May 10, 2017

The National Security Agency decided to make public today this report by the Agency’s Inspector General about compliance with Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

We hope this report – even with several important national-security redactions – will add to the public’s understanding of recent changes to Section 702 foreign intelligence collection.

NSA works tirelessly around the world to help keep the nation safe. We never stop putting improvements in place while carrying out our critical mission.

###
INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

(U) Report on the Special Study of NSA Controls to Comply with the FISA Amendments Act §§704 and 705(b) Targeting and Minimization Procedures

ST-15-0002

7 January 2016

(U) This report might not be releasable under the Freedom of Information Act or other statutes and regulations. Consult the NSA/CSS Inspector General Chief of Staff before releasing or posting all or part of this report.
(U) OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Chartered by the NSA Director and by statute, the Office of the Inspector General conducts audits, investigations, inspections, and special studies. Its mission is to ensure the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of NSA operations, provide intelligence oversight, protect against fraud, waste, and mismanagement of resources by the Agency and its affiliates, and ensure that NSA activities comply with the law. The OIG also serves as an ombudsman, assisting NSA/CSS employees, civilian and military.

(U) AUDITS

The audit function provides independent assessments of programs and organizations. Performance audits evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of entities and programs and their internal controls. Financial audits determine the accuracy of the Agency's financial statements. All audits are conducted in accordance with standards established by the Comptroller General of the United States.

(U) INVESTIGATIONS

The OIG administers a system for receiving complaints (including anonymous tips) about fraud, waste, and mismanagement. Investigations may be undertaken in response to those complaints, at the request of management, as the result of irregularities that surface during inspections and audits, or at the initiative of the Inspector General.

(U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

Intelligence oversight is designed to ensure that Agency intelligence functions comply with federal law, executive orders, and DoD and NSA policies. The IO mission is grounded in Executive Order 12333, which establishes broad principles under which IC components must accomplish their missions.

(U) FIELD INSPECTIONS

Inspections are organizational reviews that assess the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency components. The Field Inspections Division also partners with Inspectors General of the Service Cryptologic Elements and other IC entities to jointly inspect consolidated cryptologic facilities.
TO: (U) DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: (U) Report on the Special Study of NSA Controls to Comply with the FISA Amendments Act §§704 and 705(b) Targeting and Minimization Procedures (ST-15-0002)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

1. (U) This report summarizes our special study of NSA Controls to Comply with the FISA Amendments Act §§704 and 705(b) Targeting and Minimization Procedures and incorporates management's response to the draft report.

2. (U//FOUO) In accordance with NSA/CSS Policy 1-60, NSA/CSS Office of the Inspector General, and IG-11731-14, Follow-up Procedures for OIG Report Recommendations, actions on OIG recommendations are subject to monitoring and follow-up until completion. Therefore, we ask that you provide a written status report concerning each planned corrective action categorized as "OPEN." If you propose that a recommendation be considered closed, please provide sufficient information to show that actions have been taken to correct the deficiency. If a planned action will not be completed by the original target completion date, please state the reason for the delay and forward a revised target completion date to Follow-up Program Manager, at DL D1_Followup (ALIAS) D1.

3. (U//FOUO) We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to the evaluators throughout the review. For additional information, please contact [redacted] on 963-0922(s) or via email at [redacted]@nsa.ic.gov.

DR. GEORGE ELLARD
Inspector General

(U) This report might not be releasable under the Freedom of Information Act or other statutes and regulations. Consult the NSA/CSS Inspector General Chief of Staff before releasing or posting all or part of this report.
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(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Overview

(U//FOUO) We conducted this study to determine whether National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA) controls are adequate to ensure compliance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) §§704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures. We found that Agency controls for monitoring query compliance have not been completely developed.

(U) Highlights

(U) Our study of NSA’s FAA §§704 and 705(b) controls revealed:

- (U//FOUO) Agency controls for monitoring query compliance have not been completely developed
  (U//FOUO) The Agency has no process to reliably identify queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets.

- (U//FOUO)
  (S//SI//NF)

- (U//FOUO) 
  (U)

(U) Management action

(U) Officials from the Signals Intelligence Directorate agreed with the OIG’s recommendations. The planned actions meet the intent of the recommendations.
I. (U) INTRODUCTION

(U) Background

(U/FQ.00) In July 2008, the President of the United States signed into law the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). FAA §§703 through 705 set forth requirements that must be satisfied to target U.S. persons (USPs) outside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA) has implemented the FAA §§704 and 705(b) authorities, but not the FAA §703 authority.

(S//SI//NE) In July 2008, the Attorney General (AG) approved National Security Agency’s Standard Minimization Procedures for Acquisitions Targeting United States Persons Reasonably Believed to be Located Outside the United States Pursuant to Section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. These procedures also apply to FAA §705(b). In August 2008, the AG issued a memorandum to the NSA Director (known as the "Mukasey Letter") that required NSA to proceed under §§704 and 705(b) of FISA to conduct foreign intelligence that previously had been authorized by the AG pursuant to §2.5 of Executive Order 12333. The two documents comprise NSA’s FAA §§704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures.

(U/FQ.00) FAA §704 grants the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) jurisdiction over certain aspects of targeting USPs reasonably believed to be outside the United States when they have reasonable expectations of privacy and a warrant would be required if the collection were conducted inside the United States for law enforcement purposes. NSA’s application for an order under FAA §704 must include a statement of facts and circumstances sufficient to allow the FISC to find that the USP who is the target of the collection is reasonably believed to be outside the United States and is a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an officer or employee of a foreign power and targeting is for a valid foreign intelligence purpose. The FISC issues orders for 90 days when it finds that the facts support targeting.

(U/FQ.00) FAA §705(b) streamlines the approval process for collection against USPs who are outside the United States and are currently subject to a FISC order authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search under FISA §105 or §304, respectively. In such cases, the FISC has already made a probable cause determination with respect to the target. Accordingly, FAA §705(b) permits the AG to authorize collection against the USP for the effective period of the Order, while the person is reasonably believed to be outside the United States.

(U) Table 1 summarizes the requirements for targeting USPs under FAA §§704 and 705(b).
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Our study focused on NSA system controls and manual processes designed to ensure that data is collected (tasked and detasked) and queried in compliance with the FAA §§704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures. We reviewed records of taskings and detaskings and queries associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets to determine compliance for January through March 2015. We also reviewed whether selectors had been tasked in the (DNR) with the correct and entered in as the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) requires.¹ Last, we determined whether the Agency has implemented controls to

¹ (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The term "selector" includes but is not limited to dialed number recognition (DNR) data (e.g., telephone numbers) and digital network intelligence (DNI) data (e.g., e-mail addresses). is NSA's corporate system for managing selector taskings and detaskings.
Table 2 shows the four areas reviewed and the corresponding study results within the report.

### (U) Table 2. Study Scope and Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas Reviewed</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tasking and detasking compliance</td>
<td>See Appendix B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectors entered in</td>
<td>See Appendix B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query compliance</td>
<td>Finding One: Agency Controls for Monitoring Query Compliance Have Not Been Completely Developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls implemented in response to</td>
<td>See Appendix B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finding Three</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U//FOUO)
II. (U) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(U//FOUO) FINDING ONE: Agency Controls for Monitoring Query Compliance Have Not Been Completely Developed

(U//FOUO) The Agency has no process to reliably identify queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets. As a result, the Agency cannot monitor completely query compliance for these authorities.

(U) Criteria

(U) FAA §§704 and 705(b)

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) National Security Agency's Standard Minimization Procedures for Acquisitions Targeting United States Persons Reasonably Believed to be Located Outside the United States Pursuant to Section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 29 July 2008

(U//FOUO) Mukasey Letter, 18 August 2008

(U) FAA §702

(U) Minimization Procedures Used by NSA in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended in 2008, 24 July 2014

(U) E.O. 12333

(U) Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, as amended (2008)

(U//FOUO) SID Oversight and Compliance (SV) Controls for Monitoring Query Compliance Are Not Complete

(U//FOUO) The SV internal oversight program for the FAA §§704 and 705(b) authorities is still being developed. The following two activities, although important, do not allow SV to monitor completely query compliance with the FAA §§704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures.
SV's support to external reviews is limited

In October 2014, SV began supporting the Department of Justice National Security Division's (DoJ NSD) semi-annual reviews of NSA's FAA §§704 and 705(b) operations. SV provides to DoJ NSD records of queries that NSA analysts performed during the previous six months. These records include only queries of FAA §§704 and 705(b) data in and in certain partitions of 2.

The methodology that DoJ NSD and NSA have agreed on does not include providing all records of queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets.

On the basis of compliance risk and NSA system limitations, DoJ and NSA agreed that NSD’s semi-annual reviews would focus on queries of content performed in and in certain partitions of.

SV's post-query auditing controls are not designed to verify query compliance with the FAA §§704 and 705(b) authorities

SV oversees the Agency's post-query auditing controls. SV performs "super audits" that randomly sample query records across all NSA missions and authorities. SID mission auditors review query records (marked for auditor review) for their assigned missions. SV requires that auditors have target knowledge and be familiar with the types of queries within their production chain to verify the foreignness of queries and to protect USP privacy.

2 (U//FOUO) are mission data repositories approved to retain communications content. Content, as defined in 18 U.S.C. §2510, is the substance, purport, or meaning of a communication.

3 (U//FOUO)
NSA System Limitations for Identifying FAA §§704 and 705(b) Queries

At the time of our review, the Agency could not reliably identify queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets because SIGINT databases did not uniformly send records in the correct format to (NSA's SIGINT auditing and logging system). As a result, the Technology Directorate (TD) could not search these records to identify queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets.

We worked with TD to identify records of queries using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets. The TD extraction tool and the system script allowed TD, in coordination with the OIG, to identify all query records from January through March 2015 related to our review. We then developed our own process that automated the analysis of the query records and flagged potential incidents for further review.

OIG Test Results: Query Compliance Problems Discovered

We analyzed all query records available for review from January through March 2015. Queries were performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets. We identified queries that were not compliant with the FAA §§704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures. We identified another queries that were performed outside the targeting authorization periods in E.O. 12333 data, which is prohibited by the E.O. 12333 minimization procedures. We also identified.

4 (U//FOUO) is a mission data repository.
queries performed using USP selectors in FAA §702 upstream data, which is prohibited by the FAA §702 minimization procedures. Table 3 summarizes our test results.

(U) Table 3. Summary of Non-Compliant Queries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Non-Compliance</th>
<th>Non-Compliant Queries</th>
<th>Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queries performed outside targeting authorization periods (dates of queries) in E.O. 12333 data</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queries were performed in FAA §702 upstream data</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (TS//SI//NF) Non-compliant queries that had more than one problem are included in the counts in multiple categories. There were a total of non-compliant queries.

† (TS//SI//NF) We reviewed query records for the targets that had by the branch or the TOPIs selected for review. See Finding Two for additional details.

(U//FOUO) SV confirmed that of the non-compliant queries that we identified were newly discovered instances of non-compliance. SV had already discovered two instances of non-compliance and filed incident reports before our review. For the newly discovered incidents, SV ensured that the appropriate TOPIs filed incident reports and counseled analysts to prevent future non-compliance.

NSA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) notified DoJ NSD of the FISA incidents.6

(U//FOUO) Factors that caused non-compliant queries

(U//FOUO) SV explained that NSA query compliance is maintained largely through a series of manual checks that analysts perform before querying data. Analysts are relied on to maintain target awareness, track targets’ U.S. travel, and perform compliant queries. For queries performed outside the targeting authorization periods and queries performed using , SV concluded that analysts had not performed the required checks before querying data. SV also explained that SIGINT systems automatically

5 (U//FOUO) Upstream Internet collection includes acquisition of two types of communications not present in provider-enabled collection: “about” communications and “multiple communications transactions” (MCTs).

6 About” communications are those that are not to or from the target selector but whose contents include the selector. An MCT is an Internet “transaction” that contains more than one discrete communication. If one of those communications is to, from, or about a tasked selector and if the active end of the transaction is foreign, the entire MCT transaction will be acquired through upstream Internet collection. This can include other discrete communications that do not contain the tasked selector. If the targeted selector is not the active user in the transaction, the MCT can include other discrete communications that do not contain the tasked selector.

(U//FOUO) The instances of non-compliance with the E.O. 12333 minimization procedures will be reported in NSA’s first quarter 2016 calendar year Intelligence Oversight Quarterly report. The reports are provided quarterly to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Oversight Office and the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board.
include all authorities to which analysts are entitled access on the basis of their credentials. For the queries into FAA §702 upstream data, SV concluded that analysts had not removed the FAA §702 upstream authority from their search criteria (that automatically defaulted on the basis of their credentials) or had not included the appropriate limiters to prevent FAA §702 upstream data from being queried.¹

(U) New controls to improve future query compliance

(U//FOUO) NSA is in the early stages of implementing a new system control, until has been implemented. Until has been implemented, the Agency's compliance monitoring activities and compliance awareness programs will remain important tools for detecting query compliance problems and preventing future recurrences.

(U//FOUO) SV has already agreed to perform compliance verification reviews periodically using the process we developed for this study. This will significantly strengthen the Agency's ability to monitor future compliance with the FAA §§704 and 705(b) and FAA §702 targeting and minimization procedures and implement corrective action as needed.

(U) RECOMMENDATION 1

(U//FOUO) Implement a process to periodically monitor for compliance all queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets. These reviews must determine whether queries had been performed as the FAA §§704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures require, and whether queries of FAA §702 data excluded upstream data, as the FAA §702 minimization procedures require.

(ACTION: Chief, Compliance Verification (SV3) with Analysis and Compliance (S2) Compliance Lead and Office of the Director of Compliance)

7 (U//FOUO)

8 (U//FOUO)
Management Response

AGREE SV will develop a standard operating procedure (SOP) to document SV's procedures and processes to periodically monitor for compliance all queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets. It is estimated the SOP will be developed by [redacted]. This SOP will include the procedures for determining whether queries were [redacted] and whether queries of FAA §702 data excluded upstream data. It is estimated that the periodic compliance verification reviews will be implemented by [redacted].

OIG Comment

The planned action meets the intent of the recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION 2

For the periodic reviews of queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets, work with TD to obtain records that also include [redacted] query records.

ACTION: Chief, SV3, with [redacted] Lead, T1412

Management Response

AGREE SV will develop an SOP to document SV's procedures and processes to periodically monitor for compliance all queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets. The SOP will also include the procedures and processes to assess [redacted] query records. Target completion date is [redacted].

OIG Comment

The planned action meets the intent of the recommendation.
(U) RECOMMENDATION 3

(U//FOUO) Develop a process to send periodic reminders to the SID workforce to specify that queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets must be performed... Analysts must also be reminded periodically that queries of FAA §702 data using USP selectors must exclude upstream data by removing the FAA §702 upstream authority from the search criteria to prevent that data from being queried.

(ACTION: Chief, SV, and S2 Compliance Lead)

(U) Management Response

(U//FOUO) AGREE SV will develop and post two compliance advisories – one for the FAA §§704 and 705(b) queries and one for FAA §702 queries. Based on trend analysis of any non-compliant queries discovered during the planned periodic compliance verification reviews (as agreed in Recommendation 1), SV will issue periodic reminders, as needed, to the SID workforce that references the two compliance advisories to improve awareness. Target completion date is...

(U) OIG Comment

(U) The planned action meets the intent of the recommendation.
(U//FOUO) FINDING TWO: The Agency Has Not Provided Guidance for Documenting

(S//SI//NF) **targets are not documented consistently and completely and in a manner accessible to all SID analysts who cover the targets. As a result, the Agency has an increased risk of non-compliance.**

(U//FOUO) Information Is Not Documented Consistently and Completely

(U//FOUO) FAA §§704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures prohibit targeting USPs while they are in the United States. Although the Agency is not required to document these records is important for securing compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures.

(S//SI//NF) We reviewed the processes that FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets. Although the Agency uses the processes to maintain compliance with all NSA authorities, we focused our review on how they are used for the FAA §§704 and 705(b) authorities. We determined that are not documented consistently and completely and in a manner accessible to all SID analysts who cover FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets.

(U//FOUO) Processes to document are not adequate

(S//SI//NF) Each TOP1 has developed its own method for FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets. Information is often saved in systems inaccessible by analysts in other TOPIs who might cover the same targets. However, this information is not consistently documented in

(TS//SI//NF) The Staff branch also documents FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets. However, branch personnel stated that the records they maintain cannot be relied on. They also asserted that the TOPIs are responsible for maintaining the official records. Failure to have documented consistently and completely in a system available to all SID analysts increases the risk that will be performed
(U/FOUO) are not consistently documented

(TS//SI//NF) TOPIs do not consistently document As a result, the Agency has an increased risk of non-compliance.

(U) RECOMMENDATION 4

(S//SI//NF) Develop a process to document consistently and completely all including FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets. This process must designate systems for centrally documenting this information, and these systems must be available to all SID analysts. Notify the SID workforce of the new process once complete.

(ACTION: Title VII Authority Lead with S2 Compliance Lead)
(U) Management Response

(U//FOUO) AGREE Management action plan will be implemented in three phases:

a. (S//NF) The Section 704/705(b) authority virtual team will develop and disseminate guidance requiring analysts to [redacted]. It is anticipated that the interim procedures will be completed by [redacted].

b. (S//NF) [Redacted]

c. (S//NF) [Redacted]

(U) OIG Comment

(U) The planned actions meet the intent of the recommendation.

(U) OBSERVATION

(U//FOUO) On NSA’s Supplemental Procedures Governing Communications Metadata Analysis (SPCMA) web page, the system link that documents the SPCMA enabled metadata repositories does not work. This link should be restored.
(U) Finding Three:

(U) Criteria

(U) FAA §§704 and 705(b)

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) National Security Agency's Standard Minimization Procedures for Acquisitions Targeting United States Persons Reasonably Believed to be Located Outside the United States Pursuant to Section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 29 July 2008
(U//FOUO) Target completion date is **[REDACTED]**.

**Management Response**

(S//NF) **AGREE**

(U) OIG Comment

(U) The planned action meets the intent of the recommendation.
### III. (U) ABBREVIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Attorney General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Digital network intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNR</td>
<td>Dialed number recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoJ NSD</td>
<td>Department of Justice, National Security Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.O.</td>
<td>Executive Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISA</td>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISC</td>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCT</td>
<td>Multiple communication transaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency/Central Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of the Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGC</td>
<td>Office of General Counsel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SID</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPCMA</td>
<td>Supplemental Procedures Governing Communications Metadata Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Source system of record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV3</td>
<td>Compliance Verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV4</td>
<td>FISA Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>Analysis and Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TD</td>
<td>Technology Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOPI</td>
<td>Target office of primary interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV1</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence Directorate Oversight and Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV2</td>
<td>Compliance Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USP</td>
<td>U.S. person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T131</td>
<td>Compliance Capabilities (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1412</td>
<td>Compliance Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1412</td>
<td>U.S. person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The document is marked as TOP SECRET///SI//NOFORN.
(U) APPENDIX A: ABOUT THE SPECIAL STUDY

(U) Objectives

(U/FOUO) The overall objective of the study is to determine whether National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA) controls are adequate to ensure compliance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) §§704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures.

(U) The focused objectives were as follows:

1. (U/FOUO) Determine whether selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets are tasked for collection only within Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court- or Attorney General-approved targeting authorization periods and while targets are reasonably believed to be outside the United States.

2. (U/FOUO) Determine whether selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets are tasked in the and entered in

3. (U/FOUO) Determine whether queries performed using selectors associated with FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets comply with the targeting and minimization procedures.

4. (U/FOUO) Determine whether the Agency has implemented controls that ensure

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U/FOUO) This special study was conducted from March through August 2015. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) review focused on NSA system controls and manual processes for tasking and detasking selectors and querying data and on controls implemented in response to an FAA §704 purge incident.

(U/FOUO) We gained an understanding of FAA §§704 and 705(b) controls and corporate controls by interviewing personnel from the Signals Intelligence Directorate’s (SID) Oversight and Compliance (SV), SIGINT Policy and Corporate Issues Staff, the Technology Directorate’s (TD) Office of Compliance, the Research Directorate’s (RD) Office of Compliance, and the Office of
the Director of Compliance. We interviewed personnel from the Office of General Counsel to discuss the FAA §§704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures. We performed procedural reviews of product lines.

(U//FOUO) We conducted this special study using the standards of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, January 2012. Those standards require that we plan and perform the review to obtain sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions according to our review objectives. We believe we have met that standard: we reviewed policies, procedures, and internal controls and interviewed personnel to determine whether taskings and detaskings and queries are being performed compliantly, and interviewed personnel to determine whether additional controls have been implemented to prevent.

(U) Standards for Internal Control

(U) Internal controls

(U//FOUO) NSA/CSS Policy 7-3, Managers' Internal Control Program, 14 February 2012, implements the Government Accountability Office's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, November 1999 (revised September 2014), and assigns managers responsibility to establish internal controls. We focused on internal controls for documentation, record, structure, authorization, and management when assessing processes and procedures for tasking and detasking and query compliance. Table A-1 depicts the categories of internal controls outlined in NSA/CSS Policy 7-3.

(U) Table A-1. Categories of Internal Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Documentation</td>
<td>Established written procedures that are complete, accurate, and available for examination. Consists of regulations, policies, procedures, and/or standard operating procedures (SOPs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record</td>
<td>A written description of what has happened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Key duties and responsibilities in authorizing, processing, recording, and reviewing official NSA transactions should be separated among individuals. Managers should exercise appropriate oversight to ensure that individuals do not exceed or abuse their assigned authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorization</td>
<td>Procedures are in place to prevent people from exceeding their authority or misusing government resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Consists of the assignment, review, and approval of work. This control requires that management provide guidance and training to reduce loss of resources and increase achievement of results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Any method or device that can be used to restrict access to government resources. This control may utilize safes, vaults, locked rooms, locked desk drawers, computer log-on identification, and passwords.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(U) FAA §§704 and 705(b) Targeting and Minimization Procedures

(SI/NE) Mukasey Letter to the Director, NSA/CSS, 18 August 2008, required NSA to proceed under §704 and §705(b) of FAA to conduct foreign intelligence that previously had been authorized by the AG solely pursuant to §2.5 of E.O. 12333.

(SI/REL TO USA, FVEY) National Security Agency’s Standard Minimization Procedures for Acquisitions Targeting United States Persons Reasonably Believed to be Located Outside the United States Pursuant to Section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 28 July 2008, establishes NSA’s standard minimization procedures for acquisitions targeting U.S. persons (USPs) reasonably believed to be outside the United States pursuant to §704 of FISA. These procedures also apply to FAA §705(b).

(U) National policies and procedures

(U) Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, as amended (2008), authorizes NSA/CSS to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate SIGINT information and data for foreign intelligence purposes to support national and departmental missions.

(U) Department of Defense (DoD) Regulation 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, December 1982, establishes procedures governing the activities of DoD intelligence components that affect USPs.

(U) NSA policy

(U) NSA/CSS Policy 7-3, Managers’ Internal Control Program, 14 February 2012, establishes policy and prescribes procedures and responsibilities for the NSA/CSS Internal Control Program.

(U) NSA/CSS Policy 1-23, Procedures Governing NSA/CSS Activities That Affect U.S. Persons, 30 July 2013, establishes procedures to protect the privacy rights of USPs.

(U) SID policy

(U//EQLQ) USSID SP0018, Legal Compliance and U.S. Persons Minimization Procedures, 25 January 2011, prescribes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities to ensure that the missions and functions of the United States SIGINT System (USSS) are conducted in a manner that safeguards the constitutional rights of USPs.

(U//EQLQ) USSID SP0019, NSA/CSS Signals Intelligence Directorate – Oversight and Compliance Policy, 13 November 2012, outlines the oversight and compliance policy and procedures governing SIGINT activities by elements of the USSS operating under the Director, NSA.
(U) APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

(U) Tasking and Detasking Compliance

(U) System controls

(U//FOUO) Systems controls were evaluated in TD’s development environment for the following scenarios:

(U) Taskings

- (U//FOUO) 
- (U//FOUO) 
- (U//FOUO) 

(U) Detaskings

- (U//FOUO) 
- (U//FOUO) 

(U) Detasking requests

(U//FOUO) We reviewed analyst requests in to detask selectors associated with the FAA §§704 and 705(b) targets who had documented U.S. travel from through . We found that analysts had submitted the detasking requests before targets arrived in the United States to comply with the FAA §§704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures.

10 (U//FOUO) 

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
20
Examples of DNR and DNI selectors include telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, respectively.
(U//FOUO) Controls Implemented in Response to an

(TS/Sl/NF) The Agency plans to perform reconciliations one
month at a time starting with _____ and will perform monthly reconciliations as
new data is received.
(U) APPENDIX C: FULL TEXT OF MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

(U) SID RESPONSE

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
Memorandum

18 December 2015

FROM: Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID)

TO: Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

SUBJ: SID Response to the Draft Report on the Special Study of NSA Controls to Comply with the FISA Amendments Act 704 and 705(b) Targeting and Minimization Procedures (ST-15-0002)

(U) This memorandum provides the NSA/CSS OIG a response to the subject draft report.

(U) Five recommendations were identified by the OIG for SID remediation: 1 (SV), 2 (SV), 3 (SV), 4 (SO2), and 5 (SO2).

(U) SID concurs with the OIG's findings and recommendations. Corrective action plans and target completion dates for each of the five recommendations are included in the enclosed matrix.

(U) Please contact [redacted] 8022, 966-5707 (s) if you have any questions.

Enclosures

Deputy Chief of Staff for SIGINT Policy & Corporate Issues (SO2)
NSA/CSS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U//FOUO) Management Response to Draft Report on the Special Study of NSA Controls to Comply with the FISA Amendments Act 704 and 705(b) Targeting and Minimization Procedures
(ST-15-0002)

(U//FOUO) SID is required to provide management corrective actions for the subject draft report. In accordance with IG-11357-12, "Coordinating Office of Inspector General Reports," the OIG will evaluate the management response and determine whether changes to a finding, conclusion, or recommendation can be supported.

(U) SID agrees with the OIG's findings and recommendations and the following strategy has been developed for immediate remediation, and offers comments for OIG consideration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec#</th>
<th>Action Element</th>
<th>Planned Corrective Measure</th>
<th>Target Completion Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SV3</td>
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<td>(U) Comment: Request that S2 Compliance be added to Recommendation 1 as contributor.</td>
<td>(U) N/A</td>
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<td>(U//FOUO) POC: [Redacted], 969-5369, S2 Compliance Lead</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SV3</td>
<td>(U//FOUO) Recommendation 1: Implement a process to periodically monitor for compliance all queries performed using selectors associated with FAA 704 and 705(b) targets. These reviews must determine whether queries were performed as the FAA 704 and 705(b) targeting and minimization procedures require, and whether queries of FAA 702 data excluded upstream data, as the FAA 702 minimization procedures require.</td>
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<td>(U//FOUO) Corrective Action Plan: SV will develop an SOP to document SV's procedures/processes to periodically monitor for compliance all queries performed using selectors associated with FAA 704 and FAA 705(b) targets. It is estimated the SOP will be developed by [Redacted]. This SOP will include procedures for determining whether queries were performed and whether</td>
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| SV | (U/FOUO) Recommendation 2: For periodic reviews of queries performed using selectors associated with FAA 704 and 705(b) targets, work with TD to obtain records that also include [redacted] query records.  

(U) Corrective Plan: SV will develop an SOP to document SV's procedures/processes to periodically monitor for compliance all queries performed using selectors associated with FAA 704 and FAA 705(b) targets. The SOP will also include the procedures/processes to assess [redacted] query records.  

(U/FOUO) POC: [redacted] 966-4887, SV3 |
| SV4 | (U/FOUO) Recommendation 3: Develop a process to send periodic reminders to the SID workforce to specify that queries performed using selectors associated with FAA 704 and 705(b) targets must be performed.  

Analysts must also be reminded periodically that queries of FAA 702 data using USP selectors must exclude upstream data by removing the FAA 702 upstream authority from the search criteria to prevent that data from being queried.  

(U/FOUO) Corrective Action Plan: SV will develop/post two compliance advisories – one for the FAA 704/705b queries, and one for FAA 702 queries. Based on trend analysis of any non-compliant queries discovered during the planned periodic compliance verification reviews (as agreed to in Recommendation 1), SV will issue periodic reminders, as needed, to the SID workforce that references back to the two compliance advisories to improve awareness.  

(U/FOUO) POC: [redacted] 969-0021, SV4 |
| S02 | (U) Comment: Request that S2 Compliance be added to Recommendation 4 as contributor.  

(U/FOUO) POC: [redacted] 969-5356, S2 |
<table>
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<td>13</td>
<td>S02</td>
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(U) Rationale: Renumbering necessary to accommodate request to split Recommendation 4 into two separate recommendations.

Corrective Action Plan:

[Redacted]

(U/FOHO) POC: [Redacted] 969-6158, S02, Title VII Authority Lead
(U) This page intentionally left blank.