Hi Cynthia -- Apologies for taking so long on this. After a whole lot of discussion inside the NYT, my bosses have decided they do not want to run any kind of clarification or correction on the Feb. 6 drone story. I went over everything with them in great detail -- my story quoting part of that statement, the reactions from BIJ and Glenn Greenwald, and... We considered several draft clarification statements.

I think their view is that even if we had quoted the entire statement it would still not have been clear who exactly was being accused of helping AQ, and the reaction from BIJ would likely have been the same. I also think they are uncomfortable with having the NYT speak for the government in trying to explain what a government official meant.

If you want to protest or escalate to a higher level, that's absolutely fine with me. The guy to contact is Phil Corbett, the "standards editor" in NY -- sort of a tsar of ethics and rules -- at:

Again, sorry for the delay and the hassle.

Best

Scott

Scott Shane

New York Times

Washington Bureau

202-862-0305 office
Hi Scott,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

If you need to, you can say "CIA declined to comment."

Best regards,

[Redacted]

Media Spokesperson
CIA Office of Public Affairs

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 11:36 AM
To: 
Subject: Charges in Poland in connection with CIA program

Hi folks, I'd appreciate a call on cell -- [Redacted] or email with any comment or no comment or background for a story on the charges against Poland's former intelligence chief.

Thanks

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 10:09 AM
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Info requests on CT from NYT

-- Thanks for the call yesterday and the update. As I said, our deadline keeps slipping, so next week is fine for answers, though if some are ready today, all the better. You asked if there were any additional questions, and you may be sorry you asked....

-- Several people have suggested that strikes have gotten "more precise" over the last three years. Is this a result of improving technology? Or changes in rules? If the rules have changed in the last three years, can you give us some idea of how?

-- Is it true that the proportion of signature strikes (vs personality strikes) in the FATA gradually increased in the last three years? Any way of quantifying that? When were signature strikes suspended, and are they still suspended?

-- Is it true that signature strikes have never been authorized in Yemen? Or if they were authorized, when did that happen?

-- To help us understand how deaths are categorized, can you say how you categorize the deaths of Samir Khan and Abdul Rahman al-Awlaki? I understand that they were not targets, but it is unclear to me whether they would be categorized as "noncombatants." Because these deaths have been widely reported and discussed, I think they might help clarify procedures and rules.

In addition, I'll just repeat what I said on the phone: that if there is information on CT in the Obama first term that I haven't explicitly asked about but you think would be relevant to our story, I'd love to hear it. For example, while there seems to be strong bipartisan support for the operations, we have heard some folks inside and outside the administration talk about the limitations of strikes in the long run. I wonder whether CIA itself has studied the tactic-vs-strategy question.

Finally, please consider this a request for an interview, on any ground rules, with Director Petraeus, Deputy Director Morrell, GC Preston or any other agency official who is willing to discuss the counterterrorism programs, their legal basis and their strategic implications with us.

Again, many thanks for all your help on this.

Best,

Scott

Scott Shane
-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Friday, April 06, 2012 3:31 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: 
Subject: Info requests on CT from NYT

--- Below are the promised requests for information or clarification for the long story Jo Becker and I are doing on the Obama CT record. A couple of these might extend beyond the agency's strict purview, so please let me know or send them along to the NSC if that's so.

All of these questions are for kinds of information that you have kindly provided before. The questions on civilian casualties should NOT be misinterpreted as suggesting that is the major focus of our much broader story -- it is not. The story will certainly note that most experts believe the rate of civilian deaths would be far higher with conventional air strikes or ground troops.

We'd be happy to have any other information that you can provide. If it's possible to get answers by a week from today, April 13, that would be terrific.

-- List of important terrorists removed from the battlefield: It would be great to have an updated version of the background memo circulated to reporters after Awlaki was killed.
-- Is there any way to characterize, in terms of percentages or top leaders or capability of plotting against the US, what has been done by these operations to 1) Al Qaeda central in Pakistan; 2) AQAP in Yemen?

Can you give us updated estimates, 2001-present?

-- As a subset of the 2001-2012 total, what are the total combatant/noncombatant deaths in Pakistan under the Obama administration, 2009-date?

-- Similar numbers or estimates for Somalia and Yemen?

-- What is the definition of a noncombatant? Several former administration officials have expressed confusion or uncertainty about this. (Our current best guess: noncombatants include all women and children (but what is the age limit for "child") plus all males on whom there is not specific intelligence showing they were noncombatants. Is this accurate?)

-- For the March 17, 2011 strike that caused a flap, what is the best estimate for number killed? We were told news reports exaggerated the total. How many, if any, of those killed does the US believe was a noncombatant?

-- A late October 2011 strike, according to news reports and advocates, killed Tariq Khan, aged 16, and his 12-year-old cousin. What are the facts about this strike? Does the US believe that Tariq Khan was a combatant, and that 16 is old enough to be a legitimate target (or that he was not 16)?

-- Was the search for Osama bin Laden expanded or intensified in 2009? When in 2009 did this happen; why did it happen at that time; what changes were made in the ongoing hunt; and what relevance did they have to the ultimate success?

Many thanks for your care and trouble in answering these questions. I think it serves our purpose, the agency’s purpose and the administration’s purpose to have the most accurate information possible for this story. I’d be glad to talk about anything that’s unclear.

Have a great weekend

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau

202-862-0305 office

Approved for Release: 2014/03/25
-- you too. May world crises leave us both alone!

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message ----- 
From: 
Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 07:15 PM 
To: Shane, Scott 
Cc: 
Subject: Re: Info requests on CT from NYT

Scott, we'll engage with responses on Monday. Have a great weekend!

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Shane, Scott 
Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 10:08 AM 
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Info requests on CT from NYT

-- Thanks for the call yesterday and the update. As I said, our deadline keeps slipping, so next week is fine for answers, though if some are ready today, all the better. You asked if there were any additional questions, and you may be sorry you asked....

-- Several people have suggested that strikes have gotten "more precise" over the last three years. Is this a result of improving technology? Or changes in rules? If the rules have changed in the last three years, can you give us some idea of how?

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deaths have been widely reported and discussed, I think they might help clarify procedures
and rules.

In addition, I'll just repeat what I said on the phone: that if there is information on CT
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Finally, please consider this a request for an interview, on any ground rules, with
Director Petraeus, Deputy Director Morrell, GC Preston or any other agency official who is
willing to discuss the counterterrorism programs, their legal basis and their strategic
implications with us.

Again, many thanks for all your help on this.

Best
Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office

-----Original Message-----
From: Scott Shane
Sent: Friday, April 06, 2012 4:31 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Info requests on CT from NYT

Thank you Scott,

We will be in touch next week. Have a great weekend in the meantime!
-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Friday, April 06, 2012 3:31 PM
To:
Cc: Shane, Scott
Subject: Info requests on CT from NYT

Below are the promised requests for information or clarification for the long story Jo Becker and I are doing on the Obama CT record. A couple of these might extend beyond the agency's strict purview, so please let me know or send them along to the NSC if that's so.

All of these questions are for kinds of information that you have kindly provided before. The questions on civilian casualties should NOT be misinterpreted as suggesting that is the major focus of our much broader story -- it is not. The story will certainly note that most experts believe the rate of civilian deaths would be far higher with conventional air strikes or ground troops.

We'd be happy to have any other information that you can provide. If it's possible to get answers by a week from today, April 13, that would be terrific.

-- List of important terrorists removed from the battlefield: It would be great to have an updated version of the background memo circulated to reporters after Awlaki was killed.

-- Is there any way to characterize, in terms of percentages or top leaders or capability of plotting against the US, what has been done by these operations to 1) Al Qaeda central in Pakistan; 2) AQAP in Yemen?

-- Total combatant/noncombatant deaths in Pakistan: Marie in 9/2011 gave me the following estimates for Pakistan: "Over the life of the effort (2001 - present), in the neighborhood of 50 noncombatants have been killed, none since May 2010. Over the life of the effort (2001 - present), about 2,000 militants have been killed."

Can you give us updated estimates, 2001-present?

-- As a subset of the 2001-2012 total, what are the total combatant/noncombatant deaths in Pakistan under the Obama administration, 2009-date?

-- Similar numbers or estimates for Somalia and Yemen?

-- What is the definition of a noncombatant? Several former administration officials have expressed confusion or uncertainty about this. (Our current best guess: noncombatants include all women and children (but what is the age limit for "child"?) plus all males on whom there is not specific intelligence showing they were noncombatants. Is this accurate?)

-- For the March 17, 2011 strike that caused a flap, what is the best estimate for number killed? We were told news reports exaggerated the total. How many, if any, of those killed does the US believe was a noncombatant?

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- Was the search for Osama bin Laden expanded or intensified in 2009? When in 2009 did this happen; why did it happen at that time; what changes were made in the ongoing hunt; and what relevance did they have to the ultimate success?

Many thanks for your care and trouble in answering these questions. I think it serves our purpose, the agency's purpose and the administration's purpose to have the most accurate information possible for this story. I'd be glad to talk about anything that's unclear.

Have a great weekend

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office
Thanks + have fun

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

Scott,

Take care!

Media Spokesperson
CIA Office of Public Affairs
From: Shane, Scott  
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 6:39 PM  
To:  
Subject: Re: CT Story

Sadly we will not publish until you are back. Still have a ways to go. To clarify: Should I expect any more specific answers to my written questions, or is this it? And is there a chance we will get an interview with Director Petraeus, DD Morrell or GC Preston?

Thanks and have a great vacation unbothered by the NYT

Scott

Scott Shane  
New York Times  
Washington bureau  
202-862-0305

From:  
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 06:27 PM  
To: Shane, Scott  
Cc:  
Subject: RE: CT Story  

Scott,

When you do reply please send to so your query reaches the team. Starting tomorrow I will be on vacation until next Tuesday and away from email. What is the latest on your timeline?

Take care,

Media Spokesperson  
CIA Office of Public Affairs

From: Shane, Scott  
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 4:03 PM  
To:  
Subject: Re: CT Story

I'll study this and get back to you soon.
Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

From: [Blank]
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 03:49 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc:
Subject: CT Story

Scott,

[Blank]
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 7:38 PM
To: Re: CT Story

PS -- clearly I have to watch what I write in reviews! That is a hugely important point, but it does not negate all other questions. This is a new military technology being used in a new way, and everything about it is worthy of serious scrutiny. And as I may have said, a very senior WH official told us near-zero collateral deaths is the president's demand for the program. It would be odd not to ask about it. But forget about all this for a week...

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

From: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 07:24 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: RE: CT Story

Scott,

Take care!

Approved for Release: 2013/12/23
From: Shane, Scott  
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 6:39 PM  
To:  
Subject: Re: CT Story

Sadly we will not publish until you are back. Still have a ways to go. To clarify: Should I expect any more specific answers to my written questions, or is this it? And is there a chance we will get an interview with Director Petraeus, DD Morrell or GC Preston?

Thanks and have a great vacation unbothered by the NYT

Scott

---

Scott Shane  
New York Times  
Washington bureau  
202-862-0305

From:  
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 06:27 PM  
To: Shane, Scott  
Cc:  
Subject: RE: CT Story

Scott,

When you do reply please send to [redacted] so your query reaches the team. Starting tomorrow I will be on vacation until next Tuesday and away from email. What is the latest on your timeline?

Take care,

Media Spokesperson  
CIA Office of Public Affairs

---

From: Shane, Scott  
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 4:03 PM
To: 
Subject: Re: CT Story

I'll study this and get back to you soon.

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

From: 
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 03:49 PM
To: Shane. Scott
Cc: 
Subject: CT Story

Scott,
Thanks

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office

From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, April 23, 2012 10:59 AM
To: Shane, Scott
Subject: RE: Your call

No rush, thanks. You had mentioned that you might have more on the Iran drone claims today, so just checking in.

Thanks

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, April 23, 2012 10:55 AM
To: Shane, Scott
Subject: Re: Your call

Hi Scott,
It was a pleasure to make your acquaintance yesterday. Crashing on a couple of items right now - is away so shorthanded here - but wanted to let you know I'll get back with you in just a bit. Can you let me know the nature of your call so I can respond usefully? Thanks very much.
From: [Name]
Sent: Tuesday, April 24, 2012 3:21 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: [Name]
Subject: I'm back

Good Afternoon Scott,

I'm back in the office.

Hope all is well,

[Name]
Media Spokesperson
CIA Office of Public Affairs
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 10:33 AM
To: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

Well, I'd say early afternoon would be his realistic deadline, though changes could obviously be made till evening our time. If there were a solid promise of very significant cooperation, and it can't be done by deadline, conceivable that editors might consider holding till Tues paper. But at the moment plan is to go up on Web Sunday night.

Crazy times, I know....Sorry to add to the weekend load!

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-8305

----- Original Message -----  
From:
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 10:15 AM
To: Shane, Scott;
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

----- Original Message -----  
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 09:50 AM
To: Shane, Scott
Subject: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

Hi Folks -- My Islamabad colleague Declan Walsh is writing, for Monday or Tuesday's NYT, a long story on Dr. Afridi and his role before UBL raid. He asked me to seek comment, confirmation or correction on his reporting before final edit. Apologies for the short notice but this has just come together and obviously editors want it to run by the anniversary.

In view of the above, I'm sending the below very detailed summary of the facts as Declan understands them. It would be great either to get a written point by point set of comments or for someone to talk to Declan by phone or in person and go over all of this. We greatly appreciate your consideration. I'm on cell to discuss -- Declan is at Many thanks.

Scott
BACKGROUND:

Stateside trip: Afridi visited the United States in 2007 (and maybe in 2009 too) with his wife, apparently on some sort of medical conference jaunt. Was he a regular visitor to the US? Did that bring him in touch with intelligence folks?

American wife: A senior ISI official and several friends say that Afridi's schoolteacher wife, Imran Ghafoor, is a US citizen (or, most likely a dual national). True?

Checkered past: Afridi had a very checkered past, having faced multiple allegations of corruption, professional malpractice and sexual harassment. He was fired from his job as agency surgeon general (chief medical officer) in Khyber tribal agency six months before the operation, following official complaints from a nurse who alleged he had sexually assaulted her on the job. He was reinstated as agency surgeon general just a couple of weeks before May 2. Was the CIA aware of this background? Did it make any difference to the operation, for better or worse?

ABBOTTABAD OPERATION

The ISI says Afridi was in contact with a CIA handler named Peter, and was brought to the US embassy hidden in the back of a car in order to meet his handlers. True?

UN equipment used in CIA op: In interviews in Khyber we have established that Afridi used polio vaccination kits funded by the United Nations to carry out the first round of polio Hepatitis vaccinations in Abbotabad in March 2011. Was the agency aware of this? Would it have mattered to them?

Save the Children link: A senior US official says that Afridi's wife told ISI interrogators that her husband claimed to be working for the charity Save the Children (US) at the time he was doing the vaccination campaign. The ISI, however, goes even further: it claims that Afridi had actually persuaded Save the Children to fund the vaccination program (without their knowing its true purpose), and that he even went to the extent of giving Save the Children fake invoices to keep the pretense going. Subsequently, according to aid agency sources, two senior managers at Save the Children - one Irish, one Pakistani - were put on the Pakistani government's Exit Control List, preventing them from leaving Pakistan. The US and British embassies have been involved with the SC case and helped make representations stressing their innocence with the Pakistanis. Can you confirm?

The phone call: US official say that Afridi didn't manage to get DNA from the OBL house, something that Pakistanis generally agree with. True? The Pakistanis also claim that, in order to confirm the identities of the people inside the house, he was given a phone number. A week or so before the raid, Afridi got one of the nurses employed on the vaccination program to ring that number, and the courier, Abu Ahmed al Kuwaiti came on the line. The ISI claims the CIA used voice recognition software to confirm Kuwaiti's presence. A second version of the story has it that Kuwaiti passed the phone to bin Laden's wife, Khairi, who came on the line. Can you confirm or debunk?

Payment: Different Pakistani sources say he was paid between $10,000 and $20,000 for his part in the operation. Any comment on figures?

AFTERMATH

Efforts to spring him free. What efforts has the US government/CIA made to have Afridi released? What do the Pakistanis privately say about the case? Is there any chance of a deal? And if not, won't that have implications for others' willingness to help the US in the future?
Leon Panetta: I was very surprised to hear Director Panetta's comment in the 60 Minutes interview last January where he admitted Afridi was a CIA operative and appealed to the Pakistanis to let him go. Did Panetta put that out there intentionally? Inside the CIA, was this public admission considered unusual? Was it seen as furthering or hindering Afridi's cause?

Aid agency blowback: In general terms, there's been a lot of criticism from western aid workers about the vaccination scheme, saying it has brought much unwelcome attention from the ISI in the past year, and endangered their humanitarian work. Despite the huge success of the overall mission, are there any regrets inside the CIA about this aspect of the operation, or any changes in rules or guidelines for cover?

Capture by ISI: One thing I can't really figure out: after May 2 Afridi continued with life as normal, and didn't skip Pakistan. One of his colleagues says that he had a Saudi visa for performing Hajj in his passport, so he clearly had an option. Why didn't he leave? Did he think he would get away with it? And how, in the end, did the ISI figure out what he had been doing?

Possible compromise: Pakistani officials in Peshawar tell us that Afridi may now be charged under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which is the operative law in the tribal belt, instead of under the civil code. This effectively means that he could skirt treason charges, which carry the death penalty, and instead be incarcerated under the opaque tribal belt legal system. This would, in theory, make it easier for Pakistan to have Afridi quietly released a few years hence, and traded with the US at an opportune moment. OTHER

- Bin Laden's buddies: Stepping back from the small detail of the Afridi story, what's striking is that the Pakistanis put a lot of effort into catching the man who helped catch OBL - but what have they done to roll up the network of people who helped OBL when he was on the run? In this story - http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/on-run-bin-laden-had-4-children-and-5-houses-a-wife-says.html?pagewanted=all - Bin Laden's youngest wife said she changed house seven times in six months in Karachi in 2002. Has the ISI rounded up any of these people?
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 10:54 PM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

Will check on deadline -- thanks much

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message -----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 10:20 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

----- Original Message -----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 08:26 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

Thanks,

----- Original Message -----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 10:32 AM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent
Thanks Preston. Well, I'd say early afternoon would be his realistic deadline, though changes could obviously be made till evening our time. If there were a solid promise of very significant cooperation, and it can't be done by deadline, conceivable that editors might consider holding till Tues paper. But at the moment plan is to go up on Web Sunday night.

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Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-662-0305

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Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 10:15 AM
To: Shane, Scott
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

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To: Shane, Scott
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Many thanks.

Scott

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--

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--

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Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Sunday, April 29, 2012 12:52 PM
To: 
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

You too!

Scott Shane  
New York Times  
Washington bureau  
202-862-0305

----- Original Message -----  
From:  
Sent: Sunday, April 29, 2012 12:41 PM  
To: Shane, Scott  
Cc:  
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

Thanks Scott. Greatly appreciated. Enjoy your Sunday.

----- Original Message -----  
From: Shane, Scott  
Sent: Sunday, April 29, 2012 12:02 PM  
To:  
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

we're putting off the story for Tuesday's paper, as requested. Grateful for all info.

Thanks

Scott

Scott Shane  
New York Times  
Washington bureau  
202-862-0305
----- Original Message ----- 
From: 
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 10:20 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: 
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

----- Original Message ----- 
From: 
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 08:26 PM
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

Thanks,

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2012 10:32 AM
To: 
Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent

Well, I'd say early afternoon would be his realistic deadline, though changes could obviously be made till evening our time. If there were a solid promise of very significant cooperation, and it can't be done by deadline, conceivable that editors might consider holding till Tues paper. But at the moment plan is to go up on Web Sunday night.

Crazy times, I know....Sorry to add to the weekend load!

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message ----- 
From:
Hi Folks -- My Islamabad colleague Declan Walsh is writing, for Monday or Tuesday's NYT, a long story on Dr. Afridi and his role before UBL raid. He asked me to seek comment, confirmation or correction on his reporting before final edit. Apologies for the short notice but this has just come together and obviously editors want it to run by the anniversary.

In view of the above, I'm sending the below very detailed summary of the facts as Declan understands them. It would be great either to get a written point by point set of comments or for someone to talk to Declan by phone or in person and go over all of this. We greatly appreciate your consideration. I'm on cell to discuss -- Declan is at

Many thanks.

Scott

BACKGROUND:
--
Stateside trip: Afridi visited the United States in 2007 (and maybe in 2009 too) with his wife, apparently on some sort of medical conference jaunt. Was he a regular visitor to the US? Did that bring him in touch with intelligence folks?
--
American wife: A senior ISI official and several friends say that Afridi's schoolteacher wife, Imrana Ghafoor, is a US citizen (or, most likely a dual national). True?
--
Checkered past: Afridi had a very checkered past, having faced multiple allegations of corruption, professional malpractise and sexual harrassment. He was fired from his job as agency surgeon general (chief medical officer) in Khyber tribal agency six months before the operation, following official complaints from a nurse who alleged he had sexually assaulted her on the job. He was reinstated as agency surgeon general just a couple of weeks before May 2. Was the CIA aware of this background? Did it make any difference to the operation, for better or worse?

ABBOTTABAD OPERATION
-- The ISI says Afridi was in contact with a CIA handler named Peter, and was brought to the US embassy hidden in the back of a car in order to meet his handlers. True?
--
UN equipment used in CIA op: In interviews in Khyber we have established that Afridi used polio vaccination kits funded by the United Nations to carry out the first round of phoney Hepatitis vaccinations in Abbotabad in March 2011. Was the agency aware of this? Would it have mattered to them?
--
Save the Children link: A senior US official says that Afridi's wife told ISI interrogators that her husband claimed to be working for the charity Save the Children (US) at the time he was doing the vaccination campaign. The ISI, however, goes even further: it claims that Afridi had actually persuaded Save the Children to fund the vaccination program (without their knowing its true purpose), and that he even went to the extent of giving Save the Children fake invoices to keep the pretense going. Subsequently, according to aid agency
sources, two senior managers at Save the Children - one Irish, one Pakistani - were put on the Pakistani government's Exit Control List, preventing them from leaving Pakistan. The US and British embassies have been involved with the SC case and helped make representations stressing their innocence with the Pakistanis. Can you confirm?

--

The phone call: US official say that Afridi didn’t manage to get DNA from the OBL house, something that Pakistanis generally agree with. True? The Pakistanis also claim that, in order to confirm the identities of the people inside the house, he was given a phone number. A week or so before the raid, Afridi got one of the nurses employed on the vaccination program to ring that number, and the courier, Abu Ahmed al Kuwaiti came on the line. The ISI claims the CIA used voice recognition software to confirm Kuwaiti's presence. A second version of the story has it that Kuwaiti passed the phone to bin Laden's wife, Khairee, who came on the line. Can you confirm or debunk?

---

Payment: Different Pakistani sources say he was paid between $10,000 and $20,000 for his part in the operation. Any comment on figures?

AFTERMATH

--

Efforts to spring him free. What efforts has the US government/CIA made to have Afridi released? What do the Pakistanis privately say about the case? Is there any chance of a deal? And if not, won’t that have implications for others' willingness to help the US in the future?

Leon Panetta: I was very surprised to hear Director Panetta's comment in the 60 Minutes interview last January where he admitted Afridi was a CIA operative and appealed to the Pakistanis to let him go. Did Panetta put that out there intentionally? Inside the CIA, was this public admission considered unusual? Was it seen as furthering or hindering Afridi's cause?

Aid agency blowback: In general terms, there's been a lot of criticism from western aid workers about the vaccination scheme, saying it has brought much unwelcome attention from the ISI in the past year, and endangered their humanitarian work. Despite the huge success of the overall mission, are there any regrets inside the CIA about this aspect of the operation, or any changes in rules or guidelines for cover?

--

Capture by ISI: One thing I can't really figure out: after May 2 Afridi continued with life as normal, and didn't skip Pakistan. One of his colleagues says that he had a Saudi visa for performing Hajj in his passport, so he clearly had an option. Why didn't he leave? Did he think he would get away with it? And how, in the end, did the ISI figure out what he had been doing?

--

Possible compromise: Pakistani officials in Peshawar tell us that Afridi may now be charged under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which is the operative law in the tribal belt, instead of under the civil code. This effectively means that he could skirt treason charges, which carry the death penalty, and instead be incarcerated under the opaque tribal belt legal system. This would, in theory, make it easier for Pakistan to have Afridi quietly released a few years hence, and traded with the US at an opportunistic moment. OTHER

- Bin Laden's buddies: Stepping back from the small detail of the Afridi story, what's striking is that the Pakistanis put a lot of effort into catching the man who helped catch OBL - but what have they done to roll up the network of people who helped OBL when he was on the run? In this story - http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/on-run-bin-laden-had-4-children-and-5-houses-a-wife-says.html?pagewanted=all - Bin Laden's youngest wife said she changed house seven times in six months in Karachi in 2002. Has the ISI rounded up any of these people?
Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 11:24 AM
To: 
Subject: Re: Visit today

I know you know I'll give the broader story a shot, if only to try to persuade him a little more help would be in the agency's interest. But I know Afridi is the urgent question -- for us too.

See you shortly

Scott
best
Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
Cynthia L Rapp

From:                   Monday, April 30, 2012 11:55 AM
Sent:                   RE: Visit today
To:                     RE: Visit today
Cc:                     RE: Visit today

Thanks Scott. Will see what we can do on the new parts at the last minute.

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 11:37 AM
To:  
Subject: Re: Visit today

Hi again Jennifer -- just got this updated list of questions for CIA (biggest change is that Save the Children talked to us). Thanks much.

Ten Questions

Family background
Is Afridi’s wife Imrana Ghafoor, an American citizen or a dual national? Does that have any bearing on his case? Is there any record of his trips to the United States in 2007 and/or 2009?

Vaccination campaign: It’s been reported there were three rounds of Hep B vaccinations in Abbottabad: mid-March, early April and late April. True?

Capture by ISI: Why didn’t Afridi skip Pakistan after May 2? Did he have a US visa in his passport? How did the ISI figure out what he had been doing?

Panetta: Were Panetta’s comments to 60 Minutes in January part of a strategy of getting Afridi out. What effect have they had?

Humanitarian cover:
While we know that Afridi worked under the cover of a phony vaccination campaign, our reporting suggests he also sheltered under the brand name of reputable major aid organizations. Colleagues at his hospital in Khyber Agency say that he used refrigerated boxes donated by Rotary International – intended use in World Health Organization polio vaccination campaigns – to carry out the Hepatitis B campaign in Abbottabad. Moreover, he told the ISI and the Abbottabad Commission that he believed he was actually working for Save the Children instead of the CIA. As a result of this, aid workers say they suffered restrictions to important humanitarian work in the past year including visa denials, limited movement and delays in shipping relief aid. Does the CIA regret using humanitarian aid as cover for this operation?

Save the Children:
Save the Children’s Pakistan director, David Wright, has told us on-record that Afridi has made a barrage of damaging allegations against the NGO during ISI interrogations that have badly compromised his operations in Pakistan. According to Wright, Afridi claims to have been introduced to CIA personnel through a senior Save the Children official in Islamabad in 2008. He also says that Save the Children inadvertently approved the Abbottabad vaccination campaign in 2011. Among the consequences for Save the Children, Wright says that he hasn’t
been able to leave Pakistan since last October, and that a senior staff member was on the Pakistan government’s Exit Control List until a couple of weeks ago. Any comment?

Checkered past:
Our research suggests that Afridi had a very checkered past, with multiple allegations of corruption, professional malpractice and sexual harassment. He was fired from his job as agency surgeon general (chief medical officer) in Khyber tribal agency six months before the Abbottabad operation as a result of complaints by nurse who said he sexually assaulted her. He was reinstated to his job on April 13, three weeks before the Abbottabad raid. Was the CIA aware of this background? Did it make any difference to the operation, for better or worse?

CIA contacts:
The ISI says Afridi was in contact with a CIA handler named Peter. They say he was brought to meetings in the US embassy hidden in the back of a car. They say he was paid between $10,000 and $20,000 for his services. True?

The ISI
The ISI has gone on publicity offensive recently telling foreign journalist that it played a hitherto unacknowledged role in locating bin Laden. Is this true? And has the ISI rounded up any of the people who helped Bin Laden (and his family) stay on the run for a decade?

The phone call: US official say that Afridi didn’t manage to get DNA from the OBL house, something that Pakistanis generally agree with. True? The Pakistanis also claim that, in order to confirm that the courier, Abu Ahmed Al Kuwaiti, was inside the house, the CIA got Afridi to call a phone number that was eventually patched through the Kuwaiti. The ISI claims the CIA used voice recognition software to confirm Kuwaiti’s presence. A second version of the story, given by the retired Pakistani brigadier Shaukat Qadir, has it that Kuwaiti passed the phone to bin Laden’s wife, Khairee. Is there any truth in this?

Efforts to spring him free: What has the US government/CIA done to secure his release? Is it important to set an example for other foreign nationals assisting the agency who may get in trouble?

Possible compromise: Pakistani officials in Peshawar tell us that Afridi may now be charged under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, allowing him to skirt treason charges. Is this true?

Lastly: Did Afridi’s work contribute anything to the capture of OBL?
----- Original Message -----  
From: 
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 11:11 AM  
To: Shane, Scott  
Cc: 
Subject: Visit today  

Scott,  

I'll be meeting with you and Michael at 12:15 today.  

Please leave your cell phone and any recording devices in your car. See you in an hour!  

----- Original Message -----  
From: Shane, Scott  
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 8:35 AM  
To:  
Subject: Visit today  

best  
Scott  

Scott Shane  
New York Times  
Washington bureau  
202-862-0305
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 3:09 PM
To: Re: Visit today

we are pushing this off a day, thank God. So it's not going up on the web till Tues night. I'll send requests for background later today.

Thanks again

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-8085

----- Original Message ----- 
From: 
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 11:11 AM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: 
Subject: Visit today

Scott,

I'll be meeting with you and Michael at 12:15 today.

Please leave your cell phone and any recording devices in your car. See you in an hour!

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 8:35 AM
To: Cynthia L Rapp;
Subject: Visit today
best

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-9305
Scott,

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 3:57 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: CT Story

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 3:49 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: CT Story

Scott,
Cynthia L Rapp

From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 5:39 PM
To: Scott
Subject: FW: Feinstein, Levin Statement on CIA's Coercive Interrogation Techniques

Here you go. Thanks for your patience. I am causing you all kinds of trouble today. Will send the background requests later on....

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office

From: Feinstein Press [mailto:Feinstein_press@feinstein.senate.gov]
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 2:09 PM
Subject: Feinstein, Levin Statement on CIA's Coercive Interrogation Techniques
Feinstein, Levin Statement on CIA’s Coercive Interrogation Techniques

Washington—Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) released the following statement regarding claims by former CIA Deputy Director of Operations Jose Rodriguez about the effectiveness of the CIA’s coercive interrogation techniques:

“We are deeply troubled by the claims of the CIA’s former Deputy Director of Operations Jose Rodriguez regarding the effectiveness of the CIA’s coercive interrogation techniques.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will soon complete a comprehensive review of the CIA’s former Detention and Interrogation Program. Committee staff has reviewed more than 6 million pages of records and the Committee’s final report, which we expect to exceed 5000 pages, will provide a detailed, factual description of how interrogation techniques were used, the conditions under which detainees were held, and the intelligence that was – or wasn’t – gained from the program.

Statements made by Mr. Rodriguez and other former senior government officials about the role of the CIA interrogation program in locating Usama bin Laden (UBL) are inconsistent with CIA records. We are disappointed that Mr. Rodriguez and others, who left government positions prior to the UBL operation and are not privy to all of the intelligence that led to the raid, continue to insist that the CIA’s so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” used many years ago were a central component of our success. This view is misguided and misinformed.

The roots of the UBL operation stretch back nearly a decade and involve hundreds, perhaps thousands, of intelligence professionals who worked non-stop to connect and analyze many fragments of information, eventually leading the United States to Usama bin Laden’s location in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The suggestion that the operation was carried out based on information gained through the harsh treatment of CIA detainees is not only inaccurate, it trivializes the work of individuals across multiple U.S. agencies that led to UBL and the eventual operation.

We are also troubled by Mr. Rodriguez’s statements justifying the destruction of video tapes documenting the use of coercive interrogation techniques as “just getting rid of some ugly visuals.” His decision to order the destruction of the tapes was in violation of instructions from CIA and White House lawyers, illustrates a blatant disregard for the law, and unnecessarily caused damage to the CIA’s reputation.

Further, it’s worth repeating, as discussed in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s 2008 report, the SERE techniques used in the CIA’s interrogation program were never intended to be used by U.S. interrogators. Rather, the techniques – which are based on Communist Chinese interrogation techniques used during the Korean War to
elicit false confessions — were developed to expose U.S. soldiers to the abusive treatment they might be subjected to if captured by our enemies. An overwhelming number of experts agree, the SERE techniques are not an effective means to illicit accurate information.

Misinformation Relating to the UBL Operation

Statement of Jose Rodriguez, former CIA Deputy Director for Operations, Time Magazine, May 4, 2011:

"Information provided by [CIA detainees] KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libbi about bin Laden's courier was the lead information that eventually led to the location of [bin Laden's] compound and the operation that led to his death."

This statement is wrong. The original lead information had no connection to CIA detainees. The CIA had significant intelligence on the courier that was collected from a variety of classified sources. While the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used against KSM and al-Libbi, the pair provided false and misleading information during their time in CIA custody. This information will be detailed in the Intelligence Committee's report.

Statement of Michael Hayden, former CIA Director, Scott Hennen Show, May 3, 2011:

"[W]hat we got, the original lead information — and frankly it was incomplete identity information on the couriers — began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites."

This statement is wrong. The original information had no connection to CIA detainees. The CIA had significant intelligence on the courier that was collected from a variety of classified sources. This information will be detailed in the Intelligence Committee’s report.

Statement of Michael Mukasey, former Attorney General, Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2011:

"Consider how the intelligence that led to bin Laden came to hand. It began with a disclosure from Khalid Shiek Mohammed (KSM) who broke like a dam under the pressure of harsh interrogation techniques — that included waterboarding. He loosed a torrent of information — including eventually the name of a trusted courier of bin Laden ... Another of those gathered up later in this harvest, Abu Faraj al-Libi, also was subjected to certain of these harsh techniques and disclosed further details about bin Laden's couriers that helped last weekend's achievement."

This statement is wrong. There is nothing in CIA intelligence records to corroborate this statement.

Other press reports have suggested that a third CIA detainee subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques provided significant information on the courier and his relationship with al-Qa'ida. While this third detainee did provide relevant information, he did so the day before he was interrogated by the CIA using their coercive
Thanks much.

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0385

----- Original Message ----- 
From: 
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 07:22 PM 
To: Shane, Scott 
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Request for background/on record

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Shane, Scott 
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 7:16 PM 
To: 
Cc: Shane, Scott 
Subject: Request for background/on record

requests as promised:

1) On-record statement addressing criticism of CIA for using a medical worker to gather intelligence, since Save the Children and other NGOs complain that it has cast a shadow over their public health work, prompting Pakistan authorities to deny or delay visas, delay shipments of medicines, prohibit some foreign workers from leaving Pakistan, and otherwise seriously set back their efforts. Why would the same logic banning the use of journalists not also apply to medical workers, for instance? Is any change in the rules under consideration?

For background or on record:
3) That Afridi's help in the OBL hunt was "marginal" as it turned out, revealing the second set of phones that cemented the certainty that the compound's residents were acting very secretly and strangely. But how would you characterize his overall contribution, including identifying other AQ or other militant members and locations?

4) That for the Abbottabad operation, Afridi got $250,000 to buy Hep B vaccine kits and $10,500 as salary. What was the total money paid to Afridi by CIA over the whole three years, with separate numbers for expenses and salary?

5) What is the CIA's understanding of his relationship with President Zardari? He was honored for his polio work at a dinner that Zardari attended, but did they really know each other? Any greater clarity on the relationship?

6) Were Hepatitis B vaccines used to get blood for DNA analysis? And were the vaccines useless without the entire series?

That should do it.

Many thanks

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 12:22 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Subject: Re: Request for background/on record

Appreciate it

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message ----- 
From: 
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 12:19 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Request for background/on record

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 12:00 PM
To: 
Subject: Re: Request for background/on record

Thanks much. Any idea of timing? Also wanted to ask about Zeit/CNN piece on documents found in Germany -- or should I call someone else about that?

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message ----- 
From: 
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 11:54 AM
To: Shane, Scott;
Subject: RE: Request for background/on record
Scott,

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 7:56 AM
To: 
Subject: Re: Request for background/on record

Morning Jennifer -- a couple of things that occurred to me to mention. Declan will be including appeals from Afridi's family about his plight (didn't include that in memo for you guys because it requires no response). And we would not like to run the complaints from Save the Children partially blaming CIA for its troubles without a full response from you.

Also, can I assume that the following passage from UK Times today is wrong? I guess it doesn't quite contradict what Michael said, so just checking:

-----It appears that Dr Afridi was recruited by the CIA while he was in the United States in 2009. The family had gone to stay with Mona’s relatives in San Jose, California, but had fallen on hard times when they were befriended by Yogi Kumar, an expatriate Kashmiri who provided the names of people who could introduce him to the CIA.-----

Thanks. I'll be reachable anytime except during an interview roughly 2:30 to 4.

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
To: 
Cc: Shane, Scott
Subject: Request for background/on record

-- requests as promised:

1) On-record statement addressing criticism of CIA for using a medical worker to gather intelligence, since Save the Children and other NGOs complain that it has cast a shadow over their public health work, prompting Pakistan authorities to deny or delay visas, delay shipments of medicines, prohibit some foreign workers from leaving Pakistan, and otherwise seriously set back their efforts. Why would the same logic banning the use of journalists not also apply to medical workers, for instance? Is any change in the rules under consideration?

For background or on record:

2) Basic facts you shared on Afridi's work for the agency: that he was recruited in Pakistan because he traveled freely through the FATA and not recruited in the U.S., worked with the agency for three years, did some vaccination work at the agency's request and other work on his own, reported on Arabs in the places he went, gave only real vaccination for polio and hepatitis B, was motivated both by his strong desire to stop disease and hostility to the militants who he thought were harming his country and who had threatened him for treating women, was not told that CIA was specifically looking for Bin Laden but concluded that the strange compound might be of special interest, loaned his phone to the nurse who called Abu Ahmed, was probably betrayed to ISI by the nurse and the phone number recorded in his phone, was thought by CIA to have a generally good reputation, has been tortured since his arrest.

3) That Afridi's help in the OBL hunt was "marginal" as it turned out, revealing the second set of phones that cemented the certainty that the compound's residents were acting very secretly and strangely. But how would you characterize his overall contribution, including identifying other AQ or other militant members and locations?

4) That for the Abbottabad operation, Afridi got $250,000 to buy Hep B vaccine kits and $10,500 as salary. What was the total money paid to Afridi by CIA over the whole three years, with separate numbers for expenses and salary?

5) What is the CIA's understanding of his relationship with President Zardari? He was honored for his polio work at a dinner that Zardari attended, but did they really know each other? Any greater clarity on the relationship?

6) Were Hepatitis B vaccines used to get blood for DNA analysis? And were the vaccines useless without the entire series?

That should do it.

Many thanks

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office
Scott,

Background comments for your story
Thought I should share with you what the Save the Children guy told us on the record. Given the fact that the former CIA director confirmed the relationship with Afridi, I hope you can say something on-record defending or explaining this practice.

------

David Wright, the Save the Children Pakistan director, says that he is angry at the CIA, which he believes may have used Save the Children as cover for its operation. "I was outraged that a vaccination campaign would be used as cover for espionage - particularly in country that has more polio cases than the rest of the world combined." He added: "Ultimately I don't blame the ISI. What they are doing is a natural outcome of what the CIA has done. If they use humanitarian activities as cover, of course there will be consequences for us." Having previously kept a low profile, Wright said he was going public in order to expose the case. "I'm done with pussyfooting on this. If governments continue to use humanitarian activities as cover for intelligence activities, the humanitarian space across the world is going to get pretty small, pretty quick. So they really should stop it." -----

Will call later

Thanks

Scott

Scott Shane

New York Times

Washington Bureau

202-862-0305 office
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 2:28 PM
To: Seems Afridi story is running

...so would be great to get a comment. Researching the limitations on cover, I'm told that CIA by policy does not use Peace Corps volunteers or Fulbright scholars and uses journalists accredited to US news organizations only with a waiver from director or president. (If any of this is wrong or incomplete, I'd love to know.) I recognize that Afridi was not an intel officer working under physician cover, but a physician doing intel work, but the issues and consequences appear to be the same.

Thanks
Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office
Many thanks. I will make sure it has the "not confirming" part. And I will be back to you soon to pitch Michael on the Obama story.

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office

Scott,

The following is attributable to me, in name, as CIA spokesperson:

"I cannot comment on, or confirm, any possible operational activity. However, I would note that the CIA certainly respects the great work of medical NGOs in difficult places around the world. The Agency is receptive to the views of the NGO community, and met with community representatives for a full and frank exchange on their concerns. Decisions are not made in a vacuum, and the Agency welcomed the opportunity to hear directly from them."
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 7:57 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Subject: Re: Note for Michael Morrell -- please pass on

Very kind of you

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message -----  
From: 
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 07:53 PM  
To: Shane, Scott  
Subject: RE: Note for Michael Morrell -- please pass on  

I already did.

----- Original Message -----  
From: Shane, Scott  
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 07:01 PM  
To:  
Subject: Re: Note for Michael Morrell -- please pass on  

Whoops! Please correct. And thanks for your help.

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message -----  
From: 
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 06:57 PM  
To: Shane, Scott  
Subject: RE: Note for Michael Morrell -- please pass on  

By the way, it's Morell. Will pass this along.
-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 6:14 PM
To:
Cc:
Subject: Note for Michael Morrell -- please pass on

Hi Michael -- First, many thanks for sitting down with me on Monday about Dr. Afridi. You saved us from some factual errors and gave us a better sense of the stakes and the real story.

Second -- you said you would consider sitting down with Jo Becker and me for this story on the Obama counterterrorism record. I wanted to give you a sense of why we'd like more information from the agency on certain points, and why I think it would be in the agency's interest to help.

1) In our reporting we have been told in detail of the nomination process for the military's kill-capture list, including the interagency video conferences to discuss names. We do not have any details on the CIA's parallel process, which I assume is quite different but I have been assured is thorough and careful. I'm afraid that a lengthy description of the DOD process, with just a sentence saying not much is known about the CIA process, may be unfair to CIA.

2) As I mentioned, we have heard some criticism of the agency's CT program -- not from ACLU, Reprieve or the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, but from current and former senior intelligence and administration officials (whom I can't name under our ground rules, but who you would consider credible and generally well-informed if I could). The questions relate mainly to the identification of targets for signature strikes, and the counting of casualties as combatant or noncombatant. We intend to cite some of these criticisms in the story, but we would benefit from a response or explanation to better gauge their legitimacy.

3) We have been told the agency uses what is described as a "matrix" showing the relative tradeoffs of the value of the target versus the expected level of collateral casualties. We'd like to confirm this or see if the description is accurate.

4) We have been told that there was an adjustment of munitions used in strikes early in the Obama administration with the idea of achieving greater precision and reducing the risk to innocents. We'd like to confirm or clarify.

5) Unless it's included in the public documents from West Point tomorrow, we'd very much like more detail on Bin Laden's letter about the success of the US in persuading Muslims that the US is targeting Al Qaeda and not Islam.

Many thanks for your consideration.

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office
fyi, as you can imagine, Declan had info from other sources. Anything you gave us off the record stayed off the record. Thanks again.

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message -----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 07:53 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Subject: RE: Note for Michael Morrell -- please pass on

I already did.

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 7:01 PM
To:
Subject: Re: Note for Michael Morrell -- please pass on

Whoops! Please correct. And thanks for your help.

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message -----
Subject: RE: Note for Michael Morrell -- please pass on

By the way, it's Morell. Will pass this along.

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 6:14 PM
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: Note for Michael Morrell -- please pass on

Hi Michael -- First, many thanks for sitting down with me on Monday about Dr. Afridi. You saved us from some factual errors and gave us a better sense of the stakes and the real story.

Second -- you said you would consider sitting down with Jo Becker and me for this story on the Obama counterterrorism record. I wanted to give you a sense of why we'd like more information from the agency on certain points, and why I think it would be in the agency's interest to help.

1) In our reporting we have been told in detail of the nomination process for the military's kill-capture list, including the interagency video conferences to discuss names. We do not have any details on the CIA's parallel process, which I assume is quite different but I have been assured is thorough and careful. I'm afraid that a lengthy description of the DOD process, with just a sentence saying not much is known about the CIA process, may be unfair to CIA.

2) As I mentioned, we have heard some criticism of the agency's CT program -- not from ACLU, Reprieve or the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, but from current and former senior intelligence and administration officials (whom I can't name under our ground rules, but who you would consider credible and generally well-informed if I could). The questions relate mainly to the identification of targets for signature strikes, and the counting of casualties as combatant or noncombatant. We intend to cite some of these criticisms in the story, but we would benefit from a response or explanation to better gauge their legitimacy.

3) We have been told the agency uses what is described as a "matrix" showing the relative tradeoffs of the value of the target versus the expected level of collateral casualties. We'd like to confirm this or see if the description is accurate.

4) We have been told that there was an adjustment of munitions used in strikes early in the Obama administration with the idea of achieving greater precision and reducing the risk to innocents. We'd like to confirm or clarify.

5) Unless it's included in the public documents from West Point tomorrow, we'd very much like more detail on Bin Laden's letter about the success of the US in persuading Muslims that the US is targeting Al Qaeda and not Islam.

Many thanks for your consideration.

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-8305 office
From: Shane, Scott  
Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2012 6:56 PM  
To:  
Subject: Re: Your story

Sorry, was stuck in interviews and off email. Sorry to hear that. This is an imperfect business -- editor had told me he would make sure the entire quote from you ran. It was cut at some point in the evening as they rejiggered the page for space, it seems. Trust me, Michael and you would have been far more displeased with the story that we would have run without your help. You'll see what I mean (only wanted to work on vaccines, hero and patriot). He and you accomplished a great deal -- your time was by no means wasted. Meanwhile, if Michael doesn't want to talk, I still hope we might get answers to the questions I sent, and perhaps the outstanding ones I'd sent to. Many of them are very much in the agency's interest to answer -- eg, a roundup of the program's success to date. I'll try you in the morning.

Thanks again

Scott

 Scott Shane  
New York Times  
Washington bureau  
202-862-0305

From:  
Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2012 03:42 PM  
To: Shane, Scott  
Cc:  
Subject: Your story

Scott,

Approved for Release: 2014/03/25
Thanks, I'll try to catch you later (I'm on cell). My argument would be that CIA helps itself by saying more, not less. That was absolutely what happened with the Afridi story -- no question that the story was better from our point of view and yours with the agency's input.

best

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Friday, May 04, 2012 11:14 AM
To: GR;
Subject: RE: Two things

Scott,

Take care,

Media Spokesperson
CIA Office of Public Affairs

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Friday, May 04, 2012 9:43 AM
To: GR;
Subject: FW: Two things

(Copying message just sent to GR)

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Friday, May 04, 2012 9:42 AM
To: 
Subject: Two things

On the news front: we've heard that joint CIA-JSOC teams are now embedded in the tribal areas of Yemen, helping gather intelligence and direct strikes. Can you confirm, dispute, explain?

And I'd like to chat briefly on where we go from here on the bigger Obama piece. I'm on

Thanks much

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-8385
fyi and please share with Michael a little more info on our Afridi story. We very seriously considered the notion that the negative info on Afridi was coming from ISI (and ignored some of the more lurid claims that were indeed coming from ISI). Declan called the guy supposedly spreading the disinformation, the FATA director of health, Dr. Fawad Khan. They spoke about healthcare but when Declan mentioned Afridi, he clammed up and ended the conversation. So while he may well be smearing Afridi to other journalists, he didn't do so to us.

In addition, the two main allegations we mentioned - sexual harassment and dubious surgery that led to his arrest by the local warlord - were backed by multiple sources. The harassment claim came through papers filed with the FATA authorities and the local Human Rights Commission (which we obtained independently from each). The surgery/warlord info came from at least six different sources including the local parliamentarian and his own colleagues, most speaking on the record.

And of course we included the US government assessment of Afridi as a doctor of good character.

So I hope this clarifies why we do not believe the negative information about Afridi was an ISI invention.

cheers

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
Great, thanks much

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message ----- 
From: 
Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 04:54 PM 
To: Shane, Scott 
Subject: RE: AQAP plot

Scott -

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 4:38 PM
To: 
Subject: AQAP plot

I'd love to talk with someone about this as soon as possible. At the 202 number below.

Thanks much
Scott 

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 8:21 PM
To: Scott
Subject: Re: Fact check

Still don't have the background stuff, fyi. Hope it's not going in spam filter!

Thanks
Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 07:43 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc: Schmitt, Eric P
Subject: RE: Fact check

Hi Scott,

Just going through all the requests for fact checking/follow up. Please forgive the delay in responding. I just tried calling you on land line and cell.

-----Original Message----- 
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 6:26 PM
To: 
Subject: Fact check

Could you tell me if anything in this Web story (below) is wrong or misleading? Thrown together on deadline.

Also, if you have time for a chat I’m putting a fuller version together for tomorrow’s newspaper: 202-862-0305.

Thanks
Scott

May 7, 2012
U.S. Thwarts New Qaeda Plot to Attack Plane, Officials Say By JOHN H. CUSHMAN Jr.
WASHINGTON -- American counterterrorism forces recently thwarted an apparent plot to bring down a commercial plane, seizing a new, more sophisticated explosive device designed to be worn by a passenger, government officials said Monday.

Officials said the plot had been based in Yemen and appeared to be a second attempt at the kind of attack that failed in 2009 when a passenger on a flight to Detroit tried to set off an explosive hidden in his garments.

The explosive, which contained no metal parts and had a more sophisticated triggering device, may have been designed by the same bomb-maker, Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, they said. The officials did not say they had captured the bomber or any other individuals, and it was not clear whether anybody had been identified, or whether a suicide bomber had even been recruited yet.

The bomb was seized days before the May 2 anniversary of the death of Osama bin Laden. But the officials said that there was no reason to say it was intended to be used to mark the date, that an attack was never launched and that no plane was ever in danger.

Administration officials continued to say Monday, as they did for days before the anniversary of Bin Laden's death, which President Obama marked with a trip to Afghanistan and a speech to the nation, that there was no specific threat of a terrorist plot to attack the United States at this time.

A statement Monday from the Department of Homeland Security, however, spelled out the kinds of measures it is taking to prevent being caught off guard, including by this kind of improvised explosive device, or I.E.D.

"Since this I.E.D. demonstrates our adversaries' interest in targeting the aviation sector, D.H.S. continues, at the direction of the president, to employ a risk-based, layered approach to ensure the security of the traveling public," Matt Chandler, an agency spokesman, said in a statement. "These layers include threat and vulnerability analysis, prescreening and screening of passengers, using the best available technology, random searches at airports, federal air marshal coverage, and additional security measures both seen and unseen."

The Federal Bureau of Investigation said in a written statement that it possessed the device, which it said had been seized abroad. The bureau is conducting tests on the device, the statement said, and "initial exploitation indicates" that it is very similar to ones used by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula "in attempted terrorist attacks, including against aircraft and for targeted assassinations."

Mr. Obama was first told of the plot in April by the White House's homeland security and counterterrorism adviser, John O. Brennan, and has since received briefings on the matter, according to a statement by the National Security Council.

"While the president was assured that the device did not pose a threat to the public, he directed the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement and intelligence agencies to take whatever steps necessary to guard against this type of attack," said Caitlin Hayden, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council. "The disruption of this I.E.D. plot underscores the necessity of remaining vigilant against terrorism here and abroad."

The plot's disruption was earlier reported by The Associated Press, which said the government was planning to announce it on Thursday. Other officials confirmed details of the A.P. report.

It was at least the third attempt of the Qaeda affiliate to attack the United States with an aircraft plot using an innovative bomb that officials believe Mr. Asiri designed.
On Christmas in 2009, a young Nigerian tried to blow up an airliner over Detroit with chemical explosives hidden in his underwear, but the explosives merely burned the would-be bomber. Then, in October 2010, Qaeda operatives placed two printer-ink cartridges loaded with explosives and addressed to Chicago aboard cargo planes, but the bombs were detected and removed en route.

Eric Schmitt, Scott Shane and Michael S. Schmidt contributed reporting.

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-6305 office
Great. You're welcome.

From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 8:22 PM
To: 'Shane, Scott'
Subject: RE: AQAP Bomb Plot

Just got it! Thanks

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

From:
Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 08:19 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Cc:
Subject: AQAP Bomb Plot

Hi Scott,
For your convenience:

DHS Statement:

"We have no specific, credible information regarding an active terrorist plot against the U.S. at this time, although we continue to monitor efforts by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates to carry out terrorist attacks, both in the Homeland and abroad. Since this IED demonstrates our adversaries’ interest in targeting the aviation sector, DHS continues, at the direction of the President, to employ a risk-based, layered approach to ensure the security of the traveling public. These layers include threat and vulnerability analysis, prescreening and screening of passengers, using the best available technology, random searches at airports, federal air marshal coverage and additional security measures both seen and unseen. DHS will continue to work with our federal, state, local, international and private sector partners to identify potential threats and take appropriate protective measures. As always, we encourage law enforcement and security officials, as well as the general public, to maintain vigilance and report suspicious activity to the appropriate authorities.” —Matt Chandler, DHS Spokesman

FBI statement:

"As a result of close cooperation with our security and intelligence partners overseas, an improvised explosive device (IED) designed to carry out a terrorist attack has been seized abroad. The FBI currently has possession of the IED and is conducting technical and forensics analysis on it. Initial exploitation indicates that the device is very similar to IEDs that have been used previously by al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in attempted terrorist attacks, including against aircraft and for targeted assassinations. The device never presented a threat to public safety, and the U.S. Government is working closely with international partners to address associated concerns with the device. We refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, including the Transportation Security Administration, regarding ongoing security measures to safeguard the American people and the traveling public." —FBI Statement

WH COMMENT:

"The President was first informed about the plot in April by his Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan, and he has received regular updates and briefings as needed from his national security team. While the President was assured that the device did not pose a threat to the public, he directed the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement and intelligence agencies to take whatever steps necessary to guard against this type of attack. The disruption of this IED plot underscores the necessity of remaining vigilant against terrorism here and abroad. The President thanks all intelligence and counterterrorism professionals involved for their outstanding work and for serving with the extraordinary skill and commitment that their enormous responsibilities demand." —Caitlin Hayden, Deputy NSC Spokesperson

Approved for Release: 2013/12/23
We were told the following on record by Rep. Peter King from the briefing he got about the would-be suicide bomber:

"They said that we don’t have to worry about him anymore, that we don’t have to worry about this guy. That was the exact language they used."

I'm concerned about using this because it makes it sound like CIA or its partners may have killed the would-be bomber or made him disappear or something else ominous. Can you help me interpret what Rep. King is saying, or clarify off-record, so that we don’t inadvertently cause misunderstanding?

Thanks much

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
Hi Folks, Running into an interview for most of the morning, but would greatly appreciate a note advising on whether any organized briefings on Yemen are planned today by CIA, NSC or anyone else.

Thanks much

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington Bureau
202-862-0305 office
Hi Scott ~ In response to your question I can offer the following on the record, from me as a CIA Spokesperson:

"CIA takes its responsibility to keep Congress informed very seriously. We will, of course, cooperate fully with any review or investigation."

Hope you have the chance to enjoy some of this great weather.

Media Spokesperson
CIA Office of Public Affairs
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Tuesday, May 22, 2012 5:54 PM
To: Re: Obama CT Policy

Thanks very much, Will study this tonight.

Best

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Tuesday, May 22, 2012 05:49 PM
To: Scott, Obama CT Policy

Scott,
Hope this helps,

Media Spokesperson
CIA Office of Public Affairs
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, May 21, 2012 6:19 PM
To: 
Subject: Re: Obama CT story

This story is going through the editing meat grinder now and that's in plenty of time to influence it.

Thanks

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305

----- Original Message ----- 
From: 
Sent: Monday, May 21, 2012 06:03 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Subject: RE: Obama CT story

Scott,

Thanks!

Media Spokesperson
CIA Office of Public Affairs

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2012 12:02 PM
To: 
Subject: Obama CT story

Thanks for the call Monday. Again, we would naturally welcome any input in response to the various questions sent previously. Two things that came up in our reporting more recently but that I may not have listed explicitly: We're told on what seems to be good
authority that two things changed, apparently pretty early in 2009, as a result of the 
president's concern about noncombatant casualties and resulting blowback:
  1) The munitions available for Hellfires were downsized to offer at least the option of a 
     smaller blast zone;
     and 2) The standard for deciding when to go forward with a strike was changed from
     "reasonable certainty of zero collateral damage" (ie, deaths and injuries of noncombatants)
     to "near certainty of zero collateral damage"

Just letting you know this so that you can either correct it, if we've gotten this wrong
in some way, or better explain it if you think I might not grasp the significance.

On cell today, in office Thursday and Friday. Chance that this story will run this weekend
is smaller than the chance I will be named CIA director, so no huge rush, but the sooner the
better.

Thanks

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
Scott,

As always though, we will keep in dialogue. Have a good evening!

Media Spokesperson
CIA Office of Public Affairs

Just FYI, I collected all the unused comments and answers from a "US counterterrorism official" and proposed running them online in Q & A format as a sidebar to the story today (which editors rushed into print because of the Newsweek excerpt). I argued that partly because the comments are anonymous, we rarely use more than a snippet, and it might be interesting to readers to see it all and form their own opinions. But editors disagreed, saying they didn't want to give anonymous government officials an unedited platform. Still, I appreciated all your input.

I raised with you the possibility of following up on Michael Morell's comment to me on the alleged drone deaths last year of Tariq Khan, 16, and his cousin, 12. If it's try that neither boy was killed by that drone strike, is it an opportunity to illustrate

Approved for Release: 2013/12/23
how false claims travel the world? From my point of view it would be a terrific piece, assuming some degree of certainty about the facts is possible. And I think the agency would welcome a chance to show how the disinformation process operates. What you think?

Thanks again and best

Scott

---

Scott Shane
Washington bureau
The New York Times
202-862-0305
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Thursday, June 07, 2012 2:21 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Intel committee statement

Hi folks -- I'll be writing daily on the Intel committee press conference and would welcome background and comment on the somewhat unclear statement from Rogers that CIA is refusing to provide information.

Back in office about 3 pm.

Many thanks

Scott

---Original Message-----
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Thursday, June 07, 2012 2:21 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Intel committee statement

Hi folks -- I'll be writing daily on the Intel committee press conference and would welcome background and comment on the somewhat unclear statement from Rogers that CIA is refusing to provide information.

Back in office about 3 pm.

Many thanks

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Thursday, June 07, 2012 4:49 PM
To:
Subject: Re: Intel committee statement

Thanks, Preston. You're faster on the draw than Rogers' folks, who may still be trying to figure out what he meant$.
--
Scott Shane
Washington bureau
The New York Times
202-862-0305

On 6/7/12 4:41 PM,

>Scott,

>Have a good evening,
>
>Media Spokesperson
>CIA Office of Public Affairs

>

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Shane, Scott
>Sent: Thursday, June 07, 2012 2:21 PM
>To:
>Subject: Intel committee statement

>Hi folks -- I'll be writing daily on the Intel committee press conference and would welcome background and comment on the somewhat unclear statement from Rogers that CIA is refusing to provide information.
Back in office about 3 pm.
Many thanks
Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
202-862-0305
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2012 11:59 AM
To: Question on Bulgarian bomber

You have any guidance on whether indeed the bomber was Mehdi Ghezali, formerly of Gitmo?

Thanks

Scott

Scott Shane
Washington bureau
The New York Times
202-862-0305
Hi folks — As I mentioned briefly, I've been asked to write a piece on Director Petraeus and his record at the agency, probably shooting for early September (I'll be out the week of August 20). There's no hidden agenda — just a desire to catch up on his impact there. I'd like to have any guidance, material and suggestions you are able to provide — interviews with CIA officials, suggestions for outsiders to talk to, maybe a memo on his goals and achievements, or whatever else might be relevant. In addition, I would like to request an interview with the director, if he's willing.

Glad to discuss this next week.

Many thanks

Scott

Scott Shane
Washington bureau
The New York Times
202-862-0305
From: Shane, Scott
Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 2:20 PM
To: Re: Your Query on Syria

Scott Shane
Washington bureau
The New York Times
202-862-0305

From: Scott Shane
To: Scott Shane
Cc: Subject: Your Query on Syria

Hi Scott,

Thanks for your call.

Media Spokesperson
CIA Office of Public Affairs