). Though it may hurt, as discussed above, the effect is one of smarting or stinging and surprise or humiliation, but not severe pain. Nor does it alone constitute a threat of severe pain or suffering, under Section 2340(2)(A). Like the facial hold and the attention grasp, the use of this slap is not accompanied by a specific verbal threat of further escalating violence. Additionally, you have informed us that in one use this technique will typically involve at most two slaps. Certainly, the use of this slap may dislodge any expectation that Zubaydah had that he would not be touched in a physically aggressive manner. Nonetheless, this alteration in his expectations could hardly be construed by a reasonable person in his situation to be tantamount to a threat of severe physical pain or suffering. At most, this technique suggests that the circumstances of his confinement and interrogation have changed. Therefore, the facial slap is not within the statute’s exclusive list of predicate acts.
Walling plainly is not a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. While walling involves what might be characterized as rough handling, it does not involve the threat of imminent death or, as discussed above, the infliction of severe physical pain. Moreover, once again we understand that use of this technique will not be accompanied by any specific verbal threat that violence will ensue absent cooperation. Thus, like the facial slap, walling can only constitute a threat of severe physical pain if a reasonable person would infer such a threat from the use of the technique itself. Walling does not in and of itself inflict severe pain or suffering. Like the facial slap, walling may alter the subject’s expectation as to the treatment he believes he will receive. Nonetheless, the character of the action falls so far short of-inflicting severe pain or suffering within the meaning of the statute that even if he inferred that greater aggressiveness was to follow, the type of actions that could be reasonably be anticipated would still fall below anything sufficient to inflict severe physical pain or suffering under the statute. Thus, we conclude that this technique falls outside the proscribed predicate acts.

Like walling, stress positions and wall-standing are not procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses, nor are they threats of imminent death. These procedures, as discussed above, involve the use of muscle fatigue to encourage cooperation and do not themselves constitute the infliction of severe physical pain or suffering. Moreover, there is no aspect of violence to either technique that remotely suggests future severe pain or suffering from which such a threat of future harm could be inferred. They simply involve forcing the subject to remain in uncomfortable positions. While these acts may indicate to the subject that he may be placed in these positions again if he does not disclose information, the use of these techniques would not suggest to a reasonable person in the subject’s position that he is being threatened with severe pain or suffering. Accordingly, we conclude that these two procedures do not constitute any of the predicate acts set forth in Section 2340(2).

As with the other techniques discussed so far, cramped confinement is not a threat of imminent death. It may be argued that, focusing in part on the fact that the boxes will be without light, placement in these boxes would constitute a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the senses. As we explained in our recent opinion, however, to “disrupt profoundly the senses” a technique must produce an extreme effect in the subject. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 10–12. We have previously concluded that this requires that the procedure cause substantial interference with the individual’s cognitive abilities or fundamentally alter his personality. See id. at 11. Moreover, the statute requires that such procedures must be calculated to produce this effect. See id. at 10; 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(B).

With respect to the small confinement box, you have informed us that he would spend at most two hours in this box. You have informed us that your purpose in using these boxes is not to interfere with his senses or his personality, but to cause him physical discomfort that will encourage him to disclose critical information. Moreover, your imposition of time limitations on the use of either of the boxes also indicates that the use of these boxes is not designed or calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. For the larger box, in which he can
both stand and sit, he may be placed in this box for up to eighteen hours at a time, while you have informed us that he will never spend more than an hour at a time in the smaller box. These time limits further ensure that no profound disruption of the senses or personality, were it even possible, would result. As such, the use of the confinement boxes does not constitute a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.

Nor does the use of the boxes threaten Zubaydah with severe physical pain or suffering. While additional time spent in the boxes may be threatened, their use is not accompanied by any express threats of severe physical pain or suffering. Like the stress positions and walling, placement in the boxes is physically uncomfortable but any such discomfort does not rise to the level of severe physical pain or suffering. Accordingly, a reasonable person in the subject’s position would not infer from the use of this technique that severe physical pain is the next step in his interrogator’s treatment of him. Therefore, we conclude that the use of the confinement boxes does not fall within the statute’s required predicate acts.

In addition to using the confinement boxes alone, you also would like to introduce an insect into one of the boxes with Zubaydah. As we understand it, you plan to inform Zubaydah that you are going to place a stinging insect into the box, but you will actually place a harmless insect in the box, such as a caterpillar. If you do so, to ensure that you are outside the predicate act requirement, you must inform him that the insects will not have a sting that would produce death or severe pain. If, however, you were to place the insect without informing him that you are doing so, then, in order to not commit a predicate act, you should not affirmatively lead him to believe that any insect is present which has a sting that could produce severe pain or suffering or even cause his death.

So long as you take either of the approaches we have described, the insect’s placement in the box would not constitute a threat of severe physical pain or suffering to a reasonable person in his position. An individual placed in a box, even an individual with a fear of insects, would not reasonably feel threatened with severe physical pain or suffering if a caterpillar was placed in the box. Further, you have informed us that you are not aware that Zubaydah has any allergies to insects, and you have not informed us of any other factors that would cause a reasonable person in that same situation to believe that an unknown insect would cause him severe physical pain or death. Thus, we conclude that the placement of the insect in the confinement box with Zubaydah would not constitute a predicate act.

Sleep deprivation also clearly does not involve a threat of imminent death. Although it produces physical discomfort, it cannot be said to constitute a threat of severe physical pain or suffering from the perspective of a reasonable person in Zubaydah’s position. Nor could sleep deprivation constitute a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses, so long as sleep deprivation (as you have informed us is your intent) is used for limited periods, before hallucinations or other profound disruptions of the senses would occur. To be sure, sleep deprivation may reduce the subject’s ability to think on his feet. Indeed, you indicate that this is...
the intended result. His mere reduced ability to evade your questions and resist answering does not, however, rise to the level of disruption required by the statute. As we explained above, a disruption within the meaning of the statute is an extreme one, substantially interfering with an individual's cognitive abilities, for example, inducing hallucinations, or driving him to engage in uncharacteristic self-destructive behavior. See infra 13; Section 2340A Memorandum at 11. Therefore, the limited use of sleep deprivation does not constitute one of the required predicate acts.

We find that the use of the waterboard constitutes a threat of imminent death. As you have explained the waterboard procedure to us, it creates in the subject the uncontrollable physiological sensation that the subject is drowning. Although the procedure will be monitored by personnel with medical training and extensive SERE school experience with this procedure who will ensure the subject's mental and physical safety, the subject is not aware of any of these precautions. From the vantage point of any reasonable person undergoing this procedure in such circumstances, he would feel as if he is drowning at very moment of the procedure due to the uncontrollable physiological sensation he is experiencing. Thus, this procedure cannot be viewed as too uncertain to satisfy the imminence requirement. Accordingly, it constitutes a threat of imminent death and fulfills the predicate act requirement under the statute.

Although the waterboard constitutes a threat of imminent death, prolonged mental harm must nonetheless result to violate the statutory prohibition on infliction of severe mental pain or suffering. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 7. We have previously concluded that prolonged mental harm is mental harm of some lasting duration, e.g., mental harm lasting months or years. See id. Prolonged mental harm is not simply the stress experienced in, for example, an interrogation by state police. See id. Based on your research into the use of these methods at the SERE school and consultation with others with expertise in the field of psychology and interrogation, you do not anticipate that any prolonged mental harm would result from the use of the waterboard. Indeed, you have advised us that the relief is almost immediate when the cloth is removed from the nose and mouth. In the absence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental pain or suffering would have been inflicted, and the use of these procedures would not constitute torture within the meaning of the statute.

When these acts are considered as a course of conduct, we are unsure whether these acts may constitute a threat of severe physical pain or suffering. You have indicated to us that you have not determined either the order or the precise timing for implementing these procedures. It is conceivable that these procedures could be used in a course of escalating conduct, moving incrementally and rapidly from least physically intrusive, e.g., facial hold, to the most physical contact, e.g., walling or the waterboard. As we understand it, based on his treatment so far, Zubaydah has come to expect that no physical harm will be done to him. By using these techniques in increasing intensity and in rapid succession, the goal would be to dislodge this expectation. Based on the facts you have provided to us, we cannot say definitively that the entire course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to believe that he is being threatened.

TOP SECRET
with severe pain or suffering within the meaning of section 2340. On the other hand, however, under certain circumstances—for example, rapid escalation in the use of these techniques culminating in the waterboard (which we acknowledge constitutes a threat of imminent death) accompanied by verbal or other suggestions that physical violence will follow—might cause a reasonable person to believe that they are faced with such a threat. Without more information, we are uncertain whether the course of conduct would constitute a predicate act under Section 2340(2).

Even if the course of conduct were thought to pose a threat of physical pain or suffering, it would nevertheless—on the facts before us—not constitute a violation of Section 2340A. Not only must the course of conduct be a predicate act, but also those who use the procedure must actually cause prolonged mental harm. Based on the information that you have provided to us, indicating that no evidence exists that this course of conduct produces any prolonged mental harm, we conclude that a course of conduct using these procedures and culminating in the waterboard would not violate Section 2340A.

Specific Intent. To violate the statute, an individual must have the specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering. Because specific intent is an element of the offense, the absence of specific intent negates the charge of torture. As we previously opined, to have the required specific intent, an individual must expressly intend to cause such severe pain or suffering. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 3 citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 267 (2000). We have further found that if a defendant acts with the good faith belief that his actions will not cause such suffering, he has not acted with specific intent. See id. at 4 citing South Atl. Ltd. P'ship. of Tenn. v. Reese, 218 F.3d 518, 531 (4th Cir. 2002). A defendant acts in good faith when he has an honest belief that his actions will not result in severe pain or suffering. See id. citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991). Although an honest belief need not be reasonable, such a belief is easier to establish when there is a reasonable basis for it. See id. at 5. Good faith may be established by, among other things, the reliance on the advice of experts. See id. at 8.

Based on the information you have provided us, we believe that those carrying out these procedures would not have the specific intent to inflict severe physical pain or suffering. The objective of these techniques is not to cause severe physical pain. First, the constant presence of personnel with medical training who have the authority to stop the interrogation should it appear it is medically necessary indicates that it is not your intent to cause severe physical pain. The personnel on site have extensive experience with these specific techniques as they are used in SERE school training. Second, you have informed us that you are taking steps to ensure that Zubaydah’s injury is not worsened or his recovery impeded by the use of these techniques.

Third, as you have described them to us, the proposed techniques involving physical contact between the interrogator and Zubaydah actually contain precautions to prevent any serious physical harm to Zubaydah. In “walling,” a rolled hood or towel will be used to prevent
whiplash and he will be permitted to rebound from the flexible wall to reduce the likelihood of injury. Similarly, in the "facial hold," the fingertips will be kept well away from the his eyes to ensure that there is no injury to them. The purpose of that facial hold is not to injure him but to hold the head immobile. Additionally, while the stress positions and wall standing will undoubtedly result in physical discomfort by tiring the muscles, it is obvious that these positions are not intended to produce the kind of extreme pain required by the statute.

Furthermore, no specific intent to cause severe mental pain or suffering appears to be present. As we explained in our recent opinion, an individual must have the specific intent to cause prolonged mental harm in order to have the specific intent to inflict severe mental pain or suffering. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 8. Prolonged mental harm is substantial mental harm of a sustained duration, e.g., harm lasting months or even years after the acts were inflicted upon the prisoner. As we indicated above, a good faith belief can negate this element. Accordingly, if an individual conducting the interrogation has a good faith belief that the procedures he will apply, separately or together, would not result in prolonged mental harm, that individual lacks the requisite specific intent. This conclusion concerning specific intent is further bolstered by the due diligence that has been conducted concerning the effects of these interrogation procedures.

The mental health experts that you have consulted have indicated that the psychological impact of a course of conduct must be assessed with reference to the subject's psychological history and current mental health status. The healthier the individual, the less likely that the use of any one procedure or set of procedures as a course of conduct will result in prolonged mental harm. A comprehensive psychological profile of Zubaydah has been created. In creating this profile, your personnel drew on direct interviews, Zubaydah's diaries, observation of Zubaydah since his capture, and information from other sources such as other intelligence and press reports.

As we indicated above, you have informed us that your proposed interrogation methods have been used and continue to be used in SERE training. It is our understanding that these techniques are not used one by one in isolation, but as a full course of conduct to resemble a real interrogation. Thus, the information derived from SERE training bears both upon the impact of the use of the individual techniques and upon their use as a course of conduct. You have found that the use of these methods together or separately, including the use of the waterboard, has not resulted in any negative long-term mental health consequences. The continued use of these methods without mental health consequences to the trainees indicates that it is highly improbable
that such consequences would result here. Because you have conducted the due diligence to
determine that these procedures, either alone or in combination, do not produce prolonged mental
harm, we believe that you do not meet the specific intent requirement necessary to violate
Section 2340A.

You have also informed us that you have reviewed the relevant literature on the subject,
and consulted with outside psychologists. Your review of the literature uncovered no empirical
data on the use of these procedures, with the exception of sleep deprivation for which no long-
term health consequences resulted. The outside psychologists with whom you consulted
indicated were unaware of any cases where long-term problems have occurred as a result of these

techniques.

As described above, it appears you have conducted an extensive inquiry to ascertain what
impact, if any, these procedures individually and as a course of conduct would have on
Zubaydah. You have consulted with interrogation experts, including those with substantial
SERE school experience, consulted with outside psychologists, completed a psychological
assessment and reviewed the relevant literature on this topic. Based on this inquiry, you believe
that the use of the procedures, including the waterboard, and as a course of conduct would not
result in prolonged mental harm. Reliance on this information about Zubaydah and about the
effect of the use of these techniques more generally demonstrates the presence of a good faith
belief that no prolonged mental harm will result from using these methods in the interrogation of
Zubaydah. Moreover, we think that this represents not only an honest belief but also a
reasonable belief based on the information that you have supplied to us. Thus, we believe that
the specific intent to inflict prolonged mental is not present, and consequently, there is no
specific intent to inflict severe mental pain or suffering. Accordingly, we conclude that on the
facts in this case the use of these methods separately or a course of conduct would not violate
Section 2340A.

Based on the foregoing, and based on the facts that you have provided, we conclude that
the interrogation procedures that you propose would not violate Section 2340A. We wish to
emphasize that this is our best reading of the law; however, you should be aware that there are no
cases construing this statute; just as there have been no prosecutions brought under it.

Please let us know if we can be of further assistance.

Jay S. Bybee
Assistant Attorney General
Appendix D
Guidelines on Confinement Conditions For CIA Detainees

These Guidelines govern the conditions of confinement for CIA Detainees, who are persons detained in detention facilities that are under the control of CIA ("Detention Facilities").

These Guidelines recognize that environmental and other conditions, as well as particularized considerations affecting any given Detention Facility, will vary from case to case and location to location.

1. Minimums

Due provision must be taken to protect the health and safety of all CIA Detainees, including basic levels of medical care.

2. Implementing Procedures


Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees

3. Responsible CIA Officer

The Director, DCT Counterterrorist Center shall ensure (a) that, at all times, a specific Agency staff employee (the "Responsible CIA Officer") is designated as responsible for each specific Detention Facility, (b) that each Responsible CIA Officer has been provided with a copy of these Guidelines and has reviewed and signed the attached Acknowledgment, and (c) that each Responsible CIA Officer and each CIA officer participating in the questioning of individuals detained pursuant to has been provided with a copy of the "Guidelines on Interrogation Conducted Pursuant to" and has reviewed and signed the Acknowledgment attached thereto. Subject to operational and security considerations, the Responsible CIA Officer shall be present at, or visit, each Detention Facility at intervals appropriate to the circumstances.

4. 

APPROVED:

George Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

1/28/03
Date
Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I, ____________________________, am the Responsible CIA Officer for the Detention Facility known as __________________. By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have read and understand and will comply with the "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees" of ____________, 2003.

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Name ____________________________ Date ____________________________
Appendix E
Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the

These Guidelines address the conduct of interrogations of persons who are detained pursuant to the authorities set forth in

These Guidelines complement internal Directorate of Operations guidance relating to the conduct of interrogations. In the event of any inconsistency between existing DO guidance and these Guidelines, the provisions of these Guidelines shall control.

1. Permissible Interrogation Techniques

Unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Permissible Interrogation Techniques. Permissible Interrogation Techniques consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b) Enhanced Techniques.

Standard Techniques are techniques that do not incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressure. These techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful forms of questioning employed by US law enforcement and military interrogation personnel. Among Standard Techniques are the use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours, reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation of reading material, use of loud music or white noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detainee's hearing), and the use of diapers for limited periods (generally not to exceed 72 hours).
Enhanced Techniques are techniques that do incorporate physical or psychological pressure beyond Standard Techniques. The use of each specific Enhanced Technique must be approved by Headquarters in advance, and may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with the specific detainee, with appropriate medical and psychological participation in the process. These techniques are, the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap (insult slap), the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours, the use of diapers for prolonged periods, the use of harmless insects, the water board, and such other techniques as may be specifically approved pursuant to paragraph 4 below. The use of each Enhanced Technique is subject to specific temporal, physical, and related conditions, including a competent evaluation of the medical and psychological state of the detainee.

2. Medical and Psychological Personnel

Appropriate medical and psychological personnel shall be readily available for consultation and travel to the interrogation site during all detainee interrogations employing Standard Techniques, and appropriate medical and psychological personnel must be on site during all detainee interrogations employing Enhanced Techniques. In each case, the medical and psychological personnel shall suspend the interrogation if they determine that significant and prolonged physical or mental injury, pain, or suffering is likely to result if the interrogation is not suspended. In any such instance, the interrogation team shall immediately report the facts to Headquarters for management and legal review to determine whether the interrogation may be resumed.

3. Interrogation Personnel

The Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center shall ensure that all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation of persons detained pursuant have been appropriately screened (from the medical, psychological, and security standpoints), have reviewed these Guidelines, have received appropriate training in their implementation, and have completed the attached Acknowledgment.
4. Approvals Required

Whenever feasible, advance approval is required for the use of Standard Techniques by an interrogation team. In all instances, their use shall be documented in cable traffic. Prior approval in writing (e.g., by written memorandum or in cable traffic) from the Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, with the concurrence of the Chief, CTC Legal Group, is required for the use of any Enhanced Technique(s), and may be provided only where D/CTC has determined that: (a) the specific detainee is believed to possess information about risks to the citizens of the United States or other nations, (b) the use of the Enhanced Technique(s) is appropriate in order to obtain that information, (c) appropriate medical and psychological personnel have concluded that the use of the Enhanced Technique(s) is not expected to produce "severe physical or mental pain or suffering," and (d) the personnel authorized to employ the Enhanced Technique(s) have completed the attached Acknowledgment. Nothing in these Guidelines alters the right to act in self-defense.

5. Recordkeeping

In each interrogation session in which an Enhanced Technique is employed, a contemporaneous record shall be created setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable. This information, which may be in the form of a cable, shall be provided to Headquarters.

APPROVED:

George Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

January 28, 2003

Date
Guideline on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I, __________________, acknowledge that I have read and understand and will comply with the "Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to ___________________ of _________.

ACKNOWLEDGED:

______________________________
Name

______________________________
Date
DRAFT OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS
September 4, 2003

The following guidelines offer general references for medical officers supporting the detention of terrorists captured and turned over to the Central Intelligence Agency for interrogation and debriefing. There are three different contexts in which these guidelines may be applied: (1) during the period of initial interrogation, (2) during the more sustained period of debriefing at an interrogation site, and (3)...

INTERROGATION SUPPORT

Captured terrorists turned over to the C.I.A. for interrogation may be subjected to a wide range of legally sanctioned techniques, all of which are also used on U.S. military personnel in SERE training programs. These are designed to psychologically "dislocate" the detainee, maximize his feeling of vulnerability and helplessness, and reduce or eliminate his will to resist our efforts to obtain critical intelligence.

Sanctioned interrogation techniques must be specifically approved in advance by the Director, CTC in the case of each individual case. They include, in approximately ascending degree of intensity:

Standard measures (i.e., without physical or substantial psychological pressure)
- Shaving
- Stripping
- Diapering (generally for periods not greater than 72 hours)
- Hooding
- Isolation
- White noise or loud music (at a decibel level that will not damage hearing)
- Continuous light or darkness
- Uncomfortably cool environment
- Restricted diet, including reduced caloric intake (sufficient to maintain general health)
- Shackling in upright, sitting, or horizontal position
- Water Dousing
- Sleep deprivation (up to 72 hours)

Enhanced measures (with physical or psychological pressure beyond the above)
- Attention grasp
- Facial hold
- Insult (facial) slap
Abdominal slap
Prolonged diapering
Sleep deprivation (over 72 hours)
Stress positions
  - on knees, body slanted forward or backward
  - leaning with forehead on wall
Walling
Crammed confinement (Confinement boxes)
Waterboard

In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological impact, and not some physical effect, with a specific goal of "dislocating his expectations regarding the treatment he believes he will receive..." The more physical techniques are delivered in a manner carefully limited to avoid serious physical harm. The slaps for example are designed "to induce shock, surprise, and/or humiliation" and "not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting." To this end they must be delivered in a specifically circumscribed manner, e.g., with fingers spread. Walling is only against a springboard designed to be loud and bouncy (and cushion the blow). All walling and most attention grasps are delivered only with the subject's head solidly supported with a towel to avoid extension-flexion injury.

OMS is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health of all Agency detainees subject to "enhanced" interrogation techniques, and for determining that the authorized administration of these techniques would not be expected to cause serious or permanent harm. "DCI Guidelines" have been issued formalizing these responsibilities, and these should be read directly.

Whenever feasible, advance approval is required to use any measures beyond standard measures; technique-specific advanced approval is required for all "enhanced" measures and is conditional on on-site medical and psychological personnel confirming from direct detainee examination that the enhanced technique(s) is not expected to produce "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." As a practical matter, the detainee's physical condition must be such that these interventions will not have lasting

The standard used by the Justice Department for "mental" harm is "prolonged mental harm," i.e., "mental harm of some lasting duration, e.g., mental harm lasting months or years." "In the absence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental pain or suffering would have been inflicted." Memorandum of August 1, 2002, p. 15.

Unless the waterboard is being used, the medical officer can be a physician or a PA; use of the waterboard requires the presence of a physician.
effect, and his psychological state strong enough that no severe psychological harm will result.

The medical implications of the DCI guidelines are discussed below.

**General intake evaluation**

New detainees are to have a thorough initial medical assessment, with a complete, documented history and physical addressing in depth any chronic or previous medical problems. Vital signs and weight should be recorded, and blood work drawn. Documented subsequent medical rechecks should be performed on a regular basis, although brief, the data should reflect what was checked and include negative findings.

**Medical treatment**

It is important that adequate medical care be provided to detainees, even those undergoing enhanced interrogation. Those requiring chronic medications should receive them, acute medical problems should be treated, and adequate fluids and nutrition provided.
The basic diet during the period of enhanced interrogation need not be palatable, but should include adequate fluids and nutrition. Actual consumption should be monitored and recorded. Liquid Ensure (or equivalent) is a good way to assure that there is adequate nutrition. Individuals refusing adequate liquids during this stage should have fluids administered at the earliest signs of dehydration. If there is any question about adequacy of fluid intake, urinary output also should be monitored and recorded.

Uncomfortably cool environments

Detainees can safely be placed in uncomfortably cool environments for varying lengths of time, ranging from hours to days.

Core body temperature falls after more than 2 hours at an ambient temperature of 10°C/50°F. At this temperature increased metabolic rate cannot compensate for heat loss. The WHO recommended minimum indoor temperature is 18°C/64°F. The "thermoneutral zone" where minimal compensatory activity is required to maintain core temperature is 20°C/68°F to 30°C/86°F. Within the thermoneutral zone, 26°C/78°F is considered optimally comfortable for lightly clothed individuals and 30°C/86°F for naked individuals. If there is any possibility that ambient temperatures are below the thermoneutral range, they should be monitored and the actual temperatures documented.
At ambient temperatures below 13°C/56°F, detainees should be monitored for the development of hypothermia.

White noise or loud music

As a practical guide, there is no permanent hearing risk for continuous, 24-hour-a-day exposures to sound at 82 dB or lower; at 84 dB for up to 18 hours a day; 90 dB for up to 8 hours, 95 dB for 4 hours, and 100 dB for 2 hours. If necessary, instruments can be provided to measure these ambient sound levels.

Shackling

Shackling in non-stressful positions requires only monitoring for the development of pressure sores with appropriate treatment and adjustment of the shackles as required.
Assuming no medical contraindications are found, extended periods (up to 72 hours) in a standing position can be approved if the hands are no higher than head level and weight is borne fully by the lower extremities.
Sleep deprivation

The standard approval for sleep deprivation, per se (without regard to shackling position) is 72 hours. Extension of sleep deprivation beyond 72 continuous hours is considered an enhanced measure, which requires D/CTC prior approval.

NOTE: Examinations performed during periods of sleep deprivation should include the current number of hours without sleep; and, if only a brief rest preceded this period, the specifics of the previous deprivation also should be recorded.

Crammed confinement (Confinement boxes)

Detainees can be placed in awkward boxes, specifically constructed for this purpose. Confinement in the small box is allowable up to 2 hours. Confinement in the large box is limited to 8 consecutive hours.
Waterboard

This is by far the most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques. The historical context here was limited knowledge of the use of the waterboard in SERE training (several hundred trainees experience it every year or two). In the SERE model the subject is immobilized on his back, and his forehead and eyes covered with a cloth. A stream of water is directed at the upper lip. Resistant subjects then have the cloth lowered to cover the nose and mouth, as the water continues to be applied, fully saturating the cloth, and precluding the passage of air. Relatively little water enters the mouth. The occlusion (which may be partial) lasts no more than 20 seconds. On removal of the cloth, the subject is immediately able to breathe, but continues to have water directed at the upper lip to prolong the effect. This process can continue for several minutes, and involve up to 15 canteen cups of water. Ostensibly the primary desired effect derives from the sense of suffocation resulting from the wet cloth temporarily occluding the nose and mouth, and psychological impact of the continued application of water after the cloth is removed. SERE trainees usually have only a single exposure to this technique, and never more than two; SERE trainers consider it their most effective technique, and deem it virtually irresistible in the training setting.
The SERE training program has applied the waterboard technique (single exposure) to trainees for years, and reportedly there have been thousands of applications without significant or lasting medical complications. The procedure nonetheless carries some risks, particularly when repeated a large number of times or when applied to an individual less fit than a typical SERE trainee. Several medical dimensions need to be monitored to ensure the safety of the subject.

In our limited experience, extensive sustained use of the waterboard can introduce new risks. Most seriously, for reasons of physical fatigue or psychological resignation, the subject may simply give up, allowing excessive filling of the airways and loss of consciousness. An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately, and the interrogator should deliver a sub-xiphoid thrust to expel the water. If this fails to restore normal breathing, aggressive medical intervention is required. Any subject who has reached this degree of compromise is not considered an appropriate candidate for the waterboard, and the physician on the scene cannot approve further use of the waterboard without specific C/OMS consultation and approval.

A rigid guide to medically approved use of the waterboard in essentially healthy individuals is not possible, as safety will depend on how the water is applied and the specific response each time it is used. The following general guidelines are based on very limited knowledge, drawn from very few subjects whose experience and response was quite varied. These represent only the medical guidelines; legal guidelines also are operative and may be more restrictive.
A series (within a "session") of several relatively rapid waterboard applications is medically acceptable in all healthy subjects, so long as there is no indication of some emerging vulnerability.

Several such sessions per 24 hours have been employed without apparent medical complication. The exact number of sessions cannot be prescribed, and will depend on the response to each. If more than 3 sessions of 5 or more applications are envisioned within a 24 hours period, a careful medical reassessment must be made before each later session.

By days 3-5 of an aggressive program, cumulative effects become a potential concern. Without any hard data to quantify either this risk or the advantages of this technique, we believe that beyond this point continued intense waterboard applications may not be medically appropriate. Continued aggressive use of the waterboard beyond this point should be reviewed by the HVT team in consultation with Headquarters prior to any further aggressive use.

NOTE: In order to best inform future medical judgments and recommendations, it is important that every application of the waterboard be thoroughly documented: how long each application (and the entire procedure) lasted, how much water was used in the process (realizing that much splashes off), how exactly the water was applied, if a seal was achieved, if the naso- or oropharynx was filled, what sort of volume was expelled, how long was the break between applications, and how the subject looked between each treatment.
1.1 Overview

Efforts against the Al Qaeda terrorist organization have ushered hundreds of suspected and known group members into custody. Many of these detainees have proven to be sources of actionable intelligence dealing with a wide range of counter terrorist issues. A small number of these detainees are recognized as well-placed Al Qaeda operatives, who hold secret considerable information on their organization's past activities and future plans. These targets of higher value, or High Value Targets (HVT), have been uncooperative during debriefings, and resistant to our standard interrogation efforts. In fact, extensive experience with Al Qaeda prisoners has made it evident that certain detainees have received formal training in techniques to resist interrogations, and that they are particularly adept at using cultural differences as both an interactive impediment to the interrogation process and as a psychological support mechanism behind which to hide from interrogative efforts.

As the war against terrorism continues, more HVTs will be captured. In order to effectively deal with this special population, Director, Counter Terrorist Center tasked the [redacted] to set up and train interrogation teams whose members have the skills and experience necessary to navigate past resistance, and employ systematic interrogation strategies to acquire intelligence. Incumbent to this approach is resistance technique identification, and, when serviceable, implementation of certain specialized countermeasures.
A sophisticated level of resistance training is available to high-risk Al Qaeda operatives.

To this end, skillfully crafted effective countermeasures have been developed in such a way not to violate United States Federal and International torture prohibitions.
2.2 Anticipated Future Demand

Results from the first Al Qaeda HVT interrogated using the aforementioned enhanced techniques, Abu Zubayda, have been outstanding. Abu Zubayda reached a satisfactory level of compliance in August 2002. Since April, the interrogation team has produced actionable intelligence disseminations from Abu Zubayda. This has ultimately led to some instances of the US Government being able to neutralize Al Qaeda capabilities worldwide before there was an opportunity for those capabilities to engage in operations harmful to the United States. Because of this, US Government decision makers have a positive view of the program, and there is pressure to increase HVT interrogation Program capabilities in the shortest time possible.

As the success of the program and of other counter-Al Qaeda activities continues to lead to the capture of additional HVT candidates, it can be reasonably expected that intelligence disseminations will lead to even more HVT candidate captures and the likewise increase in demand for more HVT program services.

2.3 Operational Assumptions

Required resources will be approved and available for the HVT Interrogation Program as depicted in Section 4. Such resources are critical to the success of the Program's ability to meet identified customer requirements.
The program will provide for the increase in demand of fully qualified psychological services by carefully increasing the number of interrogation psychologists from a limited pool of appropriate candidates, maintaining expertise through an aggressive training and mentoring program with well-documented oversight of all activities to ensure quality control.
As directed by the Director of Central Intelligence on 28 January 2003, Interrogators may only use "permissible interrogation techniques". Permissible techniques include Standard and Enhanced. All enhanced techniques require prior Headquarters approval based on the provision of a detailed interrogation plan.

Standard Interrogation Techniques: These are techniques that do not incorporate physical and psychological pressure. These techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful forms of questioning employed by U.S. law enforcement and military interrogation personnel. Isolation, sleep deprivation (not to exceed 48 hours), reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation of reading material, use of loud noise (not
Shackles may be used for security reasons while a detainee is standing; so long as due care is taken to ensure that the shackles are neither too loose nor too tight for physical safety.

Accordingly, where shackles are to be employed on a standing detainee's wrists, they should be shackled loosely and at the level of the detainee's head to avoid problems during this phase.

Please note that shackles may be used to keep a detainee in a standing position during periods of non-enhanced sleep deprivation (shorter than 72 hours), so long as the aforementioned considerations are followed.

Enhanced Techniques: Involves techniques that DO incorporate physical or psychological pressure beyond standard techniques. All techniques are designed to not engender lasting and severe mental or physical harm to the detainee. It is understood that some interrogation techniques incorporate mild physical pressure, It is not intended, however, that the detainee actually suffer severe physical or mental pain;
In addition, appropriately trained medical and psychological personnel are present throughout the process. Our attorneys have presented our legal analysis to the legal adviser to the National Security Council, to the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, and to the Criminal Division at Justice, and the Counsel to the President has been briefed as well. These enhanced techniques include:

- Facial slap
- Facial hold
- Attention grasp
- Abdominal slap
- Walling
- Stress positions
- Sleep deprivation beyond 48 hours
- Use of diapers for prolonged periods
- Use of harmless insects
- Cramped confinement
- Water Board

The use of each technique for each detainee is dependent to specific temporal, physical, and related conditions, including a competent evaluation of the medical and psychological state of the detainee.

The use of each specific enhanced technique must be approved by Headquarters in advance, and may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with the specific detainee, with appropriate medical and psychological participation in the process.

Compliance to safety and legal issues will be addressed before any application of physical pressures can be used against the detainee. The detainee's physical and emotional state will be a prime consideration before any application of physical pressure.
These techniques will be used on an as needed basis and not all of these techniques will necessarily be used. The interrogation team will use these techniques in some combination to convince the detainee that the only way he can influence his environment is through cooperation. Generally, these techniques are used in an escalating fashion, culminating in the water board, but not necessarily ending in this technique. Note: the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions.
Psychological Assessment of
Zain al-'Abedin el-Abideen
Muhammad Hassan, n.k.a. Abu Zubaydah

The following psychological assessment of Zain al-'Abedin el-Abideen
Muhammad Hassan, (n.k.a. Abul Zubaydah) is based upon the results of direct interviews
with and observations of the subject, and from information obtained from collateral
sources such as intelligence and press reporting.

Background Information: For at least a decade, subject has lived and worked
within an environment that has conditioned, nurtured, intensified, and rewarded his radical
beliefs. The following is a partial list of responsibilities that the subject has held (in
particular order). Subject is currently 31 years old.

Abu Zubaydah worked from very low-level mujahidin (called courier by some) by age of
31 to third or fourth man in al-Qa'ida. No one rises to that level in such a short
period of time without being dedicated, trusted, and strong.

Alleged to have written al-Qa'ida's manual on resistance techniques and lectured on the
topics.

Involved in every major al-Qa'ida terrorist operation; served as the operational planner
for the millennium plot (2000), the Paris embassy (2001) and a planner of the 11
September hijackings which killed and maimed thousands of Americans.

Served as senior Usama Bin Laden lieutenant and played a key role in the movement and
training of operatives on behalf of al-Qa'ida, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and
other terrorist elements inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. He was a key player in
the Millennium threat last year and appears to be engaged in ongoing terrorism
planning against US interests. Zubaydah is wanted in Jordan for his role in the
Millennium plot.

Directed the start-up of a Bin Laden cell in Jordan that was disrupted in Amman in
December 1999 for plotting terrorist acts against US and Israeli targets during the
Millennium celebrations in Jordan. Two central figures of the plot, under arrest,
identified Abu Zubaydah as being the primary supporter of this cell and the plot.

Managed a network of training camps, safehouses, and mujahedin-related offices in
Peshawar and Afghanistan, assisted in other extremist networks, by moving men,
money and materials in support of various jihadis

DRAFT
Served as Deputy Camp Commander for al-Qa'ida training camp in Afghanistan.

Personally approved entry and graduation of all trainees since 1999-2000. From 1996-1999, approved all individuals going in and out of Afghanistan to the training camps. No one came in and out of Pakistan without his knowledge and approval. Served as al-Qa'ida's coordinator of external contacts, or foreign communications.

Acted as al-Qa'ida's CI officer and was trusted to find spies in their midst.

Relevant History: Subject reported that he persisted for a few years in holding onto the possibility that he could eventually transition from jihad life back into college and pursuit of his traditional educational, career, and family goals. As time passed he appeared to find a special niche for himself. He became increasingly integrated into the jihadist ideology and lifestyle. He periodically felt pangs of homesickness, longed for the company of family, and fantasized about a future as a computer expert or engineer. However, overtime, the frequency and intensity of these thoughts and feelings diminished. He began to think of any activity outside jihad as “silly.” Eventually, he understood that his mind and heart were devoted to serving Allah and Islam through his jihad. He asserted that he has had “no” doubts or regrets about choosing to pursue and devote himself to jihad since the mid-1990’s.

Personality: Subject is a highly self-directed individual who prizes his independence. He seeks to express his independence by doing things his own way and having his own style to the extent that he can within the structure of radical Islamist environments. When he makes concessions, it is within the context of his ideological and religious convictions. He has narcissistic features that are evident in his attention to his appearance and in his obvious “efforts” to demonstrate that he is really a rather “humble and regular guy.” Subject clearly possesses an air of confidence, self-assurance, and authority.

He is somewhat compulsive in how he organizes his environment and conducts his business.

He conceded that he still wrestles with issues regarding the killing of civilians and how to determine who is “innocent”

He acknowledged that he celebrated the destruction of the World Trade Center.

He is intellectually curious, skeptical and wary of others’ intentions, possesses excellent self-discipline and readily sets aside his own interests to meet his responsibilities.
Subject is perfectionistic, private (highly cautious regarding opening up to others), and highly capable in interactions with others from a variety of backgrounds. Not surprisingly, he possesses the discipline, drive, creativity and pragmatism that characterize effective leaders.

Social Skills and Relationships: Subject has excellent social skills and social cache. He is highly socially perceptive and quick to recognize and assess the moods and motivations of others. He is adept and keenly observant of others’ interactions. He is strongly inclined to carefully gauge a situation before voicing opinions or revealing feelings. He is adept at choosing to conceal or convey a particular attitude or emotion depending on the context and immediate utility. Subject tends to be a very private person who is skeptical of others’ intentions and alert for ulterior motives. He is markedly vigilant and tends not to trust others easily.

Emotional/Mental Status/Coping Skills: Overall, subject’s background as revealed by self-report (including diaries and interviews) does not indicate that he has a history of mood disturbance or other psychiatric pathology. Indeed, his reported and known history indicates that he is remarkably resilient and confident that he can overcome adversity. During the occasions that he experiences increased stress and/or low mood, he may become somewhat more withdrawn, melancholy, and reflective. However, this shift in mood will likely last a relatively short time. He denies and there is no evidence in his reported history of thought disorder or enduring mood or mental health problems.

Subject is generally self-sufficient and relies on his understanding and application of religious and psychological principles, intelligence, and discipline to avoid and overcome problems. His faith, the blessings of religious leaders, and camaraderie of like-minded mujahedin brothers have provided him with a reliable and durable support system.

Of particular note has been subject’s ability to manage his mood and emotions during captivity. Being circumspect, calm, controlled, and deliberate is likely characteristic of subject’s demeanor under pressure prior to capture.
addition, he showed strong signs of sympathetic nervous system arousal (possibly fear) when he experienced the initial “hard” dislocation of expectation intervention following session 62. Due to his incredibly strong resolve, expertise in civilian warfare, resistance to interrogation techniques (the latter two which he trained hundreds of others on) this experience was one of the few that led to him providing significant actionable intelligence. As has been observed throughout his recent detention, he was able to quickly bounce back from these most disconcerting moments and regain an air of calm confidence and strong resolve in not parting with other threat information.

Future Worldview: According to the subject, the jihad will ultimately be victorious over American and the west.

Motivations. Subject’s primary motivations are (in no particular order): status/prestige, power, influence, serving the Ummah, serving the prophet and Allah, pursuing a “true jihad”, contributing to the establishment of Shari’a among Muslim countries, contributing to the “lifting up” of Muslims throughout the world, and contributing to the restoration of the Palestinian homeland.

Primary Strengths. (in no particular order) Ability to focus, goal-directed discipline, intelligence, emotional resilience, street savvy, ability to organize and manage people, ability to delegate tasks, keen observation skills, fluid adaptability (can anticipate and adapt under duress and with minimal resources), capable of assessing and exploiting the needs of others, ability to adjust goals to emerging opportunities.
Captive and Interrogation. Subject recognizes that his duty as a soldier/war criminal is to delay, mislead, and lie to protect what is most critical to the success of his cause. He assumes that we understand this. Thus, he is not likely to be intimidated or weakened by being “caught” in lies. His job is to lie. During interview he explained that he lied to his neighbors, to shopkeepers, to bankers, travel agents, airport personnel, and many others in order to protect his people and activities. He said, “I lie, lie, lie, lie, lie, and lie.” He prides himself in regard to past deceptions he managed with great success.

He acquired a United Nations refugee identification card by persistently telling the same lie over a period of several weeks or months. He has learned that the combination of skillful deception and lying pays off.

He has talked with Ayman al-Zawahiri and it is likely that Zawahiri talked about his experience as a captive of the Egyptians and Russians. In addition, subject is familiar and probably well versed regarding al-Qaeda’s captivity and resistance training materials. Thus, one would expect that subject would draw upon this fund of knowledge as he attempts to cope with his own captivity.

Subject believes in the ultimate destiny of Islam is to dominate the world. He believes that global victory is inevitable. Thus, there is the chance that he could rationalize that providing information will harm current efforts but represent only a temporary setback.
**SUBJECT:** CTC's HVT Interrogation Efforts

1. **Summary:**
   CTC's interrogation efforts, with the interrogation of Al-Nashiri.

2. **Al-Nashiri - With the recent capture of a high-ranking Al Qaeda operative, Al-Nashiri.**
   CTC's interrogation efforts. Al-Nashiri is believed to be responsible for planning the USS Cole attack (which he has admitted a role in this) and future attacks on US interests in the Arab Peninsula region including attacks on US Warships.

   Al-Nashiri has undergone interrogation with the HVT Interrogators.
SUBJECT: CTC's RVT Interrogation Efforts
To: John Yoo

Phone: (202) 514-2069
      (202) 514-3713
Fax: (202) 514-9207

From: [Redacted]
Phone: [Redacted]

Date: 24 July 2002

Pages including this cover page: 7

Here is the psychological assessment. Please feel free to call me at work or at home, whenever.

Thanks - [Redacted]
Psychological Assessment of
Zain al-'Abedin al-Abideen Muhammad Hassan, a.k.a. Abu Zubaydah

The following psychological assessment of Zain al-'Abedin al-Abideen Muhammad Hassan, (a.k.a. Abu Zubaydah) is based upon the results of direct interviews with and observations of the subject, and from information obtained from collateral sources such as intelligence and press reporting.

Background Information. For at least a decade, subject has lived and worked within an environment that has conditioned, nurtured, intensified, and rewarded his radical beliefs. The following is a partial list of responsibilities that the subject has held (no particular order). Subject is currently 31 years old.

Abu Zubaydah worked from very low-level mujahidin (called courier by some) by age of 31 to third or fourth man in al-Qa'ida. No one rises to that level in such a short period of time without being dedicated, trusted, and strong.

Alleged to have written al-Qa'ida's manual on resistance techniques and lectured on the topic.

Involved in every major al-Qa'ida terrorist operation: served as the operational planner for the millennium plot (2000), the Paris embassy (2001) and a planner of the 11 September hijackings which killed and maimed thousands of Americans.

Served as senior Usama Bin Laden lieutenant and played a key role in the movement and training of operatives on behalf of al-Qa'ida, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist elements inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. He was a key player in the Millennium threat last year and appears to be engaged in ongoing terrorism planning against US interests. Zubaydah is wanted in Jordan for his role in the Millennium plot.

Directed the start-up of a Bin Laden cell in Jordan that was disrupted in Amman in December 1999 for plotting terrorist acts against US and Israeli targets during the Millennium celebrations in Jordan. Two central figures of the plot, under arrest, identified Abu Zubaydah as being the primary supporter of this cell and the plot.

Managed a network of training camps, safehouses, and mujahedin-related offices in Pakistan and Afghanistan, assisted in other extremist networks by moving men, money and materials in support of various jihads and jihadis around the world.
Served as Deputy Camp Commander for al-Qa‘ida training camp in Afghanistan. Personally approved entry and graduation of all trainees -- circa 1999-2000. From 1996-1999, approved all individuals going in and out of Afghanistan to the training camps. No one came in and out of Peshawar, Pakistan without his knowledge and approval. Served as al-Qa‘ida’s coordinator of external contacts, or foreign communications.

Acted as al-Qa‘ida’s CI officer and was trusted to find spies in their midst.

Relevant History: Subject reported that he persisted for a few years in holding onto the possibility that he could eventually transition from jihad life back into college and pursuit of his traditional educational, career, and family goals. As time passed he appeared to find a special niche for himself. He became increasingly integrated into the jihadi ideology and lifestyle. He periodically felt pangs of homesickness, longed for the company of family, and fantasized about a future as a computer expert or engineer. However, overtime, the frequency and intensity of these thoughts and feelings diminished. He began to think of any activity outside jihad as “silly”. Eventually, he understood that his mind and heart were devoted to serving Allah and Islam through his jihad. He asserted that he has had “no” doubts or regrets about choosing to pursue and devote himself to jihad since the mid-1990’s.

Personality: Subject is a highly self-directed individual who prizes his independence. He seeks to express his independence by doing things his own way and having his own style to the extent that he can within the structure of radical salafist environments. When he makes concessions, it is within the context of his ideological and religious convictions. He has narcissistic features that are evident in his attention to his appearance and in his obvious “efforts” to demonstrate that he is really a rather “humble and regular guy.” Subject already possesses an air of confidence, self-assurance, and authority. He is somewhat compulsive in how he organizes his environment and conducts his business. He conceded that he still wrestles with issues regarding the killing of civilians and how to determine who is “innocent.” He acknowledged that he celebrated the destruction of the World Trade Center.

He is intellectually curious, skeptical and wary of others’ intentions, possesses excellent self-discipline and readily sets aside his own interests to meet his responsibilities. Subject is perfectionistic (very
private (highly cautious regarding opening up to others), and highly capable in interactions with others from a variety of backgrounds. Not surprisingly, he possesses the discipline, drive, creativity and pragmatism that characterize effective leaders.

Social Skills and Relationships: Subject has excellent social skills and social

He is highly socially perceptive and quick to recognize and assess the moods and motivations of others. He is alert and keenly observant of others' interactions. He is strongly inclined to carefully gauge a situation before voicing opinions or revealing feelings. He is adept at choosing to conceal or convey a particular attitude or emotion depending on the context and immediate utility. Subject tends to be a very private person who is skeptical of others' intentions and alert for ulterior motives. He is markedly vigilant and tends not to trust others easily.

Emotional/Mental Status/Coping Skills: Overall, subject's background as revealed by self-report (including diaries and interview) does not indicate that he has a history of mood disturbance or other psychiatric pathology. Indeed, his reported and known history indicates that he is remarkably resilient and confident that he can overcome adversity. During the occasions that he experiences increased stress and/or low mood, he may become somewhat more withdrawn, melancholy, and reflective. However, this shift in mood will likely last a relatively short time. He deals and there is no evidence in his reported history of thought disorder or enduring mood or mental health problems.

Subject is generally self-sufficient and relies on his understanding and application of religious and psychological principles, intelligence, and discipline to avoid and overcome problems. His faith, the blessings of religious leaders, and camaraderie of like-minded mujahedin brothers have provided him with a reliable and durable support system.

Of particular note has been subject's ability to manage his mood and emotions during detention. Being circumspect, calm, controlled, and deliberate is likely characteristic of subject's demeanor under pressure prior to capture.
addition, he showed strong signs of sympathetic nervous system arousal (possibly fear) when he experienced the initial "confrontational" dislocation of expectation during an interrogation session. Due to his incredibly strong resolve, expertise in civilian warfare, resistance to interrogation techniques (the latter two which he trained hundreds of others on), this experience was one of the few that led to him providing significant actionable intelligence. As has been observed throughout his recent detention, he was able to quickly bounce back from these most disconcerting moments and regain an air of calm confidence, and strong resolve in not parting with other threat information.

Future Worldview: According to the subject, the jihad will ultimately be victorious over American and the west.

Motivations. Subject's primary motivations are (in no particular order): status/prestige, power, influence, serving the Unmash, serving the prophet and Allah, pursuing a "pure jihad", contributing to the establishment of Shari'a among Muslim countries, contributing to the "lifting up" of Muslims throughout the world, and contributing to the restoration of the Palestinian homeland.

Primary Strengths. (in no particular order) Ability to focus, goal-directed discipline, intelligence, emotional resilience, street savvy, ability to organize and manage people, ability to delegate tasks, keen observation skills, fluid adaptability (can anticipate and adapt under duress and with minimal resources), capable of assessing and exploiting the needs of others, ability to adjust goals to emerging opportunities.
Detention and Interrogation. Subject recognizes that his duty as a soldier/warrior/mujahid is to delay, mislead, and lie to protect what is most critical to the success of his cause. He assumes that we understand this. Thus, he is not likely to be intimidated or weakened by being "caught" in lies. His job is to lie. During interview he explained that he lied to his neighbors, to shopkeepers, to bankers, travel agents, airport personnel, and many others in order to protect his people and activities. He said, "I lie, lie, lie, lie, and lie." He prides himself in regard to past deceptions, he managed with great success.

He acquired a United Nations refugee identification card by persistently telling the same lie over a period of several weeks or months. He has learned that the combination of skillful deception and lying pays off.

He has talked with Ayman al-Zawahiri and it is likely that Zawahiri talked about his experience as a captive of the Egyptians and Russians. In addition, subject is familiar and probably well versed regarding al-Qaeda's detention and resistance training materials. Thus, one would expect that subject would draw upon this fund of knowledge as he attempts to cope with his own detention.

Subject believes in the ultimate destiny of Islam is to dominate the world. He believes that global victory is inevitable. Thus, there is no chance that he could rationalize that providing information will harm current efforts but represent only a temporary setback.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trainer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Certification Date</th>
<th>initials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 Nov</td>
<td>18 Nov</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Briefing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SBRE transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facial Slap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attention Grasp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Silencing Facial Hold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abdominal Slap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Walling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of Water</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cramped Confinement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stress Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. Kneel

2. Wall
**NAME:**

Waterboard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trainer:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configuration:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjected:</td>
<td>Y · N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Signature:**  
**Date:**  
**Trainer Signature:**  
**Date:**  

**Refresher/ Requal Date:**

9000143
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: (U) Meeting with

1. On 16 July 2003, I met with [redacted] in Office of Inspector General spaces. The meeting was conducted as part of a review of Agency practices regarding the custody and interrogation of individuals for counterterrorism purposes. Specifically, the meeting was designed to gain information on the impact of CTC's involvement in detention and interrogation.

2. [redacted] asked how we judge the success of the detention and interrogation program, [redacted] stated that the value of the program is taking the terrorists off the streets, and success is judged by the quality of the information they provide. If they get unique, valuable information from the detainees, then they have done their job. In view, using the quality of the intelligence as the yardstick, the program has been an absolute success. She stated further that there was no other way CTC could have gotten the information they have obtained from the detainees.

3. [redacted] provided information about the modus operandi of Al-Qa’ida,
SUBJECT: Meeting with

7. According to information from detainees has also provided a wealth of information about Al-Qaeda plots. These include the following:

- A plot against the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan.
- The Heathrow/Canary Wharf plot, which involved hijacking aircraft to fly into and destroy both locations.
- The train track plot where the operative would loosen the spikes in an attempt to derail a train.
- The gas station plot where several gas stations were to be blown up to create panic and havoc.
- The Library Tower plot where the tallest building in California was to be attacked similar to the World Trade Center.
- The suspension bridge plot where the lines of the bridge were to be cut, thus making it collapse.
SUBJECT: (U) Meeting with

4. [Redacted] stated that detainees have provided information that led to the arrest of other terrorists. Zubaydah provided information that led to a raid that netted Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.

5. Because of his position as chief of Al-Qa'ida operations outside of Afghanistan, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) personally recruited, trained, or otherwise had direct knowledge of many terrorist operatives. KSM provided information that helped lead to the arrest of: Tymen Faris, the Ohio truck driver; Uzair Paracha, a smuggler; Saleh al-Mawari, a sleeper operative in New York; Majid Khan, an operative who could get into the U.S. easily; and Amar al Baluchi, KSM's nephew. who Zubaydah identified as one of the most likely operatives to travel to the U.S. to carry out operations.
9. **SUBJECT:** (U) Meeting with

On the question of whether actual plots had been thwarted, [REDACTED] opined that since the operatives involved in many of the above plots had been arrested, they have, in effect, thwarted the operation. The following captured terrorists were associated with plots:

- Majid Khan, whose father owned a gas station, was associated with the gas station plot, as well as the poison operation.

- Iyman Faris was tasked to work on the suspension bridge plot.

- Khalad bin Attash was involved in the Heathrow plot.

- The California Library Tower operation to blow up the tallest building in California. Subair was also involved in the Library Tower plot.

- Amar al Baluchi had the U.S. Consulate in Karachi as his target.
SUBJECT: CTC's HVT Interrogation Efforts

1. Summary:
   CTC's interrogation efforts with the interrogation of Al-Nashiri.

2. Al-Nashiri - With the recent capture of a high-ranking Al Qaeda operative, Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, CTC's interrogation efforts. Al-Nashiri is believed to be responsible for planning the USS Cole attack (which he has admitted a role in this) and future attacks on US interests in the Arab Peninsula region including attacks on US Warships. Al-Nashiri has undergone interrogation with the HVT Interrogators using and Al-Nashiri is becoming more compliant and is providing actionable intelligence.
SUBJECT: CTC's HVT Interrogation Efforts
13 July 2004

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad:
Preeminent Source On
Al-Qaeda (S/I/NF)
He then joined Yousef in the Philippines in 1994 to plan the “Bojinka” plot—the simultaneous bombings of a dozen US-flagged commercial airliners over the Pacific.

- After the Bojinka plot was disrupted and Yousef was caught in early 1995, KSM escaped but was subsequently indicted in the United States for his role in the plot and went into hiding.

While preparing the Bojinka plot, Yousef and KSM also discussed the idea of using planes as missiles to strike targets in the United States, including the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency. KSM says that, in 1996, he expanded the idea of using planes as missiles by constructing a plot of hijacking ten airliners to strike simultaneously targets on both coasts of the United States, and

KSM traveled to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s to gain the support of Osama Bin Laden and thereby obtain the resources necessary to realize the operation. The al-Qaeda leader at first demurred but changed his mind in late 1999 and provided KSM operatives and funding for a scaled-down version of his hijacking operation. This planning culminated in the 11 September attacks.

- Before September 2001, KSM was neither a formal member of al-Qaeda nor a member of its leadership council, but in addition to managing the 11 September operation, he headed al-Qaeda’s Media Committee and oversaw efforts during 2000-2001 to work with East Asian Jemah Islamiya (JI) operatives to launch terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia against US and Israeli targets.

- KSM has stated that he intentionally did not swear bay’ah (a pledge of loyalty) to Bin Laden until after September 2001 so that he could have ignored a decision by the al-Qaeda leadership to cancel the 11 September attacks.

After late 2001, the collapse of the Taliban regime, the dispersal of al-Qaeda’s leadership, and the prestige associated with engineering the 11 September attacks combined to propel KSM into the role of operations chief for al-Qaeda around the world.

- KSM stated that he had planned a second wave of hijacking attacks even before September 2001 but shifted his aim from the United States to the United Kingdom because of the United States’ post-11 September security posture and the British Government’s strong support for Washington’s global war on terror.
In addition to attempting to prepare this so-called "Heathrow Plot"—in which he planned to have multiple aircraft attack Heathrow Airport and other targets in the United Kingdom—KSM also launched a number of plots against the United States.

Although he was responsible for operational plotting, KSM stated that during most of 2002, he spent considerable time managing the movement and housing of operatives and their families from Afghanistan to Pakistan and then onwards to the Middle East. (S/SAP)
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida (SINR)

Key Findings (U)

Since his March 2003 capture, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), the driving force behind the 11 September attacks as well as several subsequent plots against US and Western targets worldwide, has become one of the US Government's key sources on al-Qa'ida. As a detainee, he has provided reports that have shed light on al-Qa'ida's strategic doctrine, plots and probable targets, key operatives, and the likely methods for attacks in the US homeland, leading to the disruption of several plots against the United States.

• Information from KSM has not only dramatically expanded our universe of knowledge on al-Qa'ida's plots but has provided leads that assisted directly in the capture of other terrorists, including Jemaah Islamiya leader Hambali [REDACTED] (SINR).

KSM steadfastly maintains that his overriding priority was to strike the United States but says that immediately after 11 September he realized that a follow-on attack in the United States would be difficult because of new security measures. As a result, KSM's plots against the US homeland from late 2001 were opportunistic and limited, including a plot to fly a hijacked plane into the tallest building on the US West Coast and a plan to send al-Qa'ida operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise apartment buildings in a US city. (SINR)

• CIA assesses that KSM has revealed at least the broad outlines of the set of terrorist attacks upon which he and his lieutenants focused from about 1999 until his detention four years later. We judge that KSM has been generally accurate because his information tends to be consistent, and much of it has been corroborated by fellow detainees and other reporting. (SINR)
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Present Source on Al-Qaeda

What KSM Has Told Us (S/NIW)

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), the driving force behind the 11 September attacks as well as several subsequent plots against US and Western targets worldwide, has become, since his capture in March 2003, a key intelligence source for the US Government on al-Qaeda's plots and personalities. Debriefings since his detention have yielded reports that have shed light on the plots, capabilities, the identity and location of al-Qaeda operatives, and affiliated terrorist organizations and networks. He has provided information on al-Qaeda's strategic doctrine, probable targets, the impact of striking each target set, and likely methods of attacks inside the United States.

- KSM has also provided in considerable detail the traits and profiles that al-Qaeda sought in Western operatives after the 11 September attacks.

- In addition, KSM has given us insight into how al-Qaeda might conduct surveillance of potential targets in the United States, how it might select targets,

It will take years to determine definitively all the plots in which KSM was involved and of which he was aware, but our extensive debriefings of various KSM lieutenants since early 2003 suggest that he has divulged at least the broad outlines of his network's most significant plots against the United States and elsewhere in his role as al-Qaeda's chief of operations outside Afghanistan:

- Striking the United States. Despite KSM's assertion that a post-11 September attack in the United States would be difficult because of more stringent security measures, he has admitted to batching a plot in late 2001 to use Jemaah Islamiya (JI) operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into the tallest building on the US West Coast. From late 2001 until early 2003, KSM also conceived several low-level plots, including an early 2002 plan to send al-Qaeda operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise apartment buildings in an unspecified major US city and an early 2003 plot to employ a network of Pakistanis—including Ymeen Paris and Majid Khan—to target gas stations, railroad tracks, and the Brooklyn Bridge in New York. KSM has also spoken at length about operative Ja'far al-Tayyur, admitting that al-Qaeda had tasked al-Tayyur in case specific targets in New York City in 2001.

- Attacks in Asia, Europe, the Middle East. During 2000-2001, KSM plotted attacks against US and other targets in Southeast Asia using al-Qaeda and JI operatives, but after the 11 September attacks he claims that he largely regarded JI operatives as a resource for his plots against targets in Europe and
In response to questions about al-Qaeda's efforts to acquire WMD, KSM revealed he had met three individuals involved in al-Qaeda's program to produce anthrax. He appears to have calculated, incorrectly, that we had this information already, given that one of the three—Yazid Sufaat—had been in foreign custody for several months before KSM's arrest for unrelated terrorist activity.

When confronted with the information provided by KSM, Yazid, who had access to press reports and therefore knew of KSM's capture, expressed anger because he figured it was KSM who betrayed him. Eventually, Yazid admitted his principal role in the anthrax program and provided some fragmentary information on his, at the time, still-elusive assistant, but it was ultimately the information provided by KSM that led to the capture of Yazid's two principal assistants in the anthrax program.

Historical Plots. KSM has been one of the primary sources on understanding how the 11 September attacks were conceived, planned, and executed. While KSM was the manager of the 11 September plot, he claims to lack knowledge of many aspects of the attack's planning and execution because Bin Laden and his deceased deputy Muhammad 'Adil played a key role in the selection of operatives, and Ramzi Binalshibh, not KSM, was in direct contact with the 11 September hijackers once they were in the United States. KSM also has provided a fair amount of detail on the 1994-95 "Bojinka" plot—formulated along with his nephew Ramzi Yousef—in which they conspired to explode in midair a dozen US-flagged airliners over the Pacific Ocean.

1 KSM has not admitted to a role in the bombing by JI operatives of nightclubs in Bali in October 2002. Hambali claims that he financed those bombings from funding provided by KSM for attacks in general in Southeast Asia.
KSM’s Rolodex A Boon For Operations (S/NI)

KSM’s decade-long career as a terrorist, during which he met with a broad range of Islamic extremists from around the world, has made him a key source of information on numerous al-Qa’ida operatives and other mujahidin. He has provided intelligence that has led directly to the capture of operatives or flushed out our understanding of the activities of important detainees, which in turn assisted in the debriefings of those individuals.

Similarly, information that KSM provided to us on Majid Khan in the spring of 2003 was the crucial first link in the chain that led us to the capture of prominent al-Qa’ida leader and al-Qa’ida associate Hambali in August 2003 and more than a dozen Southeast Asian operatives slated for attacks against the US homeland. KSM told us about Khan’s role in delivering $50,000 in December 2002 to operatives associated with Hambali.

In an example of how information from one detainee can be used in debriefing another detainee in a “building-block” process, Khan—who had been detained in Pakistan in early 2003—was confronted with KSM's information about the money and acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named “Zubair.” Khan also provided Zubair’s physical description and contact number. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June 2003.

During debriefings, Zubair revealed that he worked directly for Hambali.

Next, KSM—when explicitly queried on the issue—identified Hambali’s brother, ‘Abd al-Hadi, as a prospective successor to Hambali.

Bringing the story full circle, ‘Abd al-Hadi identified a cell of JI operatives—some of them pilots—who had been sent to Karachi for possible al-Qa’ida operations. When confronted with his brother’s revelations, Hambali admitted that he was grooming members of the cell for US operations—at the behest of KSM—probably as part of KSM’s plot to fly hijacked planes into the tallest building on the US West Coast.
KSM's Information Seems Credible... (3/18)

KSM probably received the bulk of his reporting—such as on the Heathrow plot and operatives targeted for missions against the United States after 11 September—has been consistent with or corroborated by reporting from other detainees.

- Shortly after his capture, KSM probably was willing to divulge limited information on the Heathrow plot because key Heathrow plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh had been detained about six months earlier. Nevertheless, KSM withheld details about the evolution of the operation until confronted with reporting from two other operatives knowledgeable concerning the plot—Khalid Bin Attash and KSM's nephew Ammar al-Baluchi—who were caught after KSM.

- KSM also provided much more specific information on al-Qaeda's operational activities with JI and the identities of JI operatives only after he was confronted by detailed questions derived from the debriefings of JI leader and al-Qaeda associate Hambali.
Appendix: Biography of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) (U)

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was born on 24 April 1965; his father, a cleric who died in 1969, moved to Kuwait along with other Baluchi relatives from Iran in the 1950s and early 1960s, when large numbers of migrants traveled to the Gulf region from across the Muslim World to take advantage of the oil boom. In a lengthy autobiographical statement made after his capture, KSM noted that he had a rebellious streak from childhood; he claimed that in grade school, he and his nephew, World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef, tore down the Kuwaiti flag from their school. He also stated that he joined the Muslim Brotherhood as a teenager as an expression of his defiance against the secular world he saw around him.

- In addition to Ramzi Yousef, another five relatives of KSM are terrorists, the most notable of whom are nephew ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Aziz ‘Ali (a.k.a. ‘Ammar), a key facilitator for the 11 September attacks.

KSM’s limited and negative experiences in the United States—which included a brief jail stay because of unpaid bills—almost certainly helped propel him on his path to become a terrorist. KSM stated in his jailhouse autobiography that, while attending North Carolina’s A&T State University, he focused on his studies and associated primarily with fellow Islamist students from the Middle East.

He stated that his contacts with Americans, while minimal, confirmed his view that the United States was a debauched and racist country.

- After graduating from A&T in 1986 with a degree in mechanical engineering, KSM said that he traveled to Afghanistan to participate in the fighting against the Soviet Army there. He stated that most of his time in Afghanistan during this period was directed to support work for other mujahidin.

KSM also has identified the terrorist activities of his nephew Ramzi Yousef, along with his anger at the US Government’s support of Israel, as playing a pivotal role in his decision to engage in terrorism against the United States. In 1992, KSM says he provided about $1,000 to help fund Yousef’s bombing of the World Trade Center, adding that he was impressed by the ease with which his nephew was able to operate in the United States.
3 June 2005

Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida
(S/NF)
also provided invaluable insights in reports that have aided our analysis of al-Qa'ida's current organization, the personalities of its key members, and al-Qa'ida's decisionmaking process. His reporting has contributed to our understanding of the enemy, how al-Qa'ida members interact with each other, how they are organized, and what their personal networks are like.

Ahmed Khalfam Ghailani (a.k.a. Haytham al-Kini, a.k.a. Fupi) a Tanzanian al-Qa'ida member who was indicted for his role in the 1998 East Africa US Embassy bombings, has provided new insights into al-Qa'ida's skills and networks. As a facilitator and one of al-Qa'ida's top document forgers since the 11 September attacks, with access to individuals across the organizations until his arrest in July 2004, he has reported on how he forged passports and to whom he supplied them.
in confronting detainees to persuade them to talk about topics they would otherwise not reveal.

- For example, lists of names found on the computer—a key al-Qa‘ida financial operative and facilitator for the 11 September attacks—seized in March 2003 represented al-Qa‘ida members who were to receive funds. Debriefers questioned detainees extensively on the names to determine who they were and how important they were to the organization. The information helped us to better understand al-Qa‘ida’s hierarchy, revenues, and expenditures, as well as funds that were available to families.

- The same computer contained a list of e-mail addresses for individuals KSM helped deploy abroad who he hoped would execute operations;

Challenges of Detainee Reporting (S/NF)

Detainees, by virtue of their circumstances, have an adversarial relationship with their debrievers; they often try pass incomplete or intentionally misleading information, perhaps hoping that the volume of the reporting will make it difficult to sort out the truth. admitted outright that there were some topics—he would not discuss.
Detainees' information must be corroborated using multiple sources of intelligence; uncorroborated information from detainees must be regarded with some degree of suspicion. Sometimes the detainee gives information he calculates—rightly or wrongly—that the debriefers already know.

- Uncharacteristic for most detainees, KSM almost immediately following his capture in March 2003 elaborated on his plan to crash commercial airlines into Heathrow Airport; he may have assumed that Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who was captured in December 2002, had already divulged this plan.

Refusing To Budge on Certain Topics (S/TF)

We assess that each detainee very likely has information that he will not reveal.
Appendix B: Detainee Reporting on al-Qa'ida (S/NF)

2004 HUMINT Reporting on Terrorism (S/N)

Total Reports: 19,707

HUMINT Reporting on al-Qa'ida 6,600

2004 HUMINT Reporting on al-Qa'ida ('S/N)

Total Reports: 6,600

Detainee Reporting on al-Qa'ida 3,800
Appendix C: Capture of Al-Qa'ida's Southeast Asian Chief Hambali (SII~F)

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) is captured and reports that Majid Khan, one of his Pakistan operatives, who was also captured in March, delivered $50,000 to some of Hambali's operatives in December 2002.

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)

March 2003

Zubair reports that he worked directly for Hambali and provides fragmentary information on a passport used by Hambali.

Zubair

June 2003

In debriefings, Hambali unwittingly provides Abl al-Hadi's location.

Hambali

August 2003

Abd al-Hadi identifies to us a cell of 11 operatives whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for training. When confronted with his brother's revelations, Hambali admits that he was grooming members of the cell for US operations—part of KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the tallest building on the US west coast.

Abd al-Hadi

September 2003

When confronted with KSM's information, Majid Khan acknowledges that he delivered the money to an operative named Nasar—a key informant for Hambali.

Majid Khan

March 2003

We use the information provided by Zubair to capture Hambali's other key lieutenant, Bashir Bin Lap, a.k.a. Lillie, who provides the location of Hambali, leading to his capture.

Bashir Bin Lap, a.k.a. Lillie

August 2003

Bringing the story full circle, in September 2003, Pakistani authorities take down 14 members of the cell.

September 2003
Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa‘ida (S//NF)

Since 11 September 2001, detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, aiding intelligence and law enforcement operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots, and advancing our analysis of the al-Qa‘ida target. In addition, detainees have been able to clarify and provide context for information collected from other sources; they also have provided unique insights into different aspects of the terrorist organization, including its leadership, attack strategy and tactics, and CBRN capabilities and ambitions. The reporting is disseminated broadly within the US Government.

Detainees have given us a wealth of useful information on al-Qa‘ida members and associates; in fact, detainees have played some role in nearly every capture of al-Qa‘ida members and associates since 2002, including helping us unravel most of the network associated with the now detained 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). KSM provided information that set the stage for the detention of Hambali, lead contact of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) to al-Qa‘ida, and most of his network.

- Detainee information was also key to wrapping up such important al-Qa‘ida members and associates as Jose Padilla and Iyman Faris.

One of the gains to detaining the additional terrorists has been the thwarting of a number of al-Qa‘ida operations in the United States and overseas. Jose Padilla was detained as he was arriving in Chicago with plans to mount an attack. Similarly, Wali Bin Attash (a.k.a. Khalad) was captured on the verge of mounting attacks against the US Consulate in Karachi, Westerners at the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas.

Since 11 September, the capture and debriefing of detainees also has transformed our understanding of al-Qa‘ida and affiliated terrorist groups,
providing increased avenues for sophisticated analysis. Before the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002, within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa’ida’s organizational structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. It also was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of the 11 September attacks.

- In the nearly four years since 11 September 2001, successive detainees have helped us gauge our progress in the fight against al-Qa’ida by providing updated information on the changing structure and health of the organization. 

Despite the unquestionable utility of detainee reporting, uncorroborated information from detainees must be regarded with some degree of suspicion. Detainees have been known to pass incomplete or intentionally misleading information; moreover, we assess that each detainee very likely has information that he will not reveal.
Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida (S/NF)

Since 11 September 2001, reporting from high value al-Qa'ida detainees has become a crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, contributing directly and indirectly to intelligence and law-enforcement operations against the al-Qa'ida target. In addition, detainees have been able to clarify and provide context for information collected from other sources; they also have provided unique insights into different aspects of the terrorist organization, including its leadership, attack strategy and tactics, and CBRN capabilities and ambitions.

- Detainee reporting since early 2003 has been a major foundation for much of the Intelligence Community's analysis on al-Qa'ida, both in terms of current intelligence publications and of more in-depth intelligence assessments.

- High Value Detainee (HVD): A detainee who—in large part due to his having held a position in or in association with al-Qa'ida before detention—has advanced our understanding of terrorism on multiple fronts.

- Medium Value Detainee (MVD): A detainee whose reporting advanced our knowledge of al-Qa'ida, but only on a limited range of issues.

- Low Value Detainee (LVD): A detainee who may have provided some information on a specific issue, but whose overall reporting has not advanced our knowledge of al-Qa'ida (S/NF).

Helping Target Other Terrorists (S/NF)

High and medium value detainees have given us a wealth of useful information on al-Qa'ida members and associates, including new details on the personalities and activities of known terrorists. Detainees also divulge, either wittingly or unwittingly, details about terrorists who are unknown to us. As is information from other collection streams, detainee reporting is often incomplete or too general to lead directly to arrests; instead, detainees provide critical pieces to the puzzle, which, when combined with other reporting, have helped direct an investigation’s focus and led to the capture of terrorists.

Defining al-Qa'ida Detainees (S/NF)

Detained members and associates of al-Qa'ida fall into three basic categories, based on their position and access and the reporting they have provided.

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief.
Unraveling Hambali’s Network
In March 2003, al-Qa’ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) provided information about an al-Qa’ida operative, Majid Khan, who he was aware had recently been captured. KSM—possibly believing the detained operative was “talking”—admitted to having tasked Majid with delivering a large sum of money to individuals working for another senior al-Qa’ida associate.

- In an example of how information from one detainee can be used in debriefing another detainee in a “building block” process, Khan—confronted with KSM’s information about the money—acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named “Zubair” and provided Zubair’s physical description and contact number. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June 2003.

- During debriefings, Zubair revealed that he worked directly for Hambali, who was the principle Jemaah Islamiya (JI) conduit to al-Qa’ida. Zubair provided information we used to track down and arrest Hambali.

- Next, KSM—when explicitly queried on the issue—identified Hambali’s brother, ‘Abd al-Hadi (a.k.a. Rusman Gunawan) as a prospective successor to Hambali.

Bringing New Targets to Light
A variety of detainee reporting has provided us initial information about individuals having links to al-Qa’ida and has given us insight into individuals about whom we had some reporting but whose

1 See Appendix A: Capture of Al-Qa’ida’s Southeast Asian Chief Hambali. (S/ARF)
al-Qa'ida involvement was unclear. For example, detainees in mid-2003 helped us build a list of approximately 70 individuals—many of whom we had never heard of before—that al-Qa'ida deemed suitable for Western operations.

- **Ja'far al-Tayyar** first came to the FBI's attention when Abu Zubaydah named him as one of the most likely individuals to be used by al-Qa'ida for operations in the United States or Europe.

Aiding US Law Enforcement Efforts

Many actionable leads provided by detainee reporting have assisted the efforts of the FBI, local law enforcement, and the Department of Defense. Such information has led to arrests, helped in questioning suspects, and may ultimately be used in a judicial process.

Soon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio-based truck driver whom the FBI identified as **Iyman Faris**, and who was already under suspicion for his contacts with al-Qa'ida operative **Majid Khan**. The FBI and CIA shared intelligence from interviews of KSM, Khan, and Faris on a near real-time basis and quickly ascertained that Faris had met and accepted operational taskings from KSM on several occasions. Faris is currently serving a 20-year sentence for conspiracy and material support to a terrorist organization.

KSM’s revelation in March 2003 that he was plotting with **Sayf al-Rahman Paracha**—who also used the name Saifullah al-Rahman Paracha—to smuggle explosives into the United States for a planned attack in New York prompted the FBI to investigate Paracha’s business ties in the United States. The investigation also involved questioning Paracha’s son, Uzair Paracha, in New York and resulted in designating in May 2003 Sayf al-Rahman Paracha an enemy combatant. Sayf al-Rahman Paracha entered into US custody in July 2003, and Uzair was indicted in the Federal Court in Manhattan. Sayf al-Rahman Paracha remains in detention at Guantanamo Bay.
Revealing Plots, Potential Targets (S/NF)

Detainee reporting has helped thwart a number of al-Qa’ida plots to attack targets in the West and elsewhere. Not only have detainees reported on potential targets and techniques that al-Qa’ida operational planners have considered but arrests also have disrupted attack plans in progress.
In response to questions about al-Qa’ida’s efforts to acquire WMD, KSM also revealed he had met three individuals involved in al-Qa’ida’s program to produce anthrax. He apparently calculated—incorrectly—that we had this information already, given that one of the three—JI operative and al-Qa’ida associate Yazid Sufaat—had been in foreign custody for unrelated terrorist activity.

- After being confronted with KSM’s reporting, Sufaat eventually admitted his principal role in the anthrax program and provided information on his at-large assistants. Ultimately, the information from Sufaat and KSM contributed to the capture of Sufaat’s two assistants in the anthrax program.

US Targets Here and Abroad
Abu Zubaydah was the first of several detainees to reveal a significant quantity of general threat information against targets abroad and in the United States—including the White House and other US symbols.

- Reporting from Abu Zubaydah has been used as a baseline for debriefing other senior detainees.

Debriefings of mid-level al-Qa’ida operatives also have reported on specific plots against US interests.

• A key Somali operative working with al-Qa’ida and al-Ittihad al-Islami in East Africa, Hassan Ahmed Guleed, soon after his capture admitted that East African al-Qa’ida leaders planned to attack the US military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti using explosive-laden water tankers.

- Debriefers used KSM’s and Bin al-Shibh’s reporting to confront Walid Bin ‘Attash (a.k.a. Khallad) and Ammar al-Baluchi, who were caught two months after KSM. Khallad admitted to having been involved in the plot and revealed that he had directed cell leaders to begin locating pilots who could hijack planes and crash them into the airport. Khallad said he and operative had considered some 10 countries as possible launch sites for the hijacking attempts and that they narrowed the options to the

Heathrow Airport Plot
Shortly after his capture in March 2003, KSM divulged limited information about his plot to use commercial airliners to attack Heathrow Airport and other targets in the United Kingdom. He discussed the plot probably because he suspected that key al-Qa’ida 11 September facilitator and Heathrow Airport plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who had been detained six months previously, had already revealed the information.

- Debriefers used KSM’s and Bin al-Shibh’s reporting to confront Walid Bin ‘Attash (a.k.a. Khallad) and Ammar al-Baluchi, who were caught two months after KSM. Khallad admitted to having been involved in the plot and revealed that he had directed cell leaders to begin locating pilots who could hijack planes and crash them into the airport. Khallad said he and operative had considered some 10 countries as possible launch sites for the hijacking attempts and that they narrowed the options to the
• Khallad’s statements provided leverage in
debriefings of KSM. KSM fleshed out the status of
the operation, including identifying an additional
target in the United Kingdom.

Revealing the Karachi Plots
When confronted with information provided by
Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad admitted during
debriefings that al-Qa’ida was planning to attack the
US Consulate in Karachi.

Aiding Our Understanding of Al-Qa’ida
Since 11 September, the capture and debriefing of
HVDs has significantly advanced our understanding
of al-Qa’ida and affiliated terrorist groups. Before
the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002, we had
significant gaps in knowledge about al-Qa’ida’s
organizational structure, key members and associates,
capabilities, and its presence
around the globe. Within months of his arrest, Abu
Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa’ida’s
organizational structure, key operatives, and modus
operandi. Early in his detention, his information on
al-Qa’ida’s Shura Council and its various committees
added to what we were learning.

• In addition, Abu Zubaydah’s identification early in
his detention of KSM as the mastermind of
11 September and al-Qa’ida’s premier terrorist
planner and of ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri as another
key al-Qa’ida operational planner corroborated
information.

Since 11 September, successive detainees have
helped us gauge our progress in the fight against
al-Qa’ida by providing updated information on the
changing structure and health of the organization.