WAR SECRETS IN THE ETHER

Part III

By
Wilhelm F. Flicke

Translated by
Ray W. Pettengill

NOTICE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and Title 50, U.S. C., Sections 46, 46a and 46b. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

National Security Agency
Washington, 25 D. C.

1953
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To the Reader:

Parts I and II of "War Secrets in the Ether" are really the prelude to Part III. Here the author reveals aspects of espionage and the counterespionage conducted on a scale never before known. As the title suggests, the aspects treated are those concerned with communications; traditional cloak and dagger methods of securing information are involved, to be sure, but the spotlight rarely rests on them.

Others have already exploited this field and have painted more detailed word pictures of specific operations. Mr. Flicke has done so himself in his novel "Die Rote Kapelle", published in 1949.

The present volume has been somewhat abridged, primarily because of the space devoted to military operations which are adequately covered elsewhere. When no immediate connection between the main theme and a particular action was indicated, the translator has felt free to cut a bit. While this may have resulted in an occasional abrupt transition, it is not believed that the author's efforts to make a contribution to historical research have been impaired.

The Translator.
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PART III
Doubtless there will appear numerous books, articles and other publications dealing with the war between Germany and Poland which began in the morning hours of 1 September 1939. These will cover the course of the operations, the events preceding the war and many other details. We do not intend to discuss these things here but to deal with some of the preliminaries of this war into which relatively few people had any insight.

The question as to when preparation for the war against Poland began is difficult to answer but the preliminary period is longer than is generally assumed. We can state with certainty that the earliest preparations date back to about 1923. From then on, there began a systematic penetration of the entire Polish state by the German espionage service using so-called confidential agents.

The first part of this work consisted in current coverage of all events in Polish official agencies, in the armed forces, in the government, in industry, in transportation and in all other aspects of public life. The second part of the activity of the confidential agents consisted in infiltrating and undermining the military power of resistance of the Polish state.

Conditions were especially favorable in the Poland of those days. Many Germans had become Polish citizens, although at heart not in sympathy with the Polish state. It was now a question of enlisting these people for the work, by playing on their feelings as Germans. A special subsection "Poland" in Section 1 of the Counterintelligence Group of the Ministry of Defense began intensive
work about 1923. Using agents and official and semi-official agencies, it endeavored to spin a net over all Poland and in two years there was hardly a place of any size in that country which did not have a confidential agent or at least a purveyor of information.

Early in 1926 espionage against Poland was intensified, possibly because some very useful agents had been enlisted. One worked in the Regulations Office of the Polish War Ministry and from 1926 on sent photographs of service regulations to Berlin. Two others were in the so-called D.O.K. (corps areas) from which they supplied photographs of tables of organization, service instructions, strength summaries, etc. Consequently German espionage was very fully informed regarding every branch of the service and nearly every troop unit. Regulations and instructions for maneuvers were also obtained in this manner. The first important shipment from the agent in the Polish Ministry of War was a lengthy set of instructions for the Polish Air Force which was then holding its first large scale exercise.

Sometimes deserters from the Polish Armed Forces brought all sorts of information. During seven or eight months in 1931-1932, three officers of the Polish General Staff appeared in Berlin and offered most welcome information.

In addition to this work of the spies, the Germans carried on very active intercept work against Poland, using the stations in Königsberg, Frankfurt on the Oder, and Breslau, which devoted half their time to Polish traffic. Of the military successes, the most important were those against the Polish Air Force which by 1926
had virtually completed its organization. The Poles had a network of high-powered stations for their weather service, reports of take-off and landing, and for administration of the Air Force. The Poles made liberal use of these stations, ten in all, and the German intercept service monitored them day and night and passed the results to Berlin. By the end of 1925 the cryptographic system had been solved and by the end of 1926 nothing regarding the Polish Air Force was any longer a secret. Every Polish plane was known by its type, serial number, and individual number.

This was possible because the Poles announced by radio every start and every landing of a plane, giving the direction of flight, time of starting or landing, type, serial number, and individual number of the plane— all in plain text. If a plane flew from Lemburg to Lida with an intermediate landing in Warsaw and returned to Lemburg by the same route, it was reported not less than eight times by radio. There were normally 60 to 80 of these reports a day and all planes mentioned were carded. After a few months every plane was recorded, together with its assignment to one of the six air regiments. Moreover, the condition of the plane was known and after a few years its serviceability could be determined precisely using coefficients of depreciation. While the Polish Air Force used radio freely and thus gave away plenty of information, the Army was very reserved in its use of radio. Only at drills and maneuvers could anything be learned. The first German success was with the Polish maneuvers near Lida in 1929, the course of which could be reconstructed almost completely. It was a question, to be sure, whether the Army radio was cloaking
itself in an excess of security at the expense of the transmission of information. In case of war the need for rapid communication might upset the whole system of radio camouflage, which was quite complicated. Each station worked with three call signs simultaneously and on its own wavelengths. Both call signs and wave lengths changed daily, sometimes twice a day. It was inevitable that war conditions would severely try this system.

While speaking of German cryptanalytic activity against Poland, it may be stated that a large part of the diplomatic exchange of information between the Polish Government and its representatives abroad could be read. This gave excellent insight into the activity of the Polish diplomats and into the relations between Poland and the Western Powers.

The German intercept service was concerned not merely with interception of Polish radio traffic but also with wire communication. The Polish Corridor and Danzig afforded a fine opportunity for getting at the Polish wire networks. It goes without saying that telephone conversations of the Polish Embassy in Berlin and of all Polish consular representatives were listened to and evaluated by the Germans.

Beginning in 1934, German espionage was intensified, as was the effort to undermine the power of resistance of the Polish forces. An army of agents was recruited, often by coercion, and all offices of the Polish armed forces, police, railways, and postal services were infiltrated. The rewards paid were surprisingly small but from 1934 on virtually nothing regarding Poland's national defense remained hidden.
It is generally known that the war against Poland began at 0545 hours on 1 September 1939. It may be less well known that the attack had been planned for 27 August and that all preparations had been made for that date. Late in the evening of 26 August it suddenly occurred to Adolf Hitler to postpone the attack. What induced him to make this change is not known to me. Perhaps his astrologer was responsible or it may have been one of his well-known whims. In short, about 10 o'clock in the evening telephones began to ring, teletypes to rattle, radio stations to function, and a flood of thousands of orders tried to reach the advance units in time to take account of the new situation and to prevent the troops from launching an attack. The fact that it was possible to get these orders through in time was a masterful achievement of the German communication system.

Without doubt the Polish communication service must have noticed this activity on the German communication network. It must have been a serious warning for the Poles. Any specialist knows what such a change of decision means in modern warfare where there is an intercept service. This naive change in a plan long since precisely worked out, together with all the dangers inherent in such a change, was the first indication of the primitive quality of Hitler's thinking in military matters.

It is not necessary to recount the invasion of Poland. Thanks to the information available, it was all over in a matter of weeks; that is to say all over save for the repercussions in other countries.
The campaign in the West in the summer of 1940 appears to many people to be the master stroke of a military genius. Even when we take into account the German superiority in numbers and materiel and appraise adequately the spirit of the German troops, many things still remain inexplicable - in particular the swift drive through the northern continuation of the Maginot Line. On the basis of what I was able to learn, I shall attempt to throw a few side lights on this campaign, without pretending to be able to explain everything.

I have already reported on the situation in the intercept service. Conditions for successful intercept work were as favorable as one could desire in France, Holland, and Belgium. From intercept traffic the French assembly and the Belgian and Dutch frontier defenses could be recognized so clearly both in respect to organization and geographical distribution that the information was fully adequate for making German dispositions. It was a pleasure for the German command to be able to enter the enemy's troop dispositions on its own situation maps on the basis of the results of the intercept service. In the present case, however, this did not suffice. Before the war the great question was: how good will the mighty defense system of the Maginot Line be? Will it be possible to break through quickly or will a war of position on a large scale develop here? Will modern heavy artillery be able to crack these defenses? Who could answer these questions?

Earlier we reported how Poland and Czechoslovakia were thoroughly reconnoitered by the German espionage service. In France there
was no such degree of success although the German intelligence Service did receive current reports and single notices. France had no extensive German minority and conditions were less favorable. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1939 the German Secret Service succeeded in pulling off something which absolutely made up for the previous years. In August it was possible to get a photograph of a French map showing all forts, barriers, obstacles, communications routes and communications points of the Maginot Line and of its extension to the coast. This showed how imperfectly the French had developed their system of defense along the Belgian frontier and one did not need to study the map long in order to put his finger on the weakest point in this system of defense. This map was reproduced in Germany and was the basis for planning the campaign in France.

In order to drive at this weak point in the French system of defense, it was necessary to advance through Holland and Belgium. Consequently, this move was decided upon in Germany without hesitation. The prospect of overrunning the French line swiftly was too inviting and it was impossible for the French to build up this weak point within a few months to match the strength of the Maginot Line proper.

The campaign against Poland was followed by a period of calm. Only in the air and at sea did some minor engagements take place, which no one regarded very seriously. People were already beginning to crack jokes about the "phony war". Many thought there would be no serious conflict and that France and England were in a state of
war merely "to save face" with respect to Poland. Peace would surely come in the spring.

The monitoring of French and English traffic, however, did not indicate that people in those countries were concerned with "saving face". War production was under way; they were arming for battle, though only for a defensive struggle. The whole system of land defense for France since 1919 had been based on the invincibility of the Maginot Line, while England was convinced that economic measures directed against Germany would not fail. Anyhow, one could not count on a conciliatory attitude in either France or England.

On 27 January was broadcast Churchill's speech in which he said: "Hitler has already lost his best opportunity".

On 9 April the German people were surprised by the information that "German troops have undertaken the protection of Denmark and Norway". The National Socialist Government tried, naturally, to throw all blame on the English and Norwegians. Of course no mention was made of the fact that the invasion might not have been successful, if the intercept service of the German Navy had not ascertained the position of the British naval forces and calculated the time so that no surprises need be feared from that quarter. Despite heroic resistance, all Norway was occupied within four weeks during which the German intercept service played a notable role against both land and naval forces. At Narvik, both the British and the Norwegians used radio very incautiously. The course of British ships could be followed perfectly at all times. Several Norwegian units were encircled and captured because of their incautious use of radio, and the capture of Bergen with its war stores was possible only because of frivolous use of radio.
Of course the Germans sometimes made mistakes, too, and the British followed German ship movements.

Simultaneous with increase in military radio traffic at the beginning of these operations was the enormous increase in diplomatic and press traffic. It was interesting to see how the German advance against the two northern countries affected neutral lands. While the German press tried to characterize the whole action as a "British crime" against which the entire press of the world was clamoring indignantly and while German papers were printing quotations from foreign papers, which had been paid for with German money, intercepts from foreign countries gave a very different picture. British action against Norway had been started only after Germany's intention had become known to England at the last moment. Consequently it was not England but Germany that had attacked, and this unjustified attack in defiance of all international law lost Germany the respect of the world and laid the groundwork for her defeat.

On 9 May, one of the leading German newspapers carried the headline: "Stupid British Diversionary Maneuver." The content was to the effect that the discovery by Germany of ostensible British plans had produced such an impression in England that they were resorting to diversionary maneuvers; nonsense was being spread abroad that Holland was sorely threatened by Germany. There was a false report that two German armies were moving toward Holland, but of course that was nonsense, an old wives' tale of the Ministry of Lies in London. But the next day at nine o'clock Doctor Goebbels delivered a long talk on the German invasion of Holland, Belgium, and
Luxembourg. The war in the west had begun.

The attempt to attribute the blame for the outbreak of hostilities to the Dutch and Belgians was ridiculous. From everything that could be observed by monitoring their traffic, it was clear that both countries did everything possible to maintain neutrality. On 14 May the Dutch army gave up the hopeless struggle and a break was made in the extended Maginot Line at Sedan.

On 16 May came a break through the Maginot Line on a front of 100 kilometers. On 17 May German troops entered Brussels. Soon Hitler's threat: "We will put them in a panic which will spread!" was made good.

This creation of panic was carried on by all modern technical means. Leaflets were dropped by the hundreds of thousands and served to spread the wildest rumors. Agents deposited by parachute behind the enemy front cut in on the telephone wires, called up all sorts of government offices, gave false instructions to civilian offices and troop units, and by reports of panic caused a chaotic flight on the part of the civilian population, which resulted in a hopeless blocking of the highways. Captured radio stations were likewise put into operation and issued alarming reports. With events moving so rapidly, the French command had no possibility of effectively counteracting these activities; moreover, the French did not catch on to these methods until too late. In several cases, whole divisions were forced in this fashion to surrender. A number of German agents equipped with small shortwave radio had been deposited behind the French front and were working from there with excellent success. These
people watched everything that went on and reported each of their observations immediately to one of the three control stations by which their work was directed. For the first time in history a combat instrumentality was employed here, which in the later years of this war was to give it its special character and which was to be turned in catastrophic fashion against Germany.

On 3 June the frightful slaughter known in history as the "Battle of Flanders" ended with the capitulation of the Belgian army and the encirclement and annihilation of British and French forces. These troops fought bravely but succumbed to superior force. The name Dunkirk became for the Germans the symbol of a decisive victory over England and for the British the symbol of a most successful evacuation, carried out with the aid of the fleet. Both were right - everything depends on the point of view.

Once again there came a period of tense expectation. What would happen? Would the Germans turn south and attack the French divisions on the Aisne and the Somme, or would they follow British troops across the Channel? The word "invasion" began to spook around. The German High Command diligently spread the news that it was preparing to invade at once. In any case the fate of France was virtually sealed. This seemed to be a suitable time for Italy to enter the war. Pressure was put on Mussolini. A feverish exchange of telegrams between Berlin and Rome began. And finally it happened. On 10 June 1940, from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia, Mussolini proclaimed to the Italian people and to the world Italy's entry into the war on the side of Germany. This was speculating on a cheap victory, on sharing the
spoil after France had been completely subdued and England had pulled out of the war, as it was expected to do.

But even in this seemingly so favorable situation, the true attitude of a large part of the Italian Officer Corps, in particular the General Staff Officers, was and remained adverse both to the war and to Germany. A not inconsiderable group of officers was outright anti-German in sympathy to such a degree that this could be clearly recognized from intercepted Italian traffic. We shall have occasion to speak of this later. For the moment, however, the chances seemed to favor the two Axis Powers and for the moment this outweighed everything else.

The battle along the Aisne and the Somme began and in a few days the French army was split into four groups. On 15 June, German troops crossed the Loire. On 18 June Hitler and Mussolini met in Munich to discuss the terms of an armistice. On 22 June, the armistice was concluded in the Forest of Compiegne; the French fleet remained in French harbors.

France was beaten. Hopelessly beaten in an astoundingly short time. How could this country, protected by the most modern line of fortification and with its strong army, be conquered so easily? For one thing the Germans, contrary to French expectation, had not hesitated to attack two neutral and almost defenseless countries, Holland and Belgium, and thus to reach the French frontier where it was least well protected. Moreover at the beginning of the war France was distinctly inferior in matériel. There was lack of planes, armoured tanks and other war equipment. Despite all warnings, including repeated reports to the Deuxième Bureau regarding Ger-
man armament, those in control refused to believe there was any serious danger.

When the campaign in the west began, the French greatly underestimated German strength, while espionage had revealed to the Germans the weak points in the French line of defense. Another unexpected factor was the systematic spreading of panic. In a very short time, millions of French and Belgians were in flight, blocking roads and bridges so that French troops and supplies could not get through.

On top of all that, there was the German radio intercept service. Most of the French army cryptographic systems and two systems of the French Foreign Office were known to the German cryptanalytic service. Countless messages with highly important content could be read. Moreover, diplomatic representatives of various countries were transmitting by radio important information and were doing this in systems already solved in Germany. From a purely military angle, the system of French army traffic resulted in revealing to the German Intercept Service in a very short time the relation between the higher and medium units. The organization of the French front was known at all times. No movement and no dislocation remained concealed from the Germans. The French Air Force was most incautious in its use of radio and the ground stations gave countless clues.

The picture was the same as that observed during French maneuvers from 1930 to 1939.

The map of the line of fortifications, the intercept service, the cryptanalytic service, the creation of panic, the blocking of highways, air superiority, and superiority of numbers and materiel on the German side, coupled with an ineffective intelligence service
on the French side - nothing more was needed to gain a crushing victory in the west.

The campaign in the west had ended. Throughout Germany bells pealed and flags fluttered. People were convinced that victory in the west meant the end of the war; now it was up to the diplomats to find a way to bring about peace. It was incredible that England, the last remaining antagonist, would dare to continue the war. Goebbels organized a mighty reception for Hitler when the latter returned from the front; the rumor was spread that America had intervened and England would make peace. Plans for demobilization were worked out and a few people were discharged from the armed forces.

But although people were convinced in Germany that England would now try to get out of the war, longboats, light sailing vessels, motorboats and other craft began moving northward on special vehicles; they were to carry German troops across the Channel and few people doubted that this enterprise would shortly be crowned by success. Yet week after week passed and nothing happened. On the contrary, the German intercept service was obliged to report again and again that England had no thought of submission. Moreover, voices from America also had to be taken seriously.

While the public was thus forced to settle back and wait for the invasion which Hitler said was coming, it was remarkable that all preparations for invasion were carried on in the open instead of being carefully camouflaged as usual. Details which normally would have been strictly secret could be heard everywhere, until one almost had the impression that the invasion was nothing but a bluff.
Interception of English traffic, however, gave the impression that the British were counting on an attempted landing. Their air reconnaissance of points where the Germans were concentrating small boats became intensive and the assemblies were bombed constantly.

Meanwhile the air war against England began. It was supposed to break the will of the people to resist, but it soon brought two disappointments: first, the British fighter defense proved far stronger than expected; second, the effect of the bombs was by no means as great as had been expected. Furthermore, German aircraft losses increased rather than decreased - some days a hundred or more machines were lost.

Careful monitoring of all radio traffic between Great Britain and the U.S.A. showed no indication of any letup in England's will to resist. Week by week the United States was growing closer and closer to Great Britain. Unmistakably there was a resolve to put an end to the conquest of one country after another by National Socialism. The attitude of the U.S.A. was expressed in a speech in Philadelphia on 18 August by Mr. Bullitt, former ambassador to France.

Since the air war was not achieving its purpose, the German Government proclaimed in August a "total blockade of England". This step was aimed primarily at the U.S.A. but its effect was like pouring oil on a fire. It really betokened German weakness rather than strength.

While the German press printed long-winded articles on the effect of German air attacks on London, only small type was available on 10 September for the news that the House of Representatives
had on the day before accepted the Bill for Compulsory Military Service. The question was no longer, "Will the U.S.A. fight?" but, "When?"

Supposedly, the invasion was to take place during the night of 15-16 September 1940 but the English fighter defense was still too strong, the Navy was still intact, and German preparations were too inadequate. Only a few of the 1,000 large transport gliders called for had been completed. The espionage service had almost completely failed to function, in particular the establishment of a network of radio agents had never gotten beyond very modest beginnings. The intercept service provided virtually no information regarding the military situation in the British Isles.

Of course the decisive factor was Hitler himself. He did not seriously believe it would be necessary to invade by force; he expected England to make peace and Ribbentrop held the same view. Not until four weeks after the conclusion of the campaign in the west did Hitler realize that this assumption was not correct.

Hitler could pursue a goal with great obstinacy but he was an easily influenced, emotional character and now he shifted suddenly and ordered the General Staff (or at least part of it) to make plans for a Russian campaign which had never been mentioned before. He thought that England would change its attitude immediately, if Germany should attack the Soviet Union. Hess entertained the same opinion. Points of difference between England and the Soviet Union were well known, likewise Churchill's aversion to Bolshevism. If the English attitude took the course they expected, then invasion was superfluous.
It is true there was a dilemma; Hitler must say one thing to the Germans and another to the English. It was necessary to explain to the German people why the invasion did not come off: first there was fog, then there were storms, then it was said spring was the only proper time, and then when at Headquarters the idea had long since been dropped, "preparations for the invasion" were carried on in an ostentatious manner. The British were to get the impression that the invasion was imminent and the bombing attacks continued, although their intensity decreased. The main activity was confined to threats.

Amid this tense expectation there was concluded with great pomp on 26 September 1940 the so-called Three Power Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan. This act was purely theatrical. It was the first confession of the fact that from now on the whole threat of an invasion was merely a bluff, because if there were an invasion and England were defeated, then there would be no need of exerting pressure on England in the Far East. The fact that this step was taken proved that the German Government had no illusion regarding the invasion, even if it should be carried out. Actually the plan had already been given up. It was interesting to see how they reached the same conclusion in England; this was revealed by the mass of intercepted diplomatic messages of other governments, Poland in particular.

The Polish Government had fled to London and was in close contact there with all organs of the British Government and with the British armed forces. The English on their part esteemed this cooperation since the Polish element all over Europe gave a unique
basis for the organization of a large scale spy network for the English secret service. The reverse of the medal lay in the fact that the Polish Government in London talked too much out of school in its exchange of telegrams.

The cryptographic systems of the Polish government in Exile for the most part had been solved in Germany. Consequently, insight was obtained into the thinking and the plans of influential English offices. It could be seen that the British took the invasion seriously for only a short time. In any case, they were ready to accept it and were resolved, in case it succeeded, to continue the struggle from overseas. The fleet was to go to America and the struggle would be organized anew from there. Africa was to constitute the starting point for the attack on the Axis Powers. There were similar revelations in the intercepted traffic of diplomats representing other nations.

The German plan aimed, by threatening British possessions in the Far East, to force Britain to change her military dispositions. The idea appeared very clever and in those days Ribbentrop was considered in Germany a very competent and clever diplomat. However, he had neglected one important factor: should Japan try to disturb the balance of power in the Far East, this would inevitably arouse opposition in the U.S.A., and relations between the two countries were already tense due to the conflict in China. When the Japanese raised this objection, Ribbentrop assured them that the U.S.A. would not be in a position to employ its whole strength against Japan because Germany would, in case of conflict, declare war on the U.S.A.; this would mean for both the U.S.A. and Great Britain in splitting up
of forces and the Americans would be too weak to threaten Japan seriously.

At that moment, what Ribbentrop said was valid, but one factor was omitted: in September 1940 we had from intercepted traffic a fair picture of war production in the U.S.A with production estimates for the two ensuing years. Compared with German production these figures were enormous. Hitler and Ribbentrop said these figures were pure pipe dreams. What induced them to take such an attitude is not known to me. The figures were not based on propaganda speeches but were carefully compiled from authentic sources. On this occasion Hitler displayed a characteristic trait; he would believe only what accorded with his ideas, everything else he rejected abruptly.
HITLER'S BALKAN CAMPAIGN IN 1941

This book cannot deal in detail with the preliminaries of the Balkan War. Basically there is no preliminary history, for this campaign was simply plucked from a tree like Hitler's other martial enterprises. All the Balkan states had endeavored to maintain peaceful relations with Germany. However, even before the French Armistice, Hitler and Mussolini had agreed that Italy should be compensated for participation in the campaign in the West, not at the expense of France but in the Balkans. There would be two spheres of interest: Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey in Europe should belong to the German sphere; Croatia, Dalmatia, Albania, and Greece to the Italian sphere. This meant that a division of the Yugoslav kingdom was even then being considered. When the armistice had been signed, preparations began in Berlin and Rome for "the settlement of the Balkan question".

On 27 July, at Salzburg, Hitler received a Bulgarian delegation headed by the prime minister. Close collaboration between the two states was agreed upon, extending even to military matters. The division of Yugoslavia was likewise discussed and the Bulgarians claimed certain specific areas. The cession to Bulgaria of Greek Macedonia was also discussed. Close cooperation in intelligence matters was agreed upon, especially in the intercept service. Soon a German intercept station with cover name "Borer" was set up in Sofia. It was staffed with German military personnel in civilian clothes and had direct teletype connections with Berlin. Actually this station had existed since January 1940 on a somewhat
smaller scale and had been tolerated by the Bulgarians. Originally it intercepted army traffic of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey but now the work was extended to cover diplomatic traffic.

A few days later, Rome really started something. They had a report sent in from Tirana that the Albanian population under Greek domination was in a state of terror because of the frightful political murder of Daut Hoggia. Rome raise and outcry about the "unliberated" Albanian territories under the Greek yoke and about Greek persecution. A sharp note was sent to Greece to which the Greeks made a factual reply stating that the murder was in no wise political. The Italians, however, accused Greece of fomenting trouble along the frontier and of being a silent ally of a great power (England) which was now sinking into oblivion. Intercepted Greek traffic did not reveal anything to justify these reproaches.

Greece was trying to remain strictly neutral. Border incidents had occurred in this region for centuries, but to try to deduce from these a hostile attitude on the part of the Greek Government was clearly an intentional distortion of the facts. On the other hand, it is certain that Italy began sending troops and war material to Albania long before this murder. Italy was ready to seize upon any pretext and an article in the "Giornale d'Italia" left no doubt as to Italy's attitude.

With the Italians beginning to take action in "their" zone of influence, the Germans could not be idle. The chief obstacle was the attitude of King Carol of Romania. It is certain that Carol was friendly to France but this attitude did not in
of itself signify hostility to Germany. The extremely correct and benevolent treatment by the Romanian Government of the Germans in Transylvania bears this out, but Carol declined to allow his country to come under National Socialist domination. As a result he had to be overthrown. The so-called "Iron Guard", modeled after the National Socialist SA, was to accomplish this. On 6 September 1940, Carol's abdication was announced and Prime Minister Antonescu and Mioria Sima telegraphed greetings to Hitler which were cordially returned. On 8 September, Sima openly stressed the Axis had already reached the mouth of the Danube. Southern Dobrudja was immediately ceded to Bulgaria, thus establishing friendly relations, as Germany desired.

A few days after he had seized power, Antonescu began re-organizing the Romanian army and asked Hitler to send instructors. Soon German military personnel had permeated the armed forces and the country as a whole. Hitler had attained his first goal in the Balkans.

Almost overnight, Germany had reached the frontier of Turkey. On 9 September, Turkish territory in Europe was declared a military zone. The German ambassador, von Papen, tried in every way to make Turkey favorable to the Axis but it was soon clear that Turkey would fight if its neutrality were threatened.

But before southeastern Europe could supply a favorable jumping off place for Hitler, it was necessary to settle the boundary dispute between Hungary and Romania. Hungarian claims could not
possibly be accepted by the Romanians and the matter was to be submitted to arbitration by Germany and Italy. The decision rendered in Vienna in September 1940 probably fixed the most impossible frontier Europe ever saw. Both sides accepted the decision, even though they knew it was only a temporary settlement. For the moment all territorial differences between Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria had been disposed of and an absolutely pro-German block had been created.

Amid these developments in the Balkans, one country had been left out of the picture entirely thus far and that was Yugoslavia. There was, to be sure, a marked display of German-Yugoslav friendship. On 4 October Prince Regent Paul opened an exhibition of German architecture in Belgrade. Two days later Mussolini ostentatiously reviewed the Army of the Po which was stationed along the Italian-Yugoslav frontier and to which belonged Italy's most modern, fully motorized divisions. Under the circumstances Mussolini's visit was obviously meant to impress Yugoslavia.

In mid-October 1940, German troops occupied Romania "at the request of the Romanian Government", but the Germans began to set up naval bases on the Black Sea and to ship in submarines in sections. Russia began to fortify her western frontier.

In Bulgaria the people were divided; some favored Russia, some favored strict neutrality, and some favored France; hence it was imperative that those officials and officers favorable to Germany be protected and supported. Since the police were likewise divided in sympathy, this job was given to the Gestapo.
Berlin already was talking about occupying Bulgaria.

Mussolini had decided on war in the Balkans. Von Papen's warnings made Hitler averse to any immediate action there, but he was only able to restrain Mussolini to the extent of limiting Italy to war with Greece. In less than two months the Italians, who had the advantage in everything save morale, were badly beaten. The political leaders were terribly surprised and the Chief of General Staff, Marshal Badoglio, and numerous other high officers were relieved of their duties. This did not help matters.

One of the most decisive factors during those weeks was the manner in which the Italians employed radio. The set-up was the same as that used in maneuvers of previous years. They employed open circular traffic; that is, they used one uniform frequency for a group of stations belonging to the same unit (e.g. the stations of three infantry regiments of a division for traffic with one another and with the divisional station) and each station used only one call sign for all its traffic. The call sign was supposed to change daily but was often used for several days; not infrequently a change in call sign was followed by errors which betrayed the change. Traffic was so heavy that the enemy always had a chance to take bearings and fix locations. Frequently messages were sent in clear. Several units of the Italian Eleventh Army distinguished themselves in this respect. Moreover, the Greeks had obtained at least two Italian army cryptographic systems, how I do not know, but it is certain that in the very first days of the campaign they could decipher a large part of the Italian messages. This enabled
them to learn promptly most of the dispositions of the Italian com-
mand and to take appropriate action. The superiority thus gained
was utilized cleverly and a series of military actions took place
which heretofore would never have been deemed possible.

In January 1941 Turkey began sending away German citizens.
It had become an El Dorado for the German espionage service, which
was not only spying on Turkey itself but endeavored to cover the
Near East from this base. Moreover, German spies attempting to en-
ter the Soviet Union were usually sent through Turkey. Since Decem-
ber 1940, the German General Staff had among its plans one for an
attack on Turkey in Europe. In January 1941 large and small orient-
tation pamphlets dealing with Turkey were prepared—a sure sign
that things were reaching a critical stage. Turkey and the USSR
were discussing the possibility that the latter should supply Turkey
with arms in case of a German attack.

On 2 March Bulgaria officially adhered to the "Three Power
Pact". On the following day German troops marched into Bulgaria
"as a security measure".* This alarmed Yugoslavia and disquieted
the U.S.A. Roosevelt announced that the flow of war material to
Great Britain and Greece would increase until it was adequate for
all needs.

Threatened on all sides by German and Italian troops, the
government of Yugoslavia yielded to pressure and on 25 March signed
an official adherence to the Three Power Pact. This action was
bound to evoke resentment among the Yugoslavs and particularly in

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* Actually, Bulgaria officially adhered to the pact on 1 March
and German troops occupied Sofia a few hours later. (FD)
the officer corps. That this was not unexpected is clear from other negotiations. Long before the war at a time when "the best of relations" existed between Germany and Italy on the one hand and Yugoslavia on the other, and when it was ostensibly Germany's aim and ambition to live in friendship with Yugoslavia, the so-called Ustashi were being organized, trained, and equipped in Germany and Italy. The Ustashi were revolutionary bands under the leadership of Dr. Pavelic. Their numbers ran up to several thousands. Some were in Croatia and immediately after the outbreak of the war were active behind the front as saboteurs and partisans.

At the very time when Yugoslavia was adhering to the Three Power Pact, a verbal agreement was being made with Dr. Ante Pavelic and General Kraternik for the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia "at the appropriate time". There were two possibilities here:

1) Either the adherence would meet with resistance (as it did), would be dropped, and there would be military action; in this case Croatia was to secede at once and operations of the Yugoslav Fourth Army were to be hindered as far as possible by sabotage; or

2) The agreement would "go smoothly", in which case Croatia would secede after the "peaceful occupation" of Yugoslavia by German and Italian troops. Incidents could be engineered to give the necessary grounds for this "new arrangement".

Before the signers of the protocol got home, a coup was pulled off in Belgrade and the Pact of Vienna became invalid. The new government made it clear that it entertained no hostility to Germany but it was also clear that there was now no chance of sending German troops.
through Yugoslavia to aid the Italians. Nevertheless the occupa-
tion of Greece was prerequisite to other measures that had been
planned.

The Nazi press printed all manner of angry accusations and
on 6 April 1941 Germany declared war on Yugoslavia and Greece and
the open city of Belgrade was severely bombed. On 9 April Salonika
and Skoplje were occupied. On 14 April the main body of the Yugo-
slavia army had been beaten and Belgrade had been occupied. On 17
April the Yugoslav Second Army capitulated at Sarajevo. Three days
earlier at Agram the newly formed Croatian Government of Dr. Pavelic
and General Kraternik had been set up. It immediately sent greetings
to Hitler and Mussolini with a request for recognition, which was
granted.

The reasons for the swift collapse of the Yugoslav defense
lay in the great superiority of the Germans in men and materiel -
primarily in the air - but also in the fact that the Yugoslav
forces had no time for a regular mobilization. Furthermore, on
the first day of hostilities, dive bombers destroyed the Ministry
of War between 7 and 8 o’clock in the morning and the General
Staff thereafter had no contact with the armies it was supposed to
direct. On 10 April the Commander-in-Chief sent the following order
to army groups and independent armies.

"All subordinate troops, wherever they come in contact with the
enemy, have to fight in all directions on their own initiative,
without waiting for orders from the higher commands."

During the ten days of fighting, the Commander-in-Chief had to
relly entirely on a small portable radio set. The entire telephone
and telegraph network was either smashed by the air attack or crippled
by the Fifth Column. The seven Yugoslav armies had to rely exclusively-
ly on radio and now a defect in peacetime training proved fateful.
At manoeuvres, radio had been used hesitantly, hence no great practical
experience in the development and camouflaging of traffic had been
acquired. Moreover, in communications - as in other matters - the
French pattern had been followed and the weaknesses found in French
communications were also found here, only aggravated due to lack of
practice. Consequently, the German and Italian intercept service had
the best imaginable results, especially since the Germans were al-
ready reading all the Yugoslav cryptographic systems. The German
command had from the first hours of the war a complete picture of
the assembly, movements, and intentions of the Yugoslav armies. This
was a decisive factor, at least for the speed with which operations
could be carried out.

In Greece events moved rapidly and on 4 May 1941 Hitler
delivered a great speech in Berlin, which closed with the prediction
that the Nazi State would endure for a thousand years.

As early as September 1940 Hitler had decided upon war with
the Soviet Union. He knew this was no trifling matter and that
careful preparations must be made. He had his eye on the oil fields
of the Near East and his strategic goal was not Greece or Crete but
the area around Mosul, Iraq. He would attack in two directions:
from the Balkans through Turkey or Crete and Syria, and from North
Africa via Egypt. These plans were revealed to the German inter-
cept service when radio traffic of the Near East became the center of interest. The two intercept stations of the OKW were instructed to give priority to the traffic of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Egypt. Cryptanalytic activity became feverish, while in Turkey a vast espionage and propaganda organization was set up. The Arab population was to be turned against England and, if possible, a "Holy War" let loose. For success it was necessary to have Axis troops at the Suez Canal.

In September 1940 Graziani started his offensive against Alexandria from Cyrenaica. In a fortnight it had bogged down. On 9 December General Wavell began his counteroffensive and smashed the Italian front very quickly. On 6 February Benghasi fell. Then Wavell's offensive came to a halt on the frontier between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Italy had suffered its first great defeat in this war.

This eight week campaign attracted great attention. People were guessing as to where the British superiority might have lain. Certainly not in numbers, since the Italians were far stronger. Certainly not in materiel, since the Italians were well equipped and had had twenty years of experience in desert warfare; they knew the country far better than the English did. Of course General Wavell was a first rate military leader, but Graziani was no novice. In fact he was the Italian specialist in colonial warfare and from 1926 to 1932 he had fought all over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and conquered them. How could this colonial strategist suffer such a disgraceful defeat?

The answer is simple. Back in 1926-1932 the German intercept
service had been able to follow currently from Munich each of Graziani's operations including all preparations therefor, all dispositions and measures (whether regarding supply, equipment, transportation or what not) from Italian traffic. This was from a distance of many hundred kilometers. At that time people in the German intercept control station in Berlin were astounded at the frivolous manner in which the Italians used the radio. Moreover, observation of Italian maneuvers had proven that they had not learned much subsequently.

When the Italian campaign in North Africa began in September 1940, our monitoring revealed conditions similar to those during Graziani's operations against the natives. Not quite so bad, it is true, but nevertheless "bad enough." No doubt Wavell had a smoothly functioning intercept service. The Italians radioed in a way that would warm the heart of any intercept operator. Consequently Wavell was very well informed regarding the situation on the Italian side. He could learn not only how many divisions were available but also all details regarding the disposition of units, their strength, their equipment, the number and type of planes, stocks of fuel, etc. After a few weeks all this could be learned by monitoring. Consequently, Wavell must have known the constitution of the Italian front and its effective strength down to the last detail by the time his offensive started. No matter what Graziani might do, he had not the least chance of success in the face of the compromising work of his own radio stations.

Early in January 1941 an agreement was reached between Hitler and Mussolini to send German troops to North Africa; the German
"Afrika Korps" was to be set up under General Rommel. By mid-January troop trains began rolling over the Brenner Pass.

On 24 March 1941, a few days before the attack on Yugoslavia, Rommel launched his attack from El Agheila and immediately overran the British front. Tobruk was reached on 12 April and Sollum on 16 April.

Viewed from a distance, Rommel's offensive was an astounding success. But it had been possible only because the British had a long supply line and because Wavell had had to give up three divisions out of his already weakened force for service in Greece. Germany and Italy had done everything possible to induce England to send those troops to the Balkans, because it was Rommel's mission to push through to the Suez Canal. German military circles were sure that after the departure of these three divisions, the African front would be so weak that a drive through northern Egypt would be possible. But an astonishing thing happened: Rommel did not get beyond Sollum. The British had not evacuated Tobruk and the encirclement of this city tied down too many of Rommel's forces, which should have been used to continue the offensive.

As has been stated, it was Rommel's mission to push through to the Suez Canal and appear opposite the Arabian peninsula. Simultaneously, an attack from the Balkans was to be launched across Turkey in the direction of Iraq. Meanwhile, by months of effort, the ground had been prepared in Iraq for the outbreak of a "Holy War" the moment Rommel reached the Suez Canal and German troops entered Asia Minor.
There was one man who warned against this campaign, just as he had warned against the campaign in the Balkans; that was the German ambassador in Ankara, von Papen. As a result the decision was made to attack via Crete and Syria rather than through Turkey.

In some way the English must have received and deciphered the telegrams passing between von Papen and Ribbentrop. It is certain that they had knowledge of the German plans from January 1941 on. Consequently they directed all efforts to the Near East.

In Iraq, a powerful friend, Raschid Ali el Gallani, had been won over and everything had been prepared for a coup d'état.

In Iran, Reza Khan was friendly to Germany and had been reducing English influence in the oil fields of southern Iran. Numerous Germans had entered the country and had been enlisted in the intelligence service; after the beginning of the war, additional agents had been sent to Iran by way of Turkey. In the spring of 1941 the situation was such that Reza Khan was ready to act with Germany, once German troops had crossed the Suez Canal and the Bosporous.

In Afghanistan there were numerous German agents engaged in shaping up the political situation.

In Syria things were even more simple. As a French mandated territory it was under the control of the German - Italian Armistice Commission. General Dentz, who commanded the French occupation troops here, was loyal to Vichy. No opposition on his part to the landing and transit of German troops was expected.

Realizing that the majority of the people in the Arab countries can be reached only through religious leaders, Germany had
enlisted the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. He had been in Berlin, had called on Hitler repeatedly, and was prepared to unleash a "Holy War" whenever Germany desired.

Only in Trans-Jordan was the government friendly to England. In gratitude for English support, the ruler, Emir Abdullah, had placed at the disposal of the British two corps. But since the two together had scarcely 1000 men and since the territory was small, no serious resistance was to be expected.

While preparations for a large scale action were going on in the Near East, a diversionary action was started to give the impression that Germany planned an attack on Switzerland and another on Portugal either in cooperation with Spain or at least with Spanish consent. This was done so successfully that the countries concerned and Great Britain seriously counted on such military operations. On 4 April came the German attack on Yugoslavia; on the same day Rommel pushed forward to Benghasi; on the same day there was a coup d'état in Iraq.

Although the new government of Iraq proclaimed a desire to remain friends with Great Britain and Turkey, both countries received these protestations with skepticism. The British were monitoring Near East traffic and no doubt had broken the cryptographic systems. In any case, German intentions could not remain concealed forever and England decided to act.

On 17 April strong British units landed in the harbor of Basra. Early in May the Government of Iraq handed the British Government an ultimatum requesting immediate removal of all British troops from the country. After it expired on 14 May, several airfields were sur-
rounded and the pipe line to Haifa was cut. The Mosul oil fields were removed from British control and placed under guard. This interruption of the oil supply for the British Mediterranean fleet was one of the principal objectives of the operations directed from Germany. Without oil the British fleet would be incapable of action and the Italian fleet, in spite of severe losses in March, would dominate the Mediterranean, and be able to safeguard German landings. There were anti-British demonstrations in other Arab countries. German planes with officers and technicians landed in Syria and German troops occupied the island of Milos, midway between Athens and Crete. Rommel was at the Egyptian frontier. The end of British domination in the Near East seemed at hand.

On 10 May, Rudolf Hess flew to England to induce the British Government to reverse its policy on the basis of these facts and of the preparations being undertaken against Russia. He went not "officially" but "unofficially" with Hitler's knowledge.

On 14 May the German air attacks on Crete began, but the struggle for the island turned out more difficult than expected; it involved heavier losses and required more time than anticipated. Some 400 aircraft were lost and almost 16,000 German soldiers lost their lives. Rommel did not get beyond Sollum. The British appeared at the Syrian frontier; General Wavell restored calm in Egypt; the Hess affair failed utterly. President Roosevelt proclaimed an unlimited state of emergency and was authorized to give unlimited aid to England. While German troops were fighting on Crete, the British moved into Syria. The picture had changed.
fundamentally. The campaign in the Near East was abandoned and the Balkan campaign became a mere episode. In Rome the Duke of Spoleto was proclaimed King of Croatia but did not deem it advisable to go to his new kingdom.

I cannot conclude this chapter without a few more words regarding the struggle for Crete. This was one of the decisive factors in the collapse of the plan for a leap in the Near East. The Germans had counted on taking Crete quickly in a surprise attack. The troops, aircraft, and ships that were made ready were intended primarily for the landing in Syria. Unexpectedly a large part was used up in the struggle for the Island of Crete.

How can we explain the unexpected resistance on this island?

I can offer no proof in support of the assumption I am about to set forth, but all my observations indicate that the garrison had precise knowledge of the impending attack. Possibly treachery was involved. The German preparations in Athens could not be kept secret in the long run. Moreover, from all previous preparations one could easily conclude that an attack on the island would follow soon.
All this, however, merely permitted one to recognize the intention to attack, hardly the points selected for the attack. For various reasons, I consider it probable that the British intercept service had obtained precise knowledge of details of the action. Churchill said himself in Commons, that the British Command was informed of the impending attack.

The resistance of the Allied troops, which almost everywhere gave the impression that they had been waiting impatiently for the German attack, the events off Cape Spathia where the German convoy
was scattered and almost destroyed, these admit of no other explanation than that the defenders of the island were fully informed by radio of all details. Possibly there were English radio agents in Athens who got their information from high German sources but it is quite as likely that the German cryptographic systems had been solved and that German traffic was being read. This question only the British can answer.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST - 1941

While all the other campaigns of Hitler had some consistent, realistic basis, something dramatically theatrical attaches to the campaign in the East. This runs through the entire course of the enterprise, beginning with the planning of the campaign, the six documents put out by the OKW to throw the blame on the Russians, and ends - well it ends with the end.

On 22 June 1941 at 0530 Dr. Goebbels read over the German radio a long appeal by Hitler, to the German people. "Condemned to months of silence, the hour has now come when I can finally speak openly," thus the proclamation begins. Then follow all the old arguments: England's trickery, the dagger-in-the-back story of 1918, the efforts of the National Socialist Movement for unity, the Jewish-Bolshevist rulers in Russia, the treacherous Russian arming, the imperialistic aims of Moscow, and the Jewish-Anglo-Saxon instigators of the war. Many words and many untruths.

At 6 o'clock in the morning, in the hall of the Council of State in the Foreign Office, Ribbentrop revealed to representatives of the German and foreign press, who had been dragged from their beds, the note of the Foreign Office to the Soviet Government. The effect of this Sunday surprise on the German people varied. The National Socialists were enthusiastic. Some people had foreseen something of the sort and were not surprised; others believed the broadcast and found therein at last the explanation of the non-occurrence of the invasion of England: So Russia was to blame for everything! At last the story was out!
But a very large part of the German people had a dull feeling of great anxiety. A German author, who was well-informed in military matters, said to me that day: "The war in the East is no sign of German strength, rather it is the first serious sign of weakness!"

Then the German radio became silent. While everyone waited feverishly for news from the Eastern theater, all sorts of things were recounted over the German radio, only nothing about the war in the East. After a full week Goebbels pulled a theatrical stunt by having read at half hour intervals some eight or nine special reports, some were four or five days old. It was a downright childish attempt to increase the tension in order then to bring relief through these special reports as if by a clearing-off shower.

When the campaign in the East began, the German radio intercept service by months of observation had obtained a relatively clear picture of the Russian assembly. This gave the German command very valuable hints for planning and executing its operations. Moreover a captain of the Russian airforce was captured about two weeks after the war started who betrayed the Russian air key so that Hoelders' fighter squadron dealt the Russian airforce several serious blows - in particular by shooting down more than 100 machines in a battle in the vicinity of Minsk. The Russian cryptographic system was changed shortly afterward, to be sure.
The German Air Force got another surprise during those early weeks. The German espionage service had learned before the outbreak of the war that the Russian Air Force could throw some 10,000 planes into the struggle. There were also reliable reports that the Russian aviation industry was even then capable of fairly high production. In the General Staff of the German Air Force no credence was given these statements. It was decided to assume that the number of machines ready for action was 3,000.

Within a few weeks, more than 3,000 Russian machines were shot down but the Russian Air Force was still well represented in the air. The German General Staff began to mistrust its figures for planes shot down. Several commissions were sent out to count the remains of Russian machines, whereby more were found than had been reported. It was soon apparent that the German General Staff had thoroughly deceived itself. On 11 July 1941 the OKW report announced that 6,233 Russian aircraft had been put out of action.

In the first week of July came the celebrated double-encirclement battle near Bialystok and Minsk, at the conclusion of which the OKW figured the total number of prisoners taken on 11 July at more than 400,000. This was an enormous number and the numbers subsequently reported were not too modest; they had only one out: they did not quite agree with the truth, or rather they consisted of a mixture of truth and fancy. Not
only soldiers but also male civilians picked up in the battle area had been counted.

When the campaign began, the Germans expected not only the Russian army but also the political structure of the Soviet Union to collapse. Hitler called the struggle a crusade against Bolshevism and claimed it was not directed against Russia as such or against the Russian people. Russian emigrants in Germany supported this version and claimed that the Russian people as a whole was longing for the overthrow of the Bolshevist system.

The German troops were ordered not to fire on the demonstrative processions which would come to meet them, bearing banners with pictures of saints and in the Russian national colors (blue - white - red). So false was the picture entertained in influential German circles of political conditions in the Soviet Union and of the psychology of the Russian people!

Thoughtful people were asking themselves five questions:

1. What will be the effect of the vast space of Russia on fast moving units? The Sino-Japanese war afforded some clues but the terrain of European Russia was different.

2. What will be the effect of the Russian winter with its low temperatures and snow fall and of the condition of Russian highways on operations of an attacker relying chiefly on motorized warfare?
3. Is the internal structure of the Soviet Union firm enough to endure severe initial defeat? Or is there danger that - as in 1917 - unrest will result in a chain of defeats? Is there really a broad stratum in the population which is suitable and is in a position to start a counter movement?

4. Will the German attack evoke a new awakening of national feeling on the part of the Russian people? Russian history shows several such cases: once early in the 17th century under pressure from the Poles after the House of Rurik had died out; again in 1812; and a third time in 1921 in the war against the new Polish Republic while Russia was itself in the midst of civil war!

5. What is the defensive strength of the Soviet Union in personnel and materiel? What is the capacity of the munitions industry?

These questions could be discussed but only the course of events would give valid answers. The German High Command had answered them all in advance in Germany's favor, especially number 3. By leaflets and by radio reports were spread repeatedly
that Russian units had killed their political commissars and surrendered. Day by day the Finnish radio broadcast in Russian the admonition: "chase out the commissars and clean house in Russia; then the Germans will readily come to an understanding with you!"

The Russian people is not a hot-blooded race which it is easy to inflame. The Russian people has often been characterized as a sluggish mass.

This is not correct. The Russian people has a quiet dynamic force of its own. If this force is aroused - and that can only happen under extraordinary circumstances and even then not over night but only by slow degrees - then it gains momentum and moves toward its goal as irresistibly as a gigantic steam roller, having regard for nothing, shying at no danger, sparing no sacrifice. Once aroused in this war, this force would not ebb until the last foe had been driven from the sacred soil of Russia.

What those really acquainted with Russia knew and expected, came to pass. To the political fanaticism of the mass of the Russian people, which would never have proven decisive by itself, was added what Tukhachevski had striven for four years earlier, although in a different form. In the Soviet Union, the land of the Internationale, of the Comintern, of cosmopolitan Bolshevism, arose the idea of a national struggle for liberation. The watchword was not:

"Proletarians of all countries, unite! This struggle is being waged in your behalf!", but rather: "Rise for the battle of liberation to preserve the inviolability of the homeland!"
Instead of bringing on demoralization, each German victory increased the determination of the Russian people to see the struggle through to the end. Just what released this force in Russia? It was the fact that the National Socialist German Command had unmasked its true intentions prematurely. The propaganda of a "holy war against Bolshevism" had retreated into the background and quite frank talk about "space in the East" had taken its place. The gospel of "space in the East", which had been pounded into the heads of the younger German generation on all occasions, meant the occupation of the holy soil of Russia.

Anti-Bolshevist Russian emigrants in Central and Western Europe turned away from the "holy war against Bolshevism". This went so far that in August 1941 leading members of the White Guard in Paris, who had risked their lives fighting against Bolshevism, were arrested by the German Gestapo because they openly advocated defense of Russian soil. Even Gortshakov, who had been appointed by the Germans chief of Russian emigrants in German occupied territory, finally turned away from Germany.

By the middle of July 1941, the "Blitz" in the East was at an end. There followed a struggle against an opponent who fought bitterly and tenaciously. Every city was defended desperately. The German timetable was already wrecked.
The losses on both sides were enormous. On the German side at the end of July 1941 almost a million men had dropped out. The Propaganda Section thought it expedient to combat the "rumors" of heavy German losses. By mid-August, the Germans reached the Dnieper, south of Kiev, and were approaching Odessa, while the advance on Leningrad was under way.

On 16 August the OKW issued an official communique stating that the resistance of the enemy had everywhere been broken; the Russians were throwing in hurriedly-assembled reserves.

On 20 August a battle in the Gomel area terminated, in which parts of 25 Russian divisions had participated. Gomel was occupied but Odessa and Leningrad were preparing for stubborn defense. The degree to which the Russians were prepared to defend their cities had been shown at Smolensk: most of the city was destroyed and of its 160,000 inhabitants only 15,000 were there when the Germans marched in.

By the end of August the German advance was growing slower and slower even though individual victories could be reported.

Many may still recall the communique of the OKW in the second half of August which said that the Russian front was in a state of dissolution; no unified command could be recognized any longer. Behind this pronouncement, which was couched in propagandistic style, there was more than appeared at first sight. It is intriguing to look into this last statement.
Under the fury of the first German assault, which caused the entire Russian front to waiver, the system of Russian army radio traffic had likewise been badly shaken, especially in the matter of camouflage against the foreign intercept service. The Russian radio service had operated in such fashion that, with the systems employed, the relations of the radio stations and therefore of the unit staffs with one another were kept far from transparent, and in many cases could not be recognized at all. The breaking of the front at various points; the encirclement of entire divisions, corps, and armies; the swift retreat of the Russians at many points; the bringing up of reinforcements and replacements; the necessity of closing gaps; reconnaissance over large areas; the lack of any wire net of their own - all this forced the Russians in countless cases to use radio without considering whether the enemy would derive benefit therefrom or not. "Results take precedence over concealment" - that is an old military maxim which had to be applied in this case. In consequence, the German intercept service got a well rounded picture of radio connections and also of the command relations extending from regiments and divisions up to the highest staffs. The phenomenon was similar to that manifested in the campaign in the West.

Now when the Russians had overcome the first disasters and had begun an orderly retreat according to plan, while gaps in the front began to close, order returned slowly in the Russian radio service. The old system, based on link traffic with
multiple frequencies and call signs, cautious handling of messages, avoidance of plain text, etc., again came into its own. With this, the connecting lines on the radio charts of the evaluators and of the intercept service disappeared more and more and a chaotic picture resulted, consisting of single radio links without any connection. Viewed on the map, this could only give the impression of a progressive dissolution of the organic subordination hitherto observed. The conclusion drawn was that the Russian system of command was breaking down more and more and that the front everywhere consisted merely of resistance groups without connection with one another. "No unified command could be recognized any longer."

In reality the reverse was true. That which represented a strengthening of the Russian front was erroneously evaluated as a phenomenon of dissolution.

Such a capital mistake was only possible because in the expansion of the German intercept service one had neglected to increase correspondingly the number of qualified evaluators. Instead of training and assigning people of the highest intelligence with a precise knowledge of the organization of the Russian army and the Russian radio service, recourse was had to non-commissioned officers who had no operational background and knew little or nothing about specifically Russian military affairs. So far as I know, there were at the beginning of the war two or three German evaluators who had had experience with the radio situation in the East. Ten times that number would
have been necessary. Recourse was had to evaluators trained
for work in the West. The first - abnormal - radio picture these
men got of the Russians was taken by them to be the normal picture,
because it corresponded to the normal picture in the West. Then
when the situation changed and the normal Russian radio picture
was revealed, these men - using western norms - were misled into
drawing conclusions that would have been appropriate in the West.
This was a fateful error.

Leningrad held out and Odessa fought heroically until mid-
October. The battle for these two cities was a prevue of what
was to come.

Meanwhile Hitler and Ribbentrop were trying eagerly to draw
Japan into the war against Russia but Japan had other interests -
it cast its eyes toward the south.

Moreover, war production in the U.S.A. had gotten under way
and deliveries to the Soviet Union began to flow via Iran and
the Caucasus.

The National Socialists still maintained that the Russians
were fighting so stubbornly only because the political commissars
forced them into battle with drawn pistols. Few stopped to
think that one man - even the wildest, with a pistol in his
hand - cannot possibly dominate and drive forward the 4,000
men of a Russian regiment on the battle field. No, it was
not the commissars who caused the increasingly fanatical
resistance, it was the national conscience, it was the will to protect the homeland. Unit after unit fought to the last man, few prisoners still had a weapon. Such resistance to the point of annihilation was not due to commissars threatening with revolvers. Of course, the commissars did work tirelessly with propaganda to support the discipline and fighting spirit but the decisive factor was the will to defend the sacred soil of Russia.

Such resistance was something the German troops had not met before. Even on Crete, where it had been toughest, resistance had not assumed these forms. German operations were slowed up in comparison with progress in the west, north, and south. This explains repeated reference on the German radio and in the press to the "criminal and senseless resistance of the Soviets"; it is also the reason for Hitler's remark on 3 October 1941 that in the east they faced an enemy consisting not of men but of animals and beasts.

Significant was the first statement in that speech: "I say it today for the first time, because today I can say it, this enemy is already broken and will never rise again".

This abysmal self-deception may be without parallel, at all events it was fateful because followed by a second statement: "We have been so forehanded that in the midst of this mighty war of materiel I can now cut back production in many lines, because I know there is no longer any opponent whom we cannot overcome with the stock of ammunition on hand." This was not propaganda, production in many lines was cut and many a German soldier
subsequently suffered in consequence.

On the night from 1 to 2 October the decisive battle began and into it Hitler threw all he had. On 18 October the double battle of Briansk and Viazma ended with the destruction of 8 Russian armies and the capture of almost 650,000 men. The road to Moscow appeared to lie open.

On 23 October the German papers triumphantly published the news that Marshals Voroshilov, Timoshenko, and Budenny had been relieved of their commands and turned over to the GPU. "Great Purge", "They are Silent in Moscow" were among the headlines. It was no purge, however, and Moscow had good reason to be silent. These experienced commanders had been sent to the East to train new units.

During August, September, and October 1941, the German army intercept service had been monitoring radio traffic of Russian stations east of Moscow (in the area Jaroslavl - Kostroma - Vladimir - Rjasan - Kolomna - Moscow - Kaljasin - Jaroslavl), which was becoming more and more active. From this it appeared that there was being set up in this area an army reserve of some 40 divisions. This was not tactical or operational or practice traffic of these divisions; the troops' radio stations were sealed and were not allowed to put in an appearance; only procurement traffic for this reserve was involved. It was kept in cipher but the Germans were soon able to decipher and read it completely at the intercept control station in Lützen. These deciphered messages revealed:
The numbers of the divisions being formed,

Their type (tank, infantry, motorized, cavalry, or other divisions),

Their composition and organization,

Their numerical strength,

Their equipment with arms and ammunition,

Their subordination.

Colonel Kettler, Chief of the Intercept Control Station, composed an exhaustive report and sent it through General E. Fellgiebel, Chief of the Armed Forces Signal Troops (the man murdered by Hitler after 20 July 1944), to the General Staff, Section Foreign Armies East, General Matzky, who passed it on.

What was set forth there met with immediate rejection, however, and a few days later the report came back to Fellgiebel with the following marginal notations:

"They ought to put this "Hosen scheisser" Kettler out of business.

(signed) Jodl."

"This is also the opinion of the Führer.

(signed) Fegelein."

(Fegelein was Superior Group Leader in the SS and later Hitler's brother-in-law; he was a near relative of Eva Braun and was shot shortly before the end of the war by order of Hitler.)

Fellgiebel sent the report back to Kettler and that was the end of the matter. But the "Hosen scheisser" was given a command at the front. Late in October this traffic ceased and at Hitler's Headquarters they were firmly convinced that it had been a Russian hoax. The "Führer" had been right - as always.
Nevertheless, the early days of November were marked by
increasingly stiff resistance in front of Moscow. Without
the German intercept service at the front having been able to
notice anything, the Russians had brought up fresh units and
assembled them in a mighty arc northwest and south of Moscow.
They now achieved their first great victory in the ether.

On 3 November the fifth German offensive had bogged down
without even approximately reaching its goal.

Among German army commanders a light began to dawn. They
now recalled numerous reports by X 49, X 33, and V 100, mention-
ing potential reserves of the Soviet Union, the time table of
Russian mobilization, and the capacity of the munitions industry
beyond the Volga. Brauchitsch recommended withdrawing the
German front for the winter to the line Riga – Kiev – Nikolajev.
Hitler's answer was the order for the sixth German offensive
against Moscow, although even in his mind the magnitude of the
risk was beginning to dawn. On 9 November in Munich he no
longer promised the greatest victory of all times but declared
anything was possible, save that Germany would ever capitulate.
He also insisted that a German officer who did not defend
himself would be courtmartialed. The sixth and last drive
on Moscow began.

Conversation of officers in Germany revealed that the
immediate goals of the campaign in the East were Moscow and the
Caucasus. Both must be achieved this year; then there would be
a breathing spell, and in the spring the whole area would be
cleared of partisans.
Yes, the partisans! The German public rarely heard of these fighters for freedom. According to the National Socialist press they belonged to the "worst scum of the Bolshevist criminal world". They were not considered to be soldiers. Gradually word trickled through that these were not roving single bandits but very considerable groups who attacked German rear communications according to plan. But it was quite a while before the German intercept service established the fact that these fighting groups were equipped with radios and that their activities were controlled by radio. By the time this was ascertained, the extent of this traffic had taken on stately proportions.

The observation of these transmitters and especially the task of locating them proved very difficult, not merely because they changed their position almost daily but also because the transmission strength was relatively low, in any case far lower than the strength of the army stations intercepted. Since the facilities and personnel of the intercept companies (which were monitoring the enemy's army traffic) and of similar monitoring units of Radio Counter-intelligence (which were supposed to cover agent traffic) were by no means sufficient for the task, there arose a jurisdictional squabble between the two organizations, each asserting that this new type of traffic belonged to the task of the other.

Actually each was right from its own point of view but that did not help matters and the result was a vacuum which was just beginning to close when it was already too late.
Toward the turn of the year a terrific number of partisan radio stations blanketed both battle fronts in a broad band. The control stations were behind the Russian front, the partisan transmitters were behind the German front.

Not until the spring of 1942, when Russian partisan traffic had assumed tremendous proportions, was the Commander of Intercept Troops Center (in whose area were found the most partisan stations) given two "platoons" (groups of about 40 men each) of a monitoring company just trained for observing Russian partisans. Two "platoons" to watch hundreds of stations! A pitiful solution! And when in the summer of 1942 the two platoons were expanded to a company, their strength was still not equal to the task.

One cannot comprehend the slowness of the German command in reacting to any new problem and in taking effective counter-measures. And even then the measures were inadequate. We may anticipate here by stating that the failure throughout the campaign in the east to combat Russian partisan radio properly was astounding.

But to return to the events of November 1941.

On 22 November the sixth German offensive against Moscow had bogged down hopelessly and instead of reaching the Caucasus, German troops had to evacuate Rostov, which they had meanwhile conquered. Behind the center of the German front, partisans were disturbing communications and supply.

In Washington President Roosevelt ordered the Army, Navy, and the Office of War Production to work out a "victory program"
with an annual outlay of 50,000,000,000 dollars. Meanwhile, supplies for the Soviet Union were already rolling through the Near East.

On 22 November the last German offensive against Moscow came to an end. In the following night the first great Russian winter offensive began. From Voronesh to Lake Ladoga the German lines were pushed back. Mighty wedges ripped the German front so that in a few weeks it was a gigantic zig-zag line. Only heroic efforts on the part of the German commanders and troops could prevent a catastrophe. Only by prompt withdrawal could units be saved from annihilation and commanders had to act on their own responsibility, following principles of modern strategy. But Hitler would hear nothing of such tactics. He ordered them to hold out, no matter how the situation might shape up. Yield a line they had reached? - never! Military tactics must be subordinated to the requirements of politics and propaganda. Commanders who had withdrawn to more favorable positions were disciplined by Hitler. With his own hands he tore the decorations from their necks, degraded them, and threw them out of the army. By the dozens! Had these men acted as Hitler desired and allowed themselves to be encircled, then the German front in the East would have collapsed at that time. The German Air Force was able to supply the group encircled near Demjansk for months but it could never have supplied three or four such groups. Twenty-five German generals were relieved of their command but without their action the entire Eastern army might have been destroyed during that frightful winter.
The two fronts became enmeshed. German support points, divisions, and corps were encircled. Already 1,300,000 German soldiers lay buried in Russian soil; 3,500,000 had been wounded. Fresh troops were hard to find; the Class of 1923, which had been called up in August and September 1941, was shipped to the eastern front and the occupied territories in the east were almost stripped of troops. Mussolini refused Hitler's request for more Italian divisions. German propaganda took a new turn. There was praise for the bravery of the Russian soldiers, for Russian strategy and materiel, while the political leadership was decried. Hitler hoped to prepare the ground for a decisive offensive by the spring of 1942.

The course of the winter offensive 1941/42 took the whole world by surprise. Most surprised was the German command. Any attempt to explain these events solely by errors of the German command will prove inadequate. Of course, Hitler deceived himself regarding a collapse of the Soviet regime; he under-estimated Russian strength and productive capacity in a fate-ful manner, and it was serious for German troops to have to undergo this Russian winter without proper equipment. Moreover the verve of Russian attacks was astounding, a surprising factor after the serious defeats they had suffered. This does not mean that the morale and fighting strength of the German soldier failed during those weeks and months. In spite of the severity of the winter, to which he was utterly unaccustomed, the heroism displayed by the German soldier far exceeded all previous performances.
What was it then that enabled the Russians to turn around after such defeats and bring the northern half of the German front to the brink of destruction? The reasons will be dealt with in the following sections. The real reason was radio espionage, by which we mean the equipment of spies and agents with small portable sets.

By the middle of January 1942 the northern half of the eastern front began to be stabilized. The Russian counter-offensive was stuck. The German front was holding and Hitler was beginning preparations for the summer campaign of 1942. This time the decision was to be sought in the south. Vast masses of war material rolled to the Balkans. Repair and workshop material, including special sections for Ju 52's as well as speed boats in sections, were shipped to the south, mostly to Salonika and Cavalla, likewise two complete airborne divisions. The plan of the preceding year was revived. Boats prepared for the invasion of England sailed up the Rhine and at Mainz were loaded on trains for shipment to the Danube. New transport gliders with a span of 55 meters were constructed to carry 150 men with equipment. People in OKW were convinced that the Russians had thrown their last reserves into their winter offensive and that these would soon break down under the powerful blows of the German armed forces.

How badly the Germans still misjudged the enemy situation was shown by the formation of so-called air force field divisions. They thought the Russian air force was so weakened that they could afford to cut down their own air force to form field divisions from the

* Junkers 52 - transport plane.
personnel. This was done when the Russians were just getting mass production of planes under way in Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk.

In order to leave its own higher commanders in the dark regarding the situation in hostile countries, the Führer's Headquarters, toward the end of January 1942, ordered the cipher section of OKW, as the control and evaluation center of the intercept service, to cease multigraphing and distributing the daily summaries of the situation as revealed by the intercept service and to bring these results to the knowledge of only a small group of persons, using very few copies. One was becoming fearful about letting the actual situation in Germany and on the enemy side be known.
JAPAN ENTERS THE WAR

At this point something of great significance occurred which was calculated on the one hand to divert attention from the course of military events in Russia and on the other hand to bring the war as a whole into an entirely new phase. This was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and the ensuing Japanese declaration of war against the U.S.A. and Great Britain, followed by the declarations of war by Germany and Italy on 11 December.

At first sight it seems incomprehensible that these declarations of war should result at the very moment when the military picture was for the first time turning against Germany. Had the Japanese attack come three or four months earlier, coinciding with the German victories in the East, it might have appeared intelligible. In December, when the entire northern half of the German eastern front was in a serious situation, such a step could only appear incomprehensible. Nevertheless, there was a causal connection between the turn in the fortunes of war in Eastern Europe and the beginning of the war in the Far East.

The sequence of incidents is interesting. Starting in August 1941 when the war in Russia ceased to be brisk and merry and became bitter and serious, Hitler repeatedly invited the Japanese Ambassador, Hiroshi Oshima, to the eastern front - naturally to those points where the situation
was favorable for the Germans. In October these visits ceased and efforts to influence Oshima to encourage Japan to enter the war became obvious. There were also incidents in the Atlantic.

From 1934 to 1938 Oshima had been Japanese military attaché in Berlin. It was then that the collaboration of the Japanese secret service with the counterespionage section of the Ministry of War in Berlin began. Oshima was well acquainted with Admiral Canaris. Oshima's house - a ten minute walk from the Ministry of War - became a "center of social and comradely association." In other words Oshima knew how to cultivate social connections which appeared worth while for his work.

Early in 1935, Admiral Canaris ordered the head of Group I of the Counterespionage Section to send to him (Canaris) for transmission to Oshima one copy of all information referring to the Soviet Union which might be of interest to Japan. In return, Group I received from Oshima questionnaires which were translated and passed to X-49 (Dosto) and these were answered by the latter to the best of his ability.

At that time the question of cooperation between the Japanese and German cryptanalytic services was brought up for the first time but was soon dropped again because this cooperation was expressly limited to the front against the Soviet Union and here German cryptanalytic results were very slim. Oshima was unwilling to reveal anything regarding other cryptographic systems. Now and then he received -- without indication of the source -- bits of
information which were based on German cryptanalytic work.

Down to 1938 this cooperation remained within very modest limits but in the course of time it did give Oshima a very good insight into the organization of the German intercept service. There was even talk of sending German intercept personnel to Japan to collaborate there (in Manchuria).

When Oshima was appointed Japanese ambassador in 1938, mutual confidence had reached the point where collaboration in the field of general intelligence was relatively close. But it was based solely on the person of Oshima and when he was replaced by Kurusu in October 1939 it soon ebbed away. Relations between the two countries remained close and the Three Power Pact was concluded on 27 September 1940 but contact in the field of intelligence practically ceased.

This was undesirable for Japan, especially since the war had entered a phase of uncertainty following the campaign in the west. In the Far East, on the other hand, the causes of conflict were increasing. Meanwhile Japan began looking to the south; i.e., to a front against Great Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands. Hence Japan wished to reestablish relations in the intelligence field but with reference to the countries just mentioned. For this Oshima was the suitable person.
On the other hand, Hitler had begun his encirclement of the Soviet Union and needed Japan to complete his ring. In the Wilhelmstrasse a desire for strengthened relations was manifest. They remembered Oshima and thought he would be the right man. Kurusu was recalled in February 1941 and Oshima appeared again in Berlin. Late in March Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, appeared and walked with Keitel and Ribbentrop along the front of the Guard Company before the Anhalt Station. Matsuoka's reception was pompous and was intended to emphasize Germany's military strength.

But the results of the negotiations were not "binding". Contradictory purposes were too apparent. However, this did not prevent each party from pursuing its course and entertaining hope of attaining its goal.

Cooperation in the field of intelligence was quickly re-established but in the main covered only the Soviet Union. Oshima's interest meanwhile had turned in a different direction.

The moment was favorable; various British cryptographic systems had been deciphered in Berlin. Feller's telegrams were already being read*. Some other American systems had been solved. The naval cryptanalytic service had secured a good idea of the radio systems and cryptographic systems of the British navy. The Poles were supplying excellent information regarding the situation in England and elsewhere. Thus Oshima found the ground well prepared and

* See: "Rommel up to El Alamein", page 153.
reestablished his connections. In his new dwelling he soon
saw the old circle of acquaintances about him.

On 22 July 1941 Hitler opened the struggle against the
Soviet Union. At first all went according to plan but from
August on the situation began to grow more serious.

Oshima was invited to the eastern front and shown the
most impressive points. This did not help; Japan's goal lay
in another direction. Beginning in September Hitler became
ever more anxious for Japan to enter the war on Germany's
side. Oshima let it be known that the British and American
ciphers would be of great value to Japan. They smiled at
one another, talked about Japanese art and European technology,
of the Order of the Chrysanthemum, of the submarine war — and
waited.

In Eastern Europe the picture was growing less pretty from
day to day. To wait, you need time, and in Hitler's case time
was getting short. He had to use this chance while the myth
of the power of the German armed forces was not yet shaken.
Today his credit was unlimited, but no one could tell how it
would be in six months.

When it became clear that Japan did not intend under any
circumstances to enter the war against the Soviet Union but was
looking for a front in another direction, they intimated to
Oshima that they were ready to give Japan the solved American
and British ciphers and to collaborate in this field in case
Japan's declaration of war against the two countries followed at once.

Oshima telegraphed to Tokyo. The telegrams were long and there were many of them. They were intercepted by the German intercept station, deciphered by OKW, and translated in the Foreign Office. What Oshima radioed was known. Also what he received by radio. The message indicators were:

KOSHI and GAJMUDAJIN.

Moreover, telegrams with the address RIKUGUN TOKYO were not to be despised. Hence it was known how and where to apply pressure.

Day and night before Oshima's eyes dangled the bait of the solved ciphers as well as the possibilities of listening in on the radio conversations between Churchill and Roosevelt. "Now or never!", said the Germans, but Oshima said: "First the ciphers! Complete cooperation in the field of cryptanalysis! Declaration of war by Germany and Italy against the United States within a week after the beginning of hostilities in the Pacific!"

It was a hard deal. But it came about. On Germany's part, challenges now began. On 17 October the American destroyer "Kearny" was torpedoed in the Atlantic, shortly after the American destroyer "Greer" had been attacked. On 1 November Hitler's Headquarters issued a sharp official statement referring to a speech by Roosevelt. Goebbels let loose a wild press campaign against Roosevelt. The articles in German papers from 1 November on can only be evaluated
correctly in connection with the intention to worsen a situation and to spur Japan to attack.

Further incidents followed. On 9 November Hitler delivered a flaming speech in which he violently attacked Roosevelt, Willkie, and the United States. German submarines were ordered to display the utmost activity. Japan was to have a good impression. The British carrier "Ark Royal" and the battleship "Malaya" were torpedoed. Collaboration in the field of cryptanalysis got under way. The prerequisite exchange of "information" for the struggle was already established.

On 7 December followed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
The first phase of Adolph Hitler's Campaign in the East was at an end. The world held its breath and listened attentively. We, too, will pause briefly in our description of the campaign and listen attentively to other things which will be mentioned here for the first time.

Later we shall show in connected fashion the manner in which, and the extent to which, the radio agents, who appeared for the first time during World War II, decisively influenced the entire course of the unhappy struggle. At this point we shall merely anticipate by saying that the Soviet Union, recognizing what was to come, began promptly to span all Europe with a network of agents in order to get current reports on military, political, and industrial situations in Western Europe in the event of possible military complications.

These agents were equipped with radio apparatus so that they might pass their reports to Moscow as safely and quickly as possible. One such agent center had been organized in the summer of 1941 in Switzerland. This network, which spread from Switzerland to Germany, had three radio stations, all located in Swiss territory. The traffic was soon spotted and monitored currently by the German intercept service but for a long time it was not possible to decipher the radiograms. This radio net was called the "Rote Drei".
We shall have a great deal to say about the "Rote Drei." Here we shall merely tell how this set-up worked during the early days of the Russian campaign.

Naturally some time elapsed before this espionage service got established. The first messages were intercepted in September 1941 and they had numbers running from 200 up; i.e., the first 200 radio-grams escaped the German intercept service. Probably this organization began to function immediately after 22 June 1941.

While the German troops were storming forward in the east and special reports of their victories were being broadcast, in Switzerland (and in other countries) an intensive Russian espionage activity began. Day by day radiograms went to Moscow and supplied the intelligence section of the Russian General Staff with the basis for conducting its operations. It was an invisible struggle that was developing here.

Typical examples of the messages which were to undermine the efforts of the German High Command were these messages from Switzerland to Russia, which were not deciphered until too late.

According to a High German Officer in Brittany, 30 divisions are being transferred from the West to the East Front.

From Chinese diplomatic circles:
1. 400,000 Germans are holding strategic points in Italy as guarantee against a separate peace by Italy.
   Feeling in Italy increasingly anti-German.
2. Germany willing that Finland conclude a separate peace after occupying Leningrad since this would shorten the German front and ease supply and transportation.

Description of an anti-aircraft cannon.

Immediate aim of the Germans is to cut communications of U.S.S.R. with Anglo-Saxons by taking Murmansk.

Swiss Military Attaché in Italy reports increasing tension between Italian Army and Fascist Party.

From Domei representatives in Berlin:
Opinion spreading in high officer circles that, due to failure of Blitzkrieg, German victory is impossible and all Europe will be Bolshevised, unless peace is concluded with England.

Formulae for new German poisons.

Hitler’s order based on capture of Leningrad and Odessa by 15 September. All information of Swiss General Staff comes from a German Officer located at OKW. Shall call intelligence section of Swiss General Staff "Luise".
Germans concentrating troops between Munich and Brenner because of possibility of upheaval in Italy. Italians continue fortification of northern frontier.

Via Long from Luise from OKW.

1. Due to losses most German divisions on the eastern front have lost homogeneity. Along with people completely trained they have men with four to six months training and less.

2. Leading generals in OKW now count on 30 months duration of the war after which compromise peace possible.

1. Tanks of propaganda companies in Brjansk awaiting entry into Moscow first was set for 14 then for 20 October.

2. On 17 October arrangements for possible long siege of Moscow. Heavy coastal and naval artillery under way for days from Königsberg and Breslau. German press forbidden to write about conquest of Moscow.

From Berlin from Luise.

New attack on Moscow not result of strategic decision but due to discontent in army because since 22 June no new goals have been attained. Plan 1 Ural, Plan 2 Archangel-Astrakhan, Plan 3 Caucasus, abandoned because of Soviet resistance. Supply suffers most through these changes of plans.
1. Stock of German Aircraft now 22,000 machines of first and second line, also 6,000 - 6500 Ju 52 transport planes.

2. At present 10 - 12 dive bombers built daily in Germany.

3. Bomber units formerly in Crete being transferred to the East: part to Crimea, rest distributed over remaining front.

4. Number of planes lost on east front averaged 45 daily from 22 June till end of September.

5. New Messerschmitt ground attack plane has two cannon and two machine guns. All four mounted laterally on wings. Speed 600 km per hour.

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Germans threw all they had into struggle for Moscow and Crimea. Drill grounds and barracks in Germany almost entirely empty.

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High officers of German occupation in Paris estimate duration of war at two more years and expect defeat of Germany ... German people weary of war and resigned. Masses still believe in final victory but intellectuals and high military circles skeptical regarding outcome in east. Hitler’s death or defeat at front would mean end of Nazi rule by military dictatorship.

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Victories on east front cost elite of German army. Russian tanks often superior. Lithuanians and Esthonians convinced Soviets are coming back.

Generals, General Staff men, and Goering no longer consider German military victory possible. More than 12 tank divisions destroyed by end of October. Men weary, officer corps shows signs of discouragement.
WHERE DID THE RUSSIANS GET THEIR INFORMATION?

No one can tell today whether, when, and to what extent the Russians may someday release the archives of the Information Section of the General Staff of the Red Army and let the public know some of the things contained therein: This would doubtless bring to light many things of which no one dreams today.

If, in what follows, I venture some observations on the subject of the Russian information service, I am well aware that I can offer no proof and that what follows is only my personal opinion. This opinion is based upon more than 25 years of experience. If I now speak of things for which I cannot produce documentary proof, this is not a flight of fancy but the result of deductions from many symptoms which, taken collectively, forced me to these conclusions.

From the spring of 1942 on, it could be observed that the Russians were increasingly well informed about the German order of battle, strength, equipment, armaments, communications, and supply. Not only that, they were in most cases informed of German operational plans and preparations. This was much more serious.

Undoubtedly part of this knowledge was to be explained by the activity of partisans behind the German lines. Certainly the Russians had obtained much information from the statements of deserters and from captured soldiers and officers as well.
as from papers found on the latter. Certainly they learned a great deal through the activity of individual spies in areas occupied by German troops. Air reconnaissance also supplied much trustworthy information regarding enemy situations, troop concentrations, movements and the like. Added to this were the front reports of German propaganda companies, whose radio transmissions often afforded the enemy valuable hints. All these taken together gave the Russians very useful and enlightening material. Nevertheless, these do not by any means account for all the knowledge the Russians had of German operational intentions, plans, and preparations. They do not account for Russian knowledge of details of the German situation which were top secret and not always known even to high officers. When - very much later - it was positively established from deciphering radiograms of Polish agents that the Russians had knowledge of many German operational plans, the opinion arose in Germany that there must be a traitor at Hitler's Headquarters who was sending current information to the Russians. The cry of treason was often raised later on, especially in the east.

I do not believe that this was true to the extent and in the form generally assumed, but this question will be examined somewhat more closely later on. As for myself, I have no doubt that the Russians drew a very essential part of their information from their intercept service; i.e., from the interception and decipherment of German messages sent by radio and by wire.
I do not know when they succeeded in breaking into the German cryptographic systems. In my estimation, they were able by early March 1942 to read currently at least one or two of the cryptographic systems used by the German High Command. That put them in a position to recognize all details of the German initial assembly in the Kharkov area and the underlying operational ideas. For there is no doubt that they knew all this long before the beginning of the fighting. And it testifies to their confidence in the strength and striking power of the Red Army - this army which Hitler was supposed to have broken long before - that as soon as they knew of German intentions and preparations, they decided to undertake a strong concentration of troops in the opposite area and to strike the German assemblies with great force.

The "Kharkov case", which will be clarified later in another way, was not an isolated one. There were numerous indications that the Russians on all sectors of the front were well informed regarding the situation on the German side. I have already said that my view of this matter rests on the symptoms observed and deductions therefrom. I might illustrate this general statement by an example.

The cipher machine had been introduced by the German army for radio traffic about 1927. After years of work the so-called "Enigma" was developed, a cipher machine which was operated like a typewriter and automatically transformed plain text into cipher text by a system of...
wheels, ring settings, and pluggings. By changing the wheel order, the ring setting, and the plugging, a vast number of variations could be introduced into the cipher text and the key could be changed daily. In the view of the cryptanalytic experts, messages enciphered with the "Enigma" could not be deciphered by unauthorized parties and were therefore secure against foreign intercept services.

Some experts of the German intercept service had warned from the very beginning against attributing excessive significance to this machine, since it would suffice if the enemy reconstructed a considerable number of the machines - which was possible at any time - and then typed off in a purely mechanical manner the various possibilities - which could be done very rapidly. With one machine it would be possible to test four variations in a minute; i.e., 5,500 to 6,000 possibilities in 24 hours. By using a greater number of machines this total could be increased correspondingly.

When Czechoslovakia was occupied by German troops, evidence was found in Prague that the Czechs had deciphered messages enciphered with the "Enigma". How this was done remained unknown. But this proved that unauthorized decipherment of Enigma messages was possible. One of the German cryptanalytic experts then undertook to check the machine and found that solution was possible given a minimum of 25 messages enciphered with the same setting of the machine. Now it is quite easy to
find 25 messages in 24 hours, consequently foreign cryptanalytic services had a good chance of reading enciphered German army traffic. The "Enigma" was then altered somewhat by increasing the number of wheels from three to five, whereupon the cryptanalytic experts in Berlin declared that henceforth messages enciphered with this machine would be secure.

Years passed. The Second World War brought Germany three years of great victories and two years of equally great defeats and reverses. During all this time the German military staffs had worked to their heart's content with the Enigma. And hundreds of thousands of radiograms had been shot out into space. Then in the spring of 1944 the following happened:

A German office in France inquired via Paris of the cryptanalytic unit of OKW in Berlin whether messages on a Polish agent network with a certain characteristic were being deciphered and read. Due to some disturbance of the teletype network, the answer was sent by radio; it was affirmative and was enciphered by the daily key of the "Enigma". Before 24 hours had elapsed the Polish cipher ceased to be used.

Someone may object that there might have been intentional or careless betrayal on the part of the German military office in France and that the content of the Berlin answer was revealed to the enemy after it had been deciphered at the office to which it was addressed. Of course this is a possibility. However, I consider it unlikely. I am convinced that the
messages enciphered by this "Enigma" were currently deciphered and read by both the English and Russian cryptanalytic services.

In spite of this obvious warning, nothing changed in Germany. Any idea of doing away with the "Enigma" met immediately with resolute opposition. In the competent offices there was no longer the vigor or the possibility of carrying out the long chain of measures and changes which would result from abolishing the "Enigma." Total mobilization resulted not in the total utilization of our material and spiritual forces but in their exhaustion. Hence even in this field its results were negative. Here, too, people did what they had learned and practiced for years; they strewed sand in their own and in each others eyes so as not to see things as they really were.

I said earlier that I was not in a position to offer proofs; this applies simply to the question whether the Russians could or could not decipher German cryptographic systems. I can readily offer proof that they were well informed in other ways regarding events on the German side. This has already been done in the brief description of the work of the "Rote Drei." Now a second case of the kind.
THE OTWOCK CASE

In anticipation of the danger which threatened, the Russians some time before the beginning of open warfare had built up an information service in the so-called Gouvernement General. It must have been shortly after the Hess affair when, one starlit night in spring, two men parachuted from a Russian plane. It was in the area south of Warsaw. Both men were Poles, former Polish officers who had been captured during the Russo-Polish War of 1939. They had been won over by the Russians and trained for espionage. They were Captain Arcyszewski and Reserve Lieutenant Meyer. They had been equipped with an agent radio set and told to spy out all transport traffic on the railways in the area occupied by the Germans and to report their findings to Moscow. That was a tremendous task which presupposed the setting up of a gigantic organization. For this task they were furnished the sum of $2,000.

With this "operating capital" the two men went to work. Their activities could never have been of great extent, had it not been certain from the very beginning that they could count on the ready cooperation of almost the entire Polish population.

They began their work in Warsaw. The transmitter was set up in a little town called Otwock, south of Warsaw.

Arcyszewski undertook the organization of the spy net while Meyer composed the messages, enciphered them, and transmitted them to Moscow.
By months of tedious effort, Arcyszewski succeeded in spinning a gigantic spider web of purveyors of information over the entire "Gouvernement General" and the occupied Russian territories - since the war with Russia had meanwhile begun and German troops had quickly occupied extensive areas in the East.

Soon the two began to transmit their reports to the Moscow control station; these were rather scanty at first but became richer from week to week.

Somewhere around Christmas 1941 or early in January 1942, the network of informers had been so expanded that it reached from the Baltic almost to the Black Sea, from Breslau to Orel and Kursk. In the director's office of each railway, at every junction point, at every relatively large station, sat an agent who reported to Arcyszewski in an especially secure manner everything having to do with transportation.

Every report on train delay, sabotage of railway installations, trains cancelled, the work of partisans, and the like went to Arcyszewski.

The terrible winter of 1941-1942 was drawing to a close. German preparations for a decisive summer offensive in 1942 were getting under way. Transports of troops, arms, ammunition, tanks, motor vehicles, motor fuel, etc., began to roll from West to East, and reports began to come from all sides to Arcyszewski who sent them to Moscow via Meyer. Every transport was reported in this way with a precise statement of what it contained, with course and destination, with strength and number of unit contingents, with a statement of the number and type of arms, tanks, etc.
About September 1941 the German radio monitoring service first noticed the transmitter in Otwock without being able to locate it definitely. Meyer worked very cleverly so that the coverage could only be imperfect. The cipher used was so good that it defied all efforts to break it. Since the German intercept service was monitoring several dozen such transmitters currently and had no idea of the dangerous character of this Otwock station, this traffic did not receive the attention it really merited. Furthermore, the strength of the German "Radio Defense" in the East was slight and in the main was limited to the organs of the German police.

Not until June 1942 was it possible to pick up the station in Otwock and to arrest the two men, along with a number of other persons. All the keys were found and the Germans could finally decipher the previously intercepted messages.

And now for the first time a light dawned on German "radio defense". Now they saw that here they had been dealing with men of consequence, with an organization which had functioned in a manner calculated to bring destruction to the German armed forces. All for $2,000 in the course of one brief year!

It was now necessary to decipher almost 500 radiograms - a long, wearisome task. When it was finished, the content - entered on a chart - gave a complete picture of the assembly
of the German and allied armies for the great summer offensive. The Russian General Staff had an easy time making its dispositions, and the thrust against the German assembly area near Kharkov could not fail to have far reaching consequences. It did!

But what happened on the German side? Was the attention of the German command called energetically to the full magnitude of the danger threatening the armed forces from radio agents? Was the German command shown clearly that there were dozens of these transmitters which must be combatted by all available means? Was a mighty organization set up to take up the struggle with these radio agents? Did any expert of the German "radio defense" appear at Hitler's Headquarters to deliver a lecture on the Otwock case and, on the strength of this example, to draw the obvious conclusions? Nothing of the sort. The man who worked on the case composed a report to be presented to the Führer. It was regarded there as "too long-winded" and returned because "the Führer is not fond of long reports". A shorter report was composed, but now the anxious question arose: "What will the Führer say to this?" This was a dud, and the Führer "didn't like duds". No one found the courage to present the case with the appropriate emphasis. They were afraid. Moreover, the drama of Stalingrad was now appearing on the stage.

The report wound up in some safe or "in channels". The agents' game continued.
A WORD REGARDING THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The organization of the Russian strategic intelligence service in World War II was, in general, known in Germany, although many details of its work escaped the German intelligence service. In my opinion, it was burdened with a minimum of bureaucratic and formal restrictions. It must have worked with an uncanny precision to meet the needs of the Russian military command. Beyond that, I must pay the Russians a compliment; in this war, Russia was the only country whose cryptographic systems remained practically unbreakable throughout, although first-rate experts in other countries were attempting their solution. In particular, the cryptographic systems of the higher military commands and those for diplomatic traffic remained for foreign cryptographic bureaus a "book with seven seals". Of course, the systems were recognized, but solution proved out of the question. After years of vain effort, the copying of Russian diplomatic traffic was stopped in Germany. Exaggerated as it may sound to outsiders, I would like to venture an assertion; Russia lost World War I in the ether and won World War II in the ether. By this I do not by any means intend to belittle the importance of its people's war, its armaments, the capacity of its officers and the death defying courage of its soldiers.
We can summarize as follows:

1. In the spring of 1942 the Russians knew the German operational plan for the thrust toward the Volga and the Caucasus.

2. They knew the exact area of initial assembly of the troops destined for these operations.

3. They knew the numerical strength and the table of organization of the German and allied armies involved.

4. Long before the battle of Kharkov they knew the numbers of all the German and allied divisions which were to take part in the operation.

5. They knew the names of all the higher unit commanders.

6. They knew the precise number of tanks, guns and planes available on the German side.

7. They knew the attack plans of all armies employed on the German side in the great summer offensive.
WHO WERE THE "RADIO AGENTS"

Espionage has always played a great role in wartime. The difficulty in carrying it on successfully lay less in the procurement of information than in passing the information in good season to the military or political leaders of the country involved. The best reconnaissance results were worthless unless they reached the interested parties at a time when effective countermeasures could still be planned, instituted and carried out, or when it was even possible to plan an operation on the basis of the information gained regarding the enemy situation. Since a country tries in wartime to secure its frontiers in all directions against leakage of information of a military, political or economic nature, or at least greatly to delay the exploitation of such information, a major part of the intelligence work of foreign agents in earlier wars was in vain; their reports generally reached the enemy command much too late. In the long run, only a fraction of the work was of any real value. Thus literally as well as figuratively, narrow limits were imposed on the activities of spies. This problem could only be solved if it were possible to find a means of transmitting the information obtained in a way which would break down all barriers and bring the report speedily from the sender to the recipient.

The invention of radio telegraphy did not at first signify a solution of this problem. The long-wave apparatus used was far too big to be operated inconspicuously in living rooms and
the like; furthermore, it was easily spotted by direction finders and consequently exposed to the risk of being quickly discovered. Consequently, this manner of communication virtually did not come into account for spies during World War I. Not until the discovery of radio telegraphy on short-wave and the construction of small portable transmitters and receivers were the conditions created for a complete revolution in the field of practical espionage. Now it was possible to equip the agents with easily operated, easily transported, and easily concealed radio sets for transmitting their reports and for receiving instructions, or they could be assigned special operators.

The Soviet Union, Germany, and England were the first countries to prepare for the employment of such agents, even before World War II, and to put this system into practice to some degree. For purely military reconnaissance Germany was the first country to commit radio agents, first in the Polish campaign and then - on a much larger scale - in the campaign in the west.

When describing the campaign in the west, only a few words were devoted to the radio agents. In reality, they represented one of the main factors in the German intelligence service. Everything that the intercept service could not supply was reported at that time by radio agents dropped from German planes in the French rear areas. They were committed by the dozens and gave a very good account of themselves.
We must deem it a remarkable phenomenon that in the course of World War II Germany employed means and methods of warfare which later were employed with all their weight against their originator. Germany taught its opponents those methods of conducting a war which led to its own defeat. Germany invented bombing warfare and was itself laid in ruins by it. Germany invented motorized warfare and it became fateful for Germany. Germany discovered atomic energy and in the final phase of the war this was turned with annihilating effect against its strongest ally. Germany was the first to make use of radio agents and they laid the foundation for its military defeat.

Following the German model, the British, Poles, Russians, and Americans introduced radio agents on a large scale and increased their commitment to such an extent that their activity attained a significance of the first order. The German "Radio Defense", which was supposed to concern itself with combatting these agents, faced during the entire war a gigantic task, the complete solution of which would have called for many times the personnel and means that were actually made available.

Slowly but irresistibly during the course of World War II the network of agent radio stations expanded over all Europe. It began in Poland and France. It extended into Belgium, Holland, and the Balkans. Wherever a German soldier was
stationed, everywhere he was surrounded by this invisible, intangible net in the ether.

Everything he did or failed to do, everything connected with his life and work in occupied territory, was constantly watched and reported on by hundreds, thousands – yes, hundreds of thousands – of spies, agents or confidence men.

No troop movement, no transport of arms or ammunition, no construction of fortifications escaped these watchful eyes and ears. Everywhere the German soldier was watched and eavesdropped. And everywhere – often in the house in which he lived – stood those little short-wave sets by means of which these observations were passed on. But the German soldier noticed nothing of all that. He went through the streets unaware that he was ensnared in an enormous spider web – a vast network of invisible, fine, unbreakable threads. Only a very small group knew about all this and watched the efforts in the ether.

The radio traffic of the Russian partisans was especially lively. It was also developed with great skill and became so extensive that hundreds of German soldiers, organized into monitoring platoons or companies, were busy day and night trying to get a clear impression of the constantly changing picture.

The cryptographic systems used by the Poles were very good; those of the Russians were excellent. Messages of the Polish network could frequently be read by the Germans, but by no means
always. Of course, even the best operator sometimes made a mistake; it was merely a question of watching patiently for this mistake. Generally it came. Then it was possible to fix locations, establish identifications and break into cryptographic systems.

In general, it was a hopeless fight against the agent radios, since for each transmitter which was seized and for every operator who was arrested a new one appeared at a new location, with new characteristics and with a new cryptographic system.
THE GERMAN "RADIO DEFENSE"

Long before World War II, people in most European countries were convinced that in a future war the battle in the dark between the espionage service and kindred organizations on the one hand and the intercept service on the other - in this case, therefore, a battle in the ether - would assume gigantic proportions. It was clear that this struggle would not be simple and that it was necessary to create in good season an organization which would occupy itself with spotting and evaluating espionage traffic in order to bring the results to the knowledge of one's own command.

Actually nothing much was done until the outbreak of World War II. Only in the Soviet Union was some attention given to the matter and an attempt made to gather experience which might serve in the event of war for the development of a large organization to combat radio agents.

The Germans should have had special reason to occupy themselves with this problem and - in a purely theoretical way - they did. But since armament and the preparation for war went ahead at too rapid a pace and the German intercept service was weakened rather than strengthened by the constant transfer of trained men, this preliminary organization did not even come into being before the war.
I said above that there was special reason for Germany to occupy itself with such matters; I shall add some details.

Long before the war, the German counterintelligence service (Abwehrdienst) had set up abroad a network of radio stations (the so-called A-net), which was to be used by German agents for transmitting intelligence in the event of war. At various points in Germany control radio stations had been set up to handle traffic with the agents. Before the war this traffic was limited to occasional tests of transmission and reception, lest the network be unmasked prematurely. Moreover, in peacetime there was always some other way of getting a report to Germany speedily. The A-nets had been set up in Czecholovakia, in Poland, and in France. To what extent they may have been organized in other countries is not known to me.

Along with this A-net a so-called J-net had been prepared, which was located within the country and was to function if certain parts of German territory were occupied by an enemy. In that case the J-net would start transmitting reports and have a function similar to that of an A-net.

The rapid advance of the German forces in World War II soon left the A-nets behind, whereas the foreign equivalent of the J-net in the territory occupied was now behind the German lines. Thus the occupation of great areas brought foreign radio agents into German controlled territory and the further the German lines
advanced, the more foreign spies came into the zone of occupation. They were able to work under favorable conditions, since the attitude of the population in the occupied areas was consistently anti-German and every agent found aid and support whenever he needed it.

It was not until vast areas had been occupied that it occurred to those in authority in Germany that other countries might have built up organizations similar to the A-nets or J-nets. Now the agency which directed the German networks was charged with finding out how to detect and combat such enemy organizations. The so-called "Radio Defense" was created. The only organizations available at that time were the radio monitoring stations of the police, which had been responsible for watching illegal amateurs. These monitoring stations were now obliged to shift to a new field. Meanwhile people on the other side had not been asleep. The little networks organized before the war were now located within the German sphere of influence and were strengthened in every possible way. New agents with their sets were either smuggled through the lines or dropped by parachute so that little by little a very considerable number of radio agents had been introduced who were able to go about their work without worry. On the other hand "Radio Defense" faced an assignment which grew from day to day, while its resources did not suffice to cope with the situation or to gain adequate experience. As more and more territory was occupied,
the frequency band to be monitored grew wider and wider and the number of radio agents at work became greater and greater. The year 1940 saw no notable successes and not until the end of that year was an army intercept company assigned to "Radio Defense". This company had to be entirely re-trained. When committed in the west it soon found that the task assigned was far greater than had been expected. Finally two more intercept companies were assigned to "Radio Defense" which also set up an evaluation system of its own. Direction finding bases of the Navy were placed at its disposal.

By the time "Radio Defense" began to work effectively, i.e., in the summer of 1941, the British had 25 recognized circuits in the west running as far north as Norway; there was a widely ramified agent network in Western Poland which was controlled from England; in the "Protectorate" (Bohemia and Moravia) an extensive net of the Russian intelligence service was functioning, while another Russian net covering all Europe had more than 20 stations in May 1941 and 78 stations in June. This Russian network had been built up before the war but had been kept absolutely concealed by radio silence.

Some idea of the problem can be gained from the fact that in the Soviet Union alone from June 1941 to June 1944 some 120,000 agents, including some 30,000 operators, were trained for use in German territory. About one-third of those committed succeeded in carrying on their work for a longer or shorter
period. The Western powers made no such mass employment but in general the intelligence and quality of the agents employed was higher, hence the danger was greater.
LOCATING AGENT STATIONS

A basic requirement in combating agent transmitters was the location of these stations by direction finders. For technical and tactical reasons this broke down into:

a. Long-range direction finding,
b. Close-range direction finding,
c. Work in the immediate vicinity of the target.

First of all, the German long-range direction-finding set-up had to be changed to correspond to the new situation. A network of long-range direction-finders was located far beyond the German frontier, then these stations were placed under coordinated control in order to get synchronized systematic readings on the same transmitter by as many long-range direction-finders as possible so as to get dependable fixes.

In October 1943 the following short-wave D/F - bases were available to "Radio Defense":

1. For the west: Middlekirk, Wilhelmshafen, Hannover, Langenargen, Bodensee, Bordeaux
   (Partly controlled from Giessen).
2. For the east: Reval, Lemberg, Nikolajev, Pillau,
   (Controlled from Crans).
3. For south and southeast: Pulsnitz, Varna, Athens
   (Radio controlled from Pulsnitz).

In February 1943 instruments in Rome, on Sicily, and on Sardinia were added to this system.
For close-range work conditions were as follows: close-range D/F apparatus for fixing the ground-wave had been developed long before the war and sets had been constructed which were suitable for use in the field. After the search for enemy agents began in the west in the fall of 1940, the first such transmitter was located in Antwerp in April 1941. This was accomplished after the area in which the transmitter must be located had been determined by long-range direction-finding.

Even in this first case, it was manifest that the close-range direction-finders must be of such a nature that the operator could approach the location of the transmitter unnoticed. Consequently even then it was only possible to pick up the transmitter by using a special suitcase set which was operated by a man dressed as a locksmith. With this device he narrowed the choice down to a few houses.

In the immediate vicinity, the work was more difficult because the agents usually had watchers posted. The problem was not solved until early in 1943 when a belt D/F set was developed which could be worn under the operator's clothing.

The use of Fieseler-Storch planes as "flying close-range direction-finders" dates from the summer of 1941. The first experiments began in May while the first successful commitments began in September. In April 1942 three machines were used and the number was later increased to 12.
Despite all the successes of German "Radio Defense" and despite all the stations picked up, the number of hostile agent circuits in the German sphere of influence increased constantly. The means and personnel of the German "Radio Defense" during the war were in no wise commensurate with the magnitude and importance of the task; they remained totally inadequate, quite apart from the fact that they were not employed effectively until much too late.
"RADIO GAMES"

Picking up an agent's transmitter often afforded the German intelligence service a chance to enter actively into the network of foreign espionage. The first requirement was that the raid be a surprise and that all written material fall into the hands of the raiders; traffic schedules and cryptographic materials were absolutely necessary for further operation of the captured transmitter.

A second requirement was that no member of the agent group should escape and warn the enemy. If both conditions were fulfilled and it seemed worth while to attempt a radio deception - a so-called "radio game" - permission was secured from the competent agencies and the deceptive traffic was carried on by personnel of "Radio Defense".

There were two motives involved: in the first place, the enemy might be led to believe that its agent network was functioning normally in the area in question; this was a safeguard against the setting up of other agent networks. On the other hand, it might be possible to mislead the enemy with false or falsified information to disguise the actual situation. Reports on the strength, movement and assignment of troops, on arms, fortifications, transportation matters, morale, intended military measures, war production and economic matters (in cooperation with the competent authorities of the economic command) could be imparted to the enemy in a way
calculated to give the desired impression.

Carrying on such "radio games" called for great skill and perfect adaptation to the system of reporting hitherto employed by the agents. In composing messages it was necessary to follow precisely the wording previously employed. Linguistic usage in general and the use of particular expressions, technical words, and designations must not show the slightest change. A single expression used falsely could jeopardize the success of the entire "radio game".

Sometimes it was possible to "convert" the agent and get him into the game. Without doubt this was the best solution but it assumed that no secret signal had been arranged between the agent and his employer to indicate that he was working under compulsion. The possibilities varied widely and so did the results. In some cases it was possible to deceive the opponent for years and thus avert serious damage to one's own side; in other cases the success was of short duration; sometimes the opponent quickly recognized the deceit and either broke off communication at once or else played along for a time to delude us into thinking the deception was successful, while he was quietly building up a new network of agents which would have to be tracked down by "Radio Defense".

The first German deception was carried out in March 1941. The transmitter LOM, which had been picked up in southern Belgium, was continued in operation with German personnel and captured material. The game worked. The English control station announced the dispatch of additional agents who were to land by parachute...

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—RESTRICTED—
in the night of 9 - 10 May in the vicinity of Liege. They were promptly apprehended; their radio equipment with all documentary material and keys was secured.

Dozens of these "radio games" were carried on by all parties during World War II. One of the most grandiose was the "North Pole Case" which will be described at length later. At this point we shall give only a little example from the last phase of the war.

At a time which was very critical for the German military situation, an effective deception was carried out successfully in the East. On 14 August 1944 the German police in Riga arrested the Russian agent, Lieutenant Jakushov, and his wife who was acting as his radio operator. After tedious "interrogations" the two were finally induced by the Germans to make frank statements, whereupon traffic was resumed again by the Germans on 20 August. In the course of two months a large number of false, but apparently very important reports were transmitted which made such a great impression that Lieutenant Jakushov received by radio the "Bogdan-Chmielnizki Order, Class II" while his wife received a "state decoration".
THE "ROTE KAPELLE CASE"

Let us state at the outset that this case has nothing to do with a religious chapel. Neither was such a chapel used for setting up an agent’s transmitter nor were clergy involved. The designation resulted from a whim of German officials in Belgium who applied to every case of radio agents the general term "Kapelle"* and gave each individual case a particular designation. Thus there arose in the course of time a "Schrammel-Kapelle", a "Zither-Kapelle" a "Elas-Kapelle", an "Ardennen-Kapelle", a "Kapelle-Etterbeck" and one day a "Rote Kapelle", where the color referred to Bolshevism, since this "Case" had been controlled by and worked for Moscow. The story was as follows:

Even before the outbreak of the German-Russian war in 1941, the Russians had set up a network of agents which expanded over all Central and Western Europe. It was intended for espionage and was to become effective in a large way only in the event of an armed conflict. When the war with Russia broke out, this agent radio net was by no means completely developed and thoroughly organized. Only individual portions were so well organized that they were fully capable of functioning.

Among others, the Russians had set up such a center for radio agents in Brussels. The head of this spy center had become a partner in a large Belgian commercial enterprise and

* Kapelle also means orchestra, hence a group which works together! [Ed.]
thus had provided himself an opportunity for making extensive journeys without attracting attention and of establishing contact with many leading personalities. In this way he could gain insight into a number of things and gather information. At first he sent this information to Moscow through Russian diplomatic and commercial representatives. This route, which ran via Berlin, ceased to function shortly before the outbreak of the war between Germany and Russia. They now resorted to radio to transmit to Moscow the results of their spying.

The radio traffic itself was soon intercepted by German stations, for the first time on 26 June. However, it was not possible to solve the cryptographic system and read the contents. Furthermore, it was a long time before the German D/F service was able to fix the station.

Not until November 1941 was it ascertained that the station was certainly in Brussels. Now the close-range search began. On 12 December the transmitter was fixed definitely so that steps could be taken for picking it up. On 13 December it was captured by representatives of the German counterintelligence in Brussels. This was the first transmitter of its type that had been spotted in Western Europe. The villa in which it had been set up and from which it operated had been rented during the summer of 1941 by the Russian espionage service and was cared for by a Belgian housekeeper. The building served not only as the location of the radio station but also as shelter for members of the agent group and as calling point for agents and informers.
At the time of the raid six persons in all were arrested, among them an operator who came in the following day, two Russian officers, and a Polish woman who had come from Paris and served as cipher clerk.

However, this was merely the crew of the radio station; the chief and actual head of the agents was not caught.

Among the material found were some 500 enciphered radio-grams forwarded by this transmitter, hence there was no doubt that the encipherment and decipherment had been done in the house and that the cipher keys must be there somewhere. Until these were found, nothing could be done with the traffic. It was only possible to learn that a grille system was involved which was obviously reenciphered with a so-called book key. As book key, any book may be used by agreement between sender and recipient. From the text an "additive sequence" is derived and decipherment is not possible without having the book used.

With all the egoism and eagerness to advance its own interests that characterize official agencies, the Brussels counterintelligence office declined "for security reasons" any further cooperation with representatives of "Radio Defense" after the transmitter had been picked up. The villa, which had been confiscated momentarily, was released after a short time and six weeks later "Radio Defense" received a final report from which it appeared that those...
arrested had stubbornly refused to make any statements, except
the housekeeper, and that she knew nothing of consequence regard-
ing the organization which had operated there. Attached to the
report were photographic copies of the material found and a
statement that an attempt by the cipher section of OKW to
decipher the radiograms had not proved successful.

These photographs were subjected to a careful check at the
central office of "Radio Defense" and it was discovered that one
of the scraps of paper which had been photographed contained a
so-called "Caesar" key, such as is employed by the Russians for
enciphering plain text. This scrap of paper showed several
rows of the encipherment of the radiogram and this proved that
encipherment had been carried on within the house. Hence the
books used must also be there.

Some notes in secret ink and certain letters contained
hints that the organization had branches in France and Holland.

A study of the groups of the cipher text on the scraps of
paper revealed that the book must have been in the French
language. For the moment this did not help much since only
a knowledge of the entire content of the book would afford a
possibility of current decipherment.

By carefully questioning the Belgian lady who had run the
house it was possible to learn little by little the titles of
eight or nine books which might have been used by the Russian
agents. Now it was a question of getting these nine books. The
only way was to purchase them on the open market, since the villa had meanwhile changed hands and the entire library had disappeared. Even though the titles of the books were now known, there was no guarantee that the proper edition would be found in a book store, i.e., the edition which corresponded exactly in pagination and in text to the one used.

The cryptanalytic section of the central office of "Radio Defense", which meanwhile had become acquainted with all cipher systems hitherto known to have been used by radio agents in the east, attempted to solve this one by analytic methods. A half destroyed sheet used in encipherment was the critical factor. After some six weeks of work the make-up of the additive sequence was learned. On the basis of other agent traffic it was finally possible to turn these digits into letters and the short sentence obtained contained a significant name "Proctor". This name was found in one of the novels which had been procured and thus the key book was revealed and the system was broken.

Now some of the captured radiograms could be deciphered. The addresses of a number of agents were disclosed and an opportunity was opened for penetrating a widely ramified Russian agent network extending over the west and into Germany itself. The deciphered messages proved that "Radio Defense" was on the trail of a very clever man who must have connections in the very highest command, since he
transmitted in November 1941 the intention of the German command to carry out an attack in the Caucasus in the spring of 1942. Furthermore, his reports on gasoline consumption and existing stocks of fuel and planes showed that he must have contact with the Air Ministry or with the High Command of the Air Force. He even transmitted to Moscow the prediction of an impending extremely cold winter which had been made by German astronomers and other experts. He even gave a clear calculation of the time when German fuel reserves would be exhausted.

This principal agent in Brussels, always referred to by the cover name "Kent", was on the road a great deal of the time. Deciphered messages made it possible to follow his journeys to Czechoslovakia and throughout all Germany. Kent received his principal information from an agent designated in the messages by the cover name "Coro". Now it was a question of trailing this source. Chance provided the following opening.

When the war began, the Russian intelligence service had not finished building up its foreign organization. Radio connections from Germany were not functioning. The call signs and the traffic schedules had not been fixed definitely by days but were to change from one transmission to the next, so the transmitters got out of step and could not get adjusted again. This accidental maladjustment was the reason for a radiogram giving the Belgian group the names and addresses of three collaborators in Berlin who were to be instructed to establish radio connections with the Center in Moscow. Of course this went counter to t...
elemental principles of conspiracy and can only be explained by the exigencies of the situation.

Kent came to Berlin to reestablish the contact of the "Coro" group with Moscow. This was late in October or early in November 1941. However, the contact remained inadequate and Coro continued to send most of his material by way of Kent.

The radiogram had mentioned three groups in Berlin. At first nothing could be done with one of the Berlin addresses; more than six months had passed and the dwelling had changed hands. Only after a long search did one get on the right track, but this proved of secondary importance. There was more success with the second address. Here investigation led to a first lieutenant of the Air Force who was employed in the Press and Information Section of the Air Ministry, later in the Attaché Group of this ministry. In civilian life he had been a teacher at the University of Berlin and before 1933 had taken an active part in politics; he had good relations with the Foreign Office and contacts with a large circle of acquaintances and men of similar political belief. He was a man of outstanding intelligence, openly opposed to National Socialism and sympathizing with the ideas of Communism and with the Soviet Union. Through his activity in the Air Ministry he came into contact with most of the higher officers of the department as well as with many other high officials and with industrial plants. This man, a certain Schulze-Boysen, was a relative of the Tirpitz family. Using masterful disguise
he had become the head of a widely ramified German resistance organization which was trying to overthrow National Socialism at any cost. In contrast to other German resistance groups, whose activity was exhausted in preparing plans or in waiting, the Schulze-Boysen group was geared for action both inside and outside the country.

"Coro" or "Schulze-Boysen" - was now watched unobtrusively by the Gestapo, as were his acquaintances and his whole intellectual circle. Among other things it was established that at definite times he met Superior Councillor Dr. Harnack of the Ministry of Economics in the Berlin Tiergarten and openly exchanged information with him. Dr. Harnack later turned out to be one of Coro's most important co-workers. He also appeared in the messages under the name "Arwid" which was actually one of his given names.

Tracing down Schulze-Boysen's circle of acquaintances and checking their connections brought a long sequence of surprises.

For instance, a man, whom we shall call "Z", was head of construction in one department of the Loewe Radio Company. He had long been a convinced Communist and had been in Moscow but had cleverly concealed his attitude. He was a clever technician and was head of the section engaged in developing television, radar and other electronic devices for the Air Ministry. In essence, the principle of radar had long been known but thus
far little had been done to adapt the invention to military purposes. During the war this question had become prominent and such space scanning devices were proving important in detecting approaching enemy aircraft. Bomber warfare was being developed and the recognition of attacking planes at night or in fog had become indispensable, if they were to be combatted successfully. The Loewe Company was supposed to assist in developing and building the apparatus.

Anyone who knows German conditions must realize that the moment German authorities began to concern themselves with these matters there began a busy air of secrecy. Instead of entrusting as many people as possible with the development of this important apparatus and thus achieving a highly successful product, the whole project was cloaked in an utterly superfluous veil of secrecy. There were cover names for everything. The number of participants was kept as small as possible. No one was permitted to talk with anyone else regarding the problem as a whole. The result was that only a small circle of engineers was engaged in the work and the director of this section at the Loewe plant - consequently in virtual control of the progress there - was "Z". The fate of this important invention rested in his hands.

"Z" knew the importance of the task entrusted to him, but at heart he was not merely a Communist but also a bitter foe of National Socialism. He desired its destruction; here was an
opportunity. By sabotaging development of the radar equipment he could keep it from benefitting the National Socialist State, at least for some time.

"Z" had good fellow workmen. Whenever one of these men made any progress on the device, "Z" had the fact reported to the Air Ministry, but he also saw to it that the engineer disappeared from the plant. Either his deferment was cancelled and he went to the front, or he was entrusted with "more important" tasks, or he was merely transferred. The man who replaced him was sure to be more or less a stranger in this field. For almost two years, "Z" managed to sabotage this important work and England and America got a head start, with the result that the German submarine was soon driven from the seas.

For the time being, the Germans hesitated to arrest Coro because they wished to learn as much as possible about his relations with other persons and offices. A remarkable circumstance forced them to strike before the time was ripe.

Readers of detective stories know how strange accidents and complications, obviously dragged in by the hair, serve to clear up or to complicate a situation. And every reader has probably assumed that such accidents can only be invented by an author. I should like to remark that the best author is a bungler at inventing such accidents in comparison to what real life can do.

The cryptanalytic group of the station monitoring agent radio had just been reenforced at that time; among the gentlemen engaged were two students of the University of Berlin whom we shall call "A" and "B".

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There are some 80,000,000 Germans; the cryptanalytic section for monitoring agent radio consisted of some 15 men; these 15 men had been chosen at random. And, sure enough, among them were two who were in contact with Coro! "A" had agreed to go sailing with Coro one Saturday afternoon at Wannsee. At the last moment "A" was detained by his work and tried to inform Coro of the fact. In order to telephone unobserved, he went to the room of another analyst which was then empty because the man had already left. "A" called Coro's number but did not find him at home. He left his name, telephone and extension with the maid, requesting that Coro call him immediately when he came home. This did not happen for Coro had already gone to Wannsee and did not return until Monday. Then he found the urgent note of the maid, which gave the telephone number he was to call but not the name.

The telephone had just been installed and the man who normally occupied the room was none other than the analyst who during the preceding weeks had worked on and deciphered the radiograms picked up in the Brussels station! This was a Dr. "V", who knew about Coro from the messages and also knew that efforts were being made to trap him.

Imagine Dr. "V's" surprise when Coro called him that Monday, saying he had been instructed to call the number
because someone urgently desired to talk with him. This call was interpreted by the authorities to mean that Coro must have gotten wind of something. In reality it was a perfectly harmless coincidence. It was decided to act at once. Coro was arrested. And gradually all those with whom he had been in contact were arrested.

Schulze-Boysen (Coro) was a man of exceptionally high mentality, great initiative and energy, and of such amazing intellect that his collaborators were only slightly disturbed by the arrest; they were convinced that this man would betray nothing and that the Gestapo might easily be convinced of his innocence.

After eight days of grilling they had not gotten anything out of him; he had a credible explanation of everything and maintained his composure and mental alertness so that he never became entangled in contradictions. In spite of the fact that the man was proven guilty by the radio messages, experienced criminologists repeatedly doubted his guilt, especially as he was regarded very favorably by his office and by his comrades. He himself said nothing but some of the others arrested talked out of school.

More than 120 persons now became involved, including a very high official of the "Foreign Office".

Little by little the organization was revealed. There was a gigantic trial ending in the execution of some 60 persons in December 1942. This was a serious blow to the Russian intelligence service. The Germans continued to operate the radio network and were
able to pick up newly dispatched agents on arrival. However, it is a question how far or how long this deceptive traffic was really able to mislead the Russians for at that time the "Rote Drei" was already working at top efficiency. In my opinion, the Russians did not allow themselves to be deceived for very long but then cleverly continued playing the game with Germany in order to give the impression that the trick was a success. Actually they set up unnoticed a new spy net which passed reports to Moscow chiefly through the "Rote Drei".

From those arrested leads were secured regarding the people connected with the third Berlin address. The Germans were able to pick up a second Russian agent station in Breslau, taking it by surprise. Among those arrested was a certain Hermann Wenzel, who had played a role in the burning of the Reichstag. The man was rendered submissive and continued to work under German control and guidance until the summer of 1943 when he escaped by a bold trick. He reappeared in Holland, contacted the British secret service and through London reported to Moscow, but the Russians no longer trusted him.

Meanwhile in June 1942 another transmitter had been picked up in Paris. Nothing much was elicited from the operator and his wife, but it was noted that the messages were composed with the same agent key as those emanating from the Brussels station. This led to further revelations. A special detachment was sent to Brussels to try to penetrate into the Belgian, Dutch, and
French groups. Ultimately five stations were taken by surprise in Belgium and used in radio deception. Nevertheless, it had hitherto been impossible to clear up two matters. The principal agent in Brussels had been able to avoid arrest. No one knew who he was, only his cover name "Kent" was known from the messages. In the second place, it had not been possible to make connections with the Paris group and to penetrate it.

In August 1942 the Germans seized and interrogated very thoroughly an agent who maintained contact between the Dutch and the Belgian group. When cornered, a remark escaped him that he had once been in the dwelling of the principal agent, Kent, which he also pointed out. Investigation revealed that Kent had lived in the dwelling but had fled immediately after the raid on the Brussels radio station. Kent had been active as part owner of the Simex Company in Brussels, a commission house which did business on a very large scale with various representatives of the German armed forces and also of the "Organisation Todt". From here a trail led to a similar business in Paris which was the headquarters of the French group.

Kent had as lady friend the widow of a Hungarian; she and her child lived with him and under no circumstances did he wish to separate himself from this woman. That proved fateful for him. Since his friend was a striking beauty, it was possible to follow his trail and eventually to learn his address in Marseilles.
at that time still unoccupied. Since Kent traveled on a Uruguayan passport, it was necessary to negotiate with the French Government before he was picked up in Marseilles in October 1942.

Although close watch was kept on the Paris firm and although an attempt was made to negotiate big deals through the Organisation Todt, the German agents did not at first succeed in coaxing the cautious head of the French group (cover name Gilbert) out of hiding. Finally they succeeded in arresting several intermediate agents who were picked up so quietly outside of Paris that the firm noticed nothing. In this way they discovered the name of Gilbert's dentist and he was later arrested in the dentist's chair. The arrest of several collaborators followed promptly.

Further investigation showed that the transmitter picked up in June belonged to the Gilbert group of agents and it was learned that this group was in contact with the French Communist Party. Gilbert had arranged to set up four additional radio circuits. Moreover Moscow had sent through a radio key for another important agent with the cover name "Harry". With the aid of the French Communist Party, new operators - two of them Spanish Reds - had been provided for the Gilbert group. The radio schedule for Gilbert had not arrived; however, Gilbert's secretary, who had decoded the radio schedule for "Harry" four weeks earlier, was able to give from memory some information regarding the call signs. It chanced that German monitors had been listening to a Russian transmitter which regularly gave
its calls and waited for an answer. An attempt was made immediately to establish contact with this transmitter, since the German agencies were very anxious to use Gilbert, who was highly regarded in Moscow, in a deceptive game in order to get clues respecting other persons in the Russian intelligence service who might be in territory occupied by Germany. For the moment any attempt to enter into communication with Moscow appeared almost hopeless because the wave lengths on which transmission would be effective were not known; the wave lengths suggested by Gilbert's secretary had proved false. To everyone's surprise, the improbable happened at the second attempt and - to be sure - by pure chance. The Moscow Center, whose calls were monitored, suddenly ordered a change and gave the new wavelength. In such cases the number was usually enciphered but this time it clicked. The agent transmitter used by the Germans was heard in Moscow, whereupon a message was dispatched to Moscow saying that the radio schedule had arrived in garbled condition and requesting a repetition. Even now it was a question whether contact would ever be made again but in the very next traffic period Moscow ordered a new alternate wave, again using plain numbers, whereupon a message was put through with a new schedule for traffic to Moscow and another for traffic via London. Thus the connection was definitely assured.

Now it was possible to work in a new connection for agent Kent who had been arrested. This was very important because the
Germans had to keep the Russians from building up a new secret spy net. By tying their activity to the Gilbert transmitter, northern France was henceforth protected against the Russian intelligence service; the same thing was accomplished in southern France by using the Kent transmitter with German operators.

The reports which now went to Moscow showed Kent - long since in safe custody - to be a man with good connections in France. His outfit included, among other things, a "spy organization" headed by a former Latvian General. This general had been won over by intermediaries and was made to believe that he was working for a French resistance movement. He organized a spy ring directed against Germany without knowing that his work was guided and financed by the Germans. His reports were valuable and interesting because they gave insight into the weaknesses of German security and because they could be used in part to provide the Center in Moscow with credible reports and thus string it along. At the same time the Germans were penetrating further into the organization of the French Communist Party and were learning the goals and reports which were especially important to Moscow. Since Moscow must believe that the Kent organization was still working unchanged, the Germans were keeping the Russians from setting up a new and stronger intelligence group.
This was the time when the German offensive before Stalingrad
and in the foothills of the Caucasus had bogged down hopelessly;
it was the time when it became clear to every rational being that
Germany could not win a military decision. It was just the time
to sound out the political situation so as to lay the foundation
for a tolerable conclusion of the war. It was a favorable moment
for Germany because the German armed forces were still strong and
there were certain frictions between the Soviet Union on the one
hand and England and the U.S.A. on the other.

The captured Kent transmitter offered a wonderful opportunity
to touch cleverly on questions the clarification of which was of
importance to Germany. Under what conditions would the Soviet
Union be ready to enter into negotiations? On which questions
was there antagonism between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Allies?
Did the Soviet Union aim at a penetration of Central and Western
Europe? In view of the character of the Kent organization, it
would have been easy to put such leading questions in an
innocent and unobtrusive manner because Kent had already brought
up and discussed all manner of questions. Certain experts of German
Radio Defense promptly suggested such a course but in Berlin
they had cold feet. They considered the idea original and not
unattractive but they did not have the courage to do anything.
"What would the Führer say if he should find out that we were in
communication with Moscow? He would have us all hanged!" That
was the general attitude. The utter lack of freedom on the part
of the German authorities - even the highest, the pottiness of
their thinking, and their fear of responsibility found expression here.

The "Rote Kapelle Case" - or we might more appropriately say the "Kent Case" - was one of the most interesting cases of the entire war. The principal agents had been quietly introduced and established in the countries concerned long before the war without arousing the slightest suspicion. Through their position as managers of important commercial enterprises they had excellent connections with leading people in industry and trade, with the political parties, and even with the German Armed Forces, so that they could get a wide survey of the entire situation. The principal agent, Gilbert, had exact information regarding the landing of Allied troops in Algeria three weeks before it took place, whereas the Germans were taken completely by surprise.
THE RUSSIAN RADIO AGENT SERVICE TO 1942

The work of Russian radio agents has been adequately described and we shall now review the subject and show the extent of this activity during World War II. Communist Russia was the first country to undertake radio-controlled espionage on a large scale. The story goes back approximately to the year 1931, i.e., to the time when it became clear that National Socialism was gaining ground in Germany and a collision with the Soviet Union entered the realm of possibility. Such a clash might have come sooner or later anyway but it was inevitable if National Socialism seized power. Watchfulness was necessary. Therefore the Soviet Union began setting up a widespread short-wave radio network with the control station in Moscow and a dozen subordinate stations distributed all over Europe. At that time the German intercept service failed to get any insight into the content of the messages exchanged; it was assumed in Germany that this was a control net created by the Communist Internationale to guide Communist propaganda throughout the world. How mistaken this was became apparent only when German radio defense was able to get extensive insight into the work of the Russian intelligence service.

It turned out that the "Comintern Net" - really a network of the Russian intelligence service - constituted only a very small portion of the Russian spy net. The net of agent stations, which had been established all over Europe but had remained
silent until the war began, was much greater and now appeared in an all the more dangerous form. The number of agent stations in Europe increased very sharply in 1940 and by May 1941 some 25 Russian stations were heard. By June 1941 there were 78 circuits in the Russian "WNA" Net, as the Germans called it, after the call sign of the control station in Moscow. Just before the outbreak of the German-Russian War the exchange of telegrams in this net increased enormously: in August 1941 the German intercept service copied no less than 600 radiograms.

The aims of the Russian Secret Service were:

1. To seek information in all fields connected with the armed forces and armed strength of all European countries, of the U.S.A., of Japan and of a few other states.

2. To seek information in all fields of industry and economics in those countries.

3. To seek information on all political happenings in those countries which might have any reaction on the political life of the Soviet Union.

4. To infiltrate the secret service of those countries and gather information regarding any measures planned against the Soviet Union.

By using its diplomatic and commercial representatives and by employing special radio agents, the Soviet Union organized an intelligence network which functioned splendidly. It comprised agents
from all branches of the Russian secret service: officers of the General Staff, agents of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), Party functionaries, diplomats, etc. The procurement of information on military, political and economic developments in foreign countries was carried out on a grand scale and by all possible means. The central offices set up abroad, the branch offices, and individual agents were equipped with special short-wave sets and were in direct contact with Moscow.
During the course of World War II there were many groups of dangerous agents. The Germans were able to render some innocuous, some they could not. I think the most dangerous group of all was one they could not render harmless. This group could only be cleared up in slight degree and that was too late. Beginning in June 1941 the German intercept service noted three radio circuits from Switzerland to Moscow; the three stations were located in the vicinity of Lake Geneva. It was soon recognized that these were agent stations and that they belonged to the Russian military espionage system. No further essential information could be secured, especially since the cryptographic systems employed were not broken. Month by month the traffic was copied and studied. The net was called "Die Rote Drei" and gave a lot of people a headache, including those in Switzerland.

Not until December 1942, after the arrest of Agent Kent, did the Germans find any clue for breaking into the network of the Rote Drei. Kent stated that in 1940 he brought a cryptographic system to Geneva and delivered it in the Rue de Lausanne. Now the Swiss central office of the Comintern was located in the Rue de Lausanne. The transmitters had been fixed close to the French border. Through confidential agents in Switzerland and the German counterintelligence office in Dijon, France, an attempt was made to get at this organization,
above all to get some clue to the cryptographic system, so as to be able to read the tremendous volume of traffic over this net.

Not until the summer of 1944 was Germany able to read those messages. The contents were enough to take many a person's breath away.

During the entire eastern campaign, during the first German offensive in 1941, during the preliminary stages of the campaign of 1942, during the critical period of the battles around Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, and later in 1942 when the eastern front was being pushed back and one hoped to make a stand, possibly on the Dnieper, and check the on-rushing tide of the Russian armies, precisely during those days, weeks and months the most secret information regarding the German military situation in the east - troop units, tanks, assembly areas, intentions - was being passed currently through Switzerland to Moscow. This was information which must have come from the highest level of the German military command.

The sender always signed "Dora"; the sources were designated as "Werther", "Sissy", "Teddy", "Fernand", "Taylor", "Lucie", "Paki", "Maud", "Eduard", "Alfred", "Jim", "Salter", etc. The man who directed the work from Moscow signed "Director".

Direction-finding indicated that two transmitters were in Geneva and the third was in Lausanne. Now the work of German agents in Switzerland began. They soon discovered the point where the transmitters were located and the organization which they served. In Geneva, at 133 Rue de Lausanne, sat as chic:
of the organization a certain Rado who was officially director of the Goo-Prose in Geneva.

Alexander Rado was a private scholar and a citizen of Hungary. He had lived in Berlin prior to March 1933 and then gone first to Hungary and from there in 1934 to Paris, where he was active in cartographic work on behalf of the Soviet Union. He was a fanatical adherent of the Communist idea. In 1926 he had gone from Berlin to Moscow for nine months and then returned to Berlin. He was a member of the KPD and of the Association for the Study of the Soviet Planned Economy. After 30 January 1933 he was again active for the KPD and placed his dwelling at its disposal.

His wife had been secretary of the Communist Woman's Movement and was the sister of a well-known Communist, Gustel Jansen; for a time she had worked in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin and later she spent some time in the Soviet Union.

It is certain that Rado was already active as a Soviet agent in 1939. He must have been in contact with Gilbert in Paris. It is uncertain when Rado came to Switzerland, probably early in 1940 or even earlier. In Geneva he had two transmitters directly at his disposal, one of them in the Rue de Soleure No. 5.

The one in Lausanne was in the house at No. 2 Chemin Longorai. The occupant of the house was A. A. Foote who appeared under the cover name John. He did the cipher work himself, sent the reports, and also had an intelligence
organization of his own which worked independently of Rado. The Swiss authorities knew nothing about this.

In the course of time the Germans were able to clarify many points. They knew who the "Director" was, who Rado was, who the operators were. In the end they were able to read the messages. But, for all that, the most important point could not be cleared up. Who were the informers whose connections extended into the Führer's Headquarters, into the OKW, into the Air Ministry, into all industrial plants? Who were these people who knew how to secure the most important information with such masterful skill? Above all, who were the final sources from whom they drew their information?

The Germans tried by every means to get behind this secret. Hundreds of people were watched. In December 1943 in the grounds of the Führer's Headquarters, of OKH, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other offices, special detachments of Nahfeldsuchtrupps (troops charged with policing the air in areas close to the front lines) were brought in from all directions. All in vain. Not a bit of this secret was ever revealed. It was and remains the most fateful secret of World War II.

Late, in the summer of 1944 when the "Rote Drei" had long since ceased to operate and their shades were no longer spooking far away in the east on the Volga and the Don but were close to the borders of the Reich in the east and in the west, at the time of the clumsily-organized attempt on 20 July 1944 to dispose of the man who had brought misfortune on Germany and all Europe -
at that time the ghost of the "Rote Drei" rose once more from the grave. Another convulsive search for traitors swept over Germany. Close-range intercept detachments watched Hitler's Headquarters for weeks, but again no trace of any suspicious radio connection was found. It could not be found, for it had never existed. The information for the "Rote Drei" had gone to Rado by other, simpler ways.
KHARKOV AND SEVASTOPOL

Hitler said that once the German soldier got firm ground under his feet again he would again storm forward and drive the enemy before him. He asserted that nothing the future might bring could be worse than what the previous winter had brought. Along with a mighty levy of his own, almost one million foreign troops were committed, including one Italian and one Hungarian army. One goal was the Volga near Stalingrad, the other was the Caucasus with its oil wells. First the Crimea was to be cleaned up; Sevastopol was to follow.

This last decision wasted an undue number of troops on a secondary goal, since if the Caucasus fell into German hands the peninsula would automatically drop into Hitler's lap like a ripe plum. But "the general" would have it so and the struggle in the Crimea began which lasted for months and involved tremendous sacrifices.

While German transports rolled to the east and Hitler delivered his speech calling for all-out efforts, he issued an order which wiped out every trace of human freedom and every vestige of law - insofar as either still existed in Germany. This was the official beginning of organized terror within the armed forces and throughout the entire machinery of the state. It signified that for the first time Hitler felt the ground shaking beneath him and realized that
his officers did not always share his opinion and were rebelling against his "generalship" - something Hitler could not endure. He was resolved to govern with the lash and to oust leaders who opposed his orders in the slightest degree.

The newspapers were reporting the conquest of Singapore by the Japanese, but they said nothing about the fact that upon occupying Hong Kong the Japanese raped hundreds of European women and girls in the open marketplace and declared an entire Chinese quarter a brothel without regard for its inhabitants.

Early in May the struggle in the Crimea began. On 12 May the break-through near Kerch was completed. The Russians fought bitterly but were defeated. On 20 May the peninsula was occupied up to Sevastopol and the OKW reported 150,000 prisoners, 1100 guns, and 250 tanks captured.

But at the same time Timoshenko was hurling his armies against the German concentration south of Kharkov. He sent his troops into battle fully aware that he was sacrificing them, that he must sacrifice them to upset German plans. On 28 May the battle was decided. Timoshenko's armies were crushed, but the German advance had been stopped and German losses were tremendous. Who won?

It was a full month after the battle of Kharkov before the German troops could start the summer offensive. Now Timoshenko proved himself a real strategist: whereas hitherto he had required his troops to hold every yard of ground, beginning in July he called for mobile warfare, for the essence of casusale-
ment and for the infliction of heavy losses on the enemy. That gave the Germans new territory but the price was dear, very dear. Speer had to appeal to German war industry for "more and better arms!" One hundred million zinc small coins were called in. For there was a shortage of zinc - and of many other things.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE OF KHARKOV

In judging military actions people are accustomed to use the word "victory" or "defeat" according to the obvious outcome. Nevertheless, a lost battle may be decisive for the victorious conclusion of a war. A classical example is the Battle of Borodino in 1812 in which the Russians were defeated but Napoleon's army was so depleted as to decide his fate. I am inclined to believe that historians will regard the Battle of Kharkov as another classic example, since it was not at Stalingrad and not in the Caucasus that the war in the east was decided but much earlier at Kharkov, where the Russians inflicted severe losses and upset the German timetable.

Viewed superficially, this was a severe defeat for the Russians; actually they gained their objective. The ultimate results were not immediately apparent and German divisions moved forward toward the Kuban area, the Caucasus, and the Volga.
In Germany, people were now convinced that decisive blows were being struck in the east and that autumn must bring a collapse of the Soviet Union. On 12 August the German press reported an "annihilating blow" in the great bend of the Don. Two Soviet armies had been virtually wiped out. From then on, no further great success was reported. Of course minor local successes were stressed but in reality the great offensive had bogged down. For the second time the Russians had been able to put up a resolute resistance and by the end of August 1942 it was already clear to some people that the turning point of the war in the east had come.

You may think what you will about German National Socialist propaganda in World War II; one thing must be admitted: it was favored by fabulous good fortune. Whenever things began to look rotten somewhere, something happened elsewhere to furnish marvelous propaganda material. Whoever will take the trouble to examine the German newspapers published between 15 August 1942 and February 1943 will be astonished at the multitude of things triumphantly announced in the German press to drown out the funeral dirge which was beginning to sound from the East, faint at first, but then louder and louder.
In the morning hours of 19 August a reconnaissance detachment of Allied troops to the strength of approximately a regiment landed near Dieppe. Nine hours after the landing the enterprise was beaten off. And now Dr. Goebbels and the press began shooting off fireworks. The mixed detachment was turned into a great "British-American landing corps"; the reconnaissance thrust became an "invasion attempt"; the orderly retreat after its mission was accomplished became a "catastrophic defeat". For weeks this enterprise was talked about and the east was almost forgotten. Then on 9 September the papers reported that one of the greatest battles of all time was raging at Stalingrad. Then there was silence, - not at Stalingrad but in the papers. Then all sorts of strange things were heard: a German-Indies Company was founded, the craze for (patent) medicine must be conquered, the social order was secure. All with fat headlines. With small headings other reports appeared: about the battle in the ruins in Stalingrad, about terrific hand to hand fighting, and about the fact that Germans never capitulate. Quite different from the big mouthed speeches of other days.

On 30 September 1942 Hitler spoke in the Sportpalast in Berlin. He assured the German people that nothing worse than the winter of 1941/1942 could ever happen. Regarding Stalingrad he said: "you may be convinced that no human being will move us from this spot". He didn't say much about the new military situation in the east but he did tell in detail how many
kilometers of rails had been re-laid; what organizational measures had been taken in the occupied territories; and that they were on the point of setting up plants to make preserves and noodles. All this, naturally, on the premise that the areas occupied in the east would remain in German possession for all time.

Stalingrad! The name first appeared in August; in September people began to feel surprised that the city had not yet been captured; in October the name had become for the Russians a symbol of resistance and for the Germans a subject of concern. In November it became clear that the city could not be taken. While German troops were shedding their blood before this unhappy city and in the foothills of the Caucasus, the British and Americans had a chance to arm.

Winter came. The German troops suffered frightfully. The fighting became more and more stubborn, more and more bitter.

It was at this point that German propaganda began a grandiose but mistaken effort to sow mistrust among the Allies. The propaganda mill ran full speed but to no avail. Meanwhile the mighty assembly of Russian armies was being completed.

The order to the defenders of Stalingrad to hold out to the last man did not signify a senseless sacrifice. While they were holding the ruins, the Russian High Command was preparing a counter-blow which was destined to crush the attackers. Something unparalleled was happening deep in Russia. New armies with millions of men, thousands of tanks, and tens of thousands of guns were rolling westward. In Russia harbors great British and
American convoys were discharging their cargo. Hitler paid no
attention. His eyes were fixed as if in a trance on Stalingrad.

On the evening of 8 November Hitler declared he had no inten-
tion of making a second Verdun of Stalingrad but that he intended
to conquer the city by using small attack units. He went on to
say: "Our troops are attacking Stalingrad and they will take it;
on that you can rely."

In the following night the Russian encirclement began. Ten
days later the German Sixth Army was encircled and dug in. The
second act of the bloody drama of Stalingrad began.

Once again the Russians had succeeded in executing an enormous
assembly of troops in such a way that German reconnaissance, in
particular radio reconnaissance, had not been able to gather adequate
information.

The more German intelligence results in the East dried up,
the better the Russian intelligence service functioned. Mr. Rado,
Chief of the "Rote Drei" in Switzerland, maintained a very animated
exchange of messages with the "Director" in Moscow.
As if they had sprung up out of the steppes, Russian divisions appeared and hurled themselves repeatedly against the German positions. The German principal front was pushed back slowly, farther and farther from the encircled Sixth Army. Hitler refused to let the Sixth Army try to escape. He ordered it to hold out in the ruins of Stalingrad, because Goering had promised to supply the encircled Sixth Army by air. His attempt was frustrated by the Russian Air Force. With heavy losses the Germans did fetch out some 50,000 men by air but 230,000 were left behind.

The losses of the encircled Sixth Army were heavy. From the 19 to 25 November it lost 47,000 men killed and 51,000 captured, also 1164 guns, 430 tanks, 4000 trucks, 3,000,000 shells and 18,000,000 rounds of infantry ammunition. Under a terrific rain of fire the men of the Sixth Army put up an un-paralleled fight.

On 29 January total war was proclaimed. It was only a cramp of propaganda which was intended to calm but only created new unrest.

On 3 February 1943 the battle for Stalingrad came to an end. It had cost a quarter of a million dead and 90,000 prisoners, including 24 generals.

Over the German radio sounded the immortal melodies of Beethoven and Schubert and words in memory of the heroes of Stalingrad. The Russian radio also honored its dead. In the
eyes of the whole world, however, the myth of the invincibility of the German army was extinct, while the danger conjured up by that unhappy attack of 22 June 1941 became threatening.

Neither Dr. Goebbels nor the German radio nor any newspaper brought word of the last radio message sent from Stalingrad by General Paulus:

"My Führer, in the future follow more often the advice of your generals!"

There was no one who ventured to hand this message to Hitler personally. The cryptographic officer at the Führer’s Headquarters brought it with palpitating heart to the adjutant of General Field Marshall Keitel who was on duty, and departed hastily. The adjutant read it through and his heart likewise began to pound. Then he laid the telegram in the portfolio and carried this into the room of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The Field Marshall was sitting stiffly at his desk; he received the portfolio, opened it and read the item, while the adjutant departed. After a short time, a lamp flashed in the antechamber; the adjutant hastened into the room of his chief. Keitel was standing erect; deep wrinkles lay on his brow; he looked sternly at the officer who entered. "Unheard of!" he snarled. "Lay this before the Führer! Absolute secrecy! Thanks!" With this the adjutant was dismissed. He carried the telegram to his comrade in Hitler’s antechamber, laid it along with other papers on the table without a word, as if it were a matter of no concern, and left the room.
The Führer's adjutant read the message. Once! Twice!

He leaned back in his desk chair and stared at the sheet; the letters began to dance before his eyes. He began to count them in order to calm himself. Then he glanced furtively at the door leading to the room of that Heaven-favored, greatest general of all times; he knew what the effect of this telegram on him would be. Should he? Should he not? But he had to! He picked the message up gingerly as if it were a hot iron and laid it in the leather portfolio with documents that had to be laid before the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; he looked up at the ceiling as if hoping for help from above and carried the portfolio to Hitler. Then he left the room.

For a few minutes there was calm, while the adjutant anxiously looked out the window at the driving snow. Then what he had expected happened. The adjoining room came to life. A marble blotter whizzed against the wall and broke. A vase followed and crashed in splinters. A chair was overturned. The Führer began to rage. He wanted to rescind the appointment of General Paulus as Field Marshall, which had been made the day before, and to degrade him. But that was impossible: the press had already announced the appointment; it would have caused a catastrophic sensation.

Hitler tore the telegram to bits. General Field Marshall Keitel, who meanwhile had hurried in, stood a few steps away; his face portrayed regulation sternness but was turned away
from the Führer. Some thousands of kilometers away, tens of thousands of German soldiers were marching away shivering into captivity, with them General Field Marshal Paulus.

New tones from the Ether

The tones of the "Eroica" and of the "Unfinished Symphony in D-Minor" had long since died away but in the soul of the German people there echoed for a long time, tremulously and oppressively, the unwritten symphony of the German sacrifice at Stalingrad.

The name Stalingrad had become for every German a symbol, the symbol of tragic heroism. And millions of thoughtful people sought desperately for an answer to the question "Why?" For the first time during this war, doubts arose among the German people, doubts as to the infallibility and the surpassing generalship of Adolf Hitler.

But there was another group of people who felt this "Why?" with an almost physical pain. These were the men who had fought and suffered at Stalingrad and had escaped alive from the hell of insanity. The 90,000 men marching hungry, bleeding, and freezing into Russian captivity had experienced in their own persons that fabulous generalship of Hitler, and sought desperately for an answer to that question "Why?" What they had seen differed from the picture Goebbels had drawn for the people in Germany. Slowly but logically they became spiritually alienated from a system built upon force, deception, and incompetence. They could no longer be deceived; they had become hard realists.
In the prison camps beyond the Volga something new came into being - the "Free Germany" movement. General von Seydlitz-Burbach, who had been captured at Stalingrad, assumed the chairmanship. Other generals and officers joined him. Tens of thousands of German soldiers followed and the movement was mentioned in Russian broadcasts. Whereas hitherto the German language offerings of the Moscow stations had had little to attract the German listener, the latter - if he had courage - now began to listen attentively to foreign stations, particularly when German officers and generals appeared as speakers on these broadcasts.

Of course, it was fully a year and a half before this movement was mentioned in the German press and it was then represented as a piece of base treachery on the part of a few officers.

When the "Free Germany" movement started, the eastern front ran along the Don and the Donets; now, a year and a half later, it ran along the Carpathians and the frontier of East Prussia. For the war had been going on.
How slight and unimpressive are often the initial causes which lead to great changes in the course of events? How our picture of great men varies according to what we know about them and the point of view from which we regard them? How easily the fame of great generals grows pale when we know the secret of their successes!

Any history of World War II will doubtless mention one name on the German side with particular respect: Rommel. This name has become a symbol of German generalship. In the deserts of North Africa he and his men won astonishing victories and boldly chased the British to the gates of Alexandria. Actually he wanted to chase them further: out of Alexandria, across the Nile and across the Suez Canal. But suddenly his victorious march stopped. At El Alamein, almost within sight of Alexandria, it was suddenly all over.

What had happened? What was the secret of his unexampled victories, and what was the secret of their sudden cessation? There is no question but that in Rommel's case we are dealing with a man of great energy and distinguished military capacity. It would have been hard to find a better general early in 1941 when it became a question of stopping Wavell in Africa. In the fall of 1940 the Italians had crossed the Egyptian frontier and advanced to Marsa Matruk but had been forced to halt and had gone over to a war of position. On 9 December 1940 General
Wavell started his offensive against the Italians and by mid-March 1941 had thrown them back to the border of Tripolitania.

Meanwhile the Germans decided to help the Italians. The German "Africa Corps" was formed and transported to Tripolitania and General Rommel assumed command over all German and Italian forces in Italian North Africa.

Rommel went to work with great energy. On 24 March 1941 with his Africa Corps and some fresh Italian divisions he attacked the British, who were weakened by three months of combat and an extremely long supply line, and within 18 days drove them out of Cyrenaica. However, approximately on the line Sollum-Djarabub the operation came to a standstill and from early April 1941 on the front was generally calm. Nothing noteworthy occurred. At least nothing outwardly noteworthy. In reality, something was being prepared quietly which belongs among the most interesting chapters in the history of this war.

A certain Fellers, whose military rank I do not recall and whom I shall therefore call by name only, was stationed in Cairo as United States military attaché. Experience has shown that when many people suddenly display a lively interest in a new field of endeavor they merely cause mischief. Fellers had come to Cairo; the significance of the North African Theatre had been stressed by Rommel's actions, and the entire Near East seemed about to become the focal point of the war. For an ambitious young man that seemed to be just the right post. So Fellers decided to act.
But how can a military attaché act? He writes reports. And how are these reports conveyed nowadays? By radio.

So Fellers set to and sent one radiogram after another to Washington. Reports on the political situation and, above all else, reports on everything connected with military preparations and operations. They were enciphered, of course, but the death of any cryptographic system is found in its frequent use. All Fellers' radiograms were intercepted by the Germans. They bore the address "milid wash" or "agwar wash" and hence were easily recognized. By early July the system had been solved in essence and parts of the messages could be read. They proved to be a mine of important information. Fellers reported to the War Department in Washington regarding the reinforcement of British forces in Western Egypt, regarding their equipment with modern arms, regarding each transport of war materiel that arrived, regarding the withdrawal of the Australian 9th Division from Tobruk and its replacement by British and Polish units, and regarding preparations for an offensive with the aim of encircling and annihilating the Axis troops.

All these reports were passed currently to General Rommel who was able to plan correspondingly. The reports were not complete, to be sure, for the cryptographic system had not been solved in its entirety, but they were adequate to keep Rommel posted. Hence it was no surprise to him when in the grey dawn of 18 November 1941 the British offensive under
General Sir Alan Cunningham broke loose along the entire front. Rommel had made good preparations and was able to hold his front for a time. He could not prevent the British from making a break south of Sidi Omar and thus throwing the southern part of the Axis front off balance.

He was able to send an Italian armoured division which met the British thrust at Sidi Rezegh and Bir el Gobi.

On 19 November the British took Sidi Rezegh and on the same day Churchill proclaimed the impending destruction of the Axis troops in North Africa. Both sides brought up all the troops they had. Slowly but surely the British drew a ring around the Axis divisions. Nevertheless, despite all tactical successes, it seemed that the first onrush of the British had not achieved decisive results. Wherever the British started an action, Rommel immediately sent forces to oppose them. He even sent a column behind the British in the direction of Halfaya and broke their connections. He always did the right thing at the right time. Small wonder, for in each phase of the battle he knew the grouping and the intentions of the enemy.

Fellers was sending one telegram after another to Washington. He fairly outdid himself in his reporting. He ranged all over the battle area, saw and heard everything, knew all preparations, every intention, every movement of the British forces and transmitted it all to the United States. The German intercept station promptly copied his message, sent it by teletype to Berlin where it
was deciphered and sent by the speediest possible route to Rommel. That took only a few hours. By now the system had been completely solved.

The British were much surprised. Preparations for the offensive had been so thorough that the destruction of the Axis troops in the very first phase had been considered certain. Something did not click. General Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief in the Near East and Wavell's successor, flew from Cairo to Cunningham's headquarters and on 26 November relieved him of his post. A young general of 44 years, General Ritchie, was appointed commander of the British Eighth Army.

The Battle of Sidi Rezegh continued. Rommel was trying to break the British ring both from within and from without. The garrison of Halfaya Pass maintained its position and forced the British to transport their supplies across the desert. On 6 December Rommel began regrouping his forces. He had recognized a weak point in the British encirclement and on 8 December he pushed toward the west, disengaging his troops without being detected. Before the British recovered from their surprise he had escaped. On 11 December Churchill stated in the Lower House that the Libyan Campaign had not gone as expected.

In the days that followed, the British occupied several towns and captured some 25,000 men. Meanwhile Rommel had established his units near El Agheila and received dependable information regarding his opponent (Fellers had seen to that).
On 21 January he advanced 16 km into the British line with 3 armored columns. The British were taken by surprise and had to retreat. On the 27th Rommel was north and northeast of Maus. On that day Churchill declared "We are facing a very bold and clever foe, and I may well say - a great general!"

On the 29th Benghazi was taken. Rommel was promoted to Colonel General. On 10 February operations came to a standstill 100 km west of Tobruk. Rommel was not strong enough to break through the new defensive front of his opponent. Moreover, Fellers had failed him; he had lost contact and had to get oriented anew. That took a certain amount of time. Till then he could supply no useful information. Rommel waited for reports; they did not come.

A pause in the fighting ensued. Rommel received reenforcement and supplies. For the second time OKW turned its glance toward the Near East. Rommel was to be made so strong that he could drive to the Suez Canal - yes, he was to go beyond Jerusalem and Damascus and upset Northern Arabia and Iraq.

The German offensive from Southern Russia was to roll over the Caucasus, over northern Persia. Near Bagdad or Mosul the two armies were to meet. The days of British predominance in the Near East appeared to be numbered; the great British life-line through the Mediterranean and Red Sea was to be cut. Once the oilfields of the Caucasus and Iraq were in German hands, the hour of final victory would be at hand.
A gigantic plan. And it appeared capable of execution. OKW already was issuing dozens of orientation pamphlets for the troops. On Iran, Iraq, on Syria and the Arabian peninsula, on Trans-Jourdan and Palestine, yes, even on Afghanistan and India. Perhaps the day was not far away when the Germans could shake hands with their Japanese allies. The brigade "Free India" was set up and trained. Compared with this operation, the campaign of Alexander the Great would some day appear very modest.

Now there was excellent information once more regarding the situation in North Africa. Fellers had found his speech again; he wrote until his fingers were sore. He radioed everything he could discover. The German operators were listening. Again and again messages to "milid wash" and "agwar wash" were received. Two great stations had both been copying these messages since the beginning of the year in order that none should be missed and their intercepts were transmitted as "urgent" by direct wire to Berlin.

I should like to illustrate the precision with which the Germans were working. The British had carefully planned and prepared an action against Rommel's airfields. They meant to drop parachutists during the night who would destroy everything by means of the explosives they took along. The action had been so carefully planned that it could not have failed its objective. Fellers, radiant with joy, radioed this
to Washington. The message was sent about 8 o'clock in the morning by the station in Cairo; was received in Lauf immediately and transmitted to Berlin. At 9 o'clock it was on the cryptanalyst's desk; at 10 o'clock it was deciphered; at 10:30 it was in the Fuhrer's Headquarters; and an hour later Rommel had it. He had a day to warn his airfields. The British project was executed shortly after midnight. The parachutists got a warm reception; the action miscarried. Only one airfield disregarded the warning - here the British met with success.

Now Rommel knew precisely how matters stood on the British side; their supplies and equipment, their strength, their plans. February, March, and April passed quietly. Both sides were bringing in reinforcements. After the middle of May the British began to spot extensive German movements and counted on an offensive in the near future.

On 26 May Rommel's famous offensive broke loose. He advanced in two columns, employing seven divisions. A battle developed at Acroma and advanced troops pressed forward to Sidi Rezegh. But it soon appeared that Rommel's frontal attack was a ruse to divert attention from the southern sector of the front. German tanks broke through at Bir Hakim and heavy tank battles raged for days near Acroma. Approximately 1,000 tanks and 2,000 to 2,500 motorized guns were engaged on the two sides. Heat and sand storms made a hell of the battlefield.
On 10 June Bir Hakim, the key to the British defense system, was taken. General Ritchie now adopted a line of resistance consisting of individual hedgehog positions. But the Axis troops drove through in three columns. Sidi Rozegh was taken and on the 19th the Egyptian frontier was reached. The next day Tobruk was encircled and on the 21st it was taken, along with 25,000 prisoners. This had been a bold masterstroke.

On 25 June 1942 Rommel had occupied Sollum, the Halfaya Pass and Sidi Omar and was in front of Sidi Barani. Fellers was still radioing his reports and Rommel was receiving precise information every hour, while his opponent had only such information as could be picked up at the immediate front. The British were amazed; Rommel seemed to have "second sight". No matter what the British undertook Rommel always intervened as if the British High Command had been keeping him posted.

On 27 June General Ritchie was relieved as commander of the Eighth Army; Auchinleck assumed command in person.

Quickly the British retreated to Marsa Matruk. Here were the fortifications Wavell had laid out when Graziani was at the gates of Egypt. Now Rommel was at the gates of Egypt. In less than 4 weeks he had chased the British out of all Cyrenaica. Their only hope lay in the Kattara depression between Marsa Matruk and Alexandria which stretches 60 kilometers inland from the coast. This is an area of nothing but sand and great blocks of rock, unparalleled heat and absolute
lack of water. The British were resolved to hold the rectangle
Alexandria - Port Said - Suez - Cairo. Would they succeed? They
were determined to hold Singapore, but had lost it. They had been
determined to hold the Balkans, but had to withdraw. They were
afraid of German parachutists. On 1 July Rommel was near El Alamein.
The threat to Alexandria had become immediate. British domination
in the Near East was threatened.

Then the miracle occurred. No, it was no miracle; it was
a tragicomedy. It was so comical, so idiotically funny, that
it had the effect of a passage from a dime novel. Or it was like
a bad joke.

It was Saturday, 27 June 1942. I had turned on the broadcast of
the Deutschlandsender and was listening toward 6 o'clock in the
evening to the announcement of a radio drama. "We are offering a drama
with scenes from the British or American information bureau", the
announcer said. "Well, this is going to be good", I thought, but left
the apparatus tuned in while I occupied myself with some work. Suddenly,
I pricked up my ears; the drama had as its subject "Events in North
Africa" and political and military matters were involved. One of the
characters represented the American military attache in Cairo, and
now there followed a discussion of his extensive supply of information
and the way he sent it on to Washington.

I was speechless. To think that the German broadcast was putting
on something that countless people were trying to censor! The drama
was genuine. It was only too well played. But how did these
... the information?

On 29 June, 36 hours after this radio drama, the messages from Fellers to Washington suddenly ceased. The German intercept operators tried their best; they listened and searched - in vain. No further "milid" message and no "agwar" message was ever heard. When messages began to flow again, the Americans had changed their system and were using a machine which defied all our efforts at solution.

While the new German offensive swept forward in southern Russia and the world awaited the outcome with bated breath, Rommel remained without information. The British regrouped their forces; he knew nothing about it. They introduced new units - this remained hidden from Rommel. New weapons were unloaded in Alexandria and Port Said; Rommel did not find out about it. Henceforth no messages signed "Fellers" gave information regarding the enemy. The great general now had to rely upon himself and his reconnaissance at the front.

On 3 July Rommel tried a strong thrust to the south. It failed. The next day, using all available troops, he tried a major attack near El Alamein. After heavy fighting and initial successes Rommel had to withdraw. Since 26 May the British Eighth Army had lost 75,000 men, plus 1100 tanks and 450 planes. It was in bad shape, but now it held. Auchinleck was now personally conducting operations in the front line. Both sides dug in. Both sides brought up reinforcements. American tank
forces arrived in Egypt and were given intensive final training.

New contingents arrived from Italy. German troops were brought in from Crete. Alexandria was attacked by German planes. Decisions of great historical moment seemed to be impending. All eyes were fixed on Rommel. Mussolini betook himself to the Egyptian front in order to be present at the entry into Cairo. Rommel was appointed General Field Marshall. But Rommel no longer had any reliable reports concerning the enemy.

Churchill journeyed to Moscow and had a long conversation with Stalin. German troops stood before Stalingrad and at the foothills of the Caucasus. Everything seemed to portend a climax to military operations in the Near East. On his way back from Moscow, Churchill visited Cairo. Lieutenant General Montgomery was appointed Commander in Chief of the British Eighth Army; General Alexander was named successor to Auchinleck.

For the second time during the war the Near East became the center of intrigue. There was great tension throughout the Moslem world. In the bazaars and in the oases of the desert, Mohammedans gathered and discussed the question of their future in connection with the war. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem issued over the broadcasting station at Bari a flaming appeal to the Moslem world and to the population of India to rise against Great Britain and its Allies. The Jewish population was torn between fear of an Arab revolt and the approach of the war. Nationalist elements in Erez tried to mix water with the gasoline in British tanks and to strap sand in the motors.
But the Allies were not idle. In June 20,000 Americans landed in Basra. New equipment factories in the Near East began large scale production. In August another 50,000 men landed in Iraq. The British Ninth Army was in Syria and Palestine. In Iraq and Iran was the Army Group of General Maitland Wilson, formerly of the Ninth Army. Army Group Wavell was in India. Eight Russian Divisions had been brought to Iran and three Polish divisions were there also. The Near East was preparing for the struggle. Then, about mid-August 1942, the German offensive in Russia began to bog down. In those days Rommel might well have been thinking "a kingdom for one good Fellers message". But this source of information had dried up. Rommel decided to attack without Fellers' aid.

In the morning hours of 31 August he advanced against the southern flank of the British position at El Alamein but immediately encountered strong resistance. He threw in his last tanks and had all available trucks drive around in the rear to kick up a dust and give the impression that a strong tank force was advancing. But even this trick did not work.

There was hand fighting but after two days Rommel had to retreat. He had 12 divisions and at least 600 tanks, but he missed the Fellers telegrams. Rommel's operations came to a standstill, as did those before Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. The dream of a campaign through Asia Minor had come to an end. Mussolini returned to Italy. The period of Rommel's great victories was over.

On 4 November the British began a smashing offensive against the Axis front. On 8 November the front had been broken, the Africa
Corps was beaten, and the Italians were cut off. Rommel's great retreat began; his star had set. On that same day, the Americans and the British landed in Algeria and Morocco. The Second Front had come into being over night.
Immediately after the encirclement at Stalingrad and the break through the German front, the Russian intelligence service faced a new problem of the utmost importance, for it was now a question of keeping precisely informed regarding the enemy situation. The Russians had succeeded in striking a heavy blow, but how were things on the German side? What reserves did they have? What were their intentions? Would they and could they prepare a counter blow? Did the Russians on the southern front perhaps face the risk of falling into a trap?

One of the great hours for the Russian intelligence service had arrived. Its best source was the "Rote Drei" which reached up to the highest German commands, up to OKW, up to the Führer's Headquarters. And this time, too, the "Rote Drei" did not fail. It worked feverishly and its reports went to Moscow night after night.

Supported by such reliable reports, the Russian offensive rolled on. Almost the entire Eastern front was in motion. In two months the Russians crushed or threw into confusion 102 German and allied divisions, many of which were practically annihilated. In two months the Russians took 200,000 prisoners (not counting those from Stalingrad) and 13,000 guns. In the south they advanced 400 km.

The German sacrifice at Stalingrad had been in vain. England and America had been arming.
Stalingrad and El Alamein were fanfares of a shift, of a shift from an attack to defense, from offensive to retreat, from the intoxication of victory to propaganda for holding out. Dr. Goebbels, who had played the melody of intoxicated power and racial hatred, who had trampled under foot every elemental feeling of right and justice, now decided on a shift in the propaganda work. Whereas hitherto the philosophy of absolute force had been radiated out into the ether, there now ensued a slow but unmistakable change. The wavelengths remained the same but over them there began to go out something new. In place of the concepts of power, hatred, force, suppression, and the claim to leadership, there now appeared as guarantee of German victory the philosophy of "history". Germany must win "because there is justice in history", but this was not sufficient for the Ministry of Propaganda, which now gave the German people a new watchword born of satanic infamy and filled with such cynicism toward the German people as to fairly take your breath away. It ran: "if we are to lose the war, then the people at home are to blame. The attitude of the people at home is of decisive importance!" They said this to a people which for ten years had enjoyed no other right than the right to make sacrifices and to accept patiently whatever was imposed upon them.
Stalingrad and El Alamein were military defeats which, viewed superficially, might not be of vital importance. Such reverses occur in every war and need not have a disconcerting effect. The enemy need not even know that they were decisive. The man who unintentionally told the German people and the rest of the world the truth was none other than Dr. Goebbels. Abroad they soon noted his new tune and knew how to draw advantage from it. Foreign broadcasts soon revealed this. A wave of activity passed through enemy countries which was occasioned less by the battles of Stalingrad and El Alamein than by the battle waged by Dr. Goebbels in the ether. For this battle likewise was lost, slowly and hardly noticeably, but with a crippling effect on Germany while it spurred the enemy to greater effort. What the front had not yet revealed to the enemy, that Dr. Goebbels now revealed: the incipient collapse on the home front of the mighty German war machine.
Military events in North Africa during the winter 1942/1943 and the following spring will give future writers of history plenty of material and the operations in this theater will be discussed from every possible point of view in all the military schools of the world. Merely the landing of the Americans in the night of 9 November 1942 will receive consideration, whether it be from the standpoint of naval warfare, of water transportation, of supply, of air security, or of the planning of the actual operations from Algeria to Tunis. There is no doubt but that the landing of the Allies in Algeria was a masterpiece but the outstanding feature, in my opinion, was neither the mighty armada of 850 ships nor the safeguarding of this fleet against submarine and air attack, neither the solution of the supply problem nor the execution of the landing in the shortest possible time, but rather the complete assurance of the factor of surprise. The landing in North Africa literally had the effect of a bolt from a clear sky.

The intercept service of the German Navy as early as the end of August 1942 had found ever-increasing indications of preparation for a large-scale landing operation by the Western Powers. By mid-October, it was certain that this operation would be carried out in the Mediterranean. The exact point for the landing remained unclarified. Men in the German
navy thought it would be in the Balkans; the possibility of an invasion of Sicily was likewise considered.

By the end of October 1942, the German naval intercept service was sure that the time for carrying out this operation was no longer far away. All units of the intercept service were instructed to be extremely watchful.

The moment for the entry of the invasion fleet into the Mediterranean was clearly recognized by the German naval intercept service. Moreover, the extent of the impending action could be recognized. But the point at which this action would be carried out remained an open question to the very end. Some still thought that the Balkans were in danger. The possibility of a landing in Algeria and Morocco was not taken into account at all. Everyone was greatly surprised when the troops were actually disembarked there. No clues as to the areas selected for the landings were obtained from intercepted traffic down to the very end. In this perfect camouflage lay the prerequisite for the success of the entire Allied undertaking and of the future campaign in Africa.

I have already tried to describe the manner in which General Rommel was supported in his Libyan operations by the intercept and cryptanalytic services. It was a serious blow for him when Fellers' help dropped out one day. But misfortunes rarely come singly.

To Rommel's army belonged an intercept company which functioned admirably and supplied excellent results. Everything that Rommel could not ascertain by way of Fellers was furnished him by this intercept company. Now when the great Allied attack on Rommel's
position at El Alamein succeeded, this company fell into the enemy's hand early, with bag and baggage. The British attack came so suddenly that the intercept station had no time to destroy the most important and secret documents pertaining to its work. With one swoop the Allies here deprived General Rommel of his sole remaining source of information. Not only that - the Allies were now shown for the second time the mistakes they had been making.

In the Fellers case they had reacted immediately. They did so again now. Their radio service could not have been given a better lesson. And they learned quickly and thoroughly.

Rommel learned something too. He learned what the intercept service means in modern war. He learned to know what it is to face an otherwise equal opponent without this service. He learned to bow to the changing fortunes of war. The Axis front at El Alamein consisted of gigantic mine fields with numerous fortified support points. A continuous trench system existed only on the northern flank.

On 24 October the Eighth Army began its attack. Behind a continuous wall of chemical fog, the infantry advanced after heavy artillery preparation, and the tanks followed. Slowly, methodically, and surely the attack cut into the Axis lines. Violent fighting raged for days but on 5 November the breakthrough was completed. The Axis troops withdrew to Marsa Matruk but had to occupy prepared positions at Sollum.
and the Halfaya Pass on 10 November. The fury of the British attack increased. Most of the Italians had either fallen or been captured. The British occupied Derna on 16 November; Benghasi was evacuated on the 21st; Agedabia on the 23rd.

Rommel's losses already totaled 30,000 men. Eighty thousand in barely four weeks!

On 24 November the British were before El Agheila, where Rommel had constructed a new defense line. All Cyrenaica had been lost again, this time for good.

Montgomery was a methodical man. He could push forward at once, for Rommel was hard hit; but he did not like bold strokes of the Rommel type. He did not like a 51% chance; he was all in favor of a 90% chance. So he decided to sit tight and do some shifting. That took three weeks. But then the supply problem had been settled and he was ready. New troops were ready, new tanks, artillery, and planes, planes, planes. Rommel suspected all sorts of things but no longer had any reliable information regarding the enemy. In view of the British superiority in the air, his few remaining planes could not supply him with the necessary reconnaissance reports. Only the intercept service might perhaps have done this, but this source was cut off. The intercept company was already on its way to Canada and the great general was forced to rely entirely on himself and his intuition. But intuition without intercept service is a very uncertain thing.
On 14 December 1942 General Montgomery began his attack on the El Agheila position. Soon the once famous Africa Corps had to withdraw. Rommel hoped that the great, waterless Syrtes Desert would check the enemy but on 4 January Montgomery was at Buerat and had the entire desert already behind him. At the same time, General Leclerc was pushing up from the south and soon the entire Fessan area was in the hands of the Free French. Soon Leclerc made contact with a French Camel Corps operating from Algeria. Yes, from Algeria, for there was already a second front in Africa.

In the night from the 9th to the 10th of November 1942, the British and Americans had landed on the coast of North Africa. They soon had possession of the country from Oran to Bone and were preparing to occupy Tunisia which was the key for any further operations. But once more, for the last time in this war, the air superiority of the Axis powers was to make itself felt.

With hundreds of planes, troops and weapons were hastily thrown into Tunisia; positions, passes, roads, and support points along the western frontier were occupied, while other units landed in Tunisian harbors under the protection of fighters and bombers. A new intercept company was also shipped over and hardly had it taken up its position when its receivers were deluged! The Americans radioed away in a gay and carefree manner that was a joy to the company.
Shortly the enemy situation was clear. The great Allied attack, the Christmas tank battle in Tunisia, ended in favor of the Axis. In the north the British withdrew. By the beginning of January some 80,000 Axis troops - mostly German - were already in Tunisia.

And now a struggle began which lasted three full months. It was hard to understand how the relatively weak Axis forces could withstand the attack of far superior American and British forces. This was a puzzle to those who did not know the circumstances but was clear to one who did. From the coast down to Lake Shoot el Djerid there was a continuous front. In the north was the British First Army, south of it the American Fifth Army, and farther south were the French. All three tried to outdo one another in supplying the German intercept service with useful material. General von Arnim, who commanded the Axis forces in Tunisia, could be satisfied. Scarcely anything on the enemy side escaped him. "With the security of a sleep walker" - to use a favorite expression of Hitler - he could do the right thing at the right time. On 10 January the Germans thrust forward south of Pont du Fahs into the assembly area of the enemy, dented the Allied Front and forced a retreat. On 20 January the Germans and Italians attacked the junction of the American and French forces. A local success was achieved.

On 27 January at Casablanca Allied statesmen conferred. In connection therewith, the British, and particularly the Americans, started a new push on the central front. They wanted to reach Susa and split von Arnin's forces in two. They reached Kairouan and
almost reached the coast but the intercept service had learned of their intentions and preparations so that von Arnin had time to prepare countermeasures. The thrust was parried, the breakthrough was sealed off.

Meanwhile, on 9 January Montgomery attacked Rommel. On 23 January he entered Tripoli. Then he prepared to advance against Tunisia and Rommel retreated behind the Mareth Line. It was decided to hold Tunisia, cost what it might, and reinforcements were sent from Italy. But the first serious tension between the military staffs of the Axis was already appearing. On 3 February the Italian Chief of General Staff was relieved of his position.

On 9 February an Axis offensive began for which the intercept service supplied adequate information. The success was immediate. The Allies were astounded and blamed their previous want of success on the dual command. General Eisenhower became sole Commander-in-Chief of all American, British, and French troops in North Africa. But even that did not help. South of Kairouan, German armored forces broke through near Faid and advanced 35 kilometers toward Sbeitla. This threatened American positions north of Gafsa and the retreating Americans were badly cut up by divebombers. Eisenhower had been on the point of regrouping the North American troops. The German intercept service had discovered this and the German attack broke right into this movement.
On 18 February the Americans had to evacuate Gafsa hurriedly. Kairouan was in German hands. Two days later German troops took Sbeitla and on the following day occupied Kasserine Pass.

The Mareth Line consisted of three separate positions lying one behind the other in a depth of 15 kilometers. Each of these lines was supported by a number of forts built in the cliffs of the desert and re-enforced with concrete. There were countless barbed wire entanglements, tens of thousands of anti-tank obstructions, tank traps, built-in positions for anti-tank defense, disappearing guns, subterranean sleeping quarters and water tanks. The chain of forts filled the territory between the sea and the mountains. Behind the Mareth Line is the Gabes Gap which is only 20 kilometers wide.

About 15 February incautious French traffic began mentioning British reconnaissance aiming to by-pass the Mareth Line. At first these were rather small patrols, then stronger formations appeared. They were never mentioned in British traffic. I doubt if any such reports reached the German command in North Africa; if they did, they were surely not taken seriously. The region is a desert of stones and rubble, entirely without water, and was considered utterly impassable. Nevertheless, it could be deduced from the reports that the area in question was passable, at least for small units.
On 25 February came a violent Allied attack on the Kasserine Pass. It did not find the Axis troops unprepared, thanks to the intercept service. The main body of Axis troops withdrew because the superiority of the enemy was too great. Three days later the rear guard gave up the pass. The British and Americans employed a terrific number of divebombers. On March 1st the Germans launched an attack on the British First Army and moved forward 25 kilometers to Bescha. More bitter fighting occurred on the Bescha-Mateur road. Then both sides dug in. On March 3rd the Americans took Pichon, 32 kilometers west of Kairouan and even the French became active and attempted an advance toward Gafsa.

Meanwhile it had become clear that the British Eighth Army was preparing a large scale offensive against the Mareth Line. The Germans decided to anticipate the attack and moved out from the Mareth Line in the morning hours of 6 March. After heavy fighting they had to withdraw to the Mareth Line on the second day and on the same day the French advanced to the railroad line Ferina-Gafsa and occupied Toseur on the northern shore of the Salt Lake where they were stopped by the commitment of fresh Axis troops. On 18 March, however, the French advanced again in the direction of Gafsa which they took the following day. The next day they were 80 kilometers west of Sfax and the situation was beginning to look bad.
On the morning of 21 March the British attack on the Mareth Line began. The Germans were expecting it but the exact time had remained a secret because radio reconnaissance against the Eighth Army had been crowned by little success. So the attack came as a surprise. The line was penetrated but was then restored and to all appearances the situation was favorable. Then came the biggest surprise of the entire Tunisian campaign: without being detected, the British moved south, turned the Mareth Line and advanced toward El Hamma. The French messages which might have given warning had not been monitored. Now the German flank and rear were exposed. On 28 March the British were at El Hamma; on the following day "due to mobile operations" the Mareth Line was abandoned. The British gave the Germans no time to establish new defense positions. Rommel himself left the theater for new duties in Italy. Von Arnim was in command in Tunisia but there was not much left to command. His army was split first into two parts, then into three, and finally into four. The masterly turning of the Mareth Line had decided the fate of Tunisia. German and Italian troops saw how hopeless the struggle was and entire units surrendered.

On 13 May 1943 that campaign came to an end. It had cost 76,000 dead; 248,000 had laid down their arms, three-fourths of them Germans; 28 generals, 17 of them German, surrendered to General Alexander. Thus the catastrophe was even greater than that of Stalingrad. But this time in Germany they dispensed with playing on the radio Beethoven's "Eroica" and Schubert's "Unfinished."
Symphony. They did not dare reveal to the German people the full extent of the tragedy. They passed on to new business, as if the catastrophe in Tunisia were merely an episode without special significance. And they were right. With this, the entire campaign in North Africa had become an episode—without significance! At least there were no entries on the credit side of the ledger for the Axis powers. On the debit side stood in flaming letters:

1. The loss of almost a million fighting men,
2. Renunciation of the thrust toward the Near East,
3. The beginning of the collapse of Italy.

It was not merely the German public that was surprised by the collapse of the Tunisian front. OKW was also greatly surprised. They were convinced the Mareth Line could hold and had organized a supply service on a lavish scale both by air and by sea. Up to the last moment great transports of supplies were arriving. These were repeatedly received undamaged by the British. Von Arnim's troops were given supplies and equipment but the situation had become hopeless and for that reason they surrendered. It is not true that they fought till the last cartridge was gone and no food or water was left. They surrendered because they saw how hopeless further resistance was and because they knew about the tragedy of Stalingrad.
It is difficult to determine who was to blame for the fact that French radiograms which betrayed the danger of a flank movement around the Mareth Line did not receive the attention they deserved. Had this been done, there would have been time to protect the flank and frustrate the movement. This daring stroke might then have prepared a grave in the desert for the British, since it was a very dangerous undertaking. Military history will doubtless regard it as one of the most daring maneuvers of its kind.
Several times I have spoken of a duplication of cases, meaning a purely accidental coincidence of events of similar character which had no causal connection with one another. For instance, if the Germans in 1914 intercepted Russian messages and in consequence won the Battle of Tannenberg and at the same time on the Western Front made almost the same mistakes as the Russians and thus allowed the French to win the Battle of the Marne, then two similar events are involved but causally they have nothing to do with one another; they are fateful coincidences. Such coincidences are involved in the case of the two "Zimmermans". We can ascribe them to the obscure "law of the duplication of cases".

There is also something else, namely an apparently existing "law of the repetition of the same mistakes" and, to be sure, by one and the same actor.

Here we are no longer concerned with coincidences; instead the cause lies in the character of the person concerned. Hence, if in World War I the Russians kept on making the same mistakes in their use of radio telegraphy and finally lost not merely battles but the entire war in consequence, that was neither an accident nor a fateful duplication of cases. The simple fact was that in this enormous army insufficient attention was given to the training of the signal troops - perhaps nothing more was
possible under the circumstances.

The "law of the repetition of the same mistakes" remains valid in World War II; this time the Germans kept making the same mistake "with all the assurance of a sleepwalker."

The radio play about the Fellers messages may properly be called a madhouse incident. It was so crazy that I could hardly blame anyone for not believing my statements. It sounds fantastic. But if anyone should believe me, he would agree with the familiar song: "that can happen only once; it can't happen again!" Well, even in this case there was a sure enough repetition!

The battles in Africa had come to an end. The Allies had landed on Sicily. The first wave of the invasion was slowly rolling over the island. It was a bitter struggle, which suggested the form that a future battle in the West would assume. The Italians began to drop out of the picture and the role of the German units became more important. They were numerically inferior to the Allies and any help was doubly important. A dependable intelligence service represents such a help by telling about the grouping and intentions of the enemy.

After the catastrophe in Tunisia, a German radio intercept platoon was established on Sicily and quickly began to provide useful information - especially against the Americans.

I no longer recall the exact day, but one evening during the second half of the struggle for the island four short reports were broadcast, of which one dealt with the battles in
Sicily. And the reporter at the front said frankly and with obvious pride that the Germans were very well informed, thanks to intercepted radio messages.

There was an extensive investigation, but the damage had been done. Three days after this man’s report, all keys of the American troops in Sicily were changed and up to the conclusion of the struggle for this island none of the new keys was solved.
THE SPRING OF 1943 IN THE EAST

In April 1943 the great Russian offensive, which had begun at Stalingrad, faded out just before reaching the Dnieper. Kharkov had been taken by the Russians after hard fighting but in the south, on the Sea of Azov near Taganrog, the Russian advance had come to a stop. Soon the Germans struck back but their new advance was of brief duration. Then the front became rigid, somewhat to the west of the line reached in the first advance in 1941. What next? Hitler was trying to discover reserves, while some of his commanders secretly hoped there would be no further attack that summer.

The German counteroffensive had left something like a gigantic nose sticking out from the Russian lines north of Belgorod and south-east of Orel. By 20 July intercepts revealed that the Russians were concerned with the assembling of German troops in these areas to clip off this "nose". The German intercept service was able to report that the Russians were well informed regarding German preparations - they knew all the units at the front and those in reserve. It was clear that they were reinforcing their own endangered positions. What remained concealed from the Germans was an enormous concentration behind the Russian front in and south of the "nose". German air superiority had been lost and the Russian air force permitted no German air reconnaissance worth mentioning. The intelligence work shifted
more and more to the intercept service and the Russians knew it and did everything possible to shape their traffic so that it would betray as little as possible. The cryptographic systems were good and the operators rarely made compromising mistakes. Consequently the results of the German intercept service could not be remarkable. The Russian blows almost always came unexpectedly and were attended by success.

Both sides were preparing for a decisive struggle and tanks, guns and troops were rolling up from the rear areas. Hitler appealed to his troops and spoke about the last decisive battle which was to annihilate the Soviet state and its Red Army. And then the German divisions began what was to be their last offensive in the east.
STILL THE "ROTE DREI"

At this critical point the Russians had an ally. An ally who was not mentioned in the papers or on the radio. An ally of whom no one knew save the few who were in on the secret. An invisible but uncanny ally - the "Rote Drei".

It had been working for a year and a half and it was working well. If we read the messages which had passed to Moscow and realize fully their significance, then such terms as "espionage" and "treason" are no longer adequate. This was something new and unique, something which in its effect had no parallel in history. However you look at them, Tannenberg, the Marne, Zimmermann, and Fellers were fateful coincidences due to human inadequacy, but what about the "Rote Drei"? Was it the inspired performance of a spy? Was it the work of a traitor who sat at the source of most important intelligence and perhaps sold it for money or the favor of a woman? Was it the work of a group of agents employing blackmail and terrorism to procure access to these most precious secrets? - No! Nothing of the sort! The "Rote Drei" was not a clever individual act; it was not an accident but a symbol. It was a product of the times. The "Rote Drei" was the quintessence of the spiritual revolt of a people against a system of government based on force and suppression. The frightful psychic pressure to which the German people had been exposed for nine years was seeking a vent. The "Rote Drei", the "Rote
Kapelle" and all the rest became a vent. I feel sure that not a single German who supplied information to this organization was working for money. Only the organizers and gatherers of information received money from Moscow. Rado with all his agents could never have gathered even a fraction of that information had not the psychic state of the German people prepared the way.

In Germany they were breaking their heads over these questions: whence came the material superiority of the Russians? How did it happen to be greatest just where the Germans attacked? How did it happen that the Russians knew the weak points in the German front and struck at these? Can one still wonder after reading the messages of the "Rote Drei"?

I have said in my preface that the era of great generals is past. Even the Russian commanders were no heaven-sent geniuses. They - like all others - were little wheels in the war machine of their country. They knew how to utilize their opportunities and these opportunities were given them by the "Rote Drei" with all that stood behind it.

And the complex of the "Rote Drei" was only a single case. During World War II there were dozens of such cases and the number of spy messages transmitted by them ran high into the thousands.
THE LAST GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN THE EAST AND WHAT FOLLOWED

On 4 Jul 1943 the German offensive north of Belgorod and southeast of Cæl broke loose. It was not a surprise to the Russians; the "Rote Drei" had been predicting it with precision for three months. Actually, the Russians wanted it. They knew that one-third of all the German armored forces on the eastern front was assembled here and to this they were opposing artillery and tanks of their own. On the very first day of the battle it became evident that the Germans had misjudged the defensive power of the Russian. Breaks into the Russian front line were made, of course, but each break was immediately sealed off. The losses on both sides were enormous. On the Russian side they could immediately be replaced from inexhaustible sources but on the German side they weighed heavily. The "nose" was dented a little at the top and bottom, but that was all. During the first two days the Germans lost almost 1,000 tanks and 300 aircraft. On 8 July the losses had mounted to 15,000 tanks, 650 planes, and 30,000 men. The Germans had committed 15 tank divisions, one mobile division, and 1/4 infantry division in the greatest tank battle in world history. Strangely enough the German press said little about it. And when, with perfect timing, the Allied troops under the command of General Eisenhower landed on Sicily in the morning hours of 10 July, there was plenty to divert attention from the Russian theater and the hopeless contest still raging there.
Of the million Italian, Romanian, Hungarian and other vassal troops of the previous year, only a scant 100,000 men are still available, not more than 25,000 of them at the front, the remainder in the zones of communication. The German divisions, which had hitherto comprised three regiments each, were reformed into divisions with two regiments. And the Russians knew it. They knew much more. How short German manpower was getting was suggested, among other things, by a decree granting German citizenship to so-called Volksdeutsche (people of German blood) from foreign countries who would serve in the SS, Organisation Todt, or some other German organization or in a unit of the armed forces. This lure did not achieve much but did betray many things and conceal many dangers.

The high-sounding catch words of the earlier years were replaced by others: "It is a matter of life or death!" "Victory or destruction!"

On 13 July the German offensive was definitely halted; two days later a strong Russian offensive began. On the 17th the German lines had been pierced in places to a depth of 50 kilometers.

While a few Germans clung undismayed to the old braggadocio and some others intentionally closed their eyes, a few correctly sized up the situation and began to offer overt or covert opposition to the regime. The vast majority, however, felt only a dull resignation. Hitler thought it necessary to take energetic measures against "defeatism".

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When on 19 July Hitler and Mussolini met in northern Italy, "military questions were discussed" according to the official report. There was no more talk of complete agreement, of confidence in victory. One week later, on 26 July, Mussolini was deposed and Badoglio took over the government.

On 5 August the Russians occupied Orel. On 23 August Kharkov fell and the German front began to waiver. On 31 August Taganrog fell. Perhaps the Germans never before fought so bravely and with such disregard for death. The number of dead was enormous, the number of prisoners was small indeed and most of these were wounded.

Even the Dnieper could not hold up the Russians. On 6 November 1943 Kiev fell, the Holy City of the Russians and the Ukranians. Gomel, the most important rail junction in the northern Ukraine, fell on 27 November.

During this entire period the Russians handled their radio traffic so that it afforded the German intercept service very little useful intelligence material. The German command was inadequately informed regarding the enemy, who time and time again threw unexpected "final reserves" into the struggle. Tactical details - sometimes very valuable ones - were obtained often, but from an operational point of view the picture of the enemy situation remained obscure. On the other hand, the Russians were surprisingly well informed regarding the situation on the German side. They even felt so sure of themselves as to
announce in German language broadcasts the numbers of identified
German units, along with the names of the commanders; yes, they
even told of German preparations. They could afford to - for the
"Rote Drei" was working for them. As the final blows were falling
in the east, this organization outdid itself and its reports became
more complete than ever before. They covered all military events
not merely on the eastern front but throughout all Europe; they
touched on politics, industry, agriculture, transportation - on
everything Russian intelligence must know. Any change in Italy,
France, Norway, the Balkans or Germany could influence the situation
on the Eastern Front. Therefore German divisions elsewhere must be
watched just as closely as those in Russia. The destruction of
German industry by the RAF interested the Russians quite as much
as it did the British. The political situation in Hungary and Italy
had to be followed closely. So the "Rote Drei" worked feverishly.
The year 1943 drew to a close with no halt in the Russian offensive which had begun in July. The new year not only brought a continuation of this struggle but also the beginning of a new one. On 15 January the Russians started a new offensive between Leningrad and Ilmensee; on the 19th they took Novgorod. On the northern section almost 40,000 Germans were killed in the first week. The Russian superiority on the ground and in the air became frightfully clear. On 29 January the Russians began a mighty encirclement in the Ukraine south of Kiev. On 3 February 10 divisions of the German Eighth Army were encircled. Again the offensive was a surprise because the German intercept service had not been able to recognize the preparations. A few units succeeded in escaping, but 70,000 men were killed and 12,000 men were captured. This left a mighty hole in the German front, a result of the strategic ideas of the "greatest general of all times", who naturally had to find a scapegoat and relieved the commanders of Army Group Center and Army Group North. Meanwhile, from the lower bend of the Dnieper five divisions of the new German Sixth Army were encircled near Nikopol and seven others were crushed by Russian frontal attacks in the same area. On 9 February Nikopol was taken by the Russians and the German bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper was eliminated.
Twelve German divisions were crushed and more than 15,000 dead were left on the battlefields. The retreat across the Dnieper became precipitate. From then on one disaster after another befell the German forces along the entire front.

In the light of these events, there was a change of attitude in Finland and Romania. Later on, people in Germany claimed that the defection of these two countries came as a surprise and that the collapse of the northern and southern sectors of the eastern front was due to this treachery. That is not true. As early as September 1943 it was clear from radio traffic that Finland was preparing to get out of the war. In the first part of February 1944 a Finnish delegation arrived in Stockholm to negotiate with the Russian Ambassador Mrs. Kollontaj. Traffic between Sweden and Moscow increased sharply and was very revealing. The diplomatic representatives of the U.S.A. in Stockholm and Moscow began to talk out of school. Similar observations were made in respect to Romania beginning about mid-February and early in March the former Prime Minister Stirbey went to Cairo to discuss with the Allies Romania's withdrawal from the war. Early in March Russian terms for an armistice with Finland became known and on the 15th the Finnish Parliament debated the terms in a secret session. All this was known from radiograms more than 6 months before these two countries finally withdrew from the war. The only surprise was for the German people from whom the real situation was concealed as far as possible. The tragic thing was that Hitler, with characteristic obstinacy, refused to see and comprehend things.
which did not fit in with his ideas. It was dangerous to bring him reports which he did not wish to hear or believe. Only too late were measures taken and in consequence an entire German army was sacrificed needlessly in Romania.
The great Russian offensive which began in July 1943 ended nine months later in April 1944. It freed all of the Ukraine and White Russia. It cost the German army terrific losses in men and materiel. One major task remained in the south: to free the Crimea. On 8 April the Russian attack began and within a few days the German defense crumbled like a house of cards and the Russians took 20,000 prisoners. The Germans succeeded in holding the ruins of Sevastopol for three weeks, but on 9 May these ruins were captured and the remnants of the German Seventeenth Army, some 30,000 men, were compressed on Cape Khersones, a tiny peninsula. This was all that was left of an army which numbered nearly a quarter million men when it was in the area of Kuban and the foothills of the Caucasus. What followed was a slaughter which beggars description. On 13 May the last remnants of the 17th Army surrendered. On the same day, the official communique reported that German and Romanian ships had carried out an unparralled evacuation. In reality, barely 30,000 men were saved. What the communique failed to state was the fact that just the final phase of the struggle in the Crimea had cost almost 60,000 dead and more than 70,000 prisoners (Germans and Romanians).

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The Second World War was a war of surprises. And not merely military surprises. They were encountered everywhere at almost every turn. Especially if you were sitting at a radio apparatus. If you turned the dial, whether intentionally or lost in thought, you could be sure of finding on some frequency or other something absolutely new, sometimes of such a character as to take away your breath, at other times to force a laugh. I recall one evening in February 1944. It was about the 8th or 9th and I was sitting at my radio running over the whole world, figuratively speaking. Suddenly I ran into a telegram being sent by Cairo. It was in plain text. What caught my attention was a mention of the German Embassy in Ankara. With my interest thus aroused, I continued the reception and what I heard then and in the next few days reminded me vividly of the Hess case several years earlier. Three members of the German Embassy in Ankara had abandoned their posts and placed themselves under the protection of the local British Embassy. They were specialists of the so-called counterintelligence service of the embassy. To clarify what follows, it may be mentioned that all German official representatives and organizations abroad had been drawn into the espionage service. You could suspect of espionage any German organization, even a club of stamp collectors in Buenos Aires or Santiago, for in every case at least one person was
directly or indirectly working for the counterintelligence section of the Ministry of War in Berlin. This was almost certainly true of offices which could claim a limited or unlimited extra-territoriality. Extra-territorial rights were misused as a matter of principle. And so under the aegis of the ambassador, von Papen, and under the direct guidance of the military attaché, a German spy center for the entire Near and Middle East had been built up in Ankara. It had connections with dozens of big and little agencies and sources of information. It disseminated propaganda among the Arabs, Persians, Egyptians and Indians. Here, information regarding Allied military, political, and economic measures in the Near and Middle East was collected. This was also the gateway by which spies entered the Soviet Union, but this gateway was like a mouse trap - it almost always closed when anyone ventured inside.

Turkey had become a focal point and the espionage staff at the German embassy had been increased gradually until it numbered several thousand persons early in 1944. Each of these specialists possessed a dangerous amount of information. The defection of one individual could destroy the whole network of German espionage, counterespionage, and propaganda in the Near and Middle East. So it was noteworthy, or if you will - amusing, that first one and then two more specialists quit their jobs and went over to the enemy. They were not mere workers or clerks but relatively high officials who were well informed regarding everything. One had just married a cousin of Ambassador von Papen. What they took along in the way

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of papers, documents, photos or plans will probably never be known. They surely did not appear at the British Embassy with empty hands. They placed themselves under the protection of the Allies and were soon taken over the frontier. These men were Dr. Erich Vermehren, Willy Hamburger, and Carl von Klekowski with his wife; the last two were Austrians. It was a nice catch for the Allies.

Picture, if you can, the impression this made on Ribbentrop and Hitler! The military attaché in Ankara, General Hans von Rhode, was ordered to fly back and with him went four section heads of the embassy espionage service. But no cries of rage did any good. The damage could not be repaired. The Allies took care not to reveal what the three men had betrayed to them. The English did not react "like a flash" as National Socialism loved to do. Gradually but surely the whole German system of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda was lifted off its hinges. The German position in the Near East was hopelessly damaged.

But the German press printed not a word on the subject.

On 2 August 1944 Turkey broke off diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. Even before that, far reaching measures had been taken to abolish German espionage and propaganda on Turkish soil. The German espionage and propaganda net in Asia Minor ceased to exist.
ITALY

So far as I know, modern history records no alliance between two states which was more pathetically stressed than that between Nazi Germany and Facist Italy. Nevertheless, rarely has there been an alliance with so feeble a foundation. It rested solely on the personal friendship of Hitler and Mussolini. Even the contact between the dominant parties of the two countries was very loose, while between the armed forces of Italy and Germany there was nothing approaching a cordial collaboration; in fact between these armed forces there existed a deeprooted distrust, which was sometimes hidden from view by festivities but was always present.

Italy is the only country in Europe whose diplomatic systems were read by the Germans without interruption from the end of World War I to the end of World War II. We have spoken of the results of the military intercept service; what was learned by reading all the Italian diplomatic messages was even more extensive but played no decisive role down to 1933.

When in 1933 and 1934 the bond between Hitler and Mussolini began to assume concrete form, the German counterintelligence service was instructed to stop all espionage against Italy immediately. Only the intercept and cryptanalytic services underwent no change, and in 1935 actually increased their activity. The "Forschungsamt" was monitoring and deciphering all the telegrams and cablegrams of the Italian Embassy in Berlin.

Much might be said regarding the results of this monitoring
of a "friend and ally" but we must limit ourselves here. One thing was clear the Italian Officer Corps in general and the General Staff in particular were not favorable to Germany.

A few days after the war began, Admiral Canaris, Chief of Counterintelligence in the Ministry of War, called together all group leaders, specialists, and some representatives of the counterintelligence out-stations, and delivered a lecture on the political and military situation from the viewpoint of the counterintelligence service. While most of what he had to say was not particularly significant, that passage in his speech which dealt with Italy was very interesting. He said he knew that among the officers of the counterintelligence service the opinion prevailed that Italy would prove a most unreliable ally and that, no matter how things developed for the present, Italy would side with the opponents of Germany when things became critical.

Canaris said it was not the business of the counterintelligence officers to deal with such questions; that was the function of the political leaders. Of course he was right; but the statement that a majority of those officers who knew the situation in Italy felt that, in spite of all the agreements and the alliances with Hitler, Italy still inclined more to the other side was quite revealing.

At first this attitude was not obvious because National Socialist propaganda was busily trying to convince the German people that this alliance was firm as the Rock of Gibraltar. An outward confirmation was seen when Italy entered the war. Up to that point the German-Italian Alliance had not been subjected to any strain.
This came only after the failure of the air attack on England in September 1940 and again in connection with the Balkan campaign in April 1941.

From October 1940 on, Italian radiograms revealed throughout the Italian armed forces and diplomatic circles a turning away from the so-called Axis policy. I shall endeavor to prove that the German government knew about this attitude of important Italian circles and that it acted in spite of this knowledge when it continued to speak of a hearty accord with its Italian ally, seeking in this way to throw sand into the eyes of the German people. On the other hand, I shall show that by their too frank handling of radio traffic the Italians were affording German statesmen an advantage of which they had no notion. This is all the more astonishing because there was collaboration between the German and Italian cryptanalytic services. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed that the German cryptanalytic service was quite efficient and should have figured that Italian diplomatic traffic would be intercepted. Actually, all Italian traffic was monitored and all "esteri" and "italdipl" messages were currently deciphered.

The first Italian efforts to pave the way for a separate peace could be observed early in September 1941, that is to say, at a time when the German armies in the East were still advancing victoriously. At about the same time, serious tension arose between leading officers of the Italian armed forces and high officials of the Fascist Party. The military men were convinced
that the Blitzkrieg in the East had failed and that a victorious conclusion of the war had become impossible.

In October 1941 things had gone so far that German troops were held in readiness in case the Italian Government should be overthrown. In November 1941 the "Rote Drei" could report to Moscow that the Germans were more hated in Italy than in the occupied territories.

There was opposition to sending Italian divisions to the Eastern front in the spring of 1942 and contingents selected were all recruited from southern Italy and Sicily because the North Italians were in a revolutionary mood.

After the catastrophe of El Alamein, the shift in the attitude of influential military circles and of the royal household was completed. It had long been known in Germany that Crown Prince Umberto was anti-German at heart. Now the King openly turned away from Mussolini and late in December 1942 held conversations with the aim of creating a new government. This became known in Germany early in January 1943. The presence of strong German contingents in Italy and the slim success of the Allies in North Africa, made the King hesitate. In February the Italian government declined to send additional specialists to Germany.

On 13 May 1943 the Tunisian campaign ended. During the final eight days only three thousand men escaped to Italy. The Italian High Command stopped all work on coastal defenses in Eastern Sicily and withdrew coastal defense units. German commanders in
Italy had to force the Italians to take defensive measures.

On 28 June 1943 Italy expressed to the British ambassador at the Vatican, Osborne, its readiness to get out of the war and to open all its territories to the Allies. There were two conditions:

a. The invasion of Italy should be delayed to coincide with the Allies landing in the West.

b. The Allies were to refrain from demands or actions which would make it impossible for the Italians to hold off the Germans until the Allies were ready to attack on the Western Front.

This action by Italy and Italy's attempt to get similar offers for Romania and Finland were revealed to the German Government by deciphered radiograms. Steps were taken immediately to safeguard the German position in Italy against any Allied invasion and against the Italian armed forces. Soon afterward the Allies landed in Sicily; in Berlin, they figured in mid-July that Italy would desert them by the end of August and OKW planned accordingly. On 25 July Badoglio took over the government; Mussolini was arrested. The new government immediately entered into preliminary conversations with representatives of the Allies to bring about an armistice.

On 29 July the OKW informed Badoglio that the Germans reserved the right to take all appropriate steps to prevent the allies from establishing themselves in Italy or in areas occupied by Italy. Goering went to Northern Italy. In answer, the Italian government requested Germany to return 200,000 Italian laborers. The German answer took the form of new reinforcements and regroupings in Italy. On 3 September Italy signed an agreement for an armistice which should take effect at the moment most favorable for
the Allies. This happened on 8 September, but the favorable moment had been missed. The Germans had made preparations. The Italian Fifth Army waited until 11 September for the promised Anglo-Saxon aid and capitulated when this failed to appear. Numerous Italian units were disarmed by German troops. The goal of the Italian government to prevent Italy from becoming a theater of operations had not been achieved. Italian radio traffic had betrayed all plans prematurely and Italy had become a battle field, for a year and a half.
AGENT TRAFFIC IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Beginning early in 1941 one could note in the so-called "Protectorate" area of Czechoslovakia an increasing agent traffic which was controlled from England and worked for the British intelligence service. Even at that time the traffic was well established. There was other traffic which served the Russian intelligence service.

On 3 October 1941 the Germans took by surprise an agent transmitter in Prague which had been in constant communication with Moscow. Disclosures resulting from this seizure led to the arrest of 73 people, among them a former Major of the Czech army, who was working as head of the Russian intelligence service in Prague. The other net working with England was the more important and more dangerous. It was operated by a group of Czechs who belonged to the Czech resistance movement for the purpose of maintaining contact with the government in exile in London and transmitting espionage material. The traffic was so well camouflaged that only rarely could one break into this network. Peculiarities of German traffic were utilized as a disguise.

The attempt upon the life of Heydrich had been planned and directed over this network. That was a big mistake on the part of the English and Czechs because it afforded the German radio defense a complete disclosure not only of the plot itself and those directly participating but also of all the connections.
within the Czech resistance movement.

In 1944 German cryptanalysts succeeded in breaking the cryptographic system of the Czech resistance and emigre organization. Radiograms from London, Kuybyshev, Istanbul, Haifa, Cairo, and Bagdad were deciphered. The content gave interesting information regarding efforts of General Gak, leader of the Czech Legion in the Near East, to cooperate in a military way with Russia on the basis of the Benes agreement. These messages gave details of the organization and strength of the Slovak army and of German forces in Slovakia.

Late in 1943 the Germans succeeded in carrying on for a considerable time a radio deception with Moscow after picking up a Russian radio agent in Bohemia.

Beginning in May 1944 an increased commitment of parachute agents of the English-Czech resistance movement could be observed in the Protectorate. Most of these groups of agents were picked up at once. There were some 15 well-trained groups which were to establish direct connection with London and actively support the resistance movement.

In Slovakia, which "allied" with Germany and where, according to statements in the German press, such a thing was least to be expected, the resistance movement flared up in the middle of 1944 and in this connection the traffic of agents and bands played a special role. Late in August the revolt broke out openly. Even before that, increased radio activity of agents from and to this area could
be recognized. The revolt had been prepared long before by the Czechs and Russians. On two radio links, which were monitored by the Germans, the English-Czech intelligence service of the Benes Group had made contact with officer circles hostile to Germany. The two radio stations were in Neusohl and Sillein. The uprising was directed from these areas. Moreover, a Czechoslovak legion in the Soviet Union had dropped parachutists with radios in the areas Mucacevo, Uzhorod, Neusohl, Rosenberg, and Povaska Bystrica; they were to report on the status of Slovak preparations and on all matters of military importance to the government in exile in London and to the Czech military mission in Russia.

In part, the traffic was developed very clumsily so that the German radio defense was informed of events during all phases of this revolt. Thus it was possible to suppress the rebellion, although it had been well organized, and to uncover all its ramifications. This revolt, like that of the Poles in Warsaw, turned out to be a tragedy for the rebels.

In December 1944, Germans in the neighborhood of Polonka picked up an Anglo-American mission of 14 men with complete radio apparatus and other material for handling traffic. It had been dropped by parachute in September, was supposed to observe the revolt and later to smuggle through the lines the crews of any aircraft shot down.
There are pretty women all over the world and probably the women of every country are convinced that their own country has produced the most beautiful type. But just as there experts on radiotelegraphy, there are also, ostensibly, experts at judging female beauty. Such an expert once assured me he was ready to be boiled and baked if it were not true that the prettiest women in the world were in the Balkans.

Meanwhile he has lost his life in an auto accident and the death he was willing to undergo can no longer be inflicted on him. But perhaps his idea was right after all and possibly the countless wars which have been waged in the Balkans since the creation of woman are connected with this fact. Who knows? - I do not. I am no expert in this field. But I have seen a picture of a woman which inclines me to grant that the "specialist" was right. It was the picture of a Bulgarian woman with the melodious and significant name Milka.

Milka means "the lovely one". She was beautiful, that is true. Whether she was always lovely - who can judge?

Thus far I have spoken only of the women; fairness compells me to say a few words about the men of the Balkans. They are just as different here as in other parts of the world. But - along with their indubitably good qualities - they usually have one characteristic in common; they do not like to occupy much of their time with work. They go on the assumption that man was not created to work.
restlessly to reshape the world but was created to enjoy what
nature produces, if one merely helps out a little. They take the
attitude that the penalty imposed on man when he was expelled from
Paradise, namely to live by the sweat of his brow, has long since
been paid and is passed and that we can now lay claim to a condition
slowly approximating life in Paradise.

This view was entertained by the young Bulgarian, Stoinoff.
He was a man of good mental ability and, confiding in his intellect
and his lucky star, had considered it superfluous to ruin the golden
period of his youth by too zealous study in school. It was enough
for him to have learned a little reading and writing and arithmetic;
anything else seemed to him excess ballast and he thought it un-
wise to render life difficult with too much baggage.

Since he was a consistent fellow, he stuck to this attitude,
even after leaving school. He contented himself with working a little
now and then, so as to earn what was indispensible to his existence,
and was heartily glad when at a dance he became acquainted with
pretty Milka who, like himself, was far more inclined toward the
joyous than toward the serious side of life. The two young people
took a liking to one another and the hot sun of southern Europe
did the rest. They married and were convinced that heaven would
grant them a carefree life just as it does the birds in the air
and the fishes in the water. But it turned out that heaven was
often obscured by heavy clouds and the sun did not always shine.
That induced the two to consider the course of the world and,
since the sun rises in the East, they turned their glances toward
the East and decided to journey some day to the region where some
people claimed that Paradise on earth and the golden age of mankind
had dawned.

They didn't consider long but resolved to act. And since you
can go from Varna to Odessa by ship in 24 hours, their resolve one
day became an accomplished fact.

But it turned out that even in the East ripe fruit did not
fall into the mouth of the hungry if one made no attempt to climb
the tree and pick it, and that in the Soviet Union, even more than
elsewhere, people are of the opinion that work makes life sweet.
Since the two had arrived in a strange country without money and
had to learn to their regret that you cannot live in a Communist
state without cash, they adjusted themselves to the new situation
with heavy heart and accepted the job which was generously offered
them.

That was in the year 1935.

Stoinoff would have been untrue to his philosophy if he had
not sought some comfortable escape from this uncomfortable situation.
And since the Bible says one must seek in order to find, he sought
and also found one day a connection with a man who held out pros-
spects of living an agreeable life with very little labor. In
making this acquaintance pretty Milka had helped somewhat; this
does not mean that I would like to say anything unlovely about the
lovely lady.
With a good letter of recommendation from the Russian in question, the two journeyed to Moscow, where they were well received and were housed in a building which looked like a school and turned out to be one.

This time, however, it was not so easy to regard as a joke the instruction to which the two had to submit. The Russians turned out to be strict schoolmasters. They learned the Russian language, learned geography; they learned technology — in particular radio technology; they received instruction in the law of Bolshevism; they learned the Morse alphabet; and one day they were told that they would now receive the assignment of returning to Bulgaria and working there for Russia as radio agents. There would not be much to do, they need only gather information in certain ways, make friends (in this, pretty Milka could help) and then transmit to Moscow at specified times and on the specified wavelength the information obtained.

Stoinoff and his wife assented gladly; they got some supplemental training in military matters, industry, communications, and economics; a few weeks later, equipped with a nice little shortwave radio, technical material, and money, they found themselves back in Plovdiv in Bulgaria, where they moved into a little house and for the moment made some acquaintances on the basis of addresses given them. Meanwhile their family name had changed. Their name was no longer Stoinoff but Mirtscheff.

That was the year 1939.
Meanwhile World War II had broken out and Moscow entertained no illusions as to how things would develop. That the Balkans would sooner or later be in flames - as so often in their history - was clear. It was time to get busy. And Mirtscheff went to work.

In him the Russians had not made a bad catch. He took a liking to his new job. The radio connection functioned well, nobody disturbed him; the task of making contacts and acquaintances and the gathering of information just suited him and his young wife.

Mirtscheff was a clever boy who soon succeeded in recruiting for the new job his brother Stoino Stoinoff and his brother's wife, Zarah, who were in Varna. Stoino was a technician and so had a good foundation for radio work and was in other ways a "smart boy". His wife likewise did not come into this world asleep and so there was soon a first-rate community of effort. Milka undertook to train Zarah as radio operator, while Stoinoff undertook the technical maintenance of two sets which had meanwhile arrived from Russia. His main job was gathering information.

The Bulgarian people at that time were politically divided: one party was definitely pro-German, the other pro-Russian. The two brothers could use both groups in their work: one as a source of information, the other for conscious cooperation.

After a year of very intensive activity in establishing connections, Mirtscheff and his wife had a circle of collaborators and informers which reached up into the highest positions of the Bulgarian government and of the military command, yes, even into
the General Staff. The radiograms which he or his wife and Zarah sent in cipher to Moscow and Tiflis had more and more content.

But it was not until the autumn of 1940, when the campaign in France ended and Hitler was actively preparing for his campaign in the Balkans, that the messages of the two brothers began to be really valuable. Meanwhile two more agents with radios had joined his working group and these were followed in the spring of 1941 by three more. They worked from Sofia, Plevna, Varna, Burgas and Plovdiv; also from a village near the Turkish border in the vicinity of Adrianople.

Hitherto the German intercept service had not noticed these circuits; it had been too much occupied with assignments in Poland and in the West. But the Mirtscheff group was working all shifts. Mirtscheff was the leader and soul of the entire organization but in the gathering of news Milka was the leading spirit. All reports on German troop movements, on German auxiliary airfields and naval bases, on gasoline supplies, radio stations, German staffs, on diplomatic negotiations, on the cooperation of Bulgarian officials, organizations, and individuals with the Germans, went to Russia. All events within the Bulgarian army and government, reports on popular feeling, on the work of parties, organizations, industrial output, deliveries to Germany - all this was carefully spied out, reduced to radiograms and transmitted. After Romania and Hungary had been occupied by German forces, there was plenty of material and plenty of sources. They merely had to represent themselves as friendly to the Germans
in order to secure useful information.

Behind Mirtscheff's entire organization stood, as protector, Vinogradoff, Russian Vice-Consul in Varna, while the Russian embassy in Sofia put up the cash.

Not until the autumn of 1941, when the war in the East was in full swing, did some of the German intercept stations repeatedly hears suspicious traffic emanating from the Balkans (presumably from Bulgaria). However, they were too preoccupied with their Russian opponent to find any time for monitoring. The war in the East went on and the multitude of partisan radio stations which appeared occupied the German monitoring service to the full. A system of intercept stations running on a north-south line from Riga to Nikolaev was established in order to have a good base for hearing and locating Russian stations. So it was not until the autumn of 1942 that careful observation of these mysterious Balkan stations began. In November there were already twelve which worked with the characteristics of Russian agent stations. Now a systematic coverage began.

On a rainy January day in 1943, when the Battle of Stalingrad was at its dramatic height, great excitement reigned in the central office of the German intercept service on Matthew Square in Berlin. They had succeeded in breaking the cipher used by the suspicious stations in the Balkans and had deciphered a few
dozens out of the many hundreds of messages picked up during the preceding months. From these it was evident that the radiograms not only contained highly important information, but that high Bulgarian statesmen were clearly cooperating with Russia, yes, that even ministers and generals were conspiring with this group of agents. The decipherment of additional telegrams proved that an organization was involved which comprised two groups covering the entire country, with collaborators in all Bulgarian offices.

Now it was certain that these stations must be sought in Bulgaria. But since the German D/F base in the east ran from north to south, the resulting angles were so acute that the location could not be fixed. Orders were issued by telegraph for other D/F stations to cover the Bulgarian stations constantly and finally the approximate localities were determined. Early in February 1943 a short-range D/F platoon was dispatched to the Varna area, which soon learned that one of the principal stations must be located on the northern edge of the town. The house and room were soon spotted. It was a mansard room in the third story of an apartment house.

Meanwhile, pretty Milka was going quietly about her work. Her circle of acquaintances was getting larger and larger. She received invitations and fluttered from one pleasure to another. But all these pleasures were hard work for her, especially when it was a question of getting proof of some important piece of news or of getting confirmation from various sources. Milka
became the Mata Hari of Bulgaria and Mirtscheff's organization became the "Rote Drei" of the Balkans.

Milka remained modest in her manner of life. She bought herself neither costly clothes nor expensive jewelry. Her only weakness was for silk underwear nice, fine silk underwear with lots of lace. Such things were expensive in the Balkans; they were easier to get in Germany, and so were dainty, thin silk stockings. And it was a piece of irony that she, who was working against Germany, was getting these things from Germany. Not directly, but in roundabout ways. By diplomacy. As diplomatic baggage.

Slowly the German net closed about Mirtscheff and his stations. The first blow was to be struck against the station in Varna; it was Zarah's.

For a long time the Germans deliberated how to call in the Bulgarian police to pick up the station, because it was likely that the agents had confidants among the police. Finally the leader of the German unit requested some Bulgarian secret police and did not reveal the actual purpose until the very last moment.

You can hardly call the action of the Germans clever in this case. Interception of agent messages in Bulgaria had shown that they must be interconnected and have personal contacts with one another. In such a situation it would have been appropriate to pick up all the stations at the same time. Since the counterintelligence forces were not sufficient for that, they contented themselves with picking up one station after another. The raid on
the station in Varna was scheduled for 21 February 1943. It was known that this operator put through his traffic with Moscow every morning at 4 o'clock; this was the time chosen for the surprise.

The German and Bulgarian officials approached the house cautiously by night and took up concealed positions. The house lay in deep darkness. At 0345 hours an electric light flashed in the mansard room. Immediately afterwards the heavy curtains were drawn together.

A few minutes later two German radio operators, who had brought along a set, heard the agent send a rather long message. Now they tried to break into the house but were so unskilful in opening the locked door that a pane of glass broke. The men climbed the three flights; one soldier climbed to the roof and noiselessly removed the antenna to prevent the agent from sending out a warning signal when he became aware of the intruders.

Now all was ready. They gathered before the door of the apartment, not without some noise in the silence of the night. When they tried to pick the lock they found the key was in it and that the door was also bolted. Making up their minds quickly, they broke a pane of glass and reached in to open the door. Noisily they forced their way into the kitchen in order to get to the living room. At the same moment, both Zarah and Stoino Stoinoff appeared with blank astonishment on their faces to ask the cause of this disturbance. Both were completely dressed and showed no signs of the sleepiness which might have been expected when people were suddenly awakened at 4 o'clock.
The Bulgarian police told the couple it had been ascertained that they had a radio apparatus in the dwelling and had just transmitted a message. Zarah and Stoino looked at one another in amazement and then declared there must be an error because they had no transmitter in the apartment and had only gotten up to go to the doctor because Zarah had suddenly been taken ill.

However, Zarah did not give the impression of being sick but looked extremely well. And when the German soldiers went into the bedroom they noticed on the lady's night table an alarm clock set for 0345 hours, i.e. a quarter of an hour before the normal transmission time. Hence it was quite unlikely that Zarah knew when she went to bed that she and her husband would have to get up at 0345 on account of a sudden illness.

Now the whole dwelling was searched but no trace of a radio was found. They went through the coal box and stove, emptied the kitchen cabinet, pulled beds apart, climbed on tables and chests, and created chaos in all the rooms, but they found no radio. On the other hand, they did find some tools and parts of a radio set. From this they could conclude that work on such an apparatus had been done in the apartment. But Stoino denied this, while his wife said she knew so little about technology that she couldn't tell a transmitter from a broadcast receiver. It was all a ridiculous mistake and she wished they would be so good as to leave them in peace.

Now the man was interrogated and it came out that he worked
daily until 1630 hours in the German seaplane harbor, 7 kilometers southwest of Varna. He was able to prove this statement at once. Consequently he could not be the operator since the station was heard every afternoon at 1500 hours. His wife asserted she had no idea of how to send radiograms and knew the Morse alphabet only from hearsay.

Now the two were separated and the man was threatened with all the tortures of Dante's Inferno if he did not confess. Meanwhile the dwelling had been searched again with no success. After long denial, the man decided to confess that his wife was the operator and that the transmitter was in a hiding place he had built under the floor of the living room. A rug covered the spot but even after it was removed it was hard to detect the cover of the secret compartment. When the hiding place was opened they found not one transmitter but two, of which one was intended as a spare. Moreover, they found the message which had just been sent and a list of call signs and operational signals.

Now they set up the antenna again; the uninvited intruders departed with the couple they had arrested, leaving a Bulgarian and a German behind to receive possible visitors.

Three hours later there arrived, all unsuspecting and in the best of spirits, a reserve officer of the Bulgarian airforce who was bringing with him, in addition to some interesting papers and sketches, the sum of 50,000 leva. This was a sum which he would hardly be carrying around with him ordinarily, but the young man
asserted that that was nobody's business and refused to give any information. The Bulgarian secret police, however, remained curious; they locked the officer up in a dark cell, gave him nothing to eat for the time being, and fetched him out every two hours for questioning. They suggested certain disagreeable consequences, smoked some good Bulgarian cigarettes in his presence, without offering him any, and drank "sliwowitz."

After two days, he made a comprehensive confession. From this it appeared that the radio fixed by the Germans in Plovdiv had been in very close contact with the station in Varna. There had been close personal contact between the two stations. He gave the exact address of the Plovdiv station.

An automobile filled with members of the German armed forces immediately dashed off to the address given. They stormed into the dwelling but in spite of careful search found not the slightest trace of the transmitter, although this time they did not forget to inspect the flooring. What they did find was an inordinate amount of the finest silk and lace underwear and a pretty young lady who seemed to go with it and who complained bitterly at the disturbance, holding out in prospect all the torments of heaven and earth for the intruders, if they did not clear out at once.

It was Milka and she was not unduly surprised by this sudden visit. She had really been expecting it. For the following reason.

On the day after the Varna station was raided, Milka planned to visit her sister-in-law, Zarah. When she saw the broken pane of glass in the outside door of the house she became suspicious.
Cautiously she went upstairs. In the door of the apartment she noticed another broken pane and was now certain something unpleasant might have happened. She left the house in a hurry. She hunted up a couple of her go-betweens and another radio agent, warned them, and took the next conveyance home. Mirtscheff immediately removed the radio and antenna and lit out. Milka remained in the apartment although she was the one who had operated the set. She felt absolutely secure, however, and decided to await calmly whatever might come.

There was a long hearing, since Milka denied everything. She had no idea that the Bulgarian reserve officer had betrayed her. Not until she was told this did her resistance cease.

Meanwhile, Zarah had been induced to tell something about the encipherment and decipherment of the telegrams. With these hints, all messages intercepted by the Germans were deciphered, both those from the two stations raided and those from stations not yet discovered. On the basis of this information the remaining agents of the group could be picked up one after the other.

By now things were really moving. The deciphered messages yielded deep insight into the entire spy net. The Bulgarian Government was informed. But Hitler had to be told, too. This revelation placed the entire Balkan situation in a new light. Hitler raged. Ribbentrop wore his most stupid expression. Serious demarches were made to the Bulgarian King. Czar Boris journeyed to Hitler's Headquarters with a heavy heart. The Bulgarian government was made over. King Boris bestowed a couple of dozen high orders on German officials.
and officers, which were pinned on the corresponding breasts and bellies or hanged about their necks. These were supposed to work like essence of valerian on the mood of the German government.

Now Milka was taken over by the German monitoring service. They had all the necessary materials for a little deceptive game. Moreover, they felt certain the raid had been executed so cleverly that Moscow and Tiflis could not have been warned. They tried to persuade Milka to take part in the game. At first she refused, but later she consented and a little game began which cost the Germans much time and effort and probably evoked much hilarity at the Russian end since the Russians had been informed promptly of the arrest. Milka's observations in Varna and her prompt warning of the other agents had sufficed to tip off the Center. The pretty lady played her role admirably to the end. Soon one of the agents who had been arrested succeeded in escaping to Russia. Then Moscow got a clear account of what had happened.

In Bulgaria there were wholesale changes of personnel but this finally stopped and there was no change whatsoever in the general situation. The information which had gone to Russia had been sufficient to cause the Germans serious damage. However, the Germans now recognized that Bulgaria was no longer any real asset.
NOTABLE HAPPENINGS IN HUNGARY AND ITALY

When the history of World War II is written, some odd things will be discovered regarding Germany, particularly in the second half of the war. It will often be found that the beginning or the development of this or that was known to the Germans in good season, but rarely will one be able to ask: "What happened then?"; rather one will mostly have to ask: "What failed to happen then"? Typical are the cases of Bulgaria, Romania, and Finland. However, there were cases when the Germans actually did something. Even at the proper time! We have already mentioned the case of Italy. The second such case - although less dramatic and much less significant - was that of Hungary.

In February 1943 the German intercept service learned for the first time that the Hungarian Government was putting out feelers through the Vatican for a separate peace. Provided Hungary's boundaries remained intact, the country was ready to support the Allies in case of a landing in the Balkans. At the same time, Hungary called for the return of 30,000 woodworkers from Germany. The negotiations brought no results at that time.

Early in 1944 it was obvious from decrypted traffic that the Hungarians were cautiously putting out feelers to find some way to escape from their difficult situation. To bring about a change of attitude in Hungary, the Chief of State, Horthy, was summoned to Hitler's Headquarters in mid-March. Here it became apparent that Horthy himself was in favor of these efforts. The Germans
decided to act at once. In the night from 19 to 20 March, "at the wish of the Hungarian Government and in cordial collaboration with it", Hungary was occupied by German troops and Sunday morning (20.3.) the people of Budapest rubbed their eyes with astonishment as the Germans marched in. Horthy was subjected to pressure and Hitler succeeded in inducing him to continue the struggle on the side of Germany.

The Kallay Government had to resign and the Sztojay Government replaced it on 22 March. Kallay fled to the Turkish embassy in Budapest, was granted sanctuary and remained there despite all efforts to get him.

Döme Sztojay had been Hungarian ambassador in Berlin and his name had been Stojakowitsch. He later changed his name into Magyar but continued to be regarded as a convinced advocate of German-Hungarian friendship and collaboration.

The ever more unfavorable situation in the east and the obviously impending defection of Finland, Romania, and Bulgaria created for the new Hungarian Government ever more serious difficulties, which led to a new change of government. On 29 August the Lakatos Government was formed. Now influential military circles, individual members of the government, and Horthy himself began to think of a separate peace. The German collapse in France decided matters. Beginning early in September, decrypted Hungarian messages exchanged between the government and some of its representatives abroad revealed clearly that the Hungarians through their representatives abroad
at the Vatican and Ankara, were seriously seeking an armistice and a separate peace. This time it was not a question of feelers but of unmistakable preparations for getting out of the war. Not only this, the commander of the First Hungarian Army, Mőklos von Dalnok, was already conferring with representatives of the Russian army facing him.

The National Socialist government immediately consulted with leaders of the Hungarian Pfeilkreuz [Arrow Cross] Party and prepared a coup d'état for the overthrow of Horthy after the model of the action in Austria in 1938. The Hungarian Government was to give the signal itself. And it did. On Sunday, 15 October, Chief of State Horthy made over the Hungarian Broadcasting Station his famous declaration renouncing the former policy and saying it was unworthy of Hungary, in view of the changed military situation, to continue to serve as protective bumper for the Germans and to expose the country to destruction. He already had the main terms of an armistice.

Now the moment had come for active intervention. In the night before 16 October the coup was pulled off. Horthy was taken into custody and Szalasi took over the Government. German troops and officials rendered active aid. Horthy was forced to declare his proclamation to the Hungarian people null and void and to announce his retirement.

The German people did not learn of the event until two days later.
It seems strange that the two countries which for years had collaborated most closely with Germany in the matter of interception and cryptanalysis, and which therefore must have known the risk involved in the use of radio and must have been able to figure that the Germans were intercepting their wire lines and who knew about the work of the German intercept service in deciphering foreign systems, - it seems strange that these countries made the incomprehensible mistake of compromising their most secret messages by transmitting them by radio in blind reliance on the security of their own ciphers. There is hardly anything more ironical in world history than what went on here. The two allied nations which worked most closely with Germany in deciphering the radiograms of other nations had no idea that they were being watched by the Germans and that their secret telegrams were all being read. An explanation may be found in the fact that countries ruled as these were permit only an orientation which converges in the top command. I should like to term it vertical orientation. Horizontal orientation, on the other hand, is not only neglected but consciously suppressed. A classical example is the well known "basic order" of Adolph Hitler dated 11 January 1940 in which we read:

1. No one, no office, no officer is to learn of any matter which is to be kept secret, if such knowledge is not absolutely essential for official reasons.

2. No office and no officer is to learn more of matter which is to be kept secret than is necessary for the carry out
of its or his assignment.

At first sight this order appears quite correct and proper. In practice the result in countries ruled by terror is that in the face of such orders from the top a sort of fear psychosis results and people act on the principle: "better tell five offices or people too few than one too many."

No wonder that in such countries the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing, when what had been learned by one office was carefully kept secret from all others. Wholesale errors and failures were inevitable.

Secrecy is good; only it must not be overdone within one's own organization.
When the Polish Government fled to London in 1939 it began building up a new Polish state underground. The main supports were members of the former administration who had remained in what had been Poland. England supported the exiled government, expecting that Polish activity would tie up considerable German forces; furthermore, the intelligence network required to direct the Polish resistance movement functioned in the interest of British intelligence. Since the exiled government was so completely cut off from Poland, and since speed and accuracy of transmission and adequate camouflage were necessary, the radio became all important.

German intercepts showed that even in 1940 the Poles had an intelligence network which covered all Europe. It depended in the main on radio and was so well camouflaged that it eluded German observation for a long time. The net was constantly expanded but German "Radio Defense" did not recognize its nature and structure clearly until the latter half of 1941.

Polish radio intelligence assumed a more or less dual character. Leading personalities scattered over all parts of the world had to communicate with one another in order to safeguard their interests and to keep their leaders informed. The control station was in London. Ultimately there was both diplomatic and agent traffic, although a clear differentiation
was not always possible. The diplomatic stations were in neutral or
Allied countries, while the agents were usually in areas under German
control or in neutral countries.

The discipline of these stations was commendable. Traffic was
so well disguised that it could be recognized as Polish only after
long observation. Of course on a few occasions the operators
betrayed themselves by using Polish words and abbreviations but it
was almost a year before the Germans realized that they were
listening to a net of the Polish espionage service. Eventually the
cryptographic system was broken. It was astonishing to see how the
Government in Exile had built up a service with its very limited
means. Fifty links were recognized. The stations were in London,
in unoccupied France, in Russia, in the Near East, in the Balkans,
in Scandinavia and, above all, in Poland itself, where there were
stations in Warsaw, Lemberg, Bialystok, Stanislau, Jaroslaw, Lublin,
Krakow, Zamose, Bilia, Podlaska, Petrikau, Tschenstuchau, Kielce,
Sandomierz, Deblin, Kowel, Vilna, Grodno, Novogradek, Kamienna,
Ostrowiec, Random, etc. In the Near East there were stations in
Istambul, Cairo, Teheran, Bagdad, and Jerusalem.

The Polish organization inside the Government General was
split up into various cells, with no personal contact between them.
Communication was only via London. Even the agents employed in
Warsaw usually had no contact with one another.

In September 1942 came the first major German raid in Warsaw.
There were numerous arrests and instruments and documents were
confiscated. Even then, close range action in Warsaw proved very

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difficult because the Polish population was clearly working closely with the radio agents and warned them. When German D/F detachments approached, traffic was broken off at once and often transmission went on without any break from another transmitter at a different location.

The next major blow against Polish agents came in December 1942 when several transmitters of the resistance movement were picked up in Warsaw and other places. Among those arrested was the head of the radio technical section of the illicit communication service.

The organization in Warsaw was almost fantastic. If one station was picked up and the personnel arrested, it was immediately replaced by another and operations went on unchanged. No matter how many arrests the Germans made, the organization was unshaken and went on working. After every raid a new operator with a new set took over the old traffic. At times 15 or more transmitters were being watched in Warsaw alone.

This net was planned to assure communications for the Polish military resistance movement. There was also a special radio net for military espionage of the Polish General Staff in London. Coping with this traffic was difficult, because after each transmission the operators changed their location and because they also had watchers posted. To disguise their traffic they frequently changed their manner of handling it.
It should also be noted that women were used as operators, watchers and couriers. The organization had its own workshops, high-speed telegraph installations, etc.

Whenever the Poles made use of wireless they were exceedingly cautious. The operators received the messages in enciphered form; if one was captured, he was not in a position to tell anything about the cryptographic system used.

In the summer of 1943 a change was noted in the radio situation. To the former radio network two new ones were added:

1. An alarm net with transmitter in England and receivers in occupied Poland, and
2. An operational net with a considerable number of transmitters and receivers in Poland which communicated with one another only through the control station in England.

The German radio defense did not always raid a station when its location was known; it often proved more profitable to read the traffic and thus gain extensive insight into the structure and activity of the illegal Polish organization. Thus the plans for the August revolt in Warsaw had been learned by the Germans long before the revolt occurred.
The year 1944 saw the following developments in Polish agent traffic:

1. Preparation for the general revolt;
2. Touching off the revolt in Warsaw;
3. Shift in the traffic after the revolt.

In May it was already clear that the movement was receiving increased supplies and equipment by air. In June it was possible to get a picture of the preparations for opening the revolt and it was no surprise for the Germans when, on 25 July at 1600 hours, transmissions began over the "Polish alarm net" which signified the impending start of the revolt. Certain watchwords were to be sent out over the alarm net as signals for the preliminary stages "watchfulness" and "readiness". The "watchfulness" stage might last as long as 14 days, while the "readiness" stage must be followed by the revolt within 48 hours.

The watchwords sent out beginning 25 July all suggested that the "watchfulness" stage had been proclaimed for both zones. Beginning 30 July changes were noted in traffic which were interpreted as cancellation of the "watchfulness" order for the protective zone and one thought this was explained by the rapid advance of the Russians. In reality it was a cleverly executed manner of proclaiming the readiness stage, and the Polish revolt began precisely 48 hours later.
It was soon noticed that, following the appeal of General Bor for support of the Warsaw revolt, there was a concentration of agent radio stations around Warsaw. Intercepted traffic revealed flights of supply planes.

It was asserted later that the English left the Poles in the lurch and did not supply them with arms, ammunition etc. This is not quite true. Supply was well organized but prompt warning of the coming of supply planes by German radio intelligence made it possible to keep a large part of the material from benefiting the insurgents.

During the Warsaw revolt, traffic on the Polish diplomatic net also increased sharply. It was interesting to see how the Poles tried to form in London a government which would be generally recognized. The conflicts between the special interests of the U.S.A., England, and the Soviet Union were revealed, while jealousy, ambition, distrust and discord among Polish leaders prevented any positive steps. The Poles had started a revolt on their own responsibility. They had merely made arrangements with the English for supplies but they had not discussed the matter with the Russians. Consequently the latter emphatically disclaimed any interest, did nothing to support the insurgents, and claimed the revolt merely aimed at winning the political favor of the Soviet Government.
The Warsaw revolt, which was intended to be Poland's most heroic action, finally became one of the great tragedies of the war. On 2 October 1944, on the 63rd day of the struggle, came the surrender. The city was destroyed; the blood of thousands had been shed in vain.

Information regarding the background of the revolt and the political attitude of the Government in Exile was obtained from intercepted messages of the Polish Civil Delegation. Traffic of the resistance movement continued undiminished during the Warsaw revolt but after this had been crushed general changes were noted, suggesting re-groupings and displacements of forces within the AK. Radio activity tended to concentrate in the general areas of Kielce-Radom, Krakow and the foothills of the Carpathians.

The attitude of the Polish AK had, toward the end, become in part definitely anti-Soviet and attacks on the Germans from their rear were stopped. On the other hand, the attitude of the AK was very undecided. However, the further course of events in the East soon rendered this unimportant.
WHAT WAS HAPPENING MEANWHILE IN THE WEST

Having occupied ourselves at some length with the east and southeast, we shall now cast a glance toward the west where - according to Hitler - the war had ended on 22 June 1940. Looked at superficially, that was true - save for the air war which was becoming ever more violent. France had become an El Dorado for the troops stationed there. There one found things to eat, drink, and purchase which had long since disappeared in Germany. Every German soldier hoped to get to France and share in the good things for a time. But behind the scenes something had been going on since late 1940 of which very few people knew anything. This was the prelude to that which was to prove fateful to the German forces three and one-half years later. It was the development of the resistance movement and of the radio agent service, which we shall now discuss.

The Polish Agent Radio Service in France and Belgium

After the collapse of Poland, part of the officials and of the general staff officers who fled to England via the Balkans, remained in France and began gathering together all Polish elements. The immediate purpose was to smuggle Polish citizens to England via Spain and Portugal for service in the Polish Legion. Since among the prominent Poles in France there were many former members of the II Section; i.e. of the Polish intelligence service, and since the attempt to evacuate Poles
was not very successful, the "out-station France of the II Section of the Polish General Staff" was ordered by the Government in Exile to set up an espionage network for the benefit of the Allies. At the same time, an exceptionally smooth-functioning radio network was set up for purposes of control and to forward the information gathered.

The Polish intelligence service in France had the following tasks:

1. Spotting concentrations of the German army, air force and navy.
2. Transport by land and sea and naval movements.
3. Ammunition dumps; coastal fortifications, especially on the French coast after the occupation of Northern France.
4. Selection of targets for air attack.
5. Ascertaining and reporting everything which demanded immediate action by the military command.
6. Details regarding the French armament industry working for Germany, with reports on new weapons and planes.

The Poles carried on their work from southern France which had not been occupied by the Germans. Beginning in September 1942 it was certain that Polish agent stations were located in the immediate vicinity of the higher staffs of the French armistice army.

In March 1943 German counterintelligence was able to deal the Polish organization a serious blow but after a few weeks it revived, following a reorganization. Beginning in the summer of 1943 messages could be read. They contained military and economic information.
The Poles in southern France worked as an independent group and received instructions from England, partly by courier, and partly by radio. They collaborated closely with the staff of General Giraud in North Africa and with American intelligence service in Lisbon. Official French couriers traveling between Vichy and Lisbon were used, with or without their knowledge, to carry reports (in the form of microfilm concealed in the covers of books).

The Poles had a special organization to check on German rail traffic to France. It watched traffic at the following frontier points: Trier, Aachen, Saarbrücken, München-Gladbach, Strassburg Mühlhausen and Belfort. They also watched the Rhine crossings at Duisburg, Coblenz, Düsseldorf, Köln, Mannheim, Mainz, Ludwigshafen, and Wiesbaden. Ten transmitters were used for this purpose.

All the Polish organizations in France were directed by General Julius Kleeberg. They worked primarily against Germany and in three fields:

1. Espionage and intelligence;
2. Smuggling [personnel];
3. Courier service.

Head of the "smuggling service" until 1.6.1944 was the celebrated Colonel Jaklicz, followed later by Lt. Colonel Goralski. Jaklicz tried to penetrate all Polish organizations and send all available man power via Spain to England for service in the Polish army.
The "courier net" in France served the "Civil Delegation", the smuggler net, and the espionage service by forwarding reports. The function of the Civil Sector of the "Civil Delegation" in France was to prepare the Poles in France to fight for an independent Poland by setting up action groups, to combat Communism among the Poles, and to fight against the occupying Germans. The tasks of the military sector of the Delegation were to organize groups with military training to carry on sabotage, to take part in the invasion, and to recruit Poles for military service on "D-Day". The "Civil Delegation" was particularly concerned with Poles in the German O.T. (Organisation Todt) or in the armed forces. It sought to set up cells which would encourage desertion and to supply information.

Early in 1944 this spy net shifted to Northern France and the Channel Coast. The Poles sought to camouflage this development by sending their messages from the Grenoble area and permitting transmitters in Northern France to send only occasional operational chatter. The center asked primarily for reports and figures on German troops, tanks and planes, the production of parts in France, strength at airfields, fuel deliveries from Germany, French police, constabulary, concentration camps and control offices, as well as rocket aircraft, rocket bombs and unmanned aircraft.

In February 1944 the Germans found that Polish agents were getting very important information by tapping the army telephone
In March 1944 the Germans made a successful raid and obtained important radio and cryptographic material. Quite a few agents were arrested and the structure of the organization was fully revealed.

Beginning early in June, increased activity of Polish radio agents in France became noticeable. They covered German control points and tried to report currently all troop movements. German counterintelligence was able to clarify the organization, its members, and its activity, by reading some 3,000 intercepted messages in connection with traffic analysis. With the aid of the Security Police preparations were made for action "Fichte" which was carried out on 13 July 1944 and netted over 300 prisoners in all parts of France.

This, together with preliminary and simultaneous actions, affected:

1. The intelligence service of the Polish II. Section,
2. The smuggling service,
3. The courier service with its wide ramifications.

The importance of the work of the Poles in France is indicated by the fact that in May 1944 Lubicz and two agents were commended by persons very high in the Allied command "because their work was beginning to surpass first class French sources". These agents had supplied the plans of
all German defense installations in French territory and valuable details regarding weapons and special devices.

Decrypted messages revealed to the Germans that a director of the Creusot plants was supplying the Poles with very important information for England, primarily on plane production. The bombing of the electric power plant in Chalons sur Saone was due to information supplied by him.

Down to the middle of November 1944, Polish agents reported no less than 162 launching points for flying bombs directed against England. When the German occupation of France collapsed, the Polish agent stations reappeared in November 1944. The organizational framework was maintained and instructions were given to find ways and means of setting up a new intelligence service in the West German industrial area and in other parts of Germany where Poles were employed or permanently settled. Meanwhile the Polish II. Section had moved from Chambery to Reims.

In contrast to the radio net of the II. Section, that of the sabotage organization "Monika", subordinate to the "Civil Delegation", did not cease transmitting after the events in France. Its purpose now was to gather all able bodied Poles into the Allied forces. When France was liberated, the "Civil Delegation" moved to Paris and as official representative of Poland to the French Government maintained radio communication with London and with an out-station in Lyon.
CHURCHILL TALKS WITH ROOSEVELT

Representatives of the Fascist and National Socialist states have claimed that the personality of a great statesman can be fully effective only in a totalitarian state, whereas in a democratic system the energies of a leader are dissipated in fruitless negotiations with parties and in various parliamentary debates. Only a dictatorial leader can proceed consciously toward his goal.

Probably few people will be inclined to dispute the statement that Churchill and Roosevelt during World War II were statesmen of great stature and that they purposefully went their way and so represented their countries that one could say: Churchill is Great Britain and Roosevelt is the United States of America.

Nevertheless they stood at the head of consistently democratic countries. They had not usurped power, had not come to power through a revolution, and needed no SS and SA to remain in power and no Gestapo to control the attitude of the people.

Hitler knew that these two men represented the will of their countries and therefore reduced his theory to an absurdity. Since he knew this, he hated them. And since he hated them, he could not think logically. Consequently, his impulsive actions led to mistakes. And since one mistake always engendered another, his system could only end in disaster.
Churchill and Roosevelt represented two world powers in a common struggle against doctrinaire Fascism. They led two groups of states which were so widely separated geographically that personal conferences, such as those between Hitler and Mussolini, could take place only rarely. However, such discussions were necessary, indeed even more vital in the case of democracies than between the "leaders" of totalitarian countries. It was important that there be facilities available at any time for an exchange of ideas over a space of thousands of kilometers and that this exchange should not be overheard by a third party.

This was a problem for technicians and the problem had already been solved before World War II. The principle of scrambled radio telephony was already known. Just imagine you are standing on the edge of a seething volcano with a dozen yelping dogs just behind you and with a few wolves and lions howling and roaring on the other side of the crater. Add a gentle whistle to this sound mixture and you have an idea of what scrambled speech is like. It is obvious that one can make nothing of a recording of such sounds.

Even before the United States entered the war, it was known in Germany that the two western statesmen often talked in this way. When Hitler found it out, he gave orders to develop, without regard for cost, a device which would make it possible to understand such conversations.
Group III of the Cipher Section was ordered to construct such a device. It was a question of unscrambling these waves so as to restore the original form of the spoken word. It was not easy, but within a few months a complicated apparatus was constructed at great cost, based on the recognized rhythm of the known distortions. Now it was possible to listen to the interesting and significant conversations of the two men. A special unit was set up and the results were transmitted to Hitler with the least possible delay.

Just as Zimmermann had been convinced twenty years before that his telegrams to von Eckardt were not known to any third person, so Churchill and Roosevelt felt secure in their conversation. Had they known that a few hours after they were talking, Hitler had the text of their conversation neatly typed on his desk, it might have taken more than a pill to enable them to sleep. It is well if statesmen do not know too much about the secrets of technology, otherwise they would hesitate to make use of them or even to open their mouths.

Hitler was satisfied and saw in this new German invention a sign that Providence was on his side. He bestowed a few decorations but one day his joy came to a sudden end.

As I recall it, it was some time before the invasion that the system of scrambled telephony between the British
and the Americans was changed. Whether it was an accident or
whether treachery played a part, I do not know. In any event,
the voices could no longer be unscrambled by the new device and
henceforth all conversations between the two statesmen remained a
"book with seven seals." This splendid source of intelligence
had dried up. Perhaps London knows the reason!!
STRUGGLE BETWEEN RADAR AND THE INTERCEPT SERVICE

The invention of radar was the death knell for German submarine warfare. However, radar apparatus did not come into being overnight and its final form was the result of years of development and experimentation. During the phase when radar had not reached its destructive perfection and the Germans were still ignorant of its existence, some very tense and interesting contests were going on in the field of technology in which neither of the opponents knew the sources of information of the other.

At a time when U-boat successes were falling off noticeably, the intercept service of the German Navy picked up radio traffic of a large Allied convoy in the Atlantic and plotted its course. Some 30 German submarines then in the Atlantic were ordered to take positions along the expected course of the convoy. Everything was prepared for destruction of the transports.

Suddenly, the naval intercept station in Neumünster picked up a message instructing the convoy to change its course to the north because several packs of submarines were lying in wait.

People in Berlin were dismayed and thought at first that the enemy had solved the U-boat cipher. A new message was sent in a spare cipher commanding them to take battle positions on the new route. The very next day Neumünster picked up another message instructing the convoy to change course again. This last message gave the precise location of all thirty German submarines.
In Berlin they were mystified. The assumption that the cipher had been compromised would not explain this situation. People slowly began to realize that the German submarines were no longer invisible but that their locations and movements were observed by the enemy, even when they were submerged. Again the U-boat packs were ordered to take new positions; hardly had this been done when the convoy for the third time was instructed to change course, and again the location of the U-boats was given precisely. This happened a fourth time before the two opponents finally met in what proved a costly attack for the submarines.

There were other similar cases, in fact Neumünster intercepted messages giving precisely the location of German submarines at sea; e.g.: 10 subs in that area, 20 in this, 15 in a third, 3 returning home, seven just putting out into the Atlantic, etc. Now the Germans realized that the submarines were no longer invisible and soon had to realize that submarine warfare as hitherto conducted would no longer be successful.
In the summer of 1939, before the war began, the British intelligence service started to set up a special radio network in the west. This did not expand greatly, even in the first half of 1940, and the German advance soon left it behind. It then began working in a new way, undisturbed by German countermeasures. The latter half of 1940 was used to expand this network on the basis of past experience with the aid of newly developed small short-wave transmitters.

When the German radio defense got on the track of this traffic late in the year there were already twenty agent stations. The control station was in England near Bristol. Almost all the operators were French, Belgian, or Dutch. They worked separately and their only contact with one another was through go-betweens. Traffic was only slightly disguised. In general the agents felt sure their transmitters could not be located. They were stationed in both occupied and unoccupied France, in Belgium, and in Holland. In March 1941 there were 25 stations; new ones were added constantly. This network now became the chief target of the radio defense. In October 1941 there were 56 stations, some of them outside of France, because this set-up had begun to expand over all Europe.

Spain soon became the door for agents of every sort. Consequently, despite the watchfulness of the Spanish police, various control stations were set up (e.g., Madrid, Barcelona, and Cartegena) which corresponded with France. In November 1941 and in March 1942 radio
defense succeeded in making its first major breaks into the net of the English agents in France. A number were picked up with their sets, in some cases with full documentary material. This led to the arrest of four additional agents. As a result agent activity shifted during the summer of 1942 more and more to unoccupied France. Information was brought from the occupied areas. To combat this, the Germans decided to undertake raids in conjunction with French police in unoccupied France. This "Operation Donar" was pulled off on 21 September. Everything depended upon the loyal cooperation of the French police who had to make the arrests and screen the material. In the course of three months 12 transmitters were picked up, thus disclosing the organizations back of them. Now the Germans were able to proceed on their own initiative and matters were speeded up.

The close connection between the British agents in France and the preparations for the invasion became apparent, when traffic increased noticeably from 16 to 20 August before the landing at Dieppe. Soon after that the traffic of several English transmitters in France showed that there were two organizations in France preparing for an Allied invasion and maintaining close contact with the French resistance movement "Armee Secrete". The Chief of Rayon I of this secret army was apprehended on Lyon. At the same time plans for the landing of airplanes fell into German hands.

Repeated German defeats in the East and in Africa, the American landing in Algiers, and the decreased effectiveness of the German submarines in 1943 convinced the population of the occupied area in the west more and more that the invasion and their liberation were at hand. People daily became more willing to aid All...
intelligence and to join resistance movements. Those Frenchmen who had been inclined to work with Germany withdrew, especially as they had to fear vengeance from their compatriots. Work for Germany was sabotaged and the labor supply was reduced as young people disappeared into Maquia camps. The FFI (Forces francaises de l'interieur) and the sabotage groups of the KPF (Communist Party of France) were strengthened. In some sections single vehicles of the radio defense could no longer travel the roads. Collaboration with the French police also ceased and the police sided more and more with the underground.

At the same time Allied influence increased, more arms and supplies were dropped, and the espionage organizations, now supported by the population, expanded. Although all France had been occupied since November 1942, the number of spies and saboteurs, controlled partly by the English and partly by De Gaulle, had become enormous. The SOE (Secret Operations Executive, a subdivision of Military Intelligence headed by General Gubbins), handled supplies.

In June 1943 the Germans dealt British intelligence in France a heavy blow. A surprise raid revealed the whole Paris set-up and resulted in the seizure of 11 stations. At one place all the documents for the operation of Paris stations were found, along with unknown plans. All told, 49 complicated radio plans fell into German hands. Close range direction finding had already revealed a large number of shifting transmitter installations in the Paris area which made German counter measures ineffective. Actually, messages
were sent by a number of transmitters operating in a variable sequence. The center sent out the operators daily with their messages, plans, and crystals to work with the appointed transmitters.

The so-called "Vichy-wave" caused the Germans much trouble. Various links had been observed on wave lengths normally used by Vichy. The character of the traffic showed, however, that this could be only agent work and after much effort the Germans succeeded in July 1943 in breaking into the central office of a number of French resistance groups in Paris. Many of the groups were now picked up. Thirteen transmitters were seized and operators, agents, and numerous leading personalities of the resistance movement were arrested. At about the same time deciphered messages revealed much of the activity of the groups known collectively as "Mouvements Unis". It was also possible to penetrate "Ceux de la liberation" operating in the North.

The composition of the groups around Lyon was recognized and a number of leaders arrested, including General Delestraint (alias Vidal) and Prefect Moulin (cover name "Max"). This was a hard blow to the movement in that area. In August 1943 a depot was seized in Paris which yielded a number of radio sets, including two ultrashort wave sets.

Shortly thereafter, the Germans in Marseille uncovered an organization associated with the Deuxième Bureau and disguised as "Service Radio Electrique de Sécurité Territorial". It had been forbidden by the German military commander but reestablished in secret as a military establishment. It had 40 stations with over 300...
trained operators. It also had a number of trucks and plenty of money.

A few weeks later the Germans struck at the organization of Colonel Faye, arresting him and several others. This eliminated one of the outstanding agents of the Franco-British intelligence service. He and his station had been pursued all over France but had hitherto avoided arrest.

The frequent raids, followed often by the escape of agents after they had been interrogated, called for extensive security measures. Aside from frequent change of location and the use of watchers during the second half of 1943 there was an ambitious change in the handling of traffic, which aimed to make the monitoring and fixing of stations more difficult. Sometimes two stations worked with the same system and the same traffic plan. Spare instruments and operators, sometimes spare organizations, were held in readiness so that even after extensive raids service was resumed after a brief time. An instance in point was the breaking up of Colonel Faye's organization in 1943 which was replaced a month later by the organization "Alliance" headed by a certain "Bernard".

The Germans had one unusual experience with the "Alliance". The head was a French count with the cover name "Bernard" and his secretary was the daughter of a French colonel, whom we will call Miss M. She was a woman of unusual intelligence, energy and beauty. When the count was arrested, Miss M. immediately took over and built up the organization anew. Later she went to England.
and served as contact for this movement.

One day she reappeared in Marseilles and was picked up in a raid. At first she could not be identified. She was placed in the custody of the naval unit in Marseilles for the night. The man who was to guard her, quickly took a liking to the pretty woman and thought to spend a pleasant night. However, he was a cautious fellow and locked up all the lady’s clothing in a closet in the next room, to guard against unpleasant surprises.

Meanwhile the German officials had been studying photographs and learned to their surprise that they had made a good catch. In the morning, when they came to the naval unit to take the woman away, they found the guard fast asleep. Miss M. had disappeared stark naked and was not seen again.

The activity of the resistance movement in France began to unfold vigorously in the summer of 1943. In August there were some 20 different organizations and the radio traffic was correspondingly lively. Although these organizations differed greatly and sometimes were politically antagonistic to one another, there was in England an overriding organization, the BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignment et d’Action), which guided their efforts and provided them with material and money. This supply service employed several parachute organizations of which the BOA and SAP were the most important. They saw to it that the material dropped was properly distributed. France was divided into a north and a south Zone. The BOA (Bureau des operations aeriennes) operated in the north, bringing supplies
from England. The SAP (Service d'atterrisage et parachuttage) supplied the South Zone from North Africa. Few of the cryptographic systems were broken. In November 1943 the Germans scored a great success. By raiding a single station in Paris they got enough information regarding the "Liaison Terrestre, Aerienne, Maritime, Radio" to pick up 68 persons and 34 radio sets by carrying on a series of radio deceptions.
During the entire year 1940 not a single agent transmitter was picked up in Belgium although the Germans had evidence that a number were working in this area. Not until February 1941 could they make two successful raids but even then secured little valuable information. The first really good catch was in May 1941, when a transmitter was fixed in the vicinity of Brussels. The location was finally narrowed down to a row of houses which were searched until the instrument was finally discovered hidden under coal in a cellar. The arrested agent, named Martiny, had been dropped in Belgium on 13 October 1940 with two transmitters. One transmitter was secured in a raid in February 1941 but Martiny escaped with the second. When he was captured, he had abundant material which gave a good picture of his espionage activity which included important military reports to England.

Sometimes droll incidents occurred in connection with raids, once, when after much effort the house in which there must be a station had been spotted and the police were just about to enter, two men emerged. When they were stopped, one of them showed an identification paper issued by the German General M, top signal officer in Belgium. They let the fellow go and did not learn until the next day that he was working for both sides, so to speak. As a precautionary measure, he had entered the employ of the signal officer and received the identification papers while, on the side,
he was spying and using radio sets to transmit his reports to England. When they tried to find him again he had disappeared.

One peculiarity of the radio agent work in Belgium was that it was not limited to Belgian territory but almost always reached over into France or Holland or Luxembourg. The number of "Kappelen" was extremely large, since the British, Russians, French, Belgians, Dutch, and Poles all used this country as a base of operation. The "Rote Kapelle" case has been reported at length elsewhere; here a few other cases will be mentioned.

"Lagerkapelle". A raid on the station in January 1944 yielded information on the connections between various Belgian espionage services and their relations to French groups and the "Service Luxembourg".

"Patriarchenkapelle". This was related to the "Lagerkapelle". It worked chiefly in Luxembourg but had connections with three German groups in the Eifel, Hunsrück, and Saar areas. The Germans made a number of raids and arrests.

"Depot-Kapelle". Careful D/F-ing and a surprise raid in Brussels by radio defense in May 1944 afforded the first information regarding the "Belgian Secret Army".

In Belgium as in France the activity of radio agents increased and reached its peak just before the invasion. All movements of troops and supplies, every depot, in fact every headquarters down to company level, was reported to England.

The raids in Belgium afforded considerable insight into the or-
ganization of the British agent system. Control was exercised by the "Special Operations Executive" (SOE) which was set up for the duration within the "Military Intelligence Service". There were sections for the following countries: France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Spain, and Germany. "The Military Intelligence Service" and the SOE made the necessary preparations for undertakings in other countries by procuring the necessary information and equipping non-English military auxiliary forces with agents, money, arms, and equipment.

In Belgium, which was divided into 5 zones, the SOE made use of the so-called "Belgian Secret Army" which was made up chiefly of members of the former Belgian army led by Belgian officers. At the top were the headquarters in Brussels, to which the zones were subordinate; the zones comprised individual fighting groups.
AMERICAN RADIO AGENTS IN FRANCE

The United States even before the beginning of World War II had a central intercept station for monitoring illicit radio links. It belonged to the so-called Radio Intelligence Division (R.I.D.) and had first class equipment. According to its own statements the R.I.D. had discovered by the end of 1944 nearly 9,000 illicit transmitters in the U.S.A. and had identified more than 200 transmitters of Axis agents in South America. Quite a respectable number - if correct! Because the Axis Powers during World War II did not have anywhere near 200 agent stations in America.

After American forces appeared, American radio agents were employed in much the same fashion as the English agents. By the end of 1943 the American intelligence service had spread out, in Spain especially, and thus was able to draw information from France by various routes. Down to November 1943 only an English radio agent service had been observed in Western Europe but now an American service appeared which was supplied from Spain. Late in 1943 the Americans had an organization extending from the Spanish frontier to Nice. It was manned by American officers and its duties were to ascertain troop movements, support points, mine fields, etc. Its stations at that time were in Lyon, Valence, Montéleman, Marseilles, Toulon, Chambery, Narbonne, on Corsica and in other places.
During the first six months of 1944 the American agent network was expanded to 42 links. The control station was in Algiers. It made use of arrangements of the former French 2me Bureau controlled by General Rivet or Major Paillole and Major Lejeune, while Major Lafont, alias Verneuil, occupied the leading position in southern France. American officers were gradually introduced into the organization and after the removal of General Giraud a network was organized along the lines of the BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action) and officers were detailed from London. Supply by parachute was chiefly from Algiers. (Beginning in June 1944 the 2me Bureau and the "Securite militaire" were combined in Algiers and the "Securite militaire Algiers" henceforth controlled the employment of radio agents in German territory - especially in Austria - using German prisoners of war by preference).

The American organization which trained agents was the O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services) which was set up like the Secret Service in England. The head was General Donovan. The entire American secret service for North Africa, the Near East and Europe was directed from Algiers. The O.S.S. had a school in Naples training men to set up illegal organizations in hostile territory and another school in Brindisi training radio operators. Italian officers were used here. Camouflage and security measures were in general like those of the English but sometimes procedure was adapted to that of American armed forces in attempt to deceive the German intercept service. Just before the invasion the various groups of agents were
combined more and more and single agents were attached to existing organizations. They did valuable work in preparing for the invasion. Beginning in June 1944 monitoring of these stations in southern France was largely neglected by the Germans, since most of the intercept units were assigned higher priority missions in northern France. Contact with the traffic was lost and this was one of the reasons for the German catastrophe two months later in southern France.
THE NORTH POLE CASE*

The episode about to be recounted had nothing to do with the geographic or magnetic North Pole. The scene was remote from both and lay in the Netherlands. But German officials had the habit of giving a cover name to every "case" and that frosty designation was selected for this particular affair. Just how they hit on North Pole I do not know since in reality the term "equator" would have fitted better, inasmuch as those concerned got pretty warm. However that may be, "North Pole" was the name given and is therefore the title of this chapter.

In the spring of 1941 the British began building up an espionage organization in Holland which was then occupied by the Germans. The Government in Exile handled the matter under British guidance; the practical execution lay with the organization "Inlichtingendienst". This was the official information bureau of the Dutch Government, comparable in a way to the English "Secret Service".

During the summer of 1941 the German intercept service spotted two agent transmitters in Dutch territory which communicated with a control station in England.

[For 4 Feb. 1953 (page A6) has a notice of a book recently published in London: "London Calling the North Pole" by H.J. Giskes, ostensibly the chief of the German counterintelligence unit involved. [ Ed. ]]
At that time the Germans knew little about any Dutch espionage service but the German Security Police had recently apprehended an agent by the name of Tuin who was said to have had a transmitter. After an auto accident, Tuin had been placed in a hospital in Amersfoort, from which he was abducted one day. Since the doctor had found that in addition to injuries sustained in the accident Tuin had a serious kidney trouble and must be operated on at once, the Germans assumed that he had been done away with by his own espionage organization in order to leave no trace.

The two transmitters, which had been spotted and which because of their characteristics seemed to belong to one and the same organization, were to be picked up simultaneously, if possible. The raid on the transmitter in the Hague misfired due to poor organization; the local German counterintelligence office was anxious to make the raid itself and the D/F platoon used to pin-point the transmitter was expressly forbidden by the counterintelligence people to make an arrest; consequently the leader of the D/F platoon had to stand idly by while the radio agent and his assistants escaped from the house.

After this incident the second transmitter was seized by representatives of radio defense two days later in Buitenhoven near Utrecht. That was 31 August 1941. Along with the operator the Germans apprehended an important agent and found a suitcase with some 800 individual reports ready for delivery to England.

This immediately revealed the extent of the espionage organization in Holland, which had ramifications reaching deep into German territory. There were clues to existing and projected transmitters and from scraps of paper it was possible to recognize the
ciphertext system employed. Moreover, in the library of the house the key books used for enciphering the messages were discovered.

The operator obstinately refused to talk and the Germans were unable for the moment to make complete use of the material. Various harmless looking notes, letters, travel expense accounts, etc., yielded important clues to cover-names and residences of other agents. This permitted the Germans to interrogate in one night more than 20 persons and to arrest 12 of them. This meant a swift and significant break-up of the organization.

After the other agents, who had momentarily gone underground, were arrested, plans for an internal Dutch radio service were discovered and steps were taken to prevent Philips engineers from setting up transmitters. In this connection the man who had abducted Tuin was discovered among the agents arrested. Tuin had been placed in a small sanatorium in Bilthoven. The sanatorium was searched by the German Security Police without success; Tuin had dressed as a sister and, thus disguised, remained another 18 months in the same sanatorium before being arrested again in the breaking up of a Dutch-Belgian organization.

The breaking up of the Dutch intelligence service after the seizure of the Bilthoven transmitter enabled the German signal intelligence service to establish itself successfully. It was decided to carry on a deceptive game with the captured transmitter.
The first transmitter seized could not be used because the keys could not be solved promptly. The transmitters picked up in the following raids could be used at once and eventually all the intelligence and sabotage work of the "Inlichtingendienst" lay in the hands of the German counter intelligence and the messages were enciphered by representatives of the German radio defense. At times as many as 11 Dutch transmitters were being operated simultaneously and all the agents dropped by parachute or landed by speed boats for five different rings were picked up immediately after landing. Within a short time the Germans picked up one after another the members of the English spy net and also took over little by little the radio system and continued operating it without the change being noted in England.

This had to be done very cautiously to avoid arousing suspicion. It was necessary to send many truthful reports to England, but all sorts of things were introduced which did not correspond to the truth. Thus the Germans reported greater troop strength and greater quantities of weapons than were actually available, told of incoming troop units, fortifications, etc., to make their military position in Holland appear more secure than it was.

The British must have been delighted with the activity of their "agents" during the next year and a half, for things really were moving in Holland! The Dutch Freedom and Resistance Movement was enthusiastically organized. There were local groups everywhere.
Members flocked in from month to month. Acts of sabotage were carried out everywhere, buildings were blasted, cables destroyed, German sentries were drowned in canals or otherwise disposed of. All these were reported by the previously arrested agents and the reports in no wise corresponded to the facts, because all these reports were manufactured at his desk by the head of this grandiose deception who had the several radio stations send them out strictly according to plan.

All these reports were composed and transmitted in such "genuine" fashion that London did not become suspicious. That was clear from the fact that all requests for arms, ammunition, explosives, sabotage material, yes, even for coffee, cocoa, chocolate, cigarettes, and cigars were promptly complied with. Everything asked for was delivered by parachute. It was even better: visitors from England were announced. New agents, new operators, new couriers. They were received promptly, taken to the comfortable lodgings of the "Chef", where they were entertained and were able to send their reports to England by radio. Only then did the Germans reveal the true situation and arrest the agents.

"All told, several hundred planes dropped several thousand tons of arms and other material for the benefit of the Germans, and over 50 new agents and operators were taken into custody upon arrival."
This game, which lasted fully a year and a half, pleased the Germans greatly and many of the messages occasioned great hilarity.

The game was played faultlessly until late in the summer of 1943. It might have gone on even longer, had it not been possible for four of the captured agents to escape from the special prison in Haarlem. When two of them reached the Swiss frontier the deception was revealed.

Anyhow the Germans had succeeded for two years in completely crippling the enemy intelligence service in Holland and avoiding untold damage by sabotage. Moreover, early organization of resistance in Holland was checked by the prompt arrest of all those sent from England as leaders. In consequence the resistance movement in Holland was not able to assume proportions comparable to the development in France or Belgium.

Even before the four agents escaped, the English apparently got wind of the matter somehow and realized that something was not in order. Without informing the old group of agents, the British began in April 1943 to build up an entirely new network. The Germans soon discovered this through the appearance of new radio stations and did not wait until the English broke off traffic but sent them one day a message thanking them for all the information, cigars, cigarettes, and coffee, and good humoredly bade them goodbye.
The year 1944 was marked on the Western Front by the preparations for the invasion, its execution, and the forcing of the German front back to the frontier.

At the very beginning of the year English agent traffic showed increased interest in the development of camouflage measures. Nevertheless, the German radio defense succeeded again and again in breaking into agent centers and putting out of commission numero 3 control stations of the different organizations. In view of the fact that more than 20 organizations were working in France and that many of them had tens of thousands of collaborators and adherents, it was, of course, impossible to pick up all of them; nevertheless, their activity could be crippled for a time.

It may be assumed that the Germans picked up some 10 per cent of the agent operators in the course of a month, while in many months the numbers of sets seized was roughly equal to the number of stations in operation. However, it was not difficult for the enemy to replace the agents, since they had at their disposal most of the trained operators of the navy and army and of the police. And since these men were protected in their work by the populace they were happy to be employed at good wages in their own line of work when unemployment was general, especially since they would also be performing a patriotic duty.
We may look briefly at a small selection from among the large number of "cases" which occupied the Germans during 1944:

"Jade case". In January 1944 the Germans broke up an organization in France which worked directly for British intelligence. It was directed from Paris and had stations in Reims and Bordeaux. The head was a certain Lamirault, alias Roy. When he was arrested, keys and radiograms were seized which revealed a very significant espionage activity. The organization was widely ramified and had many agents; on the side it also worked for Russia.

"Cogny case". In February near Melun a station was raided which belonged to the "Cogny" organization. Decrypted messages showed that this was a sabotage organization which operated primarily in Brittany and the Vosges.

"Helios case". A raid on 8 March 1944 in Rouen had to do with a group working with the R.A.F. in planning attacks on electric power plants. It resulted in the arrest of numerous heads of ground crews and sabotage groups.

"Burgundy case". In a raid in Bordeaux in March a number of members of the American intelligence service were arrested. A widely ramified organization was involved with headquarters in Tarbes. Records showed espionage missions had been assigned, covering coastal fortifications in the Hendaye - Verdon area as well as harbors and airfields.

"Baltimore case". In April 1944 some 30 persons were arrested who belonged to a group working in Toulouse and Bordeaux for the Inter-Allied General Staff in Algiers.
"Danilo case". At the same time a ground organization for parachute enterprises was picked up in Nemours. It distributed supplies and equipment of all kinds from England to different resistance organizations.

"Raymond case". Immediately afterward an organization was crushed in southern France which was supposed to set up a special radio net for the invasion and to discover landing places for gliders and planes along the Cote d'Azur.

"Monika case". In the same month the Germans obtained information regarding the structure and intended employment of the "Monika" organization. This group comprised Polish workers in France and Belgium who were to aid an Allied invasion by strikes and active measures.

"Normandy case". (French Section) When German radio defense picked up two agent stations in Montlucon on 1 May 1944, an Englishman, Major Southgate, fell into the net. Since January 1942 he had built up in France in the areas of Tours, Poitiers, Vichy, Limoges, and Toulouse special transmitting groups and had organized numerous parachute deliveries of arms and explosives. A study of the captured material enabled the Germans to identify 62 places used for parachute drops.

"Mithridate - Sorbonne case". In May radio defense picked up an ultra short wave station near St. Omer. An exceptionally clever and active agent, Lt. Colonel Donnet, was arrested who
had for sometime been occupied primarily in reporting on the German "secret weapon". The "Mithridate" organization was completely smashed.

"Seraphim case". A raid on a station in Bordeaux enabled the Germans to gain insight into the organization of the Giraud intelligence service ("Nile" later "Mithridate"). This last named was taken up into the BCRA. Arrests were made and numerous messages and keys fell into German hands.

"Alliance case". In June 1944 the Germans raided the command post of the "Alliance" espionage organization in Paris and among those arrested was the chief of the "Region Nord". His statements revealed that the "Alliance" was subordinate to the 2me Bureau of General König who had taken over the leadership of French forces in England after Giraud had been deposed.

The situation developed during the summer of 1944 in such fashion that in July the Germans made almost a raid a day in France, but any effective combatting of the resistance movement was out of the question.

The British intelligence service relied on some 20 organizations which worked independently of one another and were controlled from London through the BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignment et d'Aviation). Some were originally Giraud organizations operating chiefly in southern France but gradually they were joined to DeGaulle groups after Giraud had left.
The French Section, led by English officers, worked primarily in the coastal areas. It was supplied primarily by the B.O.A. (Bureau des Operations Aeriennes), while in the south the S.A.P. (Service d'Atterisage et Parachutage) flew in supplies from Algiers. These organizations handled the airborne landing (Lysander) and parachute supply service and worked very closely with the BCRA. 500 planeloads were dumped in the average month.¹

Beginning in May 1944 it was noted that the so-called "Equipes Jedburgh" exercised control over military preparations of the resistance movement in France. These were rather small groups of officers dropped by parachute and their appearance was an unmistakable sign that the invasion was impending, but those Germans in responsible positions did not heed it.

The mass appearance of new agent transmitters of Franco-British intelligence in the Vosges-Grenoble-Lyon area during March 1944 showed clearly that the groups of saboteurs there were to destroy communications between Germany and France when the invasion came. This was also clear from numerous orders of the

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¹ It may be assumed that about 30% of the material dropped was picked up by the Germans on the basis of radio names and decrypted messages. Generally the transmitters of the several organizations could be recognized by radio characteristics, so that, before a transmitter was seized, one knew the agents for whom it worked and also which other transmitters in the network were still active and which had already been picked up. This facilitated interrogations, since those arrested reacted quicker to specific questions and were less inclined to be evasive when they discovered that details of their organization were already known.
Chief of the F.F.I. (Forces Francaises de l'Interieur). This was confirmed in full five months later.

The English, who had set up a wonderfully organized spy network in France, had in July 1944 espionage centers with radio equipment in almost all the larger cities of the country.

These intelligence units were seconded at the time of the invasion by airborne troops of the S.A.S. (Special Air Service) who were dropped in partisan areas behind the German front. They were to carry out certain sabotage missions, relying on members of the F.F.I. who were familiar with the country. They contributed materially to getting the F.F.I into real activity and to harassing German rear communications and confusing retreating columns.
in Tuscany. The purpose of the group was:

1. To combine resistance forces into partisan groups.
2. To select dropping points and regulate supplies of all kinds.
3. To transmit military reports.
4. To pass agents and important documents to Allied headquarters.

In time Bari became an important junction point for all sorts of intelligence services. The Russians set up a radio station, as did the Poles; the latter communicated from here with 21 stations in German occupied Poland.

British intelligence was not able at first to set up any sizeable organization in northern Italy because many agents were arrested upon arrival.

On the other hand, the Germans were able to use the documents found on agents to carry on several deceptive games with the control station in Bari. But in spite of all the German successes the number of agent transmitters in northern Italy increased to 42 in July and 63 in August. This was largely due to the fact that the agents operated in territory held by partisans where raids could be carried out only by large detachments.

Early in 1945 the radio agents were told to attach themselves to the political organizations and partisan formations from which they were to gather military information and to spy out worthwhile targets for air attack. They were also to report on the
situation and strength of partisan groups and arrange for supply by parachute. Moreover agents slipped across the northern boundary and a regular courier service between Italy and Switzerland was established.
In preparation for the invasion the British intelligence began late in 1943 to set up a brand new radio organization. Using existing resistance groups with their operators and instruments, new radio networks were projected along the coast and in several lines parallel to it at distances of about 100 km. Each of these U.C.R. (Unites de Combat et de Renseignement) was an independent military intelligence center whose chief was the local leader of the resistance organization with the greatest strength in the particular area. The members of all other resistance organizations in the district were directly subordinate to him and sent their reports to this U.C.R.

The purpose of the U.C.R. was to provide, under the direction of its chief, direct connection with the staff of the Allies whenever Allied operations on French soil should begin and also to assure transmission of all information gathered by agents of "fighting France". Beginning on the critical day the chief was responsible for all military intelligence communications in his area.

The personnel at his disposal included intelligence agents and scouts, likewise one or two operators with instruments, and men to guard communications. He also had a certain number of concealed quarters with secure addresses and "letter drops". Special schedules were assigned to the transmitters, which were not to function until the critical day. Till then the net was to maintain absolute radio silence and the cryptographic system was not to be employed.
The command expected the U.C.R. to report as quickly and precisely as possible on enemy movements in its sector. It was not to take part in combat. Members were strictly forbidden to shoot unless in self defense or to escape capture.

The chiefs of the U.C.R. were instructed to transmit as promptly as possible precise information regarding the strength and movements of the enemy in adjacent territories. This included assemblies and movements of troops and air units, the construction of fortified positions, the location of mine fields, munition depots, hospital stations, etc.

In June 1944 the Germans obtained by accident the keys for the "silent net of the U.C.R." along with the authenticators of six agents. This would have meant a wonderful opportunity if the organization had been functioning like all the rest, but instead it was silent.

Whereas in the case of all the other agent links the Germans were dealing with an opponent whom they could hear, observe, locate, and eliminate, here they faced a foe who was not merely invisible but inaudible and intangible, a foe who, in a sense, didn't exist at all, who put in an appearance only when it was too late to combat him effectively. The Germans knew the general area in which he was located but they did not know a single transmitter location, a single go-between, a single letter-drop. They stood before an impenetrable wall of mist and all they knew was that behind it, slowly but purposefully, preparations were going on which would mean the turning point on the western front.
THE INVASION

If ever a military undertaking was prepared for down to the least detail, then it was the Allied invasion in the night from the 5th to the 6th of Juno 1944.

We have already shown how British intelligence was informed of all details it needed to know regarding the situation in France. The work of the various French resistance organizations made it probable that, insofar as the German forces were concerned, all France resembled a bog which gave way wherever one might step.

Sabotage had so damaged communication lines that they could not be depended on. Even before the invasion started, defense of the occupied areas in the West had been so shaken and undermined that – in spite of the Atlantic Wall – only a few powerful thrusts were necessary to cause the entire structure to collapse. Shortly after the invasion of Northern France started, the English and Americans employed special groups (Equipes) consisting of two men with an ultra short wave telephone set and shortwave radio for telegraphic communications. These groups worked under the direction of the BCRA, were meant for purely military reconnaissance in connection with operations of German troops, and were especially interested in German retaliatory weapons. Working far in advance of the invaders, each group recruited some 10 local informers, screened their reports, and radioed condensed versions.
The ultra short wave traffic of British intelligence increased rapidly with the beginning of the invasion. The German intercept organization was nowhere near adequate for interception of this traffic; in some instances interception was not technically possible, in other cases the service was swamped. Since it was impossible, to cover all traffic systematically, it was necessary to concentrate on certain links which appeared important - a pitiful solution in view of the tremendous opportunity.

When one station was raided in July 1944, important information on the V1 was found. It enabled the British to attack many depots and launching sites effectively.

In August of the same year ultra shortwave messages showed that very important reports on the V1 and on military operations were going to England.

For almost two months it looked as though the invasion were making no progress. The Germans had not succeeded in driving the invaders into the sea, but a stabilized front had been formed which seemed to defy every attack. Until the breakthrough near Avranches which lifted the German west wing off its hinges! Just as the Russian offensive came to a halt, the front in the West began to move. The German west wing was penetrated on 3 August; on 7 August the Americans advanced via Mayenne and were 200 kilometers from Paris. They had taken Laval and Chateau Gontier and had also occupied Vanna in Brittany. They reached the coast on both sides of St. Nazaire and thus cut off Brittany. Since the
landing, 85,000 German troops had been captured. Of 35 German divisions, 13 had been destroyed.

In Germany a bloody purge was raging which had begun on 20 July. Hitler solemnly received the newly appointed NS commanders and Himmler issued an order of the day on the creation of "the National Socialist Peoples Army of the Führer and his Reich", while Goebbels proclaimed "far reaching measures" and release of vast reserves of power.

In the German armed forces the "German greeting" was introduced in place of the military salute.
When the invasion began, it was observed that the British Broadcast station in Daventry introduced a new special service. Before or after the entertainment program, sometimes even in the midst of it the speaker called several times: "Hello Pierre!" or "Hello Lulu!" etc. and then gave enciphered or disguised instructions.

As soon as the invasion started, the English dropped so-called SAS units behind the German lines. These were two military units of about regimental strength, of which one comprised two groups with the call names "Pierre" and "Sabu" while the second had three groups "Jeannette", "Jojo" and "Lulu". Each of these groups corresponded roughly to a battalion. These were sabotage units. Groups "Pierre", "Jeannette" and "Lulu" received their instructions in French, while the others got theirs in English. Orders and information for all SAS units went under the name "Romo"; those for all "Lulu" units were sent with that name, etc. Enciphered messages on the other hand were addressed directly to the individual unit.

The organization was very rigid and the work intense. It caused the Germans much trouble and among other things hopelessly crippled the French telephone and teleprinter lines upon which the German command relied. All that was left was the radio and we have already seen how dangerous that can be.

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After the Allied advance had overtaken the first SAS

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it took little part in further operations. Its main body was withdrawn from the front beginning in September 1944.

The second SA: regiment was not employed to any great extent until late August. As the Allies approached the German frontier its employment increased. Its main body was dropped in the Vosges, chiefly in the forest of Senones, north of St. Die. This was the area where the Allies made a surprise thrust a few weeks later which overran the area between Nancy and Strassburg in four days and resulted in the capture of Strassburg on 23 November. Here again the SAS units had solved their problems brilliantly.
Immediately after the defection of the Badoglio Government, British intelligence took over all Italian command agencies, in particular the SIM (Servizio Informazione Militari) and used them to set up its own agent radio service in Italy. From then on this service played a considerable role.

The SIM was absolutely a British service and its chief task was to provide British intelligence with agents. The central office was set up in Brindisi with Colonel Massaioli in charge. Agents were recruited among officers, in work battalions, and in prisoner camps. Some were Italians who had been drafted for the Canadian Army and were now sent to Italy for employment as agents.

When recruiting, the SIM did not reveal the character of the work; some persons were not recruited but were selected and detailed to British intelligence which then trained them in schools for agents and finally delivered them behind the German lines, either by parachute or by submarine. Their radio control station was in Bari.

At first the Germans were able to hinder the development of the hostile radio agent service. Even in the early months of 1944 when the British employed more and more agents, most of them were arrested or remained quiescent since many simply went home to their families.
Beginning in April 1944, however, there was a marked increase in agent traffic since British intelligence tried to make up by quantity for what was lacking in the quality of the agents. Following a raid on a station in Rome late in April, captured documents and interrogations disclosed that an organization was involved which worked mostly with the illegal parties (known collectively as the "liberation committee") which had access to material in the highest German military offices. The Germans gained valuable information in this case by playing a radio game and were able to learn the structure of the liberation committee and prove its collaboration with Allied intelligence.

The organization "Otto" was dealt a serious blow in Genoa in April 1944. Its function was centralized supply and military leadership of partisans in Piedmont and Liguria. Several groups of radio agents were picked up along with a mass of radiograms, many of which were later deciphered. These gave a terrifying picture of the true situation in Italy. A control station, which issued espionage assignments, was located in Bari and communicated with fully a dozen stations in those parts of Italy occupied by the Germans. There was a second control station in Tarentum which communicated with partisans in upper Italy.

Early in July an agent station was picked up by the Germans near Pisa which had been an important link of the partisan organization.
AMERICAN RADIO AGENTS IN ITALY

American intelligence, directed by OSS (Office of Strategic Services), set up the ORI (Organizational Resistenza Italia) and recruited radio agents. To facilitate the work, most of those employed in the OSS were Italian Americans. Radio communication was directed by the control station in Naples. The agents were generally trained in American uniform and put in civilian clothing only when they were sent out.

Although there was some collaboration between the English and American services, it was apparent that both followed the same goal but thought to reach it in a different fashion.

In May 1944 the Germans succeeded in picking up an American station in Milan after an exchange of fire with the agents. When the material and traffic had been sifted, it was clear that this group was part of an organization extending all over northern Italy and down to Rome.

By following up the clues obtained, the Germans eliminated a large number of persons charged with important espionage missions. The Germans discovered the regular communication routes used and prevented very important material from slipping through: e.g., a report by Marshal Graziani to Göring on the newly created Italian army and its new positions, together with a complete reconnaissance report on the German line of defense from the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian Sea (the so-called Gothic Line).
In September the Germans picked up another American group near Genoa. This raid proved the most profitable of all those made in Italy. The principal agent had exercised control over all the groups and single agents of the intelligence service of the American Fifth Army. He was also concerned with the organization of the resistance movement, with sabotage (as far north as the Brenner Pass), and with the recruiting of agents. As a direct result of this raid five other groups were picked up.

The control station of the American radio agents was initially in Naples but was later moved to Bari.

With that all the radio agent work of the Allies in the south was united in one place and was directed as a unit.

Late in 1944 two centers of English and American agents were noted: The Milan-Genoa area (where collaboration of the Italian Maquis with French troops along the frontier could be noted) and the Udine - Venice area. Here agents were instructed to reconnoiter highways, bridges, the width and depth of rivers, supply etc. This was in preparation for the swift advances of the Allies in the spring of 1945 which caused the entire southern front to collapse. A net of radio agents had been set up which reached far into Austria and, as a result, anything that took place behind the German front no longer remained a secret.
A COLD BATH, A CRAMP IN THE CALF, AND OTHER NOTEWORTHY MATTERS

What person who knows life will deny that one of the most beautiful components of which a woman is put together is a pair of shapely legs? And who will maintain that a bath in a bathtub with water just a little above the freezing point is something everyone desires?

I once saw a photograph of G.B.Shaw taken just as he was bathing in a frozen pond through a hole cut in the ice. I saw the picture 15 years ago but when I think of it even today I get goose flesh and am grateful to the engineers who invented the water heater for bathrooms.

And what does all this have to do with "War Secrets in the Ether"? - A great deal!

In my youth I had a teacher who often asserted that the Middle Ages with their applied cruelty were gone forever. I am glad he died long before World War II, otherwise he would have had to admit that his theory was the greatest mistake of his life and in the philosophy of the 19th century.

But you still inquire what connection there is between "War Secrets in the Ether" and my philosophical remarks. Pardon the digression, my dear reader, I will tell you.

We have already spoken several times of the fact that agents or their operators were arrested by the German police and that some of them made statements which afforded considerable information.
Thus far, however, we have said nothing about the way in which such people were induced to talk. For it is clear that as a rule they were not at all inclined to give information regarding their organization and to betray their own cause. On the other hand, the whole system of agents constituted for German intelligence such a serious danger that one tried by all available means to get these men and women to talk.

The organs of the German Security Service (S.D.) - corresponding to its nature - had a very simple recipe. Those arrested were cruelly mistreated. The result was generally very slight. The abused person roared with pain and then grew silent. Or he fainted. After this treatment most of these men were so embittered and fanatical that they would have preferred to be executed rather than say a single word. The agents of the armed forces had in such cases a "more humane" method of interrogation. Essentially there were only two methods, but they were quite effective. One was used principally with women, and the other with men. In the case of women they applied to each calf a clamp with a fairly wide surface which could be tightened by means of a screw. The result after a short time was a cramp in the calf which could be endured for a few minutes, perhaps, but not for long; it became torture and - especially in the case of women who were concerned with the beauty of their legs and did not care to get varicose veins - quickly opened the mouth. If the clamp was removed, the cramp soon let up and the leg showed no trace of abuse. In the process not even the sheerest silk hose
would be damaged.

Equally "considerate" was the method employed with men. The delinquent was stripped, bound hand and foot, perched on the edge of a bathtub filled with ice cold water. With the open hand, water was splashed on the man's back. The effect was like that of an electric shock. If this didn't suffice, the man was laid or seated in the tub and that had a more powerful effect. However, it did not always suffice to break the person's resistance. In such cases the man was immersed and held under water until his tongue was loosened and he was ready to talk. Frequently brief electric currents were sent through the water to stimulate the bather.

Many of those arrested tried to commit suicide in the tub by throwing themselves into the water and violently swallowing and breathing water. They were then fished out promptly and none of these "guests" ever made a second such attempt at suicide.

The "cold bath" almost always worked and, like the clamp, had the advantage of leaving no marks. Along with the cold bath and the cramp in the calf there was another - and indeed more humane - way to get the desired statements from the apprehended agent. He was put in a sort of trance by a narcotic and specific questions were put to him again and again. This recipe did not always work but it did in many cases.

It is well known that people are not exactly gentle in the Balkans when they get an enemy in their power. German close-range detachments who had to raid agent stations often got into
difficult situations. And woe to those who fell into the hands of
the partisans. It happened more than once and then there were
tortures such as the German Gestapo never dreamed of.

A favorite method was "lighting up the soles". They suspended
the prisoner by his hands with his naked feet some 30 cm above the
ground. They then placed burning candles beneath them and patiently
waited for the results. By fettering the legs one could prevent
the tormented victim from pulling them up away from the heat.

There were other methods of bloodless torture but I do not
wish to enumerate them here. The human race is bad enough; I do
not wish to teach it any more evil tricks.
Norway had been occupied in May 1940. The Government, with King Haakon at its head, had gone to England. The Storting in its final session had decided that if an independent government within the country were not possible, it should go outside the country for the time being.

Thus the cabinet with Prime Minister Nygaardsveld continued to be the legitimate government of the country. It issued ardent appeals to the people for passive resistance. Daily broadcasts in the Norwegian language gave the people all they needed to know. The armed conflict was at an end. The spiritual conflict was beginning. And the man who had undertaken to represent the Norwegian people and the Norwegian state, Vidkun Quisling, had firm ground under his feet only so long as he was under the protection of German arms. Beyond the range of German guns he had no power and his name had become throughout the civilized world a symbol of treason and a term of opprobrium.

As early as February 1941 some agent transmitters appeared in Norway, which obviously belonged to the British intelligence net. It could soon be recognized that British intelligence was proceeding here as in France to build up an agent network, utilizing the Norwegian resistance movement. Thanks to the geographic peculiarity of the country, these agents found ideal protection in the mountainous regions which were difficult of access.
During the year 1941 this agent network spread over the whole country so that British intelligence could get reports from all parts of Norway. Among other things there was developed an organization called "Scorpion" for reporting on shipping. It was directed from Drontheim by ships' engineer Rolf Lystadt and shipyard director Groen. Reporting units were set up along the entire coast of Norway; they observed ship movements and reported them to England by radio.

To safeguard the traffic one soon resorted to short traffic periods and clever disguise, just as was done in France. Agents were often able to avoid arrest by frequently changing their location.

The Germans tried to locate these transmitters by long range and short range D/F-ing, and D/F readings taken from Storch planes, but rarely was a raid successful, and if one did succeed a new devotee of freedom immediately stepped into the gap.

In May 1944 the Germans raided an agent station on the island Onoye where the transmitter was located in a cave from which shipping could be observed readily. An abundance of apparatus and documentary material was secured. All observations had been passed to England. It was virtually impossible for a German ship to enter or leave a Norwegian harbor or even to sail along the Norwegian coast without a signal going to England immediately.

By picking up an agent station in Norway in March 1944, the Germans secured information on the military organization of the
resistance movement and the English radio intelligence service in all Norwegian territories. It was directed from London by the "Defense Command". In Norway there was the central control unit which issued orders to the several districts, sectors, and areas. An extensive intelligence net was being built up in Norway which was intended to start functioning when military operations began or in connection with a possible German withdrawal.

Until May 1944 the number of radio agents working in Norway averaged 15. From then on the network was expanded greatly. In June the number of transmitters had doubled and early in September another large increase in number was noted. In October there were not less than 86 stations. In view of the character of the terrain, the German radio defense encountered great difficulty in its efforts to suppress them. Not only were the agents protected by inaccessible locations, they also had a chance to get what they needed either by water or from Sweden with virtually no interference.

Most of the agents were charged with watching shipping and reporting their observations to England. However, there was an increasing number of agents charged with preparations for sabotage and with support and furtherance of the Norwegian resistance movement. A supply service by parachute was organized which at times assumed great importance in the area around and southwest of Oslo.

Late in September 1944 an agent station was picked up not far from Pålmlø and the operators, Ragwald Mack and Rolf Kjøz Hanson,
were arrested. Decrypted radiograms found there contained reports on fortifications in the Stavanger area, on troop transports, troop organization, and submarine reports. The chief agents; Ernst Arkildsen and Artur Bakka, succeeded in escaping in a speed boat.

In October 1944 the English Major Adamson was captured near Bodoe. He was leader of a detachment of "Special Forces" which had been sent in to carry on sabotage and reconnaissance. He had landed with some 15 parachutists to look up suitable sea and air landing places in the Helgoland district, to block Highway 50 possibly by destroying bridges near Viskiskja and Kroekstranden — and later to cut the Northern Railway. The purpose was to interfere with German withdrawal.

A raid by the German radio defense in November 1944 disclosed an organization which worked across the frontier into Sweden and was concerned with reporting on shipping and weather. (Loedinggan-Narvik case).

Almost without exception the agent transmitters were located in the southern half of the country (south of Drontheim). The majority were near the coast. From this fact one could conclude that they were working exclusively on shipping. It is true, of course, that most of them were carefully watching the shipping along the coast day and night and reporting their observations to England and that for this reason they had to be located in coastal areas. It is also true, however, that the concentration of radio
agents in these areas can be explained by the geography of the
country and the fact that the interior is thinly populated in com-
parison with coastal areas. Wherever fairly densely populated areas
were to be found in the interior, e.g., in the area of Oslo, one also
noted an increased employment of radio agents.

In addition to this net of radio agents controlled from England
there was a similar net of Russian agent transmitters which also
handled their traffic very skillfully and constantly manifested a
desire to mislead the German radio defense. The central station
was in the Murmansk district and the control station was in Kola.

During the first half of 1943 it was noted again and again that
the Russians were very quickly and very accurately informed regarding
shipping in the north of Norway since ships would hardly have put
to sea before hostile aircraft would appear and attack them. It
became clear that Russian intelligence had planted radio agents
along the Norwegian coast who reported currently on German sea trans-
port to the Murman coast. The agents were put ashore by submarines
and since the distance was short, wave lengths of 80 to 100 m with
low output were used which could not be picked up by the German mon-
itors.

In the fall of 1943 the Germans succeeded in raiding several
Russian agent stations and the ensuing radio game with the Russian
control station was successful. The Germans succeeded in enticing
in and probably sinking a Russian submarine, as well as in apprehending agents when they were landing. Apparently the Russians did not become suspicious and the deception went on for some time.
English and Russian radio agents appeared in Denmark too, but were not of great importance. The number of agents there was small and not until October 1944 was any great activity observed. In November there were twice as many agents active as in the month preceding and the volume of traffic swelled rapidly.

A raid on a Russian agent station in Copenhagen in December 1942 was the first step in unmasking a large Danish Comintern organization. A raid in November 1944 crippled a sabotage group which operated against the railroads. Just when a sort of barrier of sabotage detachments and radio agents had been set up in Alsace and in the Burgundian Gateway - a similar phenomenon was noted in northern Denmark. Here three groups of radio agents were noted: one in northern Jütland, a second in eastern Jütland, and a third near Copenhagen. The last was the most important and exercised some influence upon the other two; its traffic with England was very active. The purpose of these groups were to reconnoiter military objectives, to transmit messages and to prepare and carry out acts of sabotage. The speed with which things happened in the spring of 1945 did not give this organization a chance to accomplish much.
Holland is the only country in which the English radio agent service had downright bad luck, simply and solely because of the arrests in the "North Pole Case". Not until 1943 did the English begin slowly and gropingly to develop a new net. In August three transmitters appeared on the west coast but again the Germans carried out several successful raids.

On 3 February 1944 the Germans picked up an agent station in Amsterdam. That led to a major break into the newly organized Dutch spy organization "Ordre-Dienst". The principal agent, von Borsum-Buisman, was arrested. Documents seized revealed that the former radio deception became known in November 1943 when Dourlein and Ubbink escaped to Switzerland.

Later the Germans made further raids but did not succeed in breaking up the new organization. A new invisible spider began spinning its net over the country. Before the invasion started, the work of the British agent stations in Holland had expanded enormously. That remained true after the new western front had stabilized for a time. Moreover, an absolutely new organization of the entire Dutch resistance movement had resulted. The three major groups

Ordre-Dienst
Raad van Verzet
Knock-Ploegs

now combined to form a triangle, the so-called "Delta".
Beginning early in September 1944 the military forces of the Dutch resistance movement (including those in German occupied territories) were placed under the unified command of Prince Bernhardt, who in turn was directly subordinate to Eisenhower. At the same time the Dutch Government proposed to recognize the resistance organizations officially as Dutch armed forces.

Orders were then issued to the resistance organizations to protect important public works, such as water works and electric power plants, the docks at Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Ymuiden, the broadcast transmitters, telegraph offices, and repeater stations. They were also to seize a number of bridges and prevent the Germans from blowing them up. Minefields were also to be marked and advancing Allied troops were to be aided by agents familiar with the locality who were to report in pairs with a password to the signal officer of the nearest brigade.

The Government also tried to induce experts on harbor administration and the regulation of rivers to agree to be smuggled to Eindhoven by agents. One route ran via Culemborg - Piel. Later, agents were ferried across by canoe.

Of course the Germans raided some of the agent stations but they merely succeeded in getting a picture of the organization and work of the "Delta" without being able to combat it effectively. Partial success was achieved, in particular in respect to the famous English parachute action near Arnhem which turned out disastrously.
Now all the resistance movements in the country were assigned to intelligence work in order to procure dependable information. This required time, naturally, and never assumed great proportions, although at times some 30 stations were working.

Late in 1944 the transmitters working in Holland might be divided into two groups:

1. A group with some 15 radio stations of the "Delta" triangle,

2. Another group of about 15 stations which apparently belonged to a British organization for airborne and parachute troops.

What now ensued on the German side was a hopeless struggle, just as hopeless as the one a year before in France.

Of the more important "cases" on Dutch soil the following may be mentioned:

"Gerhard case". The seizure of an agent station in Zaandam in March 1944 dealt with "Ordre-Dienst" a serious blow. 1/4 sets were seized, along with cipher data and operation schedules.

"Fallschirm case". In October 1944 the German radio defense seized an agent station in Leiden which worked on ultra-short wave and had sent to England reports on the use of the V1 (Vergeltungswaffe). Only part of the clever group of agents was apprehended.

"Rotterdam case". In December 1944 a station was raided in Rotterdam and a complete plant for the production of false identification papers with numerous rubber stamps of German military and party offices fell into German hands. In this case an organization was involved which supplied resistance groups and sabotage units.
POLISH RADIO AGENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

Aside from their agent nets in Poland and France, the Poles had a great system of agent networks which covered all Europe and extended into the Near East. It is obvious that because of its central location and neutrality Switzerland afforded favorable conditions for setting up such a net. An organization was developed here which increased in importance, especially after the end of 1943. The connections of the Poles with Switzerland were more extensive and varied than those available to the various French organizations. Moreover the local chief, Captain Choynacki, was one of the best Polish intelligence officers. Over a transmitter in Switzerland espionage reports were sent currently to London.

Beyond a doubt the British "Secret Service" is one of the best secret services in the world. There are people who claim it is the very best and I am willing to believe it. And even if it didn't work with poison, murder, bombing, safe cracking, and burying people alive, as National Socialist propaganda claimed, it undoubtedly had pulled off many a clever stunt with the result that over the decades the British Government has been one of the best informed in the world. It was that way before World War II and it was that way during the war. However, twice during World War II its work was outshone as the moon is by the sun. Once by the work of the "Note Drei", which has been described in detail. And the second time it was again by a group working in Switzerland. This time it was
by the Work of Captain Choynacki in collaboration with the office of the Polish military attache in Berne.

In the "Rote Drei" case proof has been offered. In the Choynacki case I should like to omit such proofs. If I were to give all the messages - or even the most important ones (and who can say which message was not important?), If I tried to give all the telegrams from the Marne to Brest-Litowsk, from the "Rote Kapelle" to "Otwock", from the North African Theater to Stalingrad, then it would make not a book but a sizeable library!

I hope, therefore, that the reader will believe without proof that the "Berne case", as we shall call it, belongs alongside the "Rote Drei" as one of the most sensational cases of World War II. What was sent out from here by the Polish secret service was of great, in many cases decisive importance for the Allied conduct of the war.

The fateful thing for the Germans - just as in the "Rote Drei" case - was the fact that the intercepted telegrams were deciphered much too late. When they were deciphered and laid before influential persons in Germany, it was well that the office chairs of these gentlemen were sturdily constructed, with stout broad arms which kept them from falling from their seats and allowed them to rest the hand lamed by terror on those broad arms and say with resignation: "Ben Akiba lied! Such a thing never happened before".

The gentlemen were right, even though they were often wrong.
As a sample of this Berne case I should merely like to mention the fact that that dramatic final German offensive in the East, which began on 4 July 1943 near Orel and showed in the very first hours that it must inevitably fail, had been betrayed in all details back in the spring of 1943 by this Polish group! Three months before the first shot of this offensive was fired, every detail had been transmitted, including every division, every tank, and every gun! All this and much, much more!

The content of decrypted Polish telegrams revealed two things:

1. That the man who supplied the information was undoubtedly in Hitler's immediate vicinity;

2. That the content of foreign diplomatic and military messages decrypted by the German cryptanalytic service was known to that man.

The German Chief Signal Officer, Fellgiebel, Chief of the entire German Intercept Service and Signal Service (who was hanged by order of Hitler for participation in the conspiracy of 20 July 1944), then issued orders that decrypted foreign messages should be shown to only a limited number of persons. This number was cut down more and more. The Chief of German counterintelligence, Admiral Canaris, personally conducted an investigation for the purpose of discovering the mysterious source of this Polish information. All in vain! The riddle remained unsolved!
In June 1943 the transmitters of the Polish agents were distributed as follows:

- England: 5
- France: 6
- Switzerland: 3
- Italy: 1
- Poland: 15
- Hungary: 2
- Romania: 1
- Turkey: 2
- Iraq: 1
- Egypt: 1
- Iran: 1
- Palestine: 1
- Algeria: 1

The Polish agents in Romania pulled a hot one in 1943. Two Poles employed by the Japanese attache in Bucharest used the transmitter of the Japanese military attache to transmit their messages in a feeling of absolute security. In addition they installed two additional sets, one of them concealed in a large broadcast receiver. These transmitters caused the Germans a headache for a long time but at last a surprise raid was pulled off with the consent of the Japanese, who were not a little astonished to find they were harboring Polish agent transmitters in their own quarters.
The Poles were arrested; the material confiscated. This gave considerable insight into the organization of Polish espionage in Romania.

Subsequently Major Ziemianski, the principal Polish agent in Romania, was apprehended and the organization broken up, at least for a time. It had been directed by the Polish espionage service in Istanbul. The craziest thing about the whole crazy affair was that the two Polish operators were cleverly using the couriers of the Japanese embassies in Bucharest and Istanbul to carry their reports.
THE NEW FRONT IN THE WEST

After the new front in the West was formed and had stabilized in the fall of 1944, the Germans began intensive intercept activity for the purpose of learning the grouping and intentions of the enemy forces. In this connection it is very interesting to study the extent to which the several Allied armies gave the Germans information regarding their situation by their use of radio telegraphy.

The Canadian First Army was extremely cautious in its use of radio so that the Germans learned almost nothing.

The English Second Army was a little more generous but even here the results of the German intercept service were rather modest. The American Ninth Army was very silent and usually gave the Germans little to work on, so little that on many days the German intercept service had nothing to report.

Conditions were similar in the case of the American First Army.

The most profitable target for the German intercept service was the American Third Army; it sent an exceptional number of radiograms and was very incautious.

The American Seventh Army, on the other hand, could be compared with the American Ninth since it was very careful and sparing in the use of radio.

The French First Army was also very cautious at first, but
in November shed its reticence and later supplied the Germans with very good intercept results.
AGENT RADIO AS INDICATION OF OPERATIONS PLANNED

The monitoring of agent traffic, when combined with careful evaluation, often made it possible to recognize the area in which the enemy was planning new operations. If a considerable number of new agent stations appeared in an area occupied by German troops, it could be assumed with certainty that this area had been picked for a major operation. Hence the mere fact that such stations appeared was enough to justify far reaching conclusions. For instance, in the spring of 1944 there was considerable increase in agent traffic along the northern coast of France. On 6 June followed the invasion of Normandy.

Beginning in May 1944 an increase in the number of English stations in southern Greece and on the islands of the Aegean was noticeable. In October most of these islands were occupied by the Allies.

Beginning early in June 1944 it was noted that a center of agent activity was developing on the French coast between Toulon and Nice and in the Grenoble area. Five weeks later came the Allied landing.

In the very early days of August 1944 agents were dropped by parachute in Holland, primarily around Eindhoven, where British airborne forces were employed in September.

Moreover, the intention to shift the focal point of operations in the east to Hungary was revealed early in this manner. There
was a regular parachute invasion by agents.

On 30 June 1944 the Germans captured the Russian parachutist Beatrice Markovich south of Budapest. Shortly thereafter the operator who had dropped with her was arrested. Beatrice M. was supposed to use her knowledge of the language to contact German officers and gather military information.

On 9 July along the Slovak - Hungarian border east of Humenne a group of Soviet agents was dropped and all efforts at apprehension proved vain.

In the night from 26 to 27 July, 13 Russian agents (10 men and three women) were dropped with two radio sets, explosives, ammunition, maps, etc., near Sarkad - Hokviese (east of Beresaba). Some were arrested or shot but most of them escaped.

In the Banat southwest of Novi Bejecl, two English officers parachuted down in a uniform with Soviet stars. They had four radios along and were assigned to the English military mission to Tito, for which they were to gather information from the Banat and Belgrade. Both escaped.

On 17 August nine parachutists were dropped east of Grosswardein. Two were arrested, one operator was shot in the melee, and another operator was apprehended.

All these cases indicated clearly areas which were to be focal points of action in the near future.

Beginning in mid-July 1944 a considerable increase in the number of English agent stations behind the then southern front was noted.
This was a sure sign of impending major operations in the area.

The most striking example of the extent to which impending enemy action could be recognized by watching the employment of agents was to be found on the east front between August 1944 and 12 January 1945. This was the initial phase of the final Russian offensive.

Beginning in August 1944, the Germans noted in the western part of Poland an increased employment of Russian reconnaissance groups with radio equipment; they worked with the characteristics of partisan radio. The individual groups were well armed and combined into bands of several hundred men. They were in contact with radio control stations in the Russian front area.

As the Russian front approached the frontier of East Prussia, the Vistula and Slovakia (late October 1944) there was a change in the employment of Soviet espionage and reconnaissance. Ever since summer there had been a noticeable decline in reconnaissance in depth and in strategic espionage on the part of the highest Russian authorities. Apparently the reason was that a large number of raids and German radio games had caused the value of this type of long-range reconnaissance to sink in the estimation of the Russians. Moreover, military operations had already prospered to such an extent that the Russians could now dispense with strategic long-range reconnaissance, since for final success purely military means, supported by tactical and operational reconnaissance, were adequate.
The approach to the German frontier had overtaken and left behind most of the partisan bands (except in Slovakia) and thus eliminated one of their principal sources of intelligence. Moreover, the Russians could no longer count to the same extent as before on the cooperation of the natives.

Espionage now became primarily a concern of the front staffs and served chiefly for operational aims. Agents were employed in areas where military operations were planned and this shift in the use of agents was soon recognized. The missions assigned by the front staffs and the general staffs included reconnoitering basic factors in the enemy's military defense. Few sabotage missions were assigned. The groups employed were to limit themselves to pure intelligence work.

The Russian front staffs now received reconnaissance results from the following sources:

1. From agents: (groups of scouts beyond the main line of battle ranging to a depth of almost 300km.)
2. General reconnaissance by the troops (air and ground).
3. Signal Intelligence (intercept service and cryptanalysis).
4. From evaluation of own sources (captured documents and statements by prisoners).

The employment of agents before the great Russian offensive did not take place all at once but started slowly about August 1944 and long before the front stabilized in October it indicated the focal points of coming operations. Three principal periods of time could be distinguished:

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To mid-October,
b. From mid-October to early December,
c. From early December to the beginning of the offensive.

If we examine the groups of agents employed in these periods and their work, we see clearly the focal points and lines of thrust proposed. It was interesting to see the almost unbroken sequence in which the Russians reconnoitered military objectives, supply routes, fortifications, etc. in the areas of interest to them. It was patent that in East Prussia where the German counterintelligence network was closer meshed, any groups eliminated were always replaced by new ones. That was proof that the Russians were especially anxious to spy out this area.

Since the Russians used a large number of these scout groups (average strength some 6 men with one operator), it was frequently possible for them to check reports of several groups against one another and eliminate some of the false statements which consciously or unconsciously appeared in agent traffic.

When groups were dropped, they were given the usual set "Sewer" (output about 2.5 watts, range about 500 km); the supply of batteries was generally used up in two months; consequently if a group was still operating after two months it was clear that it had been supplied from the air. That meant that the Russian staff stressed the achievements of this group, since only those groups whose work came up to expectation were supplied by air; others were either recalled or left to their fate.
By concentrating on areas of importance for impending operations, the Russian spy net became so dense that in such sections as East Prussia, the Posen or Krakow area, virtually every bit of railway was under constant observation; other important military objectives were likewise constantly checked by radio agents.

Regarding their conduct in the areas of commitment we should note the following: groups employed in the summer of 1944, in particular on the 3rd White Russian Front, had some fighting strength. They generally consisted of some 15 qualified agents under the command of a Russian officer and moved about in their area of commitment in the manner of a small partisan detail. The results of their reconnaissance were very comprehensive, as was seen from decrypted messages.

By a very clever adaptation to the situation and by staying in inaccessible areas, several individual groups were able to carry on their work successfully for months. If such a group found conditions favorable, it would recruit informers among the local population or would use local people as watchers to warn of any danger. The missions of these groups included, along with spying out military objectives and reporting on transportation, reports on the morale of the population, subversive activity and occasionally - sabotage. They were also to watch German administrative measures, the use of identification papers, police regulations, the economic situation and details on all leading personalities.
When a great mass employment of scout groups began in October 1944, these groups had fewer people and their mission were more precisely defined. They were forbidden to contact the local population. German prisoners of war were often assigned them for the procurement of provisions. The missions were generally to be completed by the time Russian troops arrived.

How successfully the Russians had prepared for this final, wholesale employment of scouts is apparent from the fact that about 100 such groups worked uninterruptedly for longer than two months and passed their reports by radio to their employers. Moreover, more than 200 other groups of radio agents were committed which were not directly identified by the German monitors (the first mentioned 100 groups were recognized positively†). This means that the final Russian grand offensive, which began on 12 January 1945 and crushed the German eastern front, had been prepared for by some 3,000 agents with approximately 500 radio operators†.

Working with the security police and other agencies, the German radio defense was able to break up approximately 100 scout groups in a period of about 4 months; this, however, was not even a third of the number committed by the Russians. Nevertheless, what was learned in combatting Russian radio agents was quite adequate to give the German military command clear indications of the operational
intentions of the Russians and the proposed line of advance of their
army groups.

If the German top command had evaluated the reports as they
deserved and had shaped its own measures accordingly, the German
eastern front would not have been split up into single groups.
Rigid adherence to their own operational notions, contempt for
Russian leadership, disregard of everything which gave strategic
and operational intelligence regarding the enemy, and slavish
execution of the strategic ideas of the "greatest general of all
times" resulted in the smashing of the German eastern front within
a few months.

No doubt the mass employment of radio agents greatly facilitat-
ed the military success of the Russians. They were able to gather
the ripe fruits of this activity so quickly only because the Germans
utterly rejected any active evaluation of the warning signs obtained
by monitoring Russian agent traffic. Consciously or unconsciously
one no longer tried to take effective countermeasures and to launch
new operations on the basis of the intelligence gained. The upper
echelons simply allowed themselves to be guided by the will and
whimsy of Hitler. One either was resigned or one placed hope in
the use of those fabulous wonder weapons of which there had been
so much talk for two years.

In no enemy offensive could the details be foreseen so promptly
and so completely as in the case of the Russian offensive of
12 January 1945 and in no other case were the results of our own
intelligence so utterly disregarded.
Generally speaking, the agents and their radio operators were very cautious and clever. But there were some who, despite their ability, were incautious and so prepared for themselves a speedy end. A case in point was the agent Frol, employed in Berlin by the English. Ivan Frol was a Croatian by birth who had had an unstable life as technician in Italy, Germany and South America. In 1943 he was located by a Yugoslav embassy in South America and sent to England as one subject to military service. Because of his good knowledge of German, he was immediately trained as an agent. After several unsuccessful attempts he was dropped by parachute near Heilbronn on 2 October 1944 with his radio man Betzinger. From there they made their way to Berlin by train and found lodgings in Berlin-Charlottenburg, Sachsenplatz 5, an address given them in England. Here they set up their radio set.

The two began work. Their radio connection was good. Frol gathered information which Betzinger forwarded to England. That their work was not unimportant is obvious from a message sent on 21 October 1944:

"It is urgently necessary to bomb the General Staff Building in the Bendlerstrasse. Position is 100 meters NW of bridge over Landwehrkanal. Destruction will interrupt intelligence communication with all fronts. Reinforced concrete roof 4 meters, walls..."
2-1/2 meters thick. More exact report follows by courier.

Source B."

The first rash act on the part of the two was to transmit
diligently without changing the location of their set so that the
German intercept service soon noticed this new traffic and learned
the approximate location by close range D/F-ing. Still it might
have been weeks before a raid would have been possible, if Iwan
FroI had not been guilty of the same kind of stupidity that proved
fateful for so many. He talked.

He liked especially to talk and drop hints during air raid
alarms and when he met a man with a Polish sounding name in the air
raid shelter near the Zoo and discovered that the man lived in
Reichstrasse (in the same area as he), his shyness disappeared
and he proceeded to tell how he had come from England and dropped by
parachute and that he had important things to do. The man with the
Polish name arranged to meet Iwan shortly thereafter at the corner
of Leipzigerstrasse and Friedrichstrasse. He also reported the
matter promptly to the police and FroI was arrested at their
rendezvous on 28 October.

He immediately confessed everything, identified his lodgings
on Sachsenplatz and his operator.

The following day the police raided the station. Betzinger
defended himself with a gun and was shot down after a long exchange
of bullets.

With that the activity of this group was at an end.
THE GERMAN CHRISTMAS OFFENSIVE 1944

Who has forgotten the howl of triumph in the National Socialist press when on 16 December 1944 the celebrated German Christmas Offensive, between St. Vith and Monschau broke loose against the American First Army. It was the last offensive which the armies of Adolf Hitler were to undertake. The press brought out article after article on the unconquered and unconquerable strength inherent in the National Socialist State and its armed forces. And when the first successes were recorded, people were fairly turning somersaults. Now the Americans would be shown a thing or two! Now they were to be driven back to France and annihilated in great battles of encirclement. Broadcasts were made in the Flemish language, appealing to the population of Belgium to prepare for the new coming of German troops, not to leave their cities but to wait patiently for a new liberation. Within a short time all Belgium would be occupied.

But it did not turn out that way. After ten days, during which certain successes were obtained, the German offensive began to bog down; on 29 December it was completely stopped. A bitter struggle began. Then on 10 January the German retreat started slowly. The dream was over. The offensive had shown not how strong Germany still was but how little offensive power was left in the German army.
How was it possible for the relatively weak German forces to score such remarkable initial successes? How was it possible for the offensive to take the Allied High Command so completely by surprise as to bring the American First Army into a critical position?

The swift change in the military situation in the west in August 1944 did not for the moment greatly change the radio agent situation. These agent operators did not move back with the retreating German forces but remained in their own areas.

After the front had approached the German boundaries, the activity of radio agents in France and Belgium fell off gradually. Most of them ceased sending during the second half of October.

In September 1944 a new situation arose in the west. Till then the Allied agents had had an easy time working and building up resistance organizations among the predominately anti-German populations of France and Belgium. Now it was necessary to use German speaking agents in German territory. Such agents were not available in great numbers and their work was not as easy as that of the French and Belgians in the occupied territories had been.

At the northern end of the front in Holland and at the southern end in the French Departments Doubs, Haute Saone, and Vosges conditions were more favorable for the agent. Here he was given stout support by the Dutch and French population. Hence Allied spies worked from the two ends of the line over into the German area of operations. It was possible to introduce into this area relatively
quickly a large number of agents, although many of them were promptly apprehended by the Germans - not less than 450 in the single month of September 1944.

Sometimes the Germans were able to carry on very profitable "radio games", e.g., on the southern sector in November 1944. On 1 November they apprehended a French agent Le Touche as he crossed the lines near LaForge with a radio set and various instructions. He was "turned" and used for a deception which was maintained almost two months.

Gradually, however, a kind of vacuum arose on German soil for the Allied radio agent service so that by the end of October 1944 this means of intelligence virtually had to be written off and no information was obtained regarding the situation behind the German front. That is why the Germans were able to assemble troops for the "Christmas offensive" quite unnoticed by the enemy.

On 26.12.44 General Payton March, Chief of Staff, stated that the lack of dependable information on the military situation of Germany had been responsible for developments on the western front.

On the same day one U.S.A. intelligence agency reported that the success of the German offensive in the west was attributed in official circles to the failure of Allied intelligence. A clean-up was to be expected which would extend into circles close to General Eisenhower.
Early in 1945 British and especially American intelligence began building up a new network of radio agents behind the German front and in occupied Holland in order to get reliable information on which to base future operations. This heavily financed activity was successful. In a few weeks a system of smoothly functioning agent stations came into being. The last phase of the struggle in the dark began and the scales soon tipped swiftly in favor of the Allies.
A WONDER-WEAPON AND ITS HISTORY

The result might be quite interesting if someone cared to take the trouble to record the number of times Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Milch, Fritzsch and many other leaders of the Third Reich stated positively that air superiority was decisive for the course and outcome of a modern war.

The validity of this statement is not open to criticism, World War II has supplied unmistakable proof. It is all the more surprising then that the German air force, which had manifested decisive superiority in the first two years of the war, began to decline in the first phase of the Russian campaign, one may even say had begun to decline (at first scarcely perceptibly, but then more and more obviously) in the autumn of 1940. After the campaign in the west, after experiences in the "air battle over England" in August - September 1940, after experiences over Crete, etc., one would have expected that every effort would be made to develop the German air force, especially since the German intercept service and other means of intelligence showed clearly that in England and in the USA the value of the air force in modern war had been recognized quickly and the output of the aviation industry was being increased to the limit. The figures reported from America were so high as to challenge attention before the middle of 1940. Nevertheless, in the fall of 1941 it was clear that the German air force was being eclipsed and in 1942, when the British began
air attacks on German territory, people in Germany asked anxiously what had become of the German air force that was to prevent such attacks. The summer and autumn of 1942 showed that the German air force no longer dominated the air over Germany. How had this been possible?

To answer the question, it is necessary to recall the origins of the German air force. It had been developed by a small group of officers with a high degree of technical and tactical training. These included Wever, Udet, Loeb, Kesselring and Jeschonnek. Wever was a real strategist and tactician, an ideal German general staff officer. Udet was the leader in practical work and commitment tactics. Loeb was the man of vision who planned and promoted the German aviation industry. Kesselring was a good organizer and administrator – perhaps a bit too grandiose in his ideas but a man of ability and energy. Jeschonnek was the genius of tactical planning. The others who came into the picture were – apart from a few capable specialists – healthy and ambitious men looking for a career. Wever was killed in an accident before the war. Udet lost his life in the Russian campaign under peculiar circumstances. Loeb had a fatal accident in the summer of 1940. Kesselring – yes, his was a peculiar story; he became a General Field Marshall and held high commands in Italy to the end of the war, but strangely enough in the army rather than in the air force. He was a victim of the most debated person in the German air force:
General Field Marshall Milch. Many people have called Milch the evil genius of the German air force; he was a career maker of the purest sort.

Germany found no replacement for these men, or perhaps did not know how to put the proper men in their places. The decline of the German air force began back in the summer of 1940 and this decline eventually proved fatal for the Third Reich and fateful for Germany.

There were plenty of reasons for the gigantic catastrophies of 1944 - 1945. Without question, one of the most important reasons for the German collapse was German air inferiority from 1942 on.

Mention has been made of the fact that the German intercept service recognized during the first half of 1940 that the development of the aircraft industry in the U.S.A. was assuming alarming proportions. It was no great trick to figure out when the results would begin to be manifest in the European theater.

People in the German Ministry for Air and in OKL underestimated the capacity of American industry and did not believe these reports. Hitler himself called the figures "astronomic and of no significance because they were Utopian". Nevertheless it was certain that the struggle with the fast expanding American superiority in production could only be carried on successfully by superior and clear sighted leadership.
Even before the war, work on a new type of propellerless
turbine - air stream propulsion (jet aircraft) had led to
promising results. In the spring of 1938 the possible use of
such propulsion devices was discussed. Computations and pre-
liminary studies at the Messerschmitt plants from the fall of
1938 to the spring of 1939 showed that a plane with the new
device would have far more speed than the old planes with
gasoline motors. Work began at once on plans for a "Strahljäger"

In June 1939 a project of the BMW* for a pursuit plane with
two jets was laid before the Ministry for Air. This was given the
model designation "Me 262", which later became famous. This model
corresponded, except for some minor details, to the final Me 262.
On the basis of this draft, the Ministry for Air ordered the
construction of three experimental planes; construction was to
begin in 1939. Early in 1940 the experimental workshops were
busy producing devices and single parts and about the middle of
1940 the first plane reached the assembly stage.

This machine represented the first stage in a development
calculated to bring about a basic change in air warfare. There
were two reasons: speed and fuel economy. Speed is of decisive
importance in a prusuit plane and the first year of the war had
shown that the superior performance of German planes could hardly
be maintained in the long run because high performance gasoline
motors were not available in Germany.

* BMW = Bavarian Motor Works.
It now appeared that the production of the jet power plant could not keep pace with the development of the aircraft. On the one hand, great difficulties of a purely technical character were encountered in developing and testing a new type of propulsion; on the other hand, surprisingly enough, an incomprehensible lack of interest in this revolutionary novelty was displayed in official circles. What happened was the exact opposite of what might rationally have been expected. In the firm conviction that the war would end with a quick victory, people thought that active furtherance of this work was not urgent. They thought the jet plane would come out much too late to play an important part in the war. This attitude prevented suitable continuation and expansion of the intensive work already done. It is true that a few people in the RLM did have vision, but their effort came to naught "in official channels" leading through their superiors.

Not to let time pass unused, the Messerschmitt Company installed a normal gasoline motor in the abbreviated nose of the first experimental apparatus. On 18 April 1941 the Me 262 (without jet propulsion) made its first flight. Some valuable information was gathered but the primary purpose — development of the jet planes — was not furthered. Thus a full year passed, a costly year that could never be made up for, because the delivery of the first jet engine was delayed a full year due to
inadequate support of the company. Finally, on 25 March 1942, the Me 262 started for the first time with two BMW jets. These experimental flights showed, however, that the engine was not yet up to expectations.

Meanwhile the Junkers Company, which was working on a similar engine, achieved a fairly good experimental form and there was hope of getting ahead faster with this model. A second Me 262 was equipped with this engine. The first flights were made about the middle of July 1942. The Junkers engines still showed various defects, especially in regard to regulation, but they were reliable enough to justify experimental operation.

The pilot who flew the plane was enthusiastic about its performance. It had now been proven that a wonder-plane had actually been created.

In 1940 Schulze-Boysen (see Rote Kapelle case) learned of the work on this new type of aircraft. He took a great interest in the matter but agreed with various high officials of the RLM that no usable machine of this type could be produced in the foreseeable future. It may be, of course, that Schulze-Boysen was the man who intentionally belittled the project in the Ministry for Air in order to sabotage development. There is evidence that he put out propaganda against the Me 262. Through Schulze-Boysen the agents of the "Rote Drei" learned of the development and through them word reached England in 1942. Here the reports were initially considered day dreams and not until 1943 apparently was any serious effort made to spy out the truth. Early in 1944 England was fairly
well informed regarding the state of development. Any sensible person would assume that after the brilliant results of the first trial flight with the jet engine, people in Germany would have done everything possible to get this device into assembly line production. Quite apart from some valuable tactical advantages, the Me 262 with a maximum speed of 870 km per hour afforded an advantage of more than 200 km an hour over the fastest planes in the world. And that at a time when all countries were on a so nearly equal footing that they were straining every nerve to gain an advantage of even one kilometer.

Nothing of the kind happened. The Ministry for Air late in 1942 issued an order for a total of 5 experimental planes (I repeat: five!) and 20 others which were to be delivered by the end of 1943. At the same time a program was worked out providing for a production of 20 machines of the Me 262 type a month (I repeat: twenty a month!).

Whenever before and during the war people compared notes on the three armed services, it was generally agreed that the German air force was relatively the most advanced, that it acted most swiftly and took account of changing situations faster than the others. In the present case I should consider the term "sleepy heads" a piece of flattery. There is absolutely no word for such an attitude. Obviously the people were not capable of estimating even approximately the importance of this
new invention. Perhaps there were people in the Ministry for Air who didn’t wish to. But it was not only the RLM which revealed the lack of interest, even OKL clearly manifested the same indifference. The Office of Development of the RLM addressed several letters to the command of the air force describing possibilities of using the device and offering to reveal the specifications they wished to make for this aircraft. The letters remained unanswered. Only after repeated admonitions by RLM did a message come from the command staff of the air force early in 1943 to the effect that the number of jet planes specified for delivery in the program was considered adequate and that after gathering sufficient experience at the front this number might be increased at the expense of other types. Anyway the air force staff was not concerned with laying down any specifications for such an aircraft! That was the upshot of efforts of the German air force through “channels”.

This didn’t help the German aviation industry – in this case the Messerschmitt Company. What the company needed was a sympathetic, intensive furtherance of the project from above, since the capacity of its plants was by no means equal to the current demands, to say nothing of providing for large scale production of the new machine. Before the Me 262 could go on the assembly line everything would have to be rearranged and brought up to the minute, since the project was already three years old! At the same time development, construction, and servicing of a number of other types had to be carried on with a very small number of workmen and draftsmen. The necessary technicians could only be drawn from the aviation industry itself and for
this the aid of the RLM was essential. The total capacity of the German aviation industry was fairly great and if work had been concentrated on a relatively small number of critical tasks, it would have been possible to make ample deliveries of the tactically necessary types. It was the duty of the RLM to exercise control in this matter. But this was precisely where the leadership failed completely. Late in 1942 no less than 53 types of planes (disregarding various sub-types and series) were in use or under construction. General Field Marshal Milch could not comprehend the need for changing this situation and did not stand up against the special wishes of the generals in the various services and it was due to these special wishes that the multiplicity of types had been developed. This explains why the output of the aviation industry was so much less than capacity. It also explains difficulties of supply and with the ground organization.

The agents of the "Rote Drei" were very well informed regarding these conditions and numerous reports on the subject went from Switzerland to Moscow.

Repeated suggestions by men in the industry that production be limited to 6 or 8 basic types in order to get higher production were not listened to by Milch. In the face of such an attitude all efforts at increasing production were virtually doomed to failure.
In April 1943 the Messerschmitt Company finally succeeded in
interestig the troops in the Me 262. Captain S., chief of an air
force testing command, flew the Me 262 and was enthusiastic about it.
He declared that even in the experimental model it could be used to
great advantage at the front. One month later Major General Galland
took off from Lechfeld on a fairly long experimental flight. He
returned greatly impressed. He was convinced that with tactics
adapted to the performance and peculiarities of this plane
air warfare would be completely revolutionized. He called for
delivery of 100 planes before the end of 1943 and for the building
as soon as possible of large numbers - in addition to the previous
program for fighters with gasoline motors. He promised to convince
Hitler through Goering that the Messerschmitt Company should be
given the necessary support. Shortly after Galland's visit Milch
called for detailed plans for assembly line production of the Me 262
and promised to take special measures to assure supplies. At the
same time he stopped production of several other machines.

Galland's request for delivery of 100 machines by the end of
1943 could not be complied with, - too much time had been lost.
This number could not be turned out until May 1944 at the earliest.
Quick production in series could only be guaranteed if the RLM met
the conditions which had been discussed repeatedly. These were:

1. Giving the Me 262 top priority.

2. Absolute protection of the workers against claims of the
   armed forces (hero catcher program).

3. Prompt fulfillment of detailed, specific requirements in the
   way of material, machines, men and space.
A few weeks after the Messerschmitt company stated its requirements, it was clear that these could not be met by the RLM. Obviously no progress could be made without the aid of Speer, Minister of Armaments. The chairman of the Messerschmitt board, Seiler, then had a conference early in July 1943 with Sauer in the Ministry for Armaments and laid before him various facts: that in the view of General Galland and other experienced officers the Me 262 afforded the air force an unparalleled opportunity, that the RLM was not in a position to supply the men and machines necessary for the program, that General Field Marshal Milch had shown no sympathy with the suggestion that the number of types in production be cut below 53 to get capacity for the Me 262, and that in consequence the support of the Ministry for Armaments was urgently needed. Using reports from agents in France, President Seiler endeavored to prove that the air superiority of the Western Allies was increasing from week to week although the command of the German air force was not drawing the proper inferences from this fact.

Saur pointed out that he had been told a few days before by Hitler to take charge of the construction of submarines in order to increase greatly the production of these vital weapons. For this reason alone he would not be in a position to intervene actively. Moreover, he thought that Seiler was too pessimistic in his view of the air situation. The enemy
was suffering in its attacks losses which it could not stand in the long run. At the present there was going on a test of morale which had to be won. In spite of all the air attacks since the spring of 1943 only eight percent of German industry had been put out of operation by the beginning of July. The only decisive weapon was the submarine; he was confident that submarine warfare would be resumed on a large scale in November 1943.

It is hard to say which of Saur's lines of thought was the more surprising. World War I had clearly shown that submarine warfare does not decide a war. Now, when the Allies were combatting submarines effectively with their radar, one could no longer count on a success with this weapon, even if thousands were employed. Regarding the increasing superiority of the enemy as a temporary test of morale when America was just starting to produce bombers is simply incomprehensible. One can only comprehend it if one assumes that Saur was getting his information on other countries solely from the broadcasts of Hans Fritsche.

After an interview lasting nearly two hours, Seiler left Mr. Saur with the impression that the latter simply did not comprehend the simple fact that a modern war cannot be waged with any prospect of success without clear superiority in the air. Speer was soon to get a sharp lesson. The British attack on Hamburg showed what the score was. In the wake of this catastrophe Saur delivered a lecture at Hitler's Headquarters and mentioned Seiler's suggestion. He said he would be ready now to take over the guidance of the aviation industry but on condition that he be given full respon-
sibility. The German leaders, however, were not at that time ready for any such incisive measures. Again months were allowed to pass and this was in the summer of 1943 after the disaster in North Africa, after Sicily, after Stalingrad, when Allied air raids were increasing in number and violence.

In September 1943 Seiler approached General Field Marshal Milch once more, supported this time by Director General Frydag of Goering's council. The two gave Milch their opinion that a number of models of the Messerschmitt, Dornier, Junkers and Focke-Wolf lines must be dropped to get capacity for the Me 262. But if the gentlemen had assumed that under the influence of the Hamburg disaster Milch would grasp the need for new revolutionary decisions, then they had deceived themselves mightily. Milch accused Frydag of accepting bribes from the Messerschmitt concern because he was representing its interests. The interview was fruitless; not a single type was dropped. The motto everywhere (not merely in the air force and RLM) was "wash my hide but don't get me wet!" The fact that this was jousting with windmills and evading the issue, that the aviation industry had only limited resources and was heavily overburdened, either was not comprehended or else people purposely closed their eyes and played strong man. "Oh, well, we have to do it, nevertheless!" strong words, but feeble brain work.

Air Force Program number 223, drawn up late in August 1943, provided for serial production of the Me 262 in January 1944 and for an increase to 60 planes per month by May 1944. Beginning
in October 1944 after a complete change over to large scale production, the output was to jump to a maximum of 1000 planes a month in September 1945 - I repeat: 1945, i.e., two full years away. If this program was nonsensical at a time when the air superiority of Britain and U.S.A. was becoming more manifest every day and when only quick action could be of any avail, it was obvious that the program was a mere pipe dream in view of the inability of the RLM to meet the requirements of the Messerschmitt Company. All these programs were drawn up with an eye to their propaganda value, so that the proponent might play the strong man in lecturing on the subject at Hitler's Headquarters and perhaps get a decoration.

British and American air activity over Germany showed that assembly line production of aircraft in Allied factories had really started. The restoration of German air superiority had become a vital matter. The problem could only be solved by a complete break with previous methods.

Meanwhile the British agent service had not been asleep and as a result people in England were fully aware of the danger threatened by the Me 262. They decided to act. On 17 August there was a heavy bombing attack on the Regensburg plant which was badly damaged. It was due solely to the initiative of a few of the leading men that production could be resumed in a relatively short time. The system of moving, camouflaging and protecting the workshops had justified itself completely. Nevertheless valuable time had been lost once more.
In October 1943 the manager in Regensburg induced Goering to agree to inspect the reconstructed plant. At the same time he wished to hear all complaints about inadequate support of the Me 262 program in the past. On 2 November Goering appeared with Milch, Galland, General Vorwald, Colonel Diesing and several engineers of the RLM. President Seiler had agreed with all his men to take full advantage of this one favorable opportunity to tell Goering all their desires and all their complaints, even though the gentlemen from the RLM and Milch might not be exactly delighted.

Reichsmarshall Goering opened the meeting by requesting the gentlemen of the Messerschmitt Company to speak quite openly and set forth all their desires and complaints. In the conference, which lasted several hours, the history of the Me 262 was given in detail and with absolute frankness, likewise all efforts to secure machines and personnel, which thus far had brought no satisfactory results. Using tables and diagrams they demonstrated that, because of lack of hundreds of technical men, production was so far behind that the delivery dates suggested in the program would have to be delayed by months, entirely due to inadequate support on the part of the authorities. The statements by the men at the Messerschmitt Company were confirmed by a staff engineer from the staff of Colonel Diesing, although Field Marshal Milch kept popping up with objections like a jack-in-the-box.
After four hours the meeting came to an end. Goering promised to see to it that construction should be furthered so as to make possible the production of considerable numbers of machines. The truth of the matter is, however, that Goering's visit did not help the Messerschmitt Company at all, although all the leading men reminded the offices concerned of the promises made by Goering.

It is an elementary observation that the employment of a new weapon can only be successful if

1. it comes as a surprise and

2. it is used in great quantities.

If this is not done but the weapon is used in homeopathic doses, the enemy has a chance either to imitate it or to invent a means of defense, or to change his tactics and adapt them to the new situation, or to interfere with production of the new weapon.

Obviously there could be no thought of surprise. It soon appeared that the British and Americans were starting to change their tactics for the safety of the bombing squadrons. The critical factor, however, was that the general air superiority of the Allies had already increased to a point where they could begin systematic destruction of the German air force and of the aviation industry thus reducing the stock of airplanes and also preventing mass production of jet planes. One plant after the other was attacked and production sank rapidly. Moreover the German air force was used up in the efforts to combat the invading planes. The Allies had already dealt the German air force a frightful blow by the attack on the Experimental Institute of the Air Force near Peoncnunde.
and the mass employment of flying bombs had been postponed indefinitely. Both the "Rote Drei" and the British radio agents had meanwhile picked up so much information that people in England and the Soviet Union were pretty well informed on the subject of the jet plane.

Prodded by the Allied air attacks, the Supreme Command finally decided to do something for the air force. In March 1944 when the sparrows were already chirping about the coming Allied invasion, the "Jügerstab" was formed under Saur, a staff of men from the Armament Industry of Speer. This office controlled labor, machine construction and the procurement of material, as well as transportation. Actually this transfer of responsibility for producing pursuit planes brought extraordinary results. Aircraft production reached a figure several times as high as in the days when the plants were still intact. There was large scale shifting and bunkering of production facilities. The "Jügerstab" signified for the aviation industry a great boost by rendering available all those things which the Air Ministry never had at its disposal. But this was no longer the point. It was now necessary to create something absolutely new and that could not happen. There was no change in the basic attitude of the top command. The countless types continued to be built; the chief emphasis was shifted to production of fighters but the production of
bombers of all sorts still tied up a large portion of existing capacity. It was no longer a question of equaling the production of the English and American industry but of catching up and surpassing it; of course this was not possible. Therefore the only way of regaining air superiority was by building the greatest possible number of far superior fighters. It was necessary to shoot down so many hostile bombers that the enemy would fall behind in the race.

The Me 262 was not immediately affected by the "Jägerstab". Its principle duty was to overcome as quickly as possible the results of air attacks and to increase production. Nevertheless the general support also aided the Me 262 in modest measure so that the first serial numbers could be delivered to the troops beginning in March 1944. To put it mildly, that was late enough.

The use of the machine by test units of the air force in Bavaria against hostile reconnaissance planes and long-range fighters definitely established the superiority of the Me 262 over any other aircraft. The number of planes shot down and the moral effect of this new type aircraft had the result that for weeks no enemy reconnaissance planes ventured into this area. These results justified the assumption that the jet pursuit plane Me 262, if properly employed, would restore air superiority in a short time. The results of the intercept service revealed that the English were not only giving much thought to the
Me 262 but were seriously worried lest the Germans succeed in producing the machine in large quantities. From this it could be inferred that neither the English nor the Americans had a model capable of opposing this aircraft. Even if they succeeded in copying the machine, it would be a long time before it could be employed by the Allies in quantity. The last chance had come for making extensive use of this weapon. All the more astounding was the news that Hitler at this time had ordered that the Me 262 be used as a high-speed bomber. Why this order was given never became clear. There are indications that Milch advised it. It is also quite possible that Hitler, in his impulsive headstrong fashion, hit upon the idea and put it through. In any case it was done for purely propaganda purposes. The German people and the enemy were to be shown that the German air force was still able to drop bombs on the target unscathed. So the German propaganda machine raced away madly and Fritsche got a new lease on life.

Of course the Me 262, like any fighter plane, could carry bomb loads for certain purposes but in the first model as a straight fighter plane without sights for bombing the success was bound to be slight and not worth while. As came out ultimately, the effect of such missions was unimportant. All efforts to get the order rescinded failed. General Galland, who saw himself robbed of the only chance
To lead his fighters to success, retired in vexation after vain attempts to alter the situation. Hitler forbade any discussion of the question. England breathed a sigh of relief.

This story shows how far the German Supreme Command failed to assess correctly the tactical possibilities of the air force and in particular the value of the jet fighter. Only at the beginning of the war was the employment of the air force correctly planned and executed, and this was due solely to the foresight and hard work of a few men who were no longer in charge and for whom no adequate successors had been found. Later on everything was improvisation and was based on propaganda considerations. This explains the commitment of the air force, the many types, the constantly changing construction programs, and the changes demanded all the while by the troops, which together with the incompetence of the leading figures of the RLM, hampered the German aviation industry. When the Allied landing took place early in June 1944 and the German Air Force was hardly able to impede, much less to stop enemy operations, the lack of a strong air force was felt keenly. Only then did people in the highest places see in the Me 262 a means of regaining air superiority. Saur meanwhile had expanded his "Jägerstab" to an armament staff which was to look after the entire armament industry. In this connection he had taken aircraft production over into the field of competence of the Ministry for Armaments. In his proposed program dated 22 June 1944 Saur called for sharply increased production of the Me 262 with a monthly production of 500 planes by December 1944.
The program could not be fulfilled. Too little preparatory work had been done and production of parts was far behind, due to want of technicians. The requests of the Messerschmitt Company for equipment experts and tool makers were forever being questioned; several commissions were appointed to check on the demands, although these always turned out to be justified. Allocations remained absolutely inadequate and at this time could not be satisfactory. It was too late. As a result, the need for common laborers to keep production going increased all the while. There was also a demand for experts and administrators for the numerous depot workshops and to look out for a large number of foreigners who had been employed. Even the Armament Staff was no longer in a position to meet the requirements of the Messerschmitt Company in full.

In the spring of 1944 the Allies began their attacks on plants making synthetic gasoline. One plant after the other was badly damaged. During the summer a point was reached where the resulting shortage of aviation gasoline forced the air command to limit radically the number of types. A number of types which had been ready for replacement before 1943 were now discontinued. The Messerschmitt Company thought this would release overseers, experts and machines for the Me 262, and permit a rapid increase in production. Instead, Hitler in August ordered the construction of a 1-TL-Fighter of Type 162.

This is the story: the Heinkel Company had meanwhile been
working on the development of a jet fighter and developed a cheap model with only one jet. Construction was completed in the summer of 1944. It was the above mentioned Type 162. It was to be put on the assembly line and be used early in 1945 in large numbers. The period from initial production to serial production was not to exceed nine months; in the light of Messerschmitt's experience this was an impossibility, since there would be the same difficulty in regard to personnel, machines, etc. Even assuming that Type 162 was cheaper than Type 262, even if we grant that it was simpler and hence could be built more rapidly, yes, even if we grant that it would perhaps be better than Type 262, we must nevertheless conclude that in this case the better was not merely the foe of the good but became the foe of the entire cause. The time when this decision was made was not a suitable time for trying time-consuming experiments. There was time in 1940, not in 1944. The Me 262 was already thoroughly tested, was on the production line and called for 2,000 hours, in other words was cheap. It was only necessary to develop the necessary capacity for mass production. Instead of getting large scale production of this model going, recourse was had once more to the scheme of splitting up material and personnel and - instead of reducing the number of types, one more type was put into production. According to all previous experience the result could only be that neither the one nor the other model would be ready in quantity in the spring of 1945.
Furthermore Type 162 was inferior to Type 262 in one respect and it also was based on a jet motor of the BMW which was not yet in large scale production and was not yet technically right. The whole thing boiled down to rivalry between the two firms, which meant a wastage of energy.

Early in October 1944 there were large new drafts for the armed forces and the Messerschmitt Company was not spared. If the quota demanded by the armed forces had been released, the production of the Me 262 would have been out of the question. President Seiler went to see Goebbels as plenipotentiary for utilization of man-power since he was responsible for the new draft calls. The interview took place on 10 October in Berlin. Dr. Goebbels expressed astonishment that the long promised "wonder weapon" was not yet coming out in quantity. Seiler gave him the whole story of the Me 262. Thereupon Dr. Goebbels sent his Chief of the Personnel Division, Dr. Schultz von Dratzik, to check up on the spot. He found that what Seiler had reported corresponded with the facts. Goebbels now intervened and the Messerschmitt Company were excused from supplying men to the armed forces and were assigned a number of first class specialists and other urgently needed helpers. But the basic question of changing the entire aircraft program could not be solved even by Goebbels.

The occupation of the Ruhr, the loss of Upper Silesia and the unrestricted air superiority of the enemy ushered in the final phase of the war. The German armament industry had
to contend with extraordinary difficulties. Hitherto the unparallel-
ed discipline of the German people as a whole had made it possible
to keep the work going in spite of constant attacks on the cities.
Now a new phase of the air war began: the systematic destruction of
means of communication. The dispersion of manufacturing plants,
which had been accomplished in the preceeding years, now presented
almost insoluble problems when normal transportation ceased. The
German air force was frittering itself away and using up a large
portion of its strength in the counterattacks of January 1945. It
was no longer able to keep the enemy from achieving his aim. The
German people waited in vain for an effective employment of the new
"wonder weapon". Only rarely did one hear of the use of individual
machines which indicated the unusual superiority of the Me 262. But
the totally inadequate tactics prevented any decisive success.
Everywhere in Germany you could see the Me 262 just as you could the
bazooka (Panzerfaust) which was on display in offices, armories,
omnibuses, guard houses, etc., everywhere except where it could be
used in great numbers. It was disheartening to see the Me 262
standing by the dozens on airfields ready to start and offering a
perfect target for hostile bombers and fighters. The order to
start did not come. Why? - I do not know. It was no longer possible
to protect the aviation industry itself from low-flying hostile
aircraft.

In the last three months of the war events crowded one another
and in administration and command circles there were powerful words
and resounding phrases which merely served to disguise the chaos.
Finally they had become aware of the fact that the Me 262 should be the focal point of production. Production of all other models, including the Me 162, which had bogged down because of poor tests results and the unsatisfactory condition of the BZW engine, was stopped. If that had been done a year earlier it would have made sense, now this hasty measure only resulted in snarling up production as a whole. Sauckel, Gauleiter of Thuringia, promised Hitler in resounding tones an additional large scale production of the Me 262 in his plants, giving incredibly near term delivery dates to which it was obviously impossible to adhere. In February 1945 Degenkolb, who had become prominent by his successes in the program for building locomotives, was put in charge of the production of the Me 262 and given plenipotentiary powers. Four weeks later Speer had to turn over the Me 262 program to the SS, which had long since betrayed its intention of getting control of industry. SS-Obergruppenführer and General der Waffen-SS Kammler was appointed by Hitler Commissar for the Me 262; he had all authority and placed his officers in all plants engaged in work on the machine. But it was too late to think of any well coordinated production. The swift advance of the Allies made it necessary to move the shops into those parts of southern Germany which were still unoccupied. Transportation was such a problem that a large part of the material was often on the
railway or highway for long periods. Anyone with a grain of sense was already convinced that all efforts were now useless. Kammler, however, continued issuing his unintelligible directives and threatened to have his SS-men shoot anyone who did not follow out his instructions at once.

The advance of the Allies became more and more rapid. Soon the entire area of Germany was occupied. The history of the Me 262 came to an end.

I have not described the struggle of the Messerschmidt Company in behalf of the Me 262 in this volume to give prominence to the concern; there were other companies in the aviation industry of no less importance whose performance merits equal recognition. The story has been told because it involves a matter of decisive importance for the course of the war and because the history of the Me 262 is typical of conditions in Germany. On the one hand, manifestations of real genius on the part of the individual scientists and technicians, on the other hand, the failure to recognize the big opportunity because of the obstinacy and indifference of men in high positions. Active, untiring effort on the part of individual industrialists and long drawn out handling of affairs by high officials; mighty plans intended to make a good impression, which could not possibly be carried out; conscious closing of the eyes to the catastrophic seriousness of the situation; working at cross purposes by the individual agencies, and the watering down of any really great plan "in official channels". This is symbolic not merely for the Me 262, but actually for everything that happened in Germany. Consequently in the history of the Me 262 we really have a bit of the history of the German people.
BROADCASTING IN WORLD WAR II

A fat volume might be written on the propaganda broadcasts of the various belligerents of World War II. No doubt some competent person will do this. In this volume we shall only mention broadcast propaganda in a general way, in particular with regard to the manner in which it was reflected in the intercept service.

The word "propaganda" has gotten a bad connotation during the last decade and a half since, unfortunately, we have had to accustom ourselves to its use, not to gain recruits for a good cause but to force upon others against their will ideas which are neither good of themselves nor useful to those upon whom they are imposed. Things have gone so far that there is a general aversion to everything connected with propaganda and an immediate resistance where propaganda is even suspected.

The different countries made use of broadcasting in different ways, and certain developments resulted in all countries on the basis of observations made. If I mention so-called broadcast propaganda, I do so with reference to the role which broadcasting played as a means of psychological warfare.

The use of broadcasting as a means of propaganda by government originated in the Soviet Union. In this federation the enormous possibilities were recognized which centrally controlled broadcasting has for propagating specific ideas. With revolutionary resolution they set to work and created a mighty organization for the use of
the government and the Communist Party.

In human affairs one must always be very cautious about making comparisons. This is especially true when comparing forms of government, countries, peoples, and the like. Of course this may be done objectively in order to recognize differences; but one must guard carefully against attaching any estimate of value. These are sure to be one sided and to yield a distorted picture.

Thus if we observe the type of Russian broadcast propaganda within the limits of the Soviet Union, we find much that is very primitive. However we must not forget that Russian internal propaganda is intended for the Russian worker and peasant, who stands on a low mental level, and that it is calculated precisely for his concepts and his attitudes. Consequently it has its effect in these circles. The extent to which it achieves its aim of affecting the entire population was shown clearly during World War II.

When the Russians broadcast in the same manner in German to Germans, then they showed that they knew little of the soul of the German people. Only during the course of the war did they learn to take actual conditions into account, both regarding what they must say to the German people and to how they must say it.

But in spite of everything, Russian broadcast propaganda played only a subordinate role during the war. It began to have a certain effectiveness only when captured German generals, officers and enlisted men appeared on Russian broadcasts and addressed their messages to the German people and the German soldiers.
Psychological warfare had begun in Europe long before the outbreak of open hostilities. Soon after the assumption of power by National Socialism, an ardent effort was made to proclaim loudly to the world the National Socialist doctrine as a panacea for all countries and all peoples. In conjunction with other "cultural accomplishments" of National Socialism (struggle against the churches, struggle against labor unions, persecution of Jews, subjugation of the press, concentration camps, etc.), this activity aroused opposition in all foreign countries and this opposition found expression in foreign broadcasts. In reality these were not counter-propaganda transmissions but merely efforts to discuss the validity of National Socialism and its practical methods, coupled at times with corrections of National Socialist claims, insofar as they were applied to other countries. But even that was enough to make the National Socialists denounce these broadcasts as pure propaganda and atrocious lies.

The British were very reserved in this matter. The French, on the other hand, were somewhat more active, and in time (beginning about 1936) the Strasbourg transmitter became the mouthpiece of liberal democratic ideas.
Indicative of the skepticism with which National Socialist propaganda was secretly viewed in Germany is the fact that the Strasbourg broadcasts were listened to by everyone who had a suitable receiver.

Even at that time people in the Ministry of War and Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin were aware that in any future war a large part of the population would regularly listen to the broadcasts of other countries. But since National Socialist propaganda worked chiefly with invented or distorted arguments, there was serious danger involved in listening to foreign broadcasts, because untruths are only effective when there is no one on the spot to disarm them by a convincing presentation of the truth.

An attempt was made to render the German people immune to foreign broadcasts. This was to be done primarily by shifting the whole German broadcasting program over to wire radio. The instruments were to be so devised that it would be absolutely impossible to hear foreign broadcasts.

This was a gigantic program and considerable time must elapse before it could be realized in full. The preliminary stage was represented by the so-called "people's receiver" which was planned to receive only German transmissions. When World War II broke out, wire radio was still in its early stages. It was necessary to find some other way of keeping foreign broadcasts from the German people.
It was decided - with characteristic National Socialist thoroughness - to use the universal cure of strict prohibition. The death penalty was fixed for listening to foreign broadcasts. They even went so far as to include listening to broadcasts of allied countries under the same ban.

It has been claimed that the National Socialists were good psychologists. In general that is true. At least by personal experience they recognized all the negative aspects of German character and took the point of view that their own attitude, their own inner inferiority must be assumed to be present in all other people. They know perfectly well that the broadcasts of other countries would be listened to in spite of all prohibitions. But in order to reduce to a minimum the resulting dangers, they established that maximum penalty for listening and passing on what had been heard. They had no choice. Their system of having everyone spied on by everyone else would see to it that listening to foreign broadcasts did not get out of hand.

Immediately after the outbreak of the war the French started a violent agitation, using transmitters in Strasbourg and Paris. It was directed against the National Socialist government of Germany and its responsibility for bringing on
World War II. The management of this propaganda was poor. One attempted to use a clumsy instrument on a clumsy object and in so doing caused more damage than would be suspected.

When the military events turned against France in 1940, the broadcasts of the above mentioned stations became a wild scolding and with that lost all effectiveness. These transmissions were listened to only with loathing and shrugging of shoulders.

Somewhat more clever were the transmissions of the British broadcast stations but they revealed such a lack of knowledge of actual conditions in Germany that the listener often had to shake his head. Had the English been asleep these past six years? Didn't they know what had happened in Germany since 1933? What had become of their celebrated "Secret Service"? If it hadn't learned more than appeared in the sometimes downright simple propaganda, then the British were indeed badly off.

Many of the statements made could be checked at once and shown to be incorrect. No, propaganda, if it were to be crowned by success, was not that simple! One got the impression that a number of newspaper reporters were working here confusedly without centralized control, without any comprehension of the actual situation in Germany. Only the reports on events in England and America were of interest, including reports on the sessions of Parliament, on the industrial situation, on ideas regarding the future course of the war. From these it was sometimes possible to draw all sorts of deductions, frequently more than - from a
military point of view - was good for the British. But since
people in Germany were accustomed to regard broadcasts as pure
propaganda, they gave no credence to those reports to which it
would have been wise to pay some attention.

There was a basic change when Brandon Bracken took over
the Ministry of Propaganda. The way in which the entire style
of broadcasts to foreign countries changed in about four weeks
was really striking. From an unsure and tortuous path, one
shifted resolutely to the only correct path under the circumstances -
to the path of truthful, factual reporting. People in Germany had
plenty of intrusive propaganda and because people knew that the
press and the radio were not describing things as they were,
but in the way National Socialism meant them to be regarded
by the German people, there developed a real hunger for some
objective reporting on burning questions of immediate and
vital importance, a reporting which should be free from scolding,
accusation, self-glorification, and distortion. The British
didn't need to do anything more than tell the German people the
truth. That was enough. That alone was so hard and annihilating
for National Socialism that any added propaganda terms, any
injected propaganda purpose, could only weaken the effect. It
was necessary to depict things in such detail and in such fashion
that anyone could at any time check their accuracy.

And at the very time when the British broadcasts were making
truthful reporting the foundation of their propaganda, Dr. Goebbels
was proclaiming openly in Berlin: "propaganda is never limited to
the truth but is only determined by the purpose."

The enemy of the lie and of distortion is the truth. Only when unadulterated truth is used as a weapon can it be effective in the long run. National Socialist propaganda relied on the principle of the "lie of the moment"; that is to say one boldly asserted anything and thus achieved for the moment the desired effect. If time ultimately revealed the untruth of the statement, one had accumulated meanwhile a number of new "facts" which could be trotted out with much to-do and which would so fully claim public interest that no thought would be left for the former "stupidity".

English propaganda - if we insist on using the term - began with the coming of Brandon Bracken to work on a long term basis and this assumed that there should be no contradictions in the stories told or in the arguments. On the other hand, people over there could now afford to collect and tocs back in wholesale fashion the contradictions in the speeches of German statesmen and propagandists, in German publications, in the press and in broadcasts. That alone was very effective. For this purpose they recorded in England every speech of Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, and others, every lecture of a military or political nature, every article read over the German broadcast stations, and so were able to produce, as it were, a multitude of living witnesses. That was damnably painful for German propaganda, especially as there was nothing to offer in return. So the English indulged in entire programs in which nothing was heard
but skillfully selected extracts from speeches by prominent National Socialist leaders. Only one course remained for reducing the effectiveness of these broadcasts - that was jamming.

So now the Germans used every available means to make reception of the German language broadcasts from London impossible. However they were rarely successful because the English sent out their broadcasts simultaneously on 3, 4, 5, sometimes even 8 to 10, different frequencies. Reception was always possible on at least one or two of them. Naturally this varied from place to place. The jammers did not really interfere everywhere and anyone who seriously intended to hear the offerings of the British Broadcasting Company generally succeeded - of course there were exceptional cases.

I am not asserting that the English like lily white angels limited themselves to 100 percent fact with no propaganda. By no means! They sent out what were admittedly propaganda broadcasts, only they always separated them from straight reports. As I said, these were admitted propaganda and everyone knew that things were invented. However, these broadcasts were spiced with so much spirit and humor that people liked to hear them. They had not been hewn with a broad ax like the products of the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin. As a rule they betrayed a cleverer hand and were pretty well worked out.
As an example we may quote the reports of "Pfc Adolf Himischal" who was at first on the eastern front and later in various other sectors or stations from which he wrote letters to his wife which began "Dear Amelia, beloved wife! This is to inform you that today has been the best day of my life and am going to tell you why....." Listening to them, it was hard to keep from laughing so hard you fell off your chair, they were so full of spicy wit and irony. There were people who waited impatiently for days for the next "letter of Pfc Adolf Himischal".

Once a week there was a "report" on the meeting of two friends, Kurt and Willy, namely senior teacher Kurt Kruger and Willy Schimanski, counsellor for the Ministry of Propaganda, in their regular cafe on the Potsdamer Platz, later - after the bombing of Berlin began - in a Berlin suburb. The way in which the methods of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry was "down up was very amusing.

Now and then "Mrs. Wernicke" put in an appearance and talked on life in Berlin but these broadcasts were among the least clever, they were only suitable for people "who were very modest in their demands".

One of the best broadcasts came daily at 1800 hours; it was the "broadcast for the German armed forces". It gave a good survey of the situation on the fronts and of general military problems connected with the war. Of course, events
at the front which were unfavorable to the Allies were not stressed too greatly; sometimes one forgot to mention them. Those were exceptional cases. Otherwise the description of the situation tallied with the facts and it was possible from these descriptions to get a dependable picture of military events. Not only of military events, but also of the situation in Germany. For, if British intelligence had been almost completely uninformed on this subject during the first year of the war, this had changed as the war continued.

Perhaps some day someone in the British intelligence service will reveal how and by what means the great apparatus was built up which permitted the British to learn very quickly about all events in Germany. I am sure British intelligence got a major portion of its information from radio agents, since through these it had available the services of confidential agents (men or women) in the very highest offices in Germany.

How well informed the British were regarding the intentions of Hitler's headquarters was revealed, for instance, when in April 1944 the London radio announced that Hitler planned, after the collapse of the eastern and western fronts (at that time on the Dnieper and the Atlantic), to employ the "strategy of the scorched earth" in Germany.
and meant to realize in terribly tragic and gruesome fashion a "heroic epic of the death of the German people". And this was a year before he began to convert his intention into deeds.

Long before they were used, the British reported openly on the new German jet fighters and described their good and bad qualities. Sometimes somebody was incautious and by premature reporting endangered the sources of information. On the whole, however, I must say the English knew how to build up a first class intelligence service under most difficult conditions and also to derive benefit from its results. Results both for military operations at the various fronts and for psychological warfare, especially by means of radio.

There is one other series of broadcasts I would like to mention here - these were the broadcasts to German women sent out twice a day. These also were adapted to the outlook and the spirit of the German woman but in general failed to be effective because - from the standpoint of time - they were badly placed and because German women were not sufficiently accustomed to thinking for themselves to be able to face these matters with adequate understanding and the necessary critical spirit.

The so-called "workers program" was not especially fortunate; it more or less missed the problems and offered the German worker little of positive value.

While in Germany the penalty for listening to foreign broadcasts was death, the British Government did not attempt to limit listening to German broadcasts. The Germans had organized a
grandiose program in the English language as information service for listeners in England, but if anybody ever missed the mark, if any laborious effort ever achieved a 100 percent failure, it was here. It even reached the point where the British recommended listening to the German stations. What was offered either provoked a shaking of heads or a compassionate smile. I once remarked that the National Socialists were good psychologists. This was true only in respect to their own people. When dealing with other countries they displayed without exception a total inability to enter into the thinking of other people. For that reason German National Socialist propaganda was usually merely a flash in the pan, unless it was supported by very practical economic interests. The United States of America set up a German language broadcast, the "Voice of America, the Voice of One of the United Nations" immediately after the beginning of the war. The broadcasts, however, were difficult to hear and found little following.

Of all the American broadcasts in the German language the most interesting were the addresses of the well known author, Thomas Mann. They were permeated by much spirit and knowledge, were excellent in style, and inspired by a glowing hatred of National Socialism. Mann was always well informed regarding developments and conditions in Germany. The trend of thought
always climaxed in the theme: "German people, how much more must you fear victory than defeat".

National Socialist leaders called Thomas Mann the "Peck's bad boy of the Apocalypse" and it is safe to say that rarely has so much truth been expressed in so few words. It outlines clearly the enormity of the actions of the National Socialist leaders of Germany and also suggests how petty this whole group of men really was.

Thus far I have mentioned only broadcast stations which worked openly and without disguise, i.e. could be recognized by the announcer's statement as being in Moscow, London, New York, etc. But there were other transmitters which worked with the most varied disguises. If one watched carefully, however, one could always determine after a while the country in which this or that transmitter was located. For instance there was the "Transmitter of the SA-Fronde". It worked in the Soviet Union and tried to give the impression that it was located in Germany and represented an opposition group inside the SA. The "German People's Transmitter" was likewise in Soviet territory. It was usually easy to recognize transmitters working from the Soviet Union because of the number of times "Kameraden!" occurred. Almost every second or third sentence began thus.

The so-called "Atlantic Transmitter" was listened to by many Germans. Its offerings were not always well chosen, its information not always dependable. It worked from Algiers and was the U.S.A.

* Apokalyptischer Lausbuben.
propaganda station for the German armed forces. The so-called 
"German Freedom Station" was in the same area and under the 
same direction. For a time "Gustav Siogfried Eins" made quite 
a stir. It was located in England and used as theme song the 
melody " - bis an dein kühles Grab", i.e., the continuation 
of the theme song of the "Deutschlandsender". It soon became 
known popularly as "der Scheissosender" for the following 
reasons:

Several times each evening at seven minutes before the 
hour this transmitter brought a talk by the "Chef". This 
chef's language was enough to make a hard-boiled soldier at 
the front turn pale. He never used a noun without prefixing 
"Scheiss - " and there was a generous interlarding with 
"Arschlöchern", "Scheisskerlen", "Misthunden" etc. He gave 
descriptions of the private lives of the National Socialist 
big-wigs. Generally these were pure fiction or at least 
greatly exaggerated. One of the maddest pranks was the report 
on "Schwarze Jutta", the supposed lady friend of a German admiral 
and the principal heroine of the wildest orgies.

This wild scolding wearied and repelled the hearer. These 
broadcasts did not have the least effect. People asked themselves: 
"if the 'Chief' uses such language, how will the 'underlings' talk?"

There was a huge number of other transmitters but their 
importance was slight.
The importance attributed to foreign broadcasts in official circles and the danger one saw in them during the war is apparent from a decree of the Chief Signal Officer, General Gimmler, dated 11 October 1944, regarding listening to foreign transmissions. Among other things he said:

"It is a sign of the most pitiful baseness and of the most dangerous weakness when one listens to foreign broadcasts."

And in view of the character of the National Socialist propaganda it was downright grotesque when he then repeated Goebbels' words that propaganda is never confined to the truth but is only limited by its purpose. Finally the order ends up:

"I order ruthless intervention without regard for person or rank whenever this greatest of all crimes is discovered."

Along with the type of broadcasts already described, there was one other - shall we say "active" use of radio, especially by the British; I mean the so-called special messages which were intended for agents employed in Germany. They were short and might read somewhat as follows:

"Stettin is in Germany",
"Mary's brother bought two chairs and a table"
"The first window is lighted, the second is dark"
"My mother is at home"
"Vienna is in Austria"
"Keep your children at home, it is still too cold"
"England's women are happy", etc.
These were messages agreed upon in advance which had reference to parachute drops, agent meetings, changes of frequency, and the like.

Occasionally pieces of music were played to convey prearranged messages, primarily in the Polish broadcasts of the British Broadcasting Company which were intended for the Polish resistance movement. They referred chiefly to parachute drops; these were regularly announced by melodies, e.g. the soldier song "Es reiten die Ulanen . . ." or "Oh du mein Rosmarin, entfalte dich . . .", or "Die tausend Tapferen" and so on.

Summing up the role of broadcasting as a means of psychological warfare, we can describe it as far reaching and significant. But if anyone should get the idea that the German people lost the war because it surrendered to the poison of hostile broadcast propaganda, he would be missing the point entirely. If things had worked this way, England would have had to lose the war because German broadcasts for five years aimed at breaking down the will of the English people to resist. Or else the German people should have given in late in 1940 when British propaganda was trying to divide and infiltrate. But it merely met with resistance, just as the broadcast propaganda of Dr. Goebbels was rejected in England.

The importance of the English, Russian and other broadcasts seems to me to lie in another quarter; they helped the German
people in its search for the truth, in its effort to learn the real
relations of things, in its conscious and unconscious urge for
spiritual recovery, in its search for a way out of the labyrinth of
aberrations. If, after the outward collapse of the National
Socialist reign of terror - a collapse which was inevitable - the
German people showed that a vast majority had long since broken
with that negative system and created conditions favorable to a
positive course, then a good part of this cure may be ascribed to
the critical searching of the broadcast frequencies. Broadcasting
showed that it can only be an effective weapon if it uses the truth.
And that is a lesson for the future.

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Perhaps from what I have said the impression may have been gained at times that the German intercept service during World War II was very poorly organized and failed on that account. I do not wish to say anything of the kind. In its several parts the intercept service was very well set up and achieved useful results in numerous cases. However, it did suffer from some defects to which I shall come back later. That which was definitely defective was the use of the results of this service.

National Socialism was a system which sabotaged itself in every way and in the long run achieved the very opposite of what it sought. We can find plenty of confirmation of this. I will pick out the following typical example in connection with the intercept service:

In the Cipher Section of OKW a group had been set up at considerable expense and with good technical equipment for monitoring all transmissions intended for any considerable circle, including broadcasts, radio telephone, press and economic radiograms. Hundreds of messages were copied daily, evaluated, and put together in so called "Chi-Nachrichten". When worked over intensively, they were a regular mine of information on the armament situation in enemy countries.
But this called in the first place for a genuine search for the truth, i.e. for the actual situation - no matter whether the findings agreed with one's wishes or not; in the second place it was necessary that the circle dealing with these "Chi-Nachrichten" should not be too small, lest it fail to extract from them laboriously all that might be extracted.

Neither the one or the other condition was satisfied. In the Third Reich the search for truth was synonymous with hostility to the state. The universal watchword was an Arab proverb: "Tie up the ass where your master wishes it to be tied". Such a system, as the guiding principle of a state, is well suited to give the uninitiated an impression of "powerful national unity". In reality it contains the germ which will bring on its own destruction.

Fear lest the truth become known dominated the leaders of the state. Instead of evaluating the extensive and significant cipher messages and thus learning about developments in hostile and neutral countries, there was an order by the Führer that these summaries should be given a very limited distribution to only a few office chiefs. It was forbidden to pass them on. Now an office chief is a man who in view of his duties as administrator cannot, even with the best of intentions, read through 10 - 20 pages of decodes daily, digest them and derive from them a clear picture. He has barely time enough to glance at them. Actually the upshot was that the recipient of these decodes initialled the upper right corner
and put them in the safe. Every two or three months came a "destruction procedure" and the stack of paper which had accumulated meanwhile was burned. All the laborious effort of many people, all the outlay of material, equipment and time had been useless. That is the way the Führer would have it. And so in countless ways a system degenerated in which the truth always got a negative label while mistrust always received a positive score.

I said before that the German intercept service suffered from some defects. We shall take up two of them here. One was also characteristic of the armed services of the Third Reich as a whole; rearmament had proceeded too fast on an inadequate foundation. The result was a critical lack of good experienced specialists. You cannot train scientific traffic evaluators on the drill ground. People had spread out but had not achieved depth. There were many intercept companies but only a few useful evaluators. Much importance was attached to externals. In the Red Army form meant nothing, content meant everything; in the Third Reich outward form occupied the foreground at all times. Many things were organized to death.

The other defect was the splitting up of the German intercept service. Even though one may grant that each of the three services was justified in having a separate intercept service corresponding to its peculiar needs, nevertheless all other facilities for monitoring the radio traffic of foreign
countries should unquestionably be combined in one central organization. Only thus could there be any guarantee that all available messages were evaluated and made the basis of reliable estimates of the situation in hostile and neutral countries. This, however, was not the case. Instead of one central strategic radio intelligence there were almost a dozen organizations working in this field. There was either absolutely no collaboration among them or the collaboration was very loose and suffered from mutual mistrust.

Quite prevalent, on the other hand, was a sort of competitive struggle. Each of these organization was ambitious to beat the others. Each wanted to appear to work faster and better than the rest and always tried to represent itself in a favorable light and its rivals in an unfavorable light. The concept of unselfish and complete cooperation for the benefit of the country was foreign to all these organizations.

This splitting up of the work used up an undue number of valuable workers; each individual worker diligently and with interest but on the whole a considerable portion of these workers and of their efforts was wasted. The same was true of the machines and other instrumentalities. With centralized control several times as much work could have been turned out and the damage caused by overlapping and antagonistic efforts could have been avoided.

This resulted in a peculiar situation where the individual organizations functioned well but the intercept service as a whole,
due to over-organization, did not achieve the results it might have achieved. A patient cannot be treated successfully by a dozen physicians, of whom one feels his pulse, another listens to his lungs, and a third examines his throat, etc., and each one subsequently makes his own independent diagnosis. That is the way things were in the German intercept service after the middle of 1939.

One other circumstance might be mentioned which was calculated to let the results of the labors of the intercept and evaluation services go up in smoke uselessly; the important personages before whom those results were laid for utilization had a preference for so-called "hot ones", i.e. for individual messages with an especially interesting content. That is all right once in a while but such messages merely bring details into the limelight. That which is of real value in the intelligence work of a modern war is the totality of the many little single hints, evaluated and combined in instructive surveys. And there was a general dislike for this detailed work.

It is hardly possible to reproach any individual for this situation. Every official person in the Third Reich - including the armed forces - was at all times so overburdened with superfluous nonsense that he simply had no time left for calm, scientific, critical work. Thus the most important part
of strategic intelligence was lost in the mad scramble of unproductive, intentionally or unintentionally purposeless business.

The development of the German intercept service during World War II was a remarkable one. Not in the matter of organization - here there was little change - although individual technical and organizational measures were always being put through. The development of which we shall speak had to do with the assignments.

The artless reader will probably start out with the assumption that the German intercept service during the war had as its primary assignment the monitoring of the traffic of hostile countries and as a secondary assignment the monitoring of neutral countries whose attitude was open to doubt. He will hardly hit upon the idea that the monitoring of the traffic of countries allied with Germany would find a place, since that would not merely indicate mistrust of one's allies but from the very start place the alliance on a very unstable foundation. An alliance which is not based upon complete mutual confidence, an alliance with mental reservations, especially in wartime, resembles a contract which either of the two parties is ready to abrogate at a moment's notice. Whoever enters upon a life and death struggle relying on such alliances admits that his cause is a poor one and knows that his partner intends to escape from his contractual obligations in case of a crisis. This means a
war with two fronts: a visible outward front against the enemy and an invisible inward front against one's friend, a front which may burst into flame at any moment, probably when one's strength is most urgently needed on the outward front.

When the Third Reich entered this war it had a political, ideological and military alliance with Italy and with Japan. There were half a dozen similar agreements with other countries. The alliances with Italy and Japan had been celebrated for years in every key, painted in every color, and discussed in countless articles. "Never yet" had there been anything with so firm a foundation. "Never yet" had an alliance been so stoutly supported by a common philosophy; "never yet" had there been such indissolubly close, such cordial alliances as these. Moreover there was such a strong personal friendship uniting the leading statesmen! This was the quintessence of all alliances the world had ever seen, the Himalaya of mutual confidence.

That is the way the public saw it. Yet in the schedule of the German intercept service were listed Italy and Japan and all the other countries with which there were treaties and agreements. But that was not all. The portion of the time of the German intercept service devoted to these two countries amounted at the beginning of the war to almost one-eighth of the total working time. In April 1943 the number of Italian messages intercepted was four times as great as in November 1939.
The proportion of intercepts of "friendly" countries in comparison to those of hostile countries increased from month to month as the war went on. Far behind the scenes, way out in the darkness back stage, an invisible struggle was taking place—without swords and noise to be sure—the effects of which were bringing death, wounds or captivity to thousands and tens of thousands at the front.

This was the struggle between cryptography and cryptanalysis. While British and Russian cryptographic security was constantly increasing and the interception of the messages in these systems retreated more and more into the background because decryption proved impossible, the German cryptanalyst kept in touch with the systems of the allied states. This was a poor testimonial for their systems. It was a poor omen for this struggle in the dark which was merely a precursor of the struggle at the fronts. So the proportion of messages of friendly powers continued to mount unchecked. In the spring of 1943 these amounted to more than a quarter of the total intercepts.

Instead of warning the lesser allies and calling their attention to the vulnerability of their systems, there was rejoicing over the cryptanalytic successes and the interest manifested in the traffic of these countries was as great as the interest in that of the enemy countries, sometimes even greater.

There was a further reason for the increase in the proportion of allied and friendly messages intercepted and decrypted and it was just as serious as the first. The attitude of these countries
toward Germany was becoming more uncertain and more unreliable from year to year and from month to month. So it was necessary to pay mighty close attention to these "friends", if one wished to be safe from surprises. In the case of Italy, Hungary, and Finland this "checking" proved very valuable.

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I cannot conclude these remarks without saying a few words about the German cryptanalytic service. From 1922 to the end of the war it was under the direction of Ministerialrat Fenner, who was well known abroad. As an individual he was one of the most debated personalities in the German intercept service. Regarded professionally, he was an organizational genius who developed the art and science of German cryptanalysis to a high state of perfection. He was born and grew up in Russia (in St. Petersburg, the later Leningrad).

His right hand man was a Russian emigrant by the name of Novopaschenny who in Czarist days had been a professor at the astronomical observatory in Pulkovo near Leningrad and had rendered good service during World War I in the Imperial Russian Navy. He served on a Russian destroyer in the Baltic until it hit a mine and sank. His cool bath apparently did him no permanent harm. The Bolsheviks during the great Russian revolution made it hell for him and sentenced him to death. Novopaschenny thought their treatment unfriendly and
fled to England where he worked for a time in Scotland Yard. In 1921 or 1922 he turned up mysteriously one day in Germany, became acquainted with Fennor, gained his friendship and was magically installed by him in his section in the then Ministry of Defense. Although Novopaschenomy (who was called in the outfit "The Old Man of the Mountain" and sometimes the "Sheik") remained a man without a country, they kept him in the German cryptanalytic service where he developed true analytic decryption. The originally very small group of cryptanalysts was expanded gradually and at times during World War II numbered more than 150 persons.

Strange to relate, Fenner proved to be a fanatical, egocentric chap who refused all collaboration with the oft mentioned "evaluation service" and obstinately stood up for his own section without regard for the functioning of the intercept service as a whole. To this lack of cooperation may be ascribed the fact that, despite excellent performance by the cryptanalytic section and excellent performance by the evaluation service, the final result of the intercept service as a whole was not what it should have been.

Fenner typified the wide spread German characteristics of egocentricity, pride in his official unit, and rejection of all that did not fall within his own narrow province. He was an opponent of National Socialism, not from philosophical conviction, but due to his basically negative attitude. He had been just as violent an opponent of the Weimar Republic and had rocked and soared every administration from Schröder to Papen and Schleicher. He was
the spirit which always denied - as Goethe said. *

Dut he represented German cryptanalysis and was its soul and inspiration.

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It seems appropriate in this connection to mention another matter connected with the central office of the German strategic intercept service in Berlin, the so-called "Chiffrierabteilung".

World War II began in September 1939, hence in November 1943 more than four years had already elapsed. Aerial warfare had increased in intensity, the bombing of cities had become more extensive. But still the "Chiffrierabteilung" worked undimayed in its own quarters on the Tirpitzufer in Berlin. During the early part of the war an alternate location had been selected outside Berlin but this was given up later. Most of the records were kept in single copies in the workrooms in wooden or at best in steel cabinets. They acted just as though the air war were of absolutely no concern to the Cipher Section, as if it were impossible for this center of the strategic and military-political intercept service to be destroyed by an air attack.

Shortly after the beginning of the war this important agency got a new Chief, a Lieutenant Colonel Komp. He was a typical drillground officer without any spiritual or humane.

* In Goethe's Faust Nephistoteles says "I am the spirit that always deniers."
qualities, a stickler for regulations in the worst sense. It would hardly have been possible to find in the entire army a more unsuitable head for this center of technical signal intelligence. In his mind the important things were correct uniform, correct saluting, correct bearing, and a military haircut. He had not the faintest conception of this special service and still loss of how to get along with people in such a sensitive organization. On the other hand he succeeded in ruining any pleasure his associates might have found in the work. In place of any joy of accomplishment the motto became "duty".

A few weeks after his departure (hailed with joy by all concerned) came the terrific British attack on Berlin in the night of 22 November 1943. With astounding precision bombs hit all the buildings along the Tirpitzufer which contained sections of the "Chiffrerabteilung". In a single hour all the keys and reports, card files and orientation folders, tables, and sketches, that had been created during decades of painful effort, were destroyed. It was not long before the effects of this blow began to be felt. It was as if the main nerve center of a human being had been dealt a heavy blow with a blackjack. A sense of being crippled fell upon all the work of this center and this was aggravated by later air attacks. Work went on of course. Files were started, new counts and new card files were produced. But the actual creative work recovered only slowly and imperfectly. Far too much had been destroyed that night.
On 1 October 1943 Kempf was replaced by Colonel Kettler, a man who already had considerable practical experience in the intercept service and who had been chief of the intercept control station of the army for several years. By dealing with his personnel in an outstanding fashion he was able to inspire and maintain an interest in the work. But he reached this position too late. Had this man with his clear insight and understanding guided the agency from the beginning of the war, probably many a fateful piece of stupidity would never have been perpetrated.

* * *

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BIG FRY AND LITTLE FRY

Pumping the servants has always been a favorite method of finding out what the master and mistress of the house were up to. In the secret services of the various states this course has been followed frequently, often with good success. It may seem somewhat strange to say the same method can be used in radio intelligence and yet during World War II something of the sort did happen, although perhaps instead of the class distinctions "master" and "servant" we should speak of the big and wealthy on the one hand and the little poor fellows on the other. Or perhaps we should distinguish between those who are at the moment "the haves" and their "dependents".

What I mean is this: Hitler's attacks on the small states of Europe from 1938 to 1941 had forced the governments of these countries to take refuge abroad in order to continue efforts for the recovery of national independence. Most of these governments in exile had gone to London. Here they maintained little ministries and kept in touch with their representatives in foreign countries, i.e. with their embassies, consulates, missions, delegations, and the like. They made extensive use of radio telegraphy and thus supplied raw material for the German intercept service. And this "raw material" was - first class! At least in most cases. And for two reasons: in the first place, the cryptographic systems used were not ordinarily first
class - the Germans usually solved them very quickly. The second reason was that these decrypted messages were exceedingly informative. Since these governments in exile really had very little to do, they had ample time to pick up information in all quarters. And as soon as the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the Minister of War found out something, he was just itching to pass the information on to the embassies, etc.

Everything that the "big fry" (i.e. the governments of Great Britain, U.S.A., Soviet Union, etc.) strove to keep secret, these "little fry" diligently tattled. It was fun to read their messages. Poland and some of the Balkan governments were the worst. An especially fruitful source was opened for the Germans in June 1943 by the solution of the system used for Polish military attaché traffic between London and Bern. The "results" were outstanding!

The Turks likewise gave the Germans valuable information throughout the course of the war. The Germans had to give up monitoring Russian diplomatic radiograms because every attempt at decryption failed, but beginning about the middle of June 1941 they were able to read Turkish diplomatic messages between Moscow and Ankara and so obtained very valuable clues. Persia was also quite fruitful. Beginning in September 1941 the focal point of the entire intercept work was concerned with the links:

| Ankara-Moscow | and | Moscow-Ankara |
| Ankara-London | " | London-Ankara |
| Teheran-Moscow | " | Moscow-Teheran |
| Teheran-London | " | London-Teheran |

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RESTRICTED
If Mr. Churchill and the British Foreign Minister and the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov, had known how their little "boarders" were tossing their secret measures to the Germans like hot biscuits, such hair as they had left would have stood on end.

Of the "big fry" the USA provided its enemies most amply with information. Among other things a special radio network had been set up in 1942 which covered the entire globe. This was the "WVNA-net" (named from the call-sign of the station in Karachi, India, which was the first one heard). Most of the exchange of messages could be read currently; it afforded information on American military measures in the Far, Middle, and Near East and in Africa. The following survey shows the extent of the network in November 1942:

WVNA-net

Call sign, location, cover name and interpretation

war  Washington  agwar = Adjutant General, War Department
milid = Attaché
crypto = Secret communications service
victor = Proper name, (head of "crypto")

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WVNA</td>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>(India)</td>
<td>speck = proper name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signatures: Jordan (vice consul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wheeler (General and head of the USA military mission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVMT</td>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>(Iraq)</td>
<td>amsir = American military section Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signature: Connolly (Vice-consul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVNV</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>(Egypt)</td>
<td>amsme = American military section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVNT</td>
<td>Asmara</td>
<td>(formerly Italian-East Africa)</td>
<td>amseg = American military section Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signature: Hodges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVMY</td>
<td>Teheran</td>
<td>(Iran)</td>
<td>amrus = American military section Russia</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signature: Ondrick (Mil.Att.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S9X</td>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>(India)</td>
<td>aquila = Cover name for American air forces.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ammadel = American military mission Delhi</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>amobsin = American military observer India</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signatures: Tiger, Speck (only there for a short time)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEKCI</td>
<td>Chungking</td>
<td>(China)</td>
<td>ammisca = American military section Karachi office in Chungking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>amilat = American military attaché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signature: Stilwell (General and Commander of U.S. Forces in China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Barrett (Military Attaché) Gauss (Ambassador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J7Z</td>
<td>Kunming</td>
<td>(China)</td>
<td>ammkun = American military mission Kunming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>bud Gura (formerly Italian-East Africa)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It was in the summer of 1944 when little slips were pasted up all over Germany which bore nothing but three letters: "Pst!". They appeared on the windows and doors of railway cars, on letter boxes, on match boxes, on the mirrors in barber shops and even in toilets. These were intended to keep people from gossiping. But apparently that was only meant for the laymen because in "initiated circles" they were diligently chattering out of school.

In other connections cases have been mentioned where the German broadcasts or the German press compromised the work of the German intercept service by revealing details which came from the intercept service. North Africa (Fellers) and Sicily are examples. Those were in the year 1942. However, the lessons were not sufficient to prevent repetitions in the year 1944.

After a long time and infinite pains the Germans had succeeded in breaking one of the cryptographic systems used by the Polish resistance movement so that they could read the intercepted messages currently. One day late in October 1944 they decrypted a message telling that the Russians had set up in the area they occupied a concentration camp for members of the Polish resistance movement where the prisoners were confined under disgraceful conditions. Numerous details were given.

Three weeks later there was a German broadcast on conditions in the part of Poland occupied by the Russians, in which that decrypted message was repeated verbatim. On the previous day the
"Ostdeutscher Beobachter", published in Posen, has also printed this message verbatim. Of course it was not stated that this was a decrypted message of the Polish resistance movement but the content was enough to catch the attention of the Poles.

It is a well known fact that in this life extremes often meet. Alongside the tendency to gossip there was something else which led to serious compromises.

The excessive secrecy within the German armed forces, which had nothing to do with any sensible or necessary secrecy, led each of the services to maintain an anxious silence with respect to the others. If there was any real orientation, it was usually limited to commanders who then kept their wisdom to themselves. Thus the right hand frequently did not know what the left was doing. This explains the countless compromises which resulted from ignorance of real conditions and their consequences. It also explains many compromises in broadcasts, in the press, etc..

Unclassified memoranda, which were distributed down to the companies and doubtless fell into the hands of the enemy, often referred to the possibilities and assignments of radio intelligence. The cover designation "S.Qu." (sure source) for decrypted messages was explained. The consequence was an increasing reticence on the part of all our enemies in the use of technical means of communication; this was felt especially beginning in July 1944 when during the retreat of German troops on all fronts all kinds of
material fell into the hands of the enemy. A further consequence was an intensification of all camouflage measures. That resulted in a new decline in intercept results. And this led in November 1944 to an order by General Praun (successor to General Fellgiebel) regarding new cover words. "S. Qu.-Nachrichten" was replaced now by "Heinrich-Meldungen", "Otto-Meldungen" and others. But the result was the same.
Ben Akiba said that all things are repeated in life and that everything that happens consists only of copies.

We have already reported the Vermehren case which happened in Ankara. Half a year later something similar happened in Stockholm. Here again the rats deserted the sinking ship. Beginning 10 October 1944 non-German broadcasts brought sensational reports in rapid succession. One member of the German embassy after the other renounced National Socialism, deserted the German Embassy, placed himself under Swedish protection and requested that a passport be issued him as a man without a country. On 13 October 8 people had already taken this decisive step, including the press attaché, two secretaries and a niece of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, who had been arrested a short time before by the Gestapo.

The German press said nothing about this but foreign countries were all the more interested and it is easy to imagine the impression produced there. What did the boastful words of Party bigwigs signify when members of the German missions preferred to break away from the National Socialist regime and placed themselves under the protection of a foreign power in spite of all the dangers threatening them from the Gestapo? How hopeless the situation in Germany must be for the second air attaché at the German Embassy in Stockholm to quit on 7 November 1944, to renounce National Socialism openly and to place himself under Swedish protection? What a
lift this gave other countries.

Nor did these matters remain hidden from the German people.
For a long time everyone who had a good broadcast receiver had been listening to foreign broadcasts. The prohibition against listening to such broadcasts carried with it the threat of imprisonment and was intended to protect the German people against improper influences; actually it became a challenge to disobey. It is worth noting that the workers were the ones who first began openly listening to foreign broadcasts. German broadcasts lost interest more and more. Goebbels had lost ground. And so had the entire National Socialist system.
Whoever has followed attentively the descriptions of radio agent activity and the way it was combatted can hardly have reached any other conclusion than that the German "radio defense" was by no means adequate to keep pace with the development of the mighty network of foreign agents, let alone to overcome it entirely. The few units assigned for monitoring and D/F-ing had their hands full if they tried to cover the most important links and fix the transmitters.

But which were the most important, i.e., the most dangerous transmitters? Frequently this was not learned until it was too late. The main evaluation unit had plenty to do. There could be no thought of complete interception and current coverage of agent traffic as a whole.

Despite the fact that this service had nothing whatsoever to do with that of the so-called Staffs of the Zones of Communications, it was always affected by cuts and reductions which applied to all rear area services. Instead of strengthening "radio defense", it was being weakened.

In the event of some protection against this, the following expedient was devised: the two battalions of "radio defense" which comprised the existing companies were combined to form a regiment. And most of the people serving on the staff of radio defense were "transferred" to this regiment. (Actually only on paper.) Thus they disappeared from the lists of OKW; one had made an "extensive reduction in force" and could now commandeer those people back to "radio defense"
from the "regiment". The fact that this "regimental staff" was located in the same place as the staff of "radio defense" is an observation we may keep to ourselves.

With this the old situation was virtually reestablished. But the execution of this measure had called for a terrific number of negotiations, conferences, letters, and lectures - a gigantic expenditure of energy and pains that should have been needless.

It was necessary time after time to use such childish methods to protect oneself against lack of understanding in one's own camp. And the resulting loss of time and waste of energy hurt the work itself.

In addition to these matters, a struggle was going on due to jealousy between the radio defense of OKW and that of the police. From the beginning of the war to its very end the struggle was going on behind the scenes. One agency was jealous of the other, begrudged it its successes and was delighted at every failure of the other "party" which it could use as proof that its own work was better. From the very beginning OKW tried to gain control of all anti-agent activity and to have the police agencies subordinated to itself. The police resisted and tried to do the very opposite, relying on Himmler who was almost all-powerful.

Even when the Allies were in Köln and Koblenz and the Russians were in Stettin, Kustrin, and Görlitz, this internal right continued
and even became more bitter from day to day. Is it any wonder that the work suffered seriously? Since the summer of 1944 the whole structure of the German armed forces and hence of the anti-agent activity had been so rotten that the struggle was more concerned with questions of competence between police and armed forces than with actual combating of the agents.

Soon military events took a turn which inevitably brought about the end of the "Thousand Year Reich" of Adolf Hitler.

People in the German radio defense were proud of the fact that in 1943 they seized twice as many agent transmitters as in 1942 and that this was repeated when they seized twice as many in 1944 as in 1943. They boasted of it and led themselves and others to believe that anti-agent activity was going along very successfully.

Actually this was merely jousting with windmills for the number of radio agents was increasing so fast that it would have been necessary to pick up ten times as many as in the previous year, just to keep pace with them. The existing resources of radio defense and of the police were by no means adequate for this purpose and the struggle between the two did its part to slow things up. The much touted German unity remained a dream, even in this field.

On 21 December 1944 the Russian offensive broke loose against the German bridgehead in western Latvia where some 25 divisions were putting up a hopeless struggle, quite cut off from their native country. These were the first flashes before the final storm in the east. And while the Russians were preparing for their great
push, officers and officials of the German armed forces were being
detached to National Socialist training centers for "spiritual and
ideological training". Even the cipher section and radio defense
with all their subordinate units had to detach from their security
personnel people for ideological training. The officers indoctrina-
ated at these training centers then traveled around as "National
Socialist Leadership Officers" (NSFO) visiting garrisons and agencies
and delivering fiery propaganda speeches. In Zima near Jüterbog,
where the central office of radio defense was located and the mass
of work coming in every day had everybody swamped, an NSFO colonel
turned up once a week and delivered speeches lasting for hours which
everyone was obliged to attend. He declared that the situation was
serious but by no means hopeless. There was constant reference to
Frederick the Great, the Seven Years War, the Napoleonic Wars
and other historic events. Otherwise the main thing was proper
saluting and a good military bearing. These were the basis of the
fighting power of the people and the will to resist. Among other
undesirable phenomena of modern civilization the lipstick was the
greatest evil.

At the High Command of the Army they created the position
"General of Signal Intelligence attached to the Chief of Staff of
the Army Signal Service in the General Staff of the Army". It had
taken five and a half years of war to bring this about. At the
army alone had 28 intercept organizations, while . . . . . . . . . .
more than 50 all told. That was a sizable organization. But its work fizzled because all these companies were not under centraliz control but all sorts of staffs were sandwiched in between and this caused delay and dissipation of energy.
Every end has a beginning but it is hard to fix the beginning of the end of World War II precisely. In my opinion, this end began promptly in connection with the bogging down of the German December offensive in the West in 1944. Up to that time the structure of the entire German military apparatus and of the state had stood up pretty well in spite of heavy burdens and the whole machine was functioning, although serious disturbances had long since been evident. With the early days of January symptoms of collapse became so obvious that no one could mistake them. And now something happened which is not without a touch of tragi-comedy.

Six months earlier a group of officers, who recognized the senselessness of continuing the war, tried to avert the worst by an act of violence. The attempt failed. The newly appointed Chief of the Replacement Army, Himmler, now introduced a discipline of terror. It resulted in giving the structure of the armed forces in all its branches an appearance of great solidity. Everywhere people "did their duty" diligently. Everyone avoided speaking about the war and its prospects or else they spoke with feigned conviction of the certainty of final victory and made mysterious mention of the impending use of new and decisive weapons. This was especially true in officer circles. At dinner in the casinos ceremony reached ridiculous proportions. What had been a free and easy meal became a demonstration of discipline and of National
Socialist thinking. The "German greeting" and a snappy clicking of heels became trump cards. A meal without raising one's arm five or six times was no longer conceivable. And at the same time there was an epidemic of reorganizations which were fatal to all regular work. Combing the lists and giving up personnel (and combining units) slowly but surely upset the former exact system of work and administration at the upper levels.

The speeches and addresses of the commanders at so-called officer gatherings kept getting sharper and "smarter". The check on railway trains and stations reached a point where enough people were employed to form whole divisions. And they increased from day to day. But this very thing led a careful observer to think that, in spite of outward discipline, the inner structure of the armed forces was in a state of dissolution. The "flying" and "motorized" courts martial didn't change matters. Executions by the firing squad and publication of them in railroad stations and in cities brought no change. Desertions became more numerous, even among officers. Listening to foreign broadcasts became general in spite of all prohibitions, because these broadcasts revealed with terrifying clarity the hopeless measures in Germany. On 12 January 1945 the Russian offensive broke loose from the bridgehead near Baranow (near Sandomir). On 15 January the Russians were at Kielce. Soon the entire east front was in motion. On the 17th Warsaw and Tschenstochau fell and the Russians were before Krakow. On the 19th they took Strassburg and advanced to Graudenz. Lucenec fell.
Up to that time there had been an out-station of the German intercept service in Tschenstochau which monitored radio traffic of the Polish resistance movement and of Russian agents. The existence of this station was known to both the Poles and the Russians.

When the front began to draw near to the city, the station reported the fact to the headquarters in Zinna and asked where it was to go. At the control station they played big brave boy. The head of the service belonged to that group of National Socialist officers who always shut their eyes to every critical situation and concealed the true picture from themselves and their subordinates by braddadocio.

The answers sent to the out-station were hardly what might have been expected; they should not regard the situation as more serious than it was; for the present there was no danger whatsoever, they would kindly refrain from spreading panic; withdrawal would be ordered when the time came, and so on.

The result was what one might expect. When the Russian tanks were rolling into the city, the head of the out-station hastily ordered his people to pack up what they could lay hands on quickly, with the result that everybody thought of his private possessions which he loaded on the few available trucks, and the unit raced out of town with the Polish rebels firing at them from the windows of the houses. Not until they were several hours away did they recover from their fright sufficiently to realize that documents of the utmost importance
for the counterintelligence service had been left behind, including a report which had arrived just 24 hours earlier with all details that had been learned regarding the Russian radio agents.

Although people in Zinna near Berlin were encouraging the outstations at Tschenstochau to be of good courage, they themselves had begun preparing to evacuate in case of a Russian advance. However, the way in which these measures were carried out showed how completely the command there had lost its head. First they began packing the old files in boxes. Then they discovered they didn't have anywhere near enough boxes. New ones were not to be had. So they unpacked again and burned all the files down to the end of 1944. This had to be done as swiftly as possible and it was inevitable that in their haste they also burned up the things they needed for their current work.

Meanwhile groping attempts were made to find out where the control station of radio defense should go if the situation became critical. In conferences of officers, on the other hand, it was stated firmly that they had no intention of changing location and would stay here till the very last minute. They set up ridiculous tank blocks. Bazookas were stored in the offices and gas masks were tested out. The Russian prisoners of war saw this and grinned.

All the while things were moving at the fronts. In the west the Allies occupied Bastogne and Honsfalize. The last three weeks had cost the German army 100,000 dead and wounded.

On 28 January the Russians were 6 km from Königsberg. Posen and Thorn were encircled, Memel was in Russian hands. Lithuania had been cleared of German troops. In East Prussia 200,000 German troops
were encircled. Kattowitz and Beuthen, Wohldau, Dyhernfurt, and Obernigk had been taken by the Russians. Bombs rained down on Berlin and other cities night after night crippling all work and destroying the most essential installations.

In the offices of OKW and near the Potsdam bridge there was no longer any real work. People ran shivering through the rooms, were telephoning, and setting up new files, or were packing. And some of this packing was done under a great nerve strain. They sent out people to look for alternate quarters but there wasn't much to be found for bombing had already destroyed too much and the remaining buildings were already overcrowded.

The most comical situation of all was found in those agencies which were subordinate to the Chief Signal Officer of the Armed Forces, General Gimmler. Gimmler was one of those officers who never get beyond the horizon of a hard boiled top sergeant. All his dispositions, orders and instructions betrayed that fact. He clung tenaciously to Berlin and insisted just as obstinately that the only possible alternate location for offices of the Signal Service of the Armed Forces would be the Army Signal School in Halle.

This Signal School was a group of buildings that stood out so prominently in the terrain that it was only a question of time when those barracks would be a victim of enemy bombs. Consequently all the units under General Gimmler were definitely averse to moving to Halle. They tried desperately to talk the chief out of this idea, but the more arguments they brought up against the plan, the more obstinately the old man insisted upon it.
Some of the sub-chiefs did, nevertheless, try to discover alternate locations, but this was done more to salve their consciences than with any honest purpose. The fewer positive preparations they made for possible evacuation from the Berlin area, the greater became the mountain of paper covered with directives and instructions, orders and arrangements for transferring the units.

Piles of instructions on how to conduct oneself in case of transfer of the units were prepared and stored and everybody knew perfectly well that if matters became serious, nobody could possibly follow out what was set forth in these instructions which had grown to book length. Nobody had time to read them through and even the specialists, who had to be employed for the purpose, were all at sea, because the contradictory ideas laid down here, the constantly changing situation, the continual changes in personnel made every plan obsolete as soon as it was drawn up.

In addition, the bombing of rail lines had made any orderly move impossible.

Finally they began to realize this and drew up lists showing the composition of the marching columns. They had reached the point where the members of the highest units of the armed forces were to set out on foot with their bundles of documents and head for the Army Signal School in Halle. Some of the files and other documents had already been shipped to Halle. Half of them were lost on the way, the other half fell victim to Allied bombs in Halle.
On 31 January the Russians reached the boundary of Lower Silesia. In Breslau the Mayor, Dr. Spielhagen, was executed publicly in the market place for cowardice. Three weeks later the Russians were at the gates of Görlitz and of Guben; Grodenz was already encircled. In the west nothing could halt the Allied armies.

At the time the German capital reflected faithfully the process of decay; it was frightful to see the mad speed with which things went down hill. Berlin became the rallying point for deserters. There were so called passes for entry into Berlin in order to make some control possible. Only such members of the armed forces (including officers) as had such a pass were permitted to enter the capital from outside. Anyone else ran the risk of being treated as a deserter. These passes had to be shown at the barriers along with all other papers. But these passes didn't help because anyone who wanted to desert found a way.

Checks on the railroads and sentries at the barriers and along the rail lines were powerless because the destruction of stations made it possible to enter or leave railroad property without having to go through the gates.

In the final days of March it reached a point where individual officers in confidential conversations spoke openly of their intention to desert. This showed how rotten the armed forces had become behind its outer facade. Single offices began moving out to the south and southwest in what approached panic and frequently ran into the
arms of the advancing enemy.

The higher officers of radio defense in Zinna held two Storch planes ready to save their own hides. But there were already some of the men standing by with machine guns, just waiting for these planes to start, to give them a final salute. The rest of the personnel was to make its way on foot.

The situation was similar at the central office of the army intercept service in Zossen near Berlin. They attended strictly to business and talked about things which no longer interested them in the least. Any direction of the processing of results of the intercept service had long since dropped out. In most cases wire connections were interrupted and radio traffic was quite inadequate. Now the control stations of all branches of the intercept service began transferring small units and within a short time they were all fluttering around like pennants in the breeze.

The final hour of the German intercept service coincided with the end of the German armed services.
THE GREAT "WHY?"

This book covers the entire field of the intercept service during the last 30 years. A lot of space has been devoted to the work of Russian, English, and other radio agents during World War II. These agents worked in behalf of their native land and thus rank with the soldiers at the front.

This was known to the German command. Since early in 1942 it had not been ignorant of the strength of this uncanny opponent in the ether. It knew that these radio agents represented the consolidated defensive power of all Europe in the face of the war let loose by the National Socialist leaders. Whoever was permitted to observe the effect of this force could come to no other conclusion than that this war could never be won. There was no way of counteracting this invisible power successfully, unless it were by exterminating all the non-German peoples of Europe. So the question arises: why did the National Socialist leaders in Germany fail to give due consideration to this fact? Why did they continue the war although it was hopeless? The results of the intercept service revealed how strong the enemy was in all fields. Why did they not stop the war when they knew it could not be won? Why did they go on adding victim to victim, destruction to destruction, suffering to suffering, until all Europe was brought to the brink of the abyss? There could be no hope of victory and yet they continued the war.

Clausewitz once said: "...often everything depends on the silken thread of imagination" but even this sentence is not justified here.
Therefore I ask in the name of all the peoples of Europe and not least in the name of the German people: WHY?