INDICATIONS LIST

Directorate of Intelligence
Headquarters United States Air Force
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MEMORANDUM FOR ALL ANALYSTS AFOIN-2

SUBJECT: Indications List

1. The attached list of indicators has been compiled as the result of an exhaustive analysis of existing lists collected from many sources.

2. The list is divided into two parts. Section I is a broad list of "Indications of Soviet Preparations to Initiate General War." Section II is a more highly specialized list of "Indications of Soviet Preparations to Launch an Atomic Air Assault Against Continental United States."

3. The indicators listed are those that will be used as controls on the several mechanical and graphic aids now under construction and consideration by OIN-2Al.

4. In order that all analysts within the Directorate of Intelligence may be cognizant of those intelligence items of particular interest to the Indications effort, it is necessary that they have continual ready reference to a comprehensive list.

5. Indications will be submitted to OIN-2Al in the same manner as is currently in effect for the Daily Intelligence Items, utilizing the Indications forms available throughout the Directorate.

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SECTION I

INDICATIONS OF SOVIET PREPARATIONS TO INITIATE GENERAL WAR
INDICATIONS OF SOVIET PREPARATIONS TO INITIATE GENERAL WAR

PART ONE - NATIONAL DEFENSE

I. ARMED FORCES

A. General

1. Unusual increase in budgets.
2. Change in organization of high commands.
3. Extensive reshuffle of top leaders.
4. Excessive increases in Soviet armed forces (including the number of women in the services).
5. Organization of new units.
6. Marked increase in the tempo of training, or implementation of unusual procedures in training, personnel.
7. Increased specialized-type training, such as assault bridging exercises, airborne or parachute training, or large-scale night exercises.
8. Redeployment or unusual movements of elements of the armed forces.
9. Increased aircraft and searchlight cooperation exercises.
10. Standardization of weapons among satellites.
11. Unusual increase in production of war material and equipment.
12. Increased supply of arms to satellite countries.
13. Increase in Soviet military personnel in satellite countries.
15. Increase in the allocation of petroleum products to armed forces and distribution to support operations and curtailment of civilian consumption.

16. New mobilization, especially the remobilization of recently demobilized groups.

17. Retention of military classes beyond demobilization date and/or the early call-up of classes.

18. Civilian registration or re-registration for military service.

19. Replacement of young men in static guard units with older men.


21. Call-up of all available Soviet, Satellite and East German personnel with maritime experience.

22. Augmentation of merchant ship crews with armed guard units.

23. Build-up of Army, Navy and Air Force units to full or greater than T/O strength.

24. Commissioning of key civilians in scientific and technical organizations and assignment of technical and scientific school graduates to the armed forces.

25. Increased numbers of medical officers in the armed forces.

26. Acceleration of promotions in all services.

27. Transfer of large numbers of meteorologists to the armed forces.

28. Assignment of military and key civilian personnel to scientific and technical organizations for operation of complicated electronics equipment.

29. Evacuation of military dependents from border areas.
30. Unusual or intensified maintenance procedures in air forces, army, and navy.

31. Increased control of and restrictions on movement and activities of military personnel - cancellation of leaves, etc.

32. Medical preparations within the Soviet bloc relating to civil defense and military use, as indicated by a marked acceleration in efforts to produce or procure medical supplies suitable for use in event of hostilities.

33. Integration of Satellite forces into operational groups or fronts accompanied by increased Soviet Staff and command control over those forces.

34. Mobilization and assembly of rail and non-rail types of transport to assist in movement of forces and supplies and adaptation of this transport for military uses.

35. Sudden increases in military stockpiling, particularly near frontiers, main communication centers, airfields, or ports.

36. Increased fortification activity.

37. Increase of postal censorship and further restriction upon private telephone and telegraph communications.

38. Extensive renumbering of military units to impede identification.

39. Marked increase in number of AA defenses, E/W and GCI facilities barrage balloons, etc., in forward, strategic, and LOC areas such as airfields, key rail centers, freight yards, bridges, supply depots, and industrial centers.

40. Unusual coastal defense preparations including reinforcement of off-shore patrols for closer supervision of maritime traffic.

41. Cancellation of foreign flying rights over likely staging and jump-off areas, e.g., closing air corridors to Berlin and Vienna, probably preceded by serious harassment of corridor traffic.
42. Increased movement of high ranking Soviet military personnel in Satellite countries or peripheral areas of the USSR.

43. Military planning conferences among Soviet and Satellite military leaders, and establishment of combined services headquarters with Satellite representation.

44. Attendance of Soviet Satellite military leaders or intelligence personalities at covert conferences, or Cominform meetings.

45. Appearance of Soviet personnel in key positions in Satellite Armed Forces.

46. Accelerated construction of military hospitals, and conversion to military medical use of aircraft, trucks, etc.

47. Unusual or accelerated construction projects, particularly in areas from which airlift, supply, or amphibious operations might be staged.

48. Forward moves of supply and repair depots and concentration of road, railroad, and airfield maintenance equipment, etc.

49. Stockpiling of all types of military supplies in forward areas, main transportation centers, airfields, assembly or staging areas. (Ammunition, weapons, food, fuel, POL)

B. AIR FORCES

50. Construction of advance airfields and/or other air facilities in peripheral areas - Satellites, and occupied territories (Dispersal areas, emergency landing grounds, etc.)

51. Increased airfield security measures.

52. Arrival of new air units at hitherto unoccupied airfields.
53. Improvement of overall air defense capabilities; construction of defenses against air attack at airfields; increased emphasis on training for passive air defense measures and air raid precautions.

54. Cancellation of furloughs and temporary ban on military mail.

55. Discontinuation or shortening of military training courses and schools.

56. Change of military vehicle number system, or obliteration of vehicle numbers.

57. Unusual Ethyl fluid requirements and movements.

58. Increase in the number of women in the Soviet Air Force.

59. Increased movement of high-ranking air force personnel in the Satellites or peripheral areas of the USSR.

60. Increase in number and scope of large-scale exercises or joint maneuvers requiring tactical groupings complete with support and service units.

61. Increased number of inspections of air units and staffs by inspection teams in order to assess the standard of training.

62. Issuance of large numbers of navigational maps to Air Army Headquarters and subordinate units.

63. Increased specialized-type training such as division-scale exercises, night missions, radar bombing, long-range navigation exercises, air gunnery, etc.

64. Build-up of air units to or beyond T/O and E strength.

65. Expansion and increased activity in headquarters of major air units.

66. Increased emphasis on coordinated aircraft and searchlight exercises.
67. Building of revetments around POL storage tanks in forward areas; camouflage and underground storage facility construction.

68. Actual issuing to air units of supplies required for combat operations particularly POL, ammo, medical supplies, and specialized air combat equipment.

69. An increase in the working hours and activities of aircraft maintenance shops, and their adaptation to mobile operations.

70. Freezing of production designs of aircraft, air materiel and special equipment.

71. Replacement of Satellite air guard troops by Soviet units at vital points.

72. Concentration of fighter aircraft for defense of vital installations.

73. Military planning conferences among Soviet and Satellite Air Force leaders.

74. Establishment of combined air headquarters among the services and including Satellite representation.

75. Increased emphasis on research in long-range weather forecasting and analysis of weather phenomena.

76. Efforts to procure weather information from unusual areas.

77. Appearance of large numbers of new aircraft types in forward areas.

78. Concentration of transport aircraft near airborne troop centers.

79. Conclusion of training programs ahead of schedule and "final" inspection tours by high-level commanders.
80. Substantial regrouping of air units and commands and the activation of new air units.

81. Replacement of Satellite air units with Soviet air units in strategic areas.

82. Transfer of medium or heavy bombers to advance bases or staging areas, and increased emphasis on the readiness and proficiency of long-range air units.

83. Soviet air reconnaissance beyond forward areas.

84. Movements to advance bases of ground service type organizations.

85. Activity in the Soviet arctic or along the Northern Sea Route, especially pointing to possible construction of airfields, movement of aircraft or materiel.

86. Any relationship between the Soviet atomic energy program and Long Range Aviation.

87. Provision of accommodation (large scale building or requisition) for air staging troops.

88. Large scale production or standardized types of aircraft.

89. Preparation of the civil air arm for possible military employment as might be indicated by an acceleration of pilot training, intensification of night and all weather flying, mass air transport flights, etc.

90. Unusual sensitivity to flights in areas contiguous to the Soviet Union, evidenced by an increased aggressiveness by intercepting aircraft, and an increase in tempo and virulence of propaganda charges referring to violations of Soviet territory.

C. GROUND FORCES

91. Reinforcement of frontier units.

92. Build-up of supply dumps near frontiers.
93. Concentration of transport facilities near the frontier.

94. General re-equipping of tactical units.

95. Replacement of rear area and home-front guards with older men.

96. Change in or disappearance of vehicle numbering systems.

97. Expansion and increased activity in headquarters of corps, army and higher level.

98. Combined operational training, particularly in higher formations and with specialist forces, such as airborne troops.

99. Joint maneuvers with Satellite forces and/or paramilitary and guerrilla units.

100. Operational training with other services; large scale and unusually realistic training programs.

101. Unusual movement and activity of Soviet signal units.

102. Specialized and realistic training in offensive and defensive BW and CW tactics and in mobile weather observation and forecasting.

103. Conclusion of training programs ahead of schedule and "final" inspections by high-level commanders.

104. Actual issuing to troops of supplies required for combat operations, particularly POL, ammunition, medical supplies, and specialized combat engineer equipment.

105. Build-up of Army units to full T/O and T/E strength.

106. Substantial regrouping of forces and commands and the formation of new units on a large scale.
107. Appearance of Satellite military personnel in rear and line of supply positions and their replacement in forward areas by Soviet forces.

108. Arrival in the German and Central Groups of Forces of additional specialized non-divisional units such as engineer bridging units, tank evacuation and recovery units, mobile medical units, and truck transportation units.

109. Replacement of training units with first-line units along the borders of the Orbit.

110. Changes in the positions of units with reference to frontiers and likely lines of advance.

111. Heavy troop movements toward probable concentration points.

112. Increased interest in reconnaissance of areas beyond forward positions of ground units.

D. NAVAL FORCES

113. Increased importance of the Soviet Navy's role in Russian strategic concept.

114. Unusual increase in shipyard activity:
   (a) Expansion of shipyards.
   (b) New construction programs; particularly in high submerged speed submarines and landing craft.
   (c) Stepped-up refitting program.
   (d) Modification of older type submarines
   (e) Appearance of unusual installations in subs.

115. Expansion of naval bases.

116. Unusual build-up of stocks of fuel, ammunition and stores, particularly if a number of ports are involved.

117. Shifting of commercial port control from civilian authority to naval authority.
118. Presence of Russian naval personnel in unimportant ports.

119. Amphibious operations training on a large scale.

120. Appearance of Soviet submarines in areas not previously frequented.

121. Appearance of picket ships in peripheral waters.

122. Stricter control of sea traffic and fishing vessels in approaches to Russian and Satellite ports.

123. The installation of anti-submarine nets and boom defenses.

124. A marked increase in the complements of Russian merchant ships.

125. Unusual allocation of shipping to import of critical materials, which would be denied in the event of war.

126. The requisitioning of auxiliary craft and fishing vessels.

127. Trend to withdraw the merchant marine from areas where it would be subject to seizure or destruction.

128. Unusual changes in fleet dispositions.

129. Increased enrollment in naval schools and shortening of the duration of courses.

130. Combined operational training, particularly in higher formations.

131. Operational training with other services; large-scale and unusually realistic training programs.

132. Conclusion of training programs ahead of schedule and "final" inspections by high-level commanders.

133. Training in landing, support and supply operations.

134. Submarine drills of unusual duration and scope.
135. Abnormal movements, routing and concentrations of conventional training vessels.

136. Build-up of naval units to full T/O and T/E strength.

137. Substantial regrouping of naval units and commands and the activation of new naval units.

138. Requisitioning and concentration of auxiliaries and vessels adaptable for amphibious and supply operations.

139. Restationing of naval vessels, especially submarines, out of land-locked seas.

140. Unusual movements of mine craft including an increase in mine-laying and mine-sweeping activities.

141. Sudden and simultaneous exodus of naval vessels from a number of ports.

142. Withdrawal of Orbit shipping from foreign ports and waters.

143. Appearance of Soviet submarines, commercial and fishing vessels in areas not ordinarily visited.

144. Overmanning of commercial and fishing vessels to form moving intelligence or surprise-attack units and their appearance in unusual areas.

II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL

145. Decrease in basic and long-range scientific research and increase in military and short-range research and development.

146. Merging of civilian and military research facilities.

147. Extensive research on the ionosphere and radio wave propagation in Arctic regions by means of additional observation posts.

148. Increased emphasis on research in long-range weather forecasting, upper atmosphere wind observation and forecasting, use of
rockets for upper atmosphere soundings, development of cloud modification and weather control devices near military airfields.

149. Research, special construction and large-scale experimentation in connection with BW and CW.

150. Experimentation, expansion of facilities and testing areas, and recruitment of technical personnel for rocket and guided missile projects.

151. Acceleration of research on cosmic radiation.

152. Acceleration of climatological research and efforts to procure weather information from unusual areas.

153. Acceleration of air research and flight testing programs.

154. Increased activity in the rocket and guided missile fields.

III. CIVIL AND INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE

155. Increased emphasis on training for passive air defense measures and air-raid precautions.

156. Institution of precautionary measures to protect civilian population against RW, BW, and CW. Sudden increase in efforts to produce or procure medical supplies suitable for use in event of hostilities.

157. Civilian training in defense and guerrilla tactics in factory, town and kolkhoz units.

158. Issuance to civilians and/or local officials of defense gear, including respirators, first-aid kits, radio-activity measuring instrument, firefighting equipment, decontaminating chemicals and spraying equipment (including atropine and hypodermic syringes).
159. Issuance of instructions to civilian defense groups and intensive training of civilian personnel and defense units in Atomic Warfare, BW and CW defense.

160. Rehearsals of blackout and air-raid precautions.

161. Increase in the strength of fire departments, emergency police, medical flying squads, etc.

162. Establishment of static water reserves for fire fighting.

163. Construction of air-raid and/or first-air shelters, particularly those designed for protection against BW, CW and atomic warfare (those with special ventilators and air filters with an independent power source).

164. Development of various types of emergency alarm systems (for gas, air-raid, etc. warnings, separately) issuance of wind vanes or their appearance in a regular pattern.

165. Increases in emergency medical facilities, particularly those involving requisition of and preparation for use of public buildings, schools, warehouses and other buildings.

166. Initiation of mass immunization programs for men and animals.

167. Unusual emphasis on measures for plant protection, e.g., quarantines and inspection, fungicidal treatment, breeding of plants for resistance.

168. Removal of street signs and other guides to locations.

169. Imposition of strong security measures on an increasing number of factories.

170. Training of plant personnel in disaster measures - camouflage, blackouts, fire drills, use of damage control equipment.
171. Appearance of AA and early-warning equipment in the vicinity of important industrial installations, particularly atomic energy installations.

172. Unusual measures for the protection of industrial equipment - revetments, decentralization, etc.

173. New installations of special air filters and ventilating equipment in key buildings of industrial plants.

174. Camouflage of industrial installations.

PART TWO - TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

I. TRANSPORTATION

175. Induction of civilian transportation personnel into the military service.

176. Mobilization and assembly of rail and non-rail types of transport to assist in movement of forces and supplies and adaptation of this transport for military uses. (Conversion of boxcars for transportation of personnel, etc.)

177. Establishment of control bodies under military authority over all means of transport, and the appearance of representatives of such bodies at key junctions, transshipment points and other control points.

178. Marshalling of large quantities of rolling stock in strategic areas.

179. Imposition of security precautions on rail shipments.

180. Increased volume of shipments of industrial materials and semi-manufactures between industrial areas.

181. Appearance of armored locomotives and heavy flatcars near military installations.
182. Dislocations and restriction of passenger traffic and civilian freight shipments by the increased military use of rail, barge, automotive and civil air facilities.

183. Large shipments by rail, truck, etc., of specially marked containers, and guarded by crews with special decontamination equipment.

184. Appearance of mobile power units in transportation nets.

185. Acceleration of railroad maintenance work, such as strengthening of bridges and roadbeds for military loads.

186. Construction projects such as the expansion of rail yards and transhipment points, laying of double tracks, or auxiliary tracks in vulnerable areas, construction of new sidings and duplicate facilities at key points.

187. Decentralization of key installations.

188. Stockpiling of repair parts for roadbed and rail equipment at key points, particularly in staging areas.


190. Stockpiling of adequate coal supplies.

191. Construction of new roads, especially in staging areas, without any particular local justification for their existence.

192. Improvement and widening of existing strategic roads, strengthening of bridges at vulnerable points.

193. Stockpiling of bridging and road repair equipment in staging areas.

194. Expansion of civil air fields so as to accommodate service aircraft.

195. Stockpiling of repair parts and stores for service aviation at civil air facilities.
196. Appearance outside the USSR of unusual quantities of motor vehicle transport particularly of Soviet manufacture.

197. Concentration of POL tank trucks in forward areas.

198. The concentration of large numbers of sea-going vessels, or inland waterway or amphibious craft at strategic points.

199. Appearance of quantities of military equipment at transhipment points and of freight cars near military installations and other evidence of movement of significant quantities of Soviet military toward Satellites or peripheral areas of the USSR.

200. Extension of the Soviet broad-gauge lines to the West, or of the standard gauge lines of the Satellites into Soviet territory, or modification of rolling stock for use on both gauges.

201. Acceleration of rail maintenance and construction work, building of new bridges and roadbeds, strengthening of bridges, double-tracking on strategic routes, construction of new sidings, and expansion of marshalling yards and trans-shipment points.

202. Construction of highways, strengthening of bridges and culverts and/or provision of duplicate bridges or fords.

203. The production and/or stockpiling of large quantities of bridge and road repair material, particularly if stockpiling areas are not normally consuming such quantities.

204. Withdrawal of Satellite merchant ships from international routes.

205. Appearance of an unusual number of orbit merchant ships in any foreign port.

206. Variations in routes or activities of orbit shipping.

COMMUNICATIONS

207. Restriction on civilian use of telephone lines and reservation of key facilities for military use.
208. Step-up in tempo of communications with foreign countries.

209. Increased censorship.

PART THREE - POLITICAL

I. INTERNAL

210. Appearance of military officials in high administrative posts.

211. Unusual shifting of personnel in high-level governmental agencies.

212. Establishment of special organizations to handle typical wartime problems in the fields of production, supply, transportation, medicine, research, etc.

213. Creation of new super-ministerial planning and coordinating bodies, such as supreme defense councils, etc.

214. Noticeable increase in meetings between high military and civilian leaders throughout USSR and Satellites.

215. Increased emphasis on internal security evidenced by: the growth in size and importance of security organizations, Orbit-wide Party and governmental purges, etc.

216. Sudden and unusual travel restrictions on foreign representatives.

217. Increase in the number of restricted or prohibited areas.

218. Increased interference with the flow of information into the orbit by jamming foreign broadcasts, etc.

219. Increased restrictions on the dissemination of information about orbit countries.

220. Indications of dissension, unrest, or resistance within the Soviet Orbit.

221. Increase in the number of MVD guards at key installations.
222. Increased severity of penalties for all forms of activities regarded as inimical to the State.

223. Sudden increase in number of defections, and increased precautions to prevent defections.

224. Evidence of increased friction resulting from Soviet efforts to extend control of the Satellites and gain uniformity in Soviet Satellite policies.

II. INTERNATIONAL

225. Recall of representatives outside the Soviet Orbit.

226. Summoning of Soviet/Satellite diplomats to secret conferences.

227. Sudden severance of all relations between Orbit personnel in the West and the officials and people of the country where they are stationed.

228. Increased liaison between Orbit diplomatic and commercial establishments in the West and the Communist parties of Western nations.

229. Increased evidence of Communist instigation of and participation in civil unrest (through the media of their diplomatic missions), particularly in those areas where Western security interests are peculiarly vulnerable.

230. Diplomatic machinations designed to effect withdrawal of US military forces from Europe and the Far East.

231. Increased sensitivity to US and/or Western plans, policies, or diplomatic activities.


233. Unusual opposition to or attempts to thwart or counter a resurgence of West Germany and Japan.
234. Noticeable trend in evacuation of key diplomatic and civilian personnel from areas outside the Soviet Orbit.

235. Concerted attempts, mainly by the USSR, to secure the neutrality of areas of potential value to the West in an attack on the Orbit.

236. Increased attempts by Soviet/Satellite representatives to generate and exploit divisive forces among the Western Allies, and to hinder implementation of plans for concerted action.


238. Gradual reduction in the number of diplomatic representatives abroad and/or replacement by less important personages.

239. Increased aggressiveness in the pursuit of international objectives and apparent disregard for Western reaction.

**PART FOUR - ECONOMIC**

240. Pressure for the early delivery of strategic products obtainable under trade agreements.

241. Acceleration of purchases of strategic raw materials and more vigorous attempts to procure such materials and essential manufactured articles from outside the Orbit by smuggling, third party dealings, front business concerns, etc.

242. Withholding of shipments of strategic materials outside the Orbit, such as chrome, manganese.

243. Sudden suspension of foreign commercial negotiations.

244. Repatriation of assets to the Orbit from possible enemy countries.

245. Increased interest in procurement of large quantities of US and British currency.
246. Strict and centralized control and supervision over industrial funds, raw materials, parts and components, increasing such allocations to war industries at the expense of the civilian economy.

247. Large-scale stockpiling of strategic materials, fuels, equipment, spare parts, etc., particularly if in such a fashion as to suggest attempts to achieve regional self-sufficiency.

248. Stockpiling of raw materials and semi-manufactures in the vicinity of industrial plants to avoid their movement during an operational diversion of transport.

249. Stockpiling of finished products, such as gasolines, tires, parts, clothing, medical supplies, etc., at the expense of the operation of the civilian economy.

250. Stockpiling of civil defense gear - protective clothing, firefighting equipment, emergency medical equipment, etc.

251. Vigorous campaigns in industry for greater conservation of materials, reclamation of scrap, and economy in all phases of operation.

252. Stockpiling of bulk foodstuffs, and of preserved and canned food products suitable for use by the armed forces.

253. An increase in the number of women employed in industry.

254. Conversion of Satellite industry to Soviet military requirements.

255. Unexplained alterations in the ministerial control of industries.

256. Large-scale withdrawals of Russian controlled funds from foreign countries.

PART FIVE - PSYCHOLOGICAL

I. INTERNAL

Psychological preparation of Orbit populations for possible war through changes in pattern and intensity of propaganda releases indicated
by increased emphasis on:

257. Militant patriotism; love of homeland, glorification of army, guerrilla, civil defense organizations as opposed to the Party, historical traditions and past anti-Western sentiments.

258. Aggressive defense; imminence of capitalist/Western attack, unity of Satellites and the USSR for mutual support and victory, "discovery" of Western plans for attack on the Orbit, accusations that the West is employing or is about to employ BW sabotage and other means of unconventional attack against the Orbit, revival of theories justifying "just" wars, attack to forestall enemy attack, offensive use of atomic bombs, BW, etc., blasts against individual Western military leaders.

259. Sacrifices for the future with the implication that reward will come after victory over the West.

260. The strength of the Orbit; its impregnability; its superiority in leaders, strategy, tactics, forces and equipment, its ideological-economic superiority over the West.

261. Discrediting US and Allied representatives by propaganda and implication in espionage trials.

262. Accusations of Western leaders for intent to attack the Orbit conventionally or unconventionally.

263. "Black Propaganda": scare rumors, allegations of Western weakness or unpreparedness.

II. EXTERNAL

264. Increased volume of propaganda aimed at Kurds, and or minority or extremist groups in Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Dusan, North Africa and SE Asia.

265. Concerted attempts to inspire disunity and dissatisfaction among the Western nations.
266. Increasingly vituperative attacks against the UK, Western
Powers, non-Communist groups and governments, Western
policies which obstruct Soviet aims.

267. Exhortations to workers in Western countries to refuse to
participate in preparations for an "imperialist war."

PART SIX - SUBVERSIVE

268. Increased tendency toward underground methods for the purpose
of international liaison and control.

269. Concentration of espionage agents in any one area.

270. Attempts through overt and covert means to obtain information
covering key production facilities, troops dispositions,
defenses, meteorological data, scientific techniques, etc.,
concerning strategic areas.

271. Establishment of clandestine units in remote areas for
espionage and reconnaissance.

272. Infiltration of international groups, and creation of new
international groups to act as sounding boards for Soviet
propaganda and as means of penetration into Western nations.

273. Cominform meetings attended by representatives of Communist
parties outside the Orbit.

274. Cominform or Soviet financial and material support to non-Orbit
Communist parties.

275. Purges of non-Orbit Communist parties reducing them to
reliable hard core organizations.

276. Preparations in non-Orbit Communist parties for going under-
ground or for wartime political problems.
277. Declarations by non-Orbit Communist leaders of their adherence to Soviet policies and their support of Soviet actions in the event of a war.

278. Exhortations by non-Orbit Communist leaders to workers in Western countries to refuse to assist in preparations for an "imperialist" war.

279. Change in Party tactics to the encouragement of political unrest and opposition to anti-Soviet measures.

280. Attempts to infiltrate key positions in war or semi-military industries and their labor forces.

281. Attempts to impair confidence in Western governments through rumors, dissemination of counterfeit money.

282. Appearance in sensitive areas of Communist coup organizers, experts in terrorism, labor organizers, etc.

283. Emergence of Communist armed groups in Western countries to paralyze local authority and disrupt order and anti-Soviet defense.

284. Coordinated strikes by Communist-infiltrated and controlled labor groups to cripple military production.

285. Waves of sabotage in industries and key centers of transport, communications and supply.

286. Attempts to assassinate key governmental, industrial and other officials.

287. Unconventional warfare as evidenced by unusual outbreaks of disease in men, animals, plants, unusual fires in crops, stockpiles, industrial establishments or centers of transport and communications; attempts to smuggle atomic weapons.
or RW and BW and CW agents into Western nations, contaminate air, water, food and medical supplies.

288. Communist-led civil wars in non-Orbit countries.

289. Strike action by Communist parties on the grounds that the workers should not help preparations for an imperialist war.

290. Transfers or changes in activities of Soviet key personnel in anti-Soviet states.
SECTION II

INDICATIONS OF SOVIET PREPARATIONS TO LAUNCH AN ATOMIC AIR ASSAULT AGAINST CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
I. LONG RANGE AVIATION

A. Order of Battle of the Long Range Air Force

291. Re-equipment of LRAA units with new aircraft types.
292. Transfer of long-range aircraft to new units or areas.
293. Concentration or transfer of maintenance, ordnance, POL, or other activities necessary for operation of LRAA units.
294. Re-deployment of air defense units.
295. Identity and activity of LRAA personalities.
296. Efforts to bring LRAA units up to full strength.
297. Withdrawal of transport aircraft from Civil Air Fleet, and other civil air components.
298. Withdrawal of spares (aircraft and parts) from storage, or movement to forward or operating bases.
299. Flight restrictions along usual LRAA flight lines.
300. Freezing of aircraft production types.

B. Aircraft Sightings and Unusual Movements

301. Unauthorized Soviet flights over non-Communist areas.
302. Stand-downs for maintenance or other purposes.
303. Unusual long-range flight activity or patterns.

C. Status of Training and Proficiency of Crews

304. Advanced individual and unit training.
305. Increased instrument and all-weather flying.

D. Air Technical Capabilities

306. Readiness of long-range guided missiles program.
307. Reports of unconventional flying objects.
308. Status of all-weather bomb-aiming systems.
309. Air-to-air refueling techniques.
310. Advances in use of electronic airborne equipment.
311. Indications of atomic weapon handling technique.
312. Creation of special weapons units.
313. Operational use or testing of new medium or heavy aircraft types.
314. Modification of long-range bomber aircraft.

E. Movement of Senior Air Officers and Key Technicians

315. Movements of atomic energy, LRAA, technicians, MGB/MVD personnel and VIP to long-range bases.
316. High-level conferences attended by Long Range Air Force Officers.
317. Movement of key personnel from Moscow to possible long-range bases.


II. POTENTIAL LAUNCHING SITES

A. Construction, Improvement, and Expansion of Long-Range Bases

318. Establishment of meteorological stations and changes in weather reporting procedures.
319. Establishment of mobile or stationary aviation repair units in new areas of long-range activity.
320. Increased activity in the arctic region.

B. **Significant Population Shifts**

321. Concentration of railroad rolling stock near LRAA supply centers.

322. Development and improvement of transportation service to suspect areas.

323. Movement of airfield construction equipment and supplies.

324. Construction of new bases capable of supporting medium or heavy bombers, and improvement of existing facilities.

325. An established communications network, probably with a direct tie to HQ LRAF and Moscow - better equipped than other similar base facilities.

326. Installation of navigational aids and ILS equipment at a base.

C. **Stocking of Air Materiel and POL at Potential Launching Sites.**

327. Stockpiling of ammunition, bombs, fuel, spare parts etc., at possible staging bases.

328. Large withdrawal of aviation POL from storage reserves, especially 100 octane avgas.

329. Shipment of materiel under unusual or high priority.

D. **Unusual Security Measures at or Near Long-Range Aviation Bases**

330. Significant or unusual movements of security troops in a long-range base area.

331. Flight restrictions or unusual ground security measures near a long-range airbase.

332. Presence of PVO, AA or security units near a long-range airbase.
333. Camouflage of a long-range air base.

334. Construction of dummy air bases, and/or aircraft.

335. Evacuations or restrictions on the movements of populations near a long-range air base.

336. Build-up of radar defenses manned by first-rate personnel.

337. Testing of previously installed GCA and/or ILS equipment.

III. ATOMIC AND OTHER MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS

A. Development of Atomic Weapons

338. Location and function of facilities relating to the development and testing of atomic weapons.

339. Significant movements of material and supplies associated with the atomic energy program.

340. Personality identification and activity relating to the atomic weapons program.

B. Testing of Atomic Weapons

341. Changes in weather reporting procedures possibly connected with atomic weapons tests.

342. Flight and rail restrictions to and from possible atomic installations.

343. Analysis of atomic weapon testing results.

C. Production and Stockpiling of Atomic Weapons

344. Pertinent conclusions and "items of Interest" derived from JAEIC meetings.
345. Location of facilities relating to the atomic weapons production, stock-pile and storage sites.

D. Development, Production, and Stockpiling of BW, CW, and RW Weapons

346. BW, CW, and RW training, developing, testing and storage.

347. Visits or assignment of atomic energy personnel to LRAA facilities and vice-versa.

IV. LOGISTICAL AND TECHNICAL BUILD-UP AT A LAUNCHING SITE

348. Movement of heavily guarded 5' x 5' x 10' packing crates.

349. Presence or use of drums in connection with crates.

350. Movement of special heavy duty jacks.

351. Movement or presence of long slung dollies capable of carrying a five ton load.

352. Presence of special battery charging equipment.

353. Presence of a building containing electronics testing equipment, overhead hoisting equipment, etc.

354. Use of one-time high security codes; change of crypto codes.

355. Construction of facilities to handle atomic and other special purpose mass destruction media.

356. Unusual communications pattern.

357. Presence or build-up of Tu-4 spare parts.

358. Arrival or stocking of JATO equipment.

359. Presence of high-speed refueling trucks.
360. Presence or arrival of VIP's and key technicians.

V. BUILD-UP OF AN ATOMIC TASK FORCE AT A LAUNCHING BASE

361. Removal of bomb bay doors and running aircraft over pits.

362. Activation of reserve communications nets at the base.

363. Presence of heavy duty jacks, bomb pits or both.

364. Construction of A-bomb loading pits and atomic-bomb testing shelters.

365. Creation and activities of special forward inspection teams to test atomic weapons.

366. Distribution of maps suitable for long-range navigation.

367. Identification of Tu-4 units at the base.

368. Movement of large quantities of burn ointment.

VI. AN ATTACK HAS BEEN LAUNCHED

369. Reported flight of Tu-4's toward the United States.

370. Sighting of Tu-4's in an unauthorized flight outside of Soviet-controlled territory.

371. Soviet air-to-submarine communications in the area between the Soviet Union and the United States.

372. Radio voice communications between flight elements or from flight elements to the ground - rendezvous instructions.

373. Covert radio or radar signals originating in the U.S.