The case summaries below include the current status of Department of Justice (Department) component disciplinary action and any appeals thereof. At the request of the components, we note that a component's disciplinary action with respect to an individual employee may be informed by the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) investigation and findings, the component's findings and conclusions, and additional information that may have been provided to component disciplinary officials in accordance with that component's approved policies and procedures.

1. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) committed misconduct that included directing subordinate DEA employees to perform work related to the management of his rental properties and other personal business, using a DEA shipping account to send personal mail, asking DEA personnel to drive him to and from the airport in an official government vehicle while on personal leave, and accepting a free holiday luncheon for his office staff in violation of government ethics rules and DEA policy. Prosecution was declined, and the ASAC subsequently admitted during an OIG interview that each of these allegations were true. On January 28, 2014, the OIG provided its Report of Investigation (ROI) to the DEA for appropriate action.

On June 20, 2014, the DEA informed us that the matter remained pending.

2. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that a Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was involved in a personal relationship with a direct subordinate that resulted in favoritism. The OIG determined that the DAD and the subordinate were involved in a personal romantic relationship based on their own admissions to the OIG as well as a review of messages exchanged between the two on their FBI-issued Blackberry devices. The OIG further determined that the DAD failed to disclose the relationship and recuse herself from all official decisions regarding the subordinate, as required by FBI policy, and that the relationship created perceived instances of benefit or favoritism towards the subordinate, in violation of FBI policy. The DAD resigned from the FBI effective November 15, 2013. On December 19, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the FBI.

3. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the FBI engaged in a protracted sexual relationship with a foreign national that he deliberately concealed from the FBI; disclosed sensitive FBI information to the foreign national; and misused FBI-issued iPads and an FBI-issued Blackberry device by allowing the foreign national to use them on numerous occasions, and by using the Blackberry device to
exchange sexually explicit communications with the foreign national. When interviewed by the OIG, the SAC acknowledged inappropriately disclosing sensitive information to the foreign national, as well as his deliberate failure to report his relationship with the foreign national to the FBI. The investigation also found that the SAC lacked candor when, during a sworn OIG interview, he denied allowing the foreign national use of the FBI-issued iPads and Blackberry device, although he later admitted to these allegations during a compelled polygraph examination administered by the OIG. In addition to lacking candor and using poor judgment, the investigation found that the SAC’s actions violated several FBI policies relating to personal conduct, ethics, security self-reporting requirements, and the provision of false or misleading information on employment and security documents. Prosecution was declined. On February 26, 2014, the OIG provided its ROI to the FBI for appropriate action.

The FBI has informed us that on January 21, 2014, FBI executive management approved the SAC’s request for a demotion to a GS-13 position while awaiting the FBI’s final determination about disciplinary action. On June 24, 2014, the FBI also informed us that the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility (FBI OPR) had issued a proposed disciplinary decision, but the matter remained pending.

4. The OIG conducted an investigation of an allegation that during a temporary duty assignment (TDY), an FBI Information Technology Specialist/Program Manager (IT Specialist) made multiple unwanted sexual advances towards an FBI contract employee while intoxicated, and that when the contractor reported the incident to an FBI supervisor, the IT Specialist threatened to kick the contractor and retaliate against her at work. During an interview with the OIG, the IT Specialist admitted consuming a large amount of alcohol and making several sexual propositions to the contract employee, but he said that he could not recall making threatening statements. The IT Specialist also admitted to having alcohol-related issues while on previous TDYs. All FBI witnesses present provided statements to the OIG confirming that the IT Specialist had consumed a large amount of alcohol and was intoxicated. The OIG found that the contract employee’s account of the incident and the witnesses’ description of the IT Specialist’s intoxication to be credible. The OIG concluded that the IT Specialist’s conduct violated the prohibitions on sexual harassment contained in the Code of Federal Regulations, as well as FBI policies relating to sexual harassment and alcohol-related misconduct. On January 6, 2014, the OIG provided its ROI to the FBI for appropriate action.

The FBI has informed us that the IT Specialist resigned effective June 13, 2014, and the matter is now closed.

5. Following a complaint by Senator Charles Grassley to the Director of the FBI, the OIG conducted an investigation to determine the propriety of a disclosure of information about an FBI investigation to Senator Grassley and a member of his staff by FBI Assistant Director Stephen Kelly, Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA).
The OIG investigation found that Kelly received information about the FBI investigation in an email forwarded to the OCA from the FBI Office of Public Affairs (OPA) that included a reference to the fact that Senator Grassley planned to attend the wedding of the FBI investigation's subject.

The OIG investigation found that the following day, Kelly told Senator Grassley's staff member and Senator Grassley that the FBI was aware that Senator Grassley planned to attend the wedding. Kelly also told Senator Grassley that he believed the source of the information was a family member of the FBI investigation’s subject, and he assured Senator Grassley that he was not a focus of the FBI investigation. The OIG found that Kelly made these disclosures based solely on the information in the email and that he did not consult in advance with anyone about doing so. The OIG concluded that Kelly did not have the authority to disclose non-public information about an ongoing criminal investigation to Senator Grassley or his staff, and in doing so exhibited poor judgment. Kelly’s actions were in violation of the Department’s and the FBI’s policies prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of information derived from an ongoing criminal investigation. On October 18, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the FBI for appropriate action.

On January 16, 2014, FBI OPR concluded that the allegation that Kelly improperly disclosed information from a pending FBI investigation was unsubstantiated. However, FBI OPR requested that the Deputy Director provide non-disciplinary counseling to Kelly regarding the need to exercise greater caution and deliberation before disclosing non-public information derived from an ongoing investigation to a Member of Congress or congressional staff.

6. The OIG conducted an investigation into information that at the conclusion of a deployment to Iraq, an FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) imported into the United States a foreign-made firearm, and possessed and transferred in the United States a machinegun. This conduct potentially violated several federal laws relating to the importation and transfer of weapons, but the statute of limitations for these criminal offenses had run prior to the initiation of the OIG’s investigation. The OIG concluded that the SSA possessed at least one such imported weapon within the relevant limitation period. The OIG also concluded that the SSA violated FBI offense codes relating to misuse of position. Prosecution was declined. On March 19, 2014, the OIG provided its ROI to the FBI for appropriate action.

On June 24, 2014, the FBI informed us that the matter remained pending.

7. Following an inquiry to ATF by Senator Charles Grassley and Congressman Darryl Issa, the OIG conducted an investigation into the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) decision to permit William McMahon, then DAD of ATF’s Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations (OPRSO), to engage in full-time outside employment with JPMorgan Chase (JPMorgan) during 2012 while still employed full-time by ATF. McMahon is no longer an ATF employee. The OIG reviewed ATF’s
approval of McMahon’s outside employment, as well as the approval of his proposed use of sick leave and annual leave for a period of several months through the date of his retirement eligibility.

The investigation found that McMahon’s supervisor, Julie Torres, who was the Assistant Director of OPRSO at the time, exercised poor judgment and failed to responsibly perform her duties when she approved McMahon’s request to engage in outside employment, and when she separately approved his written request to use sick leave after having already approved his written request to engage in full-time employment with JPMorgan beginning in the same month. Among other reasons, Torres’s action approving McMahon’s use of extensive leave knowing that it was being done in order to gain sufficient tenure to obtain law enforcement retirement benefits and that McMahon planned to retire at the end of the leave period violated an ATF order that prohibits the use of “terminal leave.” In addition, Torres should not have approved the use of sick leave without reconciling the obvious conflict between McMahon’s written outside employment request and his sick leave request.

The OIG found that ATF Deputy Director Thomas Brandon, who was not made aware by Torres of McMahon’s intention to use sick leave while engaged in outside employment, nevertheless approved McMahon’s use of annual leave for the several months leading up to McMahon’s retirement in violation of ATF’s prohibition on terminal leave. The OIG also found that Brandon should have recognized the significant issues raised by McMahon’s outside employment request, regardless of the type of leave he intended to use, particularly given that McMahon’s conduct in Operation Fast and Furious was under review by the OIG.

The OIG also found that ATF’s then-Deputy Chief Counsel and Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Official, Melanie Stinnett, exercised poor judgment and failed to responsibly perform her duties by approving McMahon’s outside employment request. Stinnett has retired from ATF.

On November, 27, 2012, following ATF’s cancellation of his leave and revocation of his approval to work for JPMorgan, McMahon was removed from ATF for his continued unauthorized outside employment, absence without leave, and insubordination. ATF and McMahon resolved issues arising from these actions in litigation, which did not result in McMahon returning to duty at ATF. On March 12, 2014, the OIG provided its ROI to ATF for appropriate action.

ATF has informed us that Torres retired on May 31, 2014, and that the ATF Director verbally counseled Brandon and included like comments in his mid-year review.

8. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) may have been involved in a fraudulent transfer of property after the AUSA learned of her spouse’s embezzlement activity. The OIG also investigated whether the AUSA made false statements during interviews with the FBI during the FBI’s investigation of her husband. The
OIG concluded there was insufficient evidence that the actual intent of the transfer was fraudulent under applicable state law. However, the OIG determined that the AUSA lacked candor during an FBI interview about her husband’s ownership interest in the property, and that she made misleading and contradictory statements to the FBI, and later to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the OIG, about how and when she learned of her spouse’s criminal activities and about the circumstances surrounding the transfer of property. Prosecution was declined. On November 25, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) for appropriate action.

EOUSA has informed us that the AUSA was verbally admonished by her supervising U.S. Attorney on March 24, 2014.

9. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that a U.S. Attorney accepted a partial-expenses paid trip to a foreign country from a non-profit organization. The investigation determined that the U.S. Attorney was aware that the invitation for the trip was offered to him because of his official position and that EOUSA had determined that the trip was not considered official travel. The investigation further determined that the U.S. Attorney subsequently failed to seek advice from ethics advisors about accepting payment of lodging and expenses associated with the trip. The OIG concluded that the U.S. Attorney’s conduct violated federal law and regulations relating to the acceptance of gifts, use of public office for private gain, and acceptance of travel and related expenses from a non-federal source. Prosecution was declined. On December 3, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to EOUSA for appropriate action.

EOUSA has informed us that it provided the OIG’s ROI to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG), which subsequently issued to the U.S. Attorney a letter of admonishment and directed him to reimburse the non-profit organization.

10. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that an AUSA used his government computer to send official documents to his spouse who was employed as a paralegal with a private law firm. The OIG’s investigation found that the documents, which related to matters occurring before the grand jury, had been forwarded to the AUSA’s spouse. During an OIG interview, the AUSA admitted he had sent the documents to his spouse to prove to her that he was working late. The OIG concluded that the AUSA violated rules requiring attorneys for the government to maintain secrecy of matters occurring before the grand jury. Prosecution was declined. The AUSA retired from government service in November 2013, after the EOUSA had issued a proposed disciplinary decision. On January 7, 2014, the OIG provided its ROI to EOUSA, as well as to the Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility for determination whether referral to the relevant state bar association is appropriate.

EOUSA has informed us that the state bar association has been notified and that EOUSA plans no further action.
11. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that a senior supervisory Deputy U.S. Marshal was involved in an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate Court Security Officer (CSO); misused his United States Marshals Service (USMS) issued Blackberry device to exchange sexually explicit messages and personal photographs; and misused his USMS-issued vehicle to further the relationship with the CSO. In separate OIG interviews, both the subject and the CSO admitted to the allegations. The subject also admitted to misusing his USMS-issued Blackberry device to send inappropriate text messages with an individual not employed by the government. On January 16, 2014 the OIG provided its ROI to the USMS for appropriate action.

The USMS has informed us that as a result of the OIG’s investigation, the subject was relieved of his temporary duties in which he occupied a senior supervisory position and that, in exchange for the USMS holding in abeyance any disciplinary action against him, the subject retired on May 31, 2014.

12. In response to an anonymous complaint received by the Department and provided to the OIG by the ODAG, the OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that a U.S. Attorney solicited her staff by use of her government email account to purchase bulk quantities of soda from an entity that employed her son. The OIG determined that the U.S. Attorney did not intend to pressure her subordinates to purchase soft drinks from her son. The OIG also determined that neither the U.S. Attorney nor any member of her family member stood to profit financially from any such purchases. However, the OIG found that these facts were not known to the recipients of the e-mail and thus the email created the appearance that the U.S. Attorney was misusing her position. The OIG concluded that the U.S. Attorney should not have sent the email. On February 24, 2014, the OIG provided its ROI to EOUSA for appropriate action.

The Department has informed us that upon receiving the initial complaint, the ODAG immediately counseled the U.S. Attorney on her obligations, and that after reviewing the OIG’s ROI the ODAG determined that no further action was warranted or appropriate.

13. The OIG conducted a joint investigation with the USMS Office of Internal Affairs of allegations that the U.S. Marshal and members of the USMS staff in a District office violated procurement procedures, falsified documents, improperly used government funds, and violated Department and USMS policies and directives. The investigation identified purchases totaling approximately $211,000 which appeared to have violated Department or USMS procurement policies or procedures, including purchases of ceremonial and promotional items previously banned by an USMS headquarters directive, personal-use or other wasteful items, and purchases which had no documented proof of delivery. Many of the purchases were approved by the U.S. Marshal or the Chief Deputy U.S. Marshal. The OIG concluded that both USMS officials had misspent identified funds, knowingly misused the government purchase card program, and violated 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101, Basic Obligation of Public Service. In October 2012, the USMS conducted an on-
site compliance review of the District’s finances and subsequently placed the District in receivership, revoking the District’s purchasing authority and assigning a Chief Inspector from another District to serve as a temporary receiver. Prosecution was declined. On April 24, 2014, the OIG provided its ROI to the USMS for appropriate action.

On June 26, 2014, the USMS informed us that the matter remained pending.

14. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that an AUSA revealed information about a federal investigation and an associated Title III wiretap. The OIG determined that the AUSA, who was recused from involvement with the federal investigation because of an existing personal relationship with the investigation’s target, disclosed information about the investigation and the wiretap to her spouse, who subsequently disclosed it to the target. The AUSA initially denied revealing the information to her spouse, but subsequently acknowledged that she might have “said something” to her spouse about the investigation. Prosecution of the AUSA was declined. The AUSA retired from federal service in November 2013. On March 26, 2014, the OIG provided its ROI to EOUSA for appropriate action.

EOUSA has informed us that no further action is planned.

15. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that a Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Warden requested two BOP marksmen to perform a live-fire, synchronized shooting drill while he sat downrange between two intended targets. Members of a local community relations board were also located down range, but on the opposite side and away from the Warden. The investigation determined that the Warden violated BOP safety rules and range regulations, which prohibit handling a firearm when someone is downrange and warn against “carelessness and failure to use good common sense.” Prosecution was declined. On April 2, 2014, the OIG provided its ROI to the BOP for appropriate action.

On June 20, 2014, the BOP informed us that the matter remained pending.

16. The OIG conducted an investigation into allegations that FBI and DEA managers retaliated against an FBI SSA for making protected disclosures regarding alleged misconduct and mismanagement at the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center. The OIG found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the SSA’s removal from the Fusion Center and his failure to be named Acting Director were in reprisal for his protected disclosures. On November 6, 2013, pursuant to the FBI Whistleblower Regulations, 28 C.F.R. pt. 27.4, the OIG provided its ROI to the Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management (OARM) for appropriate action.

On June 20, 2014, OARM informed us that the matter remained pending.
17. The OIG conducted an investigation into allegations that a DEA manager detailed to the OCDETF Fusion Center who was a subject of the investigation described in paragraph 16, above, also retaliated against an FBI SSA for making protected disclosures regarding alleged misconduct and mismanagement at the Fusion Center. The OIG found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the SSA’s loss of duties and responsibilities, and his ultimate transfer out of the Fusion Center, were in reprisal for his protected disclosures. The DEA manager retired prior to the conclusion of this investigation. On January 7, 2014, pursuant to the FBI Whistleblower Regulations, 28 C.F.R. pt. 27.4, the OIG provided its ROI to the OARM for appropriate action.

On June 20, 2014, OARM informed us that the matter remained pending.

18. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that ATF had reassigned two employees in 2012 who were whistleblowers in the investigation of Operation Fast and Furious under the command of Scot Thomasson, who had allegedly made statements in early 2011 encouraging retaliation against them. Thomasson is no longer an ATF employee, having retired from ATF during the course of the OIG investigation. According to the complaint, in early 2011, shortly after the allegations about Operation Fast and Furious became public, Thomasson allegedly stated, “[w]e need to get whatever dirt we can on these guys [the whistleblowers] and take them down. All these whistleblowers have axes to grind. ATF needs to [expletive] these guys.” At the time of these alleged statements in 2011, Thomasson was the Chief of ATF’s Public Affairs Division.

Thomasson denied making the alleged statements about the whistleblowers and denied making any anti-whistleblower statements. However, the OIG determined that Thomasson made inappropriate remarks about the whistleblowers in two open meetings while he was the Public Affairs Chief. In a February 2011 meeting, he stated that the whistleblowers were “do-nothing scumbag agents” with “axes to grind against ATF,” and commented further that the whistleblowers “had not shown their faces” during their media disclosures. In an April 2011 meeting, Thomasson said words to the effect of, “[m]ake no mistake, they all have axes to grind [with ATF].”

The OIG further found that the two whistleblowers were in fact reassigned a year later to an investigative division then under the command of Thomasson. However, the OIG found no evidence that the purpose of the reassigments was to place the whistleblowers under the supervision of Thomasson, or that they were made with an intention to retaliate against the whistleblowers. The ATF officials involved in making the reassigments told the OIG that they were unaware of the allegations regarding these statements at the time the reassigments were made. The OIG found that ATF officials responded appropriately and in a timely and effective manner to concerns expressed about the reassigments.

The OIG provided its ROI to ATF for its review in March 2014.
Appendix: Cases Previously Reported As Pending

This appendix provides the current status of cases reported in February 2014 as awaiting component disciplinary action and the completion of all appeals. At the request of the components, we note that a component’s disciplinary action with respect to an individual employee may be informed by the OIG’s investigation and findings, the component’s findings and conclusions, and additional information that may have been provided to component disciplinary officials in accordance with that component’s approved policies and procedures. Unless otherwise noted, this appendix is not intended to amend representations made in previous reports.

1. The OIG’s May 2011 letter described an investigation in which the OIG found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that an FBI Special Agent’s performance rating was lowered in retaliation for his protected disclosure regarding the alleged improper handling of his transfer from an FBI division based on threats to his personal safety arising from his work. In the appendix to our February 2013 letter, we reported that the FBI had issued non-disciplinary counseling to an FBI supervisor, and that the OARM had dismissed some of the Special Agent’s retaliation claims but was still reviewing others. In the Appendix to our June 2013 letter, we reported that, in March 2013, OARM had dismissed the Special Agent’s remaining claims without prejudice to refiling based on the parties’ stated need for additional time to complete discovery, and in the Appendix to our February 2014 letter, we reported that OARM had extended the deadline for refiling the Special Agent’s claims. On June 20, 2014, OARM informed us that the Special Agent refiled his claims and that the matter remained pending.

2. The OIG’s June 2013 letter described an investigation in which the OIG found that an FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst had failed to disclose on his FBI security and financial disclosure forms certain assets and a default on a $4.1 million commercial loan guarantee, and that he had failed to report in a timely manner that he was named as a defendant in a lawsuit related to the default. Our June 2013 and February 2014 letters reported that FBI OPR had issued its disciplinary decision, but that an appeal of that decision was still pending. On June 24, 2014, the FBI informed us that the appeal is still pending.

3. The OIG’s February 2014 letter described an investigation in which the OIG found that an FBI ASAC had been involved in a sexual relationship with a subordinate, misused his assigned government vehicle and Blackberry device to further the relationship, and sexually harassed and committed other misconduct against other female subordinates, FBI employees, and other women. That letter reported that FBI OPR had issued its disciplinary decision and that the ASAC’s appeal of that decision remained pending. On June 24, 2014, the FBI informed us that the appeal is still pending.
4. The OIG’s February 2014 letter described an investigation in which the OIG determined that an Immigration Judge had violated the Executive Office of Immigration Review’s (EOIR) Ethics and Professionalism Guide with respect to appearance of impropriety, impartiality in performing official duties, use of public office for private gain, and outside employment and activities, as well as an EOIR policy providing guidance concerning recusal orders in immigration proceedings. That letter reported that the matter remained pending while a proposal of disciplinary action was being prepared. On June 20, 2014, EOIR informed us that the proposed disciplinary letter has been issued but the matter remained pending.

5. The OIG’s February 2014 letter described an investigation in which the OIG determined that an AUSA had identified himself as a “federal prosecutor” while acting in a private capacity; had used his credentials to gain access to a security video; and had lacked candor during his OIG interview. That letter reported that the matter was still pending. EOUSA has informed us that it issued the AUSA a letter of reprimand on June 11, 2014.

6. The OIG’s February 2014 letter described an investigation in which the OIG found that a Department employee had violated both procurement and ethics regulations prohibiting the disclosure of non-public information during a contract bid process. That letter reported that the matter was still pending. On June 26, 2014, the Office of Justice Programs informed us that the matter remained pending.
The case summaries below include the current status of Department of Justice (Department) component disciplinary action and any appeals thereof. At the request of the components, we note that a component’s disciplinary action with respect to an individual employee may be informed by the OIG’s investigation and findings, the component’s findings and conclusions, and additional information that may have been provided to component disciplinary officials in accordance with that component’s approved policies and procedures.

1. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (SIA) falsified a home mortgage application when he failed to list his marital status and his wife’s extensive business debts. The investigation found that the SIA was legally divorced, but that he retained co-ownership of a joint business venture with his ex-wife, that they had jointly purchased or guaranteed several commercial and residential rental properties, and that they had defaulted on a $4.1 million commercial loan guarantee. The SIA failed to disclose some of these assets and the default on his FBI security and financial disclosure forms, and he failed to report in a timely manner that he was named as a defendant in a lawsuit related to the default. Prosecution was declined. On November 6, 2012, the OIG provided its Report of Investigation (ROI) to the FBI for appropriate action.

On May 17, 2013, the FBI informed us that the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility (FBI OPR) had issued its disciplinary decision, but that an appeal of that decision was still pending.

2. Based on information referred by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Internal Affairs Division on March 15, 2012, the OIG conducted an investigation into allegations in a newspaper report that the ATF had paid a confidential informant (CI) despite knowing the CI was a felon with a history of violence against women, and that after becoming a CI he assaulted a woman in a motel room paid for by ATF. The OIG’s investigation determined that, after being approved as a CI, the CI entered the motel room of two ATF suspects without authorization, and on a separate occasion had a physical altercation with an ATF suspect. The investigation concluded that, based on the information each had at the time, the Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) who vetted the CI should not have sought approval to employ the CI, and
the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) who received the application should not have approved the CI. The investigation further concluded that when the SSA became aware of alleged misconduct by the CI, he failed to terminate the CI or inform his supervisors of the allegations, which would have resulted in the CI being terminated prior to the assault. On February 19, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the ATF for appropriate action.

ATF has informed us that its Professional Review Board (PRB) found that no disciplinary action was necessary, and that there were no performance deficiencies with respect to either the GS-13 Special Agent who controlled the CI or the SAC who approved the CI. ATF has also informed us that the PRB determined that the SSA had provided misleading information to the SAC concerning the steps taken in vetting the CI, and that the SSA resigned his position with ATF prior to any disciplinary action. ATF also told us that it implemented a revised directive in July 2012 relating to the use of confidential informants in ATF investigations.

3. The OIG conducted an investigation into allegations that numerous Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees had stolen or misused BOP property. The investigation substantiated the allegations with regard to numerous BOP employees, including a senior manager who admitted to using the services of BOP personnel to perform minor repairs on her personal vehicle. Prosecution was declined. On December 11, 2012, the OIG provided its ROI to BOP for appropriate action.

BOP has informed us that its Office of Internal Affairs determined that the repair services the senior manager received were de minimus in nature, and that the actions taken by the senior manager did not warrant administrative discipline.

4. The OIG conducted an investigation into allegations that an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) had misused her position following the receipt of a traffic citation. When interviewed by the OIG, the AUSA admitted that she had identified herself as an AUSA and had made improper remarks to the responding police officers, although she claimed that she was under personal and professional stress at the time and that her intent had not been to seek preferential treatment. The OIG's investigation concluded that the AUSA had acted unprofessionally and improperly insinuated that she should receive lenience from the officers based on her position and performance as an AUSA. On November 6, 2012, the OIG provided its ROI to the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) for appropriate action.
EOUSA has informed us that the AUSA received a verbal admonishment and counseling.

5. The OIG conducted an investigation into allegations that a high ranking official of a Department grantmaking component had violated the conflict of financial interest statutes. The OIG investigation found that the official had reported stock ownership in a corporation whose contract with the Department he supervised, and that the contractor had received additional funding from the Department during this period of supervision by the official. During an interview with the OIG, the official stated that the stock belonged to his spouse and acknowledged that he had supervised the staff responsible for the contract, but he maintained that he had not taken any action in furtherance of the contract. He also stated that he had self-reported the possible conflict of interest as soon as he identified it and was immediately recused from all matters relating to the contract. The investigation concluded that the official had violated conflict of interest law and regulations. Prosecution was declined. On October 15, 2012, the OIG provided its ROI to the Department for appropriate action.

The Department has informed us that the official received a 2-day suspension, was removed from his Deputy Director position and from the agency's executive staff, and was reassigned to a non-supervisory position. The official subsequently left the Department.

6. The OIG conducted an investigation into information received from BOP that a Warden was engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate and that the Warden may have used his influence to prevent the subordinate from obtaining a position at another institution. The BOP further reported that the Warden had submitted a memorandum to his supervisor denying that he committed misconduct relating to the subordinate. However, when interviewed by the OIG, the Warden admitted that he had engaged in an inappropriate and intimate relationship with a subordinate. The OIG investigation concluded that the Warden had violated BOP policies prohibiting intimate relationships with subordinates and had made false statements in the memorandum to his BOP supervisor. The investigation did not substantiate the allegation that the Warden had used his influence to prevent the subordinate from obtaining another position. On January 30, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to BOP for appropriate action.

On May 14, 2013, BOP informed us that the matter was still pending.
7. The OIG initiated an investigation after the Drug Enforcement Administration identified a Department employee as having purchased prescription pharmaceuticals from an on-line pharmacy without a prescription. During his OIG interview, the employee admitted that he had obtained prescription pharmaceuticals from an on-line pharmacy without a prescription, but he provided documentation of his chronic medical condition and stated that he had completed an on-line medical questionnaire that he believed to have been reviewed and approved by a medical doctor at the time of purchase. He further stated that he had not filed for or received reimbursement from his medical insurance provider for any pharmaceuticals he purchased on-line. The OIG investigation developed no evidence that the employee was engaged in distribution of the prescription drugs and determined that there had been no loss to the insurance provider. Prosecution was declined. On February 21, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the Department for appropriate action.

The Department has informed us that it has decided not to take administrative action.

8. The OIG conducted an investigation into allegations that an FBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) engaged in a relationship with a subordinate FBI employee. The investigation determined that the ASAC and subordinate employee had been involved in a personal relationship for a lengthy period that began before and continued after the subject’s promotion to the ASAC position. The investigation also found that the ASAC was insubordinate by willfully ignoring a former SAC’s instruction to terminate the relationship; that the ASAC and the subordinate misused an FBI vehicle and FBI-issued Blackberry devices in furtherance of the relationship; and that the ASAC had given the subordinate gifts and money in violation of FBI policy. The ASAC also failed to disclose the relationship during his FBI security re-investigation. Prior to the conclusion of the OIG’s investigation, the ASAC requested to be, and was, removed from his position as ASAC and reassigned to a GS-13 Special Agent position within the same field office. On November 15, 2012, the OIG provided its ROI to the FBI for appropriate action.

On May 17, 2013, the FBI informed us that FBI OPR issued a 60-day suspension which the ASAC was in the process of serving.
Appendix: Cases Previously Reported As Pending

This appendix provides the current status of cases reported in February 2013 as awaiting component disciplinary action and the completion of all appeals. At the request of the components, we note that a component's disciplinary action with respect to an individual employee may be informed by the OIG's investigation and findings, the component's findings and conclusions, and additional information that may have been provided to component disciplinary officials in accordance with that component's approved policies and procedures. The appendix also includes corrected information about two cases reported on in the appendix to our February 2013 letter. Unless otherwise noted, this appendix is not intended to amend representations made in previous reports.

1. The OIG's June 2010 letter described an investigation concerning allegations that a Department employee allegedly interfered with an OIG investigation. In the appendix to our February 2013 letter, we erroneously reported that the subject had resigned prior to the issuance of our June 2010 letter. In fact, the subject did not resign, but rather received a letter of reprimand in May 2010. The subject has since retired from federal service.

2. The OIG's June 2010 letter described an investigation in which the OIG concluded that a Department employee's participation in a presentation to Department officials by a contractor's representatives violated ethical standards for federal employees. In the appendix to our February 2013 letter, we erroneously reported that the Department had imposed a 14-day suspension prior to the issuance of our June 2010 letter. In fact, the Department did not impose such a suspension, but rather issued a letter of censure to the employee in July 2011 for violating ethical standards.

3. The OIG's May 2011 letter described an investigation in which the OIG found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that an FBI Special Agent's performance rating was lowered in retaliation for his protected disclosure regarding the alleged improper handling of his transfer from an FBI division based on threats to his personal safety arising from his work. In the appendix to our February 2013 letter, we reported that the FBI had issued non-disciplinary counseling to an FBI supervisor, and that the Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management (OARM) had dismissed some of the Special Agent's retaliation claims but was still reviewing others. On May 30, 2013, OARM informed us that in March 2013 it dismissed the Special Agent's remaining claims without prejudice to refiling based on the parties' stated need for additional time to
complete discovery, and that the Special Agent has until July 15, 2013, to refile his claims for further consideration by OARM.

4. The OIG’s December 2011 letter described an investigation in which the OIG determined that a Department employee had misused his position to arrange for the relative of a friend to be hired under a government contract. The Department has informed us that the employee was formally disciplined in that he received a letter of reprimand in April 2013.

5. The OIG’s February 2013 letter described an investigation in which the OIG determined that an AUSA and an FBI Special Agent had misused their positions and exercised poor judgment when assisting an individual in retrieving a seized firearm from a police department. Our February 2013 letter reported that the AUSA had received a letter of counseling, and that the agent’s appeal of a disciplinary decision was pending. On May 17, 2013, the FBI informed us that the agent’s appeal was still pending.

6. The OIG’s February 2013 letter described an investigation in which the OIG concluded that an FBI SSA violated FBI ethics regulations prohibiting employees from accepting gifts given because of their official position when he received approximately 20 “public safety passes” from the National Basketball Association (NBA) that were intended for official use and gave two of the passes to family members. The FBI has informed us that FBI OPR issued a 3-day suspension, which the SSA served in April 2013.

7. The OIG’s February 2013 letter described an investigation in which the OIG concluded that an FBI SAC violated ethics regulations prohibiting employees from accepting gifts given because of their official position when he received 10 tickets from the NBA for official use only and gave at least 4 tickets to family members, misused official time and government resources to engage in extramarital affairs, and lied under oath. The FBI has informed us that FBI OPR proposed discipline of the SAC, but the SAC resigned in March 2013, prior to FBI OPR issuing a final decision.
The case summaries below include the current status of Department of Justice (Department) component disciplinary action and any appeals thereof. At the request of the components, we note that a component’s disciplinary action with respect to an individual employee may be informed by the Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) investigation and findings, the component’s findings and conclusions, and additional information that may have been provided to component disciplinary officials in accordance with that component’s approved policies and procedures.

1. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) attempted to use his official position during a traffic stop to avoid being arrested for driving while intoxicated. During an interview with the OIG, the AUSA admitted identifying himself as an AUSA to the arresting officer and referencing his relationships with the police chief and a detective, but denied that he did so in an effort to influence the officer’s investigation. He stated that he called the detective while in jail to ask if he could post a bond for him, not to ask to have the case dismissed. However, the detective’s police report stated that the AUSA had called him twice and repeatedly asked whether police personnel could provide assistance with the arrest. The OIG concluded that the AUSA misused his official position in violation of ethics regulations. On April 9, 2013, the OIG provided its Report of Investigation (ROI) to the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) for appropriate action.

EOUSA has informed us that, on May 6, 2013, the AUSA was suspended without pay for two days.

2. The OIG and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) jointly conducted an investigation of allegations that the wife and mother-in-law of an AUSA accepted money from the defendant in a state prosecution in exchange for the AUSA’s assistance in having those charges dismissed. The OIG found that the AUSA exhibited poor judgment when, at the request of his wife, he used his official position to make inquiries of local law enforcement and the defendant’s attorney about the status of the defendant’s case. The OIG also found that, although the AUSA was not involved in the solicitation of a bribe, he learned about a bribe attempt prior to the OIG’s investigation and failed to report it to his supervisors. The AUSA also provided false or misleading information during interviews with the OIG. The AUSA resigned his position on
December 28, 2012. Prosecution was declined. On April 16, 2013, the OIG provided a copy of its ROI to EOUSA and to the Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility.

3. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that a U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) Assistant Director misused government travel funds and committed other misconduct. The OIG found that at the Assistant Director’s insistence, other USMS employees accompanied him on official travel, and that the additional travel expenses were a questionable use of resources and potentially wasteful. The investigation further found that the Assistant Director reassigned a USMS employee for the purpose of allowing the employee to retain a government take home vehicle, and could not articulate a reason for the reassignment. The Assistant Director also used USMS personnel to expedite his processing through U.S. customs upon return from international travel. His doing so and authorizing overtime for the employees constituted misuse of position and waste. The OIG also found significant irregularities in the Assistant Director’s handling of the hiring, renewal, and duties of an independent contractor over a period of three years. For example, he paid the contracts from an account not authorized for the purpose, and that the contractor’s duties were far below those of an employee at an equivalent federal pay grade. Prosecution was declined. On April 25, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the USMS for appropriate action.

The USMS has informed us that the Assistant Director retired on January 11, 2014, before the matter could be adjudicated.

4. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that an FBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) had sexual relationships with and sexually harassed subordinates, creating a hostile work environment. The investigation determined that the ASAC was involved in a sexual relationship with a subordinate, and that the ASAC disregarded for three months his supervisor’s instruction to inform him if a relationship developed with the subordinate. The ASAC admitted that he also misused his assigned government vehicle and Blackberry device to further the relationship. Additionally, the investigation determined that the ASAC sexually harassed other female subordinates, had inappropriate sexual contact with two other subordinates while on duty, retaliated against a female Special Agent after she refused to engage in a romantic relationship with him, and misused his FBI-issued Blackberry device to further his efforts to engage in romantic relationships with approximately 17 female FBI employees, nine of whom were direct subordinates, as well as approximately 29 other women. On April 30, 2013, the OIG provided its findings to the FBI for appropriate action.
On January 3, 2014, the FBI informed us that the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility (FBI OPR) had issued its disciplinary decision and that the ASAC's appeal of that decision remained pending.

5. The OIG conducted an investigation of a Department official alleged to have engaged in misconduct with respect to a contractor. The OIG determined that the official exceeded his authority by directing the contractor to perform work outside the scope of the contract and without using proper procedures; that he allowed the government to accept the contractor's services free of charge; and that the contractor paid for refreshments and incurred costs in providing meeting space without charge to a professional organization in which the official served as an officer, although the official did not request the contractor to do so. The OIG also found that the official discussed a contracting opportunity with only the contractor rather than presenting the matter to appropriate contracting personnel so that the opportunity could be advertised to all potential bidders. Additionally, the OIG found that a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) official with whom the Department official worked likely communicated internal government procurement decisions to the contractor, and that another DEA official assisted a friend's daughter in obtaining employment with the contractor. Prosecution was declined. On June 13, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the Department for appropriate action.

The Department has informed us that the decision was made not to take administrative action against the Department official, as training was deemed to be the appropriate action. The Department official completed the additional training before the OIG provided its ROI to the Department. Additionally, the DEA has informed us that the decision was made not to take administrative action against the two DEA officials, one of whom retired from federal service before the OIG provided its ROI to the Department.

6. The OIG conducted an investigation into whether a Department attorney had engaged in inappropriate activity using his government computer, including accessing pornography. The OIG found that the attorney had visited over 2,500 websites containing adult content and more than 1,100 pornographic images were recovered from his hard drive. The OIG also found that, on multiple days, the attorney had spent the majority of his duty time viewing inappropriate adult websites. Prosecution and civil fraud actions were declined. The attorney retired from federal service prior to an OIG administrative interview. On July 23, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the Department component at which the attorney was employed.
7. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that a DEA official had engaged in outside employment and committed other personnel violations. The OIG investigation found that the official engaged in outside employment without prior DEA approval when he created a security services company and served on the Board of Trustees for two organizations. The official retired from DEA during the investigation. On July 23, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the DEA.

8. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations against an Immigration Judge. The OIG's investigation found, among other things, that the judge solicited immigration attorneys to purchase jewelry from her; borrowed money from an immigration attorney as well as an interpreter employed by the immigration court; failed to recuse herself from cases involving attorneys that were actively representing her family members on various criminal matters when they appeared in her court; and used her title on multiple occasions to request personal information, including a state criminal history report related to a family member. The OIG concluded that the judge had violated the Executive Office of Immigration Review's (EOIR) Ethics and Professionalism Guide with respect to appearances of impropriety, impartiality in performing official duties, use of public office for private gain, and outside employment and activities, as well as an EOIR policy providing guidance concerning recusal orders in immigration proceedings. On September 8, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to EOIR for appropriate action.

On January 9, 2014, EOIR informed us that the matter remained pending while a proposed disciplinary action was being prepared.

9. The OIG conducted two separate investigations of allegations against an FBI official.

The OIG initiated one investigation based on information that, in 2009, the official engaged in misconduct while assigned to an FBI field office. During an interview with the OIG, the official admitted that he provided two personal friends and others with information derived solely from his official duties and had warned a subject of an FBI investigation to cease certain activities following an FBI interview of the subject's brother. The OIG also found that the official had engaged in other misconduct, including a lack of candor in official communications, and that he had created potential security risks by releasing sensitive law enforcement information to media contacts without prior approval. On September 18, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the FBI.
The OIG conducted a second investigation in which separate allegations were not substantiated, but we found that the official lacked candor when interviewed by the OIG. On October 23, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to the FBI.

The official retired from the FBI during the OIG’s investigations.

10. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that an AUSA misled his official position to conduct his own investigation into his wife’s arrest for disorderly conduct and intimidated a witness associated with the arrest. The OIG found that the AUSA identified himself as a “federal prosecutor” to multiple persons while acting in a private capacity; presented his credentials or official business card to the managers of two private business establishments, which resulted in one of the managers allowing him to view a security video; and made intimidating statements to a police officer. The OIG also concluded that the AUSA lacked candor when, among other things, he stated to the OIG that he had not interviewed witnesses related to the arrest. Prosecution was declined. On September 24, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to EOUSA for appropriate action.

On January 3, 2014, EOUSA informed us that the matter was still pending.

11. Based on information from the Department’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP), the OIG conducted an investigation into whether a Department employee had released procurement-sensitive information and engaged in misconduct relating to an organizational conflict of interest. The OIG found, among other things, that the employee directed a change in the Statement of Work so that an existing subcontractor could no longer perform the work required, arranged a new subcontractor’s selection, and received assistance from that new subcontractor when preparing documents in the Request for Quotations. Based on the content and amount of the new subcontractor’s bid, the OIG also found it likely that the employee had shared the government’s internal cost estimate because the bid matched the internal government estimate exactly. The OIG concluded the employee had violated both procurement and ethics regulations prohibiting the disclosure of nonpublic information. Prosecution was declined. On October 23, 2013, the OIG provided its ROI to OJP for appropriate action.

On January 28, 2014, OJP informed us that the matter was still pending.
Appendix: Cases Previously Reported As Pending

This appendix provides the current status of cases reported in June 2013 as awaiting component disciplinary action and the completion of all appeals. At the request of the components, we note that a component’s disciplinary action with respect to an individual employee may be informed by the OIG’s investigation and findings, the component’s findings and conclusions, and additional information that may have been provided to component disciplinary officials in accordance with that component’s approved policies and procedures. Unless otherwise noted, this appendix is not intended to amend representations made in previous reports.

1. The OIG’s May 2011 letter described an investigation in which the OIG found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that an FBI Special Agent’s performance rating was lowered in retaliation for his protected disclosure regarding the alleged improper handling of his transfer from an FBI division based on threats to his personal safety arising from his work. In the appendix to our February 2013 letter, we reported that the FBI had issued non-disciplinary counseling to an FBI supervisor, and that the Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management (OARM) had dismissed some of the Special Agent’s retaliation claims but was still reviewing others. In the Appendix to our June 2013 letter, we reported that, in March 2013, OARM had dismissed the Special Agent’s remaining claims without prejudice to refiling based on the parties’ stated need for additional time to complete discovery. On January 2, 2014, OARM informed us that it has extended the deadline for refiling the Special Agent’s claims, including allegations relating to certain newly asserted personnel actions, until February 3, 2014.

2. The OIG’s February 2013 letter described an investigation in which the OIG determined that an AUSA and an FBI Special Agent had misused their positions and exercised poor judgment when assisting an individual in retrieving a seized firearm from a police department. Our February 2013 letter reported that the AUSA had received a letter of counseling and that the agent’s appeal of a disciplinary decision was pending, and our June 2013 letter reported that the agent’s appeal was still pending. On January 28, 2014, the FBI informed us that the agent retired from the FBI on January 10, 2014, before the appeal could be adjudicated.

3. The OIG’s June 2013 letter described an investigation in which the OIG found that an FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst had failed to disclose on his FBI security and financial disclosure forms certain assets and a default on a $4.1 million commercial loan guarantee, and that he had failed to report in a timely manner that he was named as a defendant in
a lawsuit related to the default. Our June 2013 letter reported that FBI OPR had issued its disciplinary decision, but that an appeal of that decision was still pending. On January 9, 2014, the FBI informed us that the appeal is still pending.

4. The OIG's June 2013 letter described an investigation in which the OIG concluded that a Warden had violated the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) policies prohibiting intimate relationships with subordinates and had made false statements in a memorandum to his BOP supervisor in which he denied committing misconduct. The BOP has informed us that the Warden was removed from the position of Warden and reassigned to a non-supervisory position with a lower pay grade.
U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of the Inspector General  
Summaries of Investigations Requested by Senators Grassley and Coburn  
October 1, 2011 – March 31, 2012

1. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted an investigation of allegations that a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) engaged in a conflict of interest and misused his official position by causing the FBI to enter contracts with an entity at which his brother was employed as a contracting officer. The investigation concluded that a conflict of interest did not arise from the brother’s employment at the contractor. However, the OIG investigation did not support the SSA’s assertions to the FBI and during his OIG interviews that he had previously notified his FBI supervisors and FBI Office of General Counsel of his brother’s employment with the contractor. The OIG determined further that the SSA failed to reveal to the FBI his pre-existing personal relationship with the contractor’s operations manager for an FBI contract that the SSA oversaw. The OIG concluded that the SSA’s unreported personal relationships with personnel working for the contractor created an appearance of favoritism, particularly in light of his managerial influence and advocacy for the contractor within the FBI. The investigation also determined that the SSA disclosed classified information to the contractor without authorization, and subsequently lied about doing so. U.S. Attorney’s Offices declined to prosecute the SSA, one office for false statements to federal officials, and another office for disclosure of classified information. On March 6, 2012, the OIG referred the matter to the FBI for action it determines to be appropriate.

On June 18, 2012, the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility (FBI OPR) issued a Statement of Proposed Action to the SSA. According to that statement, FBI OPR agreed with the OIG’s findings that the SSA’s actions created the appearance of favoritism, and that the SSA lacked candor while not under oath when he failed to make necessary disclosures to his supervisors. However, FBI OPR disagreed with the OIG’s findings that the SSA disclosed classified information and that he lied to FBI and OIG officials while under oath. The statement proposed a 30-day suspension without pay. The FBI’s final decision on this proposed action is pending.

2. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) and his spouse inflated the AUSA’s income on mortgage applications. The OIG identified multiple loan applications that improperly represented income that was derived from real estate investment transactions as salary and bonuses earned by the AUSA. The U.S. Attorney’s Office at which the AUSA is employed was recused from the matter. The OIG presented the case to a different U.S.
Attorney's Office and the Criminal Division's Fraud Section, both of which declined prosecution. On March 14, 2012, the OIG referred this matter to the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys for action it determines to be appropriate.
1. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted an investigation concerning allegations that an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent misused their positions to facilitate the return of evidence (a pistol) to an individual who had been arrested by a police department for having an official police license plate affixed to his personal vehicle. The individual legally possessed the firearm at the time of the seizure. The OIG's investigation determined that the AUSA and the FBI agent misused their positions and exercised poor judgment when they accompanied the individual into the police department building during official duty hours to assist the individual in retrieving his seized firearm. While neither the AUSA nor the FBI agent provided their names to the police, both the AUSA and the FBI agent admitted to the OIG that personnel at the police department were aware that they were federal officials, and the AUSA admitted that she believed their presence provided the individual more credibility. The investigation also determined that the AUSA further misused her position when she informed a police official of an alleged agreement made between the police department and the individual's attorney to have the weapon returned. On April 18, 2012, the OIG provided its Report of Investigation to the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) and the FBI for appropriate actions.

EOUSA informed us that the AUSA received a letter of counseling. On February 8, 2013, the FBI informed us that the agent was suspended without pay for 1 day, but that the agent has appealed the suspension and that appeal is still pending.

2. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Executive Assistant was arrested and charged with domestic violence and battery after an altercation with his wife. The investigation found that the employee was charged in state court with domestic violence and battery, but that the charge against him was subsequently dismissed without prejudice based on his wife’s refusal to cooperate in the prosecution. During a compelled interview with the OIG, the subject admitted that he grabbed and pushed his wife in a defensive manner. The OIG’s investigation determined that these actions violated the DEA Standards of Conduct. On September 16, 2012, the OIG provided its Report of Investigation to the DEA for appropriate action.

The DEA has informed us that the subject received a letter of caution.
3. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that an FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) accepted two tickets to a National Basketball Association (NBA) All-Star Game from a Special Agent, who allegedly received the tickets from the NBA for official use in his capacity as special events coordinator. The SSA allegedly gave the tickets to family members. The OIG investigation determined that the SSA received approximately 20 “public safety passes” from the NBA that were intended for official use and gave two of the passes to family members in violation of FBI ethics regulations prohibiting employees from accepting gifts given because of their official position. The OIG investigation developed no evidence that the Special Agent gave NBA tickets or passes to the SSA or otherwise committed misconduct. Prosecution of the SSA was declined. On September 27, 2012, the OIG provided its Report of Investigation to the FBI for appropriate action.

On February 8, 2013, the FBI informed us that the SSA was suspended without pay for 3 days, but that it was not known whether the SSA will appeal the suspension.

4. The OIG conducted an investigation of allegations that an FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) accepted several tickets to an NBA All-Star Game from the NBA. The OIG investigation determined that the SAC received 10 tickets to various All-Star Game events from the NBA for official use only, including 2 tickets to the All-Star game, and that he gave at least 4 tickets to family members in violation of ethics regulations prohibiting employees from accepting gifts given because of their official position. The OIG investigation further determined that the SAC had misused official time and government resources to engage in extramarital affairs with three women, and that the SAC lied under oath about both his misuse of the tickets and his misuse of official time and government resources during a compelled interview with the OIG. Prosecution of the SAC was declined. On July 24, 2012, the OIG provided its Report of Investigation to the FBI for appropriate action.

On February 8, 2013, the FBI informed us that the employee’s oral hearing regarding proposed discipline occurred in February 2013 and that a final decision by the Assistant Director for FBI Office of Professional Responsibility (FBI OPR) is pending, after which the employee may have the opportunity to appeal to the FBI Disciplinary Review Board. The FBI also informed us that, in August 2012, the subject of this investigation requested and was granted a reduction in pay grade to a non-supervisory GS-13 position.
Appendix: Cases Previously Reported As Pending

This appendix provides the current status of all cases originally reported as awaiting the relevant Department of Justice (Department) component's decision about appropriate disciplinary action. Unless otherwise noted, this appendix is not intended to amend representations made in previous reports.¹

1. The OIG’s June 2010 letter described an investigation concerning allegations that a Department employee verbally abused staff and did not cooperate with the OIG during the investigation. We reported in the June 2010 letter that disciplinary action was pending; however, the subject had resigned prior to the issuance of our letter.

2. The OIG’s June 2010 letter described an investigation that substantiated allegations that a Department employee attempted to view pornography from his government computer. We reported in the June 2010 letter that disciplinary action was pending; however, the Department had imposed a 10-day suspension prior to the issuance of our letter.

3. The OIG’s June 2010 letter described an investigation that found a Department employee had solicited and received political contributions from subordinate employees for fundraisers in a federal workplace, in violation of the Hatch Act. The Department has informed us that, since the issuance of our June 2010 letter, the subject served a 100-day suspension as the result of a settlement with the United States Office of Special Counsel.

4. The OIG’s June 2010 letter described an investigation that found that an FBI manager’s decision to remove an FBI complainant from his position on a particular project was taken in retaliation for the complainant’s various allegations of misconduct, although the complainant’s allegations did not constitute protected disclosures under the whistleblower regulations. The OIG also found that a different employee was not candid in his responses to FBI management when confronted with the complainant’s allegations of misconduct. The FBI disagreed with the OIG’s retaliation finding regarding the manager, and no disciplinary action was taken against him. The FBI has informed us that, since the issuance of our June 2010 letter, it imposed a 14-day suspension on the employee who was found to have lacked candor in his responses to management, and that the employee has served the suspension.

¹ While compiling this appendix, the OIG discovered that, for five cases previously reported as pending, the Department had already taken corrective action at the time of our letter. Those five cases are numbers 1, 2, 5, 6, and 10 of this appendix.
5. The OIG's June 2010 letter described an investigation in which the OIG concluded that a Department employee's participation in a presentation to Department officials by a contractor's representatives violated ethical standards for federal employees. We reported in the June 2010 letter that disciplinary action was pending; however, the Department had imposed a 14-day suspension prior to the issuance of our letter.

6. The OIG's January 2011 letter described an investigation in which the OIG determined that a Department employee misused his position during his arrest for refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test pursuant to a traffic stop. We reported in the January 2011 letter that disciplinary action was pending; however, the Department had imposed a 14-day suspension prior to the issuance of our letter.

7. The OIG's January 2011 letter described an investigation that determined delays in a Department office's internet access were caused by an employee's efforts to view adult pornographic photos and videos on his government computer while on duty. The Department informed us that, since the issuance of our January 2011 letter, it imposed a 10-day suspension on the employee.

8. The OIG's January 2011 letter described an investigation that found three Department employees maintained an inappropriate personal relationship with a known target of another federal agency investigation in violation of government ethics rules and agency policy. The Department has informed us that, since the issuance of our January 2011 letter, it imposed a 3-day suspension on one subject and a 4-day suspension on another subject. The third subject retired prior to the conclusion of the OIG's investigation.

9. The OIG's May 2011 letter described an investigation that substantiated allegations that an AUSA misused his position regarding an alleged dispute between the AUSA's daughter and her college roommates. EOUSA has informed us that, since the issuance of our May 2011 letter, the U.S. Attorney's Office imposed a 10-day suspension on the AUSA.

10. The OIG's May 2011 letter described an investigation that determined an AUSA routinely viewed pornography on his government computer during official duty hours. We reported in the May 2011 letter that disciplinary action was pending; however, the AUSA had resigned prior to the issuance of our letter.

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2 The January 2011 letter, which was issued on January 19, 2011, was mistakenly dated as "January 19, 2010."
11. The OIG’s May 2011 letter described an investigation in which the OIG found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that an FBI Special Agent’s performance rating was lowered in retaliation for his protected disclosure regarding the alleged improper handling of his transfer from an FBI division based on threats to his personal safety arising from his work. The FBI has informed us that it found that the Special Agent’s allegations were unsubstantiated, but issued non-disciplinary counseling to an FBI supervisor for failing to exercise reasonable care in performing her duties regarding the Special Agent’s performance evaluation. On February 11, 2013, the Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management informed us that it had dismissed some of the Special Agent’s retaliation claims but is still reviewing others.

12. The OIG’s December 2011 letter described an investigation in which the OIG found that DEA employees had sought and obtained permission from DEA supervisors for their dependent children to apply for temporary contractor positions and that the requesting employees supervised these staffing companies. The OIG determined that the permission should not have been granted, and that the DEA supervisors should have sought legal and ethics guidance prior to granting such permission. The DEA has informed us that, since the issuance of our December 2011 letter, a supervisor received verbal counseling.

13. The OIG’s December 2011 letter described an investigation that determined a U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) official violated a USMS policy directive by making an unauthorized commitment to a contractor for compensation for work performed prior to the contract issuance. We reported in the December 2011 letter that disciplinary action was pending; however, the subject had received a Letter of Caution prior to the issuance of our letter.

14. The OIG’s December 2011 letter described an investigation into an allegation against the former head of the USMS Complex Asset Team, Leonard Briskman. The USMS has informed us that, since the issuance of our December 2011 letter, Briskman received a Letter of Reprimand.

15. The OIG’s December 2011 letter described an investigation in which the OIG determined that a Department employee misused his position to arrange for the relative of a friend to be hired under a government contract. On February 1, 2013, the Department informed us that the matter is still pending.
16. The OIG's July 2012 letter described an investigation in which we determined that an FBI SSA's unreported personal relationships with personnel working for the contractor created an appearance of favoritism and that the SSA disclosed classified information to the contractor without authorization and subsequently lied about doing so. The FBI has informed us that, since the issuance of our July 2012 letter, FBI OPR disagreed with the OIG's findings that the SSA disclosed classified information without authorization and that he lacked candor while under oath, but that the FBI imposed a 20-day suspension on the SSA for creating an appearance of favoritism and lacking candor while not under oath. The employee has served the suspension.

17. The OIG's July 2012 letter described an investigation in which the OIG identified multiple mortgage loan applications by an AUSA and his spouse that improperly represented income that was derived from real estate investment transactions as salary and bonuses earned by the AUSA. The EOUSA has informed us that, since the issuance of our July 2012 letter, the AUSA received a Letter of Admonishment.
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General
Summaries of Investigations Requested by Senators Grassley and Coburn
April 1, 2011 – September 30, 2011

1. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted an investigation concerning allegations that a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) employee had directed a staffing company to convert temporary contractor positions held by the employee's dependent child and another employee's dependent child to full-time positions. The OIG investigation did not substantiate the allegation that the DEA employee induced or coerced the staffing company to hire employees' dependent children as permanent employees. However, the OIG found that DEA employees had sought and obtained permission from DEA supervisors for their dependent children to apply for temporary contractor positions and that the requesting employees supervised these staffing companies. The OIG determined that the permission should not have been granted, and that the DEA supervisors should have sought legal and ethics guidance prior to granting such permission. On September 29, 2011, the OIG referred the matter to the DEA for action it determines to be appropriate.

2. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations of irregularities in connection with a sole source contract awarded by the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). The OIG did not find a conflict of interest, ethics violation, or contract procurement irregularity. However, the investigation determined that the USMS official violated a USMS policy directive by making an unauthorized commitment to the contractor for compensation for work performed prior to the contract issuance. On August 29, 2011, the OIG referred the matter to the USMS for action it determines to be appropriate.

3. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) misused her position by identifying herself as a U.S. Attorney's Office employee and demanding payment on a debt owed to her boyfriend. The OIG investigation determined that the AUSA sent e-mails on behalf of her boyfriend that contained her official position and title. In addition, the OIG investigation determined that the AUSA made unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information to her boyfriend; used government databases to conduct legal research for her boyfriend; provided her boyfriend access to government computer accounts; and sent a gift to an attorney in order to obtain legal assistance for her boyfriend. The matter was presented to the Criminal
Division, which declined prosecution. The OIG has been advised that on December 9, 2011, the AUSA received a letter of suspension for 14 days.

4. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that an AUSA was arrested for brandishing a gun at his home to a contractor. The local police department arrested the AUSA. Local officials subsequently decided not to file charges. The OIG investigation determined that the AUSA committed off-duty misconduct, misused his official position by telling the arresting officers of his position, and failed to follow supervisory instructions relating to the police investigation. The AUSA resigned prior to the conclusion of the OIG’s investigation. The OIG provided its report to the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys.

5. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning an allegation that a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) official smuggled contraband into a federal prison facility. The OIG investigation determined that the BOP official signed forms authorizing inmates to have items such as shoes and toiletries mailed to the BOP official’s attention at the prison facility, in violation of BOP policies and procedures. The OIG investigation further determined that the BOP official did not thoroughly inspect a package he received on behalf of an inmate and used his government computer to track incoming packages for the same inmate. This investigation was presented to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which declined prosecution. The BOP official resigned prior to the conclusion of the OIG’s investigation. The OIG provided its report to the BOP.

6. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that a Department attorney may be associated with the subject of a child pornography investigation. The OIG investigation determined that the DOJ employee was not associated with the child pornography subject. However, in the course of the investigation, the OIG determined that the employee had used his government computer to visit adult pornography websites. There was no evidence that he had accessed child pornography websites. The employee resigned his Department employment prior to the conclusion of the OIG’s investigation. The OIG provided its report to the Department.

7. The OIG conducted an investigation into an allegation that Leonard Briskman, the lead career official with the USMS Complex Asset Team, owned a private appraisal business that presented a conflict of interest with his official USMS duties, which involved valuing and selling assets. The investigation did not substantiate the allegation of a conflict of interest, but concerns about potential irregularities in the USMS’s management of complex assets prompted the OIG to conduct an audit of the USMS Complex Asset Team. In addition, the OIG investigation determined that Briskman had failed to obtain the required authorization
permitting him to engage in outside employment through his appraisal business. On September 12, 2011, the OIG referred the matter to the USMS for action it determines to be appropriate.

8. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that a Department attorney identified himself as a federal prosecutor to local police and another person at the scene of a minor automobile accident in which he was involved as a passenger. The attorney was initially arrested for assault, but the charges were eventually dismissed. The OIG investigation determined that the attorney had identified himself as a federal prosecutor to the police in an attempt to influence the police action. The OIG provided its report to the Department, and the OIG was advised that on December 1, 2011, the Department attorney received a letter of counseling.

9. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning an allegation that a Department employee arranged for the relative of a friend to be hired under a government contract. The OIG determined that the employee misused his position. The OIG provided its report to the Department for action it determines to be appropriate.
1. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted an investigation concerning allegations that an official at the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) improperly used his position to influence a contract award process, had a personal affair with a subordinate DEA employee, and arranged official travel to pursue his affair. The OIG investigation did not substantiate any misconduct relative to the contract issue or the travel allegations. However, the OIG investigation determined that the DEA official engaged in a sexual relationship with a subordinate employee in violation of DEA’s Standards of Conduct. Furthermore, the OIG investigation determined that the DEA official violated federal merit system principles when he recommended the subordinate employee for a lateral transfer without disclosing his relationship with her to the selecting official. The official retired from DEA the day after his interview with the OIG.

2. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations involving spousal abuse by an employee at the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). The USMS employee and the spouse each claimed that he or she was assaulted during a domestic dispute incident and received medical treatment at separate facilities for injuries sustained. The USMS employee was arrested, first and second degree assault charges were filed, but the first degree assault charge was dismissed prior to trial and the USMS employee was found not guilty of the second degree assault charge. A second degree assault charge was also filed against the spouse, and she was found not guilty on that charge. The OIG reported its findings to the USMS, and they cautioned the USMS employee but imposed no further disciplinary action.

3. The OIG conducted an investigation into allegations that an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) misused his position regarding an alleged dispute between the AUSA’s daughter and her roommates. The complainant alleged that the AUSA contacted his daughter and the roommates, stated that he was an AUSA, used profane language, and threatened to have the roommates arrested and expelled from college. The AUSA admitted contacting his daughter’s roommates, but denied stating he was an AUSA and denied using profanity. During the investigation, the OIG determined that the AUSA had sent e-mails to a parent of one of the roommates containing the AUSA’s position and work address from the AUSA’s government computer. The e-mails also contained threats of
physical harm directed towards one of the roommates. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegations, and disciplinary action against the AUSA is pending.

4. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that an AUSA was using his government computer to view inappropriate material on his government computer. The investigation determined that the AUSA routinely viewed adult content during official duty hours, and that there was at least one image of child pornography recovered on the AUSA's government computer. The AUSA acknowledged that he had spent a significant amount of time each day viewing pornography. The U.S. Attorney's Office declined prosecution. Disciplinary action against the AUSA is pending.

5. The OIG conducted an investigation into allegations that a Department attorney made harassing telephone calls to the employee's former supervisor using a DOJ telephone. The OIG substantiated the allegations. The employee resigned from DOJ upon receiving notice of his proposed termination.

6. The OIG conducted an investigation into allegations that officials within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) retaliated against an FBI Special Agent for making protected disclosures regarding the alleged improper handling of his transfer from an FBI division based on threats to his personal safety arising from his work. The OIG found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Special Agent's lowered performance rating was a reprisal for his protected disclosure. The OIG, however, noted that the Special Agent's performance rating was corrected by the FBI's Human Resources Division when the Special Agent filed an appeal concerning his rating. The OIG also found that FBI supervisors made revisions to two threat assessment reports relating to the Special Agent that were highly biased and unfair to the agent. We identified the supervisor who was responsible for the unfair changes in one of the reports, and recommended that she be disciplined. However, because FBI witnesses said they were unable to recall who made the changes to the other report, the OIG was not able to determine with certainty the person or persons responsible for those revisions. With the Special Agent's consent, the OIG provided its report to the Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management for further consideration of the Special Agent's retaliation claim, and to the FBI with a recommendation for disciplinary action relating to the conduct of a supervisor who altered one of the threat assessment reports and unfairly downgraded the agent's performance rating. The OIG also recommended that the unfair threat assessment reports be expunged from FBI records. The FBI has not yet responded to these recommendations.
1. The Office of the Inspector (OIG) conducted an investigation concerning allegations that a Department of Justice (DOJ) employee engaged in actions that were a conflict of interest, received gratuities, and shared privileged billing information with a contractor.

The OIG investigation determined the employee had received a lunch from a contractor that twice exceeded the allowable amount and that the employee provided information to another unrelated contractor before a bid was awarded. The investigation did not conclude that the employee released any billing information as alleged. The DOJ employee received a 14-day suspension.

2. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that a DOJ employee misused his position and threatened a young student.

The OIG investigation established that the employee had misused his position, sent a threatening e-mail to the student, and confronted the student in a school hallway. The employee received a 2-day suspension.

3. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that a DOJ employee allegedly interfered with an OIG investigation.

The investigation disclosed that the employee verbally abused staff and did not cooperate with the OIG during the investigation. Disciplinary action is pending.

4. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that a DOJ employee engaged in a conflict of interest by awarding payments to a contract interpreter with whom he was romantically and financially involved.

The OIG substantiated the allegations. The DOJ employee resigned from his position.

5. The OIG conducted an investigation in 2009 concerning allegations that a DOJ employee misused his position to secure employment for a friend with a contractor conducting business with DOJ.

The OIG substantiated the allegation, and the DOJ employee was given a letter of admonishment.
6. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning an allegation that a DOJ employee was involved in an intimate relationship with a subordinate.

The OIG investigation substantiated the allegation, and the employee received a 15-day suspension.

7. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that a DOJ employee repeatedly attempted to view adult and possibly child pornography from his government computer while working.

The investigation substantiated the allegations that the employee attempted to view pornography and searched several Internet sites for "teens." Disciplinary action is pending.

8. The OIG investigated an allegation that a DOJ employee had an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate.

The OIG investigation substantiated that the employee had an intimate relationship with a subordinate and failed to recuse himself from decisions concerning the promotion of the subordinate. The employee retired from DOJ.

9. The OIG investigated an allegation that a DOJ employee improperly solicited campaign contributions from her subordinates and participated in two campaign fundraisers hosted by her husband.

The OIG found that the employee had solicited and received political contributions from subordinate employees for both fundraisers, in violation of the Hatch Act. The matter was referred to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel for appropriate action.

10. The OIG investigated allegations that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) management retaliated against an employee in violation of whistleblower regulations for disclosing information about another employee's misconduct.

The OIG found that an FBI manager's decision to remove the complainant from his position on a particular project was taken in retaliation for the complainant's various allegations of misconduct, although the allegations did not constitute protected disclosures under the whistleblower regulations. The OIG also found that a different employee was not candid in his responses to FBI management once confronted with the complainant's allegations of misconduct.
The FBI Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) disagreed with the retaliation finding regarding the manager, and no disciplinary action was taken against him. FBI OPR found that the other employee was not candid in his responses to management and recommended a 14-day suspension. Final disciplinary action is pending.

11. The OIG investigated an allegation that a DOJ employee improperly lobbied members of Congress.

The OIG investigation did not substantiate the allegations of improper lobbying of Congress. However, the OIG found that the employee used DOJ letterhead and his official title to send campaign contributions to support candidates in partisan elections, and also directed his subordinates to type his private correspondence on official letterhead. As a result of this investigation the employee resigned from his position.

12. The OIG investigated complaints that a DOJ employee gave preferential treatment to two federal contractors.

The OIG concluded that the employee’s participation in a presentation to DOJ officials by one of the contractor’s representatives violated ethical standards for federal employees. Disciplinary action is pending.

13. The OIG investigated allegations that a former DOJ employee improperly participated in awarding grants that benefitted corporations for which the employee’s spouse was a consultant.

The OIG found that the employee’s conduct violated the requirement that federal employees avoid the appearance of violating ethical standards. The employee resigned from DOJ prior to the conclusion of our investigation.

14. The OIG investigated an allegation that FBI supervisors retaliated against an employee for making protected disclosures.

The OIG found that the complainant’s disclosures were not protected disclosures within the meaning of the whistleblower regulations and that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that his supervisors retaliated against him because of his disclosure.

15. The OIG investigated allegations that a DOJ employee improperly alerted an informant to information collected in the course of an investigation of the informant. During our investigation, evidence
arose that one of the employee's supervisors failed to report allegations of misconduct.

Our investigation determined that the DOJ employee committed misconduct in his handling of the informant. We also found that two supervisors were negligent in supervising the employee, and that one of those supervisors failed to report the misconduct. The employees have since retired. The supervisors were both disciplined, with one supervisor receiving a 3-day suspension and the other supervisor receiving a 5-day suspension.

16. The OIG investigated allegations that a correctional officer smuggled tobacco into a correctional facility.

In the OIG criminal investigation the correctional officer accepted $1,300 from an undercover OIG agent in exchange for agreeing to smuggle tobacco into the facility. The U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of Texas declined prosecution. We disagreed with that conclusion. We presented the case to the local District Attorney, who prosecuted the correctional officer. The correctional officer entered a conditional plea to one count of bribery, with the final adjudication of guilt deferred until his sentence of 36 months probation is completed. He also was ordered to pay a $2,000 fine.
1. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted an investigation concerning allegations that a Department of Justice (DOJ) employee attended political events without receiving prior approval as required by DOJ policy for non-career employees and misused sick leave. The OIG substantiated the allegations. The employee resigned from DOJ prior to the investigation being completed and withdrew a pending application with another DOJ component.

2. The OIG conducted an investigation concerning allegations that a DOJ employee was arrested for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test pursuant to a traffic stop. The investigation also determined the employee misused his position during his arrest. The investigation further developed information that he had recently been arrested for public intoxication. The subject pled guilty in state court to refusing to undergo the breathalyzer test, and the DUI charges were dropped. Administrative disciplinary action is pending.

3. An OIG investigation was initiated upon discovery that a DOJ employee's government issued computer was causing an internet delay in accessing information within the office system. The OIG's investigation determined the delay was caused by blocked adult websites that the employee visited in an effort to view adult pornographic photos and videos while on duty. Administrative disciplinary action is pending.

4. An OIG investigation was initiated based on information that a DOJ employee was involved in a physical altercation outside a local restaurant. Local police responded and reported that the DOJ employee was restrained by two civilians after witnesses saw the DOJ employee slam his girlfriend into a parked truck. The officers reported the DOJ employee was intoxicated and unruly. The investigation substantiated the allegations, and the DOJ employee received a 14 day suspension.

5. The OIG investigated allegations that three DOJ employees maintained an inappropriate personal relationship with a known target of another federal agency investigation. The OIG found that the DOJ employees' relationship with the target violated government ethics rules and agency policy. Disciplinary action is pending.
6. The OIG investigated allegations that a DOJ employee engaged in a sexual relationship with a confidential source, stole evidence seized during a DOJ investigation, and misused his position to influence an investigation. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegations, and the employee retired from the Department.

7. The OIG investigated allegations that a DOJ employee accepted a gift from a prohibited source in violation of government ethics rules. The OIG substantiated the allegation, and the DOJ employee received a letter of censure.