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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

FOIA Case: 60495C
24 September 2020

MR JOHN L YOUNG
251 WEST 89TH STREET, #6E
NEW YORK NY 10024-1739

Dear John Young:

This further responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 3 January 2010 for the following documents (cited in the footnotes of NDS DOCID 3417193 provided to you in FOIA Case 60251):

1. Unknown author, Fifty Years of Mathematical Cryptanalysis (Fort Meade), Md. NSA, 1988.
2. DDIR files, 96026, Box 4, Drake Notebook, Proto Paper.
3. Ibid, Unknown Author, draft history of COMPUSEC, in CCH files.
4. Interview, Norman Boardman, by Robert D. Farley, 1986, OH 3-86, NSA.

A copy of your request is enclosed. We have already provided you with Item 1 ("Fifty Years of Mathematical Cryptanalysis") and Item 2 ("DDIR files, 96026, Box 4, Drake Notebook, Proto Paper"). The final two documents, Items 3 and 4, are enclosed. Certain information, however, has been deleted from the enclosure.

Some of the withheld information has been found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526. The information meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Subparagraph C of Section 1.4 and remains classified TOP SECRET as provided in Section 1.2 of Executive Order 13526. The information is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Because the information is currently and properly classified, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the first exemption of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(1)). The information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(b)(3) of E.O. 13526.

In addition, this Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities. We have determined that such information exists in this document. Accordingly, those portions are exempt

From: webteam@nsa.gov
Sent: Sunday, January 03, 2010 9:47 AM
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Records Requested:

Documents cited in notes of NDS DOCID: 3417193 recently provided to me by NSA:

1. Unknown Author, Fifty Years of Mathematical Cryptanalysis (Fort Meade), Md. NSA, 1988.
2. DDIR files, 96026, Box 4, Drake Notebook, Proto Paper.
3. Ibid, Unknown Author, draft history of COMPUSEC, in CCH files.
4. Interview, Norman Boardman, by Robert D. Farley, 1986, OH 3-86, NSA.

Thank you very much,

John Young

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

OHNR: OH-1986-03 **DOI:** 17 & 29 January 1986
TRSID: [Redacted] **DTR:** 21 May 2007
QCSID: [Redacted] **Text Review:**
INAME: BOARDMAN, Norman **Text w/Tape:** 28 June 2007
IPLACE: NSA, SAB2, T542 Interview Room
VIEWER: FARLEY, Robert (Bob)

[Tape 1, Side 1]

Farley: Today is 17 January 1986. Our interviewee: Mr. Norman Boardman. Mr. Boardman, following his release from the U.S. Army as a Signal Corps officer in World War II, joined the Army Security Agency as a Traffic Analyst. In later years he served in various overseas assignments, was the first NSAREP State, and held positions in the Collection and Policy elements of the agency. His final position before retirement was as Public Information Officer where he was deeply involved in the satisfying or responding to Freedom of Information requests. He retired to accept the position of Project Officer for the establishment of the NSA Archives. As a re-applied...re-employed annuitant he established the Archives and oversaw its implementation and operations until his departure in 1982. This interview is taking place in the T542 Interview Room, SAB 2 at NSA. Interviewer is Bob Farley. Classification of these tapes will be ~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//20020100~~. This is Oral History interview number 03-86. ((Tape stops and restarts)) Okay, well, let me just, ah, check the sound to make sure everything is alright, Norm. ((Acknowledgment)) Ah, thanks much for your time.

Boardman: That's okay.

Farley: Coming by, and we want to put this on the record. (TR NOTE: Because the mike is very sensitive, Mr. Boardman's breathing, mouth sounds, and every movement are audible. These will not be annotated individually but other noises will be reported.)

Boardman: Right.

Farley: Again, let's talk at any level you want. If you want to talk at a classified level or you want to talk about a sensitive, uh, project please feel free. We can protect it...

Boardman: Okay.

Farley: And, the usual form, the accessibility form that you'll, uh, sign saying everybody can listen to this or nobody can, and, uh, that way we'll control it...

Boardman: Yeah.

~~Derived From: NSA/CSSM T-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20320108~~

Farley: So it will be (1-2G).

Boardman: Okay.

Farley: To start it off, Norm, what I like to do is sort of get a general background of the person who is on tape. Pick it up in the late teenage days... Temple, and then your military...

Boardman: Okay.

Farley: Very briefly, and then we'll do a... a quick and dirty of your other... other jobs in the Agency before you came... became PR.

Boardman: Okay. So, I'll pick it up, uh, as you heard at the gatehouse there, ((Laughter)) I graduated from high school, Northeast High School, Philadelphia, in 1932, and I did, uh, work for five to six years because of the depression and, uh, was able... During that time I s... ((Verbal pause)) worked out assiduously in gymnastics at the Philadelphia (B% Turners) and I maintained a... a, uh, capability in gymnastics that was good enough to get me a scholarship to Temple University in 1938. And at that time I had a fairly good job in Philadelphia but I thought I had a chance to make the Olympic Team in 1940, ((Acknowledgment)) and I thought working with the gym team at Temple would be a good way to... to do that in addition to getting a college education. So, unfortunately the war intervened, and they cancelled the Olympics, which were to be held in Finland that year. And, uh, I then, uh, unfortunately also had a few injuries. I wasn't able to, uh, reach my goal in gymnastics, but I still was on the team, and I was a captain, and I did win the—for two years—the Intercollegiate Horizontal Bar Championship.

Farley: Oh, very good.

Boardman: Which is still in the records and which still, ah... ah, gives me an entrée into many things that I'm presently involved in, namely gymnastic judging.

Farley: Oh, sure.

Boardman: And, uh, I... I'll come back a little bit to gymnastic judging later on, but, uh, the, ah... At that time I became very eligible for the draft, ((Acknowledgment and chuckles)) and I tried to get a commission as a Navy Supply Officer because my major in college was accounting, but the Navy wouldn't accept me because of my poor eyesight, saying that, ah, in the Navy everyone has a battle station, and, uh, as a Supply Officer, I would be expected to have a battle station aboard ship, and if something happened to my glasses, I wouldn't be of much use to them.

Farley: Right. ((Chuckles))

Boardman: Well, I argued that a little bit but, uh, not enough, huh. The, uh, the next day, as a matter of fact, I met a friend in Philadelphia who told me about the, uh... a program that the Army had was to, uh, to become a member of the Signal Corps ((acknowledgment)) and to go to school for three to six months learning radio ((Thump)) and then you would be a technician fifth

grade when you graduated from the school and you would be inducted into the Army active duty. So I enlisted in the Army in 1942, in July, and, uh, immediately went to night school at that time, ah, learning about Signal Corps work, particularly radio and communications.

Farley: At Monmouth?

Boardman: No, it was in a...a school in Philadelphia.

Farley: I see.

Boardman: They established, I think, schools in, uh, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, ah, large urban areas where there were a lot of people who, uh, could, ((Verbal pause)) uh, be...be accommodated by these schools. I'm sure they had so many that, uh...uh, the, uh...They couldn't it at...at Fort Monmouth, for example. And besides, you were not officially on active duty.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: You were on your own...

Farley: Oh, yeah.

Boardman: But you went to school at night. But you were in...You were still in the Army Reserve, I guess, at that time, they called it, subject to...

Farley: Were you getting Army pay?

Boardman: No...no, we didn't get paid until we went on active duty. ((Acknowledgment)) But we didn't have to pay, obviously, for the training. And, uh, that was provided by the Army, and, uh...uh, it was a very...I thought a very good program, and I think a lot of people who...who found their way into this business, uh, started in that program. But then, uh, ((Smack)) in December I re...uh, Because, uh, of several things, I, uh, I think I was at that time, I...I graduated from Course One, I was in Course Two, and, uh, rather than wait 'til the Dec..., uh, January or February, I requested active duty in December. And in, uh, mid December, of, uh, 1942 I was put on active duty at Fort Meade.

Farley: My gosh!

Boardman: Right from Philadelphia, I...I ro...came down here on the train, and, uh, ((Laughter)) ((Smack)) was, ah, in the cold of winter, inducted into the Army as a technician, fifth grade.

Farley: That's good.

Boardman: So I was, uh, I had the s...rank of a corporal but not...not a line corporal. I was a technician corporal. ((Acknowledgment)) But then we went through, ah, in...We had two weeks of basic training here at Fort Meade and I went through all the tests that they give, and, uh, as...as you can see, I was already destined to become a member of the Signal Corps. But, uh, because of, I guess, my success in some of the tests, they assigned me to the, uh, Fort Monmouth, ah, School of Cryptology. I...I

don't remember the exact name. But then, we were reassigned at that time to, uh, to uh, ah, Vint Hill Farms, ((Acknowledgment)) after spending another four weeks in...in, uh, specialized training. That's...That was at Camp Edison, which is adjacent to Fort Monmouth.

Farley: Yes, right.

Boardman: So, ah, roughly then, I came to, uh...I did the Camp Edison, uh, specialized training. Then I went to, uh, Vint Hill Farms where I, uh, was trained in, uh, traffic analysis. But I thought, looking back on that, uh, experience, at, uh, Vint Hill, I, I think at...at that time, became very aware of the security implications of the cryptologic business and for a couple of reasons that I didn't realize was happening is I was in the school, but, uh, everything was security. It was, uh...We weren't even allowed to say the word "traffic analysis," uh...

Farley: Right.

Boardman: Outside the classroom. We were not allowed to tell anybody what we were studying. Now, they had a School of Traffic Analysis and they had a School of Cryptanalysis. And then they had, at Vint Hill, a...an intercept station where the...they had the operators. So you...You had the nucleus of the intercept operators, the traffic an...analysts, and the cryptanalysts ((Acknowledgment)) all at, uh, Vint Hill Farms and neither would talk to the...each other, because, I think they may or may not have tried to do this, ((Chuckling)) but in a very clever way, ah, each group that was in there felt that they were doing the most important work—the most sensitive work. For example, in the traffic analysis, ah...ah, was, I guess, developed to a degree by the British, ah, but we...We kind of expanded on it there at Vint Hill and, uh, the, ah...The instructors there, ah, were very, very, uh good.

Farley: Remember names?

Boardman: Yeah, Captain [redacted] was one...

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Farley: Oh, yeah.

Boardman: And Captain (B% [redacted] Ah, I...I don't know whether that [redacted] is now the famous scientist that we...

Farley: I wonder.

Boardman: Read about. Uh, he could be because he has the same...same spelling of the name and the same, uh, kind of general background as well as the appearance. I...I...I'm pretty sure that the [redacted] who was, uh, ((Verbal pause)) an author and a lecturer is the same one.

Farley: Have to check him out in "Who's Who."

Boardman: Right. ((Chuckles))

Farley: See who he is. Okay.

Boardman: Ah, we also had the Bundys down there, Bill Bundy, who, uh, everyone,

I'm sure, remembers. But Captain [] was the, uh, was the, uh, chief instructor for the, ah, traffic analysis group. And he had this expression, "Pure gold." ((Laughter)) We used to call him "Pure Gold []" And, uh, he would indicate that as...as a result of some of the, uh, exercises we went through developing the call sign, the frequencies, the schedules, and the various externals of the message, how much intelligence you could get from a message external as opposed to reading the text.

((Acknowledgment)) Now the crypt...cryptanalysts, of course, always thought that reading a text was the prime thing of...of, uh...of cryptanal...of...of the whole business of cryptol...cryptography. And we would probably not disagree with that. But we felt that we had our place in the sun, that nobody knew we were doing this weird and wonderful analysis ((Acknowledgment)) and, uh, it was based mainly on the, uh, on the study of ext...externals of the message: the call signs, as I say, the frequencies; the schedules; the, uh, addresses; and everything up to the...to the actual text of the message. We...It was our analytic work that, uh, derived a lot of intelligence from...from that type of thing. And, of course, it still is.

Farley: Right. Were you working on live traffic, do you think?

Boardman: No, we were not. Although, ((Verbal pause)) see, no one...We weren't...I don't think that...I think we could have gone into the intercept station, but that was almost, ah, "verboden" territory for us. ((Unintelligible acknowledgment)) Because...And the intercept operators, were, you know, they just had their thing and they were very proud, as they should have been, and the cryptanalysts were...were doing their thing, and the traf...traffic analysts...I guess the only time we ever got together was at...at the chow hall where...where we all used to do KP ((Acknowledgments)) and all the rest of that. But, uh, I've...I've often thought back about that, and I...In my own way I was impressed with the security regulations that were in effect and I respected them. And I still respect them. I, uh, if I...As this comes out later on in...in my involvement with the whole business of release of information, ((Acknowledgment)) ah, I...I've always...always felt that the, uh...the fact of our success in these analytic tec...techniques should be protected. Now, the, uh...The whole business of, uh, of protection of classified information...I think the CIA uses the expression, "Well, we never reveal sources and methods." Well, our feeling was ((Stutters)) agreed with that. We agree with sources and methods, uh, idea. But ((Stutters)) the basic thing that we kind of took out of that security indoctrination was that, yes, the...the...the enemy knows that we do conduct this operation. They know...They know we're intercepting their messages. We know that they're trying to decrypt them and so forth. And they may even know we have some traffic analysis. We didn't think they knew it at that time, but, uh, as far as traffic analysis was concerned. But the big thing is, we would never, never reveal the success that we had in...in this effort. And that, to me, still is a basic fundamental, ((Acknowledgment)) ah, foundation, you might say, of our security

regulations that we never reveal the success. Now, that has been...We have ((chuckles)) fallen down, if...If I can use that expression. ((Acknowledgment)) Sometimes we do it intentionally but, for the most part, we have been some...sometimes, in a way, forced to reveal our success in the cryptographic operation, which I think is unfortunate. But again, I recognize and appreciate the...the reasons and perhaps the situation that would...would force us to...to do this type of thing, that is reveal success. Uh, there are many examples of this right now, but, uh, I...I just read the newspapers and I can tell, ((Laughs)) in some instances what has happened, but I can recall many instances where I was involved in...in some of it. Uh, but, uh, the, uh...The Vint Hill ex...experience had a very profound effect on my thinking in this cryptologic business. And, uh, from...ah, when I g...When I g...graduated from the...from the, ah, course at Vint Hill, I was sent as a traffic analyst to Two Rock Ranch...

Farley: Oh yes.

Boardman: Where I actually engaged in analytic work...traffic-analytic work, uh, ((Stutters)) at that station. It was an intercept station. We were intercepting Japanese traffic, military, shipping, ((Acknowledgment)) and so forth. And, uh, we...We did our call sign studies, and our frequency studies, and our schedule studies, and we worked hand-and-glove with the intercept operators and with the, ah, officers in the station. In the meantime, I had, uh, at Vint Hill...I had, uh, applied for OCS, and, uh, at that time the...the door opened and closed very spasmodically. You could never...There was never any quota that, uh, you could sort of get onto, uh, but I think what opened the door when I applied was that they...the...the big talk of the invasion of Normandy and the fact that, uh, they expected to have a lot of casualties and that they would need a new influx of officers in this instance. And the Signal Corps, ((Acknowledgment)) ah, got its quota of whatever that magic number was. So they opened up the doors of OCS at Fort Monmouth, and in March of 1944 I went to Fort Monmouth and after, uh, three months...four months, perhaps, of OCS—90-day wonder ((Acknowledgment)) type of thing—I became a second lieutenant and was assigned directly from there to Arlington Hall Station...

Farley: Oh yeah.

Boardman: Where, again, I was, ah, then assigned to the, uh...under Ralph J. McCartney, and a s...sta...a senior master sergeant named Steve Wolfe...

Farley: Oh, yes, Steve.

Boardman: You remember Steve?

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: He, ah, he...((Verbal pause)) McCartney and Wolfe, I think it's fair to say, were in charge of the Jap Army Traffic Analysis Group, and that's where I spent the balance of the war in the, ah, in that area. I, uh...My job at, ah, the time was, ah...ah, I...I became known to, ah, First Lieutenant John P.

McGovern, who was in charge of the, ah...ah, specific traffic analysis organization in, uh, in that bigger unit that Ralph McCartney headed up, and he, ah, he asked me if I wanted to come and work in that group and I said, "Oh, yes." And he put me in charge of intercept control, ((Acknowledgment)) ah, in that unit. And I was in charge of the assignments that were made to the various intercept stations throughout the Far East on, ah, on Jap Army targets; well, not only Jap Army, but, uh, Jap Navy and so forth. Of course, as a member of the Army Security Agency, we concentrated on the Army targets. The Navy had a...a similar effort going over at Nebraska Avenue and out in Hawaii. But, ah, we, ah...We were the master control, if you will, of the, ah, intercept assignments and we s...that were...We called that the intercept control section of, uh, of the Jap Army problem. And, uh, that...that made...gave me a lot of contact with all the other types of effort that was going into working on Jap Army TA, such as the, uh, I guess at that time it was divided geographically into the, uh, Chinese area where the Japs were, and then the...that down in, uh, in the Southeast, ah, Asia and, uh...Ah, see at that time, uh, the Japs were still in control, and MacArthur hadn't yet made his ((Acknowledgment)) famous island-hopping campaign, which resulted in...in the Philippines, ah, occup...ah, Philippine, ((Stutter)) recapture, if you will. Ah, on that basis, I can well remember, I was a duty officer at, uh, in the, uh, Arlington Hall, ah, group there, ah, when, ah, MacArthur and, uh, recaptured the Philippines. And the Japanese radio had a, uh, a signal that...that went I think, from one to ten, which indicate [sic] ((Verbal pause)) what they should do. Each number had a specific, ((Stutter)) thing that would, uh, ((Verbal pause)) invoke or, that would, ah, cause the Japanese group there to take certain type of actions. And, ah, ten was...was, of course, the...the ultimate—((Laughs)) "Surrender." ((Acknowledgment)) But nine was "Dismantle and move out." ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, that meant, of course, that, oh, MacArthur had, more or less, uh, become in charge of the thing. And I well remember that...that...that was at two o'clock in the morning, we...that message came through from Station Nine, we had that in the inter...—I guess it's still there at Clark Field, ((Coughs)) and, ah, well, no, no, I'm sorry. It wasn't Station Nine; it was some...I don't remember the station.

Farley: Some Japanese station.

Boardman: Well, it was a U.S. intercept station...

Farley: Oh, it was probably Leyte.

Boardman: That intercepted the Japanese communications...

Farley: I see.

Boardman: From Manila into Tokyo.

Farley: Could it have been Leyte, down in that part?

Boardman: We had an inter...

Farley: By Clark Field?

Boardman: We had...Well, I...I'm not sure whether we had any stations at that time in the Philippines.

Farley: We had RI units, uh, down in Leyte.

Boardman: We had the RI units, yeah.

Farley: Yeah.

Boardman: Yeah. So, anyway, we...We had this message and, uh, I was the duty officer, and I was the only one, really, other than the operators, who...who saw this message, and I looked at it and I said, "Well, now, what'll I do about this?" ((Both laugh.)) So, I called...I called, uh, ((pauses)) General Corderman. I...I called, I think it was Mr. Rowlett or somebody else and then I called General Corderman, who was asleep in the, uh; billet...ah, not the...in his house on the...on the base there, and, uh, they all came in and looked at it. Ah, but there, I guess, really...really wasn't much we could do. I don't whether they advised the President, or whether it got up maybe into, uh, the higher military echelon that we were, uh, that far into the, ah...ah, removal of the Japanese from the Philippines, but that...That was one of my little experiences that I remember.

Farley: That was a significant memory.

Boardman: ((Both laugh)) Being duty officer on that particular night that, uh, that that message came through. But, you see, uh, as duty officer, ah, I think I was fortunate in that I rec...I had either...Someone had given me these...these numerical things which would indicate the, uh, status of the Japanese defense. And...And they...They were on the desk, or they were available to me when...when this message came through from the intercept station. And I was able then to...to make the decision to, ah, alert the, uh, at least the...the, ah, general officer of the, uh, of our organization at...at, uh, Arlington Hall. But it...It was kind of a thrill. I, uh, ((Verbal pause)) Nothing ever happened as a result of that. No one, ((Verbal pause)) I...I don't know whether General Corderman or Mr. Rowlett—or Colonel Rowlett at that time—((Acknowledgment)) ah, said, "Well, that was a great thing," because so much was happening. And we were definitely on the move, as you can well remember, so that, uh...uh, it was just another little incident in...in retrospect. But it...It left a...left a m...uh...uh, a good memory for me.

Farley: Absolutely.

Boardman: Yeah. So, ah, the, ah...At that point then, ah, I guess we...we were getting into Okinawa and the nuclear weapons and so forth, and we were still doing our thing at Arlington Hall—studying the Japanese communications. And, uh, I think that, uh, my, uh, feeling is that some of the, uh, decisions that, uh, President Truman made having to do with the defense of Japan, indicating the Japanese were building up their forces and ready to die for the homeland, uh, and fight to the last man, I think this

came through in the traffic that we were either reading or that we were, ah...ah, making analysis on. And I think that, uh, our military leaders had access to that type of input that emanated from the higher command of the Japanese Army as well as, uh, from Tojo's, uh, office, namely that, ah, the Japanese were undertaking, I think it was called "Operation Homeland" which...The bottom line was, we will defend Japan to the last man. We will fight on the beaches and we will ((Acknowledgment)) not allow the Americans to occupy this country. Well, I think that...and this...This is public knowledge, of course, that Truman decided to drop the atomic bombs in order to save American lives, uh, from the, uh, occupation, or the sur...ah, the, uh...the, uh, invasion of Japan. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, people are still arguing about whether that was the right decision or not. But...

Farley: COMINT certainly influenced, uh, Truman.

Boardman: Oh, I...

Farley: He had to make the decision.

Boardman: Yes, yes. Yes, it did. And I think that it's ironic, in a sense, and I...I guess I've never even said this before, but it just occurs to me that, uh, Truman was...who wrote the...It was Truman who wrote the letter which established NSA as a separate organization combining the Army, Navy, and Air Force into one defense agency. The Truman memorandum—I think it was in 1951—is a very, very famous memorandum which has been requested, ah, by many, many people. I don't think we've ever released that, at least to my knowledge we haven't.

Farley: I haven't seen it.

Boardman: But the ((microphone noise)) Truman memorandum really established NSA. And, uh, lots of people say, "Well, it was never, uh, agreed to by Congress." Or there was...There was always some question on the part of the reporters, on the part of the...the political, ((Verbal pause)) analysts on TV that...

Farley: Analysts. Right.

Boardman: You read about and they say, "Well, we...We've tried very hard to find the congressional approval, for the, ah, establishment of NSA, and, uh, it always goes back to the Truman memorandum which said yes, we're going to establish a ((Stutters and click)) a defense agency for cryptanalysis which will be ((Stutters)) a civilian agency manned by military and civilian, but particularly a...a part of the Department of Defense. And, uh, in 1951, ah, those, uh...I'm sure there's been many, many, people talk...talking about this, but, uh, ((Mouth noise)) ah, from my point of view, I was in the Army until 1946, ((Acknowledgment)) then I re...retired from the Army, or I was released. I don't ((chuckles)) quite remember whether I could have stayed in, but they were advi...they were kind of indicating as many people who wanted to get out, should get out. So I...I had been working with people like Phil Patton and Buffham and all

those people who were in the same type of situation that I was, and, uh, I, uh...We all decided to become civilians in this effort, and, uh, it was very easy to convert to a civilian job at that time, in 1946, ((Acknowledgment)) because they wanted to retain as much of the knowledge of the, uh...that was built up, uh, during the war years into this new, ah, situation. However, it should be remembered that in '46, people like myself who were in the Army, ah, ((Stutter)) resigned from the Army to work for Army Security Agency, not NSA.

Farley: Yes, Right.

Boardman: We, uh...We worked for the ASA and remained at Arlington Hall for, uh, up through '48 when, night..., uh, when the United States Air Force Security Service was formed. And, uh, we...We continued our work, in general, at Arlington Hall until NSA was formed. And then ASA and the Navy, and the, uh, Air Force, to a degree, assigned all the people that wanted to go to NSA, ah, into...into the new NSA organization. Now, the, uh...the, uh...My dates here are very general. I'm sure that there, uh...there is, ah...there is documentation on these...on these dates.

Farley: Right.

Boardman: But, uh, at some magic point in time, ((Microphone noise)) we...We all became members of...of NSA. But some people elected to stay with Army Security Agency, and some stayed with the Navy, and...and the Air Force was just new, so, ah, ((Verbal pause)) there wasn't much movement of people in that regard. But, I would say the majority of the, uh, people who...who joined with the NSA were Army related...

Farley: Right.

Boardman: People. And there was a smaller number of Navy people, but a...a very capable group of the Navy people came into the NSA aegis. And at that point in time you can see what happened. There was the usual thing ((Acknowledgment)) of a certain amount of rivalry between...certainly between Frank Raven and Frank Rowlett. And, uh, Rowlett, being, I guess, a member of the biggest group that came into the uh...uh, organiz...that came into the NSA, ah, was...was, I guess, appointed by...even the...the first Director was an admiral, as I recall. But even so, ah, ((Verbal Pause)) Rowlett achieved a...a certain amount of...of preeminence in the jobs that were given out to the new NSA people. Unfortunately Rowlett, uh, apparently, ah, ran...ran into some problem with General Canine or, uh, some such thing, and he then went over to CIA. But, uh, he, uh, I think was the first member of the school. He was the first Commandant, I think...

Farley: Commandant, right.

Boardman: Of the school. But he was...I guess he either requested to be moved, or Canine decided that, uh, ((Verbal pause)) it was time to do...to do a little shaking up, and, uh, he, uh...And, uh, Mr. Rowlett then, uh, ((Verbal pause)) left the, uh, Agency, that is NSA, and went over to, uh, CIA. That

must have been 1954 or some...something like that. ((Acknowledgment)) But, uh, that, I guess, no longer exists right now. But that...There was a little sort of loyalty group ((Thumps)) s...set up with Navy background...

Farley: Cliques.

Boardman: Cliques, if you will ((both laugh)) and the Army background, ((acknowledgment)) but I think it was probably healthy. I don't...I don't think it ever got to be dangerous in the sense of, ah, inhibiting the effort in any way. But each one achieved his destiny, I would think, in, uh, in this thing. I think Frank Raven, uh, did very well and he, uh, he made his contribution.

Farley: Yeah, uh huh.

Boardman: And, uh...

Farley: Did you stay in the TA business or not?

Boardman: Well, I stayed in the, uh...After...Uh, in 1946, when I went into the Army Security Agency, I stayed in the intercept-control business, and then, went...I was still in that business, when, uh, ((Verbal pause)) NSA was formed. In the meantime, however, I was assigned to GCHQ ((Acknowledgment)) for a year in 1948. So I went to GCHQ at Eastcote, in, uh, 19, ah...June of 1948 and stayed there for a year. I relieved Herb Conley. Ah, we were TA liaison officers. ((Acknowledgment)) And we...Our job was to sort of liaise between ((Acknowledgment)) the TA effort at GCHQ and the TA effort at, uh, Arlington Hall. At that time we were still Army Security Agency people. So, uh, I'll never forget, when my...((Verbal pause)) They, uh, ((Verbal pause)) ...The arrangements, uh, whereby we went to, uh, GCHQ...We went on TDY for six months and then it was extended for six months. I was the last one to do that, incidentally. Don Borrmann, who replaced me, was assigned PCS, ah, for a year or two, as I recall. But, ah, there was a problem. Ah, we were on TDY, uh, on a per diem basis. We didn't...We didn't get any of the, ((Verbal pause)) free transportation, etcetera, for our families. So ah, we all... ((Stutter)) It was such a thrill and, uh, such an excitement to be assigned over there, that we didn't even think about that. But, uh, as I recall, the TDY rate at that time in London was six dollars a day, or maybe nine dollars, but no more than nine dollars.

Farley: Insignificant, really.

Boardman: Yeah. It was...It was really something. But, uh, anyway I did, uh, I spent a very good year, I think at, uh, GCHQ, and I still have a lot of friends over there. We co...communicate and correspond. I met, uh, General Tiltman over there, and we remained friends until he died, and—along with his wife—and, uh, then, after I came back from, uh, GCHQ, I went back into the intercept-control business, uh, which...And I stayed there really, basically, until I went to... ((Sweeping sound)) I was on, uh, ((Verbal)) pause)) went to Japan, ah, on a three-year tour, as the, uh, Deputy Chief to, uh, NCPAC. ((Acknowledgment)) But I basically stayed in intercept-

control work, which expanded much beyond the...the assignment of...of missions to the intercept stations. It, uh, it got into all sorts of things, which, uh, included, uh...uh, the fact that as we were...as we...our cryptanalytic ability became less and less because of the phist...sophistication of the...of the people who were, uh...uh, sending the messages—mainly now we're talking about Russia—ah, we...We became more and more dependant on the an...analysis and on the Intelligence that was derived from, uh...uh, what I would say were intercept-control elements like the call signs ((Acknowledgment)) and so forth. And, uh, ((Verbal pause)) we had a little bit of...of internal bickering as to who should do what to who. Ah, as these TA groups expanded and began to produce more intelligence, they wanted to control their own assignments to the various stations. And we were a little pocket of...of centrality, if you will, for all intercept stations, for all assignments, and...And we, I think, maintained our position pretty well in that regard. But ultimately I think—and even today, I'm sure—that the traffic-analysis groups for the various problems, in some way, uh, make their own intercept assignments and change them as...dep...depending on the results that they achieve, and which targets they think are more important, and so forth and so on. ((Acknowledgment)) But, ah, in the intercept-control business we, uh...We made a study, trying to...to be what would be the most efficient assignments from a scheduling point of view. And, uh, we...We would, uh, find out, for example, if a particular target worked only eight hours a day—and many of them did—we would assign that to a station, and then we would assign another station, I mean, we would assign the same station another target ((Acknowledgment)) that would work maybe during the midnight hours, ((Acknowledgments)) and we were able to get, we think, more efficient utilization of our intercept facilities overseas, with th...that type of technique. So we had to know the schedules, we had to know the frequencies, and the call signs, and so forth, and we would provide this to the intercept stations in, ah, in what we called the "Intercept Traffic Analysis Casebook."

Farley: Oh, yeah, right.

Boardman: ITA. Remember the "ITA Casebook?"

Farley: Yes, I do. Right!

Boardman: And, uh, ((Coughs)) that was part of the intercept control responsibility. And, uh, we had a good...a good time of it, I think. Uh, it was always an interesting and lively, uh, day ((Chuckle)) when you came in to work because you never knew, really, what was...what was going to happen and there was always a lot of things to do.

Farley: Who was the chief of, uh, NCPAC then?

Boardman: At that time it was Phil Patton.

Farley: Phil Patton, good.

Boardman: Prior to that it was Herb Conley.

Farley: Oh yeah.

Boardman: And then prior to that it was Colonel [redacted]

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Farley: Didn't know him.

Boardman: Ah, then they had a... They had a change in the, uh, offices of NCPAC. I think the... the head office moved to Hawaii. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, Hugh Erskine, ah, came out to relieve Phil Patton. I was with Phil for one year and two years with Hugh Erskine. I think Phil went back to Hawaii and became Chief NCPAC, and Erskine was Chief NCPAC, Japan. ((Coughs)) And then, uh, every... It was kind of a... a mixed up situation, ah, or administratively, I think. But it seemed to work out alright.

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Nobody... Nobody was worried about prerogatives too much. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, we did our thing and, uh, I think in... in Japan we had... We had, you know, the... the exciting part of the mission because we would... We would visit the intercept stations [redacted] [redacted] or, ah, I should mo... ah, [redacted] And, uh, I remember just in thinking about that that, ah, we ((Verbal pause)) ... We were involved in the selection of a intercept station in, uh, Thailand. And, uh, we all probably knew where it was going to be, but they needed someone from NCPAC to say, well, this is going to be it. And I went... ((Laughs)) I went down there, I said... and I said, "Yeah, this is... This is where we're going to have it." And, sure enough, that's where they put it.

Farley: After site surveys and all of that, I hope.

Boardman: ((Mouth noise)) Oh, yes. It was all... It was all sort of laid on, but I was kind of the official...

Farley: Oh, you made the decision.

Boardman: Messenger. And I made the decision based on what all... all the other people had...

Farley: [redacted]

Boardman: Yes. Do you remember the name of it? It was, uh, ((Verbal pause)) Udorn? Was... Was it...?

Farley: Ud... Udorn, I think.

Boardman: Was it Udorn?

Farley: Udorn, right!

Boardman: Yeah ((Verbal pause)).

Farley: That's a while ago. I have trouble remembering.

Boardman: Isn't that something, yeah! But Udorn, there was some question as to, uh, whether it had good, uh, hearability, uh, features. ((Acknowledgment)) But, uh, there was a railroad track, as I recall, pretty close to it. And then it was... But we... We had... We said that would be it, and then there were a couple of DF stations that had, in some way, I think, been operated by the Thais and we were ((Stutters)) taking them over. But it became a very

productive station, and I was always ((Stutters)) proud about that, even though I ((Laughter)) ...I was, maybe, just like a messenger and so forth. But I do remember another incident in, uh, when I was in Japan, uh,

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[redacted] And we had a similar type of situation as to whether we would move here or here. ((TR NOTE: Continuous clicking in the background here)) And, uh, based on ((Verbal pause)) whatever reason, they felt we...They needed an American input as to whether it should be here or here, and it was some [redacted]

[redacted] And I was the one who said, "Well, yes. Maybe we should put it there." ((Laughter)) Again, based on, not just a casual, uh, selection, but based on, uh, the fact that we had made a good study of it and so forth.

Farley: ((Laughter)) Let me switch the tape.

[Tape 1, side 2]

Boardman: Ah, I'm a civilian ((Stutter)) and I had...then went to...to Japan for three years. At the end of that time, I was assigned...I was requested by General Pappy Lewis ((Acknowledgment)) to be a Liaison Officer with the Air Force, the...the new Air Force Security Service. They...They wanted an NSA guy to come down and assist them in certain things having to do with their operation and liaise between NSA and the Air Force. And I was, ah, selected by General Lewis, and, uh, Dr. Sinkov ((Acknowledgment)) was involved at that time, and, uh, I accepted it, even though it meant actually leaving NSA as a...as an employee and working for the Air Force, because that was one of the stipulations, with the add...added stipulation I would come back to NSA, at the, uh, end of the tour. Well, I was there then actually for four years as a matter...as it turned out. And I did come back, uh...At that time Herb Conley was the Chief of Personnel and he...He made it very easy for me, then, to become, uh, back into, uh...uh, the, ah, NSA organization. And sure enough, at that time then it was called the Office of Collection.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: And I became the Deputy Chief under Roger Moulton of the Office of Collection. That was roughly in 1965. I was with the Air Force from, uh, 1961 through '65. And I think that, uh, I made a contribution down there. The, uh...ironically, ah, the, uh, ((Verbal pause)) the effort that Colonel [redacted] who was in charge of the organization that I worked with at that time, was interested in getting a mission from NSA. That was the main goal. And I did succeed in getting a mission assigned to the Air Force Security Service against, probably, the wishes of the people at Fort...at Fort Meade here because they thought it would fractionate the TA effort. They wanted the mission on [redacted] Well, they had some sort of a mission on [redacted] because when the U...United States Air Force Security Service was formed, they used the basis of...of warning

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] And the Air Force Security Service was, at that time, when that...when that was formed—and this goes back, certainly not at '48 when it was first formed but shortly, or some time thereafter—they assumed the [REDACTED] with sort of the understanding of NSA: Fifty seven positions, as I recall ((Acknowledgment)) were assigned to the [REDACTED] and, of course, they were all Air Force intercept positions. Well, what they wanted:..What the Air Force wanted was a...an enlargement of that mission because...mission, because they were expanding...constantly expanding their effort, and, uh, they felt that they could take over a larger chunk. Well, I believe at...at the time that I was there we, uh, assigned them a, either a part of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED]—or one other, rather large segment. And then I left. ((Laughter)) And, ironically, ah, shortly thereafter, maybe six months, a year, NSA took back the mission.

Farley: Oh boy!

Boardman: And, uh, at...at that time, the Air Force, I think, was...felt they had been a little snookered because, having worked so hard to get, ah, an official mission, rather than doing a bootleg job down there, ah, probably didn't realize, uh, the old expression, "What the LORD giveth, ((Acknowledgment)) the LORD can taketh away." ((Acknowledgment)) ((Chuckles)) And the LORD gaveth and he tooketh away their mission. They then, uh, got back or responded to that by developing the electronics, ah, ELINT mission which, I think, ah, there was never any real question that they could...could do that sort of thing. So I think then, it became, ah, I think they renamed the center. I worked for the SPECCOM, the Special Communications Center. It then was renamed to some sort of Electronic Warfare Center. ((Acknowledgment)) And they took...took on an expanded role in, ah, in ELINT. And I think that, uh, everyone was, well, let's say, happy about that, although it was kind of a shock after all our work to get the thing...And, huh, I remember...I would relate Walter Deeley, ((Laughter)) if you will...

Farley: Oh boy!

Boardman: With this, uh, this bit of, uh...

Farley: He took it back?

Boardman: Yeah, yeah. And I, you know, I was...I was ((Stutter)) way out of it then and then, uh, it was a decision on NSA's part, which I had to respect. But...And it worked out, I guess, in the long run. You know how it...So, I made a kind of a pre...I...I kind of...I think I made ((laughs)) a contribution to both sides, but probably more to NSA than I did to the Air Force. ((Laughs))

Farley: Sounds that way.

Boardman: So, anyway, the, uh, ((Smack)) having, uh, finished the Air Force thing

and then back as Deputy Chief of, uh, ((pauses)) of the Collection Office, ah, I worked there for maybe two years, and, uh, suddenly, uh, Larry Terry, who was Chief of NCEUR, [redacted]

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[redacted] Chief

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NC...ah, NCEUR. So, ah, ((Mouth noise)) at that time—I should say NCEUR, [redacted] or something like that—then the...the Chief, NCEUR was in Paris. I...I don't remember the guy's name at that time, but, uh, anyway, Larry came home, and I was selected to go to replace Larry Terry as Chief NCEUR [redacted] NCEUR Office, [redacted] ((Acknowledgment)) and that was in 1967. So I had two years as Deputy Chief of the Office of Collection; then I went over as Chief of the NSA Office, [redacted] And, uh, at that time, ah, General Philbin was in charge, and they had just moved the office into Stuttgart. So I was the chief [redacted] and we had cognizance over the [redacted]

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as, uh, Philbin's office...General Philbin's office worked with the, ah, the command, EUCOM, I guess it...European Command, and he...They worked with the, uh, Commanding General and the, ah, ((Stutter)) Intelligence Group that operated out of Stuttgart and mainly was...sort of tied in with end product, whereas we were—in the Office, [redacted] ((coughs)) [redacted]

Falley: Okay.

Boardman: But we had in the...In that same office we had the, uh, [redacted] the I.G. Farben Building, ((Acknowledgment)) and again, it was a very, very enjoyable tour, and I think very productive. So, then when I came back, or while I was in, ah, Germany, I, uh, used to spend some time with, uh, Ray (B% Kline) up in, uh...in, uh, Bonn. He was the CIA Office Chief in Bonn, Germany. He was in charge of all the CIA activities in Germany at that time, including ((Acknowledgment)) [redacted]

[redacted] So, I, uh, I had some dealings with Ray Kline and, uh, we got on very well. And he asked me if I'd like to come to work in the State Department when, uh, when I ((Verbal pause)) would finish my tour. And I said, "Well, yeah, I, ((Verbal pause and scratching sound)) under what arrangement?" He said, "Well, you'd still be part of NSA." Well, ironically, ah, Juanita Moody and Milt Zaslow and several others had been angling to get an NSA guy at the State Department to assign to the I&R Group—that's the Intelligence and Research unit of the State Department—((Acknowledgment)) and had been unsuccessful. They, uh, the State Department didn't feel as though they wanted to have an NSA guy. But when...When Ray Kline was appointed chief of I&R by President Nixon, ah, he, of course, uh, was not ((chuckles)) influenced by some of the, uh, ((coughs)) old-line State Department guys and, uh, he said, uh, he saw no problem with having an

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NSA guy in the State Department. ((Acknowledgment)) So I was selected to do that. And I stayed for two years, as I recall. One...I was extended for one year. And, uh, I worked with [redacted] down there who had been a, uh...

Farley: I know [redacted]

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Boardman: A Navy officer during the war. We...We knew each other during the war, and so forth. And, uh, ((Smack)) [redacted] had been, uh; an Army officer who had also gone to, uh, to the State Department, but [redacted] gradually drifted away from the cryptologic effort and got into other State Department business. Ah, but [redacted] stayed and I think is still there. And, uh, I worked with him, ((Verbal Pause)) and, uh, I used to come and talk...I'd come back once a week and attend the staff meetings ((Acknowledgment)) and talk about the State Department. By this time Admiral Gayler is the, uh, Director. And, uh, I...I did that for, uh, for two years. Then I used to have a lot of dealings, in that job, with Dayl Croskey in the S...in the, uh, Policy Staff, because, ah, there was a lot of...lot of interest in what the State Department was doing, and...and how they handled the COMINT stuff and, uh, a lot of policy considerations, so, uh, I talked with Dayl, and, uh...uh, he, uh, asked me if I would like to come back and work in the Policy Staff when I finished my tour. And I said yes. And, uh, I came back, I think, in '72 to the NSA Policy Staff, ((Acknowledgment)) where I was chief of...of a branch in that group, uh, and I think it, again, had to do with the, uh, the classification...This is the beginning of my involvement with...

Farley: Okay, right.

Boardman: Official classification procedures for NSA. And, uh, ((Clears throat)) we, uh, we worked...We worked on that for a couple of years, I guess, and then when Dayl retired in 1974 from NSA, ah, we, uh...I became...I...I wa...I succeeded him as Chief of the Policy Staffing, as D4. And, uh, that opens up this new era of...of, uh, of my involvement now with, uh, classification, declassification, policy, uh...uh, decisions on, uh, involving the Freedom of Information Act, and...and all that sort of thing. Now, at this point...Let's turn that off for a minute.

Farley: All right. Sure. ((Tape stops and restarts)) ...that way then, uh, Norm, you can, uh, talk about what you recall about the declassification, the classification...

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: And the ultimate formation of the archives.

Boardman: Yeah. Now, do you happen to remember when the Freedom of Information Act was signed?

Farley: I tried to find out. I think it was '74 or '75.

Boardman: I think it was, as a matter of fact, you see, and that's exactly when I was, uh, ((Cough)) was, uh, involved in the...in the very early stages. And we

had a guy named G. P. Morgan...

Farley: I know G...yeah.

Boardman: Who went down to, uh, the archive...the National Archives, because some of our records had seeped into there, and they were in...in a classified area...space ((Acknowledgment)) and they were not released, but with...The Archives, in response to the Freedom of Information thing, wanted to get a...a definite, ((verbal pause)) program to declassify what records they had. Well, G. P. Morgan was the first one, and then...and then Dayl Croskery spent almost full time there, but...And that's what I want to talk to about. ((Laughter))

Farley: Okay, that's good. You take it just as you remember it, and as I say, if I want to interject...

Boardman: Okay. (Breathing noise))

Farley: A question or two, let's...

Boardman: Right.

Farley: Do it that way.

Boardman: Now, in the, uh...In the, uh, business of being D4, and in terms of the classification of cryptographic material, the, uh, procedures which had been established over the years I needn't belabor, but, uh, the, uh...Very, very basically, each organization in NSA had a yearly examination of its records, and they would retire to the NSA Records Center those records which they didn't feel were needed...they needed to keep for day-to-day business. So a lot of the, ((Thump)) ah, records, that, ah, were put into the Records Center actually, uh, started to collect dust because there wasn't much requirement to go back to those records until we got into this Freedom of Information Act.

Farley: Where was the Records Center then, Norm?

Boardman: The Records Center was over in L...in the L organization...

Farley: All right.

Boardman: In that other building over there.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: Now, the, uh, ((Verbal pause)) the one thing that constantly has to be borne in mind in this business of records is that the end product ((cough)) of NSA has always been on, uh, on a computerized basis. And even today, as far as I know—and I don't admit to being...know what is happening today—but the end product information that NSA has put out over the years has always been neatly catalogued and...and on...on instant recall whenever...whenever it's required to go back to a piece of product that was put out by NSA. Now, that's such a monumental task and job that the...that the, uh...uh, Archives, as it ultimately resulted, ah, never really assumed any control over that particular function, although it

still is there and is still every day of the week it's being added to. And those records, I would assume, are still part of the NSA, let's say, Archives, although physically they're still in the production building, right?

Farley: Yes, that's true.

Boardman: That's true. ((Inhales and coughs)) Well, with respect to the declassification effort, ah, I think it's fair to say that despite the, ah, uh, Freedom of Information Act, NSA has never established a ongoing declassification program on its own. NSA has responded to requests on a one-by-one basis of people who wanted to get certain information. And because of President Carter's pressure to be...release this type of information as long as it didn't affect national security, to...to, uh, adhere to these requests that, uh, ah, were coming in—and it received a lot of publicity in the newspapers, as you know—((cough)) but, looking back on, let's say, release of crypto...cryptographic information, the first one to our knowledge was, of course, Yardley's "*Black Chamber*." And, need I say more about that. The...The next bit of release that...that, uh...that I know about that was significant, was David Kahn's book, "*The Codebreakers*." Now, in my opinion, David Kahn had...had input from Mr. Friedman for a lot of the, ah, material that was in his book. In fact, he had taken the cryptologic course that was given by Friedman and ((Verbal pause)) and to all...all of our guys at Vint Hill Farms. It was...They were Cryptolo...Cryptology 1, 2, and 3, right?

Farley: Yeah, right.

Boardman: Well, David Kahn had...had either gotten those books or had become a student because he was interested, intellectually, in cryptography. Then, ah, he...He wrote "*The Codebreakers*," and I'm sure that he...He was down in the George W. Marshall Library in Virginia where they have the Friedman...I...The Friedman collection is there. And at one time or another it was totally, uh, unclassified. And there was a lot of classified material in there. That had to be corrected, and to...I'm sure to this day, ((Cough)) you need to have a special permission to go into the Friedman Library in The Marshall Collection. I...I think that's correct. ((Microphone noise))

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Farley: There was some fiasco on that, wasn't there?

Boardman: There...There was a fiasco, and I don't pretend to have any, ah, details of it. I know [redacted] ah, either ((Verbal pause)) on it...Well, I don't know whether he did it or whether he was instructed, ah, to do it, but anyway they opened up the Friedman Library for scholars, and I think Kahn got a lot of his material from, uh, from, ah, the Friedman library, as well as I think he had some direct contact with Friedman.

Farley: Hmm. Wasn't that, uh, collection again classified after it was opened up initially?

Boardman: Yes. Yes, it was. Yes. Yes. ((Microphone noise))

Farley: Okay. And that's what, uh, complicated...?

Boardman: Yes. That's what complicated...yes.

Farley: Yeah.

Boardman: So.

Farley: Was there a lawsuit...? There was a lawsuit brought by...by somebody—or maybe it's still pending, I don't know—to try and get those classified documents re-released.

Boardman: Umm, that...That I don't know. It's very possible, however, very possible, yes. Yes.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: Uh, my feeling then, based on my famous Vint Hill experience was that in no way should we ever ((chuckles)) release cryptographic material. I still adhere to that, although I am sure my feelings ((Farley laughs)) are not shared by even people in NSA. But I feel that the, uh, the...Particularly where we reveal success of our effort, it should continue and continue to be classified forever...

Farley: I agree.

Boardman: In my book.

Farley: I agree.

Boardman: And I had no hesitation, as Chief of D4, to turn down every request that we got from the outside until a man by the name of [redacted] requested, ah, copies of all intelligence decrypts that were made during World War II on the Japanese and German problem. Now [redacted] [redacted] in Telford Taylor's office in London, and he was aware of a thing called "The Magic Summary," which, ah, every day...daily they would produce all the—the British now—would produce all the intelligence they derived intercepting German communications and come up with a summary. Now [redacted] thought that we... ((Rattles)) He knew it at the time, but all of that stuff was done in London at...at a place called Hut Six in London. And, uh...

Farley: Bletchley Park.

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Boardman: Bletchley Park, right. But, he thought that we had those records. He didn't realize that we, the Americans, had the basic records on the Japanese problem ((Scratching)) but the basic intercepts and the basic reporting was done by the British. And we have... ((tap)) The Americans had full con...cognizance and knowledge of it, total, and ((microphone noise)) Telford Taylor would...had people in...throughout Europe and Paris and all over, and he would feed this material to them, but it was British produced. And they had the responsibility for the German problem. Now, during the war, Army Security Agency, of course, had responsibility for the Jap army and air problem and also the diplomatic effort that the...that ultimately mushroomed into a tremendous effort. But, ah, the,

uh, ah, the British continued to, uh, produce the material on the, uh, German problem because they were right there and had started it in the '40s. We...We got into it rather late, as a matter of fact, and we just, uh, worked with the British as our forces entered the war. But, ah, [redacted] then, requested, uh, all these...all this information about the Intelligence produced during World War II. And, uh...

Farley: This was both...

Boardman: And...And...

Farley: Both the Ultra and both the...

Boardman: Yes.

Farley: The Magic summaries?

Boardman: Yes. Yes, both.

Farley: Both of them. Okay.

Boardman: And to my chagrin, uh, our legal counsel, who was Roy Bartner at the time, felt that we couldn't win the case against [redacted] He felt that, in...in accordance with Jimmy Carter's dictate and, uh, the...the frame of mind of the American government at that time, ((Clicks)) that we should provide this material to [redacted] Well then that...Since that material was just thousands, and thousands, and thousands of documents, which basically were decrypted messages based on the Japanese, uh, Army records...As I say, we didn't have similar records of the Germans because they were in GCHQ. ((Acknowledgment)) And [redacted] could never, never, never, and still doesn't understand that we...why we were unable to furnish the basic material that he wanted on the German problem. And, uh, he...He actually made a trip over to GC...over to England and went into the, uh...uh, the equivalent of the National Archives, of the British...

Farley: Public Records Office?

Boardman: Public Records Office in, uh, Kew Gardens, is it? Somewhere down there. Uh, and, uh, and...And I saw...I went...I went to the...I went to the Public Records Office myself on one of my trips to England, and I saw his name there as, uh, as one of the guys who had been into...But he...He never got any of the material that he wanted, even from the British. ((Acknowledgment)) His...His goal was to write a book. ((Acknowledgment)) And he felt that if he had access to these summaries that he could actually log the, ah, efforts of the...of the Allies and the Germans and...and just put together a nice story as to how everything worked out from the cryptic...cryptographic ((Microphone noise)) point of view. But, uh, I...I think what...I can't...It's fair to say we tried very hard to...to find the records. We...We couldn't find them. Uh, we, uh, we corresponded with the British and, uh, they didn't feel they should release anything. And, uh, we went ahead and...and released this, ah, ((verbal pause)) declassified material, actually, and sent it on up to [redacted] And the bulk of it was the, ah, Japanese Army problem. Well, I

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can...The...My...My last recollection of this is a...is a...There was a [redacted] and, uh, he was sitting at his desk and he had these big stack of Jap Army decrypts, and he's looking at them, now, and he says, "What am I...?"...Well, sort of, "What am I going to do with all this?" Well, it really wasn't what he wanted, and he didn't know anything about the Japanese, uh, situation as far as I know. And he...He, therefore, I'm sure, has...has put these away in some sort of a file. He may read them every night when he, ((Laughter)) uh, goes to bed and looks at the, uh, things that is said. However, ((Cough)) when we...When we declassified the material, we took out a lot of the stuff. We took out names of people. ((Thump)) We took out anything having to do with sources and methods; anything having to do with cryptologic; uh, settings; for example, the Japanese would send settings of their cryptologic machines and we would intercept them. And, uh, we took...We...They...We never released that sort of thing. We...We did release the...let's say, the pure Intelligence, if you will. And this really was of no great use, I don't think, to, uh, someone like [redacted]

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Farley: Was that the beginning of the declassification effort over here...

Boardman: ((Coughs)) Well...

Farley: On the Japanese Navy and the Japanese Army traffic?

Boardman: Yes, yes. That was the beginning. I think that, uh, prior to that when, uh, when Dayl Croskery retired, ah, we...We were aware that were...there were records down in the National Archives, but we didn't really know what they were and how much of...of them existed. As I say, G.P. Morgan had gone down there and declassified, I think, 73 some documents having to do with training, more or less. And, uh...But that was only a kind of a, uh, of a drop in the bucket. And then we had Dayl go down there on a fulltime basis as a retired annuitant and, along with, uh, ah...

Farley: Renee Jones?

Boardman: A young lady, Renee Jones, yeah. Renee Jones and he worked down there and their job was to...two things: one was to catalogue the material and to let us kind of get a feel for what it was, and then, ah, to declassify... ((Verbal pause)) Croskery was authorized to declassify. Well, ((Cough)) he felt more comfortable dealing with COMSEC matters, really, as you...as you know. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, he...He did declassify a few, ah, a few COMSEC things, but I...I think he did declassify one or two, uh, SIGINT type of things, which we had to withdraw the classification of that. It was one was a translated [redacted] message ((acknowledgment)) and a couple of things like that. And, uh...But...But he then concentrated mostly on COMSEC, and I don't really think he...he declassified much. At least we...Well, I don't think we ever had a listing of anything that was declassified at the Archives. ((Acknowledgment)) It was just catalogued. So, uh, the, ah, the basis then for the release of

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SIGINT, ah, started with, ah, the Administration's emphasis on being, ah...ah, on releasing as much intelligence material as wa...as was feasible. And of course, Jimmy surrounded himself with a bunch of guys [redacted] And they were ((punching sounds)) ah, punching away at us releasing the thing. And, um, I've had many, many, ah...ah, I think Ann Caracristi and [redacted] will remember this one. We, uh...We had one request from, uh, ((Verbal pause)) uh, I forget...I forget who it was as a matter of fact, but, we had a request having to do with release of the Rosenberg material.

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Farley: [redacted]

Boardman: It must... [redacted]

Farley: [redacted]

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Boardman: Yeah, yeah. And, uh, the FBI had gotten involved in this and they were...They wanted to release the SIGINT material that...which showed that the Ro...So...that the Rosenbergs were in the employ of the Soviet Government. There was no question about it. They had names, and...and functions, and so forth. Uh, it was...Ah, based on this information, I think, the ((Verbal pause)) ...the Rosenbergs were convicted. Well, there was a guy in [redacted] I think he was the one who, uh, put in the request for this material. And, uh, we...I, ah, [redacted] and I went [redacted] and talked to him and convinced him that he shouldn't request this stuff, that it...it...It revealed that we were successful in reading Soviet communications and that, uh, the, uh...They said, "Well, are they still using the same systems?" Well, they're using ongoing systems, but the fact that we were successful is sufficient to deny releasing any of this material. Well, it finally got into the FBI and into a decision at...at the F...at the FBI, and we were re...We were requested to go down there and, uh, make a...make a case, let's say, for the NSA position. And, uh...uh, [redacted] and [redacted] and I went down and, uh, I must say— and, uh, and I have to be careful how I say this—((Farley chuckles)) [redacted] made the initial speech and [redacted] I guess, didn't say too much except he backed up [redacted] And [redacted] was, I thought, rather mild in her, uh, statements as to what would happen if this stuff was released. And, uh...And as they were about, honestly, to make a decision to authorize the release of this material, which would, uh, have gone to the President, you see, and then we would have been told—we wouldn't have been asked. ((Acknowledgment)) Again, this material was British material...

Farley: Ooh!

Boardman: That we had. It was British material. We were...And I...I finally, I got up and said, "Gentlemen, we're really not talking about releasing U.S. material. We're talking about releasing British material, which we have no authority to do." And I talked for five minutes on this, having been in

GCHQ and so forth. And they agreed that we should not release the material. ((Acknowledgment)) Now, I...to my knowledge we have never released the material on the Rosenbergs, right?

Farley: No. We have not.

Boardman: Well, I...

Farley: And we never will. ((Laughs))

Boardman: Never will, because, uh, I think that...that ((Verbal pause)) the...I met this FBI guy who was in charge of the, uh, discussion that time. I met him quite accidentally at another meeting, uh, some sort of a, uh, re...a reception that they had when Jimmy Carter was no longer President, ((Verbal pause)) and, uh, I said, ((Laughing at same time)) "Do you remember me?" He looked at me and he said, "I'll never forget you." ((Both laughing)) Because they honestly wanted to release that material—the FBI did. Because, you see, it...There's a lotta [sic] people in the United States who think we wrongly convicted...

Farley: I know, I know.

Boardman: The Rosenbergs.

Farley: I know. Boy, that would have broke it right down the middle, wouldn't it?

Boardman: Well, yes beca...You...

Farley: And our relationship with the British.

Boardman: British, yes. And the British wouldn't release it.

Farley: No! Were they approached too for permission to release it?

Boardman: Oh, yes. Yeah, they were...They were...

Farley: Oh, yeah?

Boardman: They won't release it.

Farley: Oh, good!

Boardman: You see, the British have released a lot of stuff. Ah, Higginbotham's book, remember, "*The Ultra Secret*."

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: They...Actually the British, uh, Joe Hooper, ah, saw that thing before it was published and, uh, ((Verbal pause)) they reluctantly released it. I think they tried to do something about, maybe, eliminating some of it, but they...They knew about it, and, uh, they...They authorized its release, although...I guess in the jacket of that book you can read—I haven't read it recently but I did read it when, of course, it came out—I don't know what it said about, ((Verbal pause)) approved by Her Majesty's Government, but, ((Acknowledgment)) I think that the...They...He did have some sort of approval to go ahead with it.

Farley: It started it, didn't it?

Boardman: Yes, uh, "*The Ultra Secret*"...

Farley: It opened the floodgates.

Boardman: Yeah, yeah. And of course that was after Kahn, but it...it...It sort of...David Kahn, I think, was the one that opened whatever floodgates at that time...

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: But, uh, "*The Ultra Secret*," really, is the one that, uh, ah, that opened up the whole thing, and, uh, and I think, uh, probably influenced Jimmy Carter's people to have a similar type of thing on the U.S. side. But no one, to this day, in my opinion reme...Well, remembers that the British did the German problem, not the United States, right?

Farley: Correct. ((Chuckles))

Boardman: And people are prone to for...forget that. And, uh, we're...We're not authorized to release British material.

Farley: Not now. It's still as tight as it was.

Boardman: That's right, see. ((Farley laughs)) Well, anyway, the, uh, having the, uh, ah, the business of, let's say, Dayl Croskery, now at the National Archives, he, ah, would come talk to me once a week about what he was doing, and, uh, as I say, it was mostly a problem of, uh, of uh, cataloguing, although I'm sure the Archives were pressuring him to, uh, to, uh, release more material. And he went to Suitland, Maryland, which is also a part of the National Archives. ((Acknowledgment)) They must...There's certain cryptologic records still at Suitland. And, uh, as a result of all of this...all this discussion, all of this thing...things that were going on regarding declassification of material, I felt, ((U/I noise)) personally that I had reached the point in...in the D Staff where I would be more fulfilled, if you will, by trying to get a ((Stutters)) a fix on the, uh, records of NSA and to see if there were some way that we could, uh, ah, get all this stuff together and do it in some sort of orderly fashion. ((Inhale and cough)) I was influenced, certainly, by the fact that I had numerous conversations with the National Archives. Alan Thompson's name comes to bear.

Farley: That's the fellow I worked with.

Boardman: Yeah, and he was in charge of the State Depart...of the, uh, Archive Classified Registry...

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: If you will. And, uh, I had numerous conversations with him and, uh, he finally accept...He was...He was very hot to trot on, ah, the declassification of our material. But he finally, I think, accepted, ah, the fact that we should not declassify. And he also accepted the fact that the NSA archives would be maintained at NSA. There...There had to be a little hurdle there. He felt, in view of his position at the National Archives, that maybe a portion, or part of NSA's records should routinely be given to

the ((Stutter)) National Archives instead of arriving there kind of willy-nilly. ((Acknowledgement)) Because the records they have are...There's no rhyme or reason as to why they have certain records and why they don't have certain records. They...It's just as these organizations folded up, they just literally put all their stuff and sent it to the National Archives. Some of it was cryptologic, obviously. But, uh, he...He agreed, although I don't think there's anything in writing to this effect, maybe there's just a one-sentence thing...

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(b) (3) - 50 USC 403g Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 National Security Act of 1947 Section 102A(i) (1)
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Farley: I've never seen anything.

Boardman: That the NSA archives were authorized...The establishment of the NSA archives were authorized by the National Archives, but that the National Archives had access to...to the NSA archives. It's a similar thing to what CIA has, and I'm sure it might be other intelligence agencies. CIA has its own archives [redacted] somewhere. We...We visited that organization before we established the archives here at NSA. But, uh, ah, either verbally or by actual practice, the NSA archives were established independent of the National Archives but subject to some sort of National Archives review or...or whatever you want to call it.

Farley: Did the National Archives give you some sort of guidance, or instructions, or suggestions as to modus operandi?

Boardman: Yes, I...I want to get into all that, because...Yes.

Farley: All right. Okay. I don't want to jump ahead.

Boardman: Yes, ah, but at any rate in the...In the, ah...In the establishment of the archives I think that was a hurdle ((Acknowledgement)) that took some time to sort of, ah, overcome. But it was overcome perhaps not, uh, not as well as it should have been, like in writing, but I think we had, uh, tacit approval from the Archives that we would establish these things, uh, not subject to any continuing examination by the, uh, National Archives. ((U/I noise)) But they were...They were certainly interested and wanted to know how we were going to do it, and so forth, and so on. So, uh, the, uh...This then brings us up into, uh, I guess, roughly 1978, when I retired from the, ah, from the D4 job and, ah, with the avowed purpose of...of s...of establishing the NSA archives...

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: Which I felt was a terrific challenge and which, ah, I...I was very much interested in. That letter of authorizing me to set up these archives was signed by [redacted] who was, uh, Jack Harney's deputy at that time. I think the date was some time in '78. ((Acknowledgement)) And it named me to do it. And that's in that book that I gave...

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Farley: Oh, okay.

Boardman: That's in...And that's...There is a record of that in the book. And, uh, ((Click)) the, uh...Having done that, uh, I, uh, retired and I took a leave in Florida for a month or so and came back and started to work on the

Archives. Ah...

Farley: You came back as a retired annuitant?

Boardman: Yes.

Farley: Oh, okay.

Boardman: I came back as a retired annuitant...

Farley: I didn't realize that.

Boardman: In February of '78.

Farley: I'll be darned.

Boardman: I think I retired in January, and I came back as a reemployed annuitant in '78 and worked for three years, ((Acknowledgment)) up until 1981. And this... This, then, brings... wells up in me a whole raft of reminiscent...

Farley: Yes, good (1-2g/blocked).

Boardman: Memories and so forth. But, uh, initially, ah, ((Verbal pause)) my office was established at Friendship, ah, with, ah, [redacted] as a secretary. ((Mouth noise)) And our initial job in establishing the archives, ah, consisted of acquiring a space for it, and, uh, and getting a fix on the records. ((Table taps)) Now, at this time it... It's kinda [sic] which comes first? Do you get the space first, or do you... do you... do you get a fix on the records? Well, they went... They went hand-in-glove obviously. ((Clack and acknowledgment)) But we had a little office in Friendship, and, uh, my job then was to, again, a... a kind of a liaison type. I liaisoned [sic] every day with L Group to, uh... to, uh, go into their, uh, ah, records center, uh, area and to look at what they had and, uh, at that time we got [redacted] and some other guy who, uh, who were then assigned to look at the NSA Records Center and kind of start cataloguing the material to see... to see what was there and what was available. Ah, ((Verbal pause)) I think it was a matter of luck, but we had no budget to establish ((Verbal pause)) archives, no space, but because of the declassification effort, which required the efforts of maybe 15 people, ((clears his throat)) we... We did have some working space at Friendship which was needed by the L Group. So, on a kind of a quid-pro-quo basis they s... ((Audio ends abruptly))

[Tape 2, side 1]

Farley: All right, the second tape with Mr. Boardman. Norm... ((Chuckles))

Boardman: ((Breath noise)) Okay, so with, uh... With this in hand, the, uh, ah, my efforts and, uh, theirs were certainly involved in... in working with the declassifiers, and so we were... We would get material for them through declassifying and so forth. But more than that, was to, uh, worry about the acquiring of sufficient space to establish the archives. Well, ((Cough)) I... forget the guys name in L—I think it was [redacted]—but he was a very, very key figure in... in assisting us to get this thing rolling, because he was, in fact, the guy who suggested this area that we're now in as a

logical place to bring back the Records Center material, and to, uh, consolidate all of the so-called NSA records in one area, that we could then start to develop our archival system. So the book that I gave...that Tony gave to me, ah, when I left this in 1981 contains pictures of the early, uh, ah, looks ((acknowledgment)) of this particular area. It was a part of a, uh, I think a...This is where they disposed of the, uh, disposition of records, namely, ((Cough)) this is where the truck would pull up and take...take the trash, ((Acknowledgment)) the tons of trash every day that was sent up to some place to be burned, up here in Elks Landing, I think it was. But, uh, I'm sure that effort still goes on. I'm not...I'm sure...I'm not sure where that truck pulls up. ((Acknowledgment)) But we, uh, ((Verbal pause)) we were, uh, in this area and this, uh, and these records, these...these records that were de...decided had to be burned. Uh, and this is, basically, you know the end...It wasn't the end product, it was the input to what we ultimately produced that...that had to be burned. The classified trash is what I'm really talking about.

Farley: The raw material?

Boardman: Raw material.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: Was basically, I think, burned every day. And, uh, what was kept was, of course, the...the, uh...A little bit of that raw material, maybe, but basically we kept the end product that was produced. So, uh, then it must have taken months, and months, and months, to rehab this building. And in the meantime, we, uh...We remained in, uh, ah, in the, ah, Friendship area until this place was ready for occupancy. ((Smack)) And by that time ((Cough)) the, uh, ((mouth click)) the declassification effort, vis-à-vis [redacted] request, was still going on hot and heavy. They...They had, ah...ah, upwards of 12 to 13 people working in...under Bill Gerhard, ah, to declassify those records. And they had the tapes. You...you remember?

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Farley: Yes.

Boardman: Those tapes and they were blotting out ((Chuckles)) sources, and methods, and names, and so forth. ((Repeated acknowledgments)) They had a whole list of things they used to declassify stuff with. But, ah, ((Clears throat)) while all this is going on, we were, then intent on acquiring the space and developing the...the archival situation. And, uh, I think it's fair to say that, uh, we didn't notice any de...any, uh, lessening of the declassification effort until probably early in '81 or maybe mid...mid '80s, when we started to see an end ((Acknowledgment)) to this material that was going to be declassified. ((Inhale and cough)) And I...I don't know whether there's any present sys...if there's any present declassification effort going on.

Farley: Minimal, very minimal.

Boardman: Except as re...as it's requested.

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: In other words, NSA has not—and I'm proud of this—has not instituted a...a, uh, routine declassification program, right?

Farley: Correct.

Boardman: Well, I...And I think that's great, personally. Now, there may be people that disagree with that, but...

Farley: No, I agree...I agree with you too.

Boardman: Yeah. So ultimately, as we conceived this, the declassifiers would then be put over into the work of establishing the archives. And I guess that is probably what has now happened.

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: Yeah. ((Inhale and cough)) Well, the, uh, the...the thing to remember...I will now talk a little bit about, uh, ah, the procedures ((Cough)) for the, ah, starting out of the archives. But the, uh, the thing that probably we still don't have a good fix on, NSA-wise, is what constitutes a permanent record, right?

Farley: Archives won't make that decision either.

Boardman: They won't make it still.

Farley: No.

Boardman: Basically, of course, it's...It's the...

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[Redacted]

Farley: Correct.

Boardman: Still? Well, that's unfortunate, but understandable perhaps. Uh, when I was...When I was involved in...in establishing the basic operation of the archives, my feeling was ((Cough)) that over the years, in my experience, we had Sinkov, Kullback, and Rowlett. ((Microphone noise)) We had three basic cryptologic efforts: one was SIGINT operations, one was COMSEC and one was R&D. Then we had an amorphous type of activity which you could generally call "staff," like the, ((Verbal pause)) the various staff efforts that must have mushroomed over the years, ((coughs)) and then the school. ((Acknowledgment)) So, the, uh...However, in the establishment of the archives, I...I originally—and I don't know whether this is still in effect—established

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Then, ((Cough)) and

wish I could remember the, uh, the various, um, ah, uh, digraphs or whatever the, uh, mechanical system was to...to sort out these records into these categories. But, ah, we had...we had the shin box routine, which I...I see you're still using out there.

Farley: Yes...Yeah, a lot of them.

Farley: And, if you can visualize my original visualization of the, ah, archives, was to have basically [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I had those...Those were in my mind when we set this thing up. Then within the, ah, within each one, for example, SIGINT, ah, having knowledge that the basic SIGINT records were the end product which are kept in Prod and still are, that what we would have in the archives was the, let's say, the policy matters as they related to SIGINT. Ah, within the COMSEC organization we were certainly...ah, had planned an ((Verbal pause)) ...to discuss the whole ((Cough)) business with the COMSEC organization and vice...and R&D and so forth. At that time the...There was some little reticence on the part of, let's say, COMSEC people to talk about their records because they...I think they basically felt they still had control of them. And they were a little unwilling to relinquish control of a lot of their stuff, to...to the archives. But ((Stutters)) it seemed to me, um, ultimately, uh, this had to happen, that we would have these segments or these divisions of the archives established and that we would, ah, file material in accordance with that general layout. We were then...We were then talking initially about microfiche ((Stutters)) and, uh, the, uh, the business of how we're going to store this voluminous ((Crackles and cough)) material. There just isn't enough room in these shin boxes...((Chuckles))

Farley: No more...

Boardman: And you can...right?

Farley: No more.

Boardman: So, I assume that this effort is still underway and, uh...and, uh, ongoing. But, uh, I would be interested to know what the present, uh...uh, system is and I...and I don't pretend to...to have the firsthand knowledge today, ah, for, uh, filing the archival material. Now, you asked before, did we get any advice or assistance from, uh, State Department. The, uh, thing to remember is Ar...Af...

Farley: Archives.

Boardman: Archives from the...advice or assistance from the archives, ah, that Tony Naples was made the first archivist of NSA. I was not the archivist per se, I was the, ah...

Farley: Project Officer...

Boardman: Project Officer, right, I wa...Yeah, and Tony, made many trips to the National Archives and has made, ah, some sort of a, um, career, if you

will, on archival procedures. And it was Tony, really who had the, uh, ah, let's say, the responsibility for this. But he...He often said I anticipated him in many ways. ((Laughing while Farley acknowledges.)) And uh, when we were...As we were going through this routine of just collecting the records here and trying to get a fix on what we had, that, uh, we, uh, again, uh, weren't quite sure as to ultimately how they would be, uh, ah, catalogued, and stored, and retrieved. That, uh...That...That system would...would ultimately come about because NSA was a great computer organization ((Acknowledgment)) and there's all sorts of ways, computer wise, that this stuff can be handled. But it...Unfortunately at that time I was, uh, ((Verbal pause)) I left. And I guess the reason I left, basically, is that, um, ((Verbal pause)) someone had said there's a whole bunch of guys over in the Archive Building there who are milking the government, who are not earning the retired annuitants' pay, and they're over-graded, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. And, uh, they sent some people over to, uh, put a job rating on these things. And, uh, I...I didn't... ((Verbal pause)) Personally I, uh, my job...Although I felt in many ways that I was perhaps the architect of the thing, I didn't make any bones about any grand and glorious job title as such. And they...They said, "Well, all you guys are GS13s," see. And I just felt that maybe this is the time... ((Acknowledgment)) This is the time for me to, ((verbal pause)) step out, because, ah, I don't think I was having any problems, but, uh, there was the business of people coming, ah, new people coming in to take charge of the...of the whole thing. And my recollection is that Zobelein came in, and he was all for establishing a program, which I, as I recall, I remember outlining what I just said here to Zobelein, and he...he...he apparently was happy with it. He...There weren't...He didn't have any problem with it. And then, uh, I...I guess, uh...Ah, [redacted] was also a part of this whole thing. And, uh, then I lose track as to who came in after Zobelein, but, uh...

Farley: There was a Navy captain who came in for a while.

Boardman: Was there? Yeah.

Farley: Sy...I want to say Symington, Stu Huntington...

Boardman: Uh huh.

Farley: Huntington, and then Charlie Ware came in.

Boardman: Charlie Ware, yeah.

Farley: And now it's [redacted] (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Boardman: Yeah. Well you see, in a case like that you have someone like myself who had some rather strong general ideas of what...what it should be, but not...not in any great detail as to the specific mechanics of how it would...how it would be accomplished. And, uh, I felt that, uh, that what we needed were some doers who would get on with the job of, uh, of devising a system for the, uh, recording of the archives before, ah, retiring the records from the operational groups into here, and so forth, and so on.

I...I guess I get the impression that probably still isn't...

Farley: No.

Boardman: In effect, is it? That's too bad.

Farley: When you left was it...the archives transferred out of the D4 arena into the M6?

Boardman: Let me think for a minute.

Farley: Do you remember that?

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: That happened soon after you left, I believe. Or maybe it was coincidental with your leaving. 'Cause Zobelein was battling to keep it on the D Staff and he didn't succeed.

Boardman: Oh well, that...That's about the time that I...I, uh, I think I did leave at the...at...right before the, uh...the, uh...before that happened.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: But as I...I...I...Maybe I left while it was happening.

Farley: Could be.

Boardman: Because when they...When the...When the Admin Group...And this was done by the Personnel people, not...not T.

Farley: Oh!

Boardman: Uh, based on some, what I felt was an unfortunate, uh, comment by this individual who felt that the guys weren't earning their pay, you know, and, ah, that they should...They were over-graded ((chuckles)) in the sense of senior, let's say GS-14s, 15s, and 16s in some instances, ((UI background noise)) uh, to do this type of work. And, uh, based on then the, uh, job audit, they...they did—and I guess this still is true—they...

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: They kept the jobs at the GS-13 level.

Farley: Thirteen-ten, right.

Boardman: Yeah. So, I...You...I can't really, uh, complain about that. I, uh, you know, I don't have any, ah, any great argument with that.

Farley: Was it a conscious decision to take only, ah, retired annuitants, or reemployed annuitants?

Boardman: Well, I think it was because they didn't come out of the, uh...They...They didn't, uh, come out of the, uh, ((Smack)) authorized personnel structure...

Farley: I see.

Boardman: As I understood it at the time. For example, you couldn't...You could not hire a permanent person to...if you're...if you're, uh, if you didn't have the billets, but you could get a reemployed annuitant without a so-called

permanent billet, uh, status. ((Verbal pause)) This all gets into a, uh, administrative, uh, juggling, I guess. But my understanding was that reemployed annuitants did not come out of the basic personnel structure of NSA. ((Acknowledgment)) That was my understanding that they had more flexibility in appointing, ah, hi...reemployed annuitants. However, I still understand that there is a...there is a ceiling on reemployed annuitants. You can't have more than a...a certain number...

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: Which means there is some control over it. You can't routinely just pick up anybody.

Farley: They can only work 36 hours a pay period, too, I believe. There have been so many new rules and regulations...

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: Uh, established.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: It's a mess.

Boardman: Yeah. Well, the, uh...Again, I, ah, ((Verbal pause)) I guess Tony and, uh, and these other people are, uh, well equipped to, uh, talk about the, uh, the procedures and...that are now in existence. I don't know whether...Is...Is Tony still in the archives, I guess?

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: He's still in charge of the archives.

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: And I don't know what the breakdown is of the, uh, division of labor, if you will, ah, whether it's divided into, let's say, SIGINT, COMSEC, etcetera, etcetera, ((Acknowledgment)) which is what I had thought ((Acknowledgment)) was the way to go. And I would have each...I would have one individual in charge of SIGINT records; one in charge of COMSEC; one in charge of R&D; one in charge of, let's say, staff or school, or whatever. And then you would have the cataloguers and the who...whatever working for that one individual, but you would have five, uh, branch chiefs, if you will. You would have Tony and then you'd have these five branch chiefs ((Acknowledgment)) all, uh, doing their thing with...with their own particular records. And obviously if you get a COMSEC guy who is knowledgeable in COMSEC, he would be the one chosen to head up the COMSEC effort. ((Acknowledgment)) We weren't able to do that when I was here because we just didn't have the...the numbers of people. Well, our main effort was to collect and consolidate the records that we knew existed in the, ah, in the, ah, Agency.

Farley: Right. Tony has two elements now: an accessioning group which is in control of the records—Bill Huff is the chief—and [] is the declassification expert supplying the SRHs to the... ((Background noise))

National Archives. But we're going to bring you out here, and, uh, Tony can give you a detailed, updated brief ((Acknowledgment)) on what has happened, and that way, uh, because I...I'm not that close in touch with what's going on.

Boardman: I see.

Farley: I'm in the history section.

Boardman: Yeah, I'd like to talk to, uh, Tony. Uh, here it is twelve o'clock...

Farley: Yeah, let me...

Boardman: So, let...let's take a recap of what we're...

Farley: All right.

Boardman: What we should do now.

Farley: I think you have to come back.

Boardman: Do you? ((Background noise))

Farley: I think there's some detailed questions I wanted to ask later on.

Boardman: Yeah. Yeah.

Farley: Plus the fact it'll give you a chance to, uh, talk to some of the people and see...

Boardman: I'm perfect...I'm...As you can see, I...((Stutter)) This was a vital part of my...

Farley: Absolutely.

Boardman: Final NSA experience, and I felt it was a very useful thing and something that I, uh, as an individual was probably, uh, uniquely, huh, qualified to...to get started. I'm not trying to...

Farley: No, no, I know.

Boardman: (2G).

Farley: I understand.

Boardman: But, uh...And I think...I would like to feel that it succeeded. ((Laughs))

Farley: (1-2G/blocked) I think it has. There've been a lot of pitfalls and we've been bounced around from pillar to post. And we were in M6 for a while and then we're in T now—we're a T54 organization.

Boardman: Now, let me tell you, since you mentioned you're a part of the historical group. I have always felt that the historical group should be kind of reorganized to a degree or...or at least have more, ah, definitiveness to its historical program. And my feeling was that the historical unit, and, uh, I would talk in front of Vince Wilson or...or, uh, Schorreck, because I've told them this many times. But they had...They involved themselves in incidents...historical incidents, ah, which are fine. You know, they had the, ah, one that Madison Mitchell did on the, uh...

Farley: Code Word?

Boardman: ((Verbal pause)) Code, ah...

Farley: SIGABA.

Boardman: And then they had Dr. (B% Howell) come in. He did the North...Northeast Africa Campaign. And, uh, I don't know what other...There was probably others, obviously...

Farley: We've done *Pueblo*, and the...

Boardman: *Pueblo*, yeah, that's a...

Farley: Iranian hostage crisis, the *Liberty*, and...

Boardman: Yeah ((repeated several times)) My feeling was that you should have an ongoing effort on the administrative history of NSA, going back to the Truman Memorandum and going back even as far as the Black Chamber, if you will, and...and work...work the development un...((Verbal pause)) unto the present day. And...And...But you should have access to all of the administrative, uh, memoranda as well as the organizational charts that have been built up. There must be thousands of them by now ((laughing as he speaks)) over the years, ((acknowledgement)) and you should have a...a kind of administrative history. I don't think that's ever been done, has it?

Farley: It hasn't. Those are some of the questions I was going to ask you to tie in with the history, your thoughts, concepts, and (1-2g/blocked by Boardman talking).

Boardman: I have a lot of thoughts about the history thing. ((Thump))

Farley: Okay. Let's, ah...It's...I have about seven minutes after noon. What classification shall we put on this first session?

Boardman: Well, in view of the Rosenberg...

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: I think we should say ~~TOP SECRET...~~

Farley: All right.

Boardman: Whatever the word is, now.

Farley: ~~TOP SECRET//COMINT CHANNELS//SENSITIVE.~~

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: All right.

Boardman: I really think so, don't you? I...

Farley: I do.

Boardman: I...I don't...I'm not over ((Verbal pause)) cautious on this classification, but I still feel very, very strongly about...

Farley: Especially that one.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: All right, let's leave it. So why don't we knock it off and then, at your leisure schedule another appointment and, uh, and, as I say, you can spend a longer time out here. I know you want to keep your luncheon date. And then we can talk to the people and actually...

Boardman: Yeah. ((Loud breath noise))

Farley: Invite them to sit in on this.

Boardman: Well, I'd like to because, uh, I think that the...It's...It's interesting to be away from this thing for ((sniffs)) a period of time and then sort of come back...

Farley: Oh yeah.

Boardman: And, uh, re...regroup...

Farley: See what's happening. All right, let's...

Boardman: I may or may not be able to make a...I've made a couple notes, as you see, but if you would...would like my thoughts on the history, I...I will make some definite notes about that. ((Paper shuffling noise during this.))

Farley: Right. Why don't I duplicate a copy of the questions that I was going to ask you, and you can take them home and think about them.

Boardman: Great. ((Tap))

Farley: And, uh, we'll see who has...has not gone to lunch and let you go.

Boardman: Okay.

Farley: So, thank you much, Norm.

Boardman: Okay. It's my pleasure, really.

Farley: Enjoyed it! ((Tape stops))

00:23:21

Farley: ((Restart)) Today is 29 January 1986. This is a continuation of the interview with Mr. Norman Boardman. ((Tape stops and restarts)) Yeah, I've updated it now so that, uh, this takes us to the second interview on the twenty...twenty-ninth.

Boardman: Okay.

Farley: So we'll play it by ear. So do you want to take those questions, uh, and read them out?

Boardman: Ah, should I read them out and then answer them as I see them?

Farley: Alright, I'll ask them.

Boardman: Okay, yeah.

Farley: How long has...had the need for an Archive or holding area been under discussion before it happened?

Boardman: Approximately three years.

Farley: Three years.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: How were the records disposed of before that time?

Boardman: They, uh, had the records-disposition schedule, which, ah, was done every year ((Acknowledgment)) and at that time each organization that had records would, uh, destroy or retain ((Verbal pause)) whichever records they decided. I wasn't aware of any criteria that they used for which records should be retain...retained or which should be destroyed. ((Acknowledgment)) Obviously the...They...The most important records and the most historical records would...would be the ones retained and the ((Acknowledgment)) day-to-day administrative type records would be probably destroyed. ((Acknowledgment)) So, that's...That's, uh, ah...That was my understanding of how it happened.

Farley: I see. Holabird was our only, uh, holding area...

Boardman: Um, yeah.

Farley: Up to the point that you remember?

Boardman: Well, ah, no, the Records Center was the holding area, to my knowledge.

Farley: Oh, I see. Well, what do we have in Holabird?

Boardman: I didn't ever...I never saw Hol...I never visited Holabird and I ((acknowledgment)) really didn't know what was in there.

Farley: Because I spent a week over there destroying material from, uh, B Group, a whole week...some boxes of material that were just thrown out because they were closing down Holabird, or they discontinuing the, uh, holding area ((Acknowledgment)) and a lot of it was going to, uh, Saint Louis or... ((Acknowledgment)) ah, Crain, out in that area. So we destroyed hundreds and hundreds of boxes.

Boardman: I see. Well, the, uh...I never went to Holabird, and I really... ((Verbal pause)) For some reason the...The question of Holabird never arose when I...when I was there. What...What...What was the time period when you did that, do you remember?

Farley: Si...The late '60s, early '70s.

Boardman: Well, you see by that...By the time I got involved, I guess Holabird was...was historical at that point.

Farley: Well, okay.

Boardman: Uh, I...I didn't really have anything to do with Holabird.

Farley: It could have been closed down, ah, down by then.

Boardman: By...By 1978.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: I'm sure it was, yeah. ((Table taps))

Farley: Well, you...I think you answered this.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: When was it decided to establish an archival holding area?

Boardman: I'd say roughly in 1977.

Farley: Seventy-seven.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: And you made the decision?

Boardman: I think it's fair to say that I was heavily involved in it, but the Director approved it.

Farley: Of course.

Boardman: Yeah. Ah, but, yeah, I was heavily involved in it. ((Said laughingly and Farley interjects but unintelligible)) The, uh...And...And the reason at the time, I think, was because we were involved...D4, of which I was the chief, was involved in the declassification program. And it was essential that we would have the records that people were requesting to be declassified ((Acknowledgment)) that...That we could see whether they should be declassified, or whether we should cite all the regulations and say no, we can't declassify this because it's injurious to national security and would divulge sources and methods.

Farley: Uh huh. Fair enough. Because if we say...

Boardman: ((Mouth sounds and verbal pause)) The attitude of the Director and the Deputy Director was...was they accepted the decision, but I don't think that they, it's fair to say, they were enthusiastically behind it. They...They kind of, I hope, trusted their organization to get it and being...and do it properly. But I don't think that they were ((Inhales and coughs))—pardon me—that greatly personally interested.

Farley: Good. Was the General Counsel involved at all?

Boardman: Not to my recollection.

Farley: Okay. Okay, ah, let's see. When the decision was formalized, who drew up the mission and function statement?

Boardman: D4 did, and that...That's myself and, uh, I'm sure I...We had some people who...who were involved in that, and, uh, I probably signed off on it.

Farley: Okay. Did, ah, who selected this building or the site?

Boardman: Ah, that's...I think that...Ah, that was a combination of myself and L...the L organization. As you probably know, there was a constant jockeying around for space, and, originally we had, ah, a little office in F...Friendship. Then we...we...This was D4 and declassification, which was the bulk of the people at that time. And we...We moved, ah, into an

area at, uh, Friendship, which apparently was very attractive to L because they wanted to do something else with it. And I talked with the L people—I think his name was [redacted] but I...I would have to be double checked on that—and, uh, he knew that this building was sort of in limbo, and he knew that there were a lot of records here, and he ((Verbal pause)) sort of...We...We came over and looked at it and I thought it was perfect for what we were after, because it had these racks and spaces. It...It did need to be refurbished, as you know. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, ((Verbal pause)) the basic thing was that "L" had to convince "S" who had nominal access to this area, and I think they were looking...looking on it as a...an expansion area. But he...he decided—and I guess he...he had his chief approve it—that this would be a good place to have the Archival holding area. And what we used as a basis was the D Memorandum, which auth...which indicated that the Director had approved the installation of an archival holding area and that I was appointed as the Project Officer. So I waved this paper in front of the "L" people ((Laughing)) and, uh, it was a very opportunistic type of situation and, uh, bu...everyone was happy, ((Acknowledgment)) except perhaps "S." But, "L"..."L" came out with what...with what they wanted. They got their space that was operational space. They always considered this type of space as non-operational. It wasn't conducting day-to-day NSA operations, so that's why, in a sense, the...They...They were happy that they could get this type of function to occupy this space. ((Acknowledgment)) So that's why it was a very happy type of situation. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, as I said before, we didn't...It wasn't out of any "D" budget. It was all budgeted by "L," which is ((table taps)) kind of an unusual situation, I think. ((Taps throughout))

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- Farley:** When you selected it did you have to have any authorization from the National Archives people?
- Boardman:** Yes, we, uh... ((Verbal pause)) After we selected it and...and had it rehabilitated... ((Stutter)) It was in shambles there until they really, uh, ((Verbal pause)) did their thing in terms of putting in the carpet, and the sprinkler system, and so forth. And we had the, uh... ah, several people from the Archives come over. Alan Thompson was, of course, the one who was, uh, cleared...COMINT cleared to handle COMINT material for the archives. ((Background noise in background)) And then he had another assistant, and they came out here several times. They didn't approve it at first. But they gave it, ah, tacit approval. Whether this ever came out in writing, I don't remember. But we felt and st...I s...I would still feel that we...We definitely have approval from the National Archives to have the Cryptologic Archives in this building.
- Farley:** Good. What's the difference between an archival holding area ((Table taps)) and an archive?
- Boardman:** Well, I think that that was a, maybe a euphemism ((Acknowledgment)) in the sense that, ah, maybe we sh...probably should use...have used a

different expression. Because the National Archives of the United States Government has a unique and, uh, ((Chuckles)) a definite, uh, meaning for American citizens. When you say "archives" you think of the National Archives. Ah, every governmental agency, I'm sure, produces records which are probably considered archival. Now, whether the...Let's say the Department of Agriculture has an archive building, or whether...I...I don't know. But I would think that in the bureaucratic, ah, system of the government that all government agencies who have archival records are enjoined to submit them to the National Archives. Now you...Where you run into the problem, where we ran into, the archive...The National Archives couldn't possibly hold the tremendous volume of material that we have, and, uh, I'm sure our...like ourselves, and DI...or, ah, CIA that I know definitely have their own records or archival area. I don't think CIA call it an archival area. We got into the archival holding area because ((Verbal pause)) well, that was kind of ((Verbal pause)) ...seemed to define what we were after. ((Acknowledgment)) We weren't...We weren't in competition with the National Archives.

Farley: Okay. I thought it meant that you were just holding the material until it was eventually passed to the Archives. But you were establishing a separate...an NSA archives.

Boardman: Exactly right, because of the...of the volume of material and because of the, uh, fact that it was strictly a COMINT, uh, archives, which, uh, I...I would say deserved its own place and is technically part of the National Archives and approved by them but housed in a completely, uh, secure area with access limited to people who have the need-to-know and who are cleared, etcetera. And I, uh...The Archives agreed with us. Although they do have, and have had, and probably still have, COMINT material in the, uh, archives and I should include COMSEC material, too, but, ah, we...We've never made, to my knowledge, any, ah, sort of pr...proposition to the National Archives to perhaps free up some of their space. We could take that stuff back here and hold it for the National Archives and give it the protection that we think it deserves. I don't...That's possibly...If...If...If in...If the COMINT or the Cryptologic Archives, I think, just not COMINT, the Cryptologic Archives would ever become, let's say, firmly established in its own building and with space, etcetera, etcetera, I'm sure that the National Archives would listen favorably to having that bulk of material that they have, transferred here, still under their jurisdiction. But we...We would protect it, which is, I think, the important thing.

Farley: It makes sense.

Boardman: I...I think it does, yeah.

Farley: Um hmm. Well, let's see: long-term plan; instructive guidance. Why was the archival element subordinated to "D" Staff? Because you were on "D" staff.

Boardman: Because I was on the "D" Staff, and it started with the declassification

program and, uh, and in answer to the Freedom of Information Act, which Jimmy Carter really gave teeth to in the... ((Acknowledgment)) in his own, ah, staff and he instructed his staff to...to, ah, uh, really ah, ((Verbal pause)) put a heavy hand on...on the intelligence agencies, particularly NSA.

Farley: Oh yeah, yeah.

Boardman: And we had a lot of pressure from Jimmy Carter's staff to release information, from his own personal Presidential Staff as well as the FBI, which, I'm proud to say, we resisted. ((Laughter and paper shuffling)) I'm proud to say that. Maybe... ((More laughter))

Farley: Yeah. No, I'm for you on that one. Talking...I think you answered this one already, Norm, about why did you hire retired annuitants rather than fulltime employees?

Boardman: Well, I guess it was a matter of it was easier ((Chuckles)) to do it that way. Ah, I...I think the retired annuitants in some way are part of the overall Agency strength figure, but they're in a different box, and they don't require the same type of reporting for personnel wise ((Acknowledgment)) that, uh, let's say, the regular employees do. Now I would...They would...I would have to be checked on that, but it was easier and...and I think it made a lot of sense to get people who were...who were basically, ah, very knowledgeable about cryptologic operations rather than hire new...new people off the street and build up the staff that way. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh...And, uh, fortunately there were a lot of people who, I felt, were very capable who were available and interested in this type of work. And, uh, it just...Again, like getting this building, it was a kind of a natural thing. ((Acknowledgment)) I think the, uh...One of the things that, uh, made it fairly easy for us was that Dayl Croskery who, when he retired, took a one year leave of absence with the option that he, uh, could come back after a year to see if he really was ready to retire. Well, during that year, he apparently, ah, gave it considerable thought and, uh, he, ah, arranged—and I guess the Personnel people suggested—that he could become a retired annuitant. I don't think we had a real big program of retired annuitants before that. ((Acknowledgment)) But he...he came back as a reemployed annuitant, ah, and worked for D4 at the National Archives researching COMSEC material. ((Acknowledgment)) And he...He was, ah, he had...He and Renee Jones, uh, made comprehensive lists of what was available, not only COMSEC, I shouldn't...but COMINT and COMSEC at the National Archives. He made some moves to declassification of some of that material, but it really didn't work out. And, uh, we felt that if there was material that...that should be declassified, it probably should be brought back here to our regular declassification section and f...fall in the same general pattern. But, uh, ((Verbal pause)) Therefore I don't think he...He probably declassified a ss...((Verbal pause)) well, a bulk of material; how...how big it was, I don't know. But it was basically COMSEC that he...he was...It was his major

interest and major ((verbal pause)) career in the Agency. He was, ah, actually, ah, I think ((verbal pause)) considered an expert in the COMSEC area. ((Acknowledgment)) So, ((verbal pause)) then as a result of the...the experience with, uh, with Dayl, we then, ah, took, uh, initially when we had this, uh, request to declassify SIGINT from World War II, ah, ((stutter)) we took in people like Sam Schneider and [redacted].....

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Farley: (2G).

Boardman: Remember [redacted]?

Farley: [redacted].....

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Boardman: [redacted] and two or three other people who were very, very capable people and, uh, and we started them on doing the declassification under, of course, Bill Gerhard. ((Acknowledgment)) Yeah.

Farley: Norm, who established the guidelines for accessioning material and making these materials available?

Boardman: Yeah. Well, when we...When we, uh...uh, started the archives, um, ((verbal pause)) D4 had originally...And this...Yeah, I think this quest...This question comes...comes up a little later ((Crackle)) with regard to the historical element. Ah, Tony Naples had been assigned to the historical element, E82, and, uh, for a variety of reasons, ah, we arranged, uh, D4 arranged—I guess I was heavily involved in it—in...in reassigning E82 to D4. I had a lot to do with Vince and we had a lot to do with records and availability of information. And it seemed as though Vince, as E82 didn't have a clear administrative chain of command in the school there, and, uh, he was happy, I think, to have, be part of this D4 group that was involved in the handling of records and the declassification function. And I think it was sometime in, uh...uh, 1977 that we, uh, we had the join...the joining of E82, D4, into D4. And at that time D4 had already established a declassification unit. So we had the beginning then of hist...history, declassification, and Tony, when we decided to set up the archive, had had some training and some background in the archival work and, uh—I just asked him this morning—he...he verified that I interviewed him and selected him as the first Agency Archivist. That was in late December of '67. I personally then retired in February of '78 and, ah, came back myself as a reemployed annuitant. But, uh, Tony then, as the, ah, archivist, was responsible for drawing up the framework of how the records would be handled...handled in the archives. And I assisted him ((papers turning)) to the best of my ability in...in, uh—as did the other members of the staff. But at that time my...my...bulk of my effort was involved in...in getting the new building and getting the space. ((Acknowledgment)) And I, uh, I sort of looked to Tony to set up these procedures and to...to sort of have a good working operation as we were identifying the material that was available to us and sort of making a record of it and so forth.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: I'll switch the tape.

Boardman: Yeah. ((Tape stops))

[Tape 2, side 2]

Farley: ((Tape restarts)) Okay, Norm, ah, under Carter's administration, I believe it was, Project Declassify became official.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: Did you get guidance at all from the archives...

Boardman: No, no way.

Farley: Or DOD or anybody on how to handle our material?

Boardman: No way, no.

Farley: I'll be darned.

Boardman: Isn't that funny?

Farley: It is.

Boardman: No.

Farley: It sure is. Because it was pathetic. I was down at the archives on two week active duty three years in a row, and ((pop)) those people didn't know anything about it either.

Boardman: No.

Farley: They were declassifying collateral reports, uh, attaché reports, anything, and just making some guy who was a window, ah, aluminum window manufacturer in, ah, Boston and some guy from Kansas—they were all reserve officers, ah, majors, lieutenant colonels, maj...and colonels—doing this type of thing. And I was amazed at how little guidance they had. I had to give them some guidance on some of our material which happened to be in the military records. But there was ((pop)) no official guidance?

Boardman: Isn't that something!

Farley: Uh huh.

Boardman: See there, ((verbal pause)) I...I really wasn't aware of that, but...but...because at that time General Carter was the one who approved my transfer to Europe in, un, 1967 and, uh, I...I just wasn't around the Agency at that time. ((Acknowledgment)) ((Table tap)) So I...I didn't have any knowledge of it, really. ((Acknowledgment)) In fact, ((Chuckling)) you see, I...That's the first I've heard of it frankly.

Farley: Is that right? ((Table tap))

Boardman: I...I may have heard it through the...Eh, ah, and must have forgotten about it.

Farley: Yeah, there was...There was an official project, Project Declassify.

Boardman: Well the, ah, the instructions for handling the archival material were, basically, ah, with Tony. And then I think we got Don Snow in, who...who? uh...uh, tried to, uh, help out a lot in that regard in terms of the actual paper and instructional types of material, that was, uh, the people would use to do the work. But as I say, the initial work that I was involved in that, uh, ((Verbal pause)) in terms of accessioning the material, was to identify what was in those boxes. We had opened up the boxes and catalogued the...the records that were contained in that box, and, uh, we would then give a number to the box and either in the top of the box or in some place we would have a record of what was in that box. Then, presumably, uh, what would happen—and I...I don't think it's quite run this way right now. It was my feeling, as I said before, that the archives would be di...the Cryptologic Archives would be divided basically into four main groups: one was COMINT; COMSEC; R&D; and school and staff functions. ((Acknowledgment)) And I on...I only visualized that type of setup in the archives. I also visualized that we would have an expert or a senior guy from each of the major organizations—COMINT, COMSEC, etcetera—who would be perhaps a reemployed annuitant but who would be in charge of...of making decisions as to the permanency of the various records from their own groups. And ((Verbal pause)) as members of their parent organization, let's say a COMSEC guy, he could easily call his con...his people in COMSEC and say, "Hey, I got this material. Do you think it's...we should destroy it or keep it? Do you think it has historical value?" And they could ((Verbal pause)) make records and do...do their thing. And in that way we would be assured that the Chief ((Background noise)) of COMSEC, whoever he may be, would be aware that we had these records and that we were doing something with them in, ah, either retaining them or...or disposing of them. In some instances they would say, "Well, hold it for two more years and then throw it away," that type of thing. But that was the way I had ((Scratching sound)) envisaged the archives would work. Whether it has, ah, ha...worked out that way, I am not s...frankly sure. Ah, I think, uh, I...I was... ((Verbal pause)) My brief talk with Tony this morning doesn't indicate that that's...it works quite that way, although the...the fundamentals, I think, are there of what I had envisaged I think still happened; that is, there is still access to the chiefs of the various major operating organizations, but how...How exactly that's done, I don't really know.

Farley: Okay. ((Background noise)) They've changed it about three times, I think.

Boardman: Yeah. Well... ((Laughs)) It is...Yeah, I, uh, I said to Tony that I would be happy to, uh...to, uh, come back on a volunteer basis if I could be of any assistance ((Acknowledgment)) in, uh, well, in this type of thing we're doing now, or if...If they had a, ah, particular type of thing that someone like myself could, ah, assist on, I would be happy to do it. But I don't think that that's probably feasible in the sense that, uh...uh, I wouldn't certainly

want to incr...infringe on anybody else's responsibility. It would be absolutely improper for me to do something like that. I would just do it on an ad hoc require...uh, basis, if...if such a requirement existed. ((Acknowledgment)) But, anyway, uh, I'll come in...I'll talk a little bit about that later.

Farley: Sure. Let's see: Freedom of Information Act, I think that...you discussed this (2-3g/blocked by Boardman).

Boardman: I did and I think that's really what started the whole bit.

Farley: Okay. Privacy Act? Did that...?

Boardman: Well, the Privacy Act...Uh, the...This is...protects the, uh, ((Verbal pause)) citizens from ((Verbal pause)) uh, be...their names being divulged in classified documents, and that...that is, in a sense, one of the criteria that we used in declassification purposes. We eliminated the names of individuals, ((Acknowledgment)) from...from these things. I don't know too much more about it except that w...it was useful to us, or at least in the term...in the...in the sense of guidance that we...gave us the authority to...to do some declassification.

Farley: Yeah. It didn't affect, uh, the retention of any documents, did it?

Boardman: Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge.

Farley: Okay. Let me...Let me just give you a quick-and-dirty about the guidance we got from General Counsel when this came out about oral history tapes. They said you can't retain them. If you do, you take every identification off the tapes, keep them all in a shoebox and that's your record. I said, "How can we identify these people?" You can't do it, according to the Privacy...((Tape skip?)) Thank you very much. We never did it.

Boardman: No. I'm...I'm willing to state here and now that I have no objection to my name being revealed and ((Verbal pause and acknowledgment)) whatever legal rights I have, I waive them, uh, in...in this type of thing. I don't care.

Farley: Okay, good. But that's where, ah, the Privacy Act ((tap)) impacted on us. ((Chuckles)) Okay, ah, how did the history and publications element become part of the D4 organization?

Boardman: Well, I think that it was just a matter of ((Verbal pause)) under E8...E82, really, ((Background noise)) Vince Wilson was kind of like dangling in...in that organization in that, uh...uh, they...They didn't probably, uh, think of him in terms of their school functions. ((Chuckle and acknowledgment)) And, uh, it would seem to be just a natural thing that he should become involved with this function that was just being developed. And that's the way it happened.

Farley: So were he and Gerhard side by side or were there two separate units?

Boardman: They were side by side.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: The...The three, uh, There were...The basic organization evolved is...was historical, classification and archives. ((Acknowledgment)) And each were chief...They each were chiefs of their—if you want to call them—branches and at that time, uh, Roy Banner, who had succeeded me as, uh...uh, D4, appointed [redacted] who was a consultant at the time, to sort of be...be the guy in charge, if you will, who reported to him. He...Roy Banner looked to...to [redacted] to report to him the activities of the history, the archives and the declassification. ((Taps)) He had great confidence in [redacted] and it seemed to work out very well. And, uh...uh, I don't know exactly when [redacted] uh, left but I think h...he had a yearly contract. It was probably...

Farley: Is that what it was?

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Boardman: He was a consultant, not an administrative head, but Roy Banner looked to him for that type of thing. And, uh, he, in effect, was...was in charge. You...You've got to say that because you can't operate in a vacuum ((Acknowledgment)) and he, uh...He used to have staff meetings and all the rest of it, so.

Farley: Hum. He acted like he was in charge.

Boardman: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Farley: Norm, were any new guidelines provided to the history and publications element which was already in being?

Boardman: Not to my knowledge, no. I, uh, I had always felt, as I think I indicated before, that the historical element should have an ongoing historical program. I had visited GCHQ and, uh, modestly CIA, but not in any great detail, and, uh, I was very impressed by GCHQ's history of World War II...the SIGINT history of World War II which I believe was in about five or six volumes, big...

Farley: Yeah, multi-volume, right.

Boardman: Big red books.

Farley: Yeah, there were maybe twelve of them.

Boardman: Terrific. Yeah. Were there twelve of them?

Farley: Maybe a dozen, right.

Boardman: Yeah, yeah, yeah. We...I think we have them.

Farley: Yes, we do.

Boardman: We still have them. Well, I was very impressed by that, and it took...It was a very big effort, whereas our historic unit was very small. It didn't have the backing perhaps that the GCHQ people had but seemed to be involved in...in, uh, ad hoc or specific instance types of thing as op...as opposed to a complete history. And I...I think they used to get Dr. Howell, who, uh, who I last remember was doing some sort of a SIGINT history on North Africa operations. ((Acknowledgment)) Whether that's ever been

finished...

Farley: It has been published.

Boardman: Yeah, and published. And, uh, but my feeling was that a basic fundamental thing wa...of the historical unit was to keep an administrative history, do it year-by-year, of the...of the NSA, ah, organization. So, I...I visualize "NSA 1947," you know, a big red book: "NSA 1948," "NSA 1949," and so on. Uh, every year they would produce some sort of...I'd call it "Administrative History." It could be administrative-operational. And they would have access to ((Scratching sound)) all of the administrative changes that were made. Obviously they...they...The history would not include anyone but the most...the most very, very important things and so forth.

Farley: Sort of like a detailed journal, or a diary, or...?

Boardman: A diary, if you will, of, uh, of...of NSA that could be used as a source material...

Farley: Could be worthwhile.

Boardman: For... ((Verbal pause)) Well, I talked to Vince about this from time to time. But, the...I guess the...The problem is...is just getting something like that organized is just tremendous. You need people. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, that, for example, is the sort of thing that I would be happy to even volunteer my time...

Farley: Oh yeah?

Boardman: If...if it were decided that it would be a good thing to do. Now, what I would do would be perhaps to just, ((Verbal pause)) as a person, let's say ((Verbal pause)) get...Let's say, you...you got...When NSA was formed under the Truman Memorandum and, uh, you could just document that...that whole thing. The...This thing is all...I think it's all available. It's just a matter of bringing it together.

Farley: Okay. Right.

Boardman: I...You know...You know, I think that's...That's what you have to do is just bring it all together.

Farley: Be a tremendous digging and research job.

Boardman: It would be, yeah. And somebody has to decide whether it's worth it.

Farley: I personally think it's worth it. Now they're talking about installing what they call a "Combat Historian" in the NSOC who would sit sidesaddle with people who are involved in a crises...((acknowledgment)) in a crisis and then, uh, make notes or collect duplicate copies of papers and, uh, SIGINT reports, all of this, and have it available and then later on do a post mortem slash history.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: Which I think is a good idea.

Boardman: Sure, yeah. Uh, these... These are funny kind of ((Stutters)) of, uh, provocative types of questions, and... and you... It's easy to say, "Wow, we ought to do it."

Farley: Right.

Boardman: But the... the... The distance between actually making a decision to do it and getting started, is, uh, it's like ((chuckles)) when this archives was first set up, you have to have the right situation, the climate has to be right, and ((Acknowledgment)) the people have to be there, and all the rest of it.

Farley: Could you jar, uh, Vince Wilson and his people at all, try to egg on to get, ah, published more material or turn out more...?

Boardman: I certainly tried.

Farley: Have you?

Boardman: I certainly tried. But I... I... You see, at that point I was a... I was a reemployed annuitant. ((Background voices)) And, uh, Roy Banner was always a little afraid that I would be, uh, exerting undue influence ((Acknowledgment)) on that part of the organization without his knowledge. And obviously I was not... I had no interest in that sort of thing. So ((Stutter)) I was pretty careful not to be a director, or to be a, uh, chief, or act like a chief. I was kind of, ah, as a reemployed annuitant always ((Verbal pause)) trying to operate within the framework of what had been decided although obviously I think I made probably quite a few decisions (1-2G). ((He laughs))

Farley: Yeah. Did, uh, [] seek your counsel or guidance at all?

Boardman: Yeah, I think it's fair to say he did, yeah. Yeah.

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Farley: Good.

Boardman: ((Mouth noise)) Yeah. And he, ah... He was really the conduit between me and Roy Banner. I... I probably never had too many discussions with Roy. But, uh, Roy would, I think, accept anything that came from [] even though I... it might have originated with me. But as long as he felt... He had a good deal of confidence in [] which I think was warranted.

Farley: Hmm. ((Scratching sound)) Were you gone by the time D4 passed it to, uh, M Group?

Boardman: I think, again, ah, Zobelein... I was still here when Zobelein was here.

Farley: Oh, were you?

Boardman: Now, was Zobelein part of M at that time?

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: Well, then it had... Yes, I was still here, and I was involved with Zobelein, uh, when he took over from [] And Zobelein ((Stutter)) when he first came in was always anxious to... "We need a plan. We need a plan." And we developed a plan, I think. ((Laughter and acknowledgment)) I guess it's still around.

Farley: Boy, did you ever! ((Laughs)) Right.

Boardman: Who did that? Uh...

Farley: Tony.

Boardman: Uh, Tony did it, didn't he?

Farley: Tony did it, yeah. ((U/I noise)) About an inch and a half of paper.

Boardman: Yeah. And I contributed to that, you know. ((He laughs)) I drew out...What I recall is I still remember doing...On the blackboard in Zobebelein's office we had the plan, and I still had those then operational things like the COMINT, the COMSEC, the R&D and the staff/admin/school function.

Farley: Why did D4 want...or D Staff want to get rid of the, uh, the archives and the history and the declassification?

Boardman: I think Roy Banner was, uh, was...was uncomfortable.

Farley: Was he leaving?

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: He left soon thereafter, didn't he?

Boardman: He left, yeah. I think... ((Verbal pause)) ah, I think he was nervous about it frankly because he was always afraid, as former General Counsel, that NSA would be sued and we wouldn't be able to win the case, ((Acknowledgment)) and he didn't want to lose any cases, uh, for...where the United States...Where a...a company, like the Rosenberg case, wa...uh, would bring suit against the government and then it would be up to the NSA General Counsel to defend, and, uh, Roy was al...al...I felt, always successful in getting good lawyers at the Department of Justice. And I...I know of no case which NSA lost when it was brought to trial. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, I talked to Roy many times about this, and uh, he...He mentioned to me the names of the lawyers that defended SIGINT operations, and, uh, I should say Cryptologic all the time, because... ((acknowledgment)) instead of SIGINT. But, uh...uh, and we were very successful in court, particularly with the Rosenberg case, again. I st...I still feel that one of the reasons that we, uh...uh, acceded to the Freedom of Information Act requests that we got initially from [redacted] was the legal counsel—perhaps our legal counsel as well as the legal counsel in the, uh, Department of Justice—didn't feel that they could win it with...particularly with, uh, Jimmy Carter's, uh, strong support of releasing classified information at that time. Uh, that's a personal opinion, and I don't know how accurate it is, but, uh, I feel that we still could've withheld the publication of, uh...of, uh, SIGINT material, or if not done that, we could have embarked on our own program of releasing information and not be the subject of willy-nilly requests from any American citizen who felt they...they ought to know something.

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Farley: Did you refuse or did you turn down quite a few requests?

Boardman: Oh, there's...The files are filled. My...The D4 files, they...They must be three drawers of files, refusing time, after time, after time, after time. ((Acknowledgment)) And we ((Microphone noise)) had...We had all the documentation. It was...Kind of got to be a form letter that we would send out. A guy named ((More microphone noise)) [redacted] (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Farley: I remember [redacted]

Boardman: Remember [redacted]

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: He would...He would write these letters, and, uh, I would sign them, but they...They got to be very, in a way, stereotyped, but they worked. We...We got very few, ((pause)) ah, second requests.

Farley: Nobody threatened to sue?

Boardman: Nobody threatened to sue. Even David Kahn never threatened to sue us. ((Sniffs))

Farley: I know that we've given him Military Cryptanalysis Volumes I and II, and I don't know whether we gave him machines, but we're bending over backwards to accommodate him now.

Boardman: Are we? He's still...He's still at it? Well, I felt David...Uh, Buffham and I had a conversation with David Kahn when, uh...He... [redacted]

[redacted]

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Farley: Oh!

Boardman: He did. And we...We [redacted] And these related mostly back to the time when David Kahn wrote "The Codebreakers" back in '64, [redacted]

[redacted]

Farley: Hmm. Nothing [redacted]

Boardman: There was nothing [redacted]

Farley: Yeah. Good.

Boardman: But he never...To my knowledge he never did anything with that, nor did he complain or bitch about it. Ah, I fe...I always felt that David wanted to be on our side and to become "Mr. Cryptology" of the United States Government. And, uh, ((Smack)) he was friendly with us, uh, Buffham and I. We...We didn't have any harsh words. We didn't...

Farley: Did anybody...?

Boardman: Ca...Call him an SOB or anything.

Farley: Yeah, yeah. Anybody on the top floor...the ninth floor ever think of maybe making ((Tape skip)) him an associate, ((Boardman inhales)) clearing him, and, uh, giving him some of this stuff?

Boardman: Well, we thought about that several times since...Not only David Kahn, ((U/I noise)) but there was one other historian who was interest...

Farley: [redacted]

Boardman: Not [redacted] ((Microphone noise)) no. We...We never felt good about [redacted] I don't think:

Farley: Lewin, Ronald Lewin, the Britisher?

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Boardman: The Bri...No. Well, we knew about Lewin, but there was an American; very famous, uh, American historian who...who visited us one day, and we...I mentioned it to him, and he seemed to be interested, but we just couldn't get it off the ground, uh...But, uh, I...I s...probably still feel that we could, uh, ((Microphone noise)) make it attractive enough for ((Verbal pause)) a bona fide historian to...to do some historical work on NSA. ((Inhalation)) The...The pr...The problem is that a lot of these guys, ((Crackle)) they want to publish, ((Acknowledgment)) and they don't want to have any censoring of the material that we have. But I think we could put them on the payroll and they could write a classified history, ((Winding sound)) uh, of...of what...of the Cryptologic business and, uh, ((Verbal pause)) ...and that...that would be...They...They would be happy with that.

Farley: On a contract basis?

Boardman: On a contract basis, yes. ((Acknowledgment)) ((Microphone noise continues)) I...I still feel that's a possibility.

Farley: Okay. That's right. Any of these requests, did you ever turn them down or did they refuse to accept the...((tapping noise)) the 15 cents a page, and they're asking for 10,000 pages of material?

Boardman: No, ah...Well, the only one that really in...involved an awful lot of pages was [redacted] the one...

Farley: Oh, okay.

Boardman: And I, quite honestly, don't remember what the m...exchange of money was, but we sent him a hell of a lot of material, I know that.

Farley: And that was Japanese Naval traffic?

Boardman: Japanese Navy. And he didn't want that, he wanted the German material...

Farley: Okay. ((Laughs))

Boardman: Which he had seen during the war as a member of General Telford Taylor's staff over in London.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: He wanted to write a book with the...

Farley: And he never has.

Boardman: He never has. The stuff that we gave to him was, uh, was Far East,

which...of which he had no knowledge. And, uh, the British...He went over and looked at the British archives. He...He couldn't find anything there that would give him enough to get him started. He talked with s...some British officials but, uh, he just, as far as I know, has just sort of...He still has that material. I guess he looks at it from time to time but I guess has ((Microphone noise)) kind of thrown in the sponge.

Farley: Hmm, I guess so. Too overwhelming a job, I guess.

Boardman: It is. It really is. And, uh, now, there's, uh...uh, there are ((microphone noise)) several British authorities...((microphone noise continues)) Ah, Trevor Roper, do you know that name?

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: Ah, well, he used to work in British Intelligence, and he's very well known to, uh...He has...has had a SIGINT clearance and so forth. And they've had several world w...known historians write classified history of GCHQ.

Farley: Hmm. What sort of a basis would they call them in, on a...on a contract, or a piece work type contract?

Boardman: I don't know exactly how they did it. ((Acknowledgment)) But, uh, they, uh, I'm sure they...They were paid money to do it. But the British, you see, uh, never had ((Verbal pause)) the million-dollar complex like a lot of our authors do. I think they...((Acknowledgment)) They looked upon it as a combination of s...well, it's some extra money, but it's certainly their...as a British subject, they're doing their thing for the queen.

Farley: ((Background voices)) Oh, yeah, you just have to make a decent living, too.

Boardman: Yeah, yeah.

Farley: You know. Norm, let me ask...first sheet. ((Pages turned)) Do you have any thoughts in retrospect as to what you would have done differently in establishing the archival area?

Boardman: Well, let me see. I...I don't think so. ((Pages turned)) I, uh...

Farley: Did you make some notes?

Boardman: I...What was the question? That was, uh, 33.

Farley: In retrospect. Yeah, it's 33. ((More pages turned))

Boardman: I think in retrospect it would have been much better if, uh—and this is easy to say on the sidelines. It's perhaps...I hope it's a fair comment—but when Roy Banner became the next Chief of D4, in my opinion he was still kind of, ah, the legal counsel and very wary and chary of anything that might possibly involve NSA in the courts. And I think he, ah, made some decisions, for example with Bamford, the guy who wrote "*The Puzzle Palace*," that I had totally disagreed with, ((inhales)) but I didn't say anything because he was the chief and I...It was not proper for me to interject anything. But Bamford, I think, who had...who, I feel, was a

former Navy S...SIGINT guy, but he never admits this in any of his books. But he had...He had basic knowledge of this when he was in the service. Ah, he...He, ah, knew about the NSA Monthly Newsletter, and he requested copies of all m...NSA Monthly Newsletters, uh, f...from the day one. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, Roy agreed to this because he didn't think we could win it in court, with the un...understanding that they would, ah, ((Stutter)) delete the names of the people. Well, then I lose track of this. I think Bamford ((Stutters)) disputed this and put in a complaint, and then I think we probably released the names because Bamford seemed to have more information than anybody about specific names of people in "The Puzzle Palace." ((Acknowledgment)) He, uh, I'm sure got a lot of his information from David Kahn's book. I think a lot of people who wrote about NSA, uh, used as their source the material that had been, uh, obtained by David Kahn. But, ah, I personally did not agree with that. I still don't agree with it and, uh, I think that, uh...uh, Roy was, ah, kind of ((Verbal pause)) very, very skittish about this problem of declassification. And, uh, ((pauses)) to go back and relate that to...to answer the question, I think...At that time it probably...Roy shouldn't have been in charge of the...of that element, the history, the... ((Verbal pause))

Farley: Archives.

Boardman: Declassification and the archives. I think when Roy became chief it should have been transferred to somebody else. That's the basic thing that I, ((Verbal pause)) in retrospect would...would seem to me to have been the case. I had nothing to do with it and obviously hindsight is much better than...than foresight. No one had the foresight to predict the sort of things that would happen. But I think that, uh, it would have been much better to transfer that unit to some other organization—maybe "T," maybe "M," is all, and, uh...And let...And let...And appoint a real good senior guy to run it who...who knew...who knew about these things, and, uh, I think it would have had a much better fate, frankly.

Farley: Okay. Early in the game did you ever give any consideration to microfilming or microficheing (1-2g/blocked by Boardman)?

Boardman: ((Microphone noise)) Very definitely, yes. And, uh, that was one of the things that we brought in Don Snow for because he, at one time, had been a kind of a microfiche expert, ((chuckles)) but we never...((Cough and continues chuckling while Farley is talking.))

Farley: Yeah. (2-3G). ((Chuckles))

Boardman: At this point, we...We...We did all sorts of experiments, and we had also, who was a...

Farley: I knew (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Boardman: Who was a, uh, computer expert and those two; I guess, did a lot of preliminary work in terms of microfiche and computers, and I always remember talking about the floppy disks. ((Acknowledgment and laughter)) What...What we have at this point I just don't know. I don't

know whether it's seriously considered...

Farley: Hell bent for election on computers.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: Indexes and subject index, just about everything they hope to get on. It's such a huge task. I don't know (B% if they ever)...

Boardman: It really is. ((Stutter)) It requires thought and, uh, you...you know, it's easy to talk about these things, but it's...The implementation ((Chuck)) gets very difficult. And you need a lot of support.

Farley: Oh, absolutely, absolutely, which we're not getting. They're cutting back...Well, it's the Gramm-Rudman thing.

Boardman: It's the...the same thing. Yeah.

Farley: They're cutting back all the way, fifty percent here and there.

Boardman: That will influence NSA's budget, won't it, the Gramm-Rudman?

Farley: Oh, yes, it will. We were supposed to move to a building up near FANX, ((tap)) uh, in May ((Skip)) and they were refurbishing it, but it's dead now. They told us the other day don't worry about it. Probably we'll never move there. Fifty...

Boardman: Is that right? Isn't that...It's interesting you should mention that, because I was at a, uh, a neighborhood, uh, wedding reception and, uh, there was one young lady there who is the daughter of my neighbor who lives in New York, graduated from the University of Pennsylvania and is very interested in becoming employed by NSA. And I said, "Well, I'm sure they're still hiring because they got these new buildings and so forth." ((Laughs)) And I encouraged her ((Acknowledgment)) to, uh, to put in an application. I said, "Maybe the best thing to do is, uh...is, uh, have an application sent to you." Ah, they're probably not even doing that, are they? ((Laughs as he is talking))

Farley: No. Do you, uh...

Boardman: God.

Farley: Know what background she has, computers?

Boardman: No, not computers. Let's see.

Farley: Engineer and computer type?

Boardman: She was...She's, uh, she's an analyst...She would be an analyst type.

Farley: Okay. I don't know what they're doing or where they're...they're, uh, directing the hiring, but I would say it's computer...If you're a computer expert, or an engineer, you can walk... ((Skip)) and all this good Intelligence spills right out. It's so simple. ((Chuckles)) Not like the old days, Norm. ((Laughs))

Boardman: Suppose somebody comes in and says, "I want a...I want..." ((Verbal pause)) For example, I think, if, uh, the recruiters are the basic people, ah,

who would be the...the good first step. If they're still around...I guess they still have...We still have recruiters in various colleges?

Farley: Colleges, right, uh huh.

Boardman: I wonder if we still have one in New York?

Farley: I would think so. I don't know.

Boardman: I'd like to refer this young lady to him if...if that's feasible.

Farley: Well, we should...I don't know who's in charge of that now, but we can probably find out.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: Okay. And, uh, yeah, I don't know who it is, whether they make rounds and appear at the various colleges on a pre-planned basis, I don't know, or whether they're in place in a certain...maybe in Columbia, or... or something like that. ((Cut off by Boardman))

Boardman: I thought it might be in Columbia.

Farley: Yeah, that's what I thought, too.

Boardman: She...This girl graduated from the Univer...University of Pennsylvania, but, uh...

Farley: Yeah. Could be. I'll see if I can find out.

Boardman: ((Mouth click)) Would you? It would help.

Farley: All right.

Boardman: So.

Farley: Um, let's see. Do you have some notes there you want to talk on?

Boardman: Well, the, uh, ((paper noise)) I...I had some notes on, uh, on reemployed annuitants. I...I feel that they represent a very valuable adjunct to the Agency work force that... ((Paper shuffling)) When "M" Group took over the, uh, archival and declassification function, I think a...a former reemployed annuitant had been, uh...We didn't extend him, and, uh, he wa...He...He talked to J. J. Connelly, and, uh, ((Smack and verbal pause)) felt that, ((Verbal pause)) the, uh, reemployed annuitants really weren't carrying their own weight. ((Acknowledgment)) You know, they...It was a boondoggle type of thing. I think there was, maybe a combination of a little bit of...of, uh...uh, "he wanted to get back" type of thing. ((Chuckle)) And maybe a little bit of truth in it, I...I...I don't...I...I won't want to say, but, ah, as a result of that, "M" Group came through and re-audited the jobs to establish some sort of a standard criteria for reemployed annuitant grade structure. Ah, at that time, the two people...((Microphone noise)) They interview myself and [redacted] and all the other reemployed annuitants and f...and just found out what they were doing and the...and the level of...of expertise it required etcetera. And, uh, the, uh...They came up, I guess, with a basic structure of a GS-13 that would, uh...uh, be the right grade for a reemployed annuitant because of the...of the, uh,

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responsibilities ((U/I noise)) that they had and the...and the, uh, knowledge that they possessed. Well, I think that was a bit unfortunate in...in my book. I, uh...As it related to me, it was probably the reason that I decided, well, it was about time for me to throw in the sponge. And, uh, ((pauses)) I'm sure that there were others in the same category because the, uh, the business of...of the money that was made by the reemployed annuitants, I guess get...gets to be substantial as you...if you...If you get to have 20 or 30 of them, you know, ah, the money really mounts up and it becomes quite significant. Ah, but on the other hand, the, uh, the knowledge that these guys have and the, uh, and the interest...Because they...They wouldn't come back unless they were real interested, and maybe even the need that they have to come back, uh, perhaps for extra money or whatever, I think makes them a very valuable workforce. Now I think it was unfortunate that Connelly got the impression that this...This was sort of a boondoggle. I think it was probably more of a...of a, uh, managerial problem, uh, supervision problem. And, uh, that, uh...If that was at fault, uh, that should be...That should have been corrected, not...not to make an arbitrary decision, that, uh, the...you know, there was a certain level for reemployed annuitants and that would be it. Because I think you deny the, uh...uh, archives and the cla...declassification function a lot of key people who could make important contributions to this effort if it were attractive to them in a...in a monetary sense. 'Cause they're not...They're never going to make a lot of money at it. ((Chuckle))

Farley: No.

Boardman: Right?

Farley: Norm, was it possible that somebody who had been promised a job over here was turned down and he was very unhappy and he stirred this...?

Boardman: I think...Yeah, it was something like that. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And I think that the approach that was taken was ((Clears throat)) on-the-job-rating. I think, uh, there should have been, perhaps, a...a, uh, ((Verbal pause)) at least a companion effort made to look at...at the way the thing was being managed. ((Acknowledgment)) Because these people would come in, more or less, on their own time, although it got to be that they...they...where they had workloads, and they...They....They had to be... ((Verbal pause)) They had to be adhered to. But, uh, no way should the, ah, reemployed annuitants be treated with kid gloves. They were workers just like anybody else, and they had to adhere to certain, uh, rules and regulations of any organization. And, uh, I think this is really what... what, uh, if...If there was any criticism, ah, that...ah, ((Verbal pause)) could have been corrected, I think that was it. I...I think they made the wrong approach on the grade level, in my opinion. ((Acknowledgment)) I think they should have looked at it from the, uh...uh, viewpoint of how are these reemployed annuitants being supervised, and, as reemployed annuitants, do you need to have any ((Cough)) other type of managerial techniques applied to them because they're s...they're uh...uh,

reemployed annuitants? In my opinion, the answer is no. They're just regular employees and they have to adhere to the same rules and regulations of the organization for which they're working.

Farley: Right.

Boardman: They don't have any special privileges.

Farley: Right. Norm in the original concept...Was there any requirement that they would have to work a certain schedule, that is, 36 hours every pay period? Or could they...Could they work so many hours straight through and then maybe take a couple of weeks off? Do you remember the original thought?

Boardman: The original thought was that, uh...that, uh, we had...We had such a big backlog that we wouldn't tolerate anybody coming in one day a week or two days a week. They would have to be available to work and do this declassification bit. Ah, the, uh...Obviously, uh, those...Those things are never, ((Chuckle)) a hundred percent. But we weren't interested in somebody just for one day, or ((Acknowledgment)) a limited period of time. Now, when you say 36 hours a week, that's...That's almost like a full week. Certainly, uh...And you say limited to thir...36 hours?

Farley: No...Yes, limited to 36 hours in a pay period.

Boardman: No, we never even considered that, ((Acknowledgment)) because we, uh, we...We were thinking of the workload, ((Acknowledgment)) and getting the work fi...completed. ((Tapping noise))

Farley: Let me switch...

Boardman: Yeah. ((Tape ends))

[Tape 3, side 1]

Farley: But you remember for a while there, a lot of people—and I'm thinking of one in particular—would work straight through for, uh, maybe four or five weeks and then take, uh, a month off and then still be within the regulations and the rules of his contract.

Boardman: Was that, uh, well, do we mention names? Uh, is it...? I...((stutters)) No, I don't have any...anything bad to say about anybody really, right?

Farley: It is Wally.

Boardman: Yeah. Well, with Wally... ((Microphone noise)) Now, I...I guess as I think about that I, uh, I guess Bill Gerhard was his administrative superior. And Wally, uh, had all this background knowledge, of, uh, the Army Intelligence Service and certainly, uh, had a lot of knowledge that was valuable to the archives or to the declassification people. And certainly he had access to certain, like the Army Intelligence material in the Pentagon. He knew about it and that sort of thing. So I, uh...We were anxious to get him. I guess that's number one. As it developed, when he would take off for two, three months at a time, or whatever it was, uh, I don't remember personally, ((microphone noise)) uh, getting involved in that, although I

was aware of it because he had a house in Florida obviously.
((Acknowledgment)) Ah, I don't think that should have been, uh...uh, allowed. ((Acknowledgment)) No, we shouldn't allow that. We're...We're hiring reemployed annuitants for a purpose. It's a legitimate purpose. We're using their expertise and background and the, uh...It would only be a very exceptional case where you would allow something like that to, uh, to happen. And let's say, in a case like Winkler, in retrospect, which is all very easy, ((Verbal pause)) uh, maybe we should have just said, well, okay, ((Stutter)) we hire you from here to here, and then when you...If you go away we...We have to fill your billet with somebody else. Because I still recall there were plenty of applicants ((Acknowledgment)) who were...who were, uh, ((table taps)) ah, available and who... ((acknowledgment)) who wanted to work. ((Acknowledgment)) Now, Wally's a very good friend of mine, and I, uh, I'm sure he would...would probably agree with what I've just said that he would then have re...have left his job and put his name on the list to come back, right?

Farley: Yes. Yeah. Yeah, he wanted to come back. I think he wanted to stay on. But it was costing him money to drive in. He was getting three dollars an hour or something like that...

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: I don't know what it was.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: But it was not, uh, not worth his time.

Boardman: That's right, yeah.

Farley: In the early days did you have parking privileges and certain other privileges that, uh, were since taken away? And I'm thinking of the indignity that, uh, Dale Marston said, "When they took my parking place, that's the end." And he quit.

Boardman: Well, my recollection about the parking was on the side here. Ah, these were pretty well taken up, but I think we got three...three parking places. And, uh, I think I got one of them. Ah, and, uh, I don't remember. I guess Tony got one, and maybe Gerhard, and But we were...We, uh...There were some that were not...((Verbal pause)) The...The parking place right by the side of the building was "first come—first served" except for maybe the first eight or ten. ((Acknowledgment)) Then if you were...If they were empty, anybody could move into them. Well, that...That happened from time to time if you got here early enough. But then they opened up this parking place on the hill and I think, for the most part, everyone decided they would park up there and walk down the hill to the building. And, uh, my recollection is that, uh...I always remember that Don Snow parked there. ((Acknowledgment)) And, uh, I remember that I parked there from time to time, for some reason I can't remember now.

Farley: Right. Did you people have to write performance appraisals or periodic

assessments of the accomplishments of these people?

Boardman: No, that's another fact...That's right. No, we never did. And that's what I think should be instituted. And, for example, if we have a reemployed annuitant—I made this point in my notes.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: ((Pause)) But the reemployed annuitants should be subject to a performance appraisal. And if they're not performing in accordance with the, uh, ((Verbal pause)) standards, that ((Verbal pause)) several things can happen. They can either be told to shape up or ship out, or they can say, well, we're not going to renew your contract, or they...I think it's still a yearly contract.

Farley: Yes.

Boardman: And you still have that sort of protection if you get a guy who just is not...is not cutting the mustard, as it were. And, uh, I think that, uh, those people should be weeded out, period. It may be hard in some instances where you have a f...a friend or...or whatever, but, uh, yeah, I think the reemployed annuitants are valuable, they're knowledgeable, but they should adhere to the basic Agency, uh, personnel requirements in terms of operation and supervision. I gu...We s...I guess we still don't, ah, have performance appraisals on them.

Farley: We do.

Boardman: You do now.

Farley: Not in that exact form.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: They tell how many pages of documents they reviewed and how many paper...how many pages they've clipped, and trimmed, and re-stapled, and put in boxes. It's sort of a tabulation, ((tap)) a...a piece count I guess you'd call it, rather than somebody saying, "Well, I'm researching the history of, ah, requirements," for instance, "and, uh, I've done three chapters," things like that. I don't know whether they do that in that detail, but there's some type of performance appraisal.

Boardman: Yeah, there...There should be. I think, uh, we had several people...Ah, I guess [redacted] was one. He, uh, he kind of, I think, abused the system to a degree. And...But we...Gerhard and I used to talk about this, and I said, "Well, ah, we don't renew his contract." And I think ultimately that's what happened. ((Acknowledgment)) Because he...He just wanted to do his own thing. He didn't want to work within the framework of what we were trying to do.

(b) (6)

Farley: Hmm, was that his problem?

Boardman: Yeah. He wanted to do his own thing, which was to, uh, declassify a paper he had written so it could be published. That was one of the things he... ((Table taps))

Farley: You know that.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: He left very unhappy.

Boardman: I'll bet he did.

Farley: Yeah.

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: In fact he just cut it off one day and said, "Auf Wiedersehen."

Boardman: Yeah. Well, uh, that's... That's right, and I think that's what we should do with the... ((Verbal pause)) After all it's... ((Verbal pause)) It's a bona fide operation that requires the best of people and the best of supervision. And, uh, I would say that, if, uh...uh, There were lots...certainly lots of mistakes made, and I...I'm... ((Chuckles)) I'm not, uh, lily white in any...in any regard, uh, in this area. But, uh, I would think that, uh, the reemployed annuitants should—when they first come on—should be given some sort of a...a work... ((Verbal pause)) a description of what their...what's expected of them, ((Acknowledgment and agreement)) and that we... They would be, ah... Every year they would be, ah... ((Verbal pause)) When their contract came up for renewal, they would get some sort of a...a performance appraisal. And that would be the time... If a guy is kind of marginal and you have other who, you think good guys who are on the thing, you say, "Well, we're going to... We... We're not going to renew your contract." And then if he says, "What's wrong?" and if you haven't talked to him before, then...then you...you're up the tree, you know, you... ((Acknowledgment)) So you have to... You have to exert supervisory techniques in handling these people.

Farley: Yeah. Norm, do you think the people from the analytical elements...the reemployed annuitants from the analytical elements are more valuable than somebody from "L" Group, or somebody from Personnel who has retired and then is hired over here?

Boardman: Well, that's hard to answer because, uh, it's a very, uh, basic thing. I think you need all types.

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: But you need the best... ((Emphasized and chuckles))

Farley: Okay.

Boardman: Of the analytic groups. You don't need somebody who's a...who's a sorehead, or who...who is a malcontent, or something like that. You need a real dedicated guy, and I think the same is true with these other types. You don't... You don't need anyone who's looking for a soft touch. Because I'm...I'm afraid that that's what is...is... People think, uh, when they see, uh...uh, an old employee coming back and going over to this building, ((Thump)) and... And they see him all over, uh, all over the Agency, like in the Credit Union, in the drugstore, and they see him in the

restaurants and so forth, they go, "What's he doing here?" you know.

Farley: 'Cause you remember, this place didn't have a very good reputation. I mean, it was kept quiet, and nobody wanted to tell anybody what they did. And it was sort of a...a, uh, take-care-of-your-brother type organization. Do you remember that, when Gerhard was here, and...?

Boardman: I think...Yeah, I think that's...That's a fair comment, yeah.

Farley: Sad but true. Maybe that's what shook up "M," or "D," or whoever it was.

Boardman: Yeah...Yeah, and...And...And, you see I...I'm still saying that I don't...I disagree with the approach that they took. I think they should have approached it from a managerial standpoint, not a grade standpoint.

Farley: Yeah, uh huh.

Boardman: But maybe that was the easiest way for them to do it. I don't know.

Farley: A lot of people claimed foul on that one, for sure. Some of the people who were interviewed...

Boardman: Yeah.

Farley: Claimed that they weren't given any...any chance to do a rebuttal, but, uh...

Boardman: Yeah. Well. I...I guess maybe in that regard I probably didn't do, uh, ((Verbal pause)) the organization any good because, wh...when they asked me what I did, I said, "Well, I..." ((Verbal pause)) I, uh, I was at the point where hopefully we were all going to be doing the business of, uh, of reviewing records and preparing them for archival storage. And, uh, I had considered, I guess, for the most part that my work in...in terms of getting the building and getting the thing established was...was pretty well along. And, that I had thought that as time went on that I would gradually work my way into doing the...the routine work of the archives and so forth. And, that I think, uh, ((Verbal pause)) they leaped on that as well. You don't really need any archival...uh, any reemployed annuitant types to be in any...in any higher grade structure. Well, I didn't really think that that was the way they were looking at it. Because I think that, uh, even if a guy does the routine declassification, if he has, uh, if he has a reputation and knowledge and is a very, very excellent, ah, cryptologist, I think that, uh, he shouldn't be...His grade shouldn't be lowered. ((Acknowledgment)) He...He should be ((Verbal pause)) employed at his...at the highest of his particular category and his information and knowledge be used to carry on the effort. And maybe...This may be a difficult area. It may, uh...You may have a lot of discussion or...

Farley: Yeah, (1-2G).

Boardman: Or di...disagreement on this.

Farley: I guess so.

Boardman: Personally I... ((microphone noise)) I've always liked the idea of the

reemployed annuitant concept, because I had felt that we would get the best people...We could really get the best people to do the job. Now, I'm sure if you say, "Well now you..." ((Chuckle)) You look back and you got guys like, uh, what was his name [redacted] [redacted] (b) (6)

Farley: [redacted]

Boardman: Not [redacted] He...He, uh, redheaded guy. He was in the Army. You know who I mean.

Farley: Oh yeah. Well, uh...

Boardman: Ah, the "M" Group ((Chuckle)) were a little disappointed that we took him on as a reemployed annuitant because, ah, he apparently had...He...He was kind of a meddlesome type of character. He would ask all sorts of embarrassing questions and exploit lost causes.

Farley: Oh yeah, okay. I can't think of his name, but I know who you speak of.

Boardman: Yeah. ((Farley chuckles)) Well, we felt...Uh...uh, I was...I had a hand in that as well as Bill Gerhard, and we felt that he, despite his reputation, he could, uh...uh, provide a service to the declassification function which, I am sorry to say, I don't think worked out. We...We probably made a mistake when we hired him as a reemployed annuitant.

Farley: If you're hired after you're sixty, you're...((cut off))

Boardman: Yeah, I'm glad I don't remember his name ((Laughing)) at this point.

Farley: I can see him but I can't remember his name. Hmm. Norm, do you have any other...anything, comments? ((Paper shuffling)) We did a lot of questions.

Boardman: Well, I s...I said that—and this, now, is again a managerial decision—that, uh, not being fully aware of what the present, uh, situation is in the archives, but I thought with like, let's say, the history task or specific tasks that, uh, you know, need to be completed, that it might be possible to look into the feasibility of...Just take me for an example—and I don't mean to...I'm just using myself as an example—Let's say that a...a decision was made to, uh, do something on the history program and you needed some people to think the thing through and to come up with some guidelines etcetera. The, uh...Rather than, let's say, go through the routine of a reemployed annuitant, it might be possible to put people on TDY, or even a volunteer basis, to bring them in to discuss, uh, long-term plans, uh, ideas as to how something might be accomplished and, uh...uh, and not really employ them as reemployed annuitants. It's somewhere in between a private citizen and a...and a reemployed annuitant.

Farley: Oh yeah.

Boardman: Now, like in my case here, when I come out here, I don't...I kind of enjoy looking back and ((Chuckles)) making comments, etcetera, etcetera. ((Both chuckle)) And I'm willing...personally willing to do this on a volunteer basis because it's...It's part of my whole life, really. And, uh, it

