ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSFUL
COMMUNIST INFORMANT
INTERVIEWS

(Not for Dissemination Outside the Bureau)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
John Edgar Hoover, Director
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
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PREFACE

Four previous studies have been made to assist the field in developing informants by interview. Under date of January 23, 1952, SAC Letter No. 52-9 transmitted to the field the monograph Reasons Why People Accept and Reject Communism. This study analyzes the reasons, from various academic viewpoints, giving as examples some prominent writers and intellectuals who have rejected communism.

Analysis of Accomplishments of Toplev Program is a monograph sent to the field with SAC Letter No. 54-41 dated August 10, 1954. That monograph, as its title suggests, analyzes the accomplishments up to that time of the program for developing top-level security informants.

Under date of September 20, 1955, SAC Letter No. 55-59 transmitted to the field the monograph Reasons Why Rank-and-File Members of the Communist Party Have Accepted and Rejected Communism.

Toplev subjects are primarily the leaders and "intellectuals" within the communist movement, and the Toplev monograph devotes itself to a comparison of the personal histories and the results of approaches to and interviews of both cooperative and noncooperative subjects. Concerning itself with the rank-and-file membership group, the third monograph
analyzes personal histories, the motivating factors resulting in acceptance and subsequent rejection of communism, and compares the personal histories of the cooperative rank-and-file subjects and Toplev subjects.

Sections I through IX of the monograph series Security Informants have been sent to the field by the following SAC letters: No. 56-55, dated October 23, 1956; No. 56-56, dated October 30, 1956; No. 57-22, dated April 16, 1957; No. 57-27, dated May 14, 1957; No. 57-33, dated June 4, 1957; No. 57-35, dated June 11, 1957; and No. 57-40, dated July 9, 1957. This study considers such aspects of informant work as sources, selection, conditions for the physical approach, the first interview, development, handling, methods the Communist Party uses in its efforts to uncover FBI informants, and how to counteract these efforts of the Party.

Field offices have requested that an analysis be made of successful interviews with communists since May, 1954, the terminal date of the Toplev study. This monograph has been prepared in answer to that request. The purpose of this analysis is to extract everything of value from selected successful interviews with communists since May, 1954, in order to enable Special Agents to conduct more effective interviews in the future.

For the purpose of this study, interviews were selected by these criteria: (1) accomplished after May, 1954;* (2) conducted with subjects.  

*Except the two Toplev cases in which the initial interviews were conducted prior to May, 1954, but were unsuccessful at that time in enlisting the subjects' cooperation as informants.
having a current or past history of communist activity; (3) initiated by Special Agents; and (4) concluded successfully by the subject’s development as a Bureau informant.

In this study, successful interviews were selected from among those conducted under the Toplev Program, the Security Informant Program, and those performed under Bureau instructions pertaining to interviews of Security Index subjects. Each informant has been given a symbol indicative of the Bureau program under which his particular interviews were conducted. Thus, the symbols TL, SIP, and SI refer, respectively, to Toplev, Security Informant Program, and Security Index.

This monograph is compiled from secret and confidential sources, which are being retained at the Bureau. It is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

This monograph constitutes an individual case analysis of sixteen selected successful instances of informant development by interview. All the subjects interviewed had a current or past history of communist activity. The interviews were conducted since May, 1954, * by Special Agents under the Topley Program, the Security Informant Program, and under Bureau instructions relating to interviews of Security Index subjects.

In each instance, there have been outlined briefly the subject's personal history and, where known and/or pertinent, the basis for selection of that person for interview and the initial approach. Following each personal history, an attempt has been made to analyze the decisive factors which led to the successful development of that informant. This analysis is based on the facts reported by the field. Where available, the subject's statements and the interviewing Agents' observations are included.

Conclusions

1. Successful informant development is an individual process demanding practical application of many talents. Analysis of successful interviews can provide general observations which may be helpful, but which are no substitute for the Agent's on-the-spot exercise of intelligence, judgment,

* See footnote, page ii.
ingenuity, and tact.

2. There are two principal stages to communist informant development:

   a. The subject's break with communism
   b. The subject's assumption of an active role in combating communism

Between these two principal stages of development there exists a transitional phase of "neutralization," a mid-point between allegiance to the communist movement and positive cooperation as an informant. It is of fundamental importance for interviewing Agents to be able to recognize the stage a subject is in at any given time. Accurate diagnosis provides the basic information necessary for successful informant development. It is also important for interviewing Agents to recognize the transitional phase in development and to bring the subject into it, or observe that he is in it, before placing too much emphasis on winning his positive cooperation as an active informant.

3. The principal external factors which assisted successful informant development were:

   a. Disillusionment with communism caused by:
      (1) Realization that it was ideologically unsound
      (2) Awareness that the individual was being exploited by the Communist Party
      (3) Feeling of futility about communist activity
      (4) Personal discontent at unfair policies and practices of the Communist Party
      (5) Dislike of Party discipline and regimentation
      (6) A return to religion
   b. An insecure personal life manifested in:
      (1) Finances
      (2) Employment
      (3) Domestic problems
      (4) Social status
      (5) Reputation
c. A basic sense of loyalty to the United States, particularly evident among veterans of the Armed Forces.

4. As a group, Negroes in the communist movement have excellent potential for informant development. Significant in successful interview and development of Negro subjects was the fundamental fact that they lacked a close ideological tie to communism. Inherent in Negro subjects' association with the communist movement was one of two factors, or a combination of them:
   a. Betterment of the status of their race
   b. Personal gain in the form of economic or social advantage

5. The fundamental barrier to active cooperation which had to be overcome in nearly all cases was dislike of the role of the informant. In many instances, Agents were able to overcome this barrier by use of material from the publication Stool Pigeon or Loyal Citizen? Other barriers to cooperation were personal loyalty to individual Party members for social and economic reasons, and an attitude of "live and let live" reflected among those who had broken ideologically or had drifted away from communism, but were unwilling to assume an active role combating it.

6. Some subjects had all but broken openly with the communist movement. Upon approach and interview, Agents found them receptive to a reorientation. To many subjects who were in a period of doubt or who had misgivings about the Party, the Agents' approach was the catalyst which accelerated the reaction of the existing elements.

7. Seldom was haste required in successful informant development. Only in those instances where particular circumstances demanded it, was fast action warranted. Normally, the necessity for a gradual process in winning active cooperation indicated the
subject's inherent stability or firmness of resolution, a quality which was beneficial ultimately from the Bureau's standpoint of controlling him as an informant when he was won over to full cooperation.

8. Agents had to have a thorough background or biographical knowledge of the subject to be interviewed.

9. Agents had to have a thorough knowledge of communist theory; current Communist Party practices, policy and factionalism; and had to be prepared to discuss intelligently current events, the American labor movement, and civil rights.

10. Determining the subject's state of mind and his current relationship to the Communist Party was of utmost importance. Ideally, this information should be known prior to interview, but seldom did such an ideal situation exist, except when an informant became aware of such information and reported it. In most cases, the Agents approached the interview unaided by such positive knowledge. In these latter cases, it was imperative that the Agents be perceptive to detect every nuance of the subject's personality and attitude which could guide them toward personalizing the interview.

11. The initial approach and interview were extremely important. This phase of the development was successful if it attained its limited objective of engaging the subject in conversation, about anything, to dispel any fear he might have of the FBI and to establish an amicable relationship. Once this limited objective was secured, Agents were able to proceed toward the ultimate objective of developing the subject as an informant.

12. Successful interviews with Negroes demonstrated that an initial approach developed around the topic of civil rights often succeeded in engaging the subject in conversation when a direct reference to communism might have caused him to end the interview abruptly. By avoiding any initial, direct reference to communism,
Agents succeeded in sustaining an interview and developing an amicable relationship, at which time the conversation was directed toward the Bureau's internal security jurisdiction and, specifically, communism. Many Negro subjects appeared to mistrust Government leaders and were inclined to doubt the FBI's motives in security investigations, because they lacked confidence in the FBI's work in the civil rights field. Thorough discussion of the FBI's civil rights jurisdiction and responsibilities, along with specific reference to public source material showing the FBI's action and success in civil rights cases, was extremely helpful in winning cooperation of Negroes.

13. For some trade-unionists, active union membership merged with Communist Party membership. Many trade-unionists were attracted to communism because of the practical organizational work communists accomplished in their unions. Tolerant of these apparently legitimate activities of the communists, because they were not fully aware that this performance was merely a tactical segment of the entire communist conspiracy, these trade-unionists were unwilling to take a stand against communism. By describing such communist activity in its true light and by citing specific examples of union exploitation by communists, Agents succeeded in developing such trade-unionists as informants.

14. Agents had to have the ability to listen. Interviews of prospective informants required give-and-take. The subject had to be treated as an equal and tolerance had to be shown to his views. The Agents had to be authoritative without being dogmatic, for the most effective results were achieved from reasonable persuasion.

15. Successful interviews demanded use of tact and practical psychology. Few persons who had devoted years of their lives to "the cause" would admit, even to themselves, that they were completely wrong. Often, by providing a favorable rational explanation of the subject's conduct in joining and working in the communist movement, the Agents furnished a "psychological cushion" for the subject which eased his transition from communism to an active role in opposition to it.

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16. Undoubtedly, financial reward played a more important role in their development than most informants would admit. However, any mention of it by Agents had to be accomplished delicately, for one who was ideologically bound to communism might be repelled by the idea. The possibility of financial gain was introduced, if at all, inoffensively, so that the subject was conscious of the possibility but able, if he so desired, to rationalize its acceptance in his own mind as a mere concomitant of a decision actually based on principle.

17. Subtle flattery was successfully employed with good judgment and restraint. Agents achieved success with it by impressing subjects that they were singled out for interview because of integrity, intelligence, position, or leadership ability.

18. In alienating from communism Negroes who believed that the Communist Party aided the Negro in obtaining equal rights and in opposing discrimination, Agents succeeded by comparing the methods of legitimate organizations operating in the area of Negro rights with the agitation and propaganda methods of the Communist Party, which often create racial hatred and more often have no relation to moral issues.

19. When a subject had a religious temperament, Agents found it helpful to contrast the outstanding religious freedom and opportunity available in the United States with the restrictions imposed on religion in Soviet and satellite states. Agents were also able to exploit effectively the communist position on religion by using material in Religion by V. I. Lenin.

20. Although in some instances the subject's positive cooperation was not obtained after several interviews and attempts to develop him were discontinued, successful informant interviews demonstrated that a subject should not be dropped completely from consideration as a prospective informant. Often, by following the subject's subsequent activities, Agents detected the occurrence of significant events, such as a change in attitude or in the subject's personal life, which indicated the desirability of additional interviews and which led to the subject's development as an informant.
I. SELECTED TOPLEV INTERVIEWS

TL-1

Personal History

A naturalized citizen, TL-1 was a male Negro in his early 40's, a veteran, had been married, divorced, and remarried, had four children, was a college graduate, and was self-employed.

He joined the Communist Party in 1946, and was a front group functionary when interviewed initially under the Toplev Program in October, 1952. Although willing to converse with the Agents on subsequent interviews conducted until February, 1953, TL-1 provided little information about himself and declined positive cooperation with the Bureau. Reinterviewed in April, 1956, he was developed to the point of cooperation. By May, 1956, he was designated an informant. The Bureau has assisted him in establishing his own business, and as a Party functionary furnishing information on a local and national level, he has excellent potential for advancement in the Communist Party.

Decisive Factors in Development

TL-1's acceptance of communism appears to have been caused by two factors: the practical reason, money; the idealistic reason, improving
conditions for his race. It was these same factors which enabled Agents to secure his cooperation with the Bureau.

Originally, TL-1's affiliation with communism was due to his dependence on the communist movement for financial security. Several years before joining the Communist Party, he was employed by it for a two-month period. After his discharge from the Armed Forces, he was employed by a front group and he returned to similar employment after completing his college education.

Ideologically, TL-1 had no close tie to communism. What ideological identity he had with it was bound up in his desire to aid the Negro and his belief that communism offered a program for Negro betterment. Apparently, even this tie was loosened prior to the initial interview, because TL-1 had already begun withdrawal from front group activity.

TL-1's personal life was complicated by the fact that his second wife was a white person. He said that this caused him considerable embarrassment, because he was not fully accepted by either the white race or Negroes.

Although TL-1 when approached for interview appeared friendly, it was apparent to the Agents that he expected to be questioned about communism and would terminate the interview if that were the case. Therefore, the Agents
directed the conversation toward the Bureau's responsibility in the civil rights field. Direct reference to communism was avoided. By opening the interview with a discussion of civil rights, an issue of primary importance to TL-1, the Agents were able to attract and hold his interest and to get him talking, so that eventually the conversation proceeded to the Bureau's investigative responsibility involving communism.

Subtle flattery was injected into the interview. The Agents outlined TL-1's background to him and impressed him with their detailed knowledge of him. A specific incident in which TL-1 figured was cited to him and he was complimented for his attitude. This incident occurred at a front group meeting concerning a recent racial disturbance. The majority of those present at the meeting insisted that the prior racial disturbance should be met with force and violence. Agents told TL-1 that they had been reliably informed that, against overwhelming opposition, he had been insistent that resorting to force and violence was not the solution to the problem and absolutely no violence should occur. Later events proved his contention to be a wise one. TL-1 appeared proud of the Agents' notice of this incident and the Agents told him they respected him for his attitude, as it clearly indicated he was against the use of force.
TL-1 had a basic sense of loyalty to the United States, probably due in great measure to his World War II service. He expressed disapproval of espionage activities by Communist Party members, although he said he was personally unaware of any.

The principal barriers to TL-1's full cooperation were his dislike of the role of an informant and his mistrust and lack of confidence in Government leaders. In overcoming TL-1's dislike of the role of the informant, the Agents found material of assistance in the publication Stoolpigeon or Loyal Citizen? TL-1's mistrust of Government leaders was evidenced by his statement that he was inclined to doubt the Bureau's motives for conducting security investigations, because he lacked confidence in the Bureau's civil rights investigations. The greater part of most interviews with TL-1 was devoted to discussions of civil rights, including specific cases, Communist Party activities in that field, and the Bureau's jurisdiction and its responsibility. Agents told him that the Communist Party does not offer a solution to racial problems, that, in fact, it actually incites race hatred through continual agitation, and that the Party substitutes agitation and propaganda values for any really sincere effort it might make on the moral issues.

At one point between interviews, Agents mailed anonymously to TL-1 a newspaper article reflecting Bureau activity in a current civil rights case.
An example of communist distortion of an event that the Party regarded as a civil rights issue was brought home personally to TL-1. Agents had TL-1 read a Civil Rights Congress pamphlet promoting a fund-raising party for the wife of a Party functionary arrested under the Smith Act. An interviewing Agent, who had participated in the arrest, pointed out in detail the deliberate distortion of facts in the pamphlet regarding the circumstances of the apprehension and, specifically, a statement that the arrested person was not allowed to contact an attorney. TL-1 admitted he had himself received a telephone call from the arrested person's wife asking for an attorney for her husband, and that he had made arrangements through others for the attorney's appearance.

As succeeding interviews developed TL-1's attitude toward active cooperation with the Bureau, Agents analyzed his reasons for non-cooperation and reduced them to two simple postulates. By identifying and isolating these points, summing them up articulately, and gaining TL-1's admission that he could cast aside all personal feelings and cooperate fully provided these points could be proved to his satisfaction, Agents narrowed their focus of persuasion to permit a concentrated attack on only two clearly defined barriers. In TL-1's case, these postulates were: (1) The Communist Party,
USA, is against the best interests of all people; (2) The Communist Party, USA, is a tool of the Soviet Union.

TL-1 had been made aware discreetly toward the end of the initial interview that, if he were cooperative, he would receive financial consideration. It was explained to him that he could expect remuneration, because he would be saving the Government money through his assistance.

In a succeeding interview, financial reward was touched upon obliquely when the Agent told TL-1 he could be of great value to the Bureau, not measured in monetary amounts, but measured in the value he would have in protecting the security of the country. The Agent went on to say that, although he knew it would not mean much to TL-1, he had been prepared since the interviews began, to offer TL-1 a substantial weekly sum for his time and effort expended in giving full cooperation. The Agent was careful to stress that he knew money meant little to the subject, because when TL-1 offered his services, it would be because of principle and not mere profit. The Agent told him that he should at least consider the value of his time and efforts, and, in addition, that payment of money would be a demonstration of the Government's good faith, would assist him in paying debts, and would insure college educations for his children.
From the time of the initial interview in October, 1952, until February, 1953, Agents succeeded in bringing TL-1 to a state of "neutralization." He was practically withdrawn, although not overtly, from activity in the communist movement, a course he had already undertaken prior to the original interview; but he was unwilling to accept a position combating communism. It was at this stage that interviews were discontinued and the subject's activities were followed closely to detect, if possible, a change of circumstances or attitude which might make reinterview successful.

In 1953, at the time when interviews with TL-1 were discontinued, he had resigned his regular part-time employment with his front group, was driving a truck during the day, and was operating his own business during evening hours. An informant reported that TL-1 could not afford to be active in his front group, since he had a family to support and was in need of funds that he could not realize from his front group employment. Subsequently, financial adversity compelled TL-1's wife to leave the care of their children to another woman while she worked outside the home.

In April, 1956, TL-1 was reinterviewed and the Agent called attention to his undesirable family situation brought on by financial hardship. It was suggested to TL-1 that cooperation with the Bureau might enable him to improve his family status through the purchase of a home, and might enable his wife to
remain at home with the children. As a result of this reinterview, TL-1's cooperation was gained.

In all discussions of financial consideration, Agents carefully blended the two factors of money and principle. TL-1 was told that by assisting the Bureau he could continue his efforts in behalf of equal rights for the Negro, and at the same time he could help the Bureau by furnishing valuable information and help himself through financial reward.

**TL-2**

**Personal History**

TL-2 was a native-born male Negro in his early 40's, the stepfather of two children, and a former seaman and union worker. He was a Communist Party member from at least 1949 until 1953 and was also active in front group activities.

Interviewed initially under the Toplev Program in February, 1953, TL-2 conversed with the Agent and was courteous but he refused to furnish any information. Several additional interviews were conducted with no positive results and then TL-2 refused to continue the interviews. Subsequent attempts were made in 1953 and 1954 to induce his cooperation but they too were unsuccessful. TL-2 was reinterviewed in early 1955 and by February, 1956,
was designated an informant. Now, he is seeking reactivation in the Communist Party through his present position as an official of a front group.

Decisive Factors in Development

Although, without question, TL-2 was sympathetic to the communist movement because of its alleged fight against discrimination and aid to trade unions, he was never a sincere Marxist, but rather an opportunist who saw personal advancement for himself in becoming part of the progressive movement. TL-2's position in his union made him feel that he had achieved a measure of dignity which he had never before experienced in his life and, therefore, he was grateful to the union for this opportunity.

TL-2 had an egotistical nature. Therefore, complimentary remarks, calculated to appeal to his ego, were made about his intelligence, leadership ability, and his popularity as a union leader. TL-2 had a sense of basic loyalty to the United States; but he was confused, because the people and organizations which had helped him most to obtain the things he believed in were being accused of disloyalty by the Government. He was unconvinced, as a result of his personal experience, that the Communist Party stood for force and violence. The Agents provided him with pamphlets on communism from which TL-2 said he had learned more about communism than he had ever known.
The Agents provided a rational explanation for TL-2's unawareness that the Communist Party stood for force and violence. The Agents explained that the Party was politically astute and recognized TL-2's competence in union work and his ability to impress numbers of people. Therefore, TL-2 was told, the Party concentrated on selling him certain tactical objectives and inducing him to work toward them in order to influence others to work for the same objectives. He was told that the Party, fearing that to enlighten him to the true violent nature of Marxism-Leninism might repel him and might make him unwilling to work toward any phase of its program, soft-pedaled this phase and was content to get him to do the job he was doing.

TL-2 was known to have said he hated war. The international nature and danger of communism were demonstrated sharply to him by relating to him in discreet terms, so as to avoid identifying details, an incident which had occurred in Korea. TL-2 was informed by the Agent that an American prisoner of war in Korea, prior to leaving prison camp, had been told by a Chinese official that he should activate himself in the progressive movement in the United States. The prisoner of war had been instructed to get in touch with TL-2 in order to activate himself in the progressive movement.
It was determined from interviews that TL-2 professed to be of religious temperament and, accordingly, the Agent furnished him with a copy of *Religion* by V. I. Lenin.

TL-2's indoctrination by the Communist Party against informing seemed to present the greatest difficulty in enlisting his cooperation. His hatred for the Ku Klux Klan was used effectively to overcome his reluctance to furnish information. Persuasive arguments were fashioned, substituting the Ku Klux Klan for the Communist Party, and admissions were obtained from the subject that, if he were aware that an applicant who was applying for a Government position was a member of the Ku Klux Klan, he would not hesitate to report it when questioned about derogatory information concerning the applicant.

During the period between the initial interview in 1953 and the time TL-2 began cooperating in 1955, his personal situation deteriorated until it confronted him with frustrating problems which added considerable weight to the Agents' overtures for cooperation. During that period, he was denied Coast Guard clearance, an event which interfered with his employment as a seaman; his job with the union was eliminated when that union was raided by another; he separated from his wife, had been injured in an automobile accident, and was in dire financial straits.
TL-2 admitted in March, 1955, that after the initial approach by Agents in 1953, he had told an official in his union about the incident and had been instructed to avoid any additional interviews. TL-2 disagreed with the union official, contending that the union was trying to interfere in his personal life. After this, his position in the union came under attack and fault was found with his records. As a result, TL-2's contact with the Party ended, although he continued association with a front group.

The combination of his adverse personal situation, the skillful persuasion of the Agents that cooperation with his Government offered a way out of his difficulties, and the fact that the subject had severed his strongest Party connections brought him to a point where, at the propitious moment, a small sum of money given to him without any commitment finalized the act of winning him over to active cooperation.
II. SELECTED SECURITY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

SIP-1

Personal History

SIP-1 was a native-born, white male in his late 20's, a high school graduate, married, had two children, and was employed as a clerk. He was recruited into the Communist Party in 1948 as a result of his active support of the Progressive Party, but he dropped out and moved to another part of the country in 1951.

Interviewed initially under the Security Informant Program in August, 1954, he was designated an informant in June, 1955, and is in an excellent position to reactivate his Communist Party membership when new members are recruited in his locality.

Decisive Factors in Development

SIP-1 had expected to be contacted by the Bureau and was willing to discuss fully his communist activity. His incentive to cooperate is attributable to his dislike of subjection to Communist Party discipline, regimentation, and "storm trooper methods" of leadership, and to his poor financial condition.

SIP-1 and his wife had dropped out of the communist movement in 1951,
because they had accomplished nothing through their participation and were in worse financial condition through their many contributions to the movement.

SIP-2

**Personal History**

SIP-2 was a white, native-born male in his middle 40's, a high school graduate, married, had three children, was a skilled worker, and a labor union member. He was a member of the Communist Party from 1946 to 1949 when he ceased Party activity, because he terminated employment with a corporation where his Communist Party activity had been part of his labor union work. Interviewed initially under the Security Informant Program in April, 1954, SIP-2 was designated an informant in February, 1956, and is attempting reactivation in the Communist Party. Selected for interview because he resided in a neighborhood where there was no live informant coverage and because there was no positive information of recent communist activity on his part, SIP-2 was cooperative from the first.

**Decisive Factors in Development**

SIP-2 had entered the Communist Party and had continued activity in it, because he was a labor union member and had observed that Party members
were strong, active participants in his union. He believed that union activity lessened his chances of unemployment with its consequent hardship to his family; therefore he embraced communism as a facet of his union work. Termination of employment which caused cessation of his particular union activity severed his closest Party connections.

SIP-3

Personal History

A native-born, male, Negro veteran in his middle 40’s, SIP-3 was married, and employed as a laborer. He was recruited into the Communist Party in 1945 and was suspended in 1951. Although he entertained doubts about the Party, he reregistered in 1952.

SIP-3 was interviewed initially under the Security Informant Program during October, 1954, and was designated an informant in November, 1954. A dearth of information about his Communist Party activities in recent years was probably attributable to the negligible communist work in his locality, and appeared to be the primary reason for his selection for interview.

After SIP-3's cooperative attitude had been demonstrated, his wife was interviewed in his presence and was developed as an informant in November, 1954.
Decisive Factors in Development

SIP-3's original interest in the Communist Party stemmed from his belief that the Party seemingly accepted Negroes as equal and appeared to do something for the downtrodden and less fortunate. He was suspended from the Party in 1951 under the false charge of cohabiting with a white coed. At about that time, he became disgusted with the Party as a result of the Russians' shooting down American airplanes and the explanations of these incidents made by the Communist Party, USA; but, although he had these doubts about the Party, he reregistered in 1952 when contacted by a Communist Party official.

Although the doubts SIP-3 had about the Communist Party prior to his reregistration in 1952 undoubtedly entered into his decision to cooperate, the Agents were of the opinion that the offer of financial remuneration made during the initial interview was the principal factor in his decision to cooperate by serving as an informant.

SIP-4

Personal History

SIP-4 was a native-born, white male in his middle 40's, a high school graduate with one year of vocational training who had been twice married, had two children, and was employed as a laborer. He had been active in labor
union organizational work and was a member of the Communist Party from 1937 until 1951 when he dropped out of Party activity. Interviewed initially in October, 1954, under the Security Informant Program he was designated an informant in January, 1955. As a result of his successful development as an informant, SIP-4's wife became an informant in January, 1957.

Decisive Factors in Development

SIP-4 claimed to have joined the Communist Party in 1937, because he believed that the Party offered a solution to the economic problems of the time. In his union work, he had clashed over policy with members of the union who were Party members. In 1951, as a result of such a disagreement, he resigned his union job, dropped his Party activities, and moved to another part of the country. Apparently, because of his disagreements with Party members over union policy, SIP-4 had become disgusted with communism before he was approached for interview. He declared on the original interview that, since he had left Party activity in 1951, he had recognized that the Party stood as a threat to the American way of life. He said that he desired to help combat this menace.
Personal History

An unmarried native-born, white female, SIP-5 was in her early 20's, a high school graduate and an unskilled worker. Since 1953, she had been a member of a Negro front group and a close associate of Labor Youth League* members. Professing concern about discrimination against the Negro, SIP-5 believed that it was incumbent upon her as a white person to do something concrete to assist the Negro. She was interviewed under the Security Informant Program in October, 1954, and was designated an informant in March, 1955, by which time she had become a Labor Youth League member. SIP-5 was selected for interview, because informants had reported that she was considering resigning from the Negro front group as a result of that group's unfair practices and policies.

Decisive Factors in Development

The original interview was directed to SIP-5's membership in the Negro front group, the interviewing Agents pointing up the contrast between actual aid for the Negro from noncommunist organizations and exploitation of the Negro through agitation and propaganda by the front group to which she belonged.

*Designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.
A strong point was made by informing her that the front group and its members were using her for their own advantage, because she was an attractive, white female.

SIP-5 declared that she was a loyal citizen and was persuaded by Agents that, by reporting on the front group and Labor Youth League activities, she would be performing the duty of a loyal citizen. SIP-5 already had doubts about the front group to which she belonged, because of its unfair practices and policies. The Agents were able to appeal to her basic loyalty to the United States and to accelerate her break with the front group by convincing her that it had ulterior motives and that it was using her to its own advantage.

SIP-6

Personal History

SIP-6 was a male, native-born Negro in his early 30's. He had an 11th-grade education, was a veteran, a union member, was married, and was employed as an industrial worker. SIP-6 denied he was a Communist Party member, but admitted close contact with Communist Party officials through his front group activity which began in 1948. Originally interviewed
under the Security Informant Program in November, 1954, he was designated an informant in January, 1955.

Decisive Factors in Development

Before the first interview, Agents planned the conversation to gain SIP-6's confidence and to impress him with his potential importance. One of the Agents was introduced as an official from the Bureau assigned specifically to SIP-6's case; and SIP-6 was informed that, because of his leadership qualities and past military service, he had been selected to be interviewed about measures the FBI might employ to combat subversive organizations.

During the initial interview SIP-6 expressed an interest in money. It was the opinion of the Agents, based on that inquiry and his attitude during subsequent interviews, that his cooperation was, no doubt, motivated principally by the expected financial return.

SIP-7

Personal History

Native-born, SIP-7 was a male Negro in his early 30's with a grammar school education. He was a veteran, was married, had four children, and was
employed as a laborer. SIP-7 was recruited into the Communist Party in 1950 because of his interest in Negro rights. Interviewed originally under the Security Informant Program in November, 1954, he was designated an informant in January, 1955.

SIP-7 was selected for interview on the basis of information from an informant who reported that SIP-7's attitude toward the Communist Party was "cold" and the Party thought that he should be worked on to revive his interest.

Decisive Factors in Development

Upon recruitment into the Communist Party, SIP-7 was assigned to a "longshore" club. During the period prior to his initial interview by Agents, he was being groomed by the Party for water-front employment, the plan being that he would quit his regular employment and work on the water front among Negro work gangs, for the purpose of infiltrating the water-front union and recruiting new members for the Party. SIP-7 began to realize that the Party's interest in him was not to aid the Negro, but rather to infiltrate the trade-union and gain Negro recruits for the Party.

Although SIP-7 was not unfriendly with the Agents during the first interview, he denied Party membership. After he was won over to cooperation,
he explained his denial was caused by his Party indoctrination which had led him to distrust the FBI. He said that he had never contemplated an active role against the Party, since the Party had convinced him that informing was reprehensible. SIP-7's change in attitude about furnishing information can be attributed to the fact that, during the initial interview, the Agents devoted their sole attention toward establishing a good personal relationship with SIP-7 and instilling in him confidence in the FBI.

SIP-8

Personal History

SIP-8 was a native-born, white female in her late 30's who was divorced in 1952, had custody of her two children, had completed two years of college and worked as a writer of labor articles. She claimed that she was attracted to the Communist Party while she was in college, because it offered her a social program. She became a Communist Party member in 1935 and was active until she separated from her husband, also a Party member, in 1950.

Originally interviewed under the Security Informant Program in December, 1954, SIP-8 was designated an informant in August, 1956. She was selected
for interview, because a source had advised that in 1952 SIP-8 had declared she was disgusted with the Communist Party.

**Decisive Factors in Development**

SIP-8's attitude of disgust for the Communist Party in 1952 revealed that her communist activity might have been the result of her former husband's connection with the communist movement, rather than the result of any ideological tie.

Weighing heavily in her decision to cooperate was the fact that she was a divorcee with two children to support, and that she was in need of financial assistance. SIP-8 displayed an uneasiness over the Party's views on religion and, prior to the initial interview, had undertaken steps to return to her church. The Agents were able to address persuasive arguments to SIP-8's religious temperament through discussion of the outstanding religious freedom and opportunity available in the United States.

**SIP-9**

**Personal History**

SIP-9 was a native-born, white male, in his late 60's, married, had four children, and was self-employed. Believing in the Communist Party program, he became a member of the Party in 1935 and was active until 1944,
when, because of disagreement with Communist Party leaders over policy, his interest waned. In 1945, the disagreement settled, he resumed activity in the Communist Party. Because of subsequent mistrust of local Communist Party leadership he had been inactive since 1950, but was still considered by members as a Party leader in his area. Initially interviewed under the Security Informant Program during March, 1955, he was designated an informant in October, 1955. During the first interview, SIP-9 agreed readily to discuss his own Communist Party connection, but declined to identify or discuss the activities of others. Subsequently, he agreed to cooperate and furnish all the information in his possession.

**Decisive Factors in Development**

Although SIP-9’s mistrust of local Party leadership figured in his decision to cooperate, it appeared that it was primarily his loyalty to the United States Government which won him over to cooperation. Even though SIP-9 claimed to believe in the Communist Party program as a whole, he did not believe in a change in the form of the Government unless it was accomplished by democratic procedures. He agreed to cooperate with the Bureau by reactivating himself in the Communist Party and furnishing information, because
he said this was the only way he was able to demonstrate his sincerity.

SIP-10

Personal History

A native-born, male Negro, SIP-10 was in his early 30's, a high school graduate, a veteran, married, had four children, and was employed as a laborer. He was recruited into the Communist Party in December, 1955, through his close friendship with a Party official and was obligated financially to another Party functionary.

Designated an informant in July, 1956, he was contacted initially under the Security Informant Program in June, 1956. SIP-10 was selected for interview on the basis of information from an informant who reported SIP-10 had been in desperate financial condition, faced the possibility of losing his home, and was recruited into the Party by a Party official who convinced him he needed the organization behind him to offer assistance and counsel. The Party official arranged for the refinancing of SIP-10's home to reduce the monthly payments. The informant said that SIP-10 had no real interest in the Party and had been recruited only because he was seeking a solution to his financial difficulties.
Decisive Factors in Development

Because it was known that SIP-10 was vitally interested in Negro rights and related problems, the Agents planned the initial interview for discussion of those matters and made it a point to tell SIP-10 that they appreciated his interest in groups which were fighting discrimination against Negroes but could not understand his association with one group, the Communist Party, which among all others, is foremost in preventing progress in this field. Specific examples of situations where the Party had taken advantage of Negroes were cited to him.

Since SIP-10's primary reasons for joining the Communist Party were his friendship for a Party official and his financial obligation to a Party functionary, by convincing him that he owed a loyalty to his country above and beyond loyalty to these persons, the Agents were able to enlist his cooperation.

SIP-10 declared he was loyal to his country, having served in its Armed Forces. He claimed that he would do anything to make amends for his error in joining the Communist Party, as he did not want his children to bear a stigma of disloyalty.

SIP-11

Personal History

A native-born, white male, SIP-11 was in his early 40's, was married,
was a college graduate and a white-collar worker, who, at one time, had been employed by the Federal and state governments.

He joined the Communist Party in 1937 and attributed his recruitment to the economic conditions of the 1930's and stimulation of interest in the Party while attending college economics classes. He claimed to have romantic visions of helping the downtrodden.

Information was received from an informant in September, 1956, that SIP-11 was not attending Party meetings and had said that he had had enough of the Party. SIP-11 was interviewed initially under the Security Informant Program in October, 1956, and was designated an informant in January, 1957. SIP-11 had been active in the Communist Party underground, industrial concentration, and colonization work. His prospects for advancement in the Party are good.

Decisive Factors in Development

By October, 1956, when he was interviewed initially by Agents, SIP-11 had become dissatisfied and discouraged with the Communist Party and had reached the point where he was considering resigning from the Party. SIP-11 said that he had become disillusioned as a result of the disclosures of Russian atrocities committed against the Jewish people made in Khrushchev's Report
to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

While his disillusionment was the primary reason for his ideological break with the Party, SIP-11's decision to cooperate actively as an informant was based on his sense of loyalty to the United States and his high personal regard for the FBI as an organization. Initially, SIP-11 had not intended to cooperate completely with the FBI, if the purpose of the Agents' interview was to solicit his cooperation as an informant. By acquainting him with the Bureau's functions and responsibilities for the internal security of the United States, the Agents made him understand that his failure to cooperate might make him at least partly responsible for any acts of violence inspired by the Communist Party. SIP-11 began to realize that by cooperating with the FBI, he might be able to prevent some act of sabotage or other vicious action which could be engaged in by the Communist Party. Afterward, SIP-11 said that he had held many mental reservations about furnishing information about his friends and associates in the communist movement; but he realized that the Party is not a mere political organization; and, if the opportunity presented itself for the Party to secure its objectives, it would proceed with any means at its disposal.

In agreeing to cooperate as an informant, SIP-11 said that he would furnish current information about the Communist Party exclusively to the FBI,
because, from his own personal experience, having reported information about German espionage while a Federal Employee, he had high personal regard for the FBI.
III. SELECTED INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED UNDER INSTRUCTIONS PERTAINING TO SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS

SI-1

Personal History

A native-born, male Negro, SI-1 was in his early 30's, a veteran, married, had eight children, and was employed as a laborer. Prior to joining the Communist Party in 1947, he was a member of the Young Communist League* and American Youth for Democracy.* In 1949, he drifted away from the Party. SI-1 was interviewed in September, 1954, under Bureau instructions relating to interviews of Security Index subjects and was designated an informant in February, 1956, after he had reactivated himself in the Party. As a result of the successful development of SI-1, his wife became an informant in April, 1956.

Decisive Factors in Development

SI-1 joined the communist movement by becoming a member of the Young Communist League. He was impressed with attendance at interracial parties of that organization where he had the opportunity to associate socially with white people who treated him as an equal. He said he had drifted away

*Designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.
from the Communist Party in 1949, because of a lack of interest and the realization that he was being exploited on account of his race.

SI-2

Personal History

A white male in his early 30's, SI-2 was native-born, a college graduate, a veteran, married, and employed as an engineer. He became a Communist Party member in 1940, and dropped out of the Party in 1951. Interviewed under Bureau instructions for interviews of Security Index subjects in June, 1955, he was designated an informant in March, 1956. He has succeeded in being reactivated in a Communist Party professional group. As a result of his cooperation, his wife was developed as an informant by July, 1956.

Decisive Factors in Development

SI-2 claimed to have dropped out of Party activity in 1951, as a result of his disillusionment with the Communist Party after having participated in a Party-influenced teachers' strike. He declared that he recognized that the Party's interest in improving working conditions and fighting for civil rights was for the ulterior purpose of using these points of agitation for gaining international power.

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Agents were of the opinion that he cooperated because of his financial indebtedness, because of the insecurity of his personal life as a result of being a former Communist Party member, and as a self-serving gesture to retain employment which required security clearance.

SI-3

Personal History

SI-3 was a male Negro in his early 30's, native-born, a veteran, attended college two years, was married, had four children, and was employed as a laborer. He joined the Communist Party in 1946, believing that the communists were the only ones working to elevate the Negro's status and to improve conditions for labor. In 1949, he discontinued attending Party meetings, but continued front group activity for another year. At the time of the initial interview in October, 1955, he was continuing social contacts with persons he knew to be active in the Communist Party. Originally interviewed under Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Security Index subjects, SI-3 was designated an informant in March, 1956. He was selected for interview on the basis of a report from an informant that SI-3 was no longer sympathetic to the communist movement.
Decisive Factors in Development

Cooperative from the first interview, SI-3 had become disillusioned with the communist movement in 1950. Part of his disillusionment appeared to have been attributable to his concern about preserving his reputation. When his cooperation as an informant was obtained, SI-3 said he was anxious to maintain a good reputation because of a political position he held. SI-3 offered his services as an informant among professional people in the communist movement, because he believed that he could associate with professional people without publicly jeopardizing his reputation.