Iran's strategic goal: nuclear weapons capability.
Iran's interim goal: A deal with minor concessions that preserves Iran's future ability to rush forward to produce nuclear weapons.

1. The current Iranian charm offensive aims at reaching a deal with the international community that will preserve Iran's ability to rapidly build a nuclear weapon at a time of its choosing – the so-called breakout option.

2. Iran seeks an arrangement in which sanctions are eased or lifted in exchange for cosmetic concessions, while allowing Iran to retain sufficient nuclear material and – no less importantly – nuclear infrastructure to complete its military nuclear program on short notice.

3. Iran is developing and installing new and advanced centrifuges for this purpose. These centrifuges enable Iran to enrich – within weeks – even low enriched uranium to weapons grade highly enriched uranium, the most critical component in making nuclear weapons. This speedy enrichment capability will make timely detection and effective response to an Iranian nuclear breakout increasingly difficult, if not impossible.

4. Thus, by themselves Iranian cessation of high enrichment and agreement to hand over all of its existing stockpile of highly enriched uranium would be insufficient. Iran could still speedily use its advanced centrifuges to transform its stocks of low enriched uranium to weapons grade highly enriched uranium in no time.

5. Iran's negotiation strategy is entirely consistent with Rouhani's policy of "smile and enrich." Rouhani has boasted that when he was Iran's nuclear negotiator, he engaged the West in futile negotiations to buy the time needed to complete the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan, an indispensable part of Iran's military nuclear program.

6. Since the Iranian elections, the regime has continued to move full steam ahead towards attaining a nuclear weapons capability. Iran continues to enrich uranium (in defiance of UN Security Council and IAEA resolutions), continues to upgrade both the quantity and quality of its centrifuges, continues to build the heavy water reactor in Arak
and continues to deny IAEA inspectors access to sites suspected of housing military nuclear activities.

7. Iran must be prevented from achieving a breakout capacity. The international community must make the following unequivocal demands of Iran. Iran must:

a. stop all nuclear enrichment;

b. dismantle the illicit underground nuclear facility near Qom and the cascades of second generation centrifuges in Natanz;

c. remove all enriched material from its territory;

d. stop the construction of the heavy water reactor in Arak.

8. Only by ensuring that Iran complies with all four conditions will the international community succeed in stopping Iran’s nuclear program. Any half-measures would allow Iran to continue developing nuclear weapons capabilities behind a smokescreen of promises.

9. Until Iran meets all these obligations, the pressures on it must be increased, rather than decreased.

10. In order to achieve a genuine and enforceable arrangement that will deny Iran a nuclear breakout option, diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran must be increased and backed up by a credible military threat.