(U) **Topic:** Iran – Current Topics, Interaction with GCHQ

(U) **Director’s Talking Points:**

- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Emphasize** that we have successfully worked multiple high-priority surges with GCHQ that have allowed us to refine maintaining mission continuity and seamless transition, and maximize our target coverage. These jointly-worked events include the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran, Iran’s discovery of FLAME, and support to policymakers during the multiple rounds of P5 plus 1 negotiations.

(U//FOUO) **SIGINT Director’s Talking Points:**

- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Note** that our posture on Iran will serve us well going into any crisis or Event, but we still are taking a broader look at Iran, in the context of a possible crisis. This year we have updated contingency plans with GCHQ to reflect the changes in our access and Iran’s capabilities.

(U) **Background:**

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA has seen Iran further extending its influence across the Middle East over the last year.

1. **(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Iranian Cyber Attacks:** Iran continues to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks against numerous U.S. financial institutions, and is currently in the third phase of a series of such attacks that began in August 2012. SIGINT indicates that these attacks are in retaliation to Western activities against Iran’s nuclear sector and that senior officials in the Iranian government are aware of these attacks. NSA expects Iran will continue this series of attacks, which it views as successful, while striving for increased effectiveness by adapting its tactics and techniques to circumvent victim mitigation attempts.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Iran’s destructive cyber attack against Saudi Aramco in August 2012, during which data was destroyed on tens of thousands of computers, was the first such attack NSA has observed from this adversary. Iran, having been a victim of a similar cyber attack against its own oil industry in April 2012, has demonstrated a clear ability to learn from the capabilities and actions of others. While NSA has no indications at this time that Iran plans to conduct such an attack against a U.S. or UK target, we cannot rule out the possibility of such an attack, especially in the face of increased international pressure on the regime.

2. **(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Iran Crisis Contingency Planning:** NSA’s posture on Iran will serve us well going into any crisis or event. We continually update contingency plans to reflect the changes in both our access and Iran’s capabilities.

- (TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA’s crisis and event plans have been coordinated throughout the U.S. IC and are designed to sync with plans at CENTCOM, EUCOM and CYBERCOM.
• (TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA’s planned battle rhythm focuses on production deadlines that will feed daily briefings and intelligence requirements for policy makers and Combatant Commands.

• (TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) MEA’s Iran Division has held one VTC with GCHQ’s Iran lead, [redacted] and his team, with another scheduled for 23 April to discuss ongoing contingency planning efforts on both sides.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA has successfully worked multiple high-priority surges with GCHQ that have allowed us to refine maintaining mission continuity and seamless transition, and maximize our target coverage. These jointly worked events include the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran; Iran’s discovery of computer network exploitation tools on their networks in 2012 and 2013; and support to policymakers during the multiple rounds of P5 plus 1 negotiation on Iran’s nuclear program.

3. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, GBR) NSA-GCHQ-ISNU Trilateral Discussions: In January 2013, during an NSA-ISNU analytic workshop on Iranian Leadership, the first ever trilateral VTC on an Iranian issue was held with NSA, GCHQ and ISNU participants. The focus of the trilateral effort, which was kicked off by the VTC, is the [redacted] issue. The respective NSA-ISNU and GCHQ-ISNU bilateral relationships had gotten to the point that each participant recognized the need for the trilateral engagement to advance this specific topic. The trilateral relationship is limited to the topic of [redacted] and will serve as a proof of concept of this kind of engagement.

(U) Potential Landmine:

• (TS//SI//NF) GCHQ has long advocated that it work with NSA and the ISNU in a trilateral arrangement to prosecute the Iranian target. SID policy has been opposed to such a blanket arrangement, and this specific trilateral should not be interpreted as a broad change of approach. In other areas, NSA and GCHQ have agreed to continue to share information gleaned from the respective bilateral relationships with ISNU.

(U) Date of Material: 12 April 2013

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