Abstract. In this paper we present a novel type of digital signatures, which we call blank digital signatures. The basic idea behind this scheme is that an originator can define and sign a message template, describing fixed parts of a message as well as multiple choices for exchangeable parts of a message. One may think of a form with blank fields, where for such fields the originator specifies all the allowed strings to choose from. Then, a proxy is given the power to sign an instantiation of the template signed by the originator by using some secret information. By an instantiation, the proxy commits to one allowed choice per blank field in the template. The resulting message signature can be publicly verified under the originator’s and the proxy’s signature verification keys. Thereby, no verifying party except the originator and the proxy learn anything about the “unused” choices from the message template given a message signature. Consequently, the template is hidden from verifiers.

We discuss several applications, provide a formal definition of blank digital signature schemes and introduce a security model. Furthermore, we provide an efficient construction of such a blank digital signature scheme from any secure digital signature scheme, pairing-friendly elliptic curves and polynomial commitments, which we prove secure in our model. Finally, we outline several open issues and extensions for future work.

Keywords: Digital signature scheme, blank digital signatures, elliptic curves, pairings, polynomial commitments

1 Changes to the AsiaCCS’13 Proceedings Version

- The construction of the BDSS has been greatly simplified. This makes the construction much more intuitive, enhances the performance significantly, reduces the size of the public parameters and allows the use of an indistinguishability notion for the privacy property.
- The privacy property has been restated to an indistinguishability style security game.
- This version incorporates full security proofs and uses explicit reductions in the security proofs (whenever appropriate).

2 Introduction

Digital signatures provide the means to achieve source authentication and data integrity for digital messages in a publicly verifiable way meaning that at signing time a signer commits himself to a concrete message. In this paper, we propose the novel concept of a blank digital signature scheme. Here, an originator can define and sign a message template, describing fixed parts of a message as well as several choices for exchangeable parts of a message (one may think of a form with blank fields, where for such fields the originator specifies all the allowed strings to choose from), for which he can delegate signing permissions to a proxy. This proxy is given the power to sign template instantiations of the template given by the originator by using some secret information. The resulting message signature can be publicly verified under the originator’s and the proxy’s signature verification keys. Thereby, no verifying party except the originator and the proxy learn anything about the “unused” choices from the message template and, consequently, about the template when given a message.

* This is a major revision of the version of the AsiaCCS’13 paper.
signature. In order to construct such a scheme it is helpful to look at existing variants of digital signature schemes to figure out, whether they can be used to instantiate blank digital signatures.

Conventional digital signatures require the signer to be available during signature creation, e.g., when a contract is signed. To overcome this limitation, the concept of proxy signatures [14] has been introduced. Basically, a proxy signature scheme allows an entity (the delegator) to delegate his signing capabilities to another entity (the proxy) that can then construct signatures on behalf of the delegator. This concept has seen a considerable amount of interest since then [5]. Surprisingly, only quite recently a suitable security model for proxy signatures has been introduced [4], and been extended to multi-level and identity-based proxy signature schemes later on [17]. Since in a practical application, the delegator may not want to give the proxy the power to sign any message on behalf of the signer, the delegation by warrant [14] approach was proposed. Here, a signed warrant is used to describe the delegation. Thereby, any type of security policy may be included in the warrant to describe the restrictions under which the delegation is valid. This approach seems to be particularly attractive and received the most attention, since the designator can define a message space for which he delegates his signing rights. In state of the art schemes [17,5], a warrant consists of the description \( \omega \) of the message space for which signing is being delegated, together with a “certificate”, which is a signature on \( \omega \) under the delegators private signing key. We are given a similar requirement and, consequently, could ask whether proxy signatures can be used in this setting. In proxy signatures, this warrant is an abstract description, which could, for instance, be a context-free grammar, a regular expression, or as in [4], the description of a polynomial-time Turing machine computing the characteristic function of all potential messages, i.e., given a message to decide, whether the message is covered by \( \omega \) or not. However, in proxy signatures the proxy is allowed to sign arbitrary messages from this abstract message space with the downside that the verifier learns the entire message space. Consequently, our requirement that the proxy can sign instantiations of a template without a verifier learning the corresponding template can not be realized by using existing proxy signature schemes.

Conventional digital signature schemes do not allow alterations of a signed document without invalidating the signature. Since it may be valuable to have the possibility to replace or remove (specified) parts of a message after signature creation such that the original signature stays valid (and no interaction with the original signer is required), redactable [19,11] as well as sanitizable signature schemes [1] have been introduced. Signature schemes, which allow removal of content (replacement by some special symbol \( \perp \) ) by any party are called redactable [19,11], while signature schemes allowing (arbitrary) replacements of admissible parts by a designated party are called sanitizable signature schemes [1], cf. [16] for a comparison. As in our setting, the proxy should be allowed to choose from a list of predefined replacements for designated parts of the message, one could ask whether redactable or sanitizable signatures can be used in this setting. Since in redactable signature schemes any party is allowed to modify signed messages by removing message parts, such signature schemes are obviously not compatible with our requirements. The original concept of sanitizable signatures [1] allows designated sanitizers to replace designated parts of a message. However, here the sanitizer does not have the role of a proxy meaning that it does not sign the modified message. Furthermore, a sanitizer can replace the designated parts with arbitrary strings, which is clearly not meeting our requirements. The concept of sanitizable signatures was later on extended to allow only permitted replacements [13], yet, the Bloom filter [3] based construction does not meet cryptographic security requirements and the cryptographic accumulator [2] based approach [13,7] allows to securely restrict replacements. Yet, both approaches are not designed and also do not support the hiding of the set of accumulated values (allowed replacements) and, thus, are not suitable for our construction.

To sum this up, our concept has more in common with proxy signatures than with sanitizable signatures. This is due to our requirements that the signature of the originator is not publicly verifiable as it is the case in sanitizable signatures and only instantiations can be publicly verified as it is the case for proxy signatures.

### 2.1 Contribution

Since, however, none of the existing concepts covers all our requirements, we propose the novel concept of a blank digital signature scheme. Here, an originator, i.e., the signer delegating signing
permissions, can define and sign a message template, describing fixed parts of a message as well as several choices for exchangeable parts of a message. One may think of a form with blank fields, where for such fields the originator specifies all the allowed strings to choose from. Then, a proxy is given the power to sign template instantiations of the template given by the originator by using some secret information. The resulting message signature can be publicly verified under the originator’s and the proxy’s signature verification keys. Thereby, no verifying party except the originator and the proxy learn anything about the “unused” choices from the template and, consequently, about the template given a message signature. Since this setting is quite different from the security requirements of proxy signatures and sanitizable signatures, most importantly, the template should be hidden from verifiers, we define a novel type of signature scheme along with a suitable security model. Similar to proxy signatures and sanitizable signatures, we require a public key infrastructure meaning that the originator and proxy are in possession of authentic signing keys. Moreover, since we use polynomial commitments in our construction, we need the parameters to be generated by a trusted third party.

A naive approach to realize blank digital signatures is that the originator produces \( n \) signatures for all \( n \) possible instantiations together with the public key of the proxy using a standard digital signature scheme, whereas the proxy simply signs the originator’s signature for the chosen instantiations. However, the number of signatures issued by the originator would then be \( O(n) \), which gets impractical very soon with increasing number of choices in exchangeable parts. By using randomized Merkle hash trees [15] as in redactable signatures, the number of signatures of the originator could be reduced to \( O(1) \), whereas the signature of the proxy would then, however, be of size \( O(\log n) \). At first glance, this may seem attractive, yet in Section 6.3 we illustrate that this approach also becomes soon impractical with an increasing number of choices. In our construction, the number of signatures of the originator is \( O(1) \), whereas the size of both signatures, of the originator and the proxy, are also \( O(1) \) and, in particular, very small and constant. Clearly, this is far more appealing than the aforementioned naive approaches.

2.2 Outline

In Section 3, we sketch some application scenarios for blank digital signatures. Section 4 discusses the mathematical and cryptographic preliminaries. Then, in Section 5 we introduce the notion of blank digital signatures and the corresponding security model. A construction of a blank digital signature scheme along with its security proof and a comparison to the naive approaches are given in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and lists open issues for future work.

3 Applications

Here, we sketch some application scenarios which we envision for this novel type of digital signatures.

**Partially blank signed contracts:** Suppose a person is willing to sign a contract under certain predefined conditions, e.g., set of potential prices, range of possible contract dates, but is not able to sign the contract in person. Then, this person can elegantly delegate this task to another semi-trusted party, e.g., his attorney, by using blank digital signatures. The third party is then able to conclude the contract on behalf of his client. The client can do so by defining a contract template thereby leaving certain positions “blank”, i.e., defining certain potential choices for the position without committing to one, and signing the template. Then, at a later point in time, the attorney is able to “fill in the gaps” by choosing from predefined choices, whereas the original signature of the client remains valid, and then signing the resulting contract as a proxy.

**“Sanitizable” signatures:** We may interpret exchangeable parts of message templates as replacements (with a potentially empty string) and, thus, can achieve a scheme with similar capabilities, but different meaning and strength as a non-interactive publicly accountable sanitizable signature.
scheme [6], which supports controlled replacements [7,13]. Note that such a sanitizable signature scheme does not yet exist. However, there are some key differences. In contrast to sanitizable signatures, our template signature is not intended to be publicly verifiable, i.e., can only be verified by the proxy and, thus, the originator does not commit to a concrete instantiation of the template. Furthermore, in blank digital signatures, the allowed replacements are hidden, which is not supported by sanitizable signatures allowing such replacements [7,13]. Consequently, blank digital signatures may be seen as signature schemes supporting sanitizing capabilities, but are a different concept as it is clear from the differences mentioned above.

4 Preliminaries

In this section we firstly provide an overview of required mathematical and cryptographic preliminaries.

4.1 Mathematical Background

An elliptic curve over the finite field \( \mathbb{F}_q \) is a plane, smooth curve described by the Weierstrass equation:

\[
E : Y^2 + a_1 X Y + a_3 Y = X^3 + a_2 X^2 + a_4 X + a_6,
\]

where \( a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_6 \in \mathbb{F}_q \). The set \( E(\mathbb{F}_q) \) of points \((x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_q^2 \) satisfying Equation (1) plus the point at infinity \( \infty \), which is the neutral element, forms an additive Abelian group, whereas the group law is determined by the chord-and-tangent method [18].

Let \( G \) be a cyclic group and \( p \) be a divisor of its group order, then there exists a subgroup of order \( p \), which we subsequently denote by \( G[p] \).

Definition 1 (Bilinear Map). Let \( G_1, G_2 \) and \( G_T \) be three cyclic groups of the same prime order \( p \), where \( G_1, G_2 \) are additive groups and \( G_T \) is a multiplicative group. We call the map \( e : G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T \) a bilinear map or pairing, if the following conditions hold:

Bilinearity: For all \( P_1, P_2 \in G_1 \) and \( P'_1, P'_2 \in G_2 \) we have:
- \( e(P_1 + P_2, P'_1) = e(P_1, P'_1) \cdot e(P_2, P'_2) \) for all \( P' \in G_2 \),
- \( e(P, P_1 + P_2) = e(P, P_1) \cdot e(P, P_2) \) for all \( P \in G_1 \).

Non-degeneracy: If \( P \) is a generator of \( G_1 \) and \( P' \) a generator of \( G_2 \), then \( e(P, P') \) is a generator of \( G_T \), i.e., \( e(P, P') \neq 1_{G_T} \).

Efficiently computable: \( e \) can be computed efficiently.

If \( G_1 = G_2 \), then \( e \) is called symmetric and asymmetric otherwise. The former type is also called Type-1 pairing, whereas in case of the latter we distinguish between Type-2 and Type-3 pairings. For Type-2 pairings there is an efficiently computable isomorphism \( \Psi : G_2 \to G_1 \) [8] and for Type-3 pairings such an efficiently computable isomorphism does not exist. In our setting, \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) are \( p \)-order elliptic curve group over \( \mathbb{F}_q \) and \( G_T = \mathbb{F}_q^*[p] \), which is an order \( p \) subgroup of \( \mathbb{F}_q^* \). Note that \( k \), the so called embedding degree, is defined as \( k = \min\{\ell \in \mathbb{N} : q^\ell - 1 \} \).

A function \( \epsilon : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}^+ \) is called negligible if for all \( c > 0 \) there is a \( k_0 \) such that \( \epsilon(k) < 1/k^c \) for all \( k > k_0 \). In the remainder of this paper, we use \( \epsilon \) to denote such a negligible function.

Definition 2 (Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)). Let \( p \) be a prime of bitlength \( \kappa \), \( G \) be a group of order \( p \) and \( \alpha \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^* \). Then, for every PPT adversary \( \mathcal{A} \)

\[
\Pr (\mathcal{A}(P, \alpha P) = \alpha) \leq \epsilon(\kappa).
\]

\( \uparrow \) In such a sanitizable signature scheme, when given a signature anybody can verify, whether a modification has been conducted by the original signer or the sanitizer without interacting with any party.
If $G$ is an elliptic curve group, we call the corresponding DLP \textit{elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)}.

**Definition 3 (t-Strong Diffie Hellman Assumption (t-SDH)).** Let $p$ be a prime of bitlength $\kappa$, $G$ be a group of order $p$, $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and let $(P, \alpha P, \alpha^2 P, \ldots, \alpha^t P) \in G^{t+1}$ for some $t > 0$. Then, for every PPT adversary $A$

$$
\Pr \left( A(P, \alpha P, \alpha^2 P, \ldots, \alpha^t P) = \left( \frac{1}{\alpha + c} P \right) \right) \leq \epsilon(\kappa)
$$

for any $c \in \mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \{-\alpha\}$.

### 4.2 Digital Signatures

Here, we briefly recall the definition of a standard digital signature scheme.

**Definition 4 (Digital Signature Scheme).** A digital signature scheme DSS is a tuple $(\text{DKeyGen}, \text{DSign}, \text{DVerify})$ of polynomial-time algorithms:

- $\text{DKeyGen}(\kappa)$: Is a key generation algorithm that takes as input a security parameter $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ and outputs a private (signing) key $dsk$ and a public (verification) key $dpk$.
- $\text{DSign}(M, dsk)$: Is a (probabilistic) algorithm taking input a message $M \in \{0,1\}^*$, a private key $dsk$ and outputs a signature $\sigma$.
- $\text{DVerify}(\sigma, M, dpk)$: Is a deterministic algorithm taking input a signature $\sigma$, a message $M \in \{0,1\}^*$, a public key $dpk$ and outputs a single bit $b \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ indicating whether $\sigma$ is a valid signature for $M$.

Furthermore, we require the digital signature scheme to be correct, i.e., for all $(dsk, dpk) \in \text{KeyGen}(\kappa)$ and all $M \in \{0,1\}^*$, $\text{DVerify}(\text{DSign}(M, dsk), M, dpk) = \text{true}$ must hold. A digital signature scheme is secure, if it is existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) [10]. Note that in practice, the sign and verify algorithms will typically use a hash function to map input messages to constant size strings, which is also known as the hash-then-sign paradigm.

### 4.3 Polynomial Commitments

In [12], Kate et al. introduced the notion of constant-size polynomial commitments. The authors present two distinct commitment schemes, whereas one is computationally hiding ($\text{PolyCommit}_{\text{DL}}$) and the other is unconditionally hiding ($\text{PolyCommit}_{\text{Ped}}$). For our scheme, we are using an unconditionally hiding and computationally binding variant of $\text{PolyCommit}_{\text{DL}}$ for reducible, monic polynomials. The constructions of [12] use an algebraic property of polynomials $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$. Namely, that $(X - \lambda)$ perfectly divides the polynomial $f(X) - f(\lambda)$ for $\lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_p$: Now, we briefly present the $\text{PolyCommit}_{\text{DL}}$ construction of [12].

**Setup($\kappa, t$):** Pick two groups $G, G_T$ of the same prime order $p$ (with $p$ being a prime of bitlength $\kappa$) having a symmetric pairing $e : G \times G \to G_T$ such that the $t$-SDH assumption holds. Choose a generator $P \in G$ and $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and output $\text{ppk} = (G, G_T, p, e, P, \alpha P, \ldots, \alpha^t P)$ as well as $\text{psk} = \alpha$.

**Commit($\text{ppk}, f(X)$):** Given $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ with $\deg(f) \leq t$ and compute the commitment $C = f(\alpha)P \in G$ and output $C$.

**Open($\text{ppk}, C, f(X)$):** Output $f(X)$.

**Verify($\text{ppk}, C, f(X)$):** Verify whether $C = f(\alpha)P$

holds and output $\text{true}$ on success and $\text{false}$ otherwise. \(^2\)

\(^2\) Subsequently, we use $f(\alpha)P$ as short-hand notation for $\sum_{i=0}^{\deg(f)} f^{(i)}(\alpha^i P)$, although $f(\alpha)$ as such can only be evaluated in case of a trapdoor commitment, i.e., with $\alpha$ known.
CreateWit$(ppk, f(X),γ)$: Compute $\phi(X) = \frac{f(X) - f(γ)}{X - γ}$ and $W_γ = \phi(α)P$ and output $(γ, f(γ), W_γ)$.
VerifyWit$(ppk, C, γ, f(γ), W_γ)$: Verify that $f(γ)$ is the evaluation of unknown $f$ at point $γ$. This is done by checking whether
\[
e(C, P) = e(W_γ, αP − γP) \cdot e(f(γ)P, P)
\]
holds. Output true on success and false otherwise.

A polynomial commitment scheme is secure if it is correct, polynomial binding, evaluation binding and hiding (cf. [12]). The above scheme can be proven secure under the t-SDH assumption in $G$, as long as $t < \sqrt{2^n}$. For the proof we refer the reader to [12]. Notice that $α$ must remain unknown to the committer (and thus the setup has to be run by a trusted third party), since, otherwise, it would be a trapdoor commitment scheme.

Moreover, we note that we do not need the algorithms CreateWit and VerifyEval in our construction, since we do not need to prove valid evaluations of the polynomial $f(X)$ without revealing the polynomial itself.

5 Blank Digital Signatures

In this section we introduce the notion of blank digital signatures as well as the according security model. As a prerequisite we first need to introduce representations and encodings for message templates and template instantiations.

5.1 Template and Message Representation

In the following we introduce a representation for message templates. A message template $T$ describes all potential template instantiations that correspond to a single template. More formally, a message template is defined as follows.

**Definition 5 (Message Template).** A message template $T$ is a sequence of non-empty sets $T_i = \{M_{i_1}, \ldots, M_{i_n}\}$ of bitstrings $M_{i_j}$ and uniquely identified by $id_T$. If the size of $T_i$ is one, then the set $T_i$ is called fixed element of $T$ and exchangeable element otherwise. The set of all message templates is denoted by $M$.

An exchangeable element $T_i$ represents allowed substitutions, i.e., $T_i$ can be replaced by any of its elements $M_{i_j}$ in order to obtain an instantiation of the template. Let $n$ be the sequence length of $T_i$, then $n$ is called length of template $T$. Finally, with $|T|$ we denote the size of template $T$, that is $|T| = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |T_i|$.

**Definition 6 (Template Instantation).** A template instantiation $M$ of some template $T = (T_i)_{i=1}^{n}$ is derived from $T$ as follows. For each $1 \leq i \leq n$ choose exactly one element $M_i \in T_i$ and set $M = (M_i)_{i=1}^{n}$. A template instantiation $M$ is called valid, which we denote by $M \leq T$, if it represents choices that were intended by the originator of template $T$. Furthermore, we use $M_T = \{M : M \leq T\}$ to denote the set of all possible template instantiations of a template $T$.

A message template $T$ is called

- trivial if it does not contain any exchangeable elements. Note that this implies $|T| = n$, and
- minimal if no two fixed elements are adjacent.

The minimal property guarantees that the number of fixed elements is kept minimal. The complement of the template instantiation $M$ denoted as $\overline{M}$ is a sequence of sets of bitstrings and represents all unused choices in the exchangeable elements, that is $\overline{M} = (T_i \setminus \{M_i\})_{i=1}^{n}$ for an instantiation $M = (M_i)_{i=1}^{n}$ of $T = (T_i)_{i=1}^{n}$.

Now, we give a short example to illustrate our concept.

**Example 1.** Let $T = (T_1, T_2, T_3)$ with
In the following, we consider all polynomials to be expanded. To do so, we assume that an algorithm 

\[ T \rightarrow \prod_{i=1}^{n} \prod_{M \in T_i} (X - H(M || id_T || i)). \]

The evaluation \( t(T) \) results in a so-called template encoding polynomial \( t_T \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X] \) of degree \( |T| \).

Note that the degree of the resulting polynomial needs to be bounded by \( \sqrt{2^{|T|}} \), as otherwise the security of the polynomial commitment scheme is no longer guaranteed. However, this has no impact in practice, since the polynomial can only be created by a polynomial time algorithm.

**Definition 8 (Message Encoding).** Similar to Definition 7, a message encoding function \( m_T : M_T \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p[X] \) with respect to a message template \( T \) is defined as follows:

\[ M \rightarrow \prod_{i=1}^{n} (X - H(M_i || id_T || i)), \]

where \( M = (M_i)_{i=1}^{n} \) is an instantiation of \( T = (T_i)_{i=1}^{n} \). We call \( m_M = m_T(M) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X] \) message encoding polynomial. Furthermore, we define the complementary message encoding function \( \overline{m}_T : M_T \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p[X] \):

\[ M \rightarrow \prod_{i=1}^{n} \prod_{M \in (T \setminus \{M_i\})} (X - H(M || id_T || i)). \]

We call \( m_{\overline{M}} = \overline{m}_T(M) = (\frac{t_T}{m_M}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X] \) the complementary message encoding polynomial of \( m_M \) with respect to template \( T \).

In the following, we consider all polynomials to be expanded. To do so, we assume that an algorithm \( \text{Exp} \), which carries out the polynomial expansion, is applied implicitly to all polynomials.

Typically, a template instantiation \( M = (M_i)_{i=1}^{n} \subseteq T \) will be mapped to a single bitstring \( M = M_1 \| \ldots \| M_n \). We denote the mapping leading from \( M \) to \( M \) by \( \lambda(M, I) = M \), where \( I = (|M_i|)_{i=1}^{n} \) is a descriptive sequene holding the lengths of the \( n \) elements of \( M \) as given by template \( T \).

For sake of simplicity, we consider all templates to be non-trivial as well as minimal and do not differentiate between a template instantiation \( M \) and its corresponding bitstring \( M \).

### 5.2 Blank Digital Signature Scheme

Now, we are able to formally define what we mean by a blank digital signature scheme.

**Definition 9 (Blank Digital Signature Scheme).** A blank digital signature scheme BDSS consists of a tuple \( (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify}_T, \text{Inst}, \text{Verify}_M) \) of polynomial-time algorithms:
KeyGen(κ, t): This probabilistic algorithm gets the security parameter κ ∈ N and a value t ∈ N specifying the maximum template size. It generates public parameters pp and returns them.

Sign(T, pp, dskO, dpkO): This probabilistic algorithm takes a message template T, the public parameters pp, the originator’s signing key dskO, the proxy’s verification key dpkO and outputs a template signature σT and a template dependent private key for the proxy skT O.

VerifyT(T, σT, pp, dpkO, skT O, dpkO): This deterministic algorithm takes a template T, its signature σT, the public parameters pp, the originator’s signature verification key dpkO, the proxy’s private key of the proxy skT O, and the proxy’s verification key dpkO. It outputs a bit b ∈ {true, false} indicating whether σT is a valid signature for T.

Inst(T, M, σT, pp, skT O, dsk): This probabilistic algorithm takes a template T, an instantiation M, a template signature σT, the public parameters pp, the private key of the proxy skT O, the signing key dsk of the proxy and outputs a message signature σM.

VerifyM(M, σM, pp, dpkO, dpkO): This deterministic algorithm takes a template instantiation M of T, the signature σM, the public parameters pp, the signature verification key of the proxy dpkO, and the signature verification key of the originator dpkO. It outputs a bit b ∈ {true, false} indicating whether σM is a valid signature for M ≤ T.

5.3 Security Definitions

In the following, we define the security properties a blank digital signature scheme needs to satisfy in order to be secure. Therefore, we start with a brief overview of the required properties.

Correctness: The scheme must be correct in terms of signature correctness, signature soundness and instantiation correctness, i.e., both template and message signatures are accepted when valid and template signatures of the originator are binding.

Unforgeability: No entity without knowledge of the signing keys dskO, dsk and skT O should be able to forge template or message signatures. This is analogous to the security of traditional digital signatures.

Immutability: The proxy having access to skT O and dsk, when given a template signature σT for template T should not be able to forge template or message signatures.

Privacy: No entity without knowledge of the signing keys dskO, dsk and skT O should be able to determine elements of templates, which have not so far been revealed through instantiations.

Subsequently, the security definitions are discussed in more detail.

Correctness: For a blank digital signature scheme the usual correctness properties are required to hold, i.e., genuinely signed templates and message signatures are accepted. Furthermore, we require template signatures to be sound, i.e., the originator commits to exactly one template by creating a template signature.

Signature correctness: For any key pairs (dskO, dpkO) ∈ DKeyGen(κ) and (dsk, dpk) ∈ DKeyGen(κ), any BDSS parameters pp ∈ KeyGen(κ, t), any template T and any honestly computed template signature

σT = Sign(T, pp, dskO, dpkO),

we require that the verification

VerifyT(T, σT, pp, dpkO, skT O, dpkO) = true

holds.

Signature soundness: For any key pairs (dskO, dpkO) ∈ DKeyGen(κ) and (dsk, dpk) ∈ DKeyGen(κ), any BDSS parameters pp ∈ KeyGen(κ, t), any template T and any honestly computed template signature

σT = Sign(T, pp, dskO, dpkO),
we require that for any \((sk^*_T, T^*) \neq (sk^T_P, T)\) the probability that the verification
\[
\text{Verify}_T(T^*, \sigma_T, pp, dpk_O, sk^T_P, dpk_P) = \text{true}
\]
holds is negligibly small as a function of the security parameter \(\kappa\).

**Instantiation correctness:** For any key pairs \((dsk_O, dpk_O) \in \text{DKeyGen}(\kappa)\) and \((dsk_P, dpk_P) \in \text{DKeyGen}(\kappa)\), any BDSS parameters \(pp \in \text{KeyGen}(\kappa, i)\), any template \(T\), any honestly computed signature \(\sigma_T\) and corresponding \(sk^T_P\) such that
\[
\text{Verify}_T(T, \sigma_T, pp, dpk_O, sk^T_P, dpk_P) = \text{true},
\]
any honestly computed message signature
\[
\sigma_M = \text{Inst}(T, M, \sigma_T, pp, sk^T_P, dsk_P),
\]
we require that the verification
\[
\text{Verify}_M(M, \sigma_M, pp, dpk_P, dpk_O) = \text{true}
\]
holds.

**Definition 10 (Correctness).** A BDSS is correct if it satisfies signature correctness, signature soundness and instantiation correctness.

**Unforgeability** Unforgeability in the context of blank digital signatures resembles the notion of (existential) unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks (UF-CMA) in classic digital signature schemes. We adapt the classical notion to our setting in Game 1. Unforgeability is a protection against attacks mounted by parties not having access to any secret information. Here, the adversary obtains the public keys from the challenger in the setup phase. In the query phase, \(A\) has access to two signing oracles, a template signing and a message signing oracle.

**Definition 11 (Unforgeability).** A BDSS is called unforgeable, if for any polynomial-time algorithm \(A\) the probability of winning Game 1 is negligible as a function of security parameter \(\kappa\).

**Immutability** Immutability guarantees that no malicious proxy can compute signatures for templates or template instantiations not intended by the signer. Immutability is similar to unforgeability, but, in contrast to unforgeability, immutability deals with malicious insiders (proxies).

The immutability game, as stated in Game 2, differs only slightly from the unforgeability game. Here, the adversary additionally obtains \(dsk_P\) from the challenger in the setup phase. In the query phase, \(A\) has access to two signing oracles, where the template signing oracle additionally returns the corresponding private key \(sk^T_P\). In this game, \(A\) wins if he outputs valid forgeries of type \(T_1, T_2\) or \(M_1, M_2\).

**Definition 12 (Immutability).** A BDSS is called immutable, if for any polynomial-time algorithm \(A\) the probability of winning Game 2 is negligible as a function of security parameter \(\kappa\).

**Privacy** Privacy captures that any verifier except for the originator and the proxy, which is given a signature for a template instantiation \(M\) of a non-trivial template \(T\), can not gain any information about \(M\) and thereby learn about \(T\). This means that even if all but one choice of a single exchangeable element has been revealed no verifier should be able to gain complete knowledge of \(T\). This is formalized in Game 3.

**Definition 13 (Privacy).** A BDSS is called private, if for any polynomial-time algorithm \(A\) the probability of winning Game 3 is negligibly close to \(1/2\) as a function of security parameter \(\kappa\) and unconditionally private, if for any computationally unbounded algorithm \(A\) the probability of winning Game 3 is \(1/2\).
can not choose arbitrary divisors of the template polynomial, as the indexes of message elements divides the template polynomial. A proxy can now commit to a message polynomial, by computing every allowed template instantiation is represented by a message encoding polynomial that perfectly instantiations. The intuition is that the originator commits to a template polynomial. By construction (unconditionally) private.

In this section we detail our construction and prove its security, i.e., we show that our presented construction is correct, unforgeable, immutable and private.

6.1 Intuition

Before we present the detailed construction, we provide some intuition in order to make our design choices comprehensible. As already noted, we use standard digital signatures, such as ECDSA [9], as a building block assuming the respective signature keys to be available to every participant in an authentic fashion. Note that this requires the availability of public key infrastructures, which are, however, commonly used in practice today. In our construction, DSS signatures provide authenticity of template and message signatures.

As already discussed in Section 5, we use polynomials to represent templates and template instantiations. The intuition is that the originator commits to a template polynomial. By construction every allowed template instantiation is represented by a message encoding polynomial that perfectly divides the template polynomial. A proxy can now commit to a message polynomial, by computing and signing a commitment to the complementary message encoding polynomial. However, he can not choose arbitrary divisors of the template polynomial, as the indexes of message elements...
**Setup:** The challenger $C$ runs KeyGen($\kappa, t$) to obtain $pp$. Furthermore, $C$ runs DKeyGen($\kappa$) of a secure digital signature scheme twice to generate $(dsk_0, dpk_0)$ and $(dsk_{\rho}, dpk_{\rho})$. It gives the adversary $A$ the resulting public parameters and keys $pp, dpk_0$ and $dpk_{\rho}$ as well as $dsk_0$ and keeps the private key $dsk_0$ to itself.

**Query:** The adversary $A$ has access to a template signing oracle $O_T$ and access to a message signing oracle $O_M$. Both oracles are simulated by the challenger $C$.

- On receiving a template signing query $(T_i, M_{i,j})$, $C$ checks whether such a query has already been issued. If so, $C$ retrieves $(T_i, sk^T_i, \sigma_{T_i})$ and returns $(sk^T_i, \sigma_{T_i})$. Otherwise, $C$ runs Sign$(T_i, pp, dsk_0, dpk_0)$, returns $(sk^T_i, \sigma_{T_i})$ and stores the so obtained $(T_i, sk^T_i, \sigma_{T_i})$.

- On receiving a message signing query $(T_i, M_{i,j})$, $C$ checks whether a template signing query for $T_i$ has already been made and whether $M_{i,j} \lessdot T_i$. If not, $C$ returns $\perp$. Otherwise, $C$ checks whether the query $(T_i, M_{i,j})$ has already been made. If so, $C$ retrieves $(T_i, M_{i,j}, \sigma_{M_{i,j}})$ and returns $\sigma_{M_{i,j}}$.

If not, $C$ retrieves $(T_i, sk^T_i, \sigma_{T_i})$, runs Inst$(T_i, M_{i,j}, \sigma_{T_i}, pp, sk^T_i, dsk_0)$, returns $\sigma_{M_{i,j}}$ and stores the tuple $(T_i, M_{i,j}, \sigma_{M_{i,j}})$.

All of these queries can be made adaptively.

**Output:** The adversary $A$ outputs either a triple $(T^*, \sigma_{T^*}, sk^{T^*})$ or a pair $(M^*, \sigma_{M^*})$. $A$ wins if either

- **T1** Verify$(T^*, \sigma_{T^*}, pp, dpk_0, sk^T_i, dpk_{\rho}) = \text{true}$, where $T^*$ is an unqueried template and $sk^T_i$ correspond to one queried template $T_i$.

- **T2** Verify$(T^*, \sigma_{T^*}, pp, dpk_0, sk^T_i, dpk_{\rho}) = \text{true}$ for some unqueried template $T^*$ with corresponding unqueried $sk^T_i$ and $\sigma_{T^*}$.

- **M1** Verify$_M(M^*, \sigma_{M_{i,j}}, pp, dpk_{\rho}, dpk_0) = \text{true}$, where $M^* \neq M_{i,j}$ is an unqueried message and $\sigma_{M_{i,j}}$ corresponds to an already queried $M_{i,j} \lessdot T_i$, or

- **M2** Verify$_M(M^*, \sigma_{M^*}, pp, dpk_{\rho}, dpk_0) = \text{true}$ for some unqueried message $M^*$ from signature $\sigma_{T^*}$ for some previously queried template $T^*$, such that

(b) $M \not\lessdot T_i$.

**Game 2: Immutability Game**

are incorporated into the encoding and the length of the message, i.e., the degree of the message polynomial, is fixed by the originator.

In the verification, the verifier computes a commitment to the message polynomial and checks whether the computed commitment and the commitment given by the proxy relate to the commitment given by the originator. We need a trusted third party, as the originator should not know the value $\alpha$. Otherwise, he could exchange the template polynomial after signature generation for another polynomial having the same evaluation at the point $\alpha$. Note that in the context of polynomial commitments the setup must always be run by a trusted third party, as otherwise these commitments represent trapdoor commitments, i.e., the knowledge of $\alpha$ allows to open the commitment to arbitrary polynomials.

We use polynomial commitments of the form $C = \rho \cdot f(\alpha)P$ for some random value $\rho \in R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ to hide the committed polynomials. This provides unconditional hiding of unknown factors of $f(X)$ as long as $\rho$ stays unknown.

### 6.2 Scheme

In Scheme 1, we present the detailed construction of our proposed BDSS. Moreover, in Protocol 1, we illustrate a typical scenario for the interaction of the originator, the proxy and the verifier.

We note that Scheme 1 can easily be turned into a scheme using asymmetric pairings giving flexibility in the choice of curves and pairings as well as improved efficiency. In case of Type-2 pairings there are only minor modifications necessary, as there is an efficiently computable isomorphism between $G_1$ and $G_2$, whereas in the Type-3 setting this comes at the costs of doubling the size of $pp$. This is because the values $\alpha P, \ldots, \alpha^t P \in G_1$ also need to be mapped to elements of group $G_2$, i.e., we need to put the additional points $P', \alpha P', \ldots, \alpha^t P' \in G_2$ into $pp$, where $P'$ is a generator of $G_2$. 
In our above example, the number of leaves would then be 5.

function in order to hide the instantiations from a verifier as it is done in redactable signatures [11].

tions. Furthermore, each leaf would need to include a random string as additional input to the hash

complete binary tree, where the number of leaves equals the number of possible template instantia-

- number of signatures that need to be computed by the originator at the expense of higher computa-

Recall that the first naive approach given in Section 2.1 would require the originator to produce one
signature for every possible template instantiation. Let us look at the above example, where we have
20 fixed elements and 25 exchangeable elements with 5 choices each. Note that this is an absolutely
reasonable example, which is far from being overstated. Then, the originator would have to compute
\(2^{298} \approx 298 \cdot 10^{15}\) signatures, which is obviously impractical.

The second naive approach we have mentioned is the use of Merkle hash trees to reduce the
number of signatures that need to be computed by the originator at the expense of higher computa-
tional costs and an increased size of the signature. This means that the originator needs to build a
complete binary tree, where the number of leaves equals the number of possible template instantia-
tions. Furthermore, each leaf would need to include a random string as additional input to the hash
function in order to hide the instantiations from a verifier as it is done in reductable signatures [11].
In our above example, the number of leaves would then be \(2^{25} \approx 298 \cdot 10^{15}\). In order to build the
hash tree, the originator would need to perform one hash evaluation per node in the tree. Note that
for a complete binary tree with \(n\) leaves there would be at most \(2n - 1\) nodes in the tree. For our
above example, this would yield at most \(2 \cdot 5^{25} - 1\) hash evaluations and the same number of PRF
evaluations to randomize the tree (see [11] for more details on how to compute the random strings
using a PRF). Although the verification of a signature for an instantiation in this construction would
be quite efficient, as it can be carried in logarithmic time in the number of possible instantiations,
Theorem 1. Assuming the existence of secure hash functions and that the \( t \)-SDH assumption holds in \( E(\mathbb{F}_q) \), Scheme 1 is correct with respect to Definition 10.

Proof. See Appendix A.1.

Theorem 2. Assuming the existence of secure hash functions and secure digital signature schemes and that the \( t \)-SDH assumption holds in \( E(\mathbb{F}_q) \), Scheme 1 is unforgeable with respect to Definition 11.

---

**Scheme 1: Blank Digital Signature Scheme**

**KeyGen:** On input \((\kappa, t)\), choose an elliptic curve \( E(\mathbb{F}_q) \) with a subgroup of large prime order \( p \) generated by \( P \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)[p] \), such that the bitlength of \( p \) is \( \kappa \). Choose a pairing \( e : E(\mathbb{F}_q)[p] \times E(\mathbb{F}_q)[p] \to \mathbb{F}_q^* [p] \) and a full-domain cryptographic hash function \( H : \{0, 1\}^* \to \mathbb{Z}_p \) for use with the encoding functions. Pick \( \alpha \in R \mathbb{Z}_p \), compute \((\alpha P, \ldots, \alpha^t P)\) and output \( pp = (H, E(\mathbb{F}_q), e, p, \alpha P, \ldots, \alpha^t P) \).

**Sign:** Given \( T, pp, dsk_0 \) and \( dpk_0 \), where \( T \) is a template of size \(|T| = \ell \) and length \( n \) with \( \ell > n \), this algorithm computes \( m_{\tau T} = \pi_T(M) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X] \). Then, it computes \( C_T = \rho \cdot m_{\tau T}(\alpha) P \) and \( \mu = \text{DSign}(\tau \parallel C_T \parallel I, dsk_0) \). It returns \( \sigma_T = (\mu, C_T, I, \sigma_T) \).

**Verify:** Given \( M, \sigma_T, pp, sk_0 \) and \( dpk_0 \) this algorithm checks whether \(|T| \leq \ell \). If so, return \( \text{true} \). Otherwise, it computes \( t_T = t(T) \) and checks whether

\[
D\text{Verify}(\tau, id_T \parallel C \parallel |n| \parallel dpk_0, dpk_0) = \text{true} \land e(\rho \cdot t_T(\alpha) P, P) = C.
\]

On failure return \( \text{false} \), otherwise evaluate \( m_M = m_T(M) \) and check whether

\[
e(m_M(\alpha) P, C_T) = C
\]

On success return \( \text{true} \). 

---

6.4 Security

Subsequently, we investigate the security of our construction in the proposed security model by considering all the required security properties.
We assume that the originator as well as the proxy both own an authentic key pair for a secure digital signature scheme \((dsk_O, dpk_O)\) and \((dsk_P, dpk_P)\), respectively.

**Setup**

The trusted third party \(T\) chooses a suitable security parameter \(\kappa\) and a value \(t \in \mathbb{N}\) representing the maximum template length, runs \(\text{KeyGen}(\kappa, t)\) and publishes \(pp\) in an authentic fashion.

**Issue**

\(O\) defines a message template \(T\), runs \(\text{Sign}(T, pp, dsk_O, dpk_P)\) and gives \(\sigma_T = (id_T, C, n, \tau)\) as well as \(sk_T^P\) to \(P\).

**Issue**

\(P\) runs \(\text{Verify}_T(T, \sigma_T, pp, dpk_O, dpk_P)\) to check whether \(\sigma_T\) is a valid signature for \(T\) issued by \(O\). On success, \(P\), on behalf of \(O\), defines a template instantiation \(M \preceq T\) and runs \(\text{Inst}(T, M, \sigma_T, pp, sk_T^P, dsk_P)\) and publishes \((M, \sigma_M)\).

**Verify**

Anybody in possession of the public keys can now take \((M, \sigma_M)\) and run \(\text{Verify}_M(M, \sigma_M, pp, dpk_P, dpk_O)\) to check whether \(\sigma_M\) is a valid signature for \(M\) issued by \(O\) and \(P\).

**Protocol 1:** Blank Digital Signature Protocol

**Proof.** See Appendix A.2.

**Theorem 3.** Assuming the existence of secure hash functions and secure digital signature schemes and that the \(t\)-SDH assumption holds in \(E(\mathbb{F}_q)\), Scheme 1 is immutable with respect to Definition 12.

**Proof.** See Appendix A.3.

**Theorem 4.** Scheme 1 is unconditionally private with respect to Definition 13.

**Proof.** See Appendix A.4.

Taking Theorem 1-Theorem 4 together, we obtain the following corollary.

**Corollary 1.** Scheme 1 is a secure BDSS.

### 7 Conclusions

In this paper we have introduced a new notion of digital signatures, namely so-called blank digital signatures. We have provided the abstract scheme, a security model and a concrete construction of such a scheme from any secure digital signature scheme, pairing-friendly elliptic curves and polynomial commitments. Moreover, we have proven the security of our construction and have given several use cases, such as delegated contract signing.

#### 7.1 Future Work

Since blank digital signatures are a novel concept, there are several open issues for future work, which we outline subsequently. One issue for future work is to get rid of the trusted third party for key generation. Furthermore, it would be desirable to generalize the blank digital signature scheme and its security model to multiple designated proxies, which seems to be straight-forward by inclusion of multiple proxy signature verification keys into the template signature. However, in this naive construction every proxy and every verifier can determine the set of designated proxies. This may not be desirable in practice, whereas to achieve this goal does not seem to be that straight-forward. Another issue is to find alternative designated constructions for blank signatures potentially without relying on standard digital signature schemes. Additionally, it would be desirable to prove the security of our construction under weaker assumptions and to impose further restrictions on allowed template instantiations, i.e., to further limit the allowed combinations of choices over all exchangeable elements of templates. Also, allowing blank fields, which can be substituted with arbitrary strings, would be desirable. Finally, it may be interesting to investigate concepts applied in the construction of blank digital signatures in the proxy signature setting.
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References


A Proofs

This section contains the proofs of Theorem 1-Theorem 4.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1

We show the signature correctness and soundness as well as the instantiation correctness, where we omit showing that the DSS verification as well as the signature verification and message signature verification work, since they are clear from the construction.

What remains to show is the signature soundness. Note that for a given template signature \( \sigma_T \) for template \( T \) the commitment \( C \) of the template encoding encoding polynomial is fixed. Consequently, breaking the signature soundness requires finding \( (\text{sk}_P^T, T) \neq (\text{sk}_P^{T*}, T*) \) such that \( C^* = C \).

This requires either collisions in the hash function \( H \) used in the encoding functions, finding second preimages in \( H \) or breaking the polynomial binding of the construction. If an adversary \( A \) is able to attack the latter case, then we can construct an efficient adversary \( B \), which uses \( A \) to solve the \( t \)-SDH problem in \( E(\mathbb{F}_q) \). \( B \) gets input an instance \( (P, \alpha P, \ldots, \alpha^t P) \) of the \( t \)-SDH problem. Then \( B \) runs \( \text{DKeyGen} \) twice to produce DSS key pairs for the originator and the proxy, sets up the public parameters \( pp = (H, E(\mathbb{F}_q), e, p, \alpha P, \alpha^t P) \) and gives \( pp \) and the DSS key pairs to \( A \). If \( A \) is able to win the game by outputting a template signature \( \sigma_T \) to \( T \) as well as \( (\text{sk}_P^T = \rho, T) \) and \( (\text{sk}_P^{T*} = \rho*, T*) \) with \( (\text{sk}_P^T, T) \neq (\text{sk}_P^{T*}, T*) \) such that

\[
\text{Verify}_T(T^*, \sigma_T, pp, \text{dpk}_0, \text{sk}_P^{T*}, \text{dpk}_p) = \text{true},
\]

then

\[
e(e(\rho \cdot t(\alpha) P, P) = e(\rho^* \cdot t^*(\alpha) P, P)
\]

holds. This implies that

\[
e(P, P)^{e(\alpha)} = e(P, P)^{\rho \cdot t(\alpha)} = 1
\]

Hence, \( \alpha \) is a root of the polynomial \( t'(X) = \rho t(X) - \rho^* t^*(X) \). As factoring of \( t'(X) \) yields \( \alpha, B \) can efficiently obtain \( \alpha \) and by choosing \( c \in \mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \{-\alpha\} \), \( B \) can output a solution \( (c, \frac{1}{\alpha + c}) \) of the \( t \)-SDH problem in \( E(\mathbb{F}_q) \).

\( \square \)

A.2 Proof of Theorem 2

The proof consists of two parts. The first part covers unforgeability of template signatures, whereas the second part covers the unforgeability of message signatures. Both parts consist of two cases covering the reuse of queried signatures and existential forgeries of signatures, as detailed in Section 5.3.

In the following, let \( q \) and \( q_i \) be the number of template queries and the number of instantiation queries for template \( T_i \) with \( 1 \leq i \leq q \) issued by \( A \).

Case T1. This case covers the infeasability of finding some \( T^* \neq T_i \) for all previously queried \( T_i \) such that \( T^* \) verifies under some queried template signature \( \sigma_T \). If \( A \) was able to win the game by finding - with non-negligible probability - a \( T^* \neq T_i \) for all \( 1 \leq i \leq q \) such that

\[ C_i = e(\rho^* \cdot t^*(\alpha) P, P), \]

for some \( 1 \leq i \leq q \), then \( A \) has found a template \( T^* \neq T_i \) with \( \text{deg}(t^* \cdot \alpha) \leq t \) such that either

1. \( t_{T^*}(X) = t_{T^*}(X) \), or
2. \( t_{T^*}(X) \neq t_{T^*}(X) \) and \( t_{T^*}(\alpha) = t_{T^*}(\alpha) \)

holds. Note that both cases are disjoint.

In case one, \( A \) has found second preimages in \( H \) with non-negligible probability. More precisely, \( \text{sk}_P^T \) and \( \sigma_T \) are fixed. If \( A \) is able to generate a \( T^* \neq T_i \) with \( t_{\sigma_T}(X) = t^*_{T^*}(X) \) with non-negligible probability, then it must have found second preimages in \( H \) with non-negligible probability for \( \ell_i \) roots of \( t(T_i) \), whereas the suffix of each preimage must be of the form \( \text{id}_{T^*} \| j \) and only the value of \( M \) is arbitrary.
In the second case, A must have found \( T^* \neq T_i \) such that \( t_{T_i}(\alpha) = t_{T^*}(\alpha) \), i.e., the template encoding polynomials need to have the same evaluation at the unknown point \( \alpha \), for some \( 1 \leq i \leq q \). Then we can construct an adversary \( B \) that breaks the \( t \)-SDH problem in \( E(\mathbb{F}_q) \). The reduction is identical to the reduction in the proof of signature soundness in Appendix A.1 with the only exception that we have \( \rho^* = \rho_i \).

**Case T2.** This case covers the infeasability of computing a valid signature \( \sigma_{T^*} \) for some \( T^* \) giving \( C^* \), which differs from all previously queried template signatures. If \( A \) is able to win the game by finding a pair \((T^*, \sigma_{T^*}) \neq (T_i, \sigma_{T_i})\) for all \( 1 \leq i \leq q \) such that

\[
\text{DVerify}(\tau, \text{id}_{T^*} || C^* | n^* \text{dpk}_\text{p}, \text{dpk}_\text{o}) = \text{true}
\]

then \( A \) must be able to forge signatures of the digital signature scheme DSS under \text{dsk}_\text{o}.

**Case M1.** This case covers the infeasability of finding some \( M^* \neq M_{i_j} \) for all previously queried \( M_{i_j} \) such that \( M^* \) verifies under some issued message signature \( \sigma_{M_{i_j}} \), i.e.,

\[
\text{Verify}_{M_i}(M^*, \sigma_{M_{i_j}}, \text{pp, dpk}_\text{p}, \text{dpk}_\text{o}) = \text{true}.
\]

In particular, in order to win the game, \( A \) must be able to find \( M^* \) such that either

1. \( m_{M_{i_j}}(X) = m_{M^*}(X) \), or
2. \( m_{M_{i_j}}(X) \neq m_{M^*}(X) \) and \( m_{M_{i_j}}(\alpha) = m_{M^*}(\alpha) \)

holds. Note that both cases are disjoint.

In the first case, \( A \) needs to find - with non-negligible probability - an \( M^* \neq M_{i_j} \) for all \( 1 \leq i \leq q \) and \( 1 \leq j \leq q_i \) such that

\[
|M^*| = |M_{i_j}| \land \deg(m_{M^*}) = n \land e(C_{M^*}, C_{M_{i_j}}) = C_i
\]

for some \( 1 \leq i \leq q \) and \( 1 \leq j \leq q_i \). Since all values in the verification relation are fixed due to \( \mu \), the only way for \( A \) to output an \( M^* \) that passes the signature verification for an existing signature, is to find an \( M^* \) such that \( m_{M^*}(X) = m_{M_{i_j}}(X) \) and \( |M^*| = |M_{i_j}| \). \( A \) can do so by computing second preimages in \( H \), i.e.,

\[
H(M^*_i || id_{T_i} || l) = H(M_{i_j} || id_{T_i} || l)
\]

for all \( n \) roots of the polynomial \( m_{M_{i_j}} \), whereas the suffix of each preimage must be of the form \( id_{T_i} || l \) and only the value of \( M^*_i \) is arbitrary.

In the second case, we show that if \( A \) is able to come up with such a forgery, then we can construct an adversary \( B \) against the \( t \)-SDH assumption in \( E(\mathbb{F}_q) \). Adversary \( B \) works as follows. \( B \) obtains an instance \((P, \alpha P, \ldots, \alpha^t P)\) to the \( t \)-SDH problem in \( E(\mathbb{F}_q) \), sets \( \text{pp} = (H, E(\mathbb{F}_q), e, p, P, \alpha P, \ldots, \alpha^t P) \) and gives \( \text{pp} \) and the DSS public keys of the originator and proxy to \( A \). When \( A \) wins the game by delivering such a forged \( M^* \), we know that:

\[
e(C_{M^*}, C_{M_{i_j}}) = e(C_{M^*}, C_{M_{i_j}})
\]

\[
e(C_{M^*} - C_{M_{i_j}}, C_{M_{i_j}}) = 1
\]

As \( C_{M_{i_j}} \neq 0 \) with overwhelming probability, it follows that:

\[
m_{M^*}(\alpha)P = m_{M_{i_j}}(\alpha)P
\]

\[
m_{M^*}(\alpha)P - m_{M_{i_j}}(\alpha)P = 0
\]

Consequently, \( \alpha \) is a root of the polynomial \( m_{M^*}(X) - m_{M_{i_j}}(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X] \). By factoring this polynomial, \( B \) can efficiently obtain \( \alpha \) and solve the instance of the the \( t \)-SDH problem in \( E(\mathbb{F}_q) \) given by \( \text{pp} \) by choosing \( c \in \mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \{-\alpha\} \) and outputting \( (c, \frac{1}{\alpha+c} P) \).
**Case M2.** This case covers the infeasability of computing a valid signature $\sigma_{M^*}$ for some $M^*$, which differs from all previously queried signatures. $A$ needs to find a pair $(M^*, \sigma_{M^*}) \neq (M_i, \sigma_{M_i})$ for all $1 \leq i \leq q$ and $1 \leq j \leq q$, such that

$$\text{Verify}_{M^*}(M^*, \sigma_{M^*}, pp, dpk_p, dpk_o) = \text{true}.$$ 

In both cases M2a and M2b, this implies that $A$ is able to forge DSS signatures under $dpk_p$. □

**A.3 Proof of Theorem 3**

**Case T1.** The proof for this case is analogous to the proof in Appendix A.2 with the exception that $A$ knows the proxy private keys corresponding to all templates. Therefore, the reduction is identical to the one in the proof of soundness in Appendix A.1.

**Case M1.** The proof for this case is analogous to the one in Appendix A.2, since $A$ has exactly the same knowledge as in the previous proof.

**Case M2b.** This case covers the infeasability of existentially forging signatures for messages, which are not instantiations of a template.

Firstly, we show that if $A$ is able to find an $M^*$ such that $M^* \neq T_i$ for all $1 \leq i \leq q$ and $\sigma_{M^*} \neq \sigma_{M_i}$ for all $1 \leq j \leq q$, and

$$\text{Verify}_{M^*}(M^*, \sigma_{M^*}, pp, dpk_p, dpk_o) = \text{true},$$

then we can construct an efficient adversary $B$ against the t-SDH assumption in $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$. Finding such an $M^*$ implies that $A$ has found a polynomial $m_{M^*}$ such that $m_{M^*}$ does not perfectly divide $t_{T_i}$, i.e., $t_{T_i} = \overline{m_{M^*}} \cdot m_{M^*} + \xi$ with $\xi \neq 0$.

Adversary $B$ works as follows. $B$ obtains an instance $(P, \alpha_P, \ldots, \alpha^t P)$ to the t-SDH problem in $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$, sets $pp = (H, E(\mathbb{F}_q), e, p, P, \alpha P)$ and gives $pp$ and the respective DSS keys to $A$. $B$ simulates $A$’s queries as in the original game. If $A$ wins the game by returning $(M^* = M_0, \sigma_{M^*} = (\mu^*, \overline{C_{M^*}}, \overline{T^*} = (|M^*_i|)_{i=1}^n, \sigma_{T_i}, T_i))$, then $B$ computes $m_{M^*} = m_{T_i}(M^*)$ and $t_{T_i} = t(T_i)$. As we have

$$e(C_{M^*}, C_{M^*}) = C,$$

$C_{M^*}$ must have the form $C_{M^*} = \rho_i(\overline{m_{M^*}} \cdot \alpha) P$. By dividing $t_{T_i}(X)$ through $m_{M^*}(X)$, $B$ obtains $\overline{m_{M^*}}(X)$ and $\xi(X)$. From this $B$ can compute $\overline{m_{M^*}}(\alpha) P$. Since $B$ knows $\rho_i$ from the query phase, it can now compute

$$\rho_i^{-1}C_{M^*} = \rho_i(\overline{m_{M^*}}(\alpha)) P = \frac{\xi(\alpha)}{m_{M^*}(\alpha)} P.$$ 

As $\deg(t_{T_i}) = 1$ and $\deg(m_{M^*}) = 1$, we have $\deg(\xi) = 0$, i.e., $\xi(X) = \omega \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Therefore, we obtain

$$\frac{\xi(\alpha)}{m_{M^*}(\alpha)} P = \frac{\omega}{\alpha - H(M_0||id_T||1)} P,$$

and $B$ can now compute

$$\frac{1}{\omega} \frac{\omega}{\alpha - H(M_0||id_T||1)} P = \frac{1}{\alpha - H(M_0||id_T||1)} P$$

which gives a solution $(-H(M_0||id_T||1), \frac{1}{\alpha - H(M_0||id_T||1)})$ to the $t$-SDH problem in $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$.

It is immediate that the success probability of $B$ is only negligibly smaller than that of $A$, due to the possibility that it could happen that $\alpha = H(M_0||id_T||1)$, and the time required is only a small constant larger than that of $B$.

Secondly, another strategy, $A$ can follow is to use non-intended perfect divisors of $t_{T_i}$, i.e., constructing an $M^*$ such that $\deg(m_{M^*}) \neq n$ and/or the elements of $M^*$ are not consecutive with respect to the order defined by template $T_i$. However, the degree $n$ of all valid message polynomials as well as the index values $i$ in the message encoding are fixed by the originator. Thus, the verification can never be satisfied. In the latter case, $A$ would additionally be required to compute second preimages for at least one of the unintended factors. □
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4

The strategy for this proof is as follows. When receiving the template signatures for the challenged templates $\mathcal{T}_0'$ and $\mathcal{T}_1'$, there is no a priori link between the templates and their signatures as they are returned in a randomly permuted order. Since the template ids are randomly chosen, both templates are of the same length $n$ and the proxy public keys are equal, all boils down to deciding correspondence between templates and signatures by inspecting the commitments $C_0'$ and $C_1'$ contained in the template signatures $\sigma_{\mathcal{T}_0'}$ and $\sigma_{\mathcal{T}_1'}$. Analogously, all values in the message signatures of an instantiation $\mathcal{M}_l'$, except for the commitments to the complementary message polynomials and the comprised template signatures, are identical. Latter allows the linking of queried message and template signatures and constructing two lists of commitments $(C_0', C_{\mathcal{M}_0}'_0, \ldots, C_{\mathcal{M}_0}'_k)$ and $(C_1', C_{\mathcal{M}_1}'_1, \ldots, C_{\mathcal{M}_1}'_k)$, where we assume w.l.o.g that $A$ has queried all $k$ instantiations. Consequently, the only strategy $A$ can follow to gain an advantage over guessing, is to base its decision upon these two lists. What remains to show is that $A$ has no advantage in winning the game, when using this information, which means that $A$’s success probability for winning the game is exactly $1/2$. We do so by showing that all elements in the above two lists unconditionally hide the respective encoding polynomials.

Let $\mathcal{T}$ be a template allowing $s$ instantiations and $\mathcal{C} = e(\rho \cdot t_\mathcal{T}(\alpha)P, P)$ be the commitment to its template encoding polynomial. W.l.o.g. we assume that let $s - 1$ message signatures have been issued and the corresponding commitments to the complementary message encoding polynomials $C_{\mathcal{M}_i}, \ldots, C_{\mathcal{M}_{s-1}}$ are known. Nevertheless, this implies that one monomial factor $(X - \gamma)$ in the template encoding polynomial of $\mathcal{T}$ remains unknown. It also implies that $(X - \gamma)$ is an unknown factor of all complementary message encoding polynomials in the commitments $C_{\mathcal{M}_i} = \rho \cdot m_{\mathcal{M}_i}(\alpha)P$ for $i = 1, \ldots, s - 1$. The only unknown values in $\mathcal{C}$ (and in all other commitments), for which we demand $\mathcal{C} \neq \mathcal{O}$, are $\rho$ and $\gamma$. For all these commitments, there are, however, exactly $p - 1$ valid pairs $(\gamma, \rho) \in (Z_p)^2$. Consequently, all these commitments unconditionally hide the encoding polynomials. (Note that also in case of a constrained set of $a < p$ possible values for $\gamma$ - which would for instance be the case if we are dealing with a constrained message space - the hiding is still unconditional, as there are $a$ equally likely pairs of possible values.)