The Origin and Development of 3-US

A Brief History Prepared Shortly After World War II

Introduction

As its name implies, 3-US was the American section in Hut 3; it was primarily concerned with providing liaison between the intelligence agencies at Bletchley Park and G-2 Washington. But it was much more than that.

The unit responsible to G-2 Washington for the handling of Ultra in the European Theater was the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, London (MID, WD, London). But since all intelligence derived from Ultra necessarily passed through Hut 3, the controlling part of MID, WD, London, naturally found its home in the Hut.

Much that went on in 3-US was not properly the business of Hut 3. Such questions, for example, as which individuals at American commands should be entitled to have access to Ultra, or what action should be taken on violations of security regulations at American commands—questions which on the British side were handled at Broadway Buildings—were normally handled in 3-US. As far as possible in the pages which follow, such matters receive slight, if any, mention. An attempt is made to divorce the wider function of MID, WD, London, from the purely Hut 3 commitment of 3-US.

In general, the main function of 3-US was to see that Ultra was properly disseminated to the various American headquarters authorized to receive it. In this connection, the chief task of the section was to select and edit CX/MSS for transmission to G-2 Washington.

As the various purely American headquarters under Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) were set up, 3-US was charged with the responsibility of supplying properly trained intelligence officers to each U.S. Army and Tactical Air Command as well as to Army Groups and Air Forces. Inevitably this made 3-US the intermediary between American headquarters and Hut 3, and 3-US regularly long-stopped other sections in reviewing the routing of signals to commands.

In addition to serving as liaison between the British and Americans, 3-US was responsible for disseminating to all Allied headquarters information of military value gleaned from diplomatic sources. In this way 3-US, like the other sections of the Hut, played a part in drafting, for field commands, signals based on Ultra.

Detailed descriptions of the service to Washington and the handling of diplomatic traffic for the field will be found in the sections that follow. But first an inspection of the origin and growth of 3-US is in order.

Biography

Genesis (April—September 1943)

The pre-natal history of 3-US must receive a disproportionate amount of space in this account. Without a knowledge of the conferences and correspondence between G-2 Washington and GC & CS during the six months prior to October 1943, 3-US as a section would be puzzling. Why the section came into being and what it was eventually to be is made clear from examining the records of this period.

The "Huts" at Bletchley Park were buildings where various cryptologic functions were performed. Hut 3, for example, was responsible mainly for the reporting—or "end product"—function of Ultra and other communications intelligence information.

Ultra was the common U.K.—U.S. coverterm for high-level Comint, or Special Intelligence.

The main series of Special Intelligence (or Ultra) providing information on the German Army and Air Force was the CX/F/JQ/MSS series of decrypts from German Army and Air Force Enigma traffic. The series was labeled CX/FJ until May 1940, CX/JQ from May 1940 to June 1941, and then it became CX/MSS.

4 Government Code and Cypher School, the official title of the British Comint organization at Bletchley Park.
3--US grew out of the original G--2 mission to GC & CS, which was composed of Col. Alfred McCormack and Lt. Col. Telford Taylor, representing G--2, and Mr. William F. Friedman, technical assistant and representative of Arlington Hall (Army’s Signal Security Agency). This trio arrived in England on 25 April 1943. At that time difficult and protracted negotiations were under way between G--2 and GC & CS with respect to the part, if any, which G--2 and Arlington Hall should play in the production and exploitation of CX/MSS and similar material. GC & CS originally, for security and other reasons, wished to maintain the Bletchley Park monopoly, whereas, G--2 and Arlington Hall wished to set up a separate establishment to produce and exploit CX/MSS in Washington, presumably as part of Arlington Hall and G--2. The first task of the G--2 mission, therefore, was to discover whether there was any necessity for a separate American CX/MSS center, or whether more satisfactory results could be achieved by combining with the GC & CS personnel at Bletchley Park.

At the same time that the G--2 mission was studying this question at Bletchley, negotiations were going on in Washington between Commander Travis and Col. Carter Clarke, culminating in a written agreement dated 17 May. In general, the agreement provided for complete interchange between Britain and the United States of all information concerning signals intelligence. The U.S. assumed as its main responsibility the reading of Japanese, the British the reading of German and Italian military and air codes and ciphers. Concerning the as yet unborn 3--US, the agreement specified:

1. U.S. liaison officers will be appointed at GC & CS to examine messages and summaries and select those desired for transmission to Washington for G--2 or the Theater Commanders. All decoded material will be made available to those officers. Decoded giving information regarding Order of Battle will be handled as at present, i.e., through U.S. liaison officers in War Office and Air Ministry, respectively.

2. Decodes or summaries to be passed to Washington through existing British channels.

3. Special Intelligence from this source will be passed to Commanders-in-Chief in the field through the special British units provided for this purpose. The officer in command of these units will have direct access to the Commander-in-Chief and advise as necessary on the security aspect of handling and using this intelligence. Where an American officer is Commander-in-Chief, an American officer, properly trained and indoctrinated at Bletchley Park, will be attached to the unit to advise and act as liaison officer to overcome difficulties that may arise in regard to differences in language.

Early in June the G--2 mission was dissolved. Col. McCormack and Mr. Friedman returned to America, leaving Lt. Col. Taylor as G--2’s representative on Ultra matters in this theater. Ultra matters included not only the productions of Bletchley Park but of related agencies, notably Berkeley Street and Ryder Street.

Throughout June and July nothing was done to implement the G--2/GC & CS agreement. Col. Taylor confined himself almost exclusively to diplomatic traffic, and while awaiting the arrival of assistants devoted little or no time to Hut 3 and its products. Late in July, however, he shifted the center of his activities to Bletchley Park, and for about a month he underwent schooling in the mysteries of the Park in general and Hut 3 in particular. Meanwhile, he continued to work on Ultra other than CX/MSS, and throughout August transmitted by cable to Washington a few of the more important items in ISK and ISOS and related series. After being thus engaged for almost a month he felt ready to begin a regular service. On 23 August he was joined by Major McKee; on 27 August the first CX/MSS was signalled to Washington, this initial message revealing that Army Group B under Rommel was taking over command of the German forces in upper Italy.

No sooner had the service started than trouble arose. As has been noted the agreement made in May had, rather curiously, provided that intelligence relating to order of battle would continue to be transmitted to G--2 by the War Office and Air Ministry. In fact, however, the ministries transmitted little order-of-battle intelligence derived from special intelligence, and that which was sent was in a form quite inadequate for the needs of the German Order of Battle Section in G--2. Furthermore, no arrangements had been made to handle the large volume of traffic to Washington; there were serious delays in transmission and perceptible irritation on both sides. Various officers at the War Office took a rather cool view of the whole proceedings.

At the end of August, just as the service was starting, it became known that General Strong, the Assistant Chief of Staff (A.C. of S.), G--2, War Department, was on his way to visit England and Bletchley Park. Col. Taylor was informed that, pending further discussion with General Strong, he was to send no more material to Washington. Col. Taylor pointed out that this would cast a small cloud over the General Strong’s arrival and urgently requested that he continue the service so that the General would not appear to be confronted with a fait accompli when he arrived. This was agreed to, and a few more items were transmitted until several days after General Strong’s arrival. Nothing further was sent until the end of the month.

The matter came to a head at a conference early in September, attended by General Menzies, General Strong, Commander Travis, Mr. De Grey, Group
Captain Jones and Col. Taylor. At this meeting it was agreed that Col. Taylor should select and transmit CX/MSS material to Washington, but that his selection should be conservative and not include "low order" order-of-battle information. The appropriate ministry was to be informed of every item sent. It was further agreed that ISK and ISOS material of a purely political nature was to be transmitted by Major Calfee from Ryder Street, and similar material of a military nature was to be sent by Col. Taylor from Bletchley Park.

The accord reached was short-lived. Soon after the meeting General Strong reversed the previous decision and agreed with General Menzies that no CX/MSS should be sent from Bletchley Park.

There followed numerous consultations. While these were being held General Strong returned (to Washington, conferred with Col. Clarke, decided that he had made a mistake, and on 15 September directed Col. Taylor to try to reinstate the previous arrangements.

The position taken by the Americans may be summed up in two points which were stressed at the time: (1) Intelligence of more than momentary significance, which is important enough to send to commands abroad, is also important enough to send to responsible staff officers in Washington; further, what is important enough for ministries from the long-range standpoint is equally important for the intelligence organization in the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the War Department in Washington. (2) The selection of the material to be passed to Washington must be done not at ministries by British personnel but at Bletchley Park by Americans who are familiar with the requirements of G-2.

A week or so elapsed during which frequent parleys were held. Eventually the matter was favorably concluded at a conference attended by General Menzies, General Davidson, Group Captain Jones and Col. Taylor. In brief, the agreement, dated 25 September, made Col. Taylor responsible for the selection of what was to be passed to Washington; he was also to keep the War Office and the Air Ministry informed of items passed. The appropriate ministry was responsible for any notes or comments other than the purely factual ones which were made on the text selected for transmission. Two days later the service was resumed, and 3-US, as yet unnamed, may be said to have entered the world.

Infancy (September 1943—January 1944)

At the outset, as might be expected, the volume of traffic transmitted was low. It was the desire of the
ministries that Col. Taylor's selections be conservative, since communications facilities for handling large volumes of traffic had not yet been developed. Also, the small staff at Bletchley Park, a staff of two, had much to learn, and on the receiving end much had to be done to assemble and train personnel to process the incoming material. Gradually, as the staff in Washington gained experience, the principles for selection of material broadened. But it was soon evident thatCols. Taylor and McKee needed reinforcements. The first of these, Captain Slusser, arrived in November, and toward the end of December numerous others began to assemble.

This phase was, for the most part, one of experimentation and planning for the future. Problem areas had to be explored and resolved, including (1) the form which the Washington cables were to take, (2) the route by which the material was to be sent, and (3) the establishment of techniques by which the nature of the material could be easily distinguished. By the end of the year, however, these problems had been resolved and the machinery was functioning smoothly.

Meanwhile, in Europe and America intensive searches were conducted to locate qualified personnel. Plans for servicing American commands, plans for absorbing Americans in the Watch, and plans for improving the flow of material to Washington were the problems of the moment.

And by January, when a large number of inexperienced Americans were first groping down the dark corridors of Hut 3, Col. Taylor's section was considered sizable enough and different enough to receive its name. 3-US first appeared on the distribution list of Hut 3 periodicals in January, when the section entered upon a new phase.

Adolescence (January—June 1944)

At the beginning of 1944 the interests of 3-US were three-fold:
(1) the service to Washington had to be continued and developed,
(2) American officers who were to take their place alongside the British in the Watch as air or military advisors had to be trained, and
(3) a large number of others who were to be assigned to those American headquarters which were to receive regular service from Hut 3 had to be indoctrinated.

Seldom have so many absorbed so much in so little time.

Little need be said of the first matter. The staff of 3-US responsible for feeding G-2 quickly grew from three to seven persons, although only five worked in operations, since both Cols. Taylor and McKee devoted almost all their time to establishing liaison with the various potential customers in the field. The only noteworthy change in the service to Washington was a steady extension, notably in items pertaining to the German Air Force and in non-Hut 3 material like Police and Abwehr.

Equally, little need be said here of the training of advisors. The individuals had been picked by G-2, and they were admirably trained by the veterans of Hut 3. Their sole connection with 3-US was administrative, although they unconsciously played a role in the development of the section by providing close liaison with other elements.

But others who frequented Hut 3 prior to receiving a field assignment presented a different problem. Again, the training they received was entirely due to the cooperation of specialists in Hut 3, but the program worked out for them, and the assignments they eventually received were the concern of 3-US.

As early as October 1943 Col. Taylor was involved in the questions relating to the service to be afforded American commands. In mid-December negotiations were under way to secure some sort of Ultra service to the then American Theater Commander, General Devers, and his chief intelligence officer, General Sibert. In mid-January Col. Taylor took part in discussions to begin service to COSSAC and its subordinate commands. In particular he was instrumental in the decision to service First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG, later 12th Army Group).

FUSAG was still in a state of activation and was not ready for the normal Hut 3 service, but beginning late in January and continuing for almost three months the Group received, once a day, a summary of Ultra messages which threw light on the situation in France and the Low Countries. That summary was a commitment of 3-US. In addition to this, 3-US was called upon to perform various minor tasks of a research nature with a view to assisting the not-yet operational intelligence section of FUSAG.

Meanwhile, those receiving training as prospective recipients at a command were learning the conventions, methods, and capabilities of Hut 3; they were also touring operational commands in the Mediterranean to see how Ultra was handled in the field. Their assignment, outlined in the agreement of 17 May 1943, was to insure that each purely American command had an officer who was thoroughly familiar with Hut 3, with British military phraseology, and with the necessity for secure handling of the material. Their very real contribution to the growth of 3-US was in bringing home to the section the tactical value of Ultra.

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*Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander.
During these months the section was suffering from growing pains, and was painfully learning how much there was to know. Thanks to the initiative of Col. Taylor and the policy of Hut-3, 3-US participated in various communal activities. It was represented on the Western Front Committee; it was represented on the Black Sea and Aegean Study Groups. The section regularly contributed a member at weekly meetings of SHAPE preparyory to the June invasion. It also furnished officers who occasionally journeyed to London to brief the G-2 of PUSAG.

Finally, toward the end of this period 3-US undertook to service commands with military information derived from diplomatic traffic. Col. Taylor had noticed that such information, when disseminated by the ministries, was reaching the field sporadically and belatedly. He proposed that this be remedied by a regular service, and that, by virtue of Arlington Hall's contribution in this field and his section's liaison with Berkeley Street, the new service be undertaken by 3-US. In this way began the Bay series, described in detail later in this history. The series was still young when Overlord was launched, and by this time 3-US may be said to have come of age.

Young Manhood (June 1944—January 1945)

The previous phase had been one of rapid growth, of preparation for the future. The months immediately following D-Day were marked by slight readjustments, but the character of the section had been formed.

The new phase opened with an attempt to somewhat formalize the section. Col. Taylor and his deputy Col. McKee had responsibilities which extended far beyond the fences of Bletchley Park. Within 3-US a Duty Officer was appointed. In addition, there were two officers producing the Bay series, two officers processing military information for G-2, another two similarly employed on the air side, and two charming and competent secretaries who, besides maintaining morale, did the stenographic work, the typing and a host of routine tasks.

At the beginning of this phase, service to Washington was considerably improved by shipping bag items by air rather than by water. Beginning 12 June those items not considered cable-worthy were sent by plane thrice weekly, which resulted not only in a speedier but a more regular delivery of material to G-2.

At the same time another attempt to speed up service was made. During most of its existence 3-US worked on a day shift only, from 0900 to 1800. Immediately after Overlord, partly because of the great increase in traffic, partly because the situation was thought crucial, but chiefly in an effort to get cables to G-2 sooner, the section operated on the evening shift as well. The experiment was short-lived. After a few weeks it was abandoned, since it was found that the more urgent material did not reach the section until after midnight, and, because of a difference between Washington and London time, such messages could reach General Bissell (A.C. of S., G-2) early in the day if processed at Bletchley Park in the morning.

The new phase in the section's history was further marked by the fact that there was no one then training to become a recipient in the field. By mid-June the section had turned out fourteen "specialists" who were assigned to field units.

At this time the section also began supplementing services to U.S. Strategic Air Forces headquarters (USSTAF, 8th and 15th Air Forces), preparing summaries which provided a background of ground information, now required because of their new, tactical role. After a short time the summaries became unnecessary since the commands soon acquired the ability to digest the regular Hut 3 service.

Originally, the messages prepared for Washington were submitted to Lt. Cdr. Dudley-Smith's Section, which reviewed them and prepared them for the codists. The arrangement had been made partly, it may be, for monitoring, but also for guidance. For months before Overlord the system had seemed unnecessary. Finally, at the beginning of July, 3-US itself prepared its messages for transmission.

A further step in maturing was taken in September, when it was ruled that all CX/MSS was to be sent to Washington by bag, the cable service continuing for those items which were timely. (The details will be found in the next section.)

Little more need be said of this phase. The tie between 3-US and the field was strengthened by frequent visits to the commands by Cols. Taylor and McKee, by brief visits to the field of Hut 3 personnel, and by the periodic return to Bletchley Park of recipients. The manpower problem was always present; either the section seemed overstuffed or understaffed. (Such matters are also discussed later.) But, in general, it may be said that the section functioned along the lines laid out, and not until mid-January were there signs of any significant change.

Maturity (February—May 1945)

Something of a revolution in the life of the section was the change which was actually made in the middle of February but which was being planned during the second
The grounds at Bletchley Park on which the huts are located

half of January. An account of the new departure will be found in the following section. In brief, the work of the section was halved overnight when Washington began receiving signals direct from the Watch. Thereafter the function of 3-US was, as far as its commitment to G-2, one of reviewing what the Watch had sent, and of supplementing it. At once it became obvious that the staff could be greatly lessened.

A few months later a further step in reducing the section was taken. As it turned out, the new step never had a chance of developing. In theory the plan was good, whether it would have worked out in practice is of course not known. The plan was to do away entirely with officers whose sole function had been servicing Washington. In their stead an air and a military advisor were to spend a week in the section on a rotating system. It was thought this would more closely tie the section in with other sections and would give G-2 the benefit of the greater knowledge and experience of the advisors. What happened was that, owing to illness of advisors and a delay in the orders of the then redundant personnel, only a half-hearted attempt was made to implement the scheme. Before it could be tested the Wehrmacht came to terms, and 3-US, along with other sections in the Hut, turned to fresh fields and new pastures.

The Washington Commitment

Principles of Selection

First and last the primary commitment of 3-US was to select and edit military and air items from CIC/MSS for transmission to Washington. But G-2 had, during the protracted discussions of September 1943, requested and secured permission to receive "all desired intelligence." Precisely what was to be selected was left to the staff of 3-US. Now and then a polite or indignant signal would be received from G-2 indicating what should or should not

SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMM. CHANNELS ONLY
have been sent, and on various occasions 3-US queried G–2 as to their needs. But little formal guidance was
given from Washington. The staff was held responsible
for passing all “important” information. Inevitably there
were the border-line cases, and it is to be feared that the
patient scholar, if he compared carefully the output of
Hut 3 with what was sent to G–2, would detect certain
inconsistencies in the selection.

Curiously enough the principles of selection were never
formalized and reduced to paper. A green staff at
Bletchley Park selected material for a green staff in
Washington. The unbelievable patience, interest, and
wisdom of key people in the Hut served to guide 3-US.
Fortunately, too, the staff of 3-US threw itself with
enthusiasm into the work, and as time went on certain
unwritten principles evolved out of almost daily and
sometimes rather pedantic discussions as to whether a
given item was or was not of value to G–2.

In the beginning the selection was heavily weighted on
the ground side, largely because of the background of the
early members of the section. In mid-January 1944 Lt.
Kellogg, a trained air intelligence officer, joined the
section, and after he had become operational, which was
in the short period of a month, the air content of messages
more than held its own against the ground.

Naval messages caused a certain amount of trouble.
The original agreement of May 1943 had limited 3-US
to air and military intelligence. But many messages which
were predominantly naval had a definite bearing on air or
ground matters. These were normally transmitted, although in theory it was the American Navy, through the
Admiralty, which passed such information to the few
high-ranking leaders in Washington who were entitled to
have access to Ultra.

The matter came to a head in April 1944. The
particular item, pertaining to German troubles in the
Crimea, was admittedly naval in origin but was
interservice in application. Because of its significance it
was taken, at the request of the Prime Minister, direct to
the President. Naval authorities then raised the question
as to whether 3-US had the right to pass such
information. Conferences ensued, and documents were
written, which are the only record in writing as to the
principles of selection then in force. It should be added
that no further objections on the part of the Navy were
raised.

Washington’s interest was naturally strategic rather
than tactical. Hence, as a matter of course they were sent
major order-of-battle items, messages throwing light on
future operations, on manpower, on policy. But even from
the start they also received the more significant so-called
tactical items.

Supplementing what was selected from CX/MSS, 3-US
also culled from Police Abwehr, diplomatic and low-grade
military and air sources items which were of military
significance.

As G–2 and 3-US grew, the volume tended to rise.
Eventually, in the spring of 1944, when the primary
concern of G–2 was Overlord, some of the material
previously cabled was sent by bag, and all items relating
to the Western Front were cabled. And immediately prior
to Overlord, when the volume jumped to unprecedented
heights, 3-US was forced to restrict itself, as far as cables
were concerned, to the major items dealing with France
and Italy.

By the summer of 1944 Washington was able to cope
with all that 3-US was sending, and the selection of items
to go by bag had increased to such a point that only a
small proportion of teleprints and reports were not being
passed. At the beginning of September, almost a year
after the Washington service had started, 3-US proposed
that G–2 be put on a par with the ministries in London
by receiving a copy of all teleprints and reports. The
matter was taken up with Group Captain Jones, who
secured the necessary permission from British authorities,
and beginning on 9 September the selection of items for
the bag automatically ceased, since all were sent. At the
same time, the almost intolerable burden of reporting
each transmitted item to the ministries was dispensed
with, since the ministries knew that Washington was
getting the total output.

For the next four months the task of selecting items
was restricted to what should go by cable, in what form it
should go, and what priority it should receive. Then, in
February, a major change developed which further
affected the principles of selection. In the interests of
speed and economy it was decided that, with certain
exceptions, signals originating in the Watch should be
passed directly to Washington. Thereafter, 3-US
restricted itself to reviewing what had been signalled,
augmenting the messages where necessary, and selecting
from reports, ROB’s, etc., items which were thought
important enough to be cabled. Thus, during the final
three months of the section’s life, the task of selection
dwindled.

In addition to selecting raw material from the normal
output of Hut 3 and related agencies, 3-US was also
responsible for passing to G–2 significant appreciations or
comments by ministries or commands. From the
beginning 3-US was allowed to scan all AIX’s and

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*Reports based on decrypts of German signals relating to Russian
order of battle.
MIX's\(^{16}\) and forward to G-2 those which might be of use in Washington. Soon the service was widened. A Hut 3 Directive of 8 December 1943 announced that "Brigadier Strong and Air Commodore Woolley have been granted facilities to repeat certain Ultra appreciations (sent to War Office and/or Air Ministry) to Washington, to fulfill an obligation which they have through General Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff there. Normally replies to such signals will also be repeated to Washington in order to maintain a balanced picture there." The surprised historian reads in a note of the same date: "Such signals will be cleared to Washington by bag or by CXG signal at the discretion of Lt. Col. Taylor's section. If Lt. Col. Taylor's Duty Officer is not on the premises, Signals Officer will refer to Hut 3 D.O. for decision." What is surprising is the reference to Lt. Col. Taylor's Duty Officer at this date, when Taylor's section consisted of himself, Lt. Col. McKee, and Capt. Slusser.

Mention should be made of the handling of items in the "C" series. What was passed to the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), and his equivalent at the other ministries, it was early agreed, should not be withheld from the G-2. But every item in this series which was passed to Washington was first cleared with Group Captain Jones. By no means all items were sent. Perhaps half were considered of sufficient importance to be selected. These originally went addressed "Eyes Only," followed by the names of the three recipients: the Chief of Staff (General Marshall), G-2 (General Strong, later General Bissell), and the Special Security Officer (General Clarke). Beginning late in August 1944 such items were passed in what was known as the MCC series, restricted to the three officers named above and the Director of Intelligence in MIS (Col. McCormack).

**Procedure**

A few words as to the minutiae of the Washington service. The task of the editors in 3-US was to go through the output of Hut 3 and cull from it items that should be sent. These items were divided into ground or air and each of these two (until the system was altered in September 1944) was further separated into four groups, depending upon the speed with which they should reach G-2. It was estimated that a cable sent from Bletchley Park in the morning would reach Washington (1) the same day if given the priority "important," (2) the next day if sent without priority. The fourth group, sent by bag, took approximately a fortnight to reach its destination until, during the final year, an air service was inaugurated, which cut the time by more than half.

The messages thus separated into groups were arranged according to subject matter and chronology. The editor then carefully examined the teleprint and accompanying signal, if any. Often the signal was deemed sufficient, but messages, like some of those signed Hitler or Rommel or Kesselring, were generally sent verbatim. At times the signal would be expanded, or the teleprint curtailed. To a limited extent the edited message would be annotated—more so on the air than on the ground side—but the annotations, as far as the historian is aware, were always factual with the exception of comments agreed upon with ministries and already passed to commands. In other words, the machinery whereby 3-US could write comments for Washington and have them agreed upon by the War Office or Air Ministry was seldom if ever used.

Once the material had been selected and edited the sole remaining job was to arrange it for transmission. In the very early days the various items followed one another without a break. On 6 September 1943 Col. O'Connor, whose office performed liaison in Washington, cabled "Helpful to us for reference if Taylor would number paragraphs." Thereafter, each numbered paragraph was a new item. Each was prefixed by the digraph "TP" or "JP" to indicate its nature, but after a few months the prefix became "Tare" or "Jig," a convention which continued to the end, long after JP's became KV's, VL's, HP's, KO's.

At first little attention was paid to the length of a cable. Col. O'Connor pointed out on 30 October 1943 that a given cable "was sixteen pages. Could you manage split up into shorter messages for convenience of ourselves and G-2?" And in mid-January 1944 he cabled "Should be really grateful if you could arrange to split TIR's into shorter messages of maximum 500 words. It would save us much time and trouble and facilitate division of labor in our very small office." From then on the Washington cables were normally 400 to 500 words, divided into numbered paragraphs, and composed of related messages arranged as far as possible to tell a story.

(Continued next issue)

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\(^{16}\) **AIX**—Drafts of messages from Air Ministry based on Special Intelligence, for dispatch to commands as AWL's. (AWL's were messages from service ministries to commands, based on Special Intelligence.)

**MIX**—Drafts of messages from War Office based on Special Intelligence, for dispatch to commands as AWL's.
The Origin and Development of 3-US

A Brief History Prepared Shortly After World War II—Part II

Diplomatic Affairs

Origin of Service

Prior to the inauguration of the Bay series, the field commands were on the receiving end of a sporadic and uncertain service by which intelligence of military value in diplomatic and attaché traffic was sent to them. This was accomplished by the AWL series. A message seemingly valuable to the field would be noticed at Bletchley Park or one of the ministries, and when the opportunity presented itself, an MIX or AIX embodying the substance of the message would be prepared for appropriate commands. The system, apart from the delay involved, was adequate for the occasional message which was in fact sent to commands. It resulted, however, in much intelligence of military value remaining unsignalled because no one had the responsibility to forward it to the field. There were collateral disadvantages in the absence of continuity and centralized handling of the material.

Col. Taylor, accordingly, in January of 1944 commenced discussions designed more fully to exploit the potential value of the diplomatic and attaché series. The American contribution in this field was proportionately heavier than in the military field. Moreover, an officer of MID, WD, London, was on duty at Berkeley Street giving virtually his full time to work on this traffic. It seemed for these reasons appropriate that the undertaking be an American commitment. In a memorandum of 8 February 1944, Col. Taylor proposed to Group Captain Jones that the American representative at Berkeley Street select from BJ's and auxiliary series those messages which seemed suitable for transmission to commands; his selections would be called to the attention of 3-US, which would prepare a signal for the field.

This proposal was approved in March both by G-2 and the directors of intelligence in the U.K. The directive followed the general outline of Col. Taylor's proposal, with the natural addition that ministries and Hut 3 sections should retain their normal responsibility for the form and content of all signals. This intelligence, under the directive, was to be sent to commands in the Bay series.

The Source of the Bays

Originally the Bays derived from three main sources, BJ's, SJA's and JMA's. The BJ series included all diplomatic traffic and those of the military attaches which were processed at Berkeley Street. The series averaged about fifty messages a day, from which perhaps one a day would prove Bayworthy.

The SJA's, a series which commenced about the time the Bay series was inaugurated, consisted of messages sent by the Japanese Naval Attachés at Berlin and Venice, together with occasional messages from other Japanese officials sent over that link. The messages were teleprinted to the ministries, and 3-US received a copy of each teleprint. On an average about five messages a day were produced, from which four or five signals a week would prove Bayworthy.

The BJ series is discussed in the next section.
The Manor House at Bletchley Park

were prepared. Allied intelligence benefited considerably by the fact that both of the Japanese Naval Attachés who served in Berlin during this period were men of exceptional competence; they seemed able to produce comprehensible and reasonably accurate descriptions of technical equipment, and their occasional ventures into German strategy and defenses were of considerably higher order than ordinarily encountered in the attaché field.

JMA's produced in the military section of Bletchley Park, comprised messages from the Japanese military attachés in the various capitals. At full flood, 50 or 60 of these messages would be broken each day. The traffic was more voluminous than profitable, but the attachés did send back a considerable volume of Allied order-of-battle information which proved useful to "A Force." Occasionally, they also reported, from personal involvement, items of general intelligence of some value to commands, such as a report of the military attaché in France after accompanying the Ambassador on a tour of coastal defenses. Less than one Bay a day resulted from this traffic, and most of these were selected for "A Force."

A number of less important series were fed into the Bay mill. These were: (1) COM's, commercial messages from diplomatic sources produced at Berkeley St.; (2) JADI's and GERDI's, Japanese and German diplomatic messages produced at Berkeley St. and placed in these series because they were out of date at the time of distribution; (3) SPARMA's and AS's, produced by the military section at Bletchley from Spanish military and air attaché traffic; (4) BUMAT's, also produced by the military section at Bletchley from Bulgarian MA traffic. Since they frequently contained bomb-damage reports or matters relevant to the troubled Balkan waters, they were more fruitful than the other lesser series; perhaps two signals a week derived from them but their cryptographic classification was that of Pearl rather than Ultra. They were therefore not sent over the Hut 3 link, but had to be distributed through the channels used for medium-grade signals.

Procedures

The mechanics by which this polyglot collection of information and misinformation was transformed into command signals was hardly complex. The messages arrived already translated. The Baywright's task was to select the appropriate message, do the research necessary for a proper evaluation, and draft the signal. The accuracy of the information, wherever possible, was verified by recourse to the indices at Bletchley Park or the pundits at ministries. At times conversations with translators were profitable in clearing up linguistic or cryptographic difficulties.

The actual drafting of the signals could be a rather tricky business, since the elimination of the verbosity or indirection of phrasing in the original message was desirable and yet more hazardous than in CX/MSS. In
diplomatic messages the tone is often highly significant. The drafter of Bays was required to strike a compromise.

When a signal had been prepared, the ordinary procedure was to submit it, along with the original message, to the appropriate section in Hut 3 (or Block A) before dispatch. This also involved recurrent visits to certain other elements at Bletchley Park. After approval by the section involved, the signals, during the early weeks, were routed both through the advisors in the Watch and the Duty Officer. With the increasing volume of normal Hut 3 traffic, it was directed in May 1944 that the advisors and duty officers should be spared participation in the Bays.

The Nature of the Bays

According to travellers returning from Mediterranean commands, the Bays provided a very welcome—sometimes even comic—relief. There is some evidence to indicate that in the west they were taken more seriously, perhaps too seriously.

The series included both trivial and inaccurate matters, as, for example, the notion of the Japanese Military Attaché in Lisbon of the disposition of Allied forces in Egypt. But it likewise included matters of substantial strategic importance. Reference has already been made to one—the tours of coastal fortifications. Other noteworthy signals presented German strategy as "dressed up" for the benefit of Tokyo, and Japanese reports on the Wehrmacht's appreciation of major Allied intentions.

Much of the early and detailed information on the German jet and rocketplane programs was found in Japanese (chiefly Naval Attaché) reports out of Berlin. The only clear statement that something in the nature of the Ardennes offensive would be attempted was forwarded by Japanese Ambassador Oshima following his last talk with Hitler in August 1944. Unfortunately, Hitler said the offensive would start in November, and the warning was not taken too seriously.

While the satellite Balkan countries were actively cooperating with the Germans, and for some time thereafter, weekly summaries of political information from that region were signalled to the Mediterranean. This was done in the belief that items grouped together took on more meaning than when isolated. As these countries were gradually liberated and communication privileges were denied to Axis and neutral diplomats, such material dried up, and that particular service was abandoned.

Related Series:

The Bays were the vehicle for providing commands with diplomatic information of military value. A parallel series, known as Starks, extracted political information from the same sources. At the beginning, in the summer of 1944, the Starks were the responsibility of IE and were sent only to General Strong for General Eisenhower. The Starks consisted of verbatim texts of selected messages. Originally, they were passed over the SLU link to SHAPE, but, after a few months, they were transmitted daily by courier.

3-US associated itself with the Starks in the autumn of 1944. It had come to Col. Taylor's attention that high-ranking British and American officers at Air Ministry were from time to time disseminating political material to the higher commands associated with them. To regularize and control this and to coordinate Bays and Starks, he proposed, in a memorandum dated 16 November, that one service encompassing all diplomatic material be created to service all persons whose work required access to such material. He based his proposal on the grounds that the system then operating was duplicative and inefficient for the following reasons: (1) the Starks and the Air Ministry series both covered political intelligence from the same source and in some instances were seen by the same recipient; (2) Air Ministry received only those BJs which Berkeley St. saw fit to send to them; (3) Air Ministry, it was believed, was not fully familiar with the pitfalls and technical problems involved in disseminating diplomatic Ultra; (4) security would be furthered by centralization of dissemination; and (5) to service leading military figures from uncoordinated sources was dangerous and confusing. After various conferences the proposal was accepted, and the responsibility for the service was divided among 3-US, IE, and the American liaison officer at Berkeley Street.

The Starks were continued, and to the distribution list were added Air Commodore Grierson for Air Chief Marshal Tedder and General MacDonald for General Spaatz. IE continued to prepare the items which were sent out daily by courier, but the selection of items was made

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1'Some of the "bays" at Bletchley Park were later relocated in larger buildings or "blocks." They still retained their "bays" designations, however.

16Intelligence Exchange of GC & CS.

18Special Liaison Unit, the forerunner of the U.S. SSO system.
The Grounds At Bletchley Park On Which the Huts Were Located

by G-2's representative at Berkeley Street, who on scrambler phone daily reported his selections to 3-US. 3-US and IE independently read the day's output, and if either disagreed with the selections a three-cornered discussion ensued until an agreement was reached. Thus the part played by 3-US in the production of Starks was to exercise control over what material should be disseminated.

Closely related to the Starks was the series called Coffee. It began late in December 1944 and consisted of political information of value to the American Ambassador in Paris. It was handled like the Starks, save that the copy to be transmitted was normally prepared by 3-US rather than by IE.

Finally, in May 1945, on the eve of the dissolution of Hut 3, the Nippi series was started. The recipient was the Japanese Section of G-2, SHAEF. The principal aim of the service was to provide information from diplomatic sources which might aid in locating Japanese personalities and documents in Europe. The Nippi series, which consisted of summaries, excerpts, or full texts from diplomatic sources, was transmitted by courier once a week.

Personnel and Liaison

Administratively, 3-US at its peak controlled 68 people. Of these, 19 were serving in the field as SLU's, 24 as 'specialists' at commands, 3 in London, and 12 as advisors in Hut 3. The remaining 10 may be said to have made up the actual section known as 3-US.

The head of the section necessarily spent most of his time in problems outside the scope of the section. The person in charge of 3-US was his deputy. Four officers serviced Washington, two on military matters, two on air. Another two officers handled all of the diplomatic traffic, and two civilians served in a secretarial capacity.

Had the war continued, this staff would have been halved, since the service to G-2 would have been turned
over to advisors, and one civilian could easily have handled the greatly reduced secretarial work.

On the personnel side the great difficulty experienced by the section was that it was regarded by commands as a sort of reservoir. When there was need in the field for an American intelligence officer who had some knowledge of the handling of Ultra, 3-US was called upon to produce a body. When the need was urgent the section normally sent its best qualified officer and then requested a replacement from Washington. Therefore, what with the factors of time and space, the section frequently found itself operating with five when it needed ten. Conversely, traffic seemed to fall off just when large numbers of reinforcements arrived from overseas, so that there was not much work to be done and many idle hands.

The desired qualifications for staffing the unit were an adequate grounding in military intelligence and, if possible, a reading knowledge of French and German. But the work done by this particular section could have been done well by any person with a reasonably trained mind and a modicum of common sense.

In order to do its work properly 3-US maintained at all times close liaison with other sections in the Hut and with other parts of Bletchley Park. With London, thanks to G-2 representatives at Berkeley Street and Ryder Street, there was a daily interchange of information.

Some amusement was caused by a cable from Washington to the chief American Naval Officer at Bletchley Park, advising him to do what he could to coordinate his efforts with 3-US. The relationship was always a pleasant one, but there was little in common between the two groups, since the naval party was primarily cryptographic.

Close liaison was maintained between 3-US and American commands in the European Theater. As has been seen 3-US had at least one representative at each American headquarters which received Ultra. Considerable chit-chat passed between these representatives and the mother section, and at times this liaison directly contributed to an improved service to the field from Hut 3. As has been shown, 3-US had a large part in initiating the inexperienced intelligence staff of FUSAG into the mysteries of Ultra, and at a later date the section had a role to play when USSTAF widened its interests to include tactical as well as strategic matters.

By virtue of its nationality 3-US was constantly serving as American liaison with various sections in the Park. Almost daily the telephone would bring a question, usually baffling, concerning American order of battle, customs, slang phrases, etc. The translators of Japanese attaché traffic were ever hopeful that 3-US could explain to them what a “Weasel” was, or who commanded the 3rd U.S. Fleet.

Conclusion

When an old man Benjamin Franklin was reviewing his long career, he asserted that if he were privileged to live his life over again he would choose to do just what he had done. The historian of 3-US cannot be so smug. Much that was done by the section should not have been done.

The previous sections have been factual. The subject matter might well be handled differently by different persons, but the story would be substantially the same. The present section differs in being, necessarily, more personal. That we were not always right would be readily admitted by any historian. But where we were right, where wrong, is a matter of opinion. What follows is the individual opinion of one who has been closely associated with the section from early January 1944 to the present.

Much that was “wrong,” as has been pointed out, was the result of circumstances over which the section had no control. The United States entered the war some two-and-a-half years after Bletchley Park had been set up. Another year and a half elapsed before G-2 and GC & CS agreed to share the products of Ultra. It would have been impracticable, if possible, to have set up at that time, or during the year that followed, the system which eventually evolved. An organization had to be built from nothing; personnel had to be trained; facilities had to be developed.

Furthermore, as one examines the early records, the picture that emerges is of G-2 and British authorities walking around and eyeing each other like two mongrels who have just met. Presumably and quite naturally the ministries in London were reluctant to risk Ultra’s neck by sharing this precious information with an unproven and shadowy group in Washington. Presumably and equally naturally G-2 was from Missouri and wished to be quite certain that he had access to all material Bletchley was turning up. The lack of confidence on both sides delayed the development of 3-US.

The chief mistake made by the section was its waste of time and manpower. Many hundreds of man-hours were needlessly spent in an over-elaborate method of preparing signals to Washington. The idea was to simplify matters for our customers. The intention, whether admitted or not, was to guide them by a very careful arrangement of texts and references. Great emphasis was placed on matters which, it was gradually realized, were trivial.

Clearly, if at some future date another Hut 3 is called for and another 3-US is charged with the responsibility of keeping G-2 enlightened, a system such as was developing at the end should be adopted as most efficient and most economical. G-2 should be treated, as far as the
Watch is concerned, as if it were a high headquarters in the field (like SHAEF). In other words, it should receive all signals sent to commands. At the same time it should be regarded as the ministries are and receive (by bag) a copy of all teleprints and reports. A very small section, possibly two officers and a secretary, could serve as liaison and could supplement by additional signals what would be sent out by the Watch.

The reasons for the section's diplomatic commitment have been given. They were good at the time, but in planning a future Hut 3 consideration should be given to the formation of still another section whose function would be to serve as liaison with all agencies producing diplomatic traffic and to draft signals based on that traffic for the appropriate commands.

One further point should be mentioned while considering where the section was wrong. Obviously it is a matter which goes far beyond Hut 3 entirely and 3-US, but its importance is such that it must be touched upon. We should have structured Hut 3 so that it represented navy as well as air and military interests. The problems concerned with a joint, combined intelligence service have not been solved by this war. A solution is not impossible and is greatly to be desired.

It was right and proper that the section was represented on the various Hut 3 committees and concerned itself with related groups in London. It may be that the section's representative normally played a listener's role, since, apart from diplomatic traffic, the section did not handle raw material. Nevertheless, the gain to 3-US and to Washington from such participation was considerable, and the gain was not entirely on the American side.

The self-imposed task of reviewing signals sent to commands bore fruit. There were many times when persons in other sections were annoyed by 3-US concerning the content, priority, or routing of a given signal. On some of these occasions they refused to budge; and not infrequently, particularly when the Western Front was young, the criticisms of 3-US were accepted and action taken. The somewhat different approach of the section provided a useful check on the principal mission of Hut 3.

There is no question as to the rightness of having had a 3-US. Both British and Americans have gained by American participation in the work of Hut 3. Officially, of course, it was highly necessary that G-2 be represented in Hut 3. Unofficially, the team play that was always in evidence should be encouraging to all who look to the future of both nations. In April 1945, the head of Hut 3 referred to "the friendship and close cooperation that have throughout so clearly marked the integration of American and British personnel." The phrase rings true to 3-US.

Lt. Col. F. W. Hilles, USA, directed a unit of 3-US at Bletchley Park under Col. Taylor, and, with the assistance of the chiefs of other units, compiled this brief history in 1945.