THE PREVALENCE OF GUILE:
Deception through Time and across Cultures and Disciplines

by

Barton Whaley

“The Game is so large that one sees but a little at a time.”
—Kipling, *Kim* (1901), Chapter 10
Acknowledgments and Dedication

This extended essay owes much to the proddings, bibliographical leads, research methods, and ideas and writings of foxy friends and astute acquaintances: the late J. Bowyer Bell, Ladislav Bittman, Scott Boorman, Jeffrey Busby, the late Wolfram Eberhard, Frederick Frey, William R. Harris, Ray Hyman, the late R. V. Jones, the late Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, the late Hans Speier, Frank Stech, Douglas Webster, William Whitson, and, most particularly, the late Michael Handel. I thank them all and dedicate this book to the memory of Leonardo Olschki who wisely fled one tyranny and successfully resisted another.
INTRODUCTION

This book originated as part three of my quadrilogy on deception. I finished the initial two studies of military deception in 1969. The first was published four years later as Codeword BARBAROSSA. It had begun as an attempt to replicate Roberta Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (1962), the classic signal-versus-noise model of surprise attack. This is the ultimate in pessimistic models because it concludes that it is only by hindsight that we can distinguish the “signals” from the surrounding “noise”. Fortunately my effort to replicate Wohlstetter’s hindsight hypothesis failed. To my surprise Codeword BARBAROSSA ended as a new surprise-thru-deception model. Moreover, this is an optimistic model because it shows that even a simplified analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH) method can efficiently winnow out the chaff and focus tightly and critically on the incongruous data. Moreover, it was not a “hindsight” study but, in fact, an “on-line” analysis because I did not know beforehand that BARBAROSSA was basically a deception operation.

My second study (although the first published) was Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War. It had been designed to establish the relative frequencies of the Wohlstetter signal-noise and Whaley deception models. This analyzed 168 cases of deception, surprise, and non-surprise in 16 wars from 1914 to 1968. Appearing in 1969, it showed, again to my surprise, that the then standard signal-noise model was, in fact, both rare and weak during the period studied. Indeed, the signals-noise model didn’t even apply to the Pearl Harbor case. The new deception model provided a more frequent and sturdier explanation of strategic and operational level surprises.

The study you see here, The Prevalence of Guile, had begun as the third of my four studies of deception. It describes the place of guile through time, across cultures, and in military, political, and religious-philosophical disciplines. I began exploring those questions around late 1973. By September 1974 when I suspended research, it was a 130-page typescript draft titled “On the Prevalence of Guile: Cross-Cultural Styles and Patterns of Deception in Politics, Diplomacy, and War”. I presented a summary titled “On the Prevalence of Guile: Deception in War and Politics through Twenty-five Centuries and across Eight Cultures” on Wednesday, 25 April 1979, at a conference on “Intelligence: Deception and Surprise” sponsored by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Then, in Whaley (1980), I revisited parts of this topic with a short article for Lasswell, Lerner, and Speier in their three-volume survey of Propaganda and Communication in World History. Subsequently, unable to find funding for this project, I reluctantly set it aside for 25 years until July 2005 when the orphan was adopted by the Foreign Denial & Deception Committee (FD&DC). So research resumed with updates, much new data, and substantial rethinking.

This monograph’s odd roller-coaster history is itself a direct consequence of one of its own main findings, namely that academic, governmental, and military interest in and funding of research on deception varies greatly through time. Military deception, which had nearly vanished in the United States, saw a fitfull revival of interest in the 1970s, then passed into partial eclipse, and is only now reviving in the new millennium.
The fourth and final part of the quadrilogy was the short paper titled “Toward a General Theory of Deception” (1982).\(^1\) Having thus boxed the compass of how to deceive it remained only to describe how to detect it. That began a new cycle of research, one still in progress.\(^2\)

Chapter 1) In a Nutshell: What I Expected & What I Found

I began this study with a question. How does deception play out in each of the world’s main cultures and civilizations? Specifically, in what different ways and to which degrees does deception vary, if at all, across those cultures, through time within each culture, and among the professional disciplines of war, diplomacy, politics, philosophies, and religions. I then launched into the research with four hunches (hypotheses) about what I expected to find. Here are three:

- **H1:** Some cultures are inherently more deceptive than others. We all know this! Thus the British are an eccentric mix of general blundering naivety (like Col. Blimp) and occasional clever stratagemic wit (Sir Winston Churchill, Lt.-Col. J. D. Belgrave, and Dr. R. V. Jones). Russians have low cunning. Central Europeans tend to be the most guileful among the Europeans — particularly those many Hungarians proudly proclaim this talent. Conversely, Americans tend to abhor deception as, well, un-American.

- **H2:** Specifically, China is unquestionably the most deceptive nation and culture and has been for the past 2,350 years. Think Sun Tzu!

- **H3:** The levels of guilefulness in any given country will be roughly equal across the major domains of military, domestic politics, foreign diplomacy, and commercial business. This will hold for every culture in any given period. This hypothesis not only makes good sense, but is neatly explained — uniformity across disciplines is enforced by the shared religious, moral, and ethical beliefs imposed by the elite within each different cultural or social group.

These three major conclusions were accepted without exception by all experts who had written on these topics. I expected my study to confirm all three. Do you disagree? If so, A) because as a with-it Post-Structuralist you find me guilty of cultural relativism? Or B) because are you a Politically Correct advocate of Multicultural Diversity who finds me guilty of stereotyping — of “ethnic profiling”? If you disagree on either of those grounds you’d be wrong. But do you agree with my hypotheses? If you agree, you’d also be wrong — as wrong as I proved myself to have been. By about a

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\(^1\)Although useful distinctions can be made, for the purposes of this monograph, the terms deception, guile, and stratagem are treated as synonyms.

The most dangerous potential problem with any researcher’s great expectations was put by a brilliant Harvard cognitive psychologist:

Better not know too clearly at the start what you are looking for lest you find it.

— Jerome Bruner, In Search of Mind (1983), 1

On joining the staff of the Center for International Studies at MIT in 1961 as a research associate, I unnerved my main project director, Prof. Ithiel de Sola Pool, by stating the expected findings for my proposed first study. He cautioned me with his version of Bruner’s maxim. I was puzzled, assuming my personal immunity to that particular cognitive pathology. While I now have proof that my mental immune system has never been quite as robust as assumed, it has held up well in all my research projects, including the interrelated quadrilogy of Codeword BARBAROSSA, Stratagem, “Toward a Theory of Deception”, and The Prevalence of Guile. Why? Because all consistently effective analysts are detectives seeking a solution to a mystery. Not just any solution much less the first one that comes to mind. They won’t rest until they have a solution that is congruous with (accounts for) every scrap of evidence, particularly every recognized incongruity. Nor will they stop even then until they’ve made at least a cursory search for and failed to uncover any hidden incongruities. Only then are they entitled to accept this solution as not just beyond reasonable doubt but the most likely theory among the possible alternatives. I count myself in their company. Note that the good detective or intelligence analyst does not tolerate incongruities or discrepancies but welcomes, even relishes them as an exciting challenge. It is this search for incongruities and their resolution in some new more congruous hypothesis that precisely defines the job of every researcher, whether physical scientist, police detective, or intelligence analyst.

So what were the actual findings of this study. The research revealed the following main ones, all largely unexpected:

- **A1**: Some cultures are clearly more deceptive than others but only during any given slice of time. No single culture has excelled in deceptiveness throughout its history.

- **A2**: While the Chinese did rise to the highest level of military deviousness during the time of Sun Tzu, they had low levels before Master Sun, and afterwards largely lost it for three long periods. The most recent was when they fell to the lowest level from the late 1700s until being conquered in 1948 by the stratagemic Chinese Communists (PLA). Thence the PLA has displayed high if not the highest levels of deceptiveness, although there were indications in 2002 that they are on the upswing. (A2 is a specific example of A1, above.)

- **A3**: The levels of guilefulness at any given time can be quite different across the major disciplines of military, domestic politics, foreign
diplomacy, and commercial business. Perceived practical considerations of greed and survival sometimes override religious, moral, or ethical factors.

At the outset of the research another important question was “Does deception become more sophisticated with the growth of technology?” Most authorities believed this was true. So my fourth hypothesis was:

- **H4**: Advances in technology force deceivers to plan at higher levels of sophistication.

Actually I wasn’t convinced on this point. Indeed, I’d already seen enough anecdotal evidence that contradicted the experts to believe deception had either arrived fully developed or, at most, had taken only a generation or two for it to have evolved to its maximum level of sophisticated deceptiveness.

I’d long puzzled how best to define deceptive “sophistication” — the levels of deceptiveness. A sturdy answer came recently and unexpectedly. When on 1 Jun 2006 editor Susan Aykroyd read the initial draft of this section she provoked me into seeking a clearer definition. Next morning I awoke with half the answer. I’d recently reread R. V. Jones’s 1981 thoughts on “Unmasking Deception” and for the first time appreciated their full importance. He’d made two precise points. We can detect any deception if: 1) we have access to at least one “channel” of verifying information about the deception that the deceiver doesn’t know we have; or 2) we can investigate the deception in any one channel to a greater “depth” of detail than the deceiver had built. The proverbial “flash” then brought the solution:

We can measure (and thus define) the degree of any deception by the percentage to which it occurs in each of its two dimensions (“channel” & “depth”). First, by the overall percentage of channels through which it is being sent. Second, by the specific percentage to which the deception simulates or dissimulates reality in each of those channels. Corollary: By combining these separate percentage scores for each channel we can, if desired, assign an overall score or grade.

- **A4**: Deception sophistication is independent of technological change. Deception varies widely in its levels of sophistication within every culture. High, medium, and low levels were found in every culture at different times and regardless of its level of technology.

There are several other important findings — all more-or-less unexpected — but I’ll defer these to the concluding chapter.
Chapter 2) Force versus Guile

In War, the skin of a fox is at times as necessary as that of the lion, for cunning may succeed when force fails. Since, therefore, force may at one time be repelled by force, and at another be obliged to yield to stratagem, we ought to be well acquainted with the use of both, that we may on occasion adopt either.

— Frederick the Great, Military Instructions to His Generals (1747, Foster translation), Article XI (“Of the Tricks and Stratagems of War”)

Deception is a pervasive and important but often neglected topic. Although a common means of influence, it is more intensely practiced by particular persons or groups, at certain times, and in some places more than others. This book explores how, as Machiavelli put it, people rise to or hold power by clever fraud rather than brute force. It will focus on the relationship between guile and force in the contexts only of national politics, international diplomacy, and war — while recognizing that political power can be expressed both in other ways and in most, possibly all, other social-political settings. Although thus restricting the topic, this study will range through the past twenty-eight centuries and across eight major cultures. Finally, several specific factors — mainly cultural, institutional, and psychological — will be suggested to account for the marked variations in the prevalence of guile.

This monograph proceeds through 25 short chapters as follows. After three introductory chapters (1 to 3) that include some preliminary definitions and a discussion of the importance of deception, seven chapters (4 to 10) trace chronologically the variations in force and guile in Pre-historic, Classical, Western, Byzantine, Central Asian nomadic, and European Renaissance cultures down to the near total eclipse of deception in warfare in the 19th century. Next are four chapters (11-14) on the styles of deception in the Chinese, Japanese, Indo-Pak, and Arab civilizations, chosen because the 19th century marks the beginning of the profound effect of Western military doctrine on these four other major military traditions. This historical and cross-cultural survey ends with a chapter on the fitful revival of military deception in the 20th century (Chapter 15) plus two (16 & 17) specifically on the somewhat distinctive Soviet Russian and American styles. This historical-cultural part ends with a chapter (18) on the asymmetrical conflicts that mark our entry into the 21st Century. The next part comprises four chapters (19-22) analyzing topically the various biological, cultural, institutional, and individual psychological constraints on and stimuli to the use of deception. The last part has two chapters. Chapter 23 summarizes the major patterns that emerged from the study. Chapter 24 speculates on possible decisive influence on military and other doctrines of individual innovators and teachers. And the final chapter, Chapter 25, briefly surveys the corresponding factors associated with counterdeception — the detection of deception.

In general, each chapter takes the relative balance between force and fraud in military practice and doctrine as its base, and introduces their diplomatic, political, commercial, and religious-philosophical counterparts by way of contrast. This latter approach was taken not to emphasize the military mode at the expense of these others but only because the military data is more nearly complete.
I define deception as any information (conveyed by statement, action, or object) intended to manipulate the behavior of others by inducing them to accept a false or distorted perception of reality — their physical, social, or political environment. So defined, deception is a special type of both communication and power. In communications terms it is disinformation, that is, information intended to mislead. Thus, disinformation is distinct from simple “misinformation,” which describes only the truth value of the information and not its intention. Although disinformation is in practice usually misinformation, it is not necessarily always so, for even true information can be used to deceive, as in Freud’s favorite example of “skeptical wit”. Incidentally, his version is the earliest among several I’ve collected:3

Two Jews met in a train at a Galician railway station. “Where are you traveling?” asked one. “To Cracow,” was the reply. “Now see here, what a liar you are!” said the first one, bristling. “When you say that you are traveling to Cracow, you really wish me to believe that you are traveling to Lemberg. Well, but I am sure that you are really traveling to Cracow, so why lie about it?”

Disinformation is also distinct from the “noise” of Information Theory or Intelligence analysts. Unlike either misinformation or “noise”, disinformation does not merely inadvertently confuse its recipient, it deliberately misleads.4 By stratagem I mean the planned coordination of separate ruses in a sustained deception campaign. In this broad sense it operates not just at the heady levels of political and military Grand Strategy and Strategy but all the way down the scale through Grand Tactics or Operational Art to the smallest bottom rungs of Tactics. I have no problem with using as synonyms deception & stratagem and deceptiveness & guile.

Power is defined here in German sociologist Max Weber’s sense as the ability of an individual or group to control or modify the behavior of others even against their resistance. And political power is defined, in American political scientist Frederick Frey’s terms, as the power to allocate power, “power over power, as distinguished from power over the allocation of . . . prestige and other values.”5

An interesting corollary of this definition is that the struggle for political power as opposed to other forms of power is uniquely a “zero-sum” game. Moreover, it is a played by human individuals rather than abstract institutions. Consequently, this explains the extraordinarily bitter, even lethal, limits to which competitors are often prepared to go in defense of their slice of power.

3Sigmund Freud, Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious (New York: Moffat, Yard and Co., 1916), 172. With other collectors of this joke the locales shift to Kiev & Moscow, Kiev & Odessa, a journey to Fez, a journey from Warsaw, Minsk & Pinsk, and I also recall having read it somewhere as the Omsk-Tomsk Paradox.


I don’t recall seeing this point made explicitly by political scientists. However, it is commonplace. It makes sense of such seemingly insane acts as Hitler’s willingness to drag down all Germany in his defeat (1945) or the unwillingness of Chinese Nationalist leaders to undercut the growing Chinese Communist threat by winning allies among dissident groups through surrendering any power to them. Conversely, it’s the basis of Shakespeare’s *King Lear* (and Kurosawa’s derivative *Ran*). Orson Welles understood:

He [Lear] became senile by giving power away. The only thing that keeps people alive in their old age is power. ... But take power away from de Gaulle or Churchill or Tito or Mao or Ho or any of these old men who rule the world ... and you’ll see a “babbling, slippered pantaloon”.

— *This is Orson Welles* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), xxi

But one can steer a course between these the Sylla of stonewalling and the Charybdis of surrender and appeasement. The true art of politics is knowing when and how to share power — that is what we mean by “compromise”, the “art of the deal”.

With one addition and one caveat, I also accept German political realist theoretician Hans Morgenthau’s somewhat convoluted definition of political power as “a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised [that] gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the influence which the former exert over the latter’s minds.” Morgenthau notes that such influence “may be exerted through orders, threats, persuasion, the authority or Charisma of a man or of an office, or a combination of any of these.” He should perhaps have added a more explicit recognition that political power is itself only a means for controlling one’s social, physical, or even psychic environment.

Also, I suggest caution in accepting Morgenthau’s categorical distinction between political power and force. While accepting the threat of physical violence as “an intrinsic element of politics”, he argues that the actual exercise of physical violence excludes the psychological aspect that is an essential element of all political relationships. Thus Morgenthau (with his fellow political theorists Bernard Crick and Hannah Arendt among others) sees politics and diplomacy ending when war begins. Even General Clausewitz, the German military theorist who first explicitly defined war as an extension of politics by other means, saw discontinuity between means if not ends. This sharp distinction is still the most popular view. However I find it more useful to stress the continuity among political, diplomatic, and military behaviors. All three are activities intended to secure political power, and all involve the use (in various and shifting mixes) of the several expressions of power, including both force and guile. Admittedly, the outbreak of war does usually represent a catastrophic failure of diplomacy (and often also of national politics) by at least one of the antagonists (and, as in World War I, of all). But this failure doesn’t necessarily prevent political or diplomatic processes from reasserting themselves during the conduct of war. Seldom does a war become the private plaything of generals and even then, as with Caesar or Chinggis Khan, the path of war is simply

6OW in Welles & Bogdanovich (1992), xxi.
Politics and diplomacy can (and commonly do) intrude themselves in wartime: in the search for allies, the detachment of the antagonist's allies, the threats of further escalation, the divisions between local resistors and collaborators, and the negotiations over conditions of surrender. Moreover, even in battle, politics enters wherever the outcome is influenced by such institutionalized rituals as rules of chivalry, the duel between heroes, the solicitation of treason, or the negotiation of surrender. Such rituals are as much political processes as is an election; and like elections all are subject to influence by either force or guile or both.

That warfare is indeed a political means is not only evidenced by its content (as just argued) but also can be deduced philosophically. With the one exception discussed below, warfare (like coercive violence in general) is an intermittent activity rather than a permanent state. The fact that an antagonist has struck a blow today does not necessarily mean he will strike again tomorrow. That second blow (and the next and the next) is a threat or promise of future action that need not materialize if the victim promptly surrenders, de-escalates, retreats, negotiates, apologizes, or otherwise appropriately changes his own behavior. In other words, the momentary practice of violence is as much a political means as any other as it too is intended to compel conformity to the wishes of the wielder of superior political power.

Is this view too abstractly "rational"? Yes, but only to the degree, albeit an often considerable degree, that the party resorting to violence does so from motives other than coercion. For example, the "spasm war", that mindless Götterdämmerung in which at least one side exhausts its entire arsenal in a doomsday action that is not political because its only motive is blood vengeance or eye-for-eye punishment without thought of the consequences. The motives are either wholly self-serving (national, tribal, or personal "honor"), quite other-worldly (serving the will of the Gods), or ideological.

In none of these types of case is control of the future behavior of the opponent at issue. Examples are the feud or vendetta and the crusade.

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An echo from classical antiquity sets our archetypical theme of force versus fraud, one where deception prevailed. This is the famed myth of the Trojan Horse. Here, as much later retold, is the eternal contest between brute force and deceit as...
alternate ways to prevail: The Greeks have spent ten costly years in their cruelly fought siege of Troy. The prophet Kalchas assembles the weary commanders and heroes and cries: "Waste no more labor on besieging the city.... Let us therefore not try force ... but see what a trick or stratagem can achieve." But no one could suggest a suitable plan until the ever-wily Odysseus proposed that: "A horse must be constructed to contain the leaders, an ambush that we will welcome." The Greeks will then burn their own camp, embark, and sail just over the horizon, leaving a secret agent, Sinon, who will tell the astonished Trojans that the Greeks had given up and left the Horse as an offering to appease Goddess Athena for having looted her sacred image from Troy. The Trojans would then drag the huge Horse into their city. There, that night, while the Trojans slumbered, drunk and gorged from their victory celebration, Sinon would light a signal fire to summon back the Greek fleet while the 30 plus hidden warriors would slip from the Horse to spread havoc and open the gates of Troy.

Kalchas approved this ruse, but Achilles' battle-eager son, Neoptolemos, was appalled. He argued that "strong men stand and face their foes.... Let us not, then, look for a trick or any kind of stratagem. "And so on and on, denouncing cunning as unworthy of heroes. He was, of course, right: it is not the Western fashion to award Medals of Honor and Victoria Crosses to bloodless Machiavellis. But the Greek majority now hungered more for victory than futile heroic display and so they agreed to build the great Horse of Guile.

Chapter 3) The Importance of Guile in War, Politics, and Philosophy

Deception is one way of life. In internal or domestic politics it is common enough at the local, provincial or state, and national levels to warrant serious study.12 For example, at the national level, it is sufficient to note that, for the conspiratorial coup d'état alone, between 1946 and 1964 there were 88 attempted coups (62 of which succeeded) in 37 countries.13 That's in nearly a third of the world's then approximately 118 nations.14 Nor is the coup d'état a purely modern political technique: for example, three of ancient Rome's first twelve "Caesars" (Nero, Galba, and Otho) were deposed by army coups. Nor is the coup a Western monopoly: the nine Liao dynasty emperors of China (907-1125) had to fight off 19 "rebellions" by their own closest relatives.15 Deception in the political arena became so common in the Byzantine Empire (324-1453) that the adjective byzantine has become a synonym for secret and devious behavior.

13Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat (London: Lane, 1968), and statistics based on my own secondary analysis of Luttwak's somewhat recalcitrant data in his Tables II and III, 184-88.
14S. E. Finer in his Foreword to Luttwak (p.11) makes a hopeless hash of the data in order to reach the exaggerated finding that: "there have been successful coups in no less than seventy-odd countries, which is to say well over half the total sovereign states in existence today." He adds the non sequitur that: "The coup is a more widespread way of changing governments than elections."
Assassination — or, rather, its planning — is another nominally covert and usually deceptive technique to gain (or hold) power. It was quite commonly practiced and with considerable flair in the Roman and Byzantine empires, during the Indian Maurya dynasty, and at times in China, the Italian Renaissance, in the Medieval Arab world, in early twentieth century Japan, and intermittently in the contemporary West. During the 50 years since 1918 there were at least 218 assassination attempts (68 successful) directed against chief executives in 36 countries.16

In his semi-systematic survey of 280 "campaigns" in 30 European wars during the period from 490 BC to 1913 AD, Liddell Hart found that the strategically "direct approach" was the usual one, while a purposefully "indirect approach" involving at least some deception was the rare exception. Moreover, he found a direct relationship between the degree of military success and the degree of strategic indirectness. Thus of the 32 campaigns that produced "decisive" victories, only 6 succeeded by a direct approach while the 26 others (81 percent) were credited by him to use of an indirect strategy.17

My own close study of 216 major battles in 21 wars from 1914 through 1973 confirmed and extends Liddell Hart. I found 33 victories that greatly exceeded their planners' expectations. Of these, only 5 involved a direct and non-deceptive approach while, conversely, all 28 others (85 percent) involved at least some indirection and calculated effort to deceive. Furthermore, success correlates with surprise through stratagem. That is, the more sophisticated the deception, the better the chance for major surprise (as measures after the fact by the victim’s perception) and, consequently, the greater the degree of success (as measured by the deceiver's previously announced expectations).18

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17Liddell Hart (1954), 161-162. Originally, Liddell Hart (1929), 141-143, studied only 240 campaigns in 27 wars during that same period, crediting 26 as decisive.
18Whaley (1969), 133-139, 179-192, plus later additions and revisions in my unpublished DECEPTR data bank revision. My analytical categories, while not precisely matched to those of Liddell Hart, are on inspection of the specific cases, generally comparable.
PART ONE:  OF TIME, CULTURES, & DISCIPLINES

This lengthy part shows the variations in the levels of deception throughout the sweep of history within the world’s major cultures. We trace the changes from pre-historic tribal war to our present troubled preoccupation with the asymmetric struggle between high-tech means and low-tech cunning.

Chapter 4)  Tribal Warfare

Deception has never been the sole weapon of just large nation-states. So-called primitive war has been practiced since the dawn of history by the majority of tribal communities of old Europe and among both ancient and recent Amerindian, African, Melanesian, and some other cultures. Interestingly, this mode often involves rather high levels of guile. American anthropologist Turney-High stresses the sophistication of these groups in surprise tactics achieved through effective intelligence and security systems and their relatively developed ability to avoid surprise. American political scientist Quincy Wright finds that their tactics are usually a matter of "pounce and maneuver," involving "the stratagem of surprise from ambush or darkness." This, though, is war often sharply constrained by mutually agreed rituals, such as the Eskimo duel between champions. Wright goes on to conclude that as the level of "culture advances, . . . the battle of pounce and retreat [by small groups] tends to give way to the battle of mass attack and maneuver" with the consequence that "the casualties and destructiveness of war tend to become greater." However, as we’ll see below, ritualistic warfare — combat governed by tacit or explicit rules — also occurs from time to time in so-called civilized warfare.19

Moreover, the many clashes between expanding high-tech imperial civilizations and hunting-fishing, agricultural, and nomadic and other low-tech societies keep these forms of combat active right down to the present century. But that forms the subject of Chapter 18 where we will look at modern "asymmetric" warfare.

Chapter 5) The Classical West

The Romans, in the early period of their power, looked down upon the use of stratagems as unworthy of brave and honourable soldiers. At a subsequent period these scruples were entirely laid aside.

— Col. Charles Graham, Military End and Moral Means (1864), 155

Until around 500 BC, although the surviving records are too few and too new for conclusive judgment, stratagem seemingly played only a minor role among the ancient Mediterranean cultures. There are, of course, legendary wartime exceptions: wily Odysseus (creator of the old troops-in-the-Trojan Horse ploy), devout Gideon (inventor of the notional or dummy army), and little David (father of technological surprise). But even if such old myths and legends do preserve historical events, these examples are relatively so infrequent and so marveled at by their chroniclers that intellect seems a rare substitute for brute force in European prehistory. Moreover, all the recorded examples are the idiosyncratic improvisations of unusual individuals — clearly no part of traditional doctrine or on-the-shelf repertoire of ruses available to just any general or politician.

That highly ritualized mode of warfare — the duel between heroes to settle the outcome — is clearly established in Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean from 2000 BC. From then until the fall of Jerusalem in 586 BC, stratagem surfaces only in some clumsy ambush, occasional ending of a difficult siege by some genuinely clever ruse, or the rare surprise attack. And even in that last case more often the result of sheer speed on one side and poor Intelligence on the other than much if any calculated deception.

Stratagem of sorts emerges in clear view only with the rise of historians. Thus, around 370 BC, Xenophon in citing (or pretending to cite) historical precedent advises that the wise general always takes ruthless advantage of the enemy's off-guard, weakened, or disorganized moments. By a remarkable coincidence, if that is all it is, Xenophon was adding this practical counsel to European literature at nearly the same time as his contemporaries, Sun Tzu and the epic poets of the Mahabharata, did for China and India respectively.

A moderate level of tactical deception and strategic indirectness characterizes the warfare of the Greeks and Macedonians from Marathon (490 BC) through Alexander the Great (died 323 BC) and beyond.

Then, under the Carthaginians and Romans, the level of deception in war steps to a higher plateau for over a century and a half, from Hannibal's invasion (216 BC) to
the assassination of Julius Caesar (44 BC). The Roman world in this period was marked by correspondingly high levels of deception in diplomacy and domestic politics.25

Although the use of deception in Roman battle drops steeply after Caesar, the earlier levels are long maintained in politics and, curiously, in most of the few military manuals that have survived. This lag between Roman military and Roman political deception is a pattern we shall see repeated in other cultures.

Sharp discontinuities mark the levels of guile applied to battle during the entire pre-Christian era in the West. As shown graphically in Chart A, practice is displayed across time during that period as a succession of stepped plateaus and not as smooth curves. Nor is this merely an artifact of the crude century-interval measurement used in the chart; for even an annual interval graph presents nearly as sharp breaks. Why? A partial explanation lies in the two interrelated characteristics of the generalship and the military doctrine of the time. Generalship was singularly personal. The commanders of Egypt, Persia, Judah, Greece, and early Rome were seldom military professionals but rather civilian politicians: kings, princes, senators, and consuls. Whatever astuteness they brought to war derived mainly from their political and diplomatic experience. And while the armies they commanded (particularly the Spartans and the Roman Legions) were efficient professional, disciplined, shock instruments, they lacked any formal and, therefore, transmittable doctrine beyond simple tactical evolutions. The first systematic theoretical military text (at least that is the plausible advertisement of its author) does not appear until around 85 AD. This was the now lost The Art of War by Frontinus. Thenceforward, commanders — professionals and civilians alike — at least had the possibility of learning more than mere anecdote from the accumulated experience of the earlier Great Captains.

A disappointing high point in classical Western writing on military deception is the Strategemata (“Stratagems”), also by Frontinus.26 Written around 90 AD, this book is little more than a collation of many historical examples of ruses of war, culled from the literature and crudely lumped into three main headings covering stratagems suitable 1) before battle, 2) during and after battle, and 3) during sieges. Frontinus expects the reader to master deception planning by the inductive method. However, that the author did have some vague theoretical and indeed non-trivial understanding of deception is strongly implied by his typology of 43 sub-headings. These include many such psychological role-playing rubrics as "On concealing one's plans . . . [and] finding out the enemy's plans," "distracting the attention of the enemy," "Creating panic in the enemy's ranks," and "inducing treachery."

The next text given entirely to deception is the Strategemata of Polyaenus, an elderly Macedonian rhetorician, lawyer, and retired soldier. Written hastily in 162 or 163
AD this is a pure casebook, comprising some 900 ruses of war intended to inspire the Roman co-emperors Marcus Aurelius and Verus in their then on-going current war with Parthia. It is simply a collation of anecdotes, from Greek mythology to recent Roman experience. Unlike the same-named book by Frontinus, it does not even imply a theory of stratagem, being organized only as a chronological-geographical list and, indeed, merely cribbed verbatim from existing sources and pasted together, as was then common in such collections of extracts called hypomnemata, the prototype of our modern non-book.27

In the West, from late Roman times through the 1700s, by far the most widely read and influential textbook on war was the De Re Militari. This was a late (around 390 AD) codification of Roman military theory, regulations, and lore by Vegetius.28 This eminently practical little work stresses surprise and deception in their defensive as well as offensive modes, thus anticipating what Liddell Hart later termed the "luring defensive" and the "baited offensive." Noting that "surprises, ambuscades and stratagems" are the only hope of success for a much weaker protagonist. Vegetius also points out that "stratagam and finess" and "famine, surprise or terror" are always preferable to general engagements. The former makes it possible to "destroy the enemy ... in detail and intimidate them without exposing our own forces," while in the latter "fortune has often a greater share than valor."

Chapter 6) Decline in the Medieval West

Stratagem in the West — both political and military — suddenly declined with the beginning of the Christian Era. Christian belief evidently was itself the initial sufficient cause of this decline. This new ecumenical religion imposed a corresponding universal moral command that turned the minds of all individuals — governors and governed alike — to otherworldly values at the expense of the secular values, which included power politics. Many individuals, of course, continued to practice deception; but, denied legal, constitutional, and moral approval, they could no longer plead pragmatic political expediency or raison d'état as a ready excuse for the naked exercise of either force or fraud in their avid pursuit of power.29

This religious factor inhibiting the practice of stratagem was reinforced during the Middle Ages by the institution of feudalism with its etiquette of chivalry. Charles Oman characterizes it as an age devoid of strategy when "men strove to win their ends by hard fighting rather than by skillful operations or the utilizing of extraneous advantages .... The young Frankish noble deemed his military education complete when he could sit his charger firmly and handle lance and shield with skill." Ignorant of theory, these commanders knew only chivalrous brute force; and their rigidly stereotyped style of

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29See, particularly Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellianism: The Doctrine of Raison d'État and Its Place in Modern History (New York: Praeger, 1957), 27.
battle made them easy prey to unfamiliar foes. One of these, the Byzantine Emperor Leo the Wise observing, for example, that: "The Frank believes that a retreat under any circumstances must be dishonorable, hence he will fight whenever you choose to offer him battle."  

This dreary eight-hundred year era of ponderous, mindless hack-and-slash of feudal armies was enlivened by two partial exceptions. Each, significantly, arrayed a feudal mob against an alien enemy using very different and more cunning tactics. Moreover, in each case, the feudal lords were lucky enough to face enemies weak enough that they were able to survive a series of battles, instead of simply being promptly and decisively destroyed as they always were by the clever Byzantines. Protracted, indecisive war gave both Germanic chivalry and the Crusaders that extraordinary gift, denied to all but the luckiest of armies, the opportunity to learn from their betters.

In the first case, the Germanic knights, after suffering two decades of repeated large-scale raids from the nomadic Magyar horse-archers, finally mastered the nomads’ surprise tactics of feigned flight and ambush. Thus, in 933, Henry the Fowler, and again in 955; his son, Otto the Great, ambushed, surprised, and routed the Hungarian invaders.

In the second case, the Crusaders learned within eighteen years of having blundered into the Holy Land in 1097 to avoid costly pitched battles with the Saracens and, when battle was unavoidable, to inflict surprise attacks or to feign retreats to lure premature Saracen charges. This new knowledge came both from their direct experience of the Saracens and through the received wisdom from Byzantium.

However, these two hard-won insights did not nourish the mainstream of medieval military lore and were quickly forgotten. It was an age of ecclesiastical chroniclers, not of military theorists.

Chapter 7) The Byzantine Style

Soon after Rome’s conversion from Republic to Empire in 27 BC, stratagem passed into virtual oblivion as a common military practice in the West, not to be rediscovered until the 16th century.

Exiled from the West, deception now took firm root at the eastern fringe of the classical world at the New Rome, Constantinople. Formed in the 4th century, the Eastern Roman Empire of the Byzantines inherited the political and military traditions of

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31For Germans-vs.-Magyars see Beeler (1971), 226-232, and also 205.
32For Crusaders-vs.-Saracens see Smail (1956), 120-123, 201-203; and Beeler (1971), 129-143.
33By overlooking the, admittedly paltry, Italian examples of the 16th Century, Liddell Hart (1929 and 1954 errs in dating stratagem's rediscovery to the 17th Century. It wasn't until his 1954 edition that he came to appreciate the very important Byzantine tradition.
the old Greco-Roman world and preserved much of its literature, including Frontinus and Vegetius.

During the mid-6th century, the old Empire was recreated by the campaigns of Justinian's great commander, Belisarius. At the very outset of his first campaign (in 530 against the Persians) the 25-year old General of the East showed his deep understanding of stratagem by declaring in his unsuccessful negotiations with his enemy: "The best general ... is that one who is able to bring about peace from war." And next year, by a series of bloodless, swift maneuvers, Belisarius balked a Persian-Saracen invasion and herded their army back to the Euphrates. And yet again, in 542, he cunningly bluffed a far more powerful Persian army into retreating to its homeland without joining battle.34

This extraordinarily cost-effective style of stratagem was continued by Belisarius' successors and codified in the military treatises of Emperor Maurice (his Strategicon of around 600), the plagiarizing Emperor Leo VI The Wise (the Tactica of around 900), Pseudo Nicephorus II Phocas (De velitatione bellica of around 980) and the loyal old provincial soldier Kekauraenos (the Strategicon of around 1075).35

Leo gives the most sophisticated of the several Byzantine expressions of deception. For him, a campaign won without battle is the best because it is the cheapest and least risk-filled. And, if unavoidable, battle is merely a means to a political end and not a test of honor, chivalry, courage, or heroism. These latter qualities he disdains as the claptrap of barbarians or fools — fatal to victory. Instead, Leo stresses the need to understand one's enemy in order to play against him the panoply of ruses that are the essence of generalship — such ploys as insincere parleys and sending forged compromising letters to sow unwarranted suspicion.36

As in warfare, Byzantine politics involved the common practice of deceit and palace intrigue that has made the very word "Byzantine" a synonym for these qualities.37 So too with their very active diplomatic service, whose main task was to embroil neighbors with one another.38

The long-lived Byzantine Empire was finally doomed when the fumbling emperor-general Romanus Diogenes returned to conventional offensive tactics and was promptly and decisively beaten in 1071 at Manzikert by the devious Seljuk Turks who seemingly had bought the crucial services of one Byzantine general.

36Oman (1885), 37-38; and Runciman (1933), 144.
37See also Procopius, Anekdota (550 AD), and Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (6 vols., 1776-1788).
38Runciman (1933), 155-162.
Still, like Poe’s “Fall of the House of Usher”, one final bright interlude enlivened the last years until 1453 when the great dying city of Constantine fell to an unimaginative but sufficiently ponderous Muslim siege. The long reign (1018-1118) of Emperor Alexius I Comnenus restored high intelligence and a full measure of cunning to Byzantine palace politics, diplomacy, and war. A professional soldier, he usurped the throne by a military coup, kept it for 37 years until a natural death at a ripe 62 by agile dodging of constant plots and treasons, conducted diplomacy with consummate insincerity, and fought his many wars with rare imagination. Even his own daughter, Anna Comnena (1083-1153), admired him more for his sharp dealing than his bravery. Indeed, Princess Anna herself sought to apply his methods by engineering a palace revolution to steal the succession from her hated younger brother, John the Good. However, the coup failed, and Anna was forced out of politics to become, in comfortable confinement in a convent, the West's first woman historian.

Chapter 8) The Scythian Style

At the center of the Eurasian heartland and intermittently pressing upon the great urban agricultural civilizations along its Eastern, Western, and Southern fringes, lay a unique people and polity. These were the nomads of Central Asia — the Parthians, Hsiung-nu, Scythians, Huns, Turks, Khitans, Jurchids, Mongols, and Tatars. Avoiding (more-or-less) agriculture and permanent cities, their economy was basically herding and hunting, which determined their annual nomadic cycle. Their religion was animistic. Their politics ranged from tribal to feudal. And their warfare was pure cavalry tactics under a strategy limited to raiding, except in their occasional dramatic periods of imperial expansion.

In the earliest period of warfare between nomads and the civilized, the horse-warriors were too few and too lightly armed to normally risk more than quick pounce-grab-and-run type raids. In that they resemble and even overlap with the types of combat style that I labeled “primitive” in Chapter 4. But even in their early stage the Central Asian horse nomads’ extraordinary speed and mobility gave them the secure advantage of surprise.

The invention of the armor-piercing compound reflex bow (by perhaps 1000 BC) made the horse a powerful weapons platform and the later invention of the stirrup (which spread from China around 300 AD to Byzantium around 725) made it a stable platform as well. The nomadic cavalry of the Hsiung-nu (minus-3rd century), Parthians (minus 1st century), and Seljuk Turks (11th century) could meet the infantry-cavalry armies of China, Rome, Byzantium, and the Crusaders as sometimes-more-sometimes-less equals. Their threat as conquerors rather than mere raiders was limited only by their relatively small numbers.

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40 For Anna’s conspiracy see Rae Dalven, Anna Comnena (New York: Twayne, 1972), 92-95.
41 For Seljuk tactics see Smail (1956), 75-83.
This situation continued until the formation in the 10th century of the Khitan (Liao) steppe empire, which evolved a more flexible military organization with consequent new tactics. This new system slowly diffused to the Jurchids (Chin) and finally by 1200 to the Mongols who under Chinggis Khan perfected it.42

During the 1200s, organization, discipline, mobility, striking power, and tactics combined to make the Mongol army an enormously powerful fighting machine. Because of its sparse nomadic population base, it was a small army — only 129,000 at the death of Chinggis Khan in 1227 — and therefore one that could not afford heavy casualties. Yet between 1190 and 1292 the Mongols unified all the Central Asian steppe peoples, conquered China, Korea, Persia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Russia, and raided Burma, Annam, Japan, Java, India, Syria, Hungary, Poland, and Austria. To sustain this long series of campaigns, sheer force had to be bolstered by stratagem. Mongol strategic intelligence was superb; their campaigns were planned only after getting detailed political and military information. And always executed with sufficient deceptiveness to guarantee substantial surprise. Indeed the thoroughness of Mongol planning and training produced both repeated surprises throughout each campaign and at generally high levels in most of the main forms by which the victim can be surprised — the time, place, strength, style (tactics or technology), etc.

Specifically, foreknowledge even gained the Mongols many bloodless victories by bribery, treason, or alliance.43 It also enabled them to design effective strategic psychological warfare programs to panic, demoralize and terrorize their victims, again sometimes inducing surrender without battle.44 Their psywar campaigns often included two specific deception tactics: one, the refined "black propaganda" device of forged letters to discredit or destroy prominent enemy officials; the other, the calculated spreading of rumors to exaggerate their numbers and strength or to mask their intentions. And, at the merely tactical level, their vast repertoire of ruses included notional feints, demonstration attacks, camouflage by raising dust clouds to conceal movement or exaggerate strength, stuffed dummies on spare horses, false campfires, and ambushes — especially the carefully rehearsed feigned flight intended to lure the enemy into a precipitate charge. None of these tricks were new in the 13th century and all would be used again. What was rare was the high priority the Mongols gave to stratagem in all phases of their operations.

The grandest (but not greatest) of the Mongol Khans, Khubilai Khan (or, more precisely, his superb general Bayan of the Hundred Eyes) completed the conquest of South China in 1279. Stratagem then quickly disappears from the Great Khan's arsenal. Manpower (Chinese and Korean) had become plentiful. Only weak worlds remained to be conquered. Imperial pretensions — the "arrogance of power" — now prevailed. Vast armadas were launched to subdue Japan (in 1274 and 1281) and Java (1292), but

43The best description of the Mongol army is Henry Desmond Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan and his Conquest of North China (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), 11-47. See also Liddell Hart (1927), 32ff.

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without guile. Even the conventional advance intelligence had become so neglected that the expeditionary force against Java ended unwittingly battling the wrong army.

By 1368 the Mongol political and military power that had been based on both fraud and force had so diminished that they were expelled from China by the rising political-military power of the native Ming dynasty. By a combination of military force and political manipulation, the Manchu dynasty in China was finally in the 18th century able to subdue the restive Mongols through religion — the passive Tibetan form of Buddhism. And today, the army of the (Outer) Mongolian Peoples’ Republic is, of course, largely Russian in equipment, training, and doctrine.

Chapter 9) The Renaissance of Deception

When the 15th century dawned in Europe, stratagem had been largely dead in Old World political and military practice for over 300 years in Byzantium and for over 1400 years in the rest of Europe. It now experienced a quickening. The traditional cements of feudalism, the Roman Church, and the Holy Roman Empire had weakened and the many states could again openly contend for power.

The early Renaissance in the Italian peninsula ushered in a period, from 1400, of almost continual struggle for power among the city-states Florence, Milan, Naples, Venice, and the very temporal Papacy. The tyrannical Borgias and Medicis and Pazzis epitomize the ruthless lengths to which ambition went in domestic politics and interstate diplomacy. Conspiracy, bribery, treachery, assassination, revolt, coup, and war were now again commonplace political means.45

Although early Italian Renaissance politics and diplomacy were nakedly stratagemic, warfare was not. The art of war was then monopolized by the condottieri, mercenary troops whose impresarios and soldiers were concerned only with regular paychecks, pillaging (or extorting) the countryside, occasionally looting a city, and being bought off into switching sides. These hirelings exhausted their low cunning in padding their muster rolls, concealing deficiencies in equipment, and avoiding battle. Military doctrine and training were negligible and the rare unavoidable confrontations of two mercenary armies in the field or during siege were clumsy ritualized chessboard pageants quite like those still celebrated bi-annually in Marostica, near Venice.46

This harmonious state of affairs — busy but stable — was disrupted in 1494 by a French invasion that triggered a counter-invasion by the Spanish Hapsburgs — France seeking to seize Italy and Spain attempting to balk French imperial ambition. The Italian city-states had suddenly become mere pawns in this enlarged game. Diplomacy was reduced to either making or breaking alliances, usually by threats, bribery, or betrayal. Milan, the extreme case, switched sides a dozen times.

Warfare was again deadly serious. Cities were cruelly sacked and prisoners of war were slaughtered rather than ransomed as before. The Italians realized that their desperate situation needed new military doctrine. They actively debated the merits of alternatives to the unreliable mercenary system, They experimented with new formations, new weapons, and new tactics. But time was short and little came from this experimentation. The disadvantaged Italians did turn more to military stratagem, but this was limited mainly to Prospero Colonna’s "Fabian strategy" of maneuvering to avoid risky battles and to the subornation of treason to purchase victory without battle.47

This worldly age, in which even Popes played politics to the point of breeding Princes, produced increasingly "realistic" writings on politics and war, culminating in the early 16th century with Machiavelli and Guicciardini and followed closely by Belli, Gentili, and Frachetta.

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) was a shrewd, jestful, secular, pagan, Florentine diplomat and moderately successful politician. He is the first Western theorist (the Indian, Kautilya, being first in the world) to address explicitly the problems of power, force, and stratagem in all three of our modes: politics, diplomacy, and war. Moreover, Machiavelli is clear that the manipulative psychological techniques comprising deception are equally applicable to each of these modes. These topics pervade and dominate his The Prince, The Discourses, and The Art of War. He even treats us to a farcical play, Mandragola, on the theme of gullibility and guile in everyday life.48

As late as 1512 both the French and Spanish adversaries in the Battle of Ravenna were still accustomed to begin battle with chivalrous challenges and to conduct war, at least in theory, in accord with agreed rules and fixed means. It fell to Machiavelli to point out most explicitly the very intimate interactions of war, politics, and economics, and to apply to military theory the then common practice of political deception. He urged that any and all means were justified to defend the state or insure its victory: efficacy was the only sensible criterion. Moreover, recognizing that an army was an economically precious commodity, he urged that the wise commander "never attempted to win by force" what he "was able to win by fraud."49 Although Vegetius was Machiavelli’s most influential general military source, for stratagem he particularly recommended Frontinus’ book on the subject.

The high quality of Machiavelli’s stratagemic thought runs throughout his writing, but can be judged to good effect from just three of his maxims:

- Be alert to the many opportunities that the enemy will be sure to give and be quick to seize the initiative on these occasions. (Art of War, IV)
- Use your enemy’s spies and your own traitors by feeding them the false information you want the enemy to have. (Art of War, VI)

49Niccolò Machiavelli, Vita di Castruccio Castracani (1520), Paragraph 40.
Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) was Machiavelli’s younger and politically more successful friend — an extraordinarily perceptive Florentine lawyer, diplomat, governor, and historian. More staid and serious than Machiavelli whom he rivals in candor, Guicciardini generally echoes his contemporary, although differing in details. His flavor is condensed with wit and wisdom in his 221 maxims, of which one must do:

Men who are of an open and genuine nature and, as they say in Florence, ‘frank,’ are very praiseworthy and pleasant to everyone. Deception, on the other hand, is odious and disliked. But deception is very useful, whereas your frankness tends to profit others rather than you. Still, ... I would praise the man who is ordinarily open and frank and who uses deception only in very rare, important matters. Thus you will have the reputation of being open and genuine, and you will enjoy the popularity such reputation brings. And in those very important matters, you will reap even greater advantage from deception, because your reputation for not being a deceiver will make your words be easily believed.

Note Guicciardini’s sly point about the importance of cultivating a reputation for truthfulness so that in “very important matters” your deceptions will be more easily accepted. This accounts for the great strength of open “white” propaganda sources such as the BBC, which wisely reserved its very rare lies for such crucial events as protecting the key secrets in 1944 of the Allied Normandy D-Day landings. Conversely, truth’s systematic omission led to the ridiculous performances of the official American political and military briefers during the Iraqi War and insurgency 2003-2006. “Spin”. “Shading the truth”. Being “economical with the truth”. Focusing on the “good news”. All these are too often just sugar-coated deceptions, intended as such and unlikely to long fool their target audience.

The ethos of humanist realism that rose in Italy during the 15th and 16th centuries spread quickly throughout Europe. Machiavelli had his intellectual precursors and many followers — in politics, diplomacy, and war. In France, Phillipe de Commynes (published 1524) was adviser to Louis XI. Spain had King Ferdinand (died 1516) and Jesuit Father Baltasar Gracián y Morales (published 1653). Portugal

Take just England. The 1500s there saw a flowering of the martial arts. National need, public concern, and the printing press coincided to yield almost 200 military titles. The many English translations of classical texts included such advocates of deception and surprise as Frontinus (translated 1539), Onasander (tr. 1563), Caesar's *Gallic Wars* (tr. 1565), and Vegetius (tr. 1572). And Machiavelli's *The Arte of Warre* appeared in 1560. These translations and numerous original works — some discussing and recommending stratagem — were popular with Good Queen Bess's subjects. And Shakespeare (died 1616) himself was immersed in this military ethos, if however rather poorly read in its specialized literature. For example, 8 of his 15 uses of the word "stratagems" are explicitly in its military sense. Moreover, that deception was "in the air" is seen in Shakespeare's extensive treatment of the force and fraud theme among his heroes and villains.

In sum, the most striking point about deception during the Renaissance is that, unlike any other period East or West, the higher — and often highest — levels of guile were practiced in politics and diplomacy but not in warfare. Surely part, and possibly most, of the explanation lies in the peculiar nature of the armies themselves. Being mercenaries they had no motive to risk decisive actions in which they might themselves be destroyed. They were simply cautious businessmen. Moreover, they were highly resistant to direct intervention in command attempted by any of the stratagemically oriented princes they served.

If the otherwise deceptive Renaissance in the 1500s did not itself develop more than moderately deceptive levels in warfare, the underlying conditions and stimulation were seemingly there for military deception did finally catch up. Thus from 1611 to 1806 deception gradually but steadily came to virtually dominate warfare in all its phases from grand strategy (planning), through strategy (the approach to and interrelationship of battles), to grand tactics (conduct of the battle itself). This rise proceeds for a full century, from the moderate level of Gustavus Adolphus through Cromwell to the high levels seen in the) innovative battles of Turenne, Eugène, and Marlborough.

Marshal Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750) of France was not only the most consistently successful commander of the 1700s, but also the first modern military writer to stress the importance of maneuver and surprise and the many ruses, stratagems, and feints that may support these means by diverting the enemy's reserves. He was strongly influenced on these points by Machiavelli. Saxe also had a keen understanding of the

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psychological factors bearing on the discipline and behavior of soldiers, officers, and commanders — enemies as well as his own. Although Marshal Saxe reputedly commanded in more battles than any other general in history — and never lost — he could, like Sun Tzu and du Guesclin, write that: "I am not in favour of giving battle, especially at the outset of a war. I am even convinced that a clever general can wage war his whole life without being compelled to give battle." Saxe's fine Reveries sur l'art de la guerre, written in 1732 and published posthumously in 1757, enjoyed an immediate success, but one that was quickly superseded by the greater names of Frederick the Great and Napoleon.59

Frederick the Great, King of Prussia (1740-1786), was not as uniformly successful a general as Marshal Saxe but his example and one of his early writings proved more influential in the 19th and 20th centuries. Frederick both practiced and counseled stratagem as the key means to gain surprise. His writings, including even his early "best-seller," Instruction for the Generals (1747), stress this factor, giving much practical advice and discussion. In particular, like Sun Tzu and Frontinus, he pointed out that dissimulation, stratagem, and ruses have great value at every stage of a campaign.60

The production of military books continued to grow throughout the 18th century. Even the antique collations of ruses by Frontinus and Polyaenus were reissued in several languages, and the mid-century saw the fresh compilation of yet another such hotch-potch, by the Marquis de la Rozière.61 A somewhat more systematic step toward deception theory that later influenced Bonaparte and Liddell Hart was the notion of alternative objectives proposed by General Pierre Bourcet (1700-1780).62

These relatively high levels of guile in warfare in Europe in the 1600s and 1700s were paralleled in politics as witness the following: England had Queen Elizabeth (reigned 1558-1603). France had Cardinal Richelieu (died 1642) and Cardinal de Retz (died 1679). Russia had Peter the Great (reigned 1682-1728) and Empress Elizabeth (reigned 1741-62). And so forth throughout the Continent. And America had its own cunning diplomat in Benjamin Franklin (died 1790).

The French Revolution was in part, like others before and after, an exercise in convoluted double-dealings. This quality culminated with Napoleon's laberinthine secret police chief, Joseph Fouché (1759-1820), who built his career (and, to an extent,
Napoleon's) by being just a bit more adept at spying, provocation, treachery, devious intrigue, and conspiracy than the ubiquitous conspirators of the time.63

In war, Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) made frequent, effective use of a pinning frontal feint attack with tactical deceptions to support his famed manœuvre sur les derrières, a surprise envelopment of his opponent's rear concealed by its speed, a dense cavalry security screen, and terrain. But battle was, for Napoleon, only the culmination of a carefully laid strategic plan. And his grand strategy made full use of a carefully orchestrated deception plan to confuse and mislead his enemy even before the campaign was launched or a battle joined. Thus, prior to a campaign, a thick curtain of security would descend — the press would be muzzled to prevent leaks and Fouché's counterintelligence efforts would protect against penetration by enemy agents. Information was assiduously collected about the victim — both from public sources and through Fouché's secret service. Deception was mounted through inspired articles in the controlled press. Then when the campaign was underway, various ruses were systematically used to deceive the foe about the timing, direction, strength, and nature of Napoleon's blows — unit designations were continually changed, deployments were shuffled about, and feint attacks constantly mounted.64 This was Napoleon's practice as analyzed by recent historians; but, while some of it carries over into the earliest and most widely known collection of his maxims, it does not appear there in any coherent structure.65

The preeminent work to codify and enlarge the Newtonian "classical tradition" of military theory was done by General Antoine Jomini (1779-1869), a Swiss national who served in senior staff positions under both Napoleon and, after 1813, Napoleon's enemies. From this uniquely two-faced vantage point he wrote his Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, published in 1837. Jomini therein treats surprise and diversion as important elements in war.66

General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) gave both more attention and fuller exposition than Jomini to deception in war in his great book, Vom Kriege, published unedited the year after his death. In three detailed, separate chapters on surprise, stratagem, and diversion, Clausewitz summed up the collective experience of the great stratagemic commanders of the 18th century.67

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63See, for example, Hubert Cole, Fouché: The Unprincipled Patriot (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971).
65Maxims 2, 8, 16, 18, 36 and 63 in the collection by General Burnod (1827).
Chapter 10) Discontinuity: “Progress” and Romanticism in the 19th Century

Napoleon, Jomini, and Clausewitz mark a watershed in which stratagem, having reached and held a high level from 1732 to 1806, suddenly and mysteriously disappears from European military practice and theory. How could this remarkable — yet almost unnoticed — discontinuity occur? Paradoxically, for all their own appreciation of stratagem, these three men contributed unwittingly to the sudden eclipse of their own hard-learned insights about surprise through deception.

The shift away from strategic indirection and tactical deception begins intriguingly enough with Napoleon Bonaparte himself. From 1793 to 1804, as Colonel and then General Bonaparte, he was a master deceiver, adroitly and successfully maneuvering his small armies against much larger ones. Then in 1804 he becomes Emperor Napoleon and soon (beginning at Friedland in 1807) comes to rely on number — big battalions and massed artillery. Maneuver gives way to ponderous and costly assault by main force; initiative yields to mere precipitateness; victories continue but at excessive cost until they soon become defeats.

On his part, Jomini, despite his stress on surprise and diversion, gives no guide as to how to achieve them. He leaves their realization to the ineffable psychological realms of intuition and "opportunity."

Similarly, Clausewitz was unable to integrate his concepts of surprise, stratagem, and diversion into a general theory. Consequently his disciples were able to shop freely among his notions — accepting some, rejecting others. In this competition for attention, it is understandable that his guileful principles were by-passed in favor of the more readily applied ones. But in doing this his successors ignored his injunction that without surprise "preponderance at the decisive point is not properly conceivable." Clausewitz also followed Frederick the Great in stressing its role: "Surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings without exception." He added that "there is a degree of stratagem, be it ever so small, which lies at the foundation of every attempt to surprise." In developing these maxims Clausewitz produced some worthy contributions toward a theory of deception that have been almost entirely overlooked by his followers.

The essence of this problem is that deception is a psychological notion. As such it falls within the set of military "principles" that includes surprise, determination or morale, endurance, and-in part-security. It closely relates to concepts such as deterrence and psychological warfare. Conversely, it falls outside the set of "principles" that includes objective, mass, direction, offensive, economy of force, concentration, rapidity, mobility, and distribution. These latter concepts of military theory are conventionally defined in terms of Euclidian geometry or Newtonian physics. Being geometrical and physical, they are mapable and measurable. They readily fit the broad academic subjects of ballistics, logistics, topography, and tactical evolutions. Consequently they can be and are successfully taught in all military schools and barracks, analyzed by operations research techniques, and presented in organizational charts, vectored maps, tables of equipment, and similar quantitative or representational

68Liddell Hart (1929), 101-104, 141.
One rather accurate indicator of the relative place of deception in the military doctrine of a given period is obtained by arraying chronologically the rank-ordered "principles of war" laid down by the various official manuals and influential writers. Thus my survey of 30 military theorists and manuals found six that simply do not consider deception (or surprise) to have any relevance to war. Thus six were all written in the period 1837-1920. Moreover, while surprise is acknowledged by the four other works surveyed in that same period, all but one give it a low priority.69

Granting that the students of Napoleon, Jomini, and Clausewitz disregarded the stratagemic elements in their masters' practice and writings and chose instead the mechanical (physical-geometrical) ones, we must still somehow account for that one-sided choice. It is not enough to argue (as even I once did) that it was a biased or forced choice merely because these three strategists had failed to fully integrate their psychological principles into their theories or because their followers were too stupid to perfect that promising line of theoretical development. The masters' failure to develop integrated theories and their students' intellectual impoverishment is true enough. But this does not explain why, given seemingly clear alternatives, the 19th century doctrinalists selected the "scientific" principles over the "psychological" ones and then proceeded to build upon those particular ones.

I suspect that there is a single sufficient explanation. Moreover, I suggest it also satisfactorily accounts for the persisting celebration of force over cunning in American, Russian, and most other modern military doctrines. This overriding factor is the notion of Progress, specifically technological progress.

As a mere concept, progress is, of course, at least as old as Plato and Ibn Khaldūn. In dealing with concepts, any industrious scholar can readily trace "influences", for truly there are very few new concepts beneath the sun. What is "original" to writers is seldom the concept itself but rather the new priority they assign among sets of already existing concepts.70 Thus, during the 1700s, the innovative philosophers of the Enlightenment raised Progress to the position of main concept. Rationalism and Natural Philosophy (science) reigned. Then, from 1830 to 1842, Auguste Comte published his The Positive Philosophy that explicitly linked technology to progress.71 Henceforward the notion of technological progress has been the central paradigm of our age, embracing the Industrial Revolution, Darwinian evolution, the Information Age, and "scientific" (technologically oriented) military doctrine. It is surely no accident that Clausewitz and Jomini were published at the same time as Comte. Writing when they did, they were still free to rummage the past and select both psychological and mechanical principles. But their followers, already thinking and

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writing in the new Machine Age, were conditioned to perceive and select only the new mechanical principles.

Finally, this modern Western tendency away from guilefulness is strongly reinforced by that other contemporary Great Idea of the Western World: Romanticism. Prideful heroic display as a necessary proof of manliness is an old Western tradition quite at odds with the survival instinct. Even that paragon of machismo, Hemingway, sensibly admonished young Spanish Loyalist soldiers for unnecessarily flauntingly exposing themselves to fascist gunfire. A clear complaint against this romantic sentiment was put by a wise mid-19th Century British soldier.72

As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood; the word spy conveys something as repulsive as slave; we will keep hammering along with the conviction that “honesty is the best policy”, and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well for a child’s copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his sword forever.

Despite such occasional warnings, romantic gestures multiply and dominate throughout the 19th and 20th centuries: Lord Byron swims the Hellespont in 1810 and, as every schoolboy knows, single-handly frees Greece from the Terrible Turk. In 1854, the Light Brigade blunders into the Valley of Death and General Bosquet backhandedly compliments their heroism: "It is magnificent, but it is not war." At Tanga in 1914, Royal Navy Captain F. W. Caulfield, courteously notifies the off-guard German garrison of the impending British landing; the British attack fails disastrously and Caulfield is promoted.

Those military writers and practitioners who held this attitude of romantic heroism were quick to emphasize Clausewitz's notions about force and "will." This combination was thought to guarantee delivery of a physically and psychologically overwhelming force at the decisive point, breaking the enemy army's morale and then his ranks. Rigid discipline, élan, quality-over-quantity were stressed. But the "psychological" element was only a metaphysical metaphor for physical struggle in which one breaks the other's morale not indirectly through insightful, empathic understanding but directly by sheer "will-power."73 This romantic doctrine is responsible for the single most costly and generally self-defeating type of military order: "Fight to the last man!" and "They shall not pass!" that senselessly cost France 377,000 men at Verdun and Germany 400,000 at Stalingrad. The last brave Spanish Loyalist offensive was the Ebro offensive of mid-1938. Initially it succeeded brilliantly as a "baited attack", but the Loyalists' usual doctrine of direct frontal assault immediately reasserted itself upon the appearance of major opposition. The Loyalist commander, General Enrique Lister, proved the thoroughness of his Soviet Russian military training by ordering: "If anyone loses an inch of ground he must retake it at the head of his own men or be executed." With such a "doctrine" the Loyalist's irreplaceable Army of the Ebro was virtually destroyed in 115

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72Col. Garnet J. Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket-Book for Field Service* (London: Macmillan, 1869), where it appears in his section on "Intelligence" and in all subsequent editions (the 5th and last being published in 1886).

73Codified and exemplified by such as Meckel, du Picq, and Foch. (1953).
days of attritional battle and at perhaps twice the casualties they inflicted on the fascists.  

In Romantic mythology heroes and heroines are good and God-fearing, truthful, patient in adversity, naive, impulsive, and often just a bit stupid. They are the Noble Savage, Othello, Desdemona. The Romantic villain is evil and Godless (even Satanic), a weaver of lies, quick to revenge, cynical, calculating, and always guileful. He is Machiavel, Iago, the Vice Dissimulation. We are permitted to cheer the wise and clever Merlins, Pucks, Eulenspiegels, and Good Soldier Švejks but we are told to never mistake them for personal models.

School curricula across the globe seek to socialize the young. Western and particularly American schools tend to stress simplistic moralizing bad-guy-good-guy models of shrewd villains and gullible heroes. But, in truth, Washington could and did tell a cunning lie or two. And Franklin, in his official moments away from fleshly delights, busied himself in the patriotic forgery of "black" propaganda against King George’s Hessian mercenaries. Even arch-villain Aaron Burr received a 1973 revisionist reinstatement in the hearts and minds of those of his countrymen who subscribed to the Book-of-the-Month Club.

We now interrupt the historical survey of styles of power in Western civilization to examine the somewhat different styles in four other civilizations: China, Japan, India, and Arabia.

Chapter 11) The Chinese Way

Chinese deception is oriented to the failure of the enemy; Western deception is oriented to the success of the self. In the military field, the paradigm of deception for the Chinese is the ambush in which surprise can put the enemy in disarray; for Westerners, it is the feint that gives the opening for the main forces to strike.

—Lucian Pye & Nathan Leites, "Nuances in Chinese Political Culture" (1970), 2

Deception in war and politics has been practiced in Chinese civilization in its purest historical form, less adulterated than elsewhere by competing ethical, religious, or political-social values and beliefs. However, I don’t agree with Scott Boorman that this Chinese tradition represents a higher or more sophisticated understanding of stratagem.
than ever reached in the West. Indeed, by Boorman’s own criteria, I find the same high quality in Western tradition, although less consistently and for shorter periods.

Importantly, the stratagemic tradition in China, while more secure there than in the West, is not as Griffith and Boorman imply a perfect lineage. There were at least five major perturbations or even discontinuities. First, deception did not arise full grown with the dawning of Chinese civilization but developed only in the politico-military hothouse environment of the minus 4th century. Second, it apparently underwent a dramatic if only very brief total eclipse two centuries later. Third and fourth, it briefly but sharply declined in both the 10th and late 13th centuries. And, fifth and most recently it declined during the 19th and early 20th centuries from a combination of internal bureaucratic policy and the importation of the then fashionable non-stratagemic Western military doctrines. The reintroduction of deception has occurred only after 1930 and, then, mainly among the Chinese Communist armies.

For the period before 722 BC the state of stratagem as an art in politics and war is quite as difficult to judge with assurance for China as it is for the West. These were legendary periods in both regions: the archeological reconstructions are open to several interpretations and the documentary remains are at best dimly misremembered and too often simply the mythic projections of later writers. We do know that, ranging back to nearly minus 2000 in China as in the West, internal political strife and organized interstate warfare were common enough. Still, force rather than fraud seems to have been the far more usual means for winning and holding power in that distant time.

Fortunately, we can judge with reasonable confidence the state of military practice in China during the Early Chou dynasty, the so-called "Spring and Autumn" period, from 722 BC until around 500 BC. During that "feudal" period (and probably the previous one), warfare was ritualistic, conducted in accord with a more-or-less generally accepted code. War was prohibited during the spring planting, the fall harvest, and, in principle but not always in practice, during the prescribed months of mourning after the death of a feudal lord. In battle it was forbidden to strike the obviously elderly or to kill the wounded. The code forbade that any lord raze cities, ambush armies, or continue mobilization into the proscribed agricultural seasons. And no righteous lord could deceive or take any unfair advantage of his opponent. Battles were often merely uncoordinated one-on-one (chariot) duels between individual heroic knights, as with the eastern Mediterranean peoples earlier and the European chivalry a millennium later.

A paragon of this chivalrous age was the ill-fated Duke Hsiang of Sung. In 638 BC he patiently withheld his attack until the entire invading army of Ch'u state had floundered across an intervening river and finally reorganized itself into proper battle.

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array. Shortly before his own attack, whose delay promptly earned him a wound and the utter destruction of his own army, Duke Hsiang explained to his annoyed Minister: "The sage does not crush the feeble, nor give the order for attack until the enemy have formed their ranks." I’m reminded of the story told at the end of the American Civil War by New York’s leading card sharper about a novice cheat “who was just commencing to play ‘paper’ [marked cards], and when we asked him why he didn’t drive his opponent out when he came in on a pair of deuces or trays, replied that he ‘didn't think it right to bluff a man off when he had the best hand!” Ah, if only our competitors and enemies were all that naive.

By 518 BC the style of battle had become less genteel. And by 540 BC the Later Chou dynasty found China divided among eight large and twelve small states that proceeded for over two and a quarter centuries to fully earn its sobriquet of "the Warring States period." All pretense of conformity with the old idyllic moral code soon vanished; and deception became the rule in warfare. So too in diplomacy and politics. Intrigue now flourished. Diplomacy was all espionage, deceit, and bribery. And it was expected that ambitious ministers and generals would not hesitate to advance themselves by switching sides or even outright treason. Circumstances were not unlike those in Italy during the Renaissance. And, as in the Italian city-states of that time, sheer force alone no longer availed either political predators or the defenders of independence. This disorderly situation continued in China until 221 BC when one state finally prevailed.

With war recognized as a "fundamental occupation" during the Warring States period, military textbooks flourished and one has survived as a great classic: the Sun Tzu ping fa, the "Military Doctrine of Master Sun." This earliest surviving monograph on military theory is attributed to Sun Tzu, a Chinese professional soldier. It was almost certainly written in the Warring States period, probably around 350 BC. This remarkable book not only acknowledges — indeed stresses — the importance of deception (in both its tactical and strategic aspects) but also imbeds it in a succinct yet complete body of military theory.

Sun Tzu wrote about a century and a half after Confucius. In the interval, the nature of Chinese warfare had changed from feudal nobles fighting set-piece tactical battles according to a rigidly observed chivalrous code to professional soldiers organized under a hierarchical command with staff, fighting strategic campaigns of maneuver governed mainly by pragmatic constraints. Confucius had deplored the occasional

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79Griffith (1963), 30. One of the rare counter-examples of contemporary guile, the Battle of Changshao (684 BC), is cited with approval by Mao in 1936 in his Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954), 64-66.
80Garrett M. Evans, How Gamblers Win (New York: Evans, 1865), Introduction.
81Griffith (1963), 20-29; Kierman, in Kierman and Fairbank (1974); and Hsu (1965), 62-77.
83The best of its many translations and commentaries are Griffith (1963) and Roger Ames, Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare (New York: Ballantine, 1993). The Chinese title is Sun Tzu ping fa, the fa of the title meaning (now as well as in Sun Tzu’s time) "doctrine" or "methods" and not "art," as it is always translated in deference to European custom.
lapses from the old gentlemanly code; and his great disciple, Hsüeh Tzu (3rd Century BC), urged that: "The armies of the benevolent man cannot use deceit." But the school of Sun Tzu was now "in".

China was finally reunified in 211 BC by survival of the fittest, namely the highly centralized martial state of Ch'in. However, to rule his new, vast, and diversified empire, the grandiloquently styled First Emperor (Shih Huang-ti) turned to sheer coercive force in the context of an extraordinarily rigid and legalistic civil administration. Recent Western historians who denied prochronistic the appellation "totalitarian" to the Ch'in Dynasty just didn't appreciate the degree sought and achieved toward administrative centralization, standardization, mass public works (military roads, canals, the Great Wall), total censorship, mutual responsibility assured through mutual spying — all ruled by a mercilessly arbitrary and impersonal legal code. Ch'in had no place for human traits such as, after all, even guile is. It was all too much too fast; and the First Emperor's death in 210 BC signaled the return to palace intrigue which with local revolts brought his "10,000-generation" dynasty down four years later. After the unconventional episode of Ch'in, military and political theory and practice resumed its normal (that is, stratagemic) place.

The so-called Three Kingdoms period (220 AD-280 AD) deserves special mention for two reasons. First, because it was an epic period of dynastic turmoil that reeked of both political and military deception. Second, because it came to symbolize for Chinese their own strong tradition of rebellion and guilefulness. The main vehicle for codifying and transmitting this tradition is the enormously popular late 14th century dynasty novel, San-kuo Chih Yen-i (The Romance of the Three Kingdoms). Obviously, such a later folk compilation should be read more for what it tells us of its own time than of the distant time of its ostensible subject — as with any historical novel or, for that matter, academic historiography.

During the early years of the great Sung dynasty, from 979 to 1037, China enjoyed a rare respite of internal and external peace. These two generations of political and military tranquility brought a sharp decline in the quality of stratagemic theory as well, of course, of practice — gaps urgently filled by the exigencies of renewed warfare in 1038. Stratagemic doctrine again reigned supreme for the next two and a quarter centuries until its sudden disappearance from the battlefield — but not in palace politics — under the Mongol, Khubilai Khan, as already described.

In 1368, when the native Chinese Ming dynasty ousted the Mongol Yüan dynasty, the Middle Kingdom entered upon a 500-year period of domestic tranquility, perturbed only by the relatively undisruptive takeover in 1644 by the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty. However, intermittent imperial warfare along the land and sea frontiers preserved the stratagemic martial tradition of Sun Tzu. The publication in the late 14th
The only complete English translation of the *Shui Hu Chuan* (The Water Margin), another very popular novel about a wily band of 12th century revolutionaries, both reflected and reinforced this tradition.  

Then, beginning around 1800, China entered its most recent period of decline in stratagem.  This downward trend started as a direct consequence of the Manchu regime’s official scholastic policy that increasingly emphasized a rigidly formalistic training in which stereotyped forms became the rule at the expense of practical content, professional skill, and original thought.  As this empty formalism was effectively enforced through the state monopolized civil service examination system, the texts and the training for military officers were soon reduced to an overall amateurish scholastic level.  This was, of course, the ideal environment for the bureaucrats who’d created it.  But it was a paradise soon lost because it left the dynasty prey to both rebel and foreign armies.  

There is an additional factor that helps explain the frequent failure of Chinese imperial armies to apply stratagem to battle despite the dominant Sun Tzu tradition.  This is the political tradition of civilian command of the military.  As with Roman warfare, most major (that is, politically important) military operations against both "bandits" (rebels) and "barbarians" (foreigners) were the direct responsibility of civilian bureaucrats appointed specially for each operation.  These commands were assigned either to high court officials or made the personal responsibility of the local provincial governor.  Obviously such commands often fell to (or were actively sought by) men whose competence lay elsewhere than in military affairs.  

The Emperor’s martial nakedness soon revealed itself in the bizarre Taiping Rebellion of 1851-64.  Then it was the rebels who employed much guile to sustain their prolonged (although eventually unsuccessful) challenge to the Empire.  Similarly with the more mobile Men rebels of the same period.  

In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the new, modern, German-trained Imperial Japanese Array soundly thumped the traditional armies of the Manchus, as described in the next chapter.  Although the moribund Manchu regime was visibly disintegrating, many provincial leaders began to build their own modern, i.e. "European," armies.  The training and doctrine was exclusively German:  the several new Chinese military academies were staffed with either German or German-trained officers and the Japanese Military Academy had by 1910 graduated 620 Chinese cadets, all thoroughly indoctrinated with the German Field Service Regulations.  These "New Armies" were modern in every sense, including that utter disregard for stratagem which then characterized European doctrine.  Revolution brought the final collapse of the Manchu
dynasty in 1911. Within a year, a third of the 34 revolutionary provincial governors were graduates of either the eight Japanese military academy or the three new Chinese ones.92

The Chinese military academies gradually replaced their expensive German (and other European) instructors with cheaper Japanese models and the still cheaper returned Chinese student-officers. But the training remained German. By 1922 the main school, the Paoting Military Academy, had its 9,000 graduates spread among the many warlord armies of China. The Nationalist-Communist united front regime began from Canton its drive north to seize all China. Their justly famed Whampoa Military Academy (which graduated two crack regiments of cadets) was now, from 1924 to 1927, staffed by Soviet Russian instructors who also served as advisers to the coalition army. But Soviet military doctrine, while imbued with Marxist-Leninist notions of the dialectic and conspiratorial deception and incorporating the principle of surprise, was itself too much a mirror-image of contemporary Western military doctrine to stress stratagem.93

When, in 1927, the Nationalists and Communists parted mortal enemies, their military doctrines also diverged. General Chiang K’ai-shek, trained originally in the Japanese and Paoting military academies, reverted to the revered German model. Reinforced by a parade of 137 German military advisers, from 1927 to 1938, the Germanic style dominated Nationalist doctrine until the arrival of American advisers in the 1940s. While it is not likely that any purely military doctrine could have saved the incompetent and factionalized Nationalists, their stubborn adherence to an inappropriate doctrine rendered them the too easy dupes of the highly flexible and stratagemic Chinese Communists and certainly hastened their expulsion from the Mainland to Taiwan in 1949.

On their part the Communists continued after 1927 to cling to Soviet Russian military doctrine. Key senior officers were sent for further training in Russia in 1928-1934 (at the Frunze Military Institute) and again during World War II. And a few Soviet military advisers (such as Otto Braun, aka "Li Teh") served the Chinese Red Armies in the 1930s. After their final victory over the Nationalists, Soviet-style military academies were founded at Nanking (in 1951) and Peking (1958) and Russian military advisers and technicians helped modernize and professionalize the People’s Liberation Army until 1960 when they were withdrawn at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split.

Although the non-stratagemic Western doctrines predominated in China from 1894, the native tradition of Sun Tzu did not die. It was only dormant. All literate Chinese (and many of the illiterate) knew of it through literature and folklore, which preserved and lauded the trickeries of the crafty heroes of The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, the Shui Hu Chuan and the Taiping Rebellion.94 Although the new Chinese
officers, enamored of "modernization" and technology, scoffed at the lessons of Sun Tzu, even Chiang K’ai-shek once complained that too many of his generals were blind to China’s own military traditions.

The restoration of stratagem to Chinese military practice and doctrine is due mainly to Mao Tse-tung. As a scholar he had studied Sun Tzu and the wily rebels of Chinese folklore as well as Clausewitz. Since 1928, when with Chu Teh he formed the Communist Chu-Mao Army in the Kiangsi Soviet, the principles of deception and surprise came to predominate — at least over those operations that Mao had direct control or influence. Otherwise, as Colonel Whitson argues, the history of the Chinese Communist high command has involved a never-resolved tension between the European ("warlord") Soviet Marxist ("Russian"), and Maoist ("peasant") doctrines.95

Perhaps the single most decisive difference between Mao's unconventional war strategy and the highly conventional one of the Chinese Nationalists was in the different value they assigned to urban versus rural targets. The strong Nationalists were content to control the cities. Knowing this, the weak Communists initially fought to capture the countryside. Consequently the Nationalists scattered their large force among these several points across the vast Chinese map while the Communist forces moved around and past the cities until they controlled the entire countryside. As Boorman pointed out, the result was that the Communists could then concentrate their main force to defeat in detail one relatively weakly defended city after another until 1947 when the last Nationalist holdouts were driven into the sea.

A characteristic feature of the Chinese style in warfare is the cautious avoidance of battle. Ideally, every effort to gain victory without battle is exhausted before battle is joined, and even then only if the odds are overwhelmingly favorable. The object of this Chinese "tradition of victory through non-violence," as Whitson calls it, is to induce the enemy to capitulate before battle by bribery, treachery, or tricking him into a position that he perceives is hopeless. The Western (and Japanese WW II) fight-to-the-last-man syndrome is not congenial to Chinese soldiers, generals, or politicians.96

Incidentally, this perennial Chinese inclination to avoid battle clashed directly in World War II with the prevailing American military imperative of "slapping the Jap." Consequently, the Americans in SACO, the joint U.S.-Chinese behind-the-lines organization, were simultaneously amazed and frustrated by the ingenuity of their Chinese counterparts in arranging armed truces with the local Japanese garrisons. Indeed these Nationalist Chinese tended (with reason) to define as "enemy" not the invading Japanese Army but their own countrymen, the Chinese Communists.97

95Griffith (1963), 44-56; and Whitson (1973), 8, 18-22. Mao's main discussions of deception and surprise appear in his booklets On the Protracted War (1938), para. 83; and, to a lesser extent, Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War (1936).
It is clear that the Chinese Communist movement has been frequently and deeply divided by factional disputes that are more a matter of grubbing for personal and clique power than expressions of ideological differences. Naturally such exalted power politicking is portrayed to less powerful supporters and to the powerless masses in ideological terms, through the fine sieve of "esoteric" communications.\(^{98}\) The rules of this secret game, if we can believe the victors' own claims, are conspiracy, assassination, and sudden death.\(^{99}\) In any case it is a struggle in which victory goes to the more guileful. Yet, perhaps, behind it all sat an aging genius, orchestrating and synthesizing the theses and antitheses of the ever-changing contending groups in accord with his private vision of some permanent Dialectic, which was at least as Chinese as it was Western,\(^{100}\) owing as much to Machiavelli and Sun Tzu as it did to Marx and the traditional Confucian need for an Emperor to harmonize the Yin and Yang of human affairs with those of the universe.

Chapter 12) The Japanese Style

Just as the use of deception among the Byzantines sharply deviated from the Western norm, its practice in Japan contrasts instructively with that in China.

The slow development of feudal society in Japan through the 10th into the 12th centuries bred a provincial warrior class, soon to become known as the samurai. Like the early European knights, they fought strictly individualistic duels by rigid rules — open challenges, careful paring-off of equals, rewards according to number of samurai heads fetched back to one's lord, etc. They did differ in one main respect from Western chivalry: lacking the Western customs of either ransom or wergeld (payment of death damages), samurai combat ended in death, a result that bred an unrelieved cyclical pressure for vendetta. This otherwise chivalrous style persisted until the 1300s century, when more-or-less regular type armies were first formed and mass tactics introduced.\(^{101}\)

Texts of Sun Tzu circulated and were taught in Japan from at least as early as the 8th century; and by the end of the 12th century this Chinese stratagemic doctrine was fully adopted by the samurai. From then, for nearly five hundred years, until the mid-17th century, Sun Tzu and stratagem dominated Japanese military theory and, to greater-or-less extent practice.\(^{102}\) Even the new, popular, late-17th century Genroku literary style


\(^{100}\) An important early interpretation of Mao's dialectic theory and policy was Martin Bernal, "Traveling Light," New York Review of Books (9 August 1973), 21-23.


reflected the new ethos, replacing the former moralistic writings with a stress on the daily life of money, cunning, and gullibility.103

But from this point on in Japan, stratagem met two countervailing influences that gradually eroded its practical and theoretical roles. These were, first, the rise of the indigenous code of Bushidō from the mid-17th century and, then, two centuries later, the importation of European military doctrine.104

For two and a quarter centuries, from 1638 until 1863, the samurai were unable to practice their trade in battle — it was a period entirely free of internal or external warfare. While retaining their class status, the samurai transformed themselves from warriors into educated bureaucrats. Their military training began to stress such character-building martial arts as jūdō. And their martial ethos gradually forgot strategy and tactics, to stress instead the ethical principles of loyalty, honor, and mindless bravery codified in Bushidō, the "Way of the Warrior." Sun Tzu remained the main required text, but reinterpreted to emphasize those points coinciding with Bushidō ethics — the rest became empty maxims.105

This was the state of the art in the mid-19th century when European military doctrine was imported wholesale, displacing and largely eclipsing the already vanishing stratagemic tradition of Sun Tzu, as it would almost succeed in doing in China, a quarter century later. Thus, in 1867, after five years of dabbling on its own with Western fighting techniques, Japan received its first contingent of Western military instructors — 15 Frenchmen selected by the French War Ministry. The Shōgun had picked the world's then most prestigious military doctrine. But the ignominious French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 instantly undermined French preeminence. Prussian General Staff theoretician Klemens Wilhelm Jacob Meckel arrived in Japan in 1885 and henceforward German doctrine prevailed. The 43-year old Major Meckel was atypically literate, warm, and devoid of arrogance but typically the advocate of the massed infantry assault, which by weight, organization, discipline, and sheer courage was expected to sweep all before it. Meckel's only concessions to the killing firepower of the new rapid-fire rifles were (1) moving quickly to the objective while (2) taking advantage of any protection offered by available terrain features.106

Japan had acquired a truly modern army in equipment, training, and doctrine. But by adopting the contemporary European model, it became an army without guile. Henceforward, victories or defeats were a simple function of which side had the advantage in morale, material, and organization. Henceforward Japan's victories and defeats both carried inordinately expensive butcher's bills. The self-sacrificing spirit of Bushidō meshed nicely with the demands of the German Field Service Regulations.

104By entirely overlooking these two new factors, General Griffith (1963), 175-178, incorrectly sees the stratagemic influence of Sun Tzu continuing as the preeminent doctrine right down into World War Two.
105As Griffith (1963), 174-176, unconsciously shows.
106Ernst L. Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965). Dr. Presseisen makes the opposite omission from Gen. Griffith by totally overlooking Sun Tzu and giving only passing attention (147-148) to traditional Japanese training and doctrine.
In the diminutive Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95; Meckel's students proved their mastery of the entire curriculum of modern war including the costly massed frontal assault tactics by which they took Port Arthur from a Chinese force one-third their size. Their only concession to guile was that individual units were permitted to use ground cover — when available. Otherwise, strictly up-and-at-'em. These tactics once more prevailed in winning (but just barely) the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Again Port Arthur (with its 40,000-man Russian Garrison) was taken by direct assault — and 59,000 Japanese casualties. Only at Mukden did the Japanese, by improvising less-packed mass-assault tactics, manage to sustain fewer casualties than their defeated enemy.\(^{107}\)

Their indecisive campaigning throughout the protracted Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) earned the contempt of Mao Tse-tung. In 1938 Mao listed among Japan's "many mistakes" her inflexible persistence in reinforcing lost battles and stubbornly defending untenable areas.

A brief flurry of probing border warfare with Russia ended in 1939 with Japan's crushing defeat at Khalkhin-Gol at the hands of a young general named Zhukov, who used a crude World War I type deception plan to take the Japanese quite by surprise.\(^{108}\)

We all remember Japan's magnificently successful surprise strikes at Pearl Harbor and in Malaya. Both operations did, in fact, hinge upon deception planning. This was also true of the naval Battles of Midway (1942) and Leyte Gulf (1944) which, intended as lures for the U.S. fleet, ended in catastrophe for the Japanese. These four cases represent the total Japanese stratagemic effort throughout World War II, aside from some fairly crude tactical achievements in night attack, diversions, ambushes, and camouflage. It was their opponents, MacArthur and Halsey, and Wavell and Slim, and Mao, who consistently used coordinated deception planning.\(^{109}\)

**Chapter 13) India plus Pakistan**

The sketchy evidence (from archeology and early epics) suggests that the Aryan conquerors of north India were initially (around 500 BC-around 900 BC) rather ruthless in their war-making. Seemingly, only a few rules existed, such as sacredness of treaties and inviolability of envoys, and a few restraints such as an occasional willingness to negotiate to avoid imminent battle. But even these sparse restraints were apparently not applied to the native Dravidians, who with their different Gods were deemed objects fit for conquest in which all prisoners were killed.\(^{110}\)

During the later Vedic period (around 900 BC-around 400 BC), the Aryans adopted an elaborate code of warfare. Now the goal of war was glory for the warrior class for whom combat was viewed as sacred ritual. There was much fussing about duty, honor, heroics, courtesy and morality — all quite chivalrous, particularly after the

\(^{107}\)Presseisen (1965), 139-149.

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advent of the Buddha (flourished 500 BC). Deception was deliberately and voluntarily foreworn, as it would be in feudal Europe.\textsuperscript{111}

Opportunism, born of the exigencies of success, produced frequent violations of this chivalrous code. The lapses are usually deplored, but even the Mahābhārata epic has one hero quote ostensibly even more ancient verse to silence contemporary moralizing and justify surprise attack and slaughter in the night, urging that the enemy should be struck even when he is tired, wounded, eating, sleeping, in flight, in disarray, or leaderless.

In time, what had been exceptional advocacy and practice soon became common. A clear highpoint in political and military guile was reached around minus 300 under Chandra Gupta Maurya who expelled the Greek invaders and unified northern India under the vast Maurya Empire. The quarter-century reign of this remarkable despot (around 322 BC-around 298 BC) and his wily chief minister, Kautilya, introduced a new, cynical style of rule that The Oxford History of India and Richard Christie have compared to Renaissance Italy. The Arthaśāstra — (or"Treatise on Polity," attributed to Kautilya but perhaps written or at least edited about a century later) is a veritable Machiavellian handbook of statecraft. It views the sole purpose of war to be to gain wealth and power — not glory, as the Vedas had earlier insisted. It argues that skill in diplomatic intrigue is preferable to force because the crafty intriguer can always overthrow a king who relies only on warlike spirit and military strength. And even in wartime siege, the Arthaśāstra counsels intrigue, bribery, and psychological warfare in addition to assault by main force. Detailed instructions are given on how to rule by deception, how to set up both internal and foreign espionage services, how to test the loyalty of one's ministers by having secret agents-provocateur tempt with monetary or sexual rewards, and even how to avoid assassination while preoccupied in the harem.\textsuperscript{112}

I am unable to confidently trace the subsequent fluctuations of Indian views of force and fraud. But that they did have ups-and-downs is known. Deception may have declined later in the Maurya period itself around 242 BC under the remorseful Buddhist Emperor Aśoka who placed "truthfulness" high among the virtues. But, from beginning to end, the politics of the Maurya Dynasty (around 322 BC-around 183 BC) was marked by palace rebellions.

Bāna’s early 7th century AD history expresses the author’s utter moral revulsion with the Arthaśāstra, as did his older contemporary, the poet Dandin. But, later, the great Mogul muslim warrior-emperors Akbar (1555-1605) and Aurangzeb (1658-1707) were content, where possible, to substitute bribery for battle to capture cities. Akbar’s wise and wily prime minister, Birbal, is himself the subject of a delightful cycle of Indian

\textsuperscript{111}A. L. Basham, The Wonder that was India (3rd revised edition, New York: Taplinger, 1968), 9, 122-137; and Singh (1965), 158-167.

folktales. And the southern Indian Marāthā conqueror, Śivājī (1627-1680), espoused a pious Hinduism that permitted even treachery to destroy an enemy.

The Arthaśāstra itself was lost for most of the modern era until rediscovered in 1904 when its "remarkably utilitarian character . . . caused something like an upheaval in Indian political studies. It was hailed as welcome proof of the practical turn of the Indian mind, which had been the subject of Western criticism because of its alleged preoccupation with mysticism and idealism."114

Whatever the relative balance and effects of Hindu moralism or pragmatism and Moslem values, a residue of British rule over the Indian subcontinent was a legacy of a modest sense of stratagem in the modern military doctrines of both India and Pakistan. And it is a legacy that has persisted until today, six decades after the end of British rule. When I raised this point in my class on deception in 2004, two of my students — an Indian inspector general of police and a Pakistani colonel of armor — laughed. They pointed out that having both been trained in the British military tradition, which included a heavy stress on deception, they must wonder about their ability to trick each other in battle.

Indeed, this Indo-Pak balancing act was the direct consequence in World War II when Field-Marshal Wavell added a special deception planning staff ("D-Force" under Col. Peter Fleming) to GHQ in India. D-Force, as a spin-off of Brig. Dudley Clarke’s "A-Force" in Cairo, brought the full range of sophisticated deception doctrine and tactics (notional units, double-cross agents, radio & code games, etc.) that had been developed by Clarke. Although all the senior planners at GHQ were British officers, at corps and division Indian officers were brought into and fully briefed on the planning and execution cycles. Indeed, the three field deception companies were Indian and the post-war official histories and memoirs were rather freely disclosing the British WW II deception secrets as directed by D Force against the Japanese.115

Chapter 14) Arabian to Islamic Cultures

Other writers may be able to identify some essential, characteristic Arab or Islamic "style" in military deception planning. I cannot. The initial spectacular explosion of Islam engulfed the Arabian Peninsula in the Prophet's own lifetime and then, within a century, subdued the lower tier of the Old World from Spain to Persia. But organization was tribal, tactics were enormously costly charges by unarmored light cavalry, and strategy was the raid (razzia). This initial Arab thrust was a triumph of sheer physical
exertion by inspired warrior-heroes. Religious zeal sufficed. Sufficed, that is, until 632 when at Tours they finally bumped up against an equally zealous, stubborn, and just damn lucky infidel mob of feudal French chivalry. Their incursion into Western Europe had stopped at the Franco-Spanish Pyrenees.

Thenceforward, expansion was by unarmed conversions and by a sword now wielded not by Arabs but by newly converted Turks. But these Turks — Seljuks, Ottomans, Mamluks, Tatars, Moghuls — used their own stratagemic "Scythian" tactics, as described above, in spreading Islam to Central Asia, northern India, Byzantium, Southern Russia, and the Balkans. Thus, from the 7th century on, the military style in the Islamic world was, aside from the largely rhetorical appeal of "Holy War," that of the converts, that is, mainly "Scythian," as already discussed.

Be this as it may, recognition of the utility of guile over force in war was granted by Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406), a skilled statesman and the greatest of Arab social historians. In his monumental late-14th century Prolegomena to History he argues that war is decided by two components: "external factors" such as the number of troops, quality of weapons, and skill in executing tactical evolutions; and by "hidden" or "psychological factors" that result from human ruse and trickery such as spreading false or alarming rumors and setting ambushes. Ibn Khaldūn wisely notes that defeats the victim often attributes to (bad) "luck" are usually the calculated result of these invisible psychological factors. He concludes that:

... victory in war ... as a rule is the result of imaginary psychological factors. Numbers, weapons, and proper tactics may guarantee victory. However, ... all these things are less effective than the imaginary (psychological) factors.... Trickery is one of the most useful things employed in warfare. It is the thing most likely to bring victory. A tradition says: "War is trickery."

Even as late as World War I, the Arabs were still warring by the old tribal methods. It took British Intelligence officers under General Allenby, Majors T. E. Lawrence and Lt.-Col. J. D. Belgrave (not Richard Meinertzhagen!), to wed the bedouins to strategic deception operations.

Stratagemic warfare has somehow never thrived among the Arabs themselves. I suspect that the Moslem religion, by its stress on fate and heroic death in battle, has profoundly inhibited the use of guile in battle by all Moslems, whether Arab, Turk, Tartar, Moor, or Moro. At the extreme Western side of the Islamic World, the Rif Wars, which ended in 1926, were rather simple if bloody exercises in hide-and-seek between the

Moroccan Arab Rifs and the French and Spanish foreign legions. Nor do the more recent Algerian Revolution and Yemen War or even the terrorist operations of the Palestine Liberation Front or Black September illustrate little more than rather direct confrontations of force, albeit asymmetrical force that pitted Arab irregulars against conventional Israeli military and police units.

In war, politics, diplomacy, and everyday life the Arab is said to prefer the appearance to the reality and to confuse the ought with the is. Thus in 1948 when Glubb Pasha, the British commander of the Arab Legion, explained the need to fall back to a less exposed position to avoid Israeli encirclement, he was instructed by the Trans Jordanian Prime Minister that: "Better to have the army destroyed than to give up part of the country to an enemy who has no right to it."

Considering that the Egyptians, Syrians, and Iraqis adopted Russian military doctrine during the 1950s-80s, it is not surprising that they managed to get one-up on the Israeli army in only one weekend during that period. Unfortunately for Muslims, as the Holy Koran reveals, "God loves those who fight in His behalf in a line, as if they were a strongly constructed building."

In their long war with Israel, the Arabs (whether Egyptian, Syrian, or Jordanian) have insisted on playing the ever-losing role of lion against the Israeli fox. Only once has a conventional Arab army chosen a different role-model--and found success, albeit limited. That was during the strange week in October 1973 when the Egyptian army acted as if inspired by the 7th century BC Greek lyric poet Archilochus who had observed that: "The fox knows many things; but the hedgehog knows one great thing." The Sadat’s Egyptian army differed from other Arab armies in one profound way: it was an army whose common soldiers were neither desert bedouins nor townspeople but fellaheen, peasants. And the Egyptian fellaheen knows one great thing: how to hunker down, dig in, and hold his ground. As J. Bowyer Bell recognized, Egyptian President Sadat had chosen "a strategy that would make use of the real Egyptian virtues, admirable or no, and refuse to order tactics, however fashionable, that had previously proven beyond Egyptian capacity — however shameful to admit." Sadat’s strategy was simply to "seize and hold wedges on the east bank of the canal long enough to force international recognition of the Arabs' demands" which he had already assured by orchestrating with unprecedented secrecy, "a united Arab response, an oil boycott, Third World enthusiasm, and Israeli complacency."

But if Arab warfare is mainly a study in direct force, Arab diplomacy, politics, and — indeed — everyday life employs much guile. The obvious instance is the classic ribald folktale cycle, The Thousand Nights and A Night (Alf laylah wa-laylah), which

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120 Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), 152.
122 Koran, 61.4(4).
123 J. Bowyer Bell, "National Character and Military Strategy: The Egyptian Experience, October 1973" (manuscript).
achieved its modern form in 14th-century Egypt. Packed with ingenious ruses, even its unifying theme is Scheherazade’s cunning filibuster.\textsuperscript{124}

Muhammad ’Ali, the Albanian adventurer who founded the last Egyptian royal house, took power in 1805, prevailing over many contenders by a judicious mix of force and treachery.\textsuperscript{125} Having learned to read Arabic at age 47, he was an avid reader of books on government. He stopped his private translator of Machiavelli’s \textit{The Prince} after reading the first thirty manuscript pages, saying: ”I see clearly that I have nothing to learn from Machiavelli. I know many more tricks than he knew.”\textsuperscript{126} He would have agreed with Silone’s remark that ”I don't believe that reading Machiavelli ever put a single prince on a throne.”\textsuperscript{127}

But, if their religion inhibits deception in war, why are Arabs so skilled at guile in political, social, and business affairs? Or are they in fact as guileful as reputed? I will merely cite some suggestive remarks found in the extensive literature on Arab psychology and national character.\textsuperscript{128}

First, Islam’s extraordinary insistence that the human condition is unconditionally predetermined by fate surely contributes to gullibility, and at the expense of guilefulness. If one truly believes one has any ability to determine the turn of events, then it is obviously fruitless to bother to influence, manipulate, or control others. This parallels the impotence seemingly accepted by a Buddhist’s belief that the whole world is only illusion.

Additionally, the very nature of the Arabic language reinforces a profound tendency toward self-deception. Arab rhetoric involves a high degree of exaggeration, over-assertion, and a confusion of words with actions that can too often inhibit one’s ability to control reality.\textsuperscript{129}

In light of this attitude, it may tell us more about Arab than Jew that so many Arabs view Israel as a diabolically Machiavellian state. Thus one contemporary Arab historian, Ārif al-Ārif, attributes to the Israelis ”baseness, cunning (makr), stratagems (dahā’), deceitfulness (ghanash), iron determination, skill in propaganda and war of nerves, the exploitation of all their strength and all kinds of methods in order to arrive at the goal, for in their eyes the end justifies the means.”\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{124}The premier Western edition is still Sir Richard Burton (translator and editor), \textit{The Arabian Nights’ Entertainment} (N.p.: The Burton Society, 1885-1886, 17 vols.).
\textsuperscript{125}A convenient biography is Henry Dodwell, \textit{The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad ‘Ali} (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1931).
\textsuperscript{126}Nassau William Senior, Conversations and Journals in Egypt and Malta (London: Sampson Low, 1882), Vol.2, 176-177.
\textsuperscript{127}Ignazio Silone, \textit{The School for Dictators} (New York: Harpers, 1939), Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{129}On Arab rhetoric see particularly Patai (1973), 48-72. Also E. Shouby, ”The Influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs,” \textit{Middle East Journal}, Vol.5 (Summer 1951), 284-302.
\textsuperscript{130}As quoted in Harkabi (1972), 310-312.
The eminent Mamlûk historian and student of Ibn Khaldûn, al-Maqrīzī (died 1442), characterized his fellow Egyptians in most unflattering terms: "They are extremely inclined to cunning and deceit; from their birth they excel in it and are very skillful in using it, because there is in their character a basis of flattery and adulation which makes them masters in it more than all the peoples who have lived before them or will live after them." Writing in 1951, the Iraqi author al-Wardī complains that while the bedouin is all courage, pride, show, and rapaciousness, the urban Iraqi exalts the qualities of endurance, hardship, submission, and cunning. Ibn Khaldûn had already extended this latter charge to all urban groups. For him, sedentary culture brings prosperity but this, in turn, breeds a corrupting addiction to luxury that the city dweller defends by resort to "fraud and deceit." Of all the urban spawn, the most corrupted is the merchant class whose special concern with profit makes "deceitfulness ... their main characteristic." But this urban-named difference is only relative, as one close British observer found the bedouin raised from childhood to believe that lying is "one's most ready defence to mislead his enemy."

Dr. Hamady asserts that: "Lying is a widespread habit among the Arabs, and they have a low idea of truth." She explains that: "The Arab has no scruples about lying if by it he obtains his objective.... To be frank does not pay among people who admire the shâtir (smart) and despise the miskîn (meek). To be clever, one has to see through all the admirable manners, engaging words, and the feigned humility of the Arab." Even the famed medieval Muslim theologian al-Ghazzālī (died 1111) viewed lying with self-serving subjectivity: "We must lie when truth leads to unpleasant results, but tell the truth when it leads to good results."

That the substratum of Arabian Night's realism persists, can be judged from a modern event. In March 1972, the government of Southern Yemen invited 40 exiled rebel bedouin chiefs to negotiate their grievances. As soon as their hosts had ushered the chiefs into the tent, the first (and last) order of business was the detonation of a sizeable land-mind buried under the tent. This otherwise crude ruse was unexpected precisely because it was such a gross violation of traditional Arab hospitality. However memories were short, as the previously mentioned Pasha of Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali, had already done this to guests twice, in 1805 when he slaughtered over 50 Mamluk beys and then again in 1811 when he assassinated all the rest.

Finally, the acid test of the relative level of Arab guile comes in their international diplomacy with non-Arabs, particularly the Americans, Russians, Western Europeans, and Israelis. Here the evidence is largely anecdotal, but it does seem that at least occasional Arab leaders not only can appreciate their own special cultural limitations but even turn them to advantage against alien cultures. A rather convincing case for this

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132 Ibn Khaldûn, IV, 18 (pp. 293-294 in Rosenthal’s edition).
133 Ibn Khaldûn, V, 14 (pp. 343-344 in Rosenthal).
135 Hamady (1960), 36.
136 Quoted by Samuel M. Zwemer, Childhood in the Moslem World (New York: Revell, 1915), 180. See also pp.177-184, for Dr. Zwemer’s own Christian moralizing about the deceit that he finds pervading Islam and the Muslims.
has been made out for Nasser in his protracted diplomacy in the 1960s that played the strong world powers off against each other to weak Egypt's advantage. Another example is Sadat's brilliant stroke against Israel in October 1973. And the Arab OPEC oil diplomacy of winter 1974 was a case of sharp bargaining bordering on blackmail to exploit a target of opportunity.

Chapter 15) Twentieth Century Limited

After being moribund if not quite dead for a century after Napoleon and Wellington, military deception began its still fitful revival in World War I. It has done so despite the continuing cultural, institutional, and individual psychological constraints discussed below (Chapters 20-22). Given the oppressive burden of these limiting factors, how is this modern revival of stratagem possible?

Necessity mothers invention. Even the guileless ethos of the atomistic, mechanistic, Romantic 19th century could not prevent a very occasional commander from rediscovering stratagem to his own advantage. For example, British General Sir Garnet Wolseley in designing the Battle of Tel-el-Kebr (1882).

Otherwise these exceptions are almost entirely limited to the American Civil War (1861-65). Although it was war characterized more by the pompous everything-by-the-manual McClellans, the flamboyant "Jeb" Stuarts and Custers, and the abysmally stupid Burnsides, two outstanding stratagemic champions did emerge: Jackson for the South and Sherman for the North. And Lee and even Grant showed occasional flair.

The intermittently successful effort through the first half of the present century to incorporate strategic deception in professional military doctrine was due almost entirely to a fragile chain of transmission from one teacher to another. Only after 1941 did it begin to diffuse through a few military staff networks.

The tenuous tradition of military deception returned to Britain from America. Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. R. Henderson was Britain's most unorthodox military scholar in the 1800s. His classic study of the American Civil War, published in 1898, identified a whole range of strategic (and tactical) ruses used by the Confederates, particularly the highly unorthodox General "Stonewall" Jackson, and to which Henderson explicitly attributed their frequent attainment of surprise. Henderson received the very rare opportunity to apply his academic theories to war when two years later he accompanied Lord Roberts into the hitherto disastrous quagmire of the Boer War. As head of Robert's

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140 Lieutenant-Col. G. F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (London: Longmans, Green, 1898).
141 B. H. Liddell Hart, Sherman (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1929), particularly 315-316.
Intelligence Service, Colonel Henderson devised the carefully coordinated plan of feint-and-deception that in 1900 relieved Kimberley and permitted the move against Bloemfontein. It is significant for the future of deception that a 29-year old Major named Allenby was present, an even younger Second-Lieutenant named Wavell soon joined this fated company, while 25-year old correspondent for the London *Morning Post*, Winston Churchill, reported.

At the outbreak of the Great War, the imaginative and innovative Captain Archibald Wavell was placed in charge of M.0.5, the key staff section of the Military Operations Directorate concerned with security, the secret service, ciphers, and general military intelligence. One of Wavell's many odd jobs was the "last-minute improvisation" of a field intelligence service. This brand new Intelligence Corps virtually monopolized the keen advocates of stratagem during the Great War. However, for two very costly years its superiors rejected deception as fit only for "comic opera," as one put it during the instructive butchery at the Somme in 1916.143

Then, in 1917, on another bogged front, General Allenby unloosed a full bag of tricks — tactical and strategic — on the German and Turkish commanders in Palestine. There, on 31 October, he launched his famed feint-cum-deception Third Battle of Gaza that thoroughly surprised General Falkenhayn and routed the off-guard and off-balance Turkish army, breaking an eight months' stalemate and going on to take Jerusalem as trophy. Allenby himself had learned some of these tricks in the Boer War from General Roberts and his Intelligence Officer, Colonel Henderson. Now, at Third Gaza, his own brilliantly innovative Intelligence Officer, Lt.-Col. Belgrave, was to design his stratagems. After Third Gaza, as T. E. Lawrence wrote, "deceptions, which for the ordinary general were just witty hors d'oeuvres before battle, became for Allenby a main point of strategy." Allenby repeated his initial success a year later, on 19 September 1918, at Megiddo. This time he used a similar pattern of feint-cum-deception but reversed the real line of operations to the coast. Coordinated with this were a series of feints and ruses by Major T. E. Lawrence to divert enemy attention inland to his trans-Jordan desert front. This strategy succeeded in unbalancing the smaller and weaker Turkish-German force and precipitated it into headlong flight. Seven days later all Palestine had fallen.

Meanwhile, on the Western Front, 1918 saw a revival of deception planning by the British, French, Americans, and, independently, the Germans.

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart and many other soldiers returned with deep-felt revulsion from the monstrous slaughter of the Western Front. While many intellectuals adopted such noble pacifisms as the Oxford Movement to forestall the predicted horrors of another Great War, Liddell Hart — like Fuller, Lawrence, Wavell, Von Seeckt, Marshall, and even MacArthur — believed that, as further war was likely, the wise course was to reform it. Accordingly, these men sought fervently to harness the modern technological means of war, making those means once again responsive to the political goals that unleash them. This search led Liddell Hart into a profound reappraisal of military history and theory.

\footnote{143Captain Ferdinand Tuohy, *The Secret Corps* (London: Murray, 1920), 213-215.}
Although he was a crusader driven by a moral and emotional demon, Liddell Hart adopted a modestly systematic research method that led in most of his more than thirty books to conclusions that were sharply focused yet compellingly documented. Of course, most of his conclusions are found scattered through the writings of Sun Tzu, Saxe, Frederick the Great, Sherman, and Henderson — he drew freely upon their ideas. And similar conclusions have been expressed by such contemporaries as Lawrence, Fuller, Wavell, DeGaulle, Guderian, Rommel, MacArthur, Beaufre, Yadin, and Dayan — they drew upon each other, although, most often, Liddell Hart supplied the general theory while they fed back new case material for his research mill. Liddell Hart thus proved to be the single most influential modern military theoretician; and he went further than the others toward integrating his separate findings and conclusions in a comprehensive and unified theory.\footnote{Aside from those who simply ignore Liddell Hart, there are three schools of thought about his theories. First are his several whole-hearted supporters, all of us who assume that his “strategy of the indirect approach” is synonymous with deception. Second are supporters like Lawrence and Wavell who worried that his “indirect” meant anything that worked and therefore saw him possibly trapped in circular logic. Third are those like the American political scientist John Meirsheimer who, ignorant of military deception and distracted by the man’s abrasive and self-aggrandizing personality and ignorant of military deception, hopelessly misunderstood Liddell Hart’s theory. Fortunately the Meirsheimer and Castel claque has been trumped by Danchev (1997), Reed (1998), Kam (2000), Gat (2001).}

What is Liddell Hart’s research method? It is the simple one of the comparative case study. But not the usual anecdotal off-the-top-of-my-head cherry-picking of only those cases that fit the researcher’s preconceived hypothesis. Instead, Liddell Hart chose the painstaking but systematic one of first surveying all known cases of battles within defined times and regions. For his first comprehensive study he selected the biographies of the more successful commanders, from Hannibal to Allenby. He intentionally biased his sample by setting aside for contrast all commanders whose indubitable successes were bought with heavy casualties. In other words, he was seeking those elements of strategy associated with both victory and low cost in human life. Using this filter of history, he found not only that the order of priority of the most widely accepted military principles was drastically reshuffled but that some hallowed principles disappeared altogether. This work reached its first plateau in 1927 with the publication of his \textit{Great Captains Unveiled}. Here, however, his major findings were not generalized, but left implicit as themes running through his exposition of the particular examples.

Liddell Hart then turned his comparative case study method to specific campaigns and achieved the first comprehensive formulation of his general theory with the publication in 1929 of \textit{The Decisive Wars of History}. It was in this book that he introduced and vigorously advocated his central concept of the “indirect approach.” As codified by Liddell Hart, this theory has found wide acceptance in military doctrine (particularly the Nazi German and Israeli) and with most individual practitioners of surprise-through-deception (Rommel, Guderian, Dorman-Smith, Yadin, Dayan, probably MacArthur, etc.). However, it is curious that it has not been refined, much less enlarged, by any subsequent military theoreticians. Indeed, while many have engaged Liddell Hart in polemic over specific details (such as his pre-World War II emphasis on the defense over the offense) none have attempted a frontal assault on the main body of his theory.
Instead, such military historians as Cyril Falls and John Keegan simply ignore the target—a reduction of the "indirect approach" to absurdity.\textsuperscript{145}

Liddell Hart concluded from his survey that "the indirect is by far the most hopeful and economic form of strategy."\textsuperscript{146} Moreover, he found that the relationship of ineffectiveness/effectiveness with direct/indirect strategies matched so closely along their scales that it was almost a general rule that \textit{whatever the attendant circumstances} the direct approach should be avoided and an indirect approach sought.

Liddell Hart also largely succeeds in integrating into his theory one other finding stressed by his intellectual forebears by showing that the essence of the indirect approach is psychological, quoting Lenin with approval to the effect that:\textsuperscript{147}

\begin{quote}
The soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy.
\end{quote}

Although the British had become the acknowledged masters of deception during the Great War, they had lost this technique—as they virtually had with military intelligence—by the beginning of World War II. The sole repository of such wisdom in a position of senior command was General Wavell, now the G.O.C.-in-C. Middle East. Wavell had learned deception under Allenby in Palestine during the Great War and had perfected its theory in his highly unorthodox inter-war training maneuvers. After the fall of France, Wavell put theory to effective practice in his rearguard defense against the over-cautious, semi-competent, but far stronger Italian Army in the Western Desert. Finally, in December 1940, he proved its value by gaining the first British strategic surprise and victory of the war. Then, early in 1941 he sent his principle deception planning officer, Colonel Dudley Clarke, to London to argue the need for the centralized inter-theater planning and coordination of strategic deception.\textsuperscript{148} The dreary failure of recent plans such as at Dakar were vivid reminders of the need to improve such operations.

It seems likely that Wavell's revolutionary recommendation to upgrade and centralize deception was accepted because of the fortuitous circumstance that Churchill was then Prime Minister. Churchill was himself a quite unorthodox military thinker, always ready to consider (and sometimes overly willing to approve) the most outrageous innovations—such as tanks, amphibious warfare, guerrilla warfare—anything that might strengthen Britain's weak hand against the Axis. Moreover, Churchill had himself successfully practiced military stratagem in the Great War. Lawrence and Liddell Hart had once had his ear and he was an early advocate of the "indirect approach"—indeed


\textsuperscript{146}Liddell Hart (1929), 143.

\textsuperscript{147}Liddell Hart (1929), 146.

had independently conceived the outlines of this strategic doctrine as early as 1915.\textsuperscript{149} Moreover, during the extensive reorganization of the proliferated British secret services in late 1941, Churchill was known to fully endorse deception, favoring it over even psywar, of whose utility he was wisely skeptical. Following acceptance of Wavell's 1941 proposal on deception planning, Churchill was quick to use it and to recommend its use to others, including both Roosevelt and Stalin.

In any case, the British Chiefs of Staff adopted Wavell’s proposal. Thenceforward, strategic deception planning ("special planning" was the British cover term) became institutionalized as a regular staff function. Centralized in the so-called London Controlling Section headed by Colonel J. H. "Johnny" Bevan, small deception staffs appeared among all British military echelons from theatre down to corps level. The British then taught their model to the Americans (and, in part, the Russians).\textsuperscript{150}

While theoretically there is no reason why small nations in the post-World War II period should not have integrated stratagem with their military doctrine, I am aware of no case except Israel. Moreover, Israel has emerged as one of the modern masters of this technique — indeed, perhaps, \textit{the} master, at least until the reversal of roles in the October War.

The early years of the current revival in the West of military stratagem coincide with the rise of the modern Machiavellian political theorists. Henderson, Maurice, T. E. Lawrence, and Liddell Hart published their major military theses from 1898 to 1929; and the political realists Mosca, Sorel, Michels, Pareto, and Meinecke issued theirs between 1883 and 1925. Theories of political and military realism were very much "in the air" and have remained so to this day. I rather think that the body of theory on deception that has been developing among a small number of scholars from Liddell Hart through R. V. Jones to the present generation owes much more than we suspect to this prevalent atmosphere, particularly as most of our initial work on \textit{military} deception was done independently of each other.

Since its re-invention in World War I, deception in warfare has been rather generally increasing in both relative frequency of its use and in sophistication, as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1: FREQUENCY OF USE AND SOPHISTICATION OF DECEPTION IN BATTLES, 1914-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Percent Involving Some Deception</th>
<th>Percent Involving Moderate or High Deception¹</th>
<th>Number of Battles Studied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914-19</td>
<td>43 %</td>
<td>23 %</td>
<td>(56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-39</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-49</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>(114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-59</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-69</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ That is, with an index of 3 or more on a 0-to-12 scale that indicates the number of possible types of "channels" used to communicate disinformation.

Chapter 16) Soviet Doctrine

Although Czarist Russia had produced the occasional mildly deceptive commander such as Suvorov and Brusilov, it bequeathed to its Bolshevik successors the disastrous "scientific" doctrines of Lloyd, Clausewitz, Jomini, and, later von Moltke. As in Japan and China, Russia's dire need to "modernize" its army was learned in the late 19th century — in this case in the Crimean War in 1855 — and this policy dominated Russian military doctrine from 1851 to World War I, pushed by War Minister Count Dmitri Miliutin and his influential theorizer, General Genrykh Leer.¹⁵¹ It would plague the Czar's miserable generals and infect the tacticians of the Red Army from Trotsky through Frunze, Tuchachevsky, Shaposhnikov, and Zhukov, to even the current officer corps. Moreover, this military "science" blended nicely with traditional Russian views about manpower to yield the self-fulfilling prophesy that victories were necessarily bloody.

Soviet history is an extraordinarily interesting case because it shows how both ideology and power politics can first encourage and then inhibit the development of political and military doctrine on deception.¹⁵²

In 1917, Red October suddenly fused the two major contemporary intellectual traditions that explicitly, frankly, and realistically understood deception or hypocrisy to be


¹⁵² For a summary history of Soviet military deception see Whaley (1969), particularly 62-76.
a veritable way of life. It brought together the cosmopolitan Marxist and the Russian national literary intellectual. Both recognized deception to be a major weapon for defense or attack, by self or foe, and in domestic politics and international diplomacy equally with war.\textsuperscript{153}

The Soviet Union made deception a part of its military doctrine well before World War II. Indeed, as early as 1918, Stalin himself had raised the concept of surprise to the status of a major "factor" in war.\textsuperscript{154} Nevertheless, later Soviet military theory has suffered from a curious inhibition regarding the concept of surprise. This is the direct and immediate and still operative consequence of the German invasion on 22 June 1941. That was a strategic and tactical surprise whose shock was felt throughout the country — even Stalin suffered a temporary nervous paralysis — and neither the appalling lack of defenses nor the utter failure of the Leader's vaunted omniscience could be concealed.\textsuperscript{155} Stalin therefore adjusted the concept of surprise by simultaneously downgrading and separating it from the other "factors" or principles of war. The others became "permanently operating factors," while surprise was immediately relegated to a specially created lower class of \textit{non-permanently} operating factors. The hasty improvisation involved and the embarrassed avoidance of this problem are evident from the fact that Stalin never specified the \textit{other} factors that fell into this supposedly secondary class. This intimate linkage of Stalin's name and role with the topic of surprise made any critical reappraisal of the subject taboo during his lifetime.\textsuperscript{156} Similarly, it long remained one of the more sensitive topics following his death in 1953, because it is one of the central questions involved in any reappraisals connected with the struggle over de-Stalinization. This unique circumstance deeply inhibited Soviet restatements of military \textit{doctrine}, although it remains a moot point to what degree it has degraded or calcified their \textit{practice} of deception.

From 1941 through early 1944 the level of Soviet stratagemic art shows little advance over that of the Czarist Russian army in World War I, except in the extensive use of double agents for radio "games."\textsuperscript{157} Then, as an integral part of their vast summer 1944 offensive in conjunction with the Allied invasion of Normandy, the Russians suddenly displayed a more sophisticated flair for deception. Despite the implied Soviet claims that this was an indigenous advance in strategic art, it seems most likely that it was due in some part to the lecturing on strategic deception that Stalin and his military intelligence chiefs received directly from Churchill at Teheran in 1943 and from Colonel John Bevan, the chief British deception planner, in Moscow from January to March 1944.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{153}Some one hundred examples of Russian views on deceptiveness are collected and discussed in Nathan Leites, \textit{A Study of Bolshevism} (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), Chapter 13 ("Deception"), 324-340.
\textsuperscript{156}Dinerstein (1959), 6-9; and Garthoff (1953), 34.
\textsuperscript{157}As unwittingly revealed by "Sovetskie organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti v godu velikoi otechestvennoi voiny" [Soviet state security organ in the years of the Great Patriotic War], \textit{Voprosy Istorii}, 1965, No. 5 (May), 20-39, 219-220.
\textsuperscript{158}John R. Deane, \textit{The Strange Alliance} (New York: Viking, 1947), 146-151, giving the only (inadvertently) early unclassified account of Bevan's mission to Moscow.
The summer 1944 offensive marked the next-to-highest level of Russian art in stratagem in World War II. Yet it merely shows how far behind the Britons and Germans the Russians then were in understanding this technique. For example, Colonel A. N. Shimansky proudly discloses that among several otherwise unidentified innovations was the use of: "reconnaissance in force not only in front areas involved in the offensive, but also in other contiguous strategic directions." But this "new element" in Soviet stratagem had already been standard practice in British, U.S., and German military deception operations in the First World War. Moreover, Shimansky uses this rather primitive historical case study to explicitly illustrate future means: "... why in order to achieve strategic surprise it [is] necessary to carry out a whole system of measures aimed at strategic camouflage and deception [strategicheskoi maskirovke i dezinformatsii]."

Thus, Shimansky unwittingly implies that current (1968) Soviet thinking on surprise and deception lagged behind that in, at least, the British and Israeli armies. Incidentally, this article cannot be dismissed as the idiosyncratic view of some uninformed minor officer. Colonel Shimansky, as a Candidate of Historical Sciences and one of the 15 members of the committee chaired by Marshal Sokolovsky that co-authored Military Strategy in 1962, would have full access to his subject. Soviet naiveté about stratagem is later seen in an otherwise excellent study of Anglo-American amphibious operations. A later article by the Commander of the Leningrad Military District did show, however, that Soviet military doctrine was finally beginning to understand that technological advances open up new opportunities for surprise and, by implication, deception.

If the Russians are indeed again as weak at stratagem as this limited public evidence indicates, it is seemingly a direct consequence of the dead hand of Stalin, which still restrains comprehensive rethinking about the broader topic of military surprise. At the beginning of this section it was noted that Stalin's solution to the intolerable embarrassment of the surprise of the German invasion in 1941 was the mindless evasion of re-categorizing surprise as a transitory factor. By making military doctrine a cosmetic mask for his "cult of personality," Stalin imposed a political barrier that prevented any reevaluation of doctrine during his life and has inhibited pragmatic or empirical reassessment since his death in 1953. Even the urgent Soviet search for doctrines appropriate to the unprecedented opportunities opened by missile-nuclear technology for surprise and preemption has had to proceed with wary attention to the day-to-day political vagaries of de-Stalinization.

The first attack on Stalin's doctrine of permanent-versus-transitory factors appeared six months after Stalin's death in the chief theoretical journal of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. It was an article by that confidential journal's editor, Major-General Talensky. Although this piece opened the debate in mild terms that merely qualified rather than overthrew Stalin's doctrine, it was an immediate sensation both because of

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159Colonel A. Shimansky, "O dostizhenii strategicheskoi vnezapnosti pri podgotovke letne-osennei kampanii 1944 goda" [About the achievement of strategic surprise in the preparation for the summer-fall campaign of 1944], Voenna-Istorichesky Zhurnal, 1968, No.6, pp.17-28.
162Major-General N. Talensky, ("On the Question of the Character of the Laws of Military Science") [in Russian], Voennaya Mysl, No.9 (Sep) 1953, as described in Dinerstein (1959), 9, 36-47, 168.
its high-level sponsorship and because it presented the first original thoughts on
Communist military theory to have come from any writer other than Stalin himself in the
previous 25 years. Because of the very way in which Stalin had formulated his doctrine,
the entire subsequent debate has necessarily-involved a reassessment of the role of
surprise. This was true even in Talensky's very general original piece. The ensuing
internal debate — conducted in limited-circulation journals — soon erupted in public
view through a series of articles in Red Star, the official Army newspaper.
Subsequently, with much disputatious vacillation, the debate progressed from
modifications of the Stalin doctrine to their eventual overthrow in 1955.163 The landmark
article supporting and enhancing the rediscovery of surprise was by Tank Marshal
Rotmistrov.164 Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" of 1956 merely dealt the coup de grâce
and brought this specific issue before the entire Communist Party membership. Since
then the occasional Soviet books and articles on surprise show an increasing
sophistication but still fall short of British or Israeli writings in their grasp of the
relationship between surprise and deception. Moreover, to a greater extent than even
American writers, they continue to be obsessed with the false notion that "security" — in
its narrow sense of secrecy — is the crucial factor in surprise.165

Then came the 1945 Manchurian Campaign. I argued in 1976 that knowledge of
the acquaintanceship network of an entire generation of Soviet senior military officers
could help us predict the types of strategic, operational, and tactical deceptions that they
would most likely try to use against their enemies and attempt to teach their allies,
including North Korea, Cuba, North Vietnam, and Iraq. These officers were the cohort of
men I called "The Manchurians". They were the Soviet commanders and staff officers of
the August 1945 Manchurian Campaign plus their later students and protégés. This
brief operation against the Japanese in Manchuria was the last campaign fought by the
Soviet Union in World War II. Given the great preponderance of Soviet strength against
the local Japanese forces the outcome was never in doubt. But victory came far faster
and with much lower casualties than even its most avid advocates had expected. It
proved to be the most sophisticated application of the principle of surprise-through-
deception ever undertaken by Soviet forces. This experience became a reputation-
maker for the entire group of Soviet commanders and officers involved, from the field
commander, Marshal Vasilevsky, down through all of his generals, and back to the
General Staff planners in Moscow. Consequently the "Manchurian Model" became the
prime how-to-do-it model for military victory for all Soviet officers’ schools, textbooks,
field manuals, and memoirs in the period 1960-1980.166

The successful Soviet surprise-through-deception in Czechoslovakia in 1968
proves that the ageing generation of Manchurians could still do an adequate job of

163 Dinerstein (1959), 49-51, 180-212.
164 Marshal of Tank Forces P. Rotmistrov, ("On the Role of Surprise in Contemporary War") [in
Russian], Voennaya Mysl, 1955, No.2 (Feb), as described in Dinerstein (1959), 181, 184-188.
165 For my detailed critique of this common myth see Whaley (1969), 194-200.
stratagem. But that may have been their “last hurrah” before retirement or death hooked them off the stage. The only subsequent major deception success of the General Staff seems to be the strategic surprise that began the Afghan War in 1979. Otherwise their subsequent 10-year performance in Afghanistan until their pull-out in 1992 was generally dismal. And their handling of the Chechen Revolt (1994-96 and since 1999) hasn’t been much better. Nor did the Soviet military advisers manage to instil any effective deception or counterdeception doctrine much less specific techniques with their client government in Egypt against Israel in 1956 and 1967. This seemingly abject failure of their military advisory missions to in any way prepare their Egyptian clients to anticipate much less even understand the stratagems played upon them by Israel in those two wars demonstrates an inability to teach counterdeception — which, in turn, implies an imperfect understanding of the matter.

And again the failure of the Soviet military advisors with their client state of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 suggests a similar inability to teach deception and counterdeception. The one exception was that the Russians managed to teach the Iraqi army their fairly advanced tactical camouflage and decoy techniques that greatly embarrassed the American and coalition forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

* * *

Finally, what of Soviet psychological warfare? Its general quality in World War II was rather crude, being geared more to postwar political power considerations in the recaptured Russian lands and the newly taken Eastern European states. The first decade of the Cold War saw a gradual rise in both the volume and sophistication of Soviet psychological ops applied to international politics. Then, in 1959, Soviet psywar and political deception planning and operations were combined and coordinated in the KGB’s newly created Disinformation Department under the clever and imaginative Major-General Ivan Agayants. Even so, as the former Deputy Director of the Czechoslovak Department D, Major Ladislav Bittman admits, these operations were marked by a very high proportion of aborts, failures, backfires, and expensive yet trivial practical jokes.

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169 Egyptian President Sadat’s subsequent successful strategic deception of Israeli Military Intelligence in the opening stroke of the 1973 Yom Kippur War was all his own idea.


Chapter 17) American Roller-coaster and the Missing Generation

At present, ... the United States seems to lack an intellectual, ethical, and institutional framework for understanding and undertaking deception operations on any significant scale against its adversaries.


Although the USA is a sub-culture within Western civilization, its deceptive practices deserve to be singled out for a special look. And not just because the parochial reason that majority of the readers of this study will be Americans, but because American attitudes toward and practices of deception represent a notably deviant model within the Western sphere. Its less than two and a half century history has been a roller-coaster of military deception usage — more so than that of its contemporary Chinese, Japanese, British, Russian, or Israeli counterparts. If we mentally chart the risings and fallings of American deceptive attitudes and practices in its 231-year history, we see more isolated blips and spikes than rising and falling curves. And we see an extraordinary recent generation gap among the deception and counterdeception specialists in the US intelligence community — a gap that is only now being corrected.

During America’s Revolutionary War (1775-83) the British commanders were uniformly unimaginative. Conversely, the American rebel’s Continental Army had some rather deceptive commanders, most notably General Washington. Deceptive throughout, he proved decisively so in his final war-winning deceptions for the Battle of Yorktown (1781). 173

American military commanders produced few battle-winning deception operations between the Revolutionary and Civil wars. But at least two were decisive. First was in the War of 1812 which Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson capped with the anachronistic but convincingly decisive Battle of New Orleans. The second was in 1836 during the Texas Revolution in which the small Texas Army under Gen. Sam Houston overwhelmed and completely destroyed the larger Mexican Army under Gen. Santa Ana in a surprise attack, just six weeks after the latter’s victory over the 400 brave but suicidal Texan defenders at the Alamo. However these two American commanders displayed more overall competence than any particular guile.

America’s Civil War (1861-1865) saw a substantial revival of military deception operations on both sides. Importantly, this was the first time that American military deceptions would have any influence on foreign doctrine. Thus we saw above how the British Army’s revival of interest in deception at the end of the 19th century owed much to study of the example of America’s “Stonewall” Jackson.

American command during the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902) was notably free of guile. It was only after two years and 6,000 American casualties that combat was virtually ended by a single deception operation. Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston was a local American commander when good HUMINT tipped off the current secret location of the movable rebel GHQ of Presidente Aguinaldo. By a brilliant deception operation, Funston personally led a team of 4 US officers (disguised as POWs) and 86 Filipino Maccabee soldiers (disguised as local Tagalogs) deep into rebel territory to surprise and capture Aguinaldo.

The belated entrance of the USA in World War 1917 was a slow learning experience in deception. The French and British taught the Americans the arts of camouflage and deception planning. These paid off handsomely during the decisive Battle of St.-Mihiel in September 1918.

I suspect that one reason the U.S. military so readily adopted "special plans" (the British cover name for deception) in WW II was that its Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was General George C. Marshall. As a young lieutenant-colonel on Pershing's staff in 1918, he'd designed the initial version of the successful "Belfort Ruse", which was crucial to setting the stage for the American victory in the Battle of St.-Mihiel.

However, American deception planning would continue until today to meet with occasional rejection, deep skepticism, and almost universal misunderstanding. In World War II for example, the JCS's favorable attitude was not in general shared by its Navy member nor by the U.S. Navy. Thus the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, penciled in on his rejection in 1943 of a study recommending that the U.S. build midget surprise-attack submarines the remark: "The element of surprise has been dissipated. — EJK." At that point, U.S. Navy policy on surprise was felt fulfilled by its large-scale harbor defense program, while its potential in offensive operations was overlooked in the confident reliance on its sheer numbers. Surprise and its tools were deemed "weapons of despair of the have-not nations, . . . not for us. For some, only a display of naked force could avenge the wounded pride of the Pearl Harbor "sneak attack." This negative attitude toward surprise and deception, connected with a simple misunderstanding of their nature and interrelationship, permeates the magnificent 15-volume semiofficial history of U.S. naval operations in World War II by Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison. For him, deception was seldom more than a comic interlude before the real business of battle.

The post-WW II era saw a noteworthy split between the American military and the intelligence communities in their attitudes toward and practice of deception, particularly toward the main enemy, the Soviet Union. The US military demobilized virtually its entire strategic and operational deception capabilities, keeping only some weak tactical doctrine and practice in the Air Force (electronic warfare ECM & ECCM), Navy (anti-submarine detection and evasion), and Army (tactical defensive camouflage). However, the US intelligence community, particularly the new CIA, continued and improved much of its deception tradecraft through its continuous active battle with their

Soviet counterparts. Indeed, unlike their military services and contrary to popular and media opinion, the US intel community generally proved itself a match throughout the Cold War against what we now know was a greatly over-rated, equally bureaucratized KGB.

Then came the Missing Generation, as some intelligencers call it. Anyone in the first five years of this millennium who sat in with any 20 to 100 person-group of American intelligence community (IC) analysts is apt to be struck by a curious generational gap. Almost everyone in these groups is either quite young (25-35) or somewhat weathered and grizzled (over 55). This is the cumulative effect of several successive jolts to the IC, particularly the CIA, that drastically shifted policy, budgetary, and organizational emphasis away from human intelligence (HUMINT) and toward technological intelligence. These jolts — the Angleton affair (1974), Church Committee (1976), Iran-Contra (1986), and the CIA’s own Smith Guidelines (1995) — each led to successively both cutting existing HUMINT sources and analysts and severely limiting recruitment of new ones.

A few efforts to bridge this generational gap have been attempted since 1979. These were mostly CIA, Scaife Foundation, or DOD-sponsored. Although all these projects showed promise, none succeeded in generating follow-ons. The most recent was attempted around the turn of the millennium by Roy Godson through his Washington, DC, based Cantril Group, but this was interrupted by the bureaucratic confusion following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the USA. Now, beginning in 2006, this largely US government outreach to American universities to stimulate studies on D&D has been renewed.

Chapter 18) Twenty-First Century Unlimited: Asymmetric Warfare Revisited

“It [the United States] can win [in Vietnam] if it deliberately de-escalates the firepower and meets the guerrillas on their own terms, in close combat, instead of alienating the entire population with indiscriminate artillery and airpower.”
— I. F. Stone, May 1967

The term “asymmetric warfare” was introduced recently (in the mid-1990s). It loosely characterizes various types of conflict where the opponents differ in one or more specified ways. Unfortunately US joint and service doctrines as well as a multitude of military writers fail to agree on its meaning, which they define in range from the simple weak-versus-strong hypothesis (Prof. T. V. Paul in 1994) to the far-fetched Gitmo prisoner terrorist suicide tactics notion (Rear Admiral Harry Harris in 2006). This muddled usage has rightly been deplored by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and US Army Major Stephen Pomper. I define asymmetric warfare here as either high tech versus low tech opponents or conventionally armed and trained forces versus unconventional forces. And unconventional forces cover an array from full-scale civil

Deception has never been the sole prerogative of just large nation-states. It operates in two modes — either Very Low Tech versus Very Low Tech or Very Low Tech vs High Tech.

That first category, namely VLT vs VLT, is the so-called “primitive” or tribal war that was the subject of Chapter 4. There we saw that the style of warfare common among Amerindian, African, Melanesian, and some other cultures often involved rather high levels of guile.

The second category is the one that pits a Very Low Tech force against a High or Very High Tech one. Recent and present examples include Taliban versus Russia, Hamas vs Israel, Chechen rebels vs Russia, Al Qaida versus USA, etc. In terms of time these ranged from brief periods like that of the Irgun and Lehi against the British and UN in Palestine (1940-48) that produced the state of Israel to the longest on-going revolutionary-terrorist struggle of all, that of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) versus Britain, which with several truces and cease-fires and truces, has raged for over two hundred years.177

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177The defining authority is J. Bowyer Bell. See particularly his The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice (New York: Knopf, 1971) and his five works listed below in the Bibliography.
PART TWO: LIMITATIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF DECEPTION

What are the main factors or circumstances that have influenced and appear to still affect the many changes in levels of guilefulness in the several cultures examined above — changes that are usually slow and almost unnoticed but sometimes sudden and dramatic? What are these limiting factors, these constraints and stimuli? I see four broad types: biological, cultural, institutional, and personal. While noting that there are significant overlaps among them, it is convenient to adopt these four in analyzing the great variability in deceptive practices.

Chapter 19) Biological Limitations: Nature & Nuture

Deception is just one of a set of strategies that increases an individual’s chances of survival and of transmitting its attributes to the next generation.

— Denis Owen, *Camouflage and Mimicry* (1980), 9

At least some parts of our ability to perceive and think are now known to be genetically or early-on “hot-wired” into fetal brains. But which faculties and how much of each is still unsure.178

Recent studies show that we’re born with brains already equipped with at least some primitive models of our three-dimensional environment. That is, we’re designed to deal with this specific physical universe rather than, say, mathematician Edwin Abbott’s amusing two-dimensional *Flatland*. We also come with some sense of number (specifically some ability to categorize and count objects), weak but functioning memories, some models for sociability such as selfishness and occasional cooperative altruism, and mechanisms for acquiring and using language. But not much more. The rest must be slowly acquired.

It was found in the 1960s-70s that the several ways our faces express the basic emotions (fear, disgust, happiness, and anger) are universal across cultures. This finding ran contrary to the then current assumption of most social scientists. But Silvan Tomkins (in 1962-63), Paul Ekman (since the late 1960s), Iraneus Eibl-Eibesfeldt (in 1970), Carroll Izard (in 1971), and Karl & Eleanor Heider (early 1970s) independently studied facial expressions of these basic emotions in separate cultures of the USA, Japan, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, among two culturally isolated tribes of New Guinea, and among at least four other groups. These studies agreed that these four general expressions of emotion are the same across these cultures when the person is alone. This is seemingly pure human nature. It is only when with another person that we control our facial expressions to conform with each culture’s mandate. That latter part is evidently environmental nurture.

Most relevant for understanding the abilities of humans to deceive and to detect deceptions, we depart the womb with some ability for inductive thought, including even

178This chapter is extensively discussed and documented in Whaley, *The Maverick Detective* (2006 draft).
some ability to detect persons who cheat on social contracts. This ability has been variously dubbed "reciprocal altruism", "reciprocity", and "social exchange".179

American biologist Robert Trivers has been doing research that extends the studies in the late 1970s on self-deception by psychiatrists Gur & Sacheim. He argues:180

With powers to deceive and to spot deception being improved by natural selection, a new kind of deception may be favored; self-deception. Self-deception renders the deception being practiced unconscious for the practitioner, thereby hiding from other individuals the subtle signs of self-knowledge that may give away the deception being practiced.

I believe this recent work on evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology is, after much floundering, misunderstanding, and moralistic or politically motivated counterattack, again on a fruitful track. Its theory is sensible and, while the data is still weak, most new findings tend to support it — and disconfirm the rear-guard arguments of such adamant critics as Jerry Fodor and Michel Morange.181 The latter are the "holists" who see an evolutionary development through genetics as highly complex. Their opponents are the "reductionists" who propose simpler processes. While the emerging evidence clearly sides with the reductionists, the best theory will almost certainly have to concede some points to the holists. A final resolution of this dilemma will be crucial for determining some of the central issues of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Deception/Counterdeception Theory. Fortunately, whichever side will triumph, we don't have to accept either the denunciations of the Fodors or the cunning theories and limited confirming data of the likes of Robert Trivers, Roger Shepard, Leda Cosmides, Chris Knight, Jean-Louis Dessalles, Marc Hauser, Steven Pinker, Karen Wynn, and Geoffrey Miller. We can (at least temporarily) bypass both parties in our continuing efforts to study modern humans. Whatever the balance between nature and nurture, between genetics and environment, building on our primitive cognitive capabilities, we begin as children to learn various specific techniques of detection.

At this point we have all the biology, all the "nature", we're going to get. From here on it's all "nurture" — that overlaying and interacting mix of cultural, social, and psychological influences.

179Gregory R. Bock and Gail Cardew (editors), Characterizing Human Psychological Adaptations (Chichester, England: Wiley, 1997), particularly the papers by Roger Shepard, Geoffrey Miller, Cosmides & Tooby, and Marc Hauser.
Chapter 20) Cultural Limitations: Philosophies, Religions, & Languages

That which is honourable in one age of society is repudiated in another, as, for instance, the practice of duelling.
— Col. Charles Graham, *Military Ends and Moral Means* (1864), 166

It is naive to assume that the traditional religion or ethos of a country is necessarily a significant influence in the daily lives of its people.
— Prof. Leonard Feinberg, *Asian Laughter* (1971), 4

In the preceding chapters, several specific factors have been suggested to account for the varying use of force or guile in particular cases. The next three chapters discuss various general cultural, institutional, and psychological factors that seem to apply, albeit in varying degrees, to all cases regardless of time or culture.

Boorman and Pye and Leites have argued strong cases for fundamental cultural differences in the Chinese and Western viewpoints on stratagem. And Leon Gouré has made the same point about Soviet and American styles. Indeed, Pye and Leites (1970: p.1) frankly acknowledge that their rhetorically "unqualified" statements should be read as only "tentative", without, however, mentioning the counter-evidence. Boorman, too, once said to me as much about his own conclusions about Chinese and Western deception. Their caveats apply also to my cavalier assertions about Byzantine, Scythian, Indian, Japanese, Russian, and tribal deception. I partially accept their arguments and have suggested additional supporting evidence. However, their case for these culture-based stereotypes isn't ironclad.

In order to believe that deceptions can work, one must hold the prior belief that it is possible somehow to influence the expectations of other persons, to induce them to perceive a falsely contrived picture of reality and accept it as true. This means that one's mind or thoughts must be able to somehow sense or get inside another's mind or thoughts with its special preconceptions, expectations, fears, and values. In short, effective deception requires acceptance of such psychological concepts as perception and empathy. Although "psychology" as both a word and a special field of study is recent (17th century) coinage, most of its concepts such as mind, perception, empathy, and sympathy, were known to the ancients. In the West they were subsumed under philosophy, rhetoric, and ethics; in China under physical studies (*wu li*) and moral philosophy.\(^\text{182}\)

The language and the prevailing philosophy of any group will impose certain basic constraints on the way it perceives and interacts with its environment — with one another, with other groups and individuals, and with nature. Mindful of the caveats about pressing psycholinguistics too far, and aware that a culture's classic scholarly philosophy may not be the same as the set of beliefs by which either its politicians or

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generals operate, I still presume that a group’s language and philosophy will affect the degree and manner to which it accepts and practices deception.

Take the concept "to think." For most Westerners, in most of its meanings, "think" (German denken, French penser, Russian dumat, etc.) refers to a process that takes place in the mind, within oneself, locked inside one's own bony skull.\textsuperscript{183} It is conceived as an individual, subjective, and very personal process, one quite divorced from the direct perception of the objects of thought. This frame of mind is useless for getting inside the head of another to perceive or sense the other's thoughts, to empathize, to anticipate, or to deceive.

Of course, "think" can also take the meaning of "perceive" (deem, consider; meinen, estimer, etc.), which does imply a mind in partial "touch" with another mind, person, or object. Hence their languages offer Westerners the conceptual option of the sort of empathic process that makes deception possible. However, the fact that most Western planners weave their schemes without reference to the thoughts of competing planners, suggests that they may too easily adopt and then get stuck with a mind-set limited to mirror-imaging and excluding empathy.

The Chinese, on the other hand, are differently directed or biased by their language. For them "to think" (hsiang or k'an) necessarily implies or connotes "perceive."\textsuperscript{184} The thoughts and intentions of another may be deliberately veiled but they are not, in principle, unknowable. Recall Sun Tzu’s prime maxim: “If you know yourself and know your enemy, in a hundred battles you will savor a hundred victories.”

* * *

Natural philosophy (physics, astronomy, etc.) becomes relevant to moral philosophy (politics, sociology, anthropology, psychology) whenever social and political philosophers take the models or paradigms of natural philosophy and apply them to human affairs. In practice, the interconnections and overlappings of these two concepts are quite intimate, often even fused within individual philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Lao Tzu, and the Buddha, who portrayed nature and man as intertwined parts of a Whole.

I suspect a major reason why Sun Tzu’s psychologically sophisticated view of stratagem could emerge nearly full-blown in China in the minus-4th century, and receive largely unchallenged acceptance and even reinforcement throughout most of Chinese history is that all Chinese philosophers and scholars are more-or-less predisposed to field theories. Field concepts come easily to Chinese because, as Needham demonstrated, organic materialism is the universal concept underlying and often pervading all indigenous traditional Chinese schools of thought from the divinations of the I Ching through Taoism and even Confucianism. This organic view insists that each phenomenon is connected with every other one, vibrating harmonically throughout the

\textsuperscript{183}See, particularly, the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Edition) under "think."

\textsuperscript{184}Pye and Leites (1970), 5, citing Arthur Waley.
universe like some cosmic wind-organ.\textsuperscript{185} Thus the Chinese could closely observe the phenomenon of magnetism (polarity, induction, remanence, and declination) and perfect the magnetic compass itself, centuries before Europeans noticed even simple polarity.\textsuperscript{186}

Of course, while this organic view does not dominate the West, it isn't unknown there. For example, it comprises psychiatrist Jung's notions of both the "common unconscious" and "simultaneity," the last being influenced in part from Jung's reading of the \textit{I Ching}. Indeed, it is the Chinese — particularly through the 1950 Wilhelm/Baynes/Jung edition of the \textit{I Ching} — who have supplied the current simultaneity rationale for the Western (or Westernized) versions of fortune telling such as astrology, palmistry, and the Tarot. And the natural sciences — specifically physics — do incorporate the crucial concept of "action at a distance."\textsuperscript{187} Also, Mesmer's abortive 18th century theory of "animal magnetism" required a field concept. And, finally, the bulk of theorizing about parapsychology draws variously on field or related action-at-a-distance concepts.\textsuperscript{188}

All this, of course, is the basis of Simultaneity Theory, that popular fad which has since the 1950s enthralled many Western philosophers and pseudo-philosophers, leading them even further astray of verifiable evidence than it has their Chinese counterparts. Thus, although Simultaneity Theory as an action-at-a-distance model proved very fruitful for Chinese theorizing about and applications of magnetism (as noted above), it has so far been experimentally unhelpful for explaining either acupuncture or \textit{feng-shui}. (See sidebar)

Consequently, Westerners can, in principle, shop freely among natural philosophies that variously allow or prohibit the possibility of one mind somehow sensing another. Nevertheless, Western (and Islamic) philosophy has tended far more than
Far Eastern to be enthralled by atomism, the theory that the universe is composed of individual, indivisible, and indestructible units of matter that can interact in only one way: by simple ballistic contact, the only effect being to transfer motion. This notion of discreet, particulate materialism, insistent that "matter cannot act where it is not," dominated the classical Greco-Roman world from its invention in the minus 5th century by Leucippus and Democritus through its advocacy by the Epicureans. Atomism was repudiated throughout the early Christian centuries, only to be resurrected in 17th century Europe by Descartes and Boyle.\footnote{Joshua C. Gregory, \textit{A Short History of Atomism} (London: Black, 1931).}

Atomism, translated into political philosophy, gives us the astonishing concept of atomistic individualism. Thus, for Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and Smith, each person is a self-sufficient, independent mental substance, a splendid isolate whose only interaction with other persons is purely, impersonally, ballistic.\footnote{See Joan A. Rothschild, "The Search for a Humanistic Political Theory in America: Toward a Theory of Social Structures and Political Community," \textit{Logos Report}, Vol. 1, No.6 (October/November 1974), 1-20.} I think it implausible that anyone who acts in accord with such a belief system could consciously plan deceptions, as they would not be thought to have any possible effect on another person.

There is, however, another old Western philosophical position that views the person not as an atomistic individual but as a "political (or social) animal" whose every action, belief, and thought is inextricably and organizationally intertwined with other humans (and with nature itself).\footnote{F. S. C Northrup, \textit{The Meeting of East and West} (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 88, 173, and throughout.} This view, epitomized by Aristotle and Hooker, while it does not necessarily condone manipulative deception, at least makes it a feasible, rational, and ostensibly effective tactic.

On the other hand, the organistic view of physical nature that dominates traditional Chinese philosophers links directly with their equally organistic view of human nature. Confucianism, Mohism, Legalism, even the somewhat individualistic Taoism, all share the premise that persons can be socially controlled and educated by others, that is, cognitively manipulated — even deceived.\footnote{See, for example, Donald J. Munro, \textit{The Concept of Man in Early China} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).} Chinese who operate interpersonally and politically on this premise may, of course, deplore and reject deception on ethical grounds; but they will appreciate that is an entirely feasible tactic.

criticism now self-labeled variously Postmodern, Poststructural, Deconstructionist, Semiotic, New Historicist, Social Constructionist, Science Studies, or just plain Theory. These recent notions are direct descendants of the anti-science faction in what used to be called the Two Cultures (coined in 1958 by C. P. Snow) and, later, the Culture Wars, and now, since 1995 when Andrew Ross coined the term, the Science Wars.

In truth the neo-Relativists are neither as original nor as profound as they pretend. Indeed, they stand at the back of a long queue that can be traced back through time and cultures to the classical Greek Sophists — those rhetoricians who believed that there are no "truths", only more-or-less persuasive arguments. The Zen of relativism is irrelevant to the detective except when relaxing in the fictional alternate Wonderlands of writers like Chuang Tzu, William Gibson, Don DeLillo, or Lewis Carroll.

Chapter 21) Social Limitations: Ethical Codes and Political Needs

The first method of estimating the intelligence of a ruler is to look at the men he has around him.
— Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1513)

Just as deception has broad and vague psycho-cultural constraints and stimuli imposed by language and philosophy, it also has much narrower and immediate social and institutional constraints supplied by rules and the nature of palace and bureaucratic politics.

This study is limited to the values, beliefs, opinions, and mores of the political and social elites. Those of the general populace have been by-passed for two reasons. First, because except in times of great social rebellion, the elites can enforce conformity through the coercive organs of the state such as the police and military. Second, because the surviving documentary evidence tends to be elite history, it leaves vast gaps in the historical record of ordinary people. At best we get only occasional detailed glimpses of them. Examples: In much of Chinese folklore.\(^{194}\) And in German popular novels since 1669 in Hans Jakob Grimmelshausen.\(^{195}\) It has only been in modern times (since around 1800) when literacy has trickled down into the masses that any considerable intermingling across class boundaries has occurred and only quite recently through mass media and the Internet that it has become common in many societies.

The *practice* of deception is, like any other type of public behavior, subject to the prevailing cultural mores. Deceptive behavior such as lying (in verbal communication), cheating (by overt acts), bluffing, practical joking, etc., will be noted or unnoticed, approved or disapproved, rewarded or punished by every social group at different times, in different ways, and under various specific circumstances. Some examples: The type of cheap "coffee-house" ruses in chess such as seating one's opponent facing the sun is frowned upon in chess circles today but in the 1500s was openly advocated by the Spanish Bishop Ruy Lopez. Cheating at poker is discouraged by verbal admonition,

\(^{194}\)Eberhard (1965), xxxiii-xxxviii; and Eberhard (1967), 5.
\(^{195}\)Speier (1969), 221-234.
social ostracism, or sudden death, depending on group custom. And West Point cadets are required to betray their comrades for cheating in their academic study but not on the playing field where all are carefully coached in the devious tactics of football. The same constraint applies to all deceptive communications and acts in politics and its most coercive extension, war.

Is deception ethical? Is it acceptable in politics? Or in war?

The ethical problem of deception has been recognized since antiquity. Even the ancient Indians who excelled in setting and practicing "humane ideals of warfare" could, as noted earlier, argue both sides of the case. And, of course, both Xenophon and Sun Tzu insisted on the expedient use of deception. Aristotle (384 BC-322 BC) detested tyrannical government but was pragmatic about it. In addition to his many personal accommodations to tyranny, his *Politics* frankly advises the tyrant who would avoid provoking his own early overthrow to practice every dissimulation to mask the darker realities of his rule. Even Thomas Aquinas, writing in the somewhat otherworldly 13th century and affirming the Biblical commandment against shedding blood, could still excuse a narrowly defined use of deception in the conduct of "just" wars. Erasmus, in his advice to princes published in 1516, an otherwise pious and unrealistic work, grudgingly follows Aristotle in allowing the Prince certain small deceits for the "good" of the people and to evade public responsibility for "odious duties" by delegating them to others.

As we should expect, Machiavelli urged the view that: "Although deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in the conduct of war it is laudable and honorable; and a commander who vanquishes an enemy by stratagem is equally praised with one who gains victory by force." This, however, was a casuistical argument, as it ran counter to the *professed* (if seldom practiced) ethic of his own time.

In general, while all major occidental and oriental cultures assume stratagem to be somehow immoral, none have unilaterally forsworn it. Sheer expediency has always proved sufficient excuse, if not justification. The only cases where I have found stratagem banned are those involving tacit bilateral arms control of the type styled "rules of chivalry," specifically in the Spring and Autumn period in ancient China, the later Vedic Age in ancient India, and medieval Europe, and early feudal Japan.

A detailed argument about deception is given by Milton in his heretical and suppressed *The Christian Doctrine*. He concluded by cautioning that falsehood should be defined in a specially qualified manner: "Falsehood is incurred when any one, from a dishonest motive, either perverts the truth, or utters what is false to one to whom it is his

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197 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II, ii, 40 (*de bello*), article 3. The saint cites both Augustine and Frontinus.
199 Machiavelli, *Discourses*, XL.
200 Gilbert (1968), 118-126.
duty to speak the truth.” Among a number of other real situations, Milton specifically applied his argument to deception in war:

> It is better therefore to say that stratagems, though coupled with falsehood, are lawful for the cause above assigned, namely, that where we are not under an obligation to speak the truth, there can be no reason why we should not, when occasion requires it, utter even what is false; nor do I perceive why this should be more allowable in war than in peace, especially in cases where, by an honest and beneficial kind of falsehood, we may be enabled to avert injury or danger from ourselves or our neighbor.

Milton’s argument may seem a bit self-serving to those who recall that, among other accomplishments, he was then serving Cromwell as chief propaganda writer.

Thus, with notable exceptions, the weight of philosophical and religious authority excuses deception in politics and justifies it in warfare. However we judge the merits of the case, the fact that deception has been the subject of extended debate has, I suspect, had one significant consequence for its practice. Labeled as somehow evil, disreputable, or cowardly, it is understandable that officers nurtured on the 19th century code of the gentleman would feel uneasy in using deception on the field of battle. Certainly, the tendency in the 19th and 20th centuries has been for the great majority of professional soldiers to either reject stratagem entirely or to avoid it by passing such an "unsoldierly" task to the limbo of the secret services along with psychological warfare, covert operations, and such similar sinister arts. While there are some rational if moot arguments for placing deception planning and, particularly, operations under the intelligence (or counterespionage) staffs, I suspect that this psychological factor has been at least as effective in assuring that placement. Moreover, it has almost certainly inhibited the effective integration of stratagem with routine operations planning. For example, this might well prove to be an unconscious contributing factor in the slow and still incomplete adoption of deception in U.S. military doctrine.

Notwithstanding the above arguments, if we assume that deception is an undesirable aspect of war, are any control measures possible? In other words, could deception be included in arms control or disarmament proposals as other than the subject of pious injunctions? An answer is not self-evident. However, we know from history that the deliberate suspension of the use of stratagem is indeed possible. Thus it was voluntarily foresworn during particular periods in ancient India and China, during the Middle Ages in Europe, and in early feudal Japan. The rarity of these cases does, however, strongly suggest that the conditions in which stratagem can be controlled may be very closely circumscribed. Moreover, all known cases involved control through general acceptance of a code of chivalry. This suggests that the conditions for constraining deception require a distinctive pattern of social interaction, one involving

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understood obligations and trust to a degree not present in our time — even within nations much less between them.\textsuperscript{202}

Many of these values and customs also became codified in law, both national and international. Many countries legislate against various deceptive practices in politics (as well as in commerce and everyday life). Such laws ostensibly protect either the prevailing social values or some democratic or egalitarian process. However, as power is unequally distributed among political groups and as governments tend to suppress politics,\textsuperscript{202} the objective effect of such legislation can be prejudicial to those "out" factions whose political power rests more on brains than brawn. In sum, the government — any government — has an unequally powerful voice in defining morality, justice, and political crimes.\textsuperscript{204}

Is deception in war legal? In general, yes. But, as the laws of nations have developed in accord with the professed theological and secular standards of successive ages, the legal status of stratagem has tended to reflect the vagaries of its shifting ethical status.

International law may be traced back into the prehistory of all Occidental and Oriental civilizations, and from that period forward it has supplied the desired pragmatic, moral, and religious justifications or excuses for both the initiation and the specific conduct of war. Thus even the uncompromising pacifism of the early Christian Church yielded as soon as it became joined to secular power. Wars were "just" or "unjust," but, somehow, expediency almost always prevailed in labeling one's own war as "just," although Machiavelli was the first to baldly declare that "that war is just which is necessary."

When during the 1500s international law became distinguished from canon law, military stratagem received legal acceptance, an acceptance that has remained in unbroken effect ever since. The man who bridged these two legal traditions, codifying the old while opening a cautious way toward the new, was Pierino Belli. In his \textit{De Re Militari et de Bello} of 1563 Belli stated the general principle:\textsuperscript{205}

The law of nations requires that pledges be not violated, and that agreements made even with the enemy be carried out . . . . But deceptions which involve no treachery may rightly and properly be employed. They are called 'stratagems'.... With wit and arms, then, war

\textsuperscript{202}However, some remarkable local or brief periods of accommodation have sometimes been reached between enemies even during modern war. For example, the substantial chivalry in the Western Desert in WW II. See Desmond Young, \textit{Rommel} (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), 126-138.

\textsuperscript{203}Also between the Chinese Nationalist guerrillas and local Japanese garrison troops, and in the first two years of World War I between the German and Allied airmen.


should be waged against the enemy — and with wiles too, if they involve no wrong or treachery (for in these there is no room for valour or glory).

Belli’s formulation was basically accepted by both Gentili (1589)\textsuperscript{206} and Grotius (1625),\textsuperscript{207} the two Protestant founders of modern international law, that is international law detached from its previous theological premises and amalgamated with the \textit{ius gentium}.

Although Grotius owed his escape in 1621 from life imprisonment to a ruse engineered by his intelligent and courageous wife, he deemed deceptions to be morally wrong but conceded their legal permissibility. Thus he wrote:\textsuperscript{208}

\begin{quote}
\ldots ruses which do not involve breach of faith are held to be permissible. \\
\ldots In truth the law of nations begins to wink at these frequent minor wrongs, just as municipal laws of harlotry and usury.
\end{quote}

Grotius truly sensed the trend: the "wink" has since been codified.

International law does — and also since antiquity — outlaw surprise attack in the initiation of war, requiring explicit declaration of war. This legal exception to stratagem applies only to the interface between peace and war and is presumably derived from the circumstance that a breach of diplomatic faith — implied if not actually explicit — is inevitably involved, as in 1941 alone with both Germany’s surprise invasion of the Soviet Union and Japan’s surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor and Singapore.

It is curious, but typical of the not infrequent discontinuities in ostensibly closely related areas of knowledge,\textsuperscript{209} that, prior to the 1970s, while the tightly censored British and American official military histories commonly concealed the very existence of deception from peacetime soldiers and civilians alike, the unclassified publications and manuals of Judge Advocates General and the texts of international lawyers blurted the essence of stratagem to their specialized audiences — even in wartime. For example, the official French military manual of military law published in 1862 included a detailed chapter on ruses.\textsuperscript{210} And even after the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 declared

\begin{thefootnote}
\textsuperscript{206}Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), \textit{De Iuri Belli Libri Tres}, Vol.2 (English translation, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933), pp.16a, 40a, and Book II, Chapters III, IV, and V (pp.142-154). The section incorporating stratagem was originally published in 1589.
\textsuperscript{208}Grotius, Vol.2 (1925 ed.), 662.
\textsuperscript{210}Manuel de Droit International à l'usage des officiers (1862), 18 ff. This French official manual reportedly contains a detailed chapter on ruses.
\end{thefootnote}
that "Ruses of war . . . are considered permissible,"211 all international law textbooks and service field manuals have not only reiterated this permission but publicized in rather rich array the specific types (and purposes) of deception operations used. For example, as early as 1912, the official British manual spelled out the "legitimate ruses".212

. . . surprises; ambushes; feigning attacks, retreats or flights; simulating quiet and inactivity; giving large outposts or a strong advanced guard to a small force; constructing works, bridges, etc., which it is not intended to use; transmitting bogus signal and telegraph messages, and sending bogus despatches and newspapers with a view to their being intercepted by the enemy; lighting camp fires where there are no troops; making use of the enemy's signals, bugle and trumpet calls, watchwords and words of command; pretending to communicate with troops or reinforcements which have no existence; moving landmarks; putting up dummy guns or laying dummy mines; removing badges from uniforms; clothing the men of a single unit in the uniform of several different units, so that prisoners and dead may give the idea of a large force.

Although this suggestive catalogue is paraphrased in the subsequent British and American texts,213 the planning staffs of World War II and since have taken no more inspiration from these texts than did the staffs in the Great War. Yet, as one inter-war legal authority observed, "To prohibit [deception] would be to arrest progress and to favor mere brawn at the expense of brains."214

Regardless of the vague ethical and more explicit legal limits, the pressing needs of palace and bureaucratic politics will often push practice beyond these limits. Their nature encourages high levels of guile as seniors and juniors and equals struggle to enhance or protect their individual shares of political power. And, as political power is the power to set priorities and allocate all other types of power, a finite proportion is at stake, making it a zero-sum game.

At the level of personal and clique competition there seems little to distinguish the guilefulness of the palace guard and the bureaucrats except that resort to overt violence such as assassination is more common in the "palace," while provocation, blackmail, and discrediting are more common within the subordinate administrative echelons. This difference in choice of means reflects, I suggest, only the obvious difference in the rules of succession for these two types of office. Thus a throne or dictatorship can be obtained by a successful assassination or coup; but a U.S. undersecretariat of State, to take the example of Sumner Welles driven from office in 1943, can much more safely and easily be made vacant by shoddy scandal-mongering.

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213 See, for example, War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington: G.P.O., 1914), Chapter 6, Section 2 ("Stratagems"), 60-62; and The War Office, The Law of War on Land (London: H.M.S.O., 1958), Chapter 8 ("Stratagems and Ruses"), 101-104.
There is, however, one profound difference in guilefulness between the "palace" and the bureaus. Because the "palace" (Cabinet, Politburo, White House, etc.) is the highest echelon for controlling political power in general, its real and immediate concern is political power per se. Consequently there is little or no discrepancy between the real goals of the palace office-holders and their public functioning. (Their professed goals may, of course, be less than candid.) This is not true of the "bureaus" such as the Foreign Office, the Intelligence Service, the Army, etc. In their case a very great discrepancy usually exists between their professed and real goals or functions. For example, the ostensible goal or mission of military staffs to prepare for and wage war conflicts sharply with what often (and, given enough time, inevitably) becomes its real (or, at least, primary) mission of preserving and enhancing its own parochial privileges.215

This is why input-output analyses based only on professed goals usually make such organizations appear grossly inefficient or even dysfunctional; when, in fact, they are often quite efficient at pursuing their real goals. For our purpose here, the consequence is that high levels of guile can characterize the bureaucratic politics of a diplomatic, military, or intelligence service without necessarily (or even usually) being mirrored in its ostensible mission of negotiating to best advantage, fighting battles, or interpreting information.

Chapter 22) Personal Psychological Limitations: Machiavellians or Dupes

The first principle is that you must not fool yourself — and you are the easiest person to fool.
—Richard Feynman, master safe-cracker, world-class detective, & Nobel Prize physicist, “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman!” (1985), 343

Although this chapter focuses on the personal qualities of individuals that set limits on deceptive practices, this introductory paragraph applies almost equally to the social and cultural factors. Consider the following famous quotation:

“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

Almost everyone assumes this famous quotation applies to political power. And many even know it was coined by Lord Acton (in a letter written on 5 April 1887 to an Anglican apologist for the Borgia popes). But few know the surprising back-story. Baron Acton was a Roman Catholic lord in a country that was officially Protestant. A devout but independently minded Catholic, he’d openly opposed the First Vatican Council’s promulgation in 1870 of the dogma of papal infallibility. Although the context of Acton’s words had addressed a specific internal political problem within his Church, it’s clear from further comments in this letter and other writings that he truly believed that power

215The example of conflicting goals among the several former Soviet Intelligence services is in Barton Whaley. Soviet Clandestine Communication Nets (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, MIT, 1969), 37-40.
tends to corrupt all institutions and the individuals who wield power within those institutions. And he opposed the tyranny that power inevitably leads to whether, as he wrote, in "the reign of race over race, of faith over faith, of class over class." And, I presume, of individual over individual.216

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I argued above that the dramatic drop in Western military deception during the 19th century was largely due to the Romantic redefinition of the nature of the hero — an inhibiting factor that still infects the practice of deception by many Westerners. I want now to generalize further. After all, the notion of the Hero as an ideal to be followed isn’t just a Western one. The Greeks and the Norse had their heroes; the Confucian Chinese had their ideal officials, Christians have their saints, etc., etc. Consequently, these various specific images of heroes (and villains and fools) will constrain or limit all cultures’, groups’, or individuals' definitions of characteristics like deception, sincerity, virtue, bravery, etc.

The most important single clue to individuals' predispositions to deceptive behavior is perhaps to be inferred from their role-models, that is, those person upon whom they pattern themselves, whether parents, friends, colleagues, celebrities, cultures heroes, or fictional paragons of virtue. In short, if I know your heroes (and villains and fools), I will know the types of behavior you will strongly approve, disapprove, or merely find neutral or personally irrelevant; and I can then make some informed guesses about your own behavior. This, of course, oversimplifies the very complicated question of the meld — often a blend of contradictions — among personal attitudes, cultural norms, and actual behavior. These matters are studied in vivo, in real life, by various social-psychological and survey research methods. But we need some technique to analyze the psychology of persons (and groups) in earlier eras as well as the present one. The technique of psycho-biography is one example, but this modish approach should, if at all, be narrowly limited to those few historical persons for whom sufficient specific types of information are available.217

Another and more widely applicable technique depends on popular literature and folklore. This is a rich lode for ethno-historians, because the data is available for most cultures through most historical periods. Consider proverbs. We would be wise to suspect low cunning in the groups and individuals who quote the Arab folk advice to "Kiss the hand you cannot cut off."

Similarly, we can learn much from plays that treat of deception, self-deception, and gullibility like Machiavelli's Mandragola, Shakespeare's Othello, O'Neill's The Iceman Cometh, Hemingway's The Fifth Column, Shaw's Caesar and Cleopatra, or Dürrenmatt's The Physicists. From such works we gain insight not only about the

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authors’ attitudes toward personal and social control but also about these attitudes in their audiences and critics from first performance till today. The characters of fiction are all potential role-models to be accepted in whole or in part or rejected: Othello or Iago, Juliet or Portia, Horatio Alger or Clovis Sangrail, Lady Chatterley or Mrs. Peel, James Bond or the Scarlet Pimpernel. The same choices apply to the larger-than-life parts created by certain real people: Marilyn Monroe or Virginia Wolff, Hemingway or W. C. Fields, or the smaller-than-life American political “dirty tricks” of Dick Tuck for the Democrats or G. Gordon Libby for a Republican president.

Heroes, villains, and fools are not just simple models of the good, the bad, and the comic. Each model embodies a more-or-less complex blend of characteristics, a blend that will vary with culture, group, and individual. Each culture assigns different blends of characteristics to each model. And those blends may change across time in each culture, as in the West with the godlike Greek heroes, the humanistic Elizabethan ones, the Romantic heroes of the 19th century, the recent so-called anti-hero, or the currently fashionable all-are-equal Postmodern relativism.218

Within any culture, its component groups may each have its own appropriately specialized role-models. Thus Confucius and Tseng Kuo-fan are heroes to Chinese traditionalists but villains to the revolutionaries.219 Similarly Osama bin Laden is simultaneously brave hero to millions of Islamicists and cowardly villain to most others. Even individuals have some choice in taking personal models, within the narrow limits set by their own groups and times and the broader ones of their over-looming culture.

We can find the specific personal characteristics of force and guile distributed in all their possible combinations among heroes, villains, and even fools. Thus, for hero figures, Robin Hood and Chu-ko Liang were both wily and physically strong, Jesus and Joan of Arc were neither, Sherlock Holmes and Birbal work only by their wits, while Sir Galahad and Lord Greystoke have only brawn.

Even the great Fools of literature and folklore teach us something about contemporary attitudes. Of course, we know we are not expected to imitate them, for they are never presented as paragons either to emulate (as with heroes) or hate (as with villains). The proper functions of Fools are at once more obvious and far more subtle. Their ostensible function is to give comic release from the serious business of an oppressive life. But their deeper purpose is subversive, subversive in all its most profound psychological, social, and political senses. Thus, Till Eulenspiegel confronts the pompous; Felix Krull unmasks the pretentious; the Good Soldier Švejk confounds the authorities; and honest Old Falstaff, by his own bawdy name, twice puns his mocking


contempt for those who equate manliness with heroic display on battlegrounds of either war or sex.\footnote{See, importantly, Hans Speier, \textit{Force and Folly} (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 189-323.}

Fools, satirists, and fictional tricksters, from Hermes through Buster Keaton and Tom Lehrer to Addie Pray, all combat the coercive authority of the powerful and do so with guile — even though the sophisticated authors must often speak through a "naive" fiction. This artful art is found in varying styles and degrees in all cultures.\footnote{See, for examples, Lewis Hyde, \textit{Trickster Makes This World: Mischief, Myth, and Art} (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1988); Leonard Feinberg (editor), \textit{Asian Laughter: An Anthology of Oriental Satire and Humor} (New York: Weatherhill, 1971), 3-15; and Paul Radin, \textit{The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology} (New York: Greenwood Press, 1956).}

Humor turns on the incongruity between reality and sham; the joke is sprung in that moment of creative insight when the audience is tricked into confronting the truth when it had expected the conventional lie. But this brings us back full circle to deception, for — as Dr. R. V. Jones, the chief deception planner for the British Air Ministry in World War II, first noted — the same manipulation of incongruities that constitute both the joke and scientific insight also comprise the planning of deception.\footnote{Professor R. V. Jones, "The Theory of Practical Joking — Its Relevance to Physics," \textit{Bulletin of the Institute of Physics} (London), June 1957, 193-201.}

The following anecdote serves both to illustrate the value of popular literature (in this case an epigram) in measuring guileful attitudes and as a bridge to the concluding topic in this section on psychological aspects of deception. Phineas T. Barnum supposedly said "There's a sucker born every minute." Richard Christie, professor of social psychology at Columbia University, expected this prototypically cynical epigram would serve in his questionnaire to discriminate nicely between persons who were highly manipulative and those who were not. But the Barnum item failed the test. Puzzled, Christie asked his subjects why they had overwhelmingly disagreed with the question. The guileless, as expected, had disagreed on ethical grounds; but the guileful had disagreed with the question as phrased because "There's at least one sucker born every minute."

Since 1954 Christie and his students and colleagues have produced over 40 experimental studies of the psychological and social characteristics of persons who expect and use guile, deceit, and opportunism in their interpersonal relations. Their test instrument is, appropriately, called the Machiavellian (Mach) Scale. Indeed the test questions are based mainly on Machiavelli's own aphorisms about human nature and winning tactics.\footnote{Richard Christie and Florence L. Geis, \textit{Studies in Machiavellianism} (New York: Academic Press, 1970); Richard Christie and Florence Geis, "Some Consequences of Taking Machiavelli Seriously," in E. F. Borgata and W. W. Lambert (eds.), \textit{Handbook of Personality Theory and Research} (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), 959-973; and Stanley S. Guterman, \textit{The Machiavellians: A Social Psychological Study of Moral Character and Organizational Milieu} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).} Perhaps the most relevant of the Christie group's many suggestive findings is that their Machiavellians (high Machs) are not merely believers in the gullibility of others, nor themselves simply willing to practice guile, but are, in fact, generally rather successful at manipulating others either for personal gain in competitive
situations or at taking control in cooperative groups. To attain these goals they are willing to bluff and deceive, alert to possibilities for such manipulation, innovative in devising ruses, willing to take risks if these seem to have rational payoffs, willing to seize the initiative, but cooperative when mutual gain is apparent.

The continuing effort to control one’s own life necessarily involves interplay with the similar efforts of all others who share or impinge upon one’s own environment. Our social-psychological efforts can involve cooperation toward shared goals and interests in which candor and directness will be the preferred modes of communication. And they can involve more-or-less honest persuasion or negotiations in fairly good faith where compromise and accommodation can mutually satisfy. Or they can involve the use of power to compel or induce compliance in cases where immediate interests or basic goals are perceived to be in conflict. It’s in these competitive areas of interaction that human power relationships emerge in their most naked form. The two main means of power are, as we have seen, the direct use or threat of force to compel compliance and the indirect use of guile to induce it. Furthermore, most competitive situations will be marked by differences in the power available to the antagonists. Although even those who command the greater amount of force may supplement this with guile, the weaker have no choice but to resort to guile. Plutarch truly said: “Where the lion’s skin will not reach, you must patch it out with the fox’s.”

In competitive struggle between the weak and the strong, the weak often learn to be guileful. The child practices and quickly learns simple deceptions in its unequal efforts with parents and teachers. The so-called juvenile delinquent becomes impressively adept at "conning" institutional guards and other "non-delinquent" persons. Persons raised in urban environments strongly tend to Machiavellianism in their attitudes and behavior, perhaps because of the relatively greater threat that cities pose to individual psychic, economic, and even sheer physical survival. Adults unconsciously emphasize "misrepresentation" in their elaborate daily role-playing. Hypocrisy becomes a way of life.

Although little, if any, systematic study exists to show if these highly personal skills are the same ones used by persons in their roles as leaders of political organizations and governments, this seems likely.

To jump immediately to the level of the leaders of governments in their international relations, Michael Handel suggested that deception practice is evoked in weaker states (that is, by their leaders) when sorely pressed by stronger ones. Among others, he gave the cases of Poland vis-à-vis Russia and Germany, of Britain

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229 Michael Handel, "Weak States in the International System" (draft doctoral dissertation in the Government Department, Harvard University, 1974).
versus Germany after 1940, and of Israel versus its Arab neighbors since 1948. Other examples come to mind: The Vietminh versus France in the 1950s, the Vietcong versus the U.S. in the 1960s, and the subtly resourceful Danish Resistance to the Nazi Occupation in World War II. Similarly, Prof. Dror has argued that deception will become "a main substrategy" of states driven to desperation.230

PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS

This section has three chapters. Chapter 23 highlights the patterns and discontinuities in deception practice identified during the research. Chapter 24 rates how the innovations of individuals morph into doctrine. Chapter 25 briefly discusses some insights obtained for counterdeception analysis, namely the detection of deception.

Chapter 23) Patterns & Discontinuities

A few patterns and many discontinuities are apparent in this preliminary historical survey of the use of deception and force in war, diplomacy, and national politics. Many of the discontinuities are at least as revealing and interesting as the continuities. And, as they can also be expressed as empirical generalizations, I will intermix them, in this summary, with general reference to Charts A and B on "The Prevalence of Guile in War, 800 BC-1973 AD."

- Deception always changes in both quality and quantity. It varies dramatically across time, cultures, disciplines, and even within individual practitioners. This was true even of the published references collected for the first draft of this monograph. When J. Bowyer Bell read that version in 1974 his strongest criticism was that I had failed to give any recent research sources on the history of military deception. I explained that I'd cited so few publications dating during the previous two decades (that is, the post-1940s) for the simple reason that there almost none. Deception had again become a forgotten topic.

- Deception is an effective way to gain or maintain power. It is essential for the weak and cost-effective for the strong.

- Deception is ubiquitous. It is present to some degree in all political systems during all periods surveyed. It is never totally absent, even in those times and places where its practice is officially condemned by philosophers, churchmen, lawyers, and politicians. Even — perhaps especially — then there will be individuals or groups who use it (as covertly and discreetly as possible) as a means to increase or hold power.

- But highly sophisticated deception is rare. During the 2,900 years between 800 BC and 1973 AD, the higher levels of deception were achieved in war in only 300 years in Europe and in 1300 years in China. Conversely, low levels were reached in 1750 years and 650 years respectively. (See Table 2, following.)
The levels of deception vary between cultures. The marked degree of these variations is seen both from inspection of Table 23.2 and, in detail, from the text and Charts A & B. These cultural variations are due in large part to differences in "national character" or, to avoid that pitfall term, to varied (and varying) mixes of culturally preferred limitations.

The exercise of guile is subject to multiple limitations. Various cultural, institutional, and psychological factors operate to constrain or encourage the practice of deception (as they also do of force) by any given person or group in any particular period, place, or circumstance.

Force and fraud are reciprocally related. That is, the more deceptive the operation the less is the need for force to attain success, and vice versa. This hypothesis is confirmed for military operations (see Table 3).

TABLE 3: FORCE (mean avg. ratio) USED TO GAIN MILITARY OBJECTIVES, 1914-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACHIEVEMENT</th>
<th>DECEPTION</th>
<th>WITHOUT DECEPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number Cases</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>.6-to-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>.8-to-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reason why deception often compensates or even substitutes for sheer force is, as shown elsewhere, because it is designed to induce the opponent to mis-allocate his resources.

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available force, specifically by being surprised by the intention, timing, direction, strength, or style of one’s action. Indeed, at least one of these modes of surprise follows deception around 80 percent of the time in the military operations surveyed.

- **Deception makes for efficient use of force.** By relying on deception, one can gain a temporary or local but decisive advantage in efficient use of available force, even when the opponent may have much greater overall potential strength. This has two important consequences for conventional thinking, particularly military. First, it explodes the widespread 20th century rule-of-thumb that the attacker needs a 3-to-1 strength advantage for success. Second, it invalidates the predictions of such operations research as the famous Lanchester Laws on firepower and attrition by enabling a deceiver (regardless of his relative strength) to evade the slug-fest assumptions and their fatal consequences.

- **It follows from the two previous points that it is particularly important that the weak emphasize deception.** That is, those (relatively) weak in force must compensate with guile if they wish to prevail over a stronger opponent.

- **Deception is not dependent on technology.** That is, the effectiveness of deception, even in war, is independent of the technology of the period. It is potentially effective in all periods of all cultures precisely because it operates in a psychological or perceptual mode, not in a technological or physical one. The technological means of political communications, propaganda, psychological warfare, and war itself change; the basic psychology of people does not. Hence the psychological techniques by which the gullible are perceptually misdirected are (to ironically apply Stalin’s phrase) “permanently operating factors”.

- **Deceptive behavior does not necessarily correlate in levels between war, diplomacy, and politics.** In other words, and contrary to my initial expectations, some groups or individuals may prove frequent and sophisticated practitioners of deception in national politics but — while having the opportunity — not in war (e.g., Khubilai Khan, Stalin, Nasser, John F. Kennedy). Conversely, others may be very stratagemic in battle but not in politics (Belisarius, Wavell, Rommel, Patton). And some few may be skillful in all modes (Wu Ti, Chandragupta, Caesar, Chinggis Khan, Cromwell, Washington, Churchill, Mao, Dayan). Yet others have proved changeable, such as Napoleon, Muhammad ’Ali Pasha, and Hitler who eventually lost their foxiness.

- **Deception is appropriate to diplomacy.** Indeed, it is a not infrequent goal of diplomatic negotiations. The familiar diplomatic policy codified in the maxim "divide and rule" is but one common means by which cunning can substitute for force (or, indeed, for cooperation, as in "nation building"). It characterized the imperial diplomacy

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232 See the detailed critique in Whaley (1969), 167-170.
of the Byzantines, the Hapsburgs, Ottomans, and, sometimes, the British, French, and Chinese. It is also, as Michael Handel points out, a particularly appropriate technique for weak states struggling for survival among hostile neighbors, as with the Italian Renaissance states. Specifically, I find that of 19 major invasions since 1914, 15 were preceded by deliberately deceptive diplomatic negotiations. Sir Henry Wotton’s famous definition of a diplomat isn’t just a nice pun but often true: "An ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country."

- The frequency of coups, particularly successful ones, is a promising indicator of the general level of guile in national politics. The coup is one of many ways of challenging the political power of a higher level of authority. Counting coups (and, where possible, failed and aborted coups), assassinations (and failed assassinations), and probably some other forms of indirect, covert, conspiratorial violence, appears feasible. And, if it proves possible to get quality statistics about such more-or-less guileful activities, their levels of frequency would seem to be promising indices of the general levels of political deception. However, as J. Bowyer Bell cautions, we may not infer low levels of guilefulness from the absence of any one such specific type of indirect challenge to force. For example, the absence of military coups in Renaissance Italy was simply due to the fact that the officer corps were mercenaries who had no place in the political hierarchy, no political or support base.

- Similarly, assassination rates are another promising index of guile. I find that of the twelve Roman emperors between 53 BC and 96 AD, eleven were the targets of domestic assassination plots. Six of these emperors were assassinated and two, anticipating their murder following successful military coups, committed suicide. Conversely, on their own part, eight of these tyrants had connived the secret assassinations of political opponents. This era was simultaneously marked by an extraordinarily high level of guile in Roman politics in general: individual bribery, non-lethal group plottings, forging of compromising documents, and bearing false witness were all rampant. J. Bowyer Bell’s hunch that the frequency of assassinations would be a reliable indicator of the general level of political guile is fully supported for this 150-year period of the Roman polity. However, mapping these levels onto my line graph of level of guilefulness in war (Chart A) shows only a steep decline in guile in military practice, even while the theoretical textbooks on war continue to stress deception.

The pattern just described recurs, almost perfectly duplicated, in Byzantium. During the Eastern Roman Empire’s 1058 years (395-1453), less than half its emperors (42 out of 107) died in office of “natural” causes (including eight deaths by accident or in battle); the other 65 were expelled violently as a result of Byzantium’s 65 successfulrevolts — 23 by assassination, 18 mutilated and dethroned, 12 died in prison, and 12

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238 Based on my content analysis of Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars (around 120 AD). Broadly verified by Tacitus and Gibbon.
forced to abdicate. Lacking any regular rule of succession, the beckoning throne was an almost constant target for usurpation. However, despite this very long period of highly guileful conniving for political power, the deceptive sophistication of Byzantium’s generals peaks and then sharply falls after 552, although their excellent military treatises still stressed deception.

The third and most recent peak period of stratagemic thinking in Europe, the Italian Renaissance, was of course also inordinately preoccupied with the plotting of assassination, although the alchemy of the day was not quite up to compounding sure poisons. In Venice alone, between 1415 and 1768, the city Fathers (Council of Ten) debated over 90 formal proposals for assassination. What of the incidence of assassination in periods of relative guilelessness? Bell’s hypothesis predicts that assassination would be infrequent at such times. This is indeed true — spectacularly so — for the one period for which data has been screened (on regicide only), the period of feudalism in Western Europe (roughly 900-1300 AD). During that entire four century period (in which over 125 sovereign lords ruled in at least six major states) there were only two regicides (in 1208 and 1308) and both were family affairs. There were no assassinations of a feudal sovereign by a vassal or subject. Perhaps the Church’s moral protection was effective.

- Stratagem is learned by book (history), by on-the-job training (apprenticeship and mentoring), and, but only very rarely in war, by experience (hypothesis testing).

- But stratagem can also be unlearned. There is a curious but common phenomenon where the perception of one’s absolute power — however obtained and however unrealistic — induces one to stress sheer coercive force at the expense of guilefulness. Senator Fulbright’s phrase "the arrogance of power," in which "force is the ultimate proof of superiority," aptly describes this Neronic Syndrome. Nero was only the most articulate of the many monstrous tyrants who presided over the decline and fall of Rome. Guile gradually yields to naked force as Nero tests the constraints on his power and finds it seemingly unlimited. Subtly masked plottings against his opponents become open suppressions; secret assassinations of enemies become public executions. His choice of victims becomes increasingly arbitrary in Nero’s lust to prove his control until one-by-one he murders his entire family including his mother. The killings grow ever more cruel until Nero finally invents the bizarre amusement of having a demented slave eat his victims alive. We may comfort ourselves by labeling such behavior "insane." But Nero knew it was simply an ultimate, orgasmic expression of political power. In boasting of these "successes," as he called them, Nero remarked that no previous sovereign had so fully exercised the true extent of his power. Nero had monopolized force, but his fearful enemies were driven to guile: a conspiratorial plot matured into a successful
coup d'état and in the year AD 68 Nero anticipated his imminent assassination by suicide.

This arrogant Neronic pattern is apparent in other times and contexts: The Byzantine emperors fade politically in a similar way. On the battlefield the wily victorious Bonaparte becomes, after 1806, the ponderous loser Napoleon. Stalin gains absolute domestic power by guile but holds it by the blatant exercise of coercive terror. Before Stalingrad, Hitler personally designed deception into all his operations; afterwards only once. Fulbright sees this "arrogance of power" gradually infecting U.S. foreign policy since the half-century. And the "Watergate" crudities — in which "national security" gets confused with raison d'état and even the petty "dirty tricks" lack flair — signal an ambitious but unimaginative dependence on force.

- **Deception thrives on gullibility.** Pretending that foxes don't exist may be a comforting myth but, in competitive situations, it only encourages the foxes.

- **Deceptions can be detected and/or anticipated.**

- **Deceivers can themselves be deceived.**

Finally, in praise of guile:

"For that is good deceit which mates him first that first intends deceit."
—Shakespeare, *King Henry VI*

**Chapter 24) From Innovators to Doctrines**

I submitted a next-to-last final draft of this study to my editor for the first time on 18 May 2006. My research and writing was at last finished. But I had a nagging feeling that I'd missed something. I'd surveyed the main constraints on the practice of deception. But what of its stimuli? Sure, we've been advised by wise thinkers from Sun Tzu and Plutarch through Machiavelli, Baltasar Gracián, and Frederick the Great, to Liddell Hart and R. V. Jones. They agreed that deception is the last best desperate response of the weak against the strong. This is learned by all terrorists and freedom fighters who have survived their first few actions. And this belief was dramatically confirmed by the systematic data in Whaley (1969). But how and where and to what degree has this insight become established doctrine?

Is deception the result of individual or of collective thought and teaching? What are the relative contributions of individuals and groups to deception theory, doctrine, and practice? And is it the same for counterdeception theory, doctrine, and practice? This question is not just academic because the answer or answers will affect both how we can best teach the subject and how we can most efficiently organize to practice it.

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Let’s begin with theory. A key but often overlooked element in the creative construction and development of theories is the ability to perceive connections between seemingly different things, that is the ability to see fresh analogies. But analogies connect only in the minds of single individuals and diffuse thence to other individuals where they are various understood, modified, or misunderstood. If enough people in a group agree on this new theory it becomes doctrine.

In sum, I’ll quote Nobel physicist Richard Feynman’s reply to a question about whether “breakthroughs” in physics were the result of individual or team effort:245

> In high energy physics the experiments are so complicated and elaborate and require such expensive machines that almost all experiments are done by large teams. But when it comes to a realization of what an experiment might mean, or to inventing and producing a new clever way of doing something—that might be done by one fellow independently. Finally, good theoretical work seems to me to be much as it always has been—good ideas appear in individual brains, not in committee meetings. Of course, as always, reading others’ works [or] conversations and discussions with colleagues helps a lot in preliminary stages of thinking.

Similarly, deception theories begin with individuals. But their spread and solidification into doctrine depend on the circumstances of the time, ones that will most likely change with time.

Chapter 25) The Prevalence of Counterdeception

> In principle it should always be possible to unmask a deception.
> —R. V. Jones, “Intelligence and Deception,” *Journal of the Royal Institution* (Spring 1980), 142

Do the factors that drive the changes in deceptiveness also account for any changes in the ability and practice of its detection? Indeed, does it even follow that the prevalence of counterdeception necessarily parallels that of deception?

Specifically, what of cultural differences in detecting deception? I have no evidence that points to clear answers. Religion may be a factor in inhibiting detection. A few anthropologists have observed that some traditional cultures simply do not make a distinction between supernatural and natural magic.246 The tricks are invisibly embedded in ritual and visa versa. Consequently the true-believers are unable to detect the trickeries of either priests or conjurers, they take both on faith. For example, the tent-shaking of the North American Saulteau Indians remains mystical to the tribe’s

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members even when the shaman’s clever but simple trick methods are known.\(^{247}\) And 
American anthropologist Prof. Anna Simons asks why is it a wide-spread practice of 
witch-doctors to use sleight-of-hand to seemingly extract poisonous or evil objects from 
a patient’s body.\(^{248}\)

Some things that seem unremarkable to an average urban American will strike a 
rural Nigerian or even a sophisticated urban Chinese as incongruously funny. A Roman 
Catholic priest’s gown is good disguise for a thief or a spy in Italy or Ireland or the 
Philippines or Rwanda but stupid if one wishes to pass unnoticed in China or Russia or 
Iran. As one ex-burglar once lectured British spy-trainees on how to burgle any large 
English mansion, “All you have to do is go there on a weekend wearing pajamas and if 
someone stops you in the hall you say you’re looking for the bathroom.”\(^{249}\) When among 
nudists, naked is the best disguise.

In sum, the effects of culture on deception and counterdeception are found only 
in specifics. When asked whether deception and detection abilities depended on which 
culture a person was embedded in, American psychologist and military deception expert 
Col. Frank Stech answered with an example of variability drawn from one social class in 
one culture in one slice of time: “Which would you rather be? Holmes, Moriarty, or 
Watson?”\(^{250}\) The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly — they can, perhaps even must — 
coexist. And sometimes even within the same person, not as so-called multiple 
personalities but simply as different responses of one person to different situations. And 
just as there is no one deception personality that fits all individuals, there is no one style 
of deception that fits all groups or cultures or disciplines all of the time.

\(^{247}\)Roger L. Omanson, "Perceptions in Magic", *The Linking Ring* (August 1987), 38-39; Christopher 
(1973), Ch.5 (“American Indian Conjuring”), 69-81; A. L. Kroeber, *The Nature of Culture* (Chicago: University 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942).

\(^{248}\)Simons, note of February 2004, in which she cites “the Azande, the Navajo, you name the 
group.”


\(^{250}\)Stech in conversation with Whaley, 22 Jun 2004.
Although there is a rich literature on deception, including the nearly 2,500 annotated in Whaley (2006), there are few that take a broad view across time, cultures, and disciplines. The following bibliography is a first effort at filling this gap.

Barth, Fredrik (1928), Andre Gingrich, Robert Parkin, Sydel Silverman

Summarizes the anthropological traditions as they developed in the four named countries.

Beeler, John


Bell, J. Bowyer (1931-2003)

A popular but intelligent history of assassination, one that cuts across some cultures and several sub-cultures. Dr. Bell, an American historian, was a world-class authority on terrorists and terrorism.


The only history of the Irish Republican Army generally accepted as definitive by both Irish Republicans and British Imperialists. This was Bow's last edition of this study first published in 1970 when it traced the history from 1916 to 1970.


On low-intensity conflict.


On the origins and diffusion of modern Islamic fundamentalism.

Benedict, Ruth (1887-1948)

See also Mead & Métraux (1953).
For this study Dr. Bond recruited via e-mail a world-wide group of 90 researchers that he called The Global Deception Research Team. They conducted two studies in 75 different countries covering 43 different languages. Respondents to Study 1 answered the question, “How can you tell when people are lying?” In Study 2 they completed a questionnaire about their beliefs about various aspects of lying. Both studies revealed one dominant cross-cultural stereotype, namely that liars avert their gaze.

Boorman, Scott A. (1947-    )

Callwell, C[harles] E[dward] (1859-1928)  

The classic textbook of guerrilla warfare. For the role of deception and related topics in guerrilla warfare see particularly Chapters 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, and 15. Callwell initially presented his study on 26 Mar 1895 at Aldershot Military Society in a lecture that was later published as an 8-page paper titled “Lessons to be Learned from Small Wars since 1870” (Aldershot: Gale & Pelden, 1895). At that time and for the subsequent 1st edition Callwell was a Captain in the British Army; by the Revised (2nd) edition he was a Major; and with the 3rd edition he was a Colonel.  

This fine book has come into its own following the 2003 Iraq War and insurrection, which made it must reading among many American soldiers. I’m pleased that I’d recommended it way back in Whaley (1969), 105 and the Bibliography. I did so in making the key point that deception works not just at the Grand Strategic, Strategic, and Grand Tactical (Operational) levels of conflict but equally at smaller levels all the way down to the squad and individual soldier within small-arms range of an armed enemy.

Campbell, Jeremy (1931-     )  
An intelligent and instructive survey.

Daniel, Donald C., Katherine L. Herbig (editors)  
Includes important papers on Chinese, Soviet, German, and Egyptian deception theory and practice.

Deregowski, J. B.  

Argues that people in different cultures see pictorial representations of reality (drawings, art, photographs, etc.) differently. Psychologist Deregowski believes (contrary to anthropologists Boas and Lévi-Strauss) that people of one culture have difficulty understanding the art of another culture simply because they have been taught different conventions for picturing reality. Deregowski’s theory has implications for pictorial propaganda and, perhaps, camouflage.

Despres, John, Lilita Dziraks, and Barton Whaley  
A pioneer analysis of the highly sophisticated Soviet surprise-through-deception invasion of Manchuria in August 1945. See particularly Chapter II (“Strategic Design for Surprise Offensive”), 13-24, was Whaley’s main contribution to this paper. A model case study.

Detienne, Marcel, and Jean-Pierre Vernant (1914-   )

On the concept of cunning (*mêtis*) in classical Greece. See also Hesk (2000),

Dinerstein, H. S. (1919-   )

Dvornik, Francis (1893-1995)

A remarkably comprehensive work, particularly strong, as I can attest, on the Mongol Empire. This scholarly project had been originated after WW II by former OSS director General William J. Donovan in his private capacity. See also Sheldon (2003).

Dziak, John J. (1938-   )

An important historical survey. Dr. Dziak is a 1971 PhD from Georgetown in modern Russian history.

Eberhard, Wolfram (1909-1989)

Professor Eberhard, one of my main teachers at Berkeley, was a distinguished German sociologist.


A fine introduction to theories of cultural stereotypes including “national character”.

Foot, M. R. D. (1919-   )

Relevant to the question of whether differences between democratic and authoritarian political systems make any difference to the practice of deception. See also Whaley (2002).

Gat, Azar (1959-   )

Global Deception Research Team, The
SEE: Bond (2006)

Goldhamer, Herbert (1907-1977)

See particularly Chapter 3 (“Manipulation and Deception”, pp.100-123), which includes several interesting and important cross-cultural examples.


Because of his military, language, and China experience Brig. Gen. Griffith (USMC, retired), an Oxford PhD, gives the soundest introduction and translation. More complete texts, based on recently discovered manuscripts, are the translations by Roger T. Ames (1993) and Ralph D. Sawyer (1994).

Handel, Michael I. (1942-2001)

This modern classic is an in-depth study of the writings on war by its main theoreticians. See importantly Chapter 15 (“Deception, Surprise, and Intelligence”, 215-254, 421n-429n).

From this magisterial survey across cultures and epochs Dr. Handel concluded that the fundamental logical and theoretical writings on war are as universal and timeless as human nature. Handel is unusual in arguing, I believe correctly, that these writers don't contradict one another in any fundamental ways — their differences are only in details and levels of abstraction, as with Sun Tzu theorizing at the strategic level and Clausewitz at the operational. See Whaley (1980), which had earlier but much less decisively reached the same two main conclusions.

Heathcote, T. A. (1936-)

A popular but scholarly account. The original edition had been published in 1980. Dr. Tony Heathcote is a British military historian.

Hesk, Jon

A probing study that shows most Athenians were highly skeptical of the deceits of rhetoric and held a generally clear belief that, unlike our post-modernists, one could distinguish truth from falsity. Importantly cross-cultural by citing parallels in modern Western culture and politics. See also Detienne & Vernant (1978).

Hook, Sidney (1902-1989)

The first study to clearly distinguish between those few individuals in power positions (political or otherwise) who make a difference (the “Heros”) by changing the course of events as opposed to the majority who merely oversee or manage those events.
Kaegi, Walter Emil, Jr.

Shows that the Byzantine’s stratagems and ruses and indirect approaches in their military writings were firmly grounded in Greek & Roman military texts and hadn’t just evolved independently. Also points out that this tradition of deception and its texts was deliberately overlooked during the Middle Ages, to be rediscovered in the Renaissance.

Kierman, Frank A., Jr. (1914-    ) and John K. Fairbank (1907-1991) (editors),

Lawrence, T. E. (1888-1935)

Largely forgotten landmark paper in which Lawrence of Arabia presents the first theory of what he calls “irregular war", namely asymmetrical combat between regular military units and “irregulars". Based on his closely involved experience with the Arab Revolt against the Turkish Army occupiers in the Arabian Peninsula from its inception in June 1916 until victory Palestine and Syria in 1918. Lawrence drew from the sections on military strategy in the second draft of his monumental Seven Pillars of Wisdom, which wasn’t published (in its world-famous third draft) until 1926.

Lawrence, a most unusual Englishman, had graduated Oxford in 1910 with a degree in History and a deep interest in archaeology. He served in Military Intelligence during World War Two, during which he rose to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Afterwards he championed Arab rule in the Near East.

Leites, Nathan (1912-1987)


The classic study of military surprise through deception. This extraordinarily fine book introduced the author’s key theory of the “Indirect Approach”, a theory that has proved controversial and misunderstood from its inception. Indeed the publishers had force its cliché title on the author, who had wanted it to specify “Indirect Approach”. See Bond (1977), 54-56, etc; and Mearsheimer (1988), 5-6.

WHALEY COMMENT: Misdirection sets the scene for deception. If the misdirection is detected, the deception will fail. As applied to military theory I believe this key concept should be credited to Liddell Hart. He first proposed his notion of an "indirect approach" strategy in 1929 in his The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy and enlarged on it in 1954 in his Strategy: The Indirect Approach. Unfortunately, Liddell Hart’s critics seized on his somewhat ambiguous word “indirection” to grossly oversimplify his original insight and dismiss his theory as mere circular reasoning by twisting his argument to be that only successful military operations get labeled “indirect”. Even two of his most ardent supporters, Wavell and Lawrence, privately accused him of imposing “indirection” on many of his case examples. Liddell Hart’s theory might have fared better had he stressed the words “direction” & “indirection” (that is, “misdirection”) and “deception” & “surprise” and spelled out the connections between each pair.


This book (and its up-date in 1954 as Strategy) has been either wildly applauded or blindly attacked for his broad generalizations about strategy. To my surprise none of its many admirers or detractors have remarked on what I immediately recognized as this
book’s most important, indeed almost unique, merit, namely its research method. This 1929 book of military history was the first to apply any more-or-less systematically quantitative approach to one set of case studies, that is, a data base. Indeed a rather large data base. Liddell Hart laboriously collected and analyzed data (according to fairly uniform criteria) on 240 campaigns in 27 decisive wars (9 ancient, 18 modern) from antiquity to the end of the Great War, that is, nearly 25 centuries (405 BC-AD 1918).

From this survey he concluded (p.141) that: “In only six of these campaigns ... was a decisive result obtained by a direct strategic approach to the main army of the enemy!” Conversely, he found (pp.142-143) “twenty-six campaigns in which both the decisiveness and the indirectness of approach are manifest beyond dispute. ... This high proportion of history’s decisive campaigns, enhanced as it is by the comparative rarity of the indirect approach, enforces the conclusion that the indirect approach is by far the most hopeful and economic form of strategy.” He also found (p.143) that “the consistently successful commanders of history, when faced by an enemy in a position strong naturally or materially, have hardly ever attacked it directly. ... Further, history shows that rather than resign himself to a direct approach, a Great Captain will take even the most hazardous indirect approach — is necessary over mountains, deserts or swamps, with only a fraction of force, even cutting himself loose from his communications.”

This was a monumental intellectual breakthrough. That it has gone unnoticed can, I believe, be mainly attributed to the conventional education of the great majority of historians in general and military historians in particular. Being trained to seek out the small details, they tend to miss broad patterns. Most abhor “numbers, charts, and graphs”, as historian J. Bowyer Bell contemptuous called them — even while collaborating with me. The few historians (Arnold Toynbee is a ripe example) who aimed for sweeping historical and cross-cultural generalizations were rightly demolished for stepping outside their periods and cultures of expert knowledge. But this particular litmus test doesn’t apply to the mathematically oriented military writers F. W. Lanchester (1914, with his data-free hypothetical models), Liddell Hart (1929), Quincy Wright (1942/1965), Whaley (1969), Trevor Dupuy (1977 & 1985), Lewis Richardson (in 1980), David Wilkinson (in 1980), Martin van Crefeld (in 1982), John Ellis (1990), Thomas Nutter (in 2004), and Stephen Biddle (2004). We employ a level of statistical abstraction that is essentially operations research (OR) or, as in my case, out of the sociological tradition. We lean toward building a data base that we then search for patterns, while the Toynbees tend to have a fixed pattern in mind that they then cherry-pick or tailor examples.

My starting point for developing a theory of deception was Liddell Hart, particularly his 1929 and 1956 editions, which I first read in 1967 or 1968. They were the necessary “kick start” for my Stratagem (1969). Then in 1970 William “Bill” Harris returned from his first short stay at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica bearing three key papers by R. V. Jones (1957, 1965, & 1968) and thrust them upon me. Amazed by these timely treasures, they crucially helped refine my view of deception theory and opened my thoughts to the rich possibilities for counterdeception.


Summing up this book’s thesis, Liddell Hart wrote (p.102) that:

“General Bonaparte applied a theory which created an empire for him. The Emperor Napoleon developed a practice which wrecked his empire. And, a century later, evolved by Clausewitz into a system, it brought down three other empires in collapse.”

I agree. Indeed, while not having read this vivid expression until 2006, I wrote in Whaley (1969, Chapter 3), distinguishing Emperor Napoleon from “the younger General Bonaparte”. Liddell Hart’s Bonaparte-vs-Napoleon example is important because it is the most dramatic piece of evidence that a flair for deceptive thinking can not only be learned but can be unlearned or simply forgotten by human individuals as well as by nations.


A substantial update of his The Decisive Wars of History (1929). Analyzes 280 campaigns in 30 wars during the same period.
Lochrie, Karma

On secrecy (hiding, discovery, and disclosure) in the Western world during the Middle Ages among men and women in their everyday hidden and forbidden lives of sexuality, cross-dressing, gossip, confession, etc. A radical Post-Modern interpretation based on but stretching the limits of Michel Foucault and various feminist writers. Gives many facts relevant to our understanding the different ways by which the medieval west viewed deception and its detection. But, given the author’s theoretical bias and consequent selectivity, approach with caution.

Ma, Jinsheng

A remarkably sound textbook. Gives a detailed analysis of the principles and methods of military deception, each illustrated by examples from both Chinese, Russian, and Western warfare. Although I find nothing new, it indicates a high level of understanding of military deception rarely seen in Western texts and never in official American ones.

Machiavelli, Niccolò (1469-1527)

We best savor the full flavor and range of deception (from politics and war to everyday life) as expounded by this Florentine statesman-philosopher-dramatist-military executive through four of his many works:

- The Prince (1513). How to gain, keep, and lose power through deception.
- The Discourses (1513). For deception see particularly Discourses 14, 40, & 48.

Maurice, Emperor of Byzantium (reigned 582-602)

A superb textbook on war, more detailed and comprehensive than Sun Tzu. Includes much wise advice on deception, surprise, and espionage.

Mead, Margaret, (1901-1978), and Rhoda Métraux (1914-2003) (editors)

Classic methodological study of the ways one can go about studying other cultures, particularly in those circumstances such as war where direct access is denied. The classic example is Benedict (1946), a fairly successful effort to identify dominant elements in Japanese culture during WW II. Authors were prominent American anthropologists.

-90-
Miyamoto, Musashi (1584-1645)  
*Gorin no sho* [Book of five spheres]. Japan: 1643.  

A Japanese classic of military strategy & tactics. See also Yagyū (1632).

Moore, John Norton (editor) (1937- )  

A collection of 16 articles.

Morris, Donald R. (1924- )  

A scholarly history of the Zulu nation from its rise under Shaka in the early 1800s until its defeat under Cetshwayo by the British Army in 1879.

Nisbett, Richard E.  

Nisbett, an American social psychologist, identifies several cognitive differences between “Asians” and “Westerners”. He attributes these differences to a mix of different ecologies, societal structures, philosophies, and educational systems, which he traces back to their origins in ancient Greece and China. Provocative but, I suspect, exaggerated.

O’Ballance, Edgar (1918- )  

See also Heathcote (2003).

Olschki, Leonardo (1885-1961)  

A pioneering contribution to the history and philosophy of science. Prof. Olschki hypothesized that modern science couldn’t evolve in the Medieval scholastic university settings. Instead, it evolved among the groups of practitioners of the various arts and crafts, the experimentally-oriented craftsmen and artists. Specifically, Norbert Elias pointed to the gulf that separated the narrow vertical, top-to-down God-centered Medieval thinkers from the wide horizontal world view of the rising empiricists of the Renaissance epoch.  

To whatever extent this theory holds, I believe it supplies a strong explanation of why the moral opposition to deception has been and still is so firmly held by some cultures and sub-cultures and not by others.

Pillsbury, Michael (ca.1945- )  

A valuable collection of translations of recent Chinese military articles. Includes much advocacy of and techniques for surprise attack.


Poole, H. J(ohn) (1943- )

Focused on Asian deceptive ways of war, one that avoids frontal attack in favor of indirect approaches. Unfortunately, too many of his assertions about the beliefs of Asian soldiers aren't referenced.


Tightens and makes welcome revisions to the author's previous books. Adds Russian and German small unit tactics to his previous Asian model.


Essentially the same as the author's above books but with a tighter focus on Islamic terrorist tactics against Russian, Israeli, and US regular forces.

Pye, Lucian W. (1921- ), and Nathan Leites (1912-1987)

Russell, Frank Santi (1965- )


Sahgal, Amrish

Sheldon, Rose Mary (1948- )

A model bibliography — comprehensive, cross-referenced by topic, indexed, and competently proofed. Comprises well-annotated entries on intelligence in Ancient and Medieval times. Totals about 800 entries if we delete the duplicates.

Col. Dr. Sheldon (1987 U of Michigan history PhD) was a professor at Virginia Military Institute.


Shultz, Richard H., Jr. (1947- ), and Ruth Margolies Beitler
“Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in al-Qai’da’s Operations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol.8, No.2 (Jun 2004).

Portrays al-Qai’da as a non-state equivalent of a counterintelligence (CI) state.

Siegel, Lee (1945- )
On Indic wit and humor. Shows a substantial grasp of the incongruity theory of humor.

Dr. Siegel became a Yank at Oxford where in 1975 he took a DPhil in Sanskrit. Next year he joined the faculty of the University of Hawaii where he is now Professor of South Asian Religions. He is also a novelist and, by way of explanation of the following book, an amateur magician member of the International Brotherhood of Magicians.


On conjuring and conjurers in India from early times to the present. The most perceptive of several books and articles on that subject, including Branson (1953) who, as a British officer in Imperial India had only a surface understanding of Indian culture.


Sun Tzu (around 400-320 BC) *Sun Tzu Ping Fa [Sun Tzu’s Rules of War].* Around 350 BC. Thirteen Chapters.


Although the above translations by Ames and Sawyer are more nearly complete thanks to recently discovered texts, Gen. Griffith’s edition is still more useful for its insights on the strictly military aspects.


On how the Chinese, Russian, and American cultures and military doctrines differ on Information Warfare and on IW doctrines related to high-tech warfare. Thomas retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel from the US Army in 1993 to work for the Army as a civilian analyst specialized in Soviet and later Chinese studies.


Gives from open sources of the Chinese Communist Army (PLA) the PLA’s theory & practice during the past decade of network-centric warfare, what they call “integrated network-electronic warfare”. The main conclusion (pp.98-99) is that the PLA places psyops above combat among the main principles of war. This view is, of course, diametrically opposite to all Western military doctrines, which see psyops as, at most, an adjunct to combat ops. Moreover these post-Mao writers acknowledge that this was also the view of Sun Tzu who was the first military writer to argue that the highest form of war is the defeat of the enemy without fighting.


The first and still most nearly comprehensive study of tribal-style warfare. Based on the
American anthropologist’s survey of the anthropological literature. See particularly Chapter 6 “Intelligence, Surprise and Countersurprise” (pp.107-122). The first edition had appeared in 1949, the second (with Foreward by David C. Rapoport appeared in 1971.

Vincent Marrelli, Jocelyne


A detailed linguistic analysis of the subject. A substantial improvement over Bok (1978 & 1983).

Dr. Vincent Marrelli (1989 DPhil in Linguistics from Sussex U) is founding Director since 2002 of the Department of American, Cultural and Linguistic Studies in the Università degli Studi di Napoli “L’Orientale”. She has been writing on the linguistics of deception since 1977 (when she was Jocelyne M. Vincent), including an interesting contribution in Bonfantini & others (1997).

Whaley, Barton (1928-)


Deception in international politics and war across four cultures and throughout their history. Largely condensed from Whaley (1974). Provides the first model for analyzing the ups-and-downs of cultural acceptance and use of deception. This is still the only such model, except marginally for Hesk (2000) and Handel (2001).


Relevant to the question of whether differences between authoritarian and democratic political systems make any difference to the practice of deception. See also Foot (2002).

Wheeler, Everett L.


A linguistic and historical study proving the ancient Greeks and Romans both favored the use of deception in military strategy and international relations. The author contrasts this open advocacy with the Western Christian ethos that deplores trickery, at least publicly. See also Hesk (2000).


Whitson, William W.


Yagyū, Munenori (1571-1646)

Tsuketari Hyōhō kadensho. Japan: 1632.

English translation as Family Traditions on the Art of War. Included in Thomas Cleary (translator), The Book of Five Rings (Boston: Shambhala, 1993), 63-114.
A classic of Japanese Zen military art & science, specifically devoted to sword tactics. See also Miyamoto (1643).

Yagyū was a consistently victorious warrior, official Martial Arts Teacher to Shōgun Tokugawa Hidetawa, and head of his Secret Service.


This text is the best single piece of evidence I’m aware of that reinforces the view that, as we enter the present millennium, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has the most sophisticated and advanced view of military deception of any of the world’s major armed forces. It nicely updating the valuable work by Dr. Michael Pillsbury (1998 & 2000). It also supports and extends the findings about the PLA of Lt. Col. (USA Ret) Timothy Thomas (2004 & 2005) and even the PLA tactical-level deception conclusions of H. John Poole (2003).

This book’s main strength is its recognition that the doctrine of military deception expounded by Sun Tzu, Mao Tzedong, and others is not just some tired mantra to be sounded by old sages but is the very essence of all combat, binding intel, plans, and ops into one coordinated weapon of attack or defense.
CHARTS

Introduction

The two following charts of the levels of guile in war are first rough attempts to summarize and generalize my raw data. The chronological flow is, of course, precise and has some value by itself. But the levels of guile assigned to specific battles, commanders, politicians, military & political theoreticians, and philosophers are rather arbitrary and often somewhat Procrustean personal judgements. For example, on the Machiavellian presumption that there is a bit of larceny in every competitive enterprise, I have arbitrarily avoided assigning any event or person a “grade” less than “10%”. Conversely, believing that inherent “friction” (Fortuna, if you prefer) will always frustrate the total fulfillment of deceit, I have not assigned “grades” above “90%”. However, for the period 800 BC through 1915 AD I’ve at least made each judgment conform to the criteria in Charts A & B, below. The judgements on the 216 battles during the period 1914-1973 are based on Whaley (1969 with draft additions to 1974). In all, about 500 battles are rated as well as 40 military theoreticians and 50 other writers.

These charts are as I developed them in 1974. I offer them here mainly as one model of how case data can be portrayed. Obviously, they would greatly benefit by three additions — updating, adding hundreds of new case examples, and more sharply distinguishing philosophers from other types of writers. I recommended this exercise for students (individually or in teams) in search of a thesis or term paper.

KEY:  ● = TOURS = a battle
                  ● = Hannibal = a commander who has maintained the specified level of guile in command in at least two battles
  ○ = Clausewitz = a military theoretician
  ○ = [Grotius = a philosopher, writer, etc.]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>war is psychological and guileful; meta-stratagem; comprehensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>coordinated deception planning; counterdeception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>combined simulative &amp; dissimulative camouflage; “black” propaganda; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>counterespionage (double agents, Funkspiel, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>simulative (“active”) camouflage; feigned flight; provocation (agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>provocateur, etc.); initiative; pragmatism; secularism; Fabian tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>dissimulative (“passive”) camouflage; simple ambush; “white” propaganda;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>counterintelligence security; seek to surprise; rhetoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>chivalry; heroics; dueling; pure force; aggressiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>war is mechanical and guileless; either sheer claw-and-fang action or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passive turn-the-other-cheek otherworldliness or martyrdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHART B [reprint of Whaley's original worksheet, 1974]