CONFIDENTIAL

November 12, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Petraeus/October Surprise.

My operative theory on Petraeus scandal is that it became an October Surprise that failed. Forcing the scandal public and his resignation would have been the trifecta—leaks, Benghazi, then Petraeus—allowing Romney to argue that Obama had created a national security collapse. It would have overtakes the end of the campaign.

My thought is that Leahy should be in this now and that Feinstein should be made aware, if she is not already, of the October Surprise scenario.

Some questions:
Are there agents and other employees at FBI in regular contact with Republican members of the House outside the regular channel of the House Intelligence Committee?

Exactly how soon was Cantor contacted by FBI sources after Petraeus was exonerated by the
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Some questions:

Are there agents and other employees at FBI in regular contact with Republican members of the House outside the regular channel of the House Intelligence Committee?

Exactly how soon was Cantor contacted by FBI sources after Petraeus was exonerated by the investigation?

What was the decision making process of those involved in contacting congressmen Reichert and Cantor? Who exactly in the FBI was involved in that discussion? How many people? What was their connection to the investigation? Or was it a single rogue individual?

Did Cantor ever notify Speaker Boehner that he had been contacted and that he had contacted Mueller? Why not? What does Boehner have to say about what Cantor did?

Did Cantor or any House staff member speak about the matter with any member of the Romney-Ryan campaign?

Claims that Cantor was simply alerting the FBI of the investigation by contacting Mueller are
absurd on its face. The FBI knew it was conducting the investigation. What is Cantor covering up? Was he attempting to create pressure to force Petraeus' scandal into the public and his resignation before the election?

What was the connection between those involved in contacting Cantor and those involved in contacting Bob Woodward about a "Benghazi" story?

If there were irregularities in the investigation, the disgruntled FBI agents or employees should have contacted the FBI Inspector General. They did not. Was it because there were no irregularities? No one has suggested any. Did they know it is a felony to disclose an espionage investigation?

Will the FBI agent(s) and employee(s) who leaked the espionage investigation to congressmen Reichert and Cantor be the targets of a Justice Department criminal investigation? Will a grand jury be empaneled?
CONFIDENTIAL

September 4, 2010

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: intel on Merkel/German Euro policy; two memos

SOURCE: Sources with access to the highest levels of the governments and institutions discussed below. This includes political parties and regional intelligence and security services.

Memo #1:

1. Over the weekend of September 1, 2010, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble spoke privately with Chancellor Angela Merkel, preparing her for the European economic meetings scheduled for the first week of September. Schaeuble stated that in a discreet exchange, European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi led him to believe that the German government should not expect any dramatic announcements or initiatives from those economic forums. According to a well informed individual, Merkel again expressed frustration over the reality that there is no apparent solution to the crisis in the Eurozone. Schaeuble reminded her of his past warnings on this matter, and the need to avoid showing their importance with the situation.
September 4, 2012

For: Hillary  
From: Sid  
Re: Intel on Merkel/German Euro policy; two memos

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Memo #1

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2. In the opinion of this knowledgeable source, speaking on condition of secrecy, Schaeuble thanked Merkel for continuing to make diplomatic statements regarding the future of the Euro-zone, while allowing him to prepare for a worst case scenario with the very real possibility of a restructed currency union. This structure may well begin with newly defined roles for the troubled countries of the southern tier, including Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and even Italy. For her part, Merkel agreed that at this time the most important step is to prevent more panic in the world markets regarding the Euro. To this end, Merkel, Draghi, and all of the other concerned European leaders must continue to make positive, if vague statements about protecting the Euro at all costs, while preparing to move into a new, more manageable structure without raising concerns regarding a potential collapse of the Euro-zone.

3. In the opinion of this highly sensitive source, while Schaeuble was talking to Merkel, staff officers of the Ministries of Finance an Foreign Affairs, working with Chancellery economic advisors, drafted contingency plans based on discussions with their contacts in the ECB and reporting from German embassies and intelligence officers throughout Europe. These
Ministry of Finance staff officers believe, with a degree of confidence, that a decisive sovereign debt purchasing agreement, similar to last year’s Securities Market Programme (SMP), will not be unveiled on 6 September. They point out that such an agreement remains controversial; and any consensus likely will remain vague.

4. (Source Comment: During early September 2012, in a private conversation with his senior advisors, Schaeuble stated that Draghi also indicated to him that the ECB is considering a variety of bond purchasing programs. According to a sensitive source, Schaeuble also informed Merkel that the ECB Executive Board has drafted options for the sovereign debt purchasing agreement first proposed by Draghi on 2 August. Schaeuble added that this list includes at least four major elements: yield targets, asset classes, funding instruments and lending terms. Specifically, sovereign bond yields versus German bond yield spread targeting, short- versus long-term government debt purchasing and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) or European Stability Mechanism (ESM) funding. Proposed lending terms likely will resemble International Monetary Fund (IMF) letter of intent conditions. The Minister added that after speaking privately with Draghi, he believes recent public comments by ECB Board member Jörg Asmussen and IMF Deputy Manager David Lipton, raising the possibility of IMF funding, are part of an effort to reassure the markets, and that such moves are unlikely at this time.)

5. A separate sensitive source added that Draghi also warned Schaeuble that a final program decision of any kind is not likely until the day of announcement, September 6. Schaeuble accepted this, noting that there are twenty-two governors who will vote on the purchasing program, and there is no consensus on this decision. At least six publicly support a conditional lending program: Mario Draghi, Benoît Cœuré, Peter Praet, Luc Coene, Christian Noyer, and Ewald Nowotny. At least two more, Asmussen and Kaas Knot, President of De Nederlandsche Bank, support a strict conditional program. One governor has opposed any program: Jens Weidmann, President of the Bundesbank. Schaeuble’s advisors, and contacts among central bank officials throughout the European Union (EU), confirm intelligence reports that the governors are sharply divided on the nature and scale of a purchasing program. This source expects a contentious, and vague decision, coming at the end of the ECB meeting.

6. According to the same sensitive source, Schaeuble has informed Merkel that Draghi believes no legitimate path forward exists for the ECB without German support. This is partially a political matter: in the past, German leadership has consistently supported economic union. It is also part financial: Germany is the largest contributor into existing European rescue funds, accounting for about €211 Billion of the EFSF’s €780 Billion financing. Germany also has the largest European borrowing capacity. Central Bank sources regularly remind Schaeuble’s advisors that despite an eighty percent debt-to-gross domestic product ratio, German short-term borrowing costs remain below U.S. levels. Merkel added that she is often frustrated by Weidmann and realizes that his failure to ultimately support an ECB program would be crippling, raising more doubts about the Euro’s viability. However; The Chancellor continues to emphasize in private meetings with Schaeuble and her other economic advisors, speaking in the strongest possible terms that Germany must have assurances that some of its concerns will be addressed in a realistic manner.
7. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this extremely sensitive source, two key factors drive Merkel’s opposition to a new debt purchasing program. Weidmann, like many within the Bundesbank, believes such a program’s fiscal implications make it the preserve of parliamentary, not monetary authorities. At the same time Merkel and Schaeuble are focused on the fact that public support for bailout measures polls poorly in key national opinion surveys. Schaeuble notes that, while support for Merkel remains steady, her position is delicate: she realizes that she must stabilize the Euro without damaging her domestic political position. Thus, though Merkel has come out in favor of a conditional purchasing program, she has remained quiet as other German leaders have criticized Draghi’s proposals. Schaeuble, added that he, Merkel and Draghi continue to work together discreetly, but with all of these factors, a decisive agreement on September 6 is unlikely.)

8. At the same time a separate source notes that the entire Euro crisis will increasingly be driven by domestic politics in the member nations. According to this source, the Merkel and her government are focused on the upcoming elections in the Netherlands on 12 September. The Dutch government, led by right wing party, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD), is struggling against the left-wing Socialistische Partij (SP) in polls. The SP has pledged to roll back domestic austerity measures and leave the ESM and EU bailouts. The Germans are well aware of late August polling by Intomart GfK, a Dutch market research group, giving the VVD a slight lead, but the election outcome is uncertain. Merkel and Schaeuble, supported by reporting from the German Embassy in The Hague, are convinced that the Dutch Government is unlikely to press for a detailed purchasing program agreement until after a new government is formed.

9. At the same time, according to this source, Schaeuble is watching the situation in Italy. The Italian government, led by technocrat Mario Monti, is also struggling at the polls. The German Embassy in Rome reports that surveys by SWG-Agora, an Italian market research group, show that Monti’s personal popularity has fallen by half since he took office and that his centrist coalition has slightly less than fifty percent support. The Embassy and officers of the German Federal Intelligence Service (Bunesnachrichtendienst—BND) report from separate sources that Monti is considering calling snap elections this fall, ahead of general elections scheduled for April 2013. These same sources indicate that under these conditions Italy is unlikely to use the purchasing program until after new elections. Schaeuble noted that after private discussions, he believes Draghi shares this view. Monti will not burden his coalition allies with a bailout before general elections.

10. (Source Comment: In the opinion of an individual with direct access to the highest levels of the German Government and the ECB, speaking on condition of absolute secrecy, Merkel believes that Draghi’s August 2 announcement and subsequent public statements have calmed debt investors’ fears of Spanish and Italian insolvency. Since early August, Italian and Spanish yields have fallen dramatically from their late July highs. Spanish two-year yields have fallen from 6.5% to 3.7% as of 31 August. Italian two-year yields have fallen from 5.1% to 2.8%. Ten-year debt yields have seen similar declines. Further, Italy’s debt auction last week was seen by the Germans as a success, raising over €7Billion. Both Spain and Italy are shifting to short maturity debt, however the longer maturity yields are significant: Schaeuble stated privately that industry observers widely see seven percent to be the sustainable borrowing threshold. The
Minister also believes that so long as yields remain at current levels, pressure for immediate ECB action will remain muted.

11. (Source Comment: According to a source with sensitive access, Schäuble stated in private that Weidmann’s recent resignation offer is likely a ploy to gain ECB negotiating leverage. This is consistent with views expressed in private by senior advisors to Draghi, who characterize Weidmann’s public statements as seeking to limit the scope of any debt purchasing agreement. According to this sensitive source, the recent move to give the ECB regulatory oversight of all European banks is part of an attempt to gain Weidmann’s support for the bond purchasing program. Schäuble added that Weidmann’s public opposition is an attempt to drive a hard bargain for a new purchasing program and is likely to continue until an immediate detailed agreement is required.)

Memo # 2
Re: German Constitutional Court/ESM/Euro

1. Over the weekend of September 1, 2012 German Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble informed Chancellor Angela Merkel that sources associated with the German Constitutional Court (GCC) had informed him in secret that the Court staff is drafting a proposed final decision on the Social Democratic Party (SDP) case regarding the legality of German participation in the European Security Mechanism (ESM). According to these sources, this decision will support the legal status of Germany’s participation in the ESM. Schäuble cautioned that this finding must survive a final vote of the full court on September 10/11, but he and the Chief Judge are optimistic it will prevail. The source cautioned that this information is extremely sensitive and any exposure of this material could create a crisis in the German Government. Schäuble concluded by stating in secret that the Chief Judge advised him that the decision will in one area address the SDP’s position by including additional conditions requiring basic parliamentary insolvency impact assessments before approval can be provided to EU bailouts.

2. (Source Comment: Speaking under conditions of strictest secrecy, a source with access to Schäuble commented that, while the disorganized nature of the situation in the Eurozone is personally annoying for the Minister, he agrees with the staff analysis that a meaningful relief program is unlikely to be adopted until after pending Dutch and Italian elections or Spanish or Italian yields spike. In a particularly sensitive note Schäuble told his closest advisors that the Chief Judge of the GCC secretly informed him and the Chancellor that the Court is highly unlikely to strike down or critically curtail the ESM. Schäuble added that when this decision is announced on September 12 it will allow the German Government focus it’s positions on the troubled Southern tier countries, including Greece, Spain, and Italy.)

3. According to an extremely sensitive source, when the GCC rules on the legality of the June 2012 ESM legislation, the Judges will address the arguments of the plaintiffs, including the former Communist Party and the German Association of Family Businesses. These groups argue that the ESM breaches Maastricht Treaty Article 104b. This states that no EU members will be
liable for other EU members’ debts. At this time the Chief Judge believes it likely that this argument will fail, noting in a private conversation with Schaeuble that similar arguments had not succeeded in prior cases. According to this very sensitive source, German leaders strongly believe the legislation will be upheld because Germany has legally transferred similar powers to the EU in the past.
GUCCIFER 14 March 2013

CONFIDENTIAL

January 4, 2013

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Comprehensive Intel Report on Libya

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Government, as well as the highest levels of European governments and Western intelligence and security services.

1. In reviewing the events of the past year, as well as their plans for 2013, Libyan President Mohamed Magariaf and Prime Minister Ali Zidan discussed their frustration over the pace of efforts to define the relationship between the legislature and the interim government, establish the authority of this national government throughout the country, and deal with security issues that have lingered since the fall of former dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi in late 2011. Speaking on condition of absolute secrecy, a source with access to the Office of the President stated that during late December 2012 Magariaf and Zidan agreed that they must move quickly to deal with these problematic issues before they can address their long-term strategy of developing productive diplomatic and business relationships with their neighboring states in North Africa, Western Europe and the United States.

2. (Source Comment: According to this source, while Zidan and Magariaf often disagree on the mechanics involved in establishing the authority of the government, they are making a concerted effort to avoid allowing their political differences to complicate their efforts to govern the country. This individual notes that the two men opposed each other in the August 2012 presidential election and they have not yet
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2. (Source Comment: According to this source, while Zidan and Magariaf often disagree on the mechanics involved in establishing the authority of the government, they are making a concerted effort to avoid allowing their political differences to complicate their efforts to govern the country. This individual notes that the two men opposed each other in the August 2012 presidential election and they have not yet addressed the issue of how best to work together in the next national election, scheduled for mid-2013. However; they realize the fragile nature of the current Libyan government and are determined, for the present, to work together on the large national issues, leaving the day to day political infighting to the members of the General National Council--GNC. This individual believes these structural problems cannot be addressed in a serious manner until the President and Prime Minister are able to define their specific roles.)

3. For his part Zidan believes that the government and the National Oil Company (NOC) can eventually establish new relationships with Western oil firms, allowing Libyans to be trained to fill jobs at all levels of that industry, including positions previously reserved for foreign experts.
during the Qaddafi regime. The Prime Minister stated that this program will cement his popularity with the Libyan people and allow him to consolidate the role of the government across the country. Zidan realizes that he does not have enough time to make significant progress on this matter before the next round of national elections, however; he believes that positive steps in this direction will be popular, and allow him to gain enough support to establish a basis for a more effective administration.

4. In the opinion of this individual Magariaf supports Zidan in this matter and is particularly interested in resolving the ongoing issues regarding the federalist movement in the Eastern Cyrenaica region (Barqa in Arabic). The President is convinced that finding a reasonable solution to the demands of the Eastern political and tribal groups will allow the current government to move to complete its program of disarming the independent militia units left over from the 2011 revolution. At the same time this will allow the National Libyan Army (NLA) and police forces to deal with militia units that have established contacts with opposition Salafist groups, as well as Al Qai`da in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Magariaf continues to cite the development of Ansar al Sharia as an example of how a militia or group of militias can establish a relationship with AQIM and other radical organizations, eventually turning to attack Western interests in the Benghazi region. Magariaf bases his concerns on the best information available and while he believes that the NLA has made progress against Ansar al Sharia and similar groups the Army is still limited by the relative weakness of the government.

5. (Source Comment: Also in December Zidan, Oil Minister Abdulbari al-Arsi and Italian oil firm ENI’s CEO Paolo Scaroni met at the Prime Minister’s office to discuss ENI plans for developing new operations in Libya. According to an extremely sensitive source, these talks went very well. After the meeting Zidan noted that Scaroni was obviously extremely anxious to develop a new, special relationship with the post-revolutionary Libyan government and intended to gain an advantage on other Western firms looking to do business in the country. This source added that, according to Zidan’s staff, Scaroni proposed a plan calling for an $8.5 billion investment in both ongoing production and new exploration spread over 10 years. Later, in discussing the meeting, Zidan and his aides agreed that Scaroni had the full backing of the Italian government in this matter. Zidan added that his contacts in Rome report that the Italian administration believes this investment in Libya will help them deal with the long term economic problems they are facing during the current European debt crisis.)

6. According to this sensitive source, the Libyans and Scaroni worked out a rough draft of an initial Memorandum of Understanding, covering an initial investment of approximately $420 million, which will be finalized before Zidan’s planned visit to Rome in late January 2013. Before the Tripoli meeting ended the Prime Minister requested that Scaroni consider committing ENI to work on additional operations in the downstream sector under a new office of the Libyan National Oil Corporation, which the Oil Ministry plans to establish in Benghazi. Zidan noted that ENI began working in Libya in 1958, and, in his opinion remains the most important international oil company operating in the country. When Zidan briefed Magariaf on the meeting with Scaroni, the President agreed that the ENI proposal is an important matter for the new Libyan government, however; he cautioned that the recent resignation of Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti might complicate the affair. Zidan stated that his contacts in Rome assure him that the importance of the new ENI proposal for Libya transcends the ongoing political infighting in
Rome. Both the Prime Minister and President agreed that with the prospect of new ENI operations and personnel in Libya, the Army and police forces must be able to improve security conditions for Western interests throughout the country.

7. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this sensitive source, while Magriaf and Zidan have established a relationship that allows them to work together for the present, they will be unable to build an effective government administration until they define clearly the roles of the President and Prime Minister in the post – Qaddafi era.)

8. During late December 2012 Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zidan complained in private to President Mohamed Magariaf that the General National Council (GNC) had placed the interim government in an awkward position by enacting legislation demanding that National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff General Youssef al Mangoush move to close the country’s borders by deploying his troops, along with loyal Tripoli based militia units, to patrol the borders, in an effort to prevent external groups from supporting anti-government forces, including the remaining supporters of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. According to a source, speaking in strict confidence, Magariaf assured Zidan that he had no hand in this decision, and that the GNC had acted on its own initiative based on internal political considerations. The President added that he continues to support Zidan’s recent efforts to establish security relationships with neighboring states, and acknowledged that the GNC action would complicate this process.

9. (Source Comment: According to this individual, Zidan believes that the factional/regional parties in the GNC took this step in an effort to gain a greater voice in foreign affairs. The legislation complicates the implementation of diplomatic agreements regarding border security arranged by Zidan during a recent trip to Chad, Niger, Algeria and Sudan. These agreements were established in coordination with Magariaf’s earlier security initiative involving the new revolutionary governments of Tunisia and Egypt. According to this source, the neighboring states agreed to increase border patrols and to monitor their shared borders with Mali. Speaking privately, Zidan told his closest advisors that the GNC plan to seal Libya’s southern borders would complicate this process and confuse the North African states regarding who in the Libyan government is responsible for foreign affairs and security issues.)

10. In the opinion of this sensitive source Magariaf remains committed to the regional security agreements he reached with the governments of Tunisia and Egypt, and is working with Zidan to manage the effect of the GNC on their efforts to prevent foreign assistance from reaching dissident militia groups inside of Libya. As it now stands, the GNC action requires the NLA to act unilaterally and seal the entire southern border, create a military district along that border, and assign a military governor with authority under martial law to arrest or detain wanted criminals and dissidents. In private discussions with Zidan, General Mangoush acknowledged that the southern region continues to be used by groups smuggling drugs and arms, as well as human traffickers, adding that his best troops began operating in the region long before the GNC action. The general pointed out that this area is also used by groups still loyal to the Qaddafi family. At present many of the NLA’s best mechanized units are deployed along the border with South Sudan in an effort to block the shipment of weapons and supplies to these groups. Mangoush also added in confidence that, in his opinion, this GNC decision was driven by political calculation rather than concern over security threats, and signals a potential crisis where GNC
deputies attempt to take advantage of institutional weaknesses in the government administration to assert a degree of authority over security and foreign policy.

11. (Source Comment: According to this source, Zidan shared his frustration with Mangoush, assuring him that neither he nor his aides had any role in the GNC action. The general was particularly angered by the fact that assembly’s plan was created without consultation with him or his staff, and did not include any realistic consideration of the NLA’s ability to carry out this expanded mission. Mangoush also noted that a number of GNC deputies criticized the decision as rushed and without proper internal discussion. In a separate conversation, Mangoush told a senior associate that he believes Zidan may still suspect that Magariaf had a hand in the GNC action, in an effort to gain a dominant position in the government. In the opinion of this source, the fact that the GNC action came shortly after Zidan’s visits to the neighboring states to discuss security issues indicates to Mangoush that Magariaf may be moving to ensure that the GNC, rather than Zidan and his cabinet control the vital issue of southern security. Mangoush added that, in his opinion, despite Magariaf’s reassurance, the GNC plan, if left as it stands, effectively removes Zidan as the leading policy-maker on security matters.

12. According to this individual, Zidan is taking a low key approach in reacting to the GNC action, choosing not to take any step that might indicate infighting between himself and Magariaf. At the same time the prime minister continues to focus on preserving the validity of the agreements recently negotiated with Libya’s neighboring states. Speaking in private Zidan noted that foreign and security policy are his responsibility, rather than that of the GNC. This includes the authority to appoint a commander to oversee the southern military operations. Zidan did note that his choice for military governor of the South would have to be approved by Magariaf.

13. According to a very sensitive source, the serious nature of the security situation in Libya was highlighted in early December 2012, when Mangoush received reporting from the French external intelligence service (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure – DGSE) that in early May 2012 in Northern Mali a mutual cooperation agreement was concluded between terrorist groups operating in North Africa. The meeting was led by al Qai’da in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram of Nigeria, and al Qai’da in East Africa (primarily al Shabaab of Somalia), and was designed to launch the final phase of a project intended to establish a "caliphate" along an extended strip stretching from South Sudan, through Libya to Mauritania. These French officials also warn that subsequent reporting indicates that this effort to concentrate Islamist forces in the region is meeting with a degree of success. They also warn that these forces are dedicated to “religious cleansing" aimed at the governments in that area. The DGSE officials noted that they believe the central figure in this effort is a Somali associated with al Shabaab; Sheik NUR BARUD.

14. In the opinion of this sensitive source the DGSE report highlights the increasingly complex nature of the security situation in Libya, particularly as regional security continues to deteriorate. Mangoush is urging both Magariaf and Zidan to present a united front on the issue of national security, and avoid being caught up in the political infighting in the GNC.
15. (Source Comment: At the same time, this sensitive source states that the debate over the GNC security legislation is an excellent example of the difficulty Zidan is facing in establishing a working government administration and effective cabinet. According to this source, Zidan has done a good job disguising this problem from foreign diplomats and businessmen, but it will be difficult for him to properly organize the government until these political issues have been addressed. In addition, Zidan’s efforts are complicated by the ongoing legal problems of former National Transitional Council (NTC) leader Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, who will be questioned by both military and civilian prosecutors regarding his role in the July 2011 assassination of General Abdel-Fattah Younis, Gadhafi’s former interior minister and one of the first major defectors from the old regime. Jalil and 10 other NTC officials have been charged with Younis’ death, though none have been arrested. This individual notes that a significant number of the advisors and cabinet officials working with Zidan are also former associates of Jalil under the NTC. This individual believes that this matter further complicates the prime minister’s efforts to establish an efficient, respected administration before the mid-2013 national elections.)

16. (Source Comment: At the height of the 2011 revolution against the Qaddafi regime, extremely sensitive reporting indicated that in July and August 2011 NTC security officers discovered evidence that Younis was in secret contact with Saif al Islam Qaddafi. In response to this report a sensitive source stated that Jalil ordered NTC security officers to assassinate Younis while en route to a meeting at NTC headquarters. Jalil then reported that Younis had been killed by Islamist dissidents among his troops.)
CONFIDENTIAL

September 12, 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Magariaf and the attack on US in Libya

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During the afternoon of September 11, 2012 new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yussef al Magariaf spoke in private with senior advisors, including the members of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, to discuss the attacks by demonstrators on U.S. missions in Tripoli and Benghazi. According to a sensitive source, al Magariaf was shaken by the attacks, and gave permission to commanders on the ground for security
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1. During the afternoon of September 11, 2012 new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf spoke in private with senior advisors, including the members of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, to discuss the attacks by demonstrators on U.S. missions in Tripoli and Benghazi. According to a sensitive source, el Magariaf was shaken by the attacks, and gave permission to commanders on the ground for security forces to open fire over the heads of the crowds in an effort to break up mobs attacking the missions. During this session, a senior security officer told el Magariaf that the attacks on that day were inspired by what many devout Libyan viewed as a sacrilegious internet video on the prophet Mohammed originating in America. The Libyan attacks were also inspired by and linked to an attack on the U.S. mission in Egypt on the same day. At the same time, el Magariaf noted in strong terms that the atmosphere that made fostered these incidents in Libya is the product of widespread publicity regarding the security situation in the country between 2004 and 2010 and the cooperation that developed between a number of Western Intelligence services and the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.
2. This source added that el Magariaf’s advisors believe that this situation adds to the President’s growing concern over the unpredictable effects that will follow current covert efforts by his political opponents to link him directly to foreign intelligence services. According to a separate sensitive source, el Magariaf noted that his opponents had often tried to connect him to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), a group established in opposition to former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, which el Magariaf led in the 1980s. In the opinion of this individual el Magariaf believes that he can survive potential negative publicity in this regard, but if this situation continues to develop in this manner it will complicate his efforts to establish an orderly administration in the country. Again, he stated that the attacks on the U.S. missions were as much a result of the atmosphere created by this campaign, as the controversial internet video.

3. At the same time, this individual noted that several of el Magariaf’s advisors share his concerns in this matter, pointing out that the return of Qaddafi’s intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senoussi for trial in Libya has heightened public interest in the liaison relationships conducted by the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) with Qaddafi’s intelligence and security services. These same individuals note that they believe Islamist militia forces under the command of General Abdelhakim Belhaj captured files and documents describing this relationship from Qaddafi’s offices in Tripoli. This fascination with Western intelligence operations in Qaddafi’s Libya is also driven by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and its efforts to tie Western governments to human rights violations committed under Qaddafi. In this regard HRW has interviewed at least fourteen (14) individuals claiming that they were turned over to Qaddafi’s forces by the Western powers. Belhaj is included in this group.

4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el Magariaf’s enemies are working to take advantage of his suspected links to the CIA at a time when Western intelligence services are under scrutiny in Libya. They also fear that this situation will only grow more complex as Qaddafi’s son Saif al Islam Qaddafi and al Senousi are brought before Libyan courts to answer for their crimes under the old regime, particularly during the 2011 revolution. These individuals believe both men will be linked to Western Intelligence during their trials. )

5. According to this individual, el Magariaf is working with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups to defuse this situation. He is particularly concerned by the level of violence between Sufi Muslims and Salafists, and
believes he must maintain his reputation for impartiality if he is to defuse this growing problem. As he works to organize the government, and disarm the militias, he cannot afford to lose the respect and trust of the Libyan people, especially at a time when cultural clashes between followers of the mystical Sufi tradition and ultra-conservative Salafis have taken central stage in the new Libya. This source adds that these religious conflicts were largely unknown during Qaddafi’s rule.

6. (Source Comment: This source added that the individuals interviewed for the HRW report were former members of the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group (LIFG), an Islamist group formed in opposition to Gaddafi’s controversial interpretations of Islam. These LIFG fighters fled the country in the late 1980s and went to Afghanistan to join the fight against the Soviet Union while also gaining training and experience for their own struggle. A separate source adds that messages to Libya from the CIA and SIS were found among the Tripoli Documents published by HRW, indicating that the United States and Britain were eager to help Libya capture several senior LIFG figures, including its co-founders, Belhaj and Sami al-Saadi.)

7. As Libyan authorities struggle to control the armed rings that refuse to surrender weapons following last year’s civil war, Salafis, who say Islam should return to the simple ways followed by Mohammed, have established their own armed gangs in post-Gaddafi Libya. They view Sufi practices as idolatrous. Since the start of the Arab Spring uprising across the region, a number of Sufi sites have been attacked in Egypt, Mali and Libya. Magariaf is determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. This individual adds that Magariaf remains dedicated to the idea of building a tolerant Islamic state in Libya. El Magariaf’s opinions continue to be shaped by his experience with Qaddafi, whom he felt built a cult of personality in violation of all of the basic ideas of Islam.