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**COLLECTION:**
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**FOLDER TITLE:**
FG006-01 [094212] [12]

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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The Office of the Executive Secretary

Office Number: 202-647-8478
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FROM: Barbara F. Starr, Executive Secretary

TO: GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS, Senior Advisor to the President for Policy and Strategy

FAX NUMBER: 202-456-2883

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ADDITIONAL MESSAGE:

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET: 14
George --

Attached are some thoughts my staff pulled together quickly for the arms control NGO session tomorrow. I understand Bob Bell is also coming, and may have more narrowly focused thoughts. The most likely areas of concern are:

-- Comprehensive Test Ban
   * U.S. should set a deadline to complete
   * President Clinton should say more on the issue
-- Nuclear Posture Review
   * Ratifies Bush posture
   * No commitment to further reductions
-- Conventional arms transfer policy
-- ABM/TMD Demarcation

The same group met with Amb. Ledogar and my deputy, Ralph Earle, this morning, mainly on the CTB negotiations. They were most exercised about our special withdrawal position and about what they see as inadequate Presidential efforts to push the test ban through public statements.

On the latter, you can call attention to Dee Dee’s statement this morning (which, however, they find a poor substitute for a Presidential statement), and also say that (1) the President sent me back to Geneva in July to address the Conference on Disarmament and confirm his commitment to a CTBT at the earliest possible time; (2) (depending on White House Summit public affairs strategy) the Summit will address U.S.-Russian joint efforts on the CTBT; and (3) (if true and with the same caveat) the President will discuss it in his UNGA speech.

Because of the disintegration of various efforts to have a Presidential statement in connection with my July trip, then on the Sept. 7 end of the CD session, and again yesterday when Ledogar briefed at the OEOB, a strong reference on the UNGA speech is doubly important. The state of play in negotiations is not promising for a result or major progress by the NPT review conference next April. We can’t afford to let anyone think it’s for lack of our trying.

Best --

[Signature]
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

The NGO community has voiced the following three concerns.

1. Pace of negotiations

The concern is that a slow pace may hurt chances for indefinite extension of the NPT at the NPT Extension Conference next April. A second concern is that we risk losing the window of opportunity for concluding a CTBT if we are not able to accelerate progress. That window may close after French President Mitterand leaves office next May, if Russia becomes less interested in working closely with the U.S., and if there is a change in U.S. administrations.

Talking Points

-- The United States objective from the start of negotiations has been to conclude the CTBT at the earliest possible time.

-- In particular, the United States has been clear that we seek as much progress as possible by the time of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference next spring.

-- We will continue to push the process. We are pleased that the Committee agreed to intersessional negotiations this November and December.

2. Scope of the CTBT

The concern is that exceptions to the ban on nuclear testing -- i.e. hydronuclear experiments -- will mean that we end up with a threshold treaty.

Talking Points

-- The U.S. is committed to achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our intention to undertake a variety of programs to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of our stockpile do not conflict with this objective.

-- The topic of activities that will not be prohibited is under discussion in Geneva among the P-5 and we are not free to discuss it in detail at this time.

3. U.S. withdrawal position

The NGO community is concerned that the U.S. language on a special withdrawal provision has raised concern that the CTBT might turn out to be a limited duration treaty.

Talking Points

-- The U.S. position is that the treaty should be of indefinite duration.
POrTS FOR NGOs

The Nuclear Posture Review and Further Strategic Reductions

-- The Nuclear Posture Review does not represent an end to the Clinton Administration's examination of the role of and requirements for nuclear weapons in the post Cold War era. To the contrary, the Posture Review should be seen as the corollary of the START II strategic reductions process. It describes the START II environment and forces we plan to deploy, but does not represent conclusions about further reductions and stability measures.

-- The President's approval of the Nuclear Posture Review does not exclude exploring the possibilities for further reductions. In fact, he and President Yeltsin will be discussing this question next week.

-- At the same time, the Administration is continuing its internal work examining what kind of further reductions and limitations would be appropriate in light of the changing security environment in which we now operate.

If asked about fissile materials specifically:

-- The Administration is already exploring with the Russians the possibilities for an agreement to assure that fissile material from weapons is not reused in new nuclear weapons, as well as other transparency measures and a ban on production of weapons-grade fissile materials; we will in the future be looking at ways to build on these steps.

ABM/TMD Demarcation

-- The President has made clear that the viability of the ABM Treaty is of central importance to the Administration as the foundation of nuclear arms control and stability between the U.S. and Russia.

-- At the same time, effective theater missile defense (TMD) is a necessary response to the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and complements other U.S. non-proliferation initiatives. The TMD capabilities will be appropriate to the level and nature of the ballistic missile threat.

-- The ABM/TMD demarcation will be a negotiated, mutually beneficial agreement, among the United States and interested states of the former Soviet Union.

-- The President has wisely recognized that we should not force a choice between a fundamentally important treaty and prudent defenses. Through careful planning and diplomacy we can have both.

SASTART 8663
CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES

- The U.S. has emerged as the world's leading arms supplier. However, the increased U.S. share of the arms market is not the result of unrestrained U.S. sales, but of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

- The Presidential Review of Conventional Arms Transfer Policy is almost complete. It will strike a proper balance among our foreign policy, national security, arms control, and economic interests, and provide a basis for continued U.S. leadership in promoting responsible arms export standards worldwide.

- The U.S. will continue to exercise appropriate unilateral restraint in arms transfers, and is giving very high priority to completing negotiations with our closest trading partners on a new multilateral export control regime.

- The new regime will increase transparency, responsibility, and (where appropriate) restraint in the transfer of arms and sensitive dual-use items.
The 1995 NPT Conference

Results of the Third Preparatory Committee Meeting

Background

The third meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference was held September 12-16, 1994 at the Palais de Nations in Geneva. Nearly 90 of the more than 160 Treaty parties participated in the meeting. The U.S. Delegation was headed by Ambassador, Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The third PrepCom meeting was chaired by Ambassador Isaac Ayewah, Nigeria's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. Pursuant to a decision by the Preparatory Committee at its second meeting to open its sessions to observers, the third PrepCom was attended by representatives of seven States, not party to the Treaty, (Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Pakistan and Ukraine) and of 51 non-governmental organizations.

The PrepCom made important progress in developing draft rules of procedure for the 1995 NPT Conference in a separate working group chaired by Ambassador S.A. Adekanye, Nigeria's Ambassador in Vienna. The draft rules, which contain several explanatory footnotes, but no brackets, will be forwarded to the fourth PrepCom meeting for completion. The PrepCom considered a number of background papers prepared for its third session by the Secretariats of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), and the South Pacific Forum. These background papers were generally well received by the parties. The Committee asked the respective Secretariats to amend the papers in light of suggestions made by various delegations, to update them to take account of current developments, and to submit them to the Conference. Both Nigeria and Iran asked that additional papers be prepared by the UN Secretariat to (1) provide a legal interpretation of Article 10 (2) of the NPT; and (2) provide further information on the implementation of Article IV, respectively. As there was no agreement among the parties to the preparation of these documents, the Committee agreed to refer this issue to its next meeting.

The Committee also discussed the agenda for the 1995 NPT Conference but did not reach final agreement on it at this meeting.
The Committee devoted two plenary sessions to a substantive exchange of views on issues relating to the NPT and the 1995 NPT Conference. Twenty-five parties made national statements during this segment of the meeting. Virtually all of the statements emphasized the importance of the NPT in stemming nuclear proliferation. The exchange of views underlined the great importance that many parties attach to progress on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CITB), enhanced security assurances, a cutoff of fissile material for weapons purposes, and a commitment by the nuclear weapon states to work toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Preparatory Committee will hold its next meeting January 23-27, 1995 at UN Headquarters in New York.

Role of NGOs in the NPT Extension Process

Non-governmental organizations are playing an important role in the preparations for the 1995 NPT Conference. A number of them share the U.S. objective of NPT indefinite extension; others do not, however, and see the 1995 Conference as an opportunity to put pressure on the U.S. to make further disarmament progress.

ACDA has devoted considerable time and resources to an "NGO Outreach" program that has included numerous briefings by senior ACDA officials to groups and individuals in Washington, New York and Geneva.

POINTS TO MAKE

-- The U.S. is publicly committed to make every effort to secure the indefinite extension of the NPT next year.

-- We value the contribution that many NGOs have made toward this end. We want to continue our consultations with you in the remaining months before the 1995 NPT Conference.

-- We strongly believe that the NPT should be extended on its own merits. Without a strong NPT, further progress in arms control and disarmament would be jeopardized.

-- The nonproliferation and arms control goals of the NPT are mutually reinforcing. We understand that many non-nuclear weapon state parties want evidence that the arms control process is proceeding rapidly and with concrete results before they commit to a permanent NPT.

-- At the same time, a strong, reliable NPT -- an NPT that is a permanent part of the international security structure -- is an essential requirement for the further progress that is desired.

Drafted: NP/NPT - SBurk
9/22/94, NPT 2819
Export Controls Being Weakened?

• The Administration believes that export controls are a key element of a comprehensive policy to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that could deliver them.

• We believe the US statutory and regulatory framework for reviewing exports for nonproliferation purposes is second to none; the Administration is dedicated to effective implementation of these laws and policies.

• We carefully review license applications for the transfer of commodities and technology that could be useful to a potential proliferator and approve them only if we are confident that they would not be diverted for WMD or missile purposes, and are otherwise consistent with US nonproliferation objectives.

• We have vigorously enforced US sanctions against countries that engage in transfers that are not consistent with the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

• We supported the expansion of sanctions against countries that violate nuclear nonproliferation norms proposed by Senator Glenn and supported by Senator Pell, and which was enacted in April of this year.

• Of course, to be truly effective, export controls should be applied uniformly by all suppliers. And the Administration has taken an exceptionally strong leadership role in pursuing multilateral support for export controls.

• The principal multilateral fora are the Australia Group which addresses CBW-related exports, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We have pursued an expansion of membership in these multilateral groups and proposed many initiatives designed to increase their effectiveness.

• Following the dissolution of COCOM, the US has also led the effort to create a new multilateral forum that would focus on efforts to increase transparency and responsibility in trade in sensitive dual-use items and conventional weapons with a focus on countries of concern and regions of instability.

• There has been a measured relaxation of controls on dual-use items like computers, based on their widespread availability. This does not weaken our nonproliferation commitment, but rather recognizes the reality that ineffectual controls only dilute our efforts.
• And these changes did not affect exports to countries like Iraq, Libya, Iran, and North Korea, which pose significant proliferation threats.

• The US will continue to play a leadership role in promoting effective multilateral export controls, and in implementing the type of strong national system which is necessary to support our international efforts.
GENERAL ISSUES THAT COULD DRAW NGO CRITICISM

Q. In light of the end of the Cold War and the reduced Russian threat to Europe, why is it necessary for the United States to continue deploying nuclear weapons in Europe?

A.

-- NATO responded to the transformation of the European security environment by making dramatic changes in its nuclear posture, stockpile and planning. Since 1988, NATO's nuclear forces have been reduced by more than 90 percent.

-- The U.S., however, does not have a purely national deterrent; we share the deterrent value of our nuclear arsenal with our allies.
Q. With the increasingly evident shortcomings in Russian fissile material safety and security, can we be assured that U.S. fissile material is sufficiently safe and secure?

A.

-- There is no connection between Russia's fissile material control and accounting and physical protection programs and those of the United States. Fissile material stored in the United States is accounted for, controlled and protected by the most proven and sophisticated means available.

-- Indeed, the United States has been working with Russia and other FSU states in the Nunn-Lugar program to identify areas where the application of U.S. expertise and assistance could be used to enhance Russia's existing materials control and accounting and physical protection programs.
Q. Hasn't the the slow pace of Nunn-Lugar negotiations and implementation contributed to the recent interceptions of smuggling of fissile materials?

A.

-- The United States takes the smuggling of fissile material very seriously. The United States has offered assistance for improving fissile material control and accounting systems to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine and is providing equipment and design assistance to Russia for a storage facility for fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons.

-- Although somewhat more slowly than the United States initially projected, the Nunn-Lugar program is gaining momentum. With the signature of 30 implementing agreements last year, the flow of technical expertise and material is increasing dramatically this year.
Q. Wouldn't the U.S. failure to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states undermine the NPT and CTBT efforts?

A.

-- The US has long recognized the importance which non-nuclear NPT parties attach to security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

-- Of course, this topic has taken on additional importance in view of the upcoming 1995 Conference to extend the NPT.

-- The Administration has reaffirmed the policy of previous administrations with regard to non-use of nuclear weapons against parties to the NPT, which was first adopted by President Carter in 1978.

-- As we have stated at the Conference on Disarmament, we remain open to discussion on this issue and are prepared to continue consultations among the P-5 to determine whether a common approach can be developed.

SEA/ST - B. Gromoll

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