Honorabe Pat Roberts  
Chairman  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

September 1, 2005

Dear Mr. Chairman:


(U) Pursuant to the above, enclosed please find this report.

Sincerely,

Robert S. Mueller III  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Porter J. Goss  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Enclosure

Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV  
Vice Chairman  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510
(U) Executive Summary

(S/NF) Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) has been working to assess Saudi Arabia’s ties to terrorism, including the 2001 terrorist acts, in order to address questions arising about the country’s support for organizations that may have provided support for previous al-Qa’ida attacks. Our assessment to date is as follows:

- There is no evidence that either the Saudi Government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere.

- There is evidence that official Saudi entities, [REDACTED], and associated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity.

- The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa’ida.

- [REDACTED] Saudi-funded clerics have been found to be [REDACTED] Saudi-Americans and other communities in the United States.

- [REDACTED] in the United States, including diplomats, are engaged in a campaign to influence public perception and policy.

- The Saudi Government and private Saudi individuals support the propagation of the conservative Wahhabi-Salafi\(^1\) sect of Sunni Islam in the United States. Jihadists adhere to and interpret this sect’s beliefs to justify their actions.

- There is no information to indicate that either Omar al-Bayoumi or Osama Basnan materially supported the hijackers wittingly, were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or provided material support for the 11 September attacks, contrary to media speculation.

(S/NF) Recent cooperation between Saudi intelligence and the USIC is largely driven by the Saudi royal family’s recognition of the domestic threat posed to it by al-Qa’ida following several bombings by the group inside Saudi Arabia, starting in May 2003.

- In the past, the Saudi Government found itself in a precarious position, on the one hand it was denouncing al-Qa’ida as a threat, yet on the other hand it was underestimating al-Qa’ida’s vitality within the Kingdom and treating the group with special consideration. Raids by the General Directorate for Investigations (Mabahith) following the attacks in May 2003, which have resulted in the death or arrest of al-Qa’ida members in Saudi Arabia, demonstrate how this policy has changed.

\(^1\) Salafism is a strict form of Sunni Islam that rejects modern commentary and interpretation of the Koran. Wahhabism is the Arabian variant of Salafism, and has many variants in Saudi Arabia. The founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, formed a symbiotic relationship with the Saudi Royal Family that continues to have a profound effect on the Saudi monarchy. (U)