DRAFT NOTES ON OFFSHORE ISLANDS

Daniel Ellsberg

February 1963
July 23

PACAF intelligence estimated that the next crisis in the world would be in the Taiwan Strait.

Briefing by General Lawrence S. Kuter at Z.I. Commanders Conference, Patrick AFB, November 20-21, 1958 [q]

July 1958

During the series of the planning of limited war studies carried out in early 1958, State had 1st held out for the use of HE by US forces. The military felt that use of atomic weapons was inevitable. Twining reflected this.

612, p. 20 CT

July

The 1st indications of a crisis were the increased resistance to reconnaissance in July. The GRC stepped up air patrols to trigger air engagements.

620 U

July 30-31

CC occupy airfields near Swatow

621

July 1958

There were a number of signs of renewed CC activity. Western diplomats were restricted to the city of Peiking and there was an intensified propaganda war. 200 fighters including MIG 17's occupied the fields in the Fruken province. Air defense against GRC reconnaissance and fighter sorties over the mainland became more effective. Between 23 June and 8 Aug. 10 GRC planes were shot down, 7 in air engagements, and 3 by anti-aircraft fire. CC overflights over Q and Matsu began. CC's augmented their artillery strength.

601, p. 14
Aug. 1

GRC reconnaissance reveals CC planes at previously unoccupied air field
new Swatow;

no non-military activity

633

Aug. 3

According to West German intelligence sources, M advised K that the Chinese
were planning an immediate effort to take Q and Matsu or to completely demolish
them, but have no intention of attacking Taiwan. K attempted to dissuade M
and warned of the grave risk vis-a-vis the US. M disagreed, arguing that the
US was not prepared to use force to defend the islands. Tactics used in ac-
quiring the tachons (Tactoes?) might work. It is essential for internal-external
prestige of the CC to undertake the campaign. Capture would demoralize Taiwan,
increase defections

The Germans considered the report reliable.

Aug. 3

It was reported from HK on August 22 that K had told M that hostilities
must not involve the US since the SU was not in a position to offer armed as-
sistance in the FE.

Tele from HK, #299, 8/22/58 [F]

Aug. 4

At a meeting with Ambassador Drumright and Admiral Smoot, Chiang stated
that the K-M meeting was the most important event in the FE in the last 10 yrs.
After the meeting, the CC might take military action against Taiwan. It is
now transferring large contingents of the air force to South China. The CC
will take military action not limited to the OSI.

The SU tried to get the CC to take a diversionary move, and CC thought
they were ready. Communists might use nuclear weapons and missiles in sur-
prise attack on Taiwan. The CC fear the existence of Taiwan more than US
retaliation.

The GRC will observe treaty. Asked what U.S. would do if Communists
hit Taiwan with missiles, GRC should be told of likely US response. M 100's
should be stashed on Taiwan and sidewinders sent immediately.
Aug. 7

CINCPACAF distributed to all its subordinate commanders a summary of the interim plan in support of CINCPAC 25/58 which provides for phase 1) patrol and reconnaissance; phase 2) defeat of attacking force, both sides using nukes; phase 3) if authorized by JCS and capability of CC to make war. In Phase 2 atomic weapons used by both sides, 13th Air Force Commander to direct atomic operations; initial operations will emphasize pre-plans like strikes from Claude and Kadena. No conventional operations plans.

Tele CINCPACAF TO ALL MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS.
7 Aug. '58 [CT] [V]

Aug. 15

A mtg. was held in the Pentagon on this date to discuss the Taiwan Strait crisis. Present were the Joint Chiefs, Gordon Gray, Herter, C bell, Amery, etc.

Herter: State needs to know from the JCS thoughts and general plans on defense of the OSI before making further moves.

Twining: CC built up air strength to prevent air reconnaissance. They may seek to blockade for which they have the capability. Since blockade is not attacked, it is questionable if the US should intervene. If the CC attack OSI directly, then we must support GRC forces because otherwise we would lose everything -- OSI and sooner or later Taiwan.

Herter: Is there a difference between frontal attack and starving OSI?

Twining: GRC must try to cope along initially with interdiction. Any blockade takes a long time if it becomes complete to be a complete success. If it becomes complete, the US could intervene.

Herter asked how.

Twining said by any bases on the mainland.

Herter asked how extensive this would have to be.

Twining: Political as well as military factors as controlling. All of the job would not be done at once. We would start by getting a few of the airfields in the Annay area.
Heter: Is it necessary to use nuks?

Twining: Yes, low yield 10-15 kt. would be used. At this point CC might break off, but might not, in which case US has no alternative but to conduct nuclear strikes deep into China as far north as Shanghai involving likely CC nuclear retaliation against Taiwan and possibly Okinawa and elsewhere. If national policy is to defend the OSI, we must face the consequences.

Taylor: We want to stake so much over these small islands.

LeMay: It is not just the OSI, but our whole position in the FE.

Robinson agreed. We tried to get the GRC to withdraw in 1955 but had no success. The GRC will defend them. The best way to avoid attack is to give notice to the Soviet Union and China that the US will defend.

Twining: The CC may keep closing in. Decisions should be made now on whether US will help defend against interdiction as well as direct attack.

Smith: (State PPS): Could an air battle be fought simply in the air over the islands.

Twining: US would lose this battle. We need to hit bases.

Smith: What is the military effect of hitting a few bases?

Twining: "Not much."

Smith: If US first nuclear strike doesn't bring event to an end and US thrust deeper into China, where Communists likely to counter with nuks?

Twining: Yes, probably.

Taylor: If State clarified what US had to hold, JCS would use minimum force necessary to hold.

Robinson: If CC take the OSI, US would have to face up to losing Taiwan and Southeast Asia. In military terms, what is the strategic importance of Taiwan?

Taylor: US could hold Taiwan even in GRC totally destroyed.

LeMay: It would be an untenable US position to hold Taiwan if the GRC were destroyed.

Murphy: Have we recently reviewed with the GRC the question of evacuating the OSI? Does the GRC believe it will lose everything if it evacuates?

Robinson: It was difficult in 1955. It would be even more difficult today, in fact, virtually impossible.

General Bowen (former MAAG Taiwan): GRC plans call for holding OSI at all cost. They plan for army reinforcements if necessary and use of air force and Navy. GRC will fight to the finish over OSI.
Twining: Militarily the OSI have little value. The value is political and psychological.

Herter: Is the GRC likely to engage in rash action dragging US in?

Robertson: GRC pledged to consult and has stuck to its word. He raised the question of US making the statement that might deter CC from attacking or interdicting the OSI.

Gray: Publicity should reaffirm status quo, more effectively toward Peking thru diplomatic channels.

Herter: However done, must be sure to get thru.

Murphy: Opposed public statement. best approach might be JFD to Gromyko. CC would take this more seriously. There was general consensus on this.

Robinson had been thinking of warning via British ambassador in Peking, but I and JFD should be asked at press conference and must say something. Statement that Communist attack would be disturbing to peace of Asia would be useful.

Twining: preferred restatement of Formosa resolution position. How certain could we be that GRC would not precipitate an Attack?

Robertson: Chiang would not go in without US consent, and in any case, GRC has now lost air supremacy.

LeMay: US must make interests clear, perhaps by ultimatum before going in. [Note: according to interview 8/21/62 with Green, interdiction being considered was aerial and not artillery].

Substance of discussion meeting of 8/15 State/JCS, held Pentagon Fri., Aug. 15 '58 11:00 AM. Present: JCS: Gordon Gray; Herter; Cabell; etc. [CT] [05]

Aug. 15

A mtg was held on the morning of Aug 15 called by Herter and attended by Herter, Murphy, Robinson, and the JCS. The purpose was to discuss the Taiwan situation. The mtg confirmed Herter's view that there was a need to warn the CC that if they attempted to seize Q or Matsu by assault or interdiction, they would run the clear risk of US military counter measures to keep the islands in GRC hands. This seemed to Herter to be the most effective way to preserve the islands and the peace, but it involved serious risks. The State and JCS agreed that the loss of the OSI would lead to attacks on Taiwan. JCS planning recognized that if attack on the OSI, the US must intervene, or the islands would be lost. If there is a blockade, JCS do not plan initial intervention, but if the blockade is successful, the US would go in.

Effective US intervention would necessitate nuclear bombing of the mainland bases which would begin selectively with 6-8 basis in the Amoy area. If CC persists, then it would be necessary to face the possibility of nuclear exchange involving much of China and Taiwan, Okinawa, and perhaps elsewhere. The JCS believe that the CC may well probe, but will deterred [sic] if they knew it were our intention to intervene. Herter believed that the warning
should not be public, to to effective confidential diplomatic channels. However, if the US makes the warning, it must be prepared to make good. Herter recommended to Dulles that he confer with I with a view toward conveying informally to Gronyko or Meshoik an indication of our intention to prevent seizure or successful interdiction of the OSI. It is essential to consider Congressional implications. If this comes up at the press conference, I should fall back on Formosa Resolution. All this contained in Herter memo to Dulles.

[Memo for the Secy. Aug 15, subj: recommended warning to Peiping against attacking the OSI - signed Christian A. Herter (FE M. Green).]

Aug 19

General Kuter was advised by LeMay that should the contingency arise of wholly unexpected CC attack on the OSI, the US must be prepared for immediate retaliation. The best means of neutralizing the CCAF quickly would be simultaneously striking coastal airfields, catching the block of the CC aircraft on the ground, using Guam base SAC B-47’s. SAC has been alerted for this purpose. If CC beagles move south, it may be necessary to augment Guam capability. 25-58 should be modified to include this concept. Cruda’s advice requested before final JCS decision.

[Tele from HQ US Air Force to CINCPACAF TS Control #1961, personal - Cruda from LeMay 19 Aug 58 (CF RL).]

Aug 20

In response to a request of 12 Aug from Gordon Gray, the Joint Staff considered a number of possible alternatives in the TS and a proposed US course of action. The memo was tabled at the Joint Chiefs’ mtg of 20 Aug and no action was taken on it.

Situation A: CC without blockading becomes increasingly aggressive in air operations over Taiwan provoking incidents. US courses of action: (a) increase military aid to GRC; sidewinders are on way and this should be announced; (b) US should assume Taiwan defense which would mean more US aircraft; (c) increase show of force; (d) no GRC bombing of mainland; CC may be trying to provoke GRC.

Situation B: CC air force penetrates air space over Taiwan or Pescadores; US course of action: (a) US should resist by employing US air force forces available on Taiwan and 7thFlt air. US planes used only if GRC could not handle situation and against planes making attack; (b) if very large penetration US aircraft could attack mainland air bases using conventional and nuclear weapons, would require nuks, would require nuks to be effective; use of tac nuks against coastal airfields would not result in full-scale US/CC war. If CC did not cease, US would have to attack more airfields.

Situation C: CC blockade, GRC held OSI by sea and air with view to forcing surrender without landing troops; US courses of action: (a) US could provide air cover and naval escort for resupply, would be effective in holding islands
(b) failure to take necessary naval and air action would result in collapse of GRC forces on OSI. This would impair faith of GRC and US; (c) US could not afford to let the OSI be lost by any means including blockade.

Situation D: CC launch major assault on OSI; consideration of US action: (a) action under C also applies; (b) US should issue ultimatum of retaliation and bring issue to UN; US should seek UN endorsement but cannot wait for it; (c) use full strength to defeat attack, probably involve use of nukes by US and CC use of SAC required, reinforcement of US forces;

Situation E: CC attack Taiwan and the Pescadores; courses: (d) without ultimatum need for atomic attack against sea-based forces.

Gray asked what steps the US should take publicly or otherwise to state its policy toward CC effort to take OSI. Comment: no steps should be taken.

[JCS DM230-58 20 Aug 58 Memo for Gen Twining, Gen White, Gen Taylor, Gen Pate, and Adm Burke; subj: consideration of courses of US action with respect to Taiwan (U) signed Oliver S. Pié Lt Gen, USAF, Director Joint Staff (CT) (SI).]

20 August

General Kuter in a personal message to General May concurred in the proposal by Felt that the GRC be permitted to bomb airfields if the CC use air against the OSI. The second step still short of Phase 2 of 25/58 may be desirable. "There would be merit in a proposal from the military to limit the war geographically [to the newly operational CC air bases] if that proposal would forestall some misguided humanitarian's intention to limit a war to obsolete iron bombs and hot lead."

[Dept of Air Force Staff Message from CINCPACAF to COFS US Air Force, Washington, D.C., 20025-52 August 58 (CT RL).]

20 August

Adm Stump angered I by saying US military power in Pacific weaker than when Korean War began. If ISO to be saved from blockade nukes will probably be needed. I.Amin. pressured Chiang to put troops on OSI. Part of "unleashing" of new foreign policy.

[Alsop, NYHT 8/20.]

August 21

The GRC Air Force has accommodated with surprising grace to the loss of the capability to penetrate mainland air. Except for reconnaissance along coast, GRC is flying defensively only. CC aircraft are now flying regularly over the OSI. Matsu buzzed once, but no strafing or bombing. [It is believed that the CC will apply pressure slowly. There is no evidence of an amphibious build-up. The CC could launch air artillery attacks at any time, but not likely to; gradual.
strangulation more likely, GRC arguing that it can bomb mainland airfields in retaliation for even one strafing. Claim it does not need US permission, but seeks its advice. Seeking US public commitment to defend OSI. The GRC is showing discipline and restraint.

[CIA TIR TDCS-3/367/773 Aug 22, 58 (J5).]

Aug 22

At a mtg of the Secre with Allen Dulles, Twining, Buck [Burke?], etc. it was concluded (1) that the following steps should be taken to improve the GRC situation: (a) 7th Flt to add 1 [add 3?] carriers near OSI; (b) possible fleet exercise not in the Strait; (c) Smoot trip to OSI; (d) increase US fighters on Taiwan; (e) increase flow of supplies and possibly daylight supply to OSI; (f) possible increase of loan 3 LST's to GRC; (g) possible increase of weapons to GRC including recoiless rifles and delivery to OS islands; (h) joint US-GRC air defense. (2) A draft reply for Ike's answer at press conference; doubtful that CC efforts to capture the islands could be made a limited operation constituting real threat to peace; (3) GRC probably assured that "major attack from mainland airfields which looks like a real attack on Taiwan would constitute emergency in terms of Dulles-Yeh's exchange of notes, Dec 1952, and would retaliate. It was agreed that action was more important than words. Dulles said US should continue to look as if we would welcome a fight as this was most likely to deter. He didn't believe that CC would start anything except by miscalculation.

[Rough draft of Mtg of Aug 22, 2 PM; present: Secre., Under-Sec'y Rinehart, Robertson, Allen Dulles, Twining, Buck, and General Byers (ISA) (I).]

pre-Aug 23

At the time of the outbreak of the crisis, a State/Defense/CIA committee was engaged that I request a joint study of possible limited war contingencies. A total of 12, none in Europe, were planned with 6 of these in the FE including 1 on the OSI. This envisioned a CC aerial interdiction and US escalation. The possibility of artillery interdiction had been played down. Lemnitzer had said that this was impossible but Doan (MAAG/Taiwan) was not so sure. The study was in the process when the crisis broke. Green rewrote the contingency paper to fit the artillery case.
"I suspect that the determining cause of change in both Communist China
and Eastern Europe will be natural forces within rather than stimulus from
without."

"Possibly this situation could be taken to the UN Security Council as was
contemplated in one stage back in 1953 or 1954.

Signed: J. F. Dulles"

(Memo for Mr. Herter, Robertson; signed J. F. Dulles Aug. 23, 1958 (J5) )

August 24, 1958

At 24200 GRC commercial vessel was torpedoed. 3 Deputy Commander Generals
of the Q defense were killed and the Chief of Staff, Major General Lin, was
severely wounded. They were waiting to receive the defense minister when the
shelling started on 8/23. This is being closely held by the GRC.

(Dept. Army from US ARMA Taipei to DA Washington 25, August, No. 251430Z,
August '58 (J5) )

August 24, 1958

The TDC reported that if the OSI were attacked by CC aircraft, the GRC
would retaliate against coastal fields. CC attack would lead to US involvement.
If interdiction becomes effective, it may be necessary to provide US air cover
and naval escort for resupply. The US should replace any GRC ships lost in re-
supply. The GRC will fight to the death for Q, once attacked will be unable to
withdraw or reinforce. Recent staff study indicated Q and Matsu could hold out
5-7 days without US help.

(Naval message from TDC to COMNAVFORJAPAN for Feld. 240843Z Aug. '58 No. 6597
(CT) (TL) )

August 24, 1958

Drumwright reported that he believed that the CC were testing US reaction.
The CC have had no time yet to evaluate JFD letter, but if attack continues for
several days the US should deliver a more explicit warning of consequences of
US action. "I believe that if we are prepared to commit ourselves, and I think
we have no, repeat no, honorable alternative but to do so, we should by all
means make our position clear to Reds. If we do, I believe Reds will draw back.
If we do not, Reds are likely to continue probing until we are engaged in hostil-
ities with them."

(State Tele. from Taipei, 212 Aug. 24 (OT) (TL) )

August 24, 1958

Amb. Drumwright told Chiang in request for standby authority to bomb the
mainland that the letter of Dec. 10 '54 between Dulles and Yeh has a basic
applicability to this request. The US Gov't. does not question the GRC inherent
right of self-defense, expects the GRC to consult concerning any use of force
"unless attacks are mounted in such magnitude and determination as clearly to
August 24, 1958

The CNO informed the CINCPAC flt that JCS will continue to press to use A weapons on CC local airfields from the outset of hostilities, but the US government is not likely to give authority in advance. There is good reasons for this including the newly instituted test ban. Doubt US will give permission to use A weapons against mainland, until Taiwan is attacked, or at least not until after it consults many nations. There is a desire to keep the war limited. These arguments are not sound, but they are persuasive. The TDC and 7th Flt should have plans for all contingencies including a completely conventional operation, should prepare list of proposed A targets since authority to attack will be by JCS or above. All this based on receiving orders from President to assist. None received yet, although JED stated intention.

(Naval message from CNO to CINCPACFLT 241549Z Aug. '58 No. 2270 (CT) (T1) )

August 24, 1958

A Navy paper was prepared which played a major role in establishing the JCS position and which Burke gave to I on 8/25. The Paper said: 1) a major effort by the CC to take OSi is beginning of encroachment on Chinese Nationalists. It must be stopped initially or it will continue to CRC destruction. 2) Although attacks on mainland may have to be initially conventional for political reasons, "we will require atomic strikes on the Chinese mainland to effectively and quickly stop CC aggression." 3) the CC must be recognized as aggressive by world opinion or Allies (Japan, Philippines) may not support US and may deny bases. 4) US must present reasonable objectives. CC action is the beginning of further expansion. 5) US must undertake operations which bring actions to a halt quickly. Prolonged operations will diminish military capabilities in other areas or for general war. 6) US must be prepared for CC operations in other areas and Korea.

Doctrine provided for the capability for both ICB and nuclear. "It was felt that the F-100D even when employed in local war operations was more suitable for the delivery of nuclear weapons than for the delivery of obsolete World War II weapons." Near the end of 1957 PACAF units were directed to the following priorities: 1) "Development of the capability to deliver conventional (sic.) atomic weapons using low altitude bombing system (Labs)" 2) Development of the capability to deliver conventional weapons using the M1 system; 3) delivery of conventional weapons using MSQ-AFNM1; 4) "the development of the capability to deliver obsolete weapons"; four was to be deferred until 1-3 obtained. Priorities were approved until Nov. of 1957.

(603, Chapter 5 "Priorities in the Development of Weapons Delivery Capability")

August 23, 1958

The principle target of the bombardment was the GRC/Kirman defense bsdq. area. Defense Minister Yu was slightly wounded and two general officers were killed.

(Memo to Secy. from FE Mr. Parsens Subj: Developments in the TS since Aug. 23, Aug. 31, '58 (CT) (01)

August 23, 1958

The following is the test of a memo for Mr. Herter and Mr. Robertson which is signed J. F. Dulles and dated Aug. 23, 1958:

"Allan Dulles has just phoned me that the Chi-Coms have reportedly been subjected the Offshore Islands to an extremely heavy bombardment."

"If this seems really serious and critical, there is perhaps room for the good offices of some acceptable third power."

"I do not feel that we have a case which is altogether defensible. It is one thing to contend that the Chi-Coms should keep their hands off the present territorial and political status of Taiwan, the Peng-hu's, Quemoy, and Matsu, and not attempt to change this by violence which might precipitate general war in the area."

"It is another thing to contend that they should be quiescent while this area is used by the Chi-Nats as an active base for attempting to foment civil strife and to carry out widespread propaganda through leaflets, etc. against the Chi-Com regime. We are, in effect, demanding that these island be a 'privileged sanctuary' from which the Chi-Nats can wage at least political and subversive against the Chi-Coms but against which the Chi-Coms cannot retaliate."

"I wonder whether there is not the basis for some peaceful modus vivendi, although I realize that it would be extremely difficult to persuade the Chi-Nats not to attempt to be active against the Chi-Coms. I assume that such activity is important for their morale, although I am inclined to doubt that it has any appreciable effect. We ourselves have, I understand, suspended the dropping of leaflets by balloons, etc., into Eastern Europe."
The JCS at a mtg. approved a series of papers for discussion with the President. These included a draft message to CINCPAC and MAC, a draft statement of US policy, and a statement on implications of US involvement in the defense of the OSI, and a draft of message by JCS to CINCPAC and MAC. 1) in anticipation of continued CC action against OSI, a) reinforce US air defense and prepare to assume US responsibility for defense of Taiwan; b) advise if need augmentation from CONUS; c) prepare to escort and protect sea and supply ships to OSI; d) augment 7th Flt; c) sail midway from Pearl; f) in event major attack seriously endangers OSI, prepare to assist GRC including attack coastal air bases. It is probably that initially only conventional weapons will be authorized but prepare to use atomic weapons. Prepare of use of atomic weapons is authorized to extend deeper into CC territory. 2) For your info, SAC B-47 squadron of 15 aircraft now ready on Guam, can be made available for use in atomic attacks against mainland targets. "This squadron has no conventional capability." (It did, and air force knew it; see air force cables from Kuter -- MHR). 3) Following actions being taken: a) Dept. of Army being expedited to deliver modern equipment for use of OSI troops; b) Dept. of Def. has authorized dispatch NIKE battalion to Taiwan; 4) Dept. of Def. has authorized dispatch of 3 additional LST's; 5) You may inform Chinese of 1 ACDE, 3AB, and 3ABC. (Notes in margin and text indicate that 1c and 3a were deleted from list of things that could be told to the Chinese). 2) Draft by JCS of statement of US policy (SECRET) "The US Government will not permit the loss of the Offshore Islands to Chinese Communist aggression. In case of major air of amphibious attacks which in the opinion of the US seriously endanger the islands, the United States will concur in the CHINAT attack of CHICOM close in mainland bases. In such an event, the United States will reinforce the CHINATS to the extent necessary to insure the security of these islands. This action may include joining in the attack of CHICOM bases with atomic weapons used if needed to gain the military objective. This position does not cover the case of harassing bombardment and attacks of the nature and skill mounted against the Offshore Islands in the past." 3) Implications of US involvement in defense of the Offshore Islands: 1) major effort of CC to take the islands is beginning of encroachment on GRC, must be stopped initially or will continue to destruction of GRC. 2) "Although attacks against mainland targets may for political reasons, be by conventional weapons initially, we will require atomic strikes on the Chinese mainland to effectively and quickly stop Chinese Communist aggression." 3) CC must be recognized as aggressor by world opinion. If not, Japan and Philippines may deny use of US bases. 4) US must present reasonable objective to the world of stopping beginning of extensive aggression. 5) must be prepared to bring operations to a conclusion quickly "A major involvement of prolonged operation would seriously diminish our military capabilities in other areas or for general war. 6) must be prepared for CC operations in other areas, both Southeast Asia and Korea.

(Attachments to JCS Memo for Generals Twining, Taylor, White, Pat, and Adm. Burke, Aug. 25, '58 5599-58 subj: papers for discussion by the Chm., JCS with the President on Aug. 25, '58 (CT) (SL) )

August 25, 1958

CINCPAC made a review of its requirements on the 25/58 in case of a non-nuclear defense of the OSI which revealed a need for supplementary annex. Would have to be modified to recognize that the CC have the capability of
conducting amphibious and airborne operations supported by naval and air
capacity to overwhelm GRC forces on OSI. The commands were instructed to
prepare for actions as follows:

CC ACTIONS

a) Overfly OSI
b) CC Artillery and sporadic air on OSI
c) CC attempt to establish air superiority against OSI
d) CC establish air/naval blockade
e) Attempt to invade

US/GRC ACTIONS

a) US assumes responsibility air defense Taiwan
b) Some + US concurrence in GRC by any means against artillery pieces. Same
d) Some and US and GRC forces defend OSI Hot pursuit by US/GRC forces
attacking CC air and navy and supporting bases
Some + attacks against staging areas mainland bases and its assault forces. Commanders were
instructed to determine HR capability. Successful implementation of 25/53 based on nuclear environ-
ment Logistics system is not designed for HR operations of magnitude to defend OSI. Annex H
being prepared.

(AADMNO CINCPAC to CINCUSAR PAC/CINCPACFLT/CINCPACAF/TDC 8/25/58 250800Z,
No. 6027 (F1) (CT) )

August 26, 1958

The shelling of Q was 1st reported in the Soviet press today and was re-
ported as an artillery duel begun by the GRC.

August 26, 1958

Gen. Kuter provided Washington with the following analysis of the situ-
atations: The CC is aiming to trigger GRC reaction and make the GRC appear
aggressive. They are probing US policy, and this is the start of an interdic-
tion program. The CC will avoid massive air power against Q in fear of US
retaliation. CC will assault small Q island to bolster morale and probe inten-
tions within 48 hours. The GRC will not take much more provocation without
attacking. All-out air and sea effort against Q and Matsu not expected. Air
action has no chance of success unless atomic weapons used from the outset. US
should insur strong sentiment, deploy forces, refuse to agree to mainland
bombing. If invasion threats or blockade successful, should a) authorize GRC
to bomb airfields, b) provide US naval and air support near Q; c) issue ultima-
tum to CC to stop or face US bombing. If CC aggression continues, use nuks
against mainland in increments: 1) force CC airfields directly opposite Taiwan
and military control center at Ching Wang; 2) select targets within 400 mile
radius of Taiwan including beagle bases and control centers; 3) remainder of
targets and annex E Oplan 25-58; 4) phase 3 of Oplan 25-58. "It is emphasized that combined US/China capability to defend OSI without discretionary use of nukes would be costly and probably ineffective. Less forceful alternatives would in the long run prove disastrous.

(Take from CINCPAC AF to USAF 251200Z, TS2046, 26 Aug. '58 (CT) (R2)

August 26, 1958

CINCPAC sent the following assessment to the JCS on the current situation: Both the GCC and the CC are uncertain as to US actions in case of a major attack on the OSI. Concur in JCS 947046 particularly withholding information from GCC. Reports indicate the CC are working up to a major attack on one or both island groups. TDC believe GCC will retaliate coastal airfields without US consent, but CINCPAC doesn't agree. From military point of view, OSI not worth getting involved, even in limited war. Psychological factors, however, outweigh military ones. This part of world waiting to see if US will react in face of aggression, but some Asians don't believe that Q and Matsu are GCC territory. Augmentation of air defense is first step. Step 2 is augmentation ofGCC capability to defend islands. US should make clear it will not accept CC action in int'l waters. Step 3 surface escort and air cover of convoys. Step 4 offensive action against mainland should not be taken except as last resort. All commanders convinced CC have air power to cut off garrison. If CC make all-out effort, garrison could hold out 5-7 days without US aid. Air offense against CC airfields necessary if we are to hold against major attack. Questionable if success can be obtained by use of non-nuclear forces. Planning is now being done on an urgent basis to determine requirements if nukes not authorized. The CC are probing, trying to provoke US action. Can be discouraged short of full-scale war. US must keep own counsel regarding eventual action if other side forces the issue.
(CINCPAC to JCS, Aug. 26, '58 260342Z, No. 6481/6483 (F1) (CT) )

August 26, 1958

The commanders in the field were told to plan on the assumption that targets on mainland would be airfields deep enough to neutralize beagles, and might be nuclear or non-nuclear and to plan on the premise that 25/58 was out of date.
(CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT and TDC, 8/26/58 260506Z, No. 6583 (F1) (CT) )

August 27, 1958

The FE division of State urged that the secretary secure a high level agreement on the military steps to deter CC attacks on the OSI. It noted that an SNIE (100-9-58) predicts intensive military pressure against the OSI including a possible seizure of the likely defendant OSI and an interdiction effort. If US reaction leads CC to believe US will not intervene, the CC will probably attempt to seize Q and Matsu. The CC may not be deterable and the US may have to use atomic weapons. Perhaps initially 1 or 2 low-yield weapons on the Fukian airfields, might force the CC to break off. According the SNIE, if extensive US nuclear attacks on China are carried out, the Soviets would react with nukes on Taiwan and the 7th fleet and might against other US forces and bases in the FE. The US only has a few bases in the area. There is a need to try to avoid nuclear war by deterring, therefore we should 1) provide 8" howitzers or other fums
The following letter was sent from Chiang to I: "Mr. President: CC fire is inflicting heavy casualties including 3 generals injured. CC jets have strafed guns on Quemoy. CC torpedo and gun boats have been attacking GRC ships. CC is likely to continue this rather than launch assault. This would have disastrous consequences. The GRC normally would have responded with retaliatory bombing but in view of US/GRC agreement the GRC is exercising great restraint. The GRC has made no provocative moves in the last 3 years. The CC are bent on invading Quemoy and Matsu or threatening security of the Taiwan Straits. Cannot maintain morale on Quemoy in long run. It is necessary to: 1) deter CC by joining Chinese US demonstration of military might; 2) agree to GRC bombing CC air and naval bases and gun positions opposite OKI. He therefore requests 1) I make declaration that with his present Congressional authority an attack on Quemoy constitutes an attack on Taiwan. US will use forces to resist attack; 2) 7th Flt convoy to Quemoy and Matsu; 3) USNDC must have authority to take action necessary without referring to Washington or the delay will be too long. Quemoy and Matsu are inseparable from Taiwan. This has been correctly appraised by JND in his statement. The US and GRC must work out plans for joint action. When US requested withdrawal from Tachens, it agreed it was to strengthen defense of Quemoy. Signed -- Chiang (From Taipei, No. 241, Aug. 27 (CT) (T2) )

August 27, 1958

Kuter in a personal message to Gerhart said the US should keep out unless it is prepared to use its strongest weapons. He expressed surprise at the JCS statement that SAC B47's on Guam have no capability for HC since on or before Nov. 57 informed him of high-level decision that all bombers, fighter bombers, and strategic fighters must maintain a dual capability. "On one hand, I would like to give 3 rousing cheers for the JCS statement. On the other hand it seems inconceivable that the US might put fleet and marine aviation and PACAF into a high explosive air war and SAC should be incapable of entering the fight." SAC must come in if HE war however distasteful. (Tele. from CINCPAC AF to DC/S Plans and Programs HQ USAF personal to Gerhart, 270355Z TS 2085 27 Aug. '58 (CT R2) )

August 28, 1958

A mtg. was held in the Pentagon included the Acting Heads of the State Dept., Defense, and CIA, and the CNO to consider possible action in response to a message from C to I and a Smoots teles. (281105Z,Aug.). The mtg. authorized escort of GRC ships insofar as was militarily necessary and the Chinese Nats. could not do it on their own. It was agreed that the GRC might be holding back
in their effort in order to bring about a commitment of US forces. It was reported that the GRC would have to commit more naval and air strength to prevent re-supply.

(620 (CT) (I) )

August 20, 1958

At a mtg. of the acting heads of Depts., Herter expressed concern that the GRC was trying to involve the US before making all efforts to cope with the situation, and expressed the need for good intelligence estimates of GRC capabilities. Burke and Quayles agreed that this might be the case. It was agreed that a greater GRC effort, including US escort which was being authorized would guarantee re-supply unless the GRC stepped up its air and naval activity. It was agreed that Chiang should be told that the US was not at this point prepared to commit forces. It was agreed that it was necessary to phrase the answer to C in a way that avoided commitment to the islands or that was so negative that C would move against the mainland himself. Quayles estimates that the US was giving C 75 per cent of his request. It was posed to put decisions back in regular channels by having the GRC deal with the US ambassador in P.

(620 (CT) (H) )

August 28, 1958

The TDC reported that artillery fire has rendered the Q airfield useless. The landing beaches were completely under fire. US convoy will not get material on beaches. Counterbomberdment using ships or from islands cannot be effective. GRC air bombardment practicable, but limited effect with great expense. Islands can hold out for 30 days. GRC officials say morale will break in 2 days, but senior US army official on Q indicates garrison calm and highly motivated. No deterioration is expected for 15 to 30 days more. US must demonstrate that it will support GRC. The TDC requests authority to concur in GRC bombardment, including Napalm of select gun positions. 7th Flt planes and ships adopt more aggressive attitude in international waters.

(TDC to CINCPAC 28 Aug., '58 2811OZ, No. 7227 (PI) (CT) )

August 29, 1958

Gen. Geerhart informed Gen. Kuter that we could not agree in principle with the use of SAC for non-nuclear operations. The unit on Guam has racks in HE weapons. 10 hours are needed for conversion. Each concern or the inadequacy of SHE.

(Tele. from HQ USAF to CINCPACAF personal to Kuter from Geerhart, Aug. 29, 1958 (typed copy from message room), (CT R2) )

August 29, 1958

In a memo prepared by the FE section for the Acting Secretary in response to questions raised by Herter in mtg. on Aug. 25 in reference to Dulles memo of Aug. 23, the following points about the GRC use of the OSI were made: The GRC often initiates artillery and propaganda rounds, it frequently fires a dozen or so shells on the causeway linking Ta-teng Island opposite Q with mainland.

The GRC never renounced use of OSI as springboard for attack, but probably would
attack from elsewhere. Airfield on Q not used for airlift, for leaflet dropping or reconnaissance over flights. There is no airfield on Matsu. The Geneva contact has been maintained for possible use in crisis. If talks resume, the CC will likely press for foreign minister of summit talks.

(NEMO to Acting Secretary from FE Mr. Parsons, subj: background info and recommendations relating to the situation in the TS, 8/29/58)

August 29, 1958

The commands in the area received JCS instructions to escort and convoy to within 3 miles of Q and to extend GRC forces, cannot fulfill this task. Maintain freedom of sea by actions confined to international waters. TDC can at its discretion assume defense Taiwan. In event CC launch air attack, Q and Matsu, GRC aircraft are assumed to have right to pursue, i.e., fellow aircraft to bases and "attacking aircraft at these bases." Make clear to GRC don't share inevitability of loss of islands by bombardment. This resulted from WH mtg. 8/28/58 authorizing this action. Request info on meteor counterfire, shipment of 12 8" howitzers being expedited, including 6 with conventional ammo from Okinawa. Discussion at governmental level (i.e., White, WH) conferred 3 possible actions and 3 phases. Phase 1) no evidence of assault on principle OSI with the intent to capture. The US should furnish material and logistic assistance but take no direct action. Phase 2) CC start assault with evident intent to capture one or more principal OSI. US forces when directed by JCS would directly assist in defense of OSI including attack on enemy artillery and local airfields. During phase 2 it is anticipated that atomic weapons would not be used. Phase 3) when CC and US opinion extends attack to Taiwan and Pescadores, US would extend action as appropriate. During all 3 phases atomic weapons could not be used without specific authority from President. GRC not to be told about US phase plan and not use of atoms or defense plans.

(JCS to CINCPAC and TDC; JCS 947298, 29 Aug., '58, 2919262 (P1) (CT) )

August 29, 1958

The US Ambassador to UK reported that most British opinion including Conservative would oppose US use of even conventional force to defend Q and Matsu. MacMillan would probably condemn use of force by CC to urge UN consideration. Public reaction much more adverse if nukes used. There is support for the defense of Taiwan.

(D of S, Tele. from London, No. 1230, Aug. 29, '58 (J5) )

August 29, 1958

At a mtg. at the WH with I, proposed GRC actions were discussed. Quarles pointed out that they were for the period of no clear attempt to capture the islands. If the CC tried assault, it would be necessary to invoke direct US non-nuclear assistance. I agreed should hold back assault with nukes in the event of assault on OSI and hoped they would not be necessary at all in this situation. It would not be difficult to identify a massive CC action, and this was not likely without more thorough preparation. Not pursuit OK only in regard to principal islands. Burke suggested that the supplementary section referred to "atomic strikes if ordered" be deleted as unnecessary given earlier WH mtg.
August 30, 1958

CINCPAC AF informed its subordinate command that the possibility exists that US forces may employ at least initially non-nuclear munitions. They were ordered to be prepared to use HE against coastal air bases and other targets which pose invasion threat. Expansion deeper into China would involve nukes.

(Message CINCPAC AF to 13th AF, 5th AF 30 Aug. '58 605A No. 21, pp. 135-38 (CT) (L) )

August 31, 1958

In a personal message Kuter stated that he too abhors using SAC for HE missions. However, if he is ordered to fire in an HE war, he needs to use these forces. One B36 can deliver more HE than a full squadron of F106's. "If we must fight the war with HE weapons, it is in the best interests of the security of the country that part of the load be carried by the great bomb-carrying capability of the B36's or B47's rather than expanding the entire EMP forces of this command which have also been organized, trained, equipped, and positioned for the primary mission of nuclear strikes in general war."

(Tele. from CINCPAC AF to CSAF 310032Z Aug. '58; personal to the Chief from Kuter (CT R2) )

Sept. 2, 1958

The JCS denied a request made by CINCPAC AF on 8/30 that 1 SAC B36 squadron be alerted for HE operations.

(Kuter Briefing 11/10-21 at Z.I. Commanders Conference, Patrick AFB, (Q) )

NO DATE

The 8" howitzer was pushed by the Army strictly as a conventional weapon for psychological reasons. No nuclear use was envisioned.
A mtg. on the TCC was held including Dulles and the entire JCS. Twining: supplies on Q for 60-90 days, the defenders are rationing their shells although there is plenty of ammo on Q and Taiwan. Taylor: 12 8" howitzers being shipped to Q and should add usefully to GRC defense capability. Both sides are well-dug-in and are difficult to dig out gun emplacements on either side with conventional weapons. Burke: US will be using destroyers to escort and there is little danger of their being hit. We should accept this small risk. The CC does not appear so far to have used air strength to attack OSI or supplement interdict. There is an Army advisory group and a CIA representative on Q. General Byers of DOD reported that the Advisory Group communications facilities had been knocked out in the first bombardment, but they are using the CIA facility. Burke: A typhoon would prevent supply landing next 3 days. There have been no unusual gun concentrations but there are thousands of junks in the area. Taylor reported that there had been increase of 2 in the artillery divisions of the area. Burke: morale on Q excellent, casualties 180, 150 killed. GRC navy is lacking in good top-level leadership. It is good technically, but due to a lack of naval tradition, it did not have the urge to go in and scrap. The navy has few ships and fears losses, but has many landing craft. Burke was explaining a mention in the JCS memo of the problem of the relative inactivity of the GRC navy. JFD: Situation might become critical in days or weeks, not in hours. Taylor: The CC has shown in Korea can assemble junks rapidly. JFD asked if the GRC air force has the capability to hit junks, but the GRC air force has the authority to hit concentration presaging an invasion, but GRC have not struck at junks observed at Amoy harbor or elsewhere. I indicated GRC should have authority to do this. Difficult to destroy junks without using Napalm which made them very expensive to attack. Twining observed that the GRC has Napalm. Burke: The principle threat is not junks which the island guns can handle, but the shore batteries. He concurred in Dulles supposition that CC would not attempt to invade Q until GRC shore batteries had been silenced unless they were prepared to take very heavy losses. JFD: CC could conceivably stage a major assault at any time. Taylor: 300,000-400,000 troops needed and CC would not want to commit this many. Burke: Waters around Q well mined and otherwise well defended. Defenders on Q could put up determined resistance. Sent "rough" message asking for more adequate reporting. JFD: What military action would we have to take if necessary to intervene militarily? Twining: We would have to strike at CC airfields and shore batteries with massive atomic weapons. All studies of DOD show this is only way. Use of conventional weapons would mean US involvement and another protracted Korean-type conflict. The JCS believes CC should be told this is US intention. JFD: Asked staff to find out what I had said publicly re use of nukes. Observed that JCS views re the necessity of using nukes had important implications affecting the Government's whole foreign policy. Taylor pointed to the need to distinguish 3 different types of targets or situations: a) open target "with CC amphibious attack". This could be beaten back by GRC defense with conventional weapons and assistance from US. Dulles questioned whether this was true for a surprise. Taylor continued that a successful operation would require continuous back-up operations which could be destroyed. The JCS agreed that US forces had conventional capability in the area sufficient for this purpose. Q is not going to fall in 1 day. But US should determine in advance what it will do in case of attack. Burke stated that the US could beat off an amphibious attack even with heavy bombing long enough to refer back and obtain authorization to use nukes.
mence of attack, but it would be necessary to use nukes if the CC main-
tained the attack. Burke: CC would take heavy losses in the initial phase of
cventional weapons, but if they persisted, nukes would be needed. JFD: Not
ecessary, then, to use nukes immediately, but ultimately against determined
nany. Taylor (continuing his outline of the 5 situations) b) a protracted
assaultive shelling threatening breakdown in morale of GRC defenders, elimination
of gun emplacements would require nuke. Burke agrees. CC move guns around,
and have more gun positions than guns. Taylor (continuing situations) c)
heavy and continuing air bombardment: in this event nuke would certainly have
to be used. JFD: What happens if destroyers hit? Burke: Would conduct rescue
even if it meant entering CC coastal waters. JFD: Loss of American lives would
come as great shock to US public. We have not given much toward the possible
reaction here and abroad. Harris: Awareness of this is what restricted convoys
to 3 miles out. Burke: US public and Congress do not realize how serious the
situation is; not question just of OSI, but possible loss of GRC. JFD: No one
would mind very much loss of islands, but loss would mean further CC aggression.
Nothing seems worth a world war until you look hard at effect of not standing
up to each challenge as posed. Burke: Danger to whole US FE position if we
don’t take a strong stand. White: Strong stand will have favorable impact on
NATO. JFD: What kind of nukes would be used? Twining: 7-10 kiloton airburst;
groundburst is more effective, but too dirty; legal area of airburst was 3-4
miles and no fallout. Initial attack on 5 coastal airfields, 1 bomb per field.
Then stop to observe impact on CC intentions. Result would be to take air-
craft on ground and ground facilities, but runways would not be rendered in-
operable. Coastal fields do not have underground facilities. JFD: MacArthur,
the US Ambassador, reported that Japan might demand withdrawal of US forces
from Japan. Then as a minimum would request cessation of US support operations
from Japan, including logistics for the Taiwan operation. Burke: The bases in
Japan are not necessary, but supplies are important, if not critical. JFD: If
anticipated reaction against use of nukes were to be so hostile that we would be
inhibited from using them except in NATO theatre or as retaliation against Soviet
attack, was our reliance on their use correct and productive? Burke: Part of
war of nerves; opposition to use of nukes in Japan inspired by Communists. Ja-
panese government doesn’t agree. If attack persisted, US could enter attack or
lose islands which would result in the loss of Taiwan. A strong counter-attack
would result in international opposition but leaders of other countries would
soon realize that it was in their interest. US must stand firm with conventional
weapons as long as that is possible, but then with nukes. Otherwise lose whole
world in 3 years. Taylor: The problem is often discussed in the abstract, but
this is the 1st specific case which to him pointed up need for flexibility of
forces. Twining: US cannot afford to support forces of sort indicated by Taylor.
JFD: Regardless of amount of force flexibility US might maintain, it would be
no match for the manpower and in conventional power of enemies on Eurasian land
mass. Taylor: Question of careful orchestration; start with conventional weapons,
and nukes would only be final stage. Twining: US could not support needed divi-
sions. White: US could not maintain needed air fleets. Burke: Naval aircraft
has been stretched thin. Twining: If nukes used in Korea, could have done in 2
or 3 days what done to enemy in months of saturation attacks with few casualties
on both sides. Must get used to fact that nukes must be used. The Communists may
use them. JFD: If shrink from using nukes, when military circumstances require,
will have to reconsider whole defense posture. We are facing tough questions.
Burke: If not faced now, harder later. Twining: Increasing GRC fire-power
would not necessarily result in knocking out enemy gun emplacements, but would
keep them pinned down and would have good psychological effect on both sides.

(D of S, M of C; Subj: Taiwan Strait Situation, Sept. 2, 1958; Participants:
Dunna, Harker, Parsons, all of JCS, Goodtaster (CT) (01) )
Sept. 3, 1958

The Army proposed a change in the draft of JCS 2118/110 to add the following paragraph: "Our participation in the defense of the major off-shore islands should gradually increase as required. Initially only conventional weapons should be used and the degree of force would depend on the Chinese Communists. Atomic weapons should be used only as a last resort. Before making the decision to use atomic weapons, careful consideration should be given to the vulnerability of Taiwan and other islands to atomic counter-attack." "Reason: To prevent a more realistic appraisal of the probable sequence of events in case US military power is actually used in the defense of the Off-shore Islands."

(Army subj: Taiwan Strait Situation (JCS 2118/110) (U), OPS FL IP/52283, 3 Sept. 1958 - (CT) (82) )

Sept. 3, 1958

A mtg. was held in the Office of the Secre. of State. In addition to the Secre., those present included MacIlroy, Quarles, Twining, and Goodtaster. JFD stated that he did not anticipate a decision in the mtg. with I the next day. He asked how much warning of a CC attack on the OSI could be expected. Twining stated that it would be less than 24 hours. Quarles stated that an assault was possible within 3-4 days. Dulles stated that it was essential that the CC not be led to believe that the US will not intervene. This would also be bad for GRC morale. Twining stated that the present type of artillery fire could not break up the island defense. The GRC navy is not doing all that it should. Quarles noted that it is not established that the CC could be present means maintain the interdiction indefinitely. JFD emphasized the importance of a daily supply situation. Basis for US intervention and foreign support far less if it is done in response only to interdiction. Quarles supported I remark in previous mtg. that if OSI hold out for some weeks, US would give noncombatant support to GRC. Massive assault would justify US joining the battle. Dulles stated that the objective was to deter attack, and great danger in this respect lay in our position not being made sufficiently clear. Quarles: US cannot clarify situation publicly without helping CC by revealing US intentions. Dulles observed that the major CC objective is internal development, and this action is essentially a probing action agreed to at K/M mtg. Personal message to CC might be taken as a sign of weakness, unless it was an ultimatum, but this requires strong support of allies and US opinion. We could look into using intermediators. The mtg. considered the draft statement for JFD/Ike mtg. and approved it.

(This was statement to be summarized elsewhere which Ike took to Newport.)

(D of S Memo of Conversation, Office of Secre. of State, 3 P. M., Sept. 3, '58 participants: Dulles, Rinehart, Robinson, etc., MacIlroy, Quarles, Twining, Goodtaster (after 4:30 P.M.) (CT) (01) )

Sept. 4, 1958

The following paper was brought by Dulles to Newport after being approved by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. The CC with Soviet backing had begun tentatively to put into operation a program which had been prepared for the past 5 years, designed initially to liquidate the GRC position in Taiwan and the OSI and even more far reaching purposes. Program was begun by pressure on weakest and most vulnerable position, Q and Matsu. The operation is designed to produce
roll back effects, first on OSI and then on Taiwan. The liberation of Taiwan is the announced purpose of present phase. Liberation would have serious con-
sequences on Philippines, Japan, etc. The operation against Q and Katsu would be primarily military; follow up against Taiwan might be primarily subversive,
taking advantage of the blow to Republic of China involved in the loss of the
OSI on which it has virtually staked its future. A CC attack on Taiwan could
not be excluded. The above summary is based on specific estimates: 1) in
absence of US intervention, the CC by accepting heavy casualties could take Q
by amphibious assault supported by artillery and aerial bombardment. Assault
could be stayed with little advance notice, would take one to several days;
2) if CC believes US would not intervene, they could be expected to mount such
an assault whenever they believed defenders have been sufficiently softened up.
3) if CC believes US would intervene, perhaps using nukes, it is probably that
there would be no attempt to take Q; 4) if CC believe US would intervene only
if there were a major assault, they might keep assault as overhanging menace and
meanwhile continue pressure now being exerted, including bombardment and attempt
at blockade, hoping that the prolonged defense would collapse due to deteria-
tion of morale and lack of supply; 5) under these conditions if interdiction
not broken, the morale of defense capability would in fact deteriorate and might
collapse. US would find it difficult to maintain present show of strength for
long periods; 6) if Q lost by assault or surrender, would have serious impact
on China and expose it to military action or subversion which would probably
bring about which would eventually advocate union with CC; 7) (quoted in full)
"if foregoing (OSI loss) occurred, it would seriously jeopardize the anti-
Communist barrier consisting of the insular peninsula positions in the Western
Pacific, e.g., Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of China, Republic of the
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam. Other governments in Southeast Asia such as
those of Indonesia, Malay, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma would probably come fully
under the Communist influence. US positions in this area, perhaps even Okinawa,
would probably become untenable, or unuseable, and Japan with its great industrial
potential, would probably fall within the Sino-Soviet orbit. These events
would not happen all at once, but would probably occur over a period of a few
years. The consequence in the FE would be even more far-reaching and catastrophic
than those which followed when the US allowed the China mainland to be taken over
by the Chinese Communists, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union." 8) would also
have a serious world-wide repercussion; 9) if CC acting on supposition that we
will not actively intervene, there might be a period between beginning of assault
and unavoidable commitment when prompt and substantial US conventional inter-
vention would lead CC to withdraw. Otherwise US intervention would probably not
be effective if limited to use of conventional weapons; 10) US destroyers are
cooperating with the sea supply up to 3 miles. There is a possibility of an
accidental head and limited retaliation; 11) once the US intervened to save Q it
could not abandon the effort. If this required the use of nukes, there would
be strong public revulsion against US. If relatively small detonation used,
with only airburst, the revulsion might be shortlived. It is not certain, how-
ever, that the operation could be thus limited in scope or time and risk of more
extensive use of nukes in general war would have to be accepted.

(Estimate of Factors involved in the Taiwan Straits Situation prepared by Secre.
of State in consultation with policy and intelligence branches of State and JCS,
concerned in by Secre. of Defense, and by Chairman of the JCS, Sept. 4, '58
(Prepared by Secre. for Newport mtg. with I) (CR) (01) )
Sept. 4, 1958

In a conversation with JFD, I said that the use of nucks was the heart of the matter. Dulles stated that the US had acknowledged the risk of political and psychological dangers of using nucks when it decided to include them in its article. He reviewed the views of the JCS from the 9/2 mtg. that they had with Dulles, in particular reference to air-burst nucks. I noted that Communist retaliation with nucks might well be against Taiwan and beyond rather than against Q. The Secre. of State discussed the draft statement to the press. He spoke to Robertson who suggested one change which was approved by I. It was decided that JFD should make the statement, not I.

(Memo for Secre. of State, Sept. 5, '58; excerpt from conversa. between Secre. of State and President on Sept. 4, (CT) (01) )

Sept. 4, 1958

Dulles in a letter dictated for Macmillan on the way back from Newport noted that it was regrettable that so much now seems to hang on the small islands which are not readily defensible. The US has made a serious effort to get the GRC off the islands, but it never pushed this to the point of coercion because of the fact that the ability to keep Taiwan in friendly hands is not separable from the GRC holding the islands. Intelligence, State, and JCS are unanimous in belief that loss of OSI by surrender or assault would have serious impact on GRC. At this point in the letter, Dulles repeated the repercussions indications from the memo prepared for I. In light of this, I authorized statements which does not involve any formal commitment, but does indicate I would probably act if there were an effort to take Q and Matsu, which GRC did not resist. The GRC capacity is not negligible. The CC has so far been avoiding aerial attack, perhaps in fear of bringing US in. The use of at least small airbursts without fallout would likely be necessary. Entire military establishment assumes more and more that the use of nucks will become normal in event of hostilities. If this not the case, we face grave situation in view of massive manpower of Sino-Soviet bloc. The JCS is concerned about US being spread too thin, and lack of world understanding of US position. A balanced firm position will deter CC action, but K and M may be reckless and may miscalculate. Therefore, position involves serious risks. Acting strongly involves, however, less risk than inaction. The letter was cleared with I by phone.

(Letter Dulles to Macmillan, 9/4/58 (CT) (01) )

Sept. 5, 1958

The Chief of Staff of the AF was warned by his staff that the Army considered a memo proposing change in JCS 2118/110 which would de-emphasize the need for stopping CC attacks by an immediate counter-attack with atomic weapons. Such a position is unacceptable to the AF. (The Army proposal was in fact submitted but only a very minor change was actually made in the document -- MIN).

(Memo for Chief of Staff, USAF 5 Sept. '58 subj: TS situation (JCS 2118/110 (U) ) signed Glenn S. Martin, Acting Director of Plans (CT) (S2) )
Sept. 5, 1958

The present Taiwan arrangement was predicated on nuclear warfare with need for highly centralized control. No need for single commander directly responsible to CINCPAC. Annex II of Oplan, 2553 would give TDC operational control. Annex II provides for "continuing CC interdiction and/or aggression against Q/Matsu/Taiwan/Pengue without use of nuka. Requests concurrence."

(From CINCPAC to CNO, 5 Sept., '58 No. 9937)

Sept. 5, 1958

In a letter to JFD Macmillan noted that the US believes that if must defend Matsu although it acknowledges that this may lead to a world war. The new will be against any action. Others are not much more enthusiastic. The UK statement in '55 by Churchill "War to keep coastal islands would not be defensible here" in private letter to President reflects public opinion here. Half war is not likely to continue and the use of nukes seems possible. Can the UN GA or SC do anything? Your suggestion to UK Ambassador Hood of demilitarization should make good public position. Should US raise it publicly? Might rally public opinion. Could present publicly or privately to SU which may be anxious about situation. Do not believe that SU/CC have agreed on war.

(Letter Harold Macmillan to JFD delivered 9/5/58 (CT) (01) )

Sept. 6, 1958

The JCS approved a memo for the Secy. of Defense on the TS situation in which they noted that US military forces spread dangerously thin. Condition of weakness is aggravated by uncertainty as to the use of atomic weapons. Southeast Asia or Korea might " and this would require mobilization. US public and free world are uninformed and unprepared. "At any time and without further warning incidents may turn the Taiwan Straits area ... which would result in involvement of the US forces." Following action offered for consideration: a) statement to GRC, CC, and Soviet Union that "no doubt exists as to US intentions concerning the Off-shore Islands." b) notify Congressional leaders of seriousness of situation; c) appraise allies of seriousness of situation; d) appraise UN of seriousness of situation, consider special Security Council session; e) release fiscal year 1959 funds immediately; f) marshall public opinion; g) consider radio and TV address by I. The appendix to this document read as follows: "US policy -- until recently it has been our policy not to commit US forces to assist in the defense of the Off-shore Islands unless it was clearly demonstrated that the Chicom attack is a prelude to attacks on Taiwan and the Pengues. We hope by our actions to convince that Chicos we will come to the assistance of the GRC without at the same time inviting the GRC to create a situation which will cause our immediate involvement. We now intend to assist the major Off-shore Islands, but the manner and timing of this assistance must remain under US control." For US purposes we have defined the ORI to include Kinmen, and Little Kinmen and the 5 larger islands of the Matsu area (Kao-teng Tao, Pei-kan Tang, Ma-tsu shan, Hsi-ch'uan Tao, Tung-ch'uan Tao). Best hope of stopping invasion quickly is immediate use of atomic weapons. "If the fact of US participation does not cause the CC to desist, it is most probably (inevitable) that we will have to (must) use atomic weapons against air bases (on the
China mainland) and perhaps against other targets in the Chinese mainland." Bracketed words eliminated and changes made as a result of Army request for much greater down-grading of role of nukes--NSM).

(JCS memo for Secy. of Defense subj: TS situation (U) JCS 2122/110 approved Sept. 5 '58, signed Twining, Chmn. JCS)

Sept. 7, 1958

CNO informed its commanders in the field that since the CC is not now firing against the OSI and did not try to interfere with the last convoy, it considers it particularly important to avoid any action which is provocative or might appear to be provocative. Small incidents or minor events may have great impact on negotiations about to be undertaken by the US and the CC. As long as the CC withhold fire on the OSI, only 1 US destroyer should be in sight of off-loading of the beaches of Q. If 1 ship could control the situation, call for additional US and GRC support if needed, as well as "make sure GRC navy takes proper action." Other US support should remain over the horizon. US aircraft should remain over Taiwan.

(Navy message CNO to CINCPAC/TDC/7FLT Sept. 7, '58, 071705Z Sept. 58 No. 23490, (CT, P2) )

Sept. 6, 1958

In a White House paper initialed by I, the JCS was given standing authority to oppose an assault by using conventional weapons against artillery positions and naval targets.

(DS Memo of C, 9/20/58 (CT) )

Sept. 7, 1958

The first GRC resupply effort to Q took place on 9/7. There was no Communist interference, a slight delay in withdrawing LSM's due to GRC failure to unload vessels on schedule.

(State Tele. from Taipei, No. 332 9/7 (J1) )

Sept 11, 1958

Selvin Lloyd in a letter to John Foster Dulles said that the Western line of defense, including Taiwan, is weakened by the GRC retention of Q and Matsu. If the defense of them involved even the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the risk of a chain reaction is obvious. GRC withdrawal would strengthen the GRC position. Withdrawal might be the only way to avoid defeat. It is doubtful that the CC would accept demilitarization even if the GRC did.

Lloyd stressed the importance of the Warsaw talks, and perhaps talks at a higher level. The UK is willing to float any idea if US thinks it will help. Lloyd asked how the UK can help.

(Letter of Selvin Lloyd to John Foster Dulles, 9/11/58 (01) (CT) )
'Felt issued non-nuclear Annex II of 022PLW 25-58. The nex enunciates spelled out the 3 intermediate phases between 1 and 2 as defined by JCS on Aug. 25. In phase III no indication that CC would attempt to capture OGL, US forces provided only logistic aid. In Phase 2, CC attempt to capture 1 or more principal islands. US assist CC in attacking invading force, artillery positions and airfields in the vicinity of the islands. Phase 3, CC extend battle to the Pescadores and Taiwan or to international waters near them. US and GRC aircraft would attack Communist airfields, GCI sites, military control sectors adjacent to coastal airfields in fixed targets. They would attack the airfields on a carefully controlled basis in a gradually expanding arc until they had destroyed all bases in a 500 mile radius capable of supporting Russian built IL-28 beagle aircraft.

(601, p. 32)

Sept. 12, 1958

The JCS commented on the tendency of the GRC craft to retreat as soon as fired upon without waiting over horizon awhile and trying again. "There is a possibility that GRC is being deliberately inept in order to draw US inexcusably into conflict with ChComs. Consequently, we must be certain that Kinmen would fall despite all GRC can and should do before we consider taking direct action against ChCom forces or installations except in self-defense." The GRC cannot expect US aid until they have demonstrated that they have determination to see action through to the finish despite hazards. It is important that the next resupply be well planned and succeed.

(From JCS to TDC JCS 947931 121823Z Sept. '58 (CT) (T3) )

Sept. 12, 1958

Lunch was held with MacIlroy, Sprague, Twining, and DCNO (P&P) at which MacIlroy expressed the feeling that GRC were not doing all they could to resupply Quemoy. At a 2:00 mtg. including the above and Dulles and Robinson, Dulles and Robinson were both reluctant to believe that the GRC might be hoping to draw US in through seeming ineptitude. They practically rejected the idea. (This argument was apparently raised in the JNO briefings--MrK). JFD pointed out extreme importance in his view of resupply. He was told that there was a 30 day supply on the island, and he asked many questions about logistics and asked what could be done to aid resupply.

(Memo to Chief of Naval Operations from DCNO (Plans and Policy) Op-06/WR EX000212P05, Sept. 12, '58, subj: luncheon with Sec. MacIlroy and Gen. Twining preceding a mtg. with Secre. Dulles (CT) (T3) )

Sept. 12, 1958

In a memo prepared by the Joint Staff for the JCS it was noted that CINCPAC had proposed that either the US permit GRC bombing of the artillery or US escort all the way in. However, neither of these offers assurance of being useful and are not recommended. The supply situation is not critical. Present methods of resupply will never be truly effective due partly to GRC experience and lack of
A mtg. was held on Sept. 12, 1958 including Dulles, Robertson, Cuming, MacIlroy, Twining, Sprague, etc. to discuss, "the supply of Quemoy—military and diplomatic aspects of problem." Twining reported that he had received a message from CINCPAC outlining alternatives if GRC proves incapable of supplying Quemoy. These include authorizing CAP attacks on the artillery and providing US escort into territorial waters. JCS replied that the GRC should first demonstrate more determination. Quemoy has 50 days of supplies left. Dulles pointed out that there was only 9-10 days of artillery supplies if heavily used. Dulles asked how helpful would GRC counter-battery be. Twining replied that it would help keep CC heads down, but would not be too effective. The GRC seems to be trying to get the US involved. This seems to be their main motive. MacIlroy: If this is so, we must find a way to get the GRC to act. US direct involvement will lead to casualties and have serious repercussions here. This is not the time for this. Dulles questioned whether the GRC was really engaged in "a pretty complicated plot" to get the US involved. It is more likely that the GRC needs experience in training in resupply operations under fire. The Warsaw talks will start Monday. The Chi-Coms will probably insist on 12 mile limit which includes all of OSI and that the US pull out of Taiwan. The US will reject this. The talks might break off or get down to realities, but there is not much hope. The issue is likely to come up in the UN. There may be calls for a cease-fire. The CC might prolong the interdiction and avoid a direct assault with a view to gaining political advantage in the UN. If the GRC can handle resupply, there will be more time for maneuver. Otherwise there will be a real crisis in 2 or 3 weeks. There was a general discussion of the difficulty of convoy and the way in which it could be made more effective. MacIlroy suggested enlisting Drumright's support. Sprague pointed out that the keys to convince the GRC that we will not do the supply job for them. Robertson: If Soot confirms that the GRC is dragging its feet, Ambassador Soot should see Cheng on this.

Dulles: We must be on sure ground before going to Chiang. First-hand US information on effort is lacking. GRC adequately seems more near to blundering than to any willfulness. It is inconceivable that people on Quemoy would be a party to a deliberate plan to sabotage unloading. Twining pointed out that the men on the boats, not on the shore, control the unloading. The OCM which beached and failed to unload anything could have unloaded one-half of its cargo in 40 minutes it has. Though the CC will probably not assault islands or take military initiative while the UN Warsaw talks are in session, the US also must not take new moves in this period. The vital objective is to continue to maintain the status quo. Twining said that aerial resupply often only limited possibilities and enemy aerial action. MacIlroy approved John Foster Dulles' suggestion that the US station observers on boats and on the beaches. It was agreed that the JCS would immediately contact the TDC in conformity with the sense of the mtg.

(Resupply of Quemoy: Military and Diplomatic Aspects of Problem, Sept. 12, '58; present Dulles, Robertson, Cuming, MacIlroy, Twining, Sprague, etc. ISA No. 1-6293/8 (CT) (B) )
operation to demonstrate intent to maintain Q. e) Conclusion is that effect of air counter-battery action distinctly limited except as part of other support action.

(Navy message 16 Sept. '58 140530Z 758 No. 3705 from TDC to

Sept. 16, 1958

A CME concluded that the Soviet leaders were informed about and concurred in CC actions. The Soviet commitment is based on the belief that CC actions would fall short of provoking US intervention. The Soviets will probably not intervene if the US attacks coastal areas with HE.

(614)

Sept. 16, 1958

A CME indicated that the CC will continue the interdiction by artillery fire and expect it to succeed. The CC are willing to risk US involvement. They will probably fire on US ships if they go in. The CC might seize one of the small OSI.

(614)

Sept. 18, 1958

The 7th Flt. ordered its subordinate units to lose some degree of operations readiness by concentrating on preparations for conventional warfare. Additional modifications hereby authorized permitting all light attack aircraft to be configured for conventional weapons. It is necessary to be capable of going either way on short notice. Midway will be assigned North GEOP targets. No further reduction in nuclear capability justified.

(From COMMAND 7th Flt to CTF 77, 171354Z Sept 18, '58, No. 4537)

Sept. 18, 1958

An early report of MIGS strafing a GRP convoy later proved to be a GRU pilot mistakenly firing on his own ships.

(620, 5)

Sept. 19, 1958

The Canadians have told us that the new Yugoslav Ambassador to India says that the Chicsms have enough Russian howitzers to make Q utterly untenable. If the US uses atomic weapons against the mainland, the Russians will use its atomic weapons against the 7th Fleet, and destroy it quickly.

(Tele. from NY, No. 365, 9/19)
A mtg. was held at Dulles' residence at 11:00 A.M. Present were: Hurter, Robinson, Twining, Burke, Sprague, Campbell, and Dulles. JFD: The situation is grave. Nothing will come of Warsaw talks. There are three possibilities for the interpretation of CC action: 1) preparing open attack on GDR, perhaps followed by attack on Taiwan; 2) Berlin-type blockade; 3) gradually tapering off as in 54-55. There was insufficient evidence of a trend toward 3. Burke: CC might let up for a while to get out of caves and gun emplacements. JFD: If CC let up, US should reciprocate. Twining agrees. Re 2nd possible interpretation of CC actions, could the blockade be broken? Burke: Q has hidden supplies. Q could hold out for 2 months at the rate of 100 tons a day resupply; but not indefinitely. But build-up to 300 tons a day likely and this could go on for a long period. Problem is morale. Troops cannot be located. JFD: GRC fails to appreciate that US has serious problem of public opinion, and must keep its alliance together. Is there any evidence of an assault? CC probably realize this would involve US sea and air action against shore batteries and assault craft which would defeat assault. Twining: Special WH paper of 9/6 initiated by I gives JCS standing authority to oppose assault by using conventional weapons against artillery positions and naval targets. Campbell: CIA estimates SU would not become involved unless war extends beyond strait area. Soviets not taking overt measures they took in Mid-East crisis, not making any unusual preparations. Burke: K letter seems to be saying support will only be logistical unless US uses atomic weapons in which case they will retaliate in kind. JFD: Thus situation OK provided a) we are prepared to oppose assault; b) keep Q resupplied on suxty basis. Would GRC tolerate this situation bearing in mind GRC may view this as a golden opportunity for recovering mainland by US/CC war. This sentiment pervades many people on Taiwan and is understandable on their terms. Discussion followed of how to make GRC aware of realities of any war involving Taiwan. Twining: GRC air attack on shore batteries would not knock them out. Even if retaliation limited to Q would make situation worse. Robertson: Could escort be limited to 20 miles? Burke: No. Resupply costing US Navy $5 million. JFD: Thus essentially Berlin-type blockade operation in which US must make maximum resupply effort while ready to act against CC assault and restraining GRC. Burke indicated that he proposed considering all US convoy. JFD: US should ask GRC for restraint and assure them Warsaw talks will not give away anything. Purpose of Warsaw is to enlist allied support. UN nations support withdrawal and in a sense are right, but no way to withdraw without engendering collapse of GRC and take-over of Taiwan by subversion and possible attack. Cabell agrees. JFD: Warsaw talks will drag out. CC not bent on military showdown for they asked for talks which would be a liability if they pursued new military initiative. The issue raised in UN. US will press for resolution asking for cease-fire, renunciation of force, and examination of measures to tranquilize. CC will not accept, but it might pass. Twining read JCS paper opposing US consideration. JFD said there was no way to do this. In addition US committed by I in '55 to go to the UN. Resolution putting Taiwan under UN trusteeship and admitting CC to UN is real feeling of 90% of members. US pressure prevents this.

(D of S, M of C, Sept. 20, '58 11:00 A.M. Dulles' residence; Subj: Taiwan Strait Crisis; Participants: Dulles, Hurter, Robertson, Twining, Burke, Sprague, Cabell
(CT) (02) )
Sept. 25, 1958

In a personal message from Burke to Feld, Burke stated that the political situation in Washington might become critical in a few days. It is not just the long-term resupply operation that is important. On whether we can soon demonstrate an ability to resupply OSI may determine whether the US is going to stay in the FE. Equally important is competent dispatcher stating you can resupply OSI provided you can live up to them.

(From CNO to CINC PAC/TOG 261657Z Sept. '58, No. 24574 (CT) (T3) )

Sept. 26, 1958

General Kuter was told by his staff that the situation regarding conventional munitions is serious indeed. There has been authorized a limited amount of conventional munitions in support of EMP. Amount is such that successive conventional operations would be in jeopardy. AMCD militarization has been halted. "If a conventional war is at all likely, the demilitarization program should be cancelled and adequate levels established to support operations."

(Briefing for General Kuter, 5th F Forces Commander's Conference Room, 26 Sept. '58 by Lt. Col. WM D. Morrison, 605A, No. 47, pp. 184-88 (L) )

Sept. 29, 1958

Dulles, in conversation with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, agreed that the UN might play a role if the Warsaw talks failed. The US considers the OSI as an outpost likely held and made strenuous efforts to get the CRC to reduce the garrison. The OSI are not regarded as of fundamental importance. Chiang attaches importance to the islands as they are the last remnants of the mainland territory to be held since abandoning the tachons in 1955. The US is anxious to get the troops off the island. Their presence is regarded as provocative, although the Nats do little harassing from them. The most likely solution is a de facto cease fire.

(DSM of C, 9/29/58; Subj: Lang Discussions: Formosa and OSI; participants: Secre. Halvard Lang, NOR. For. Minister, et. al. (F) )

Oct. 22, 1958

Conversation between Dulles and Chiang on Taipei: Chiang expected the on-again-off-again firing to continue. This is a device to paralyze morale, and in the long run could be very demoralizing. 3 or 4 months of this could be very serious, and have an adverse effect on the defenders of Q. There is a need to strengthen Q defenses with more guns. Dulles: US considering supply more guns, but no one in US military believe that conventional weapons could knock out deeply-in-place guns. Only nuclear guns could do it. Did Chiang want US to use niks? Chiang: not necessary to use niks. Use of tactical atomic weapons might be advisable. Dulles: no tactical atomic weapon in existence which could be used at Q to knock out enemy guns emplacements which did not have power of Hiroshima bomb. Use of such a weapon at Q could kill millions of people. Heavy fallout and casualties if bomb was exploded on ground which was only way to destroy gun emplacements. Chiang not nuclear expert. However, the problem should
be studied. Some way must be found to prevent alternative attacks and stop... Dulles: CC attacks not effective. Chiang: this is agreed, but problem is morale. Positive action is needed. Dulles can knock out guns in and around Q, would probably kill 20 million people. (In dittoed version, this was changed to "very many" people—CC). Chiang stated that he had not found any solution. Dulles: "only nukes could take out gun emplacements. Use of nukes would involve Taiwan."
"If nukes were used to attack Taiwan, there would be nothing left of Taiwan."
Chiang: Chinnats might have to tomb supply lines to Anmoy area. Dulles: US studying providing better guns. Chiang: Patience of defenders on Q might break, and they could act on their own. Dulles: Best solution is amistic.

(D of S, M of C, Oct. 22 '58, 7 P.M.; place: President Chiang Kai-shek's residence at Shilin; President Chiang, George Casey, Yeh, etc. Dulles, Robertson, Drumright; Subj: Communist defense of Q, use of nukes. (I) )

Oct. 23, 1958

At a mtg. at which only Dulles, Chiang, and Ambassador Yeh were present as interpreter, the following was discussed: Dulles: Whole fate of free China should not be identified with holding few square miles in highly vulnerable position. Chiang: If Q lost, free China is lost. Dulles: This relationship ought not to be accepted. Chiang: Taiwan could not be held after Q fall. Communist agents on Taiwan would undermine the government if Q fell. Government could not survive 5 months. He could guarantee defense of Q given current US support. Dulles: No one can guarantee defense indefinitely of island in that position. Chiang: What could be done to prevent an on-off attack on the islands? Dulles: Only ground-burst nuke could effectively take out guns and this would kill most people on Q by fall-out. Suggested reducing garrison as sound political and military move. Chiang: Prepared to move in this direction if hostilities stop. Impossible to do so under fire. Dulles: Hope that reduction being discussed of 15-20,000 could be brought about. Chiang: Hope US would consult before making decisions, and not do anything which depreciated Chiang's prestige. Dulles: Interpreted this as a reference to I and Dulles press conferences, and pointed out that answers to loaded questions at press conferences were difficult and urged Chiang to look at considered state papers. Chiang: Renunciation of force is a very important milestone. Free nations should not risk was as a means of promoting their own policies. (Memo is in first person by Dulles and included his interpretations-MH).

(M of C, Secre., Chiang, Ambassador Yeh, interpreter Subj: defense of OSI, US/GRG Consultation Communicé, Oct. 23, '58, 11 A.M., Chiang's house)
October 23

Taylor informed the JCS that the JFD/Chiang talks had ended today. A major achievement, he said, were the words "not the use of force." Dulles informed Taylor that Chiang had raised the use of tactical nukes against the coastal batteries and in an ensuing discussion had showed complete lack of knowledge of atomic weapons effects. Dulles suggested the utility of briefing Chiang with elemental facts.

TS Twining for JCS from Taylor, ref. NR OKA 320 23 Oct. 58/ Eag [CT 53]

October 24

The 13th AF published Annex N to its OPPLAN 25-58 on October 24 in order to provide for conventional war operations.

(608, p. 25)

October 28

A SNTIE concluded that it was not believed that the CC initiated the crisis with the firm intention of obtaining an OSI regardless of GRC, US, and world reaction. The failure to use the CC AF for offensive action and less than maximum artillery effort indicates less than total effort. Internal developments were probably of secondary importance in the timing of the crisis. Their motives were: a) probe US intentions; b) drive a wedge in US/GRC relations; c) discredit US and GRC; d) remind world CC to be reckoned with; e) prevent 2-China development; f) reduce GRC morale. The Soviets did not initiate the action but encouraged and supported it.

613

October 30

Drumright was told that he should leave it to the GRC when to resupply, but the GRC should understand in advance that if it chooses to resupply on odd days and if it tracks CC interference, the US would not necessarily engage in escort. The military need for escort is lacking if the GRC can supply on even days.

Tele to Taipei, #398 Oct. 30 [CT] [T4]

November 7

On November 7 Dulles was briefed by a representative of the JCS on the effects of nukes.

Memo for Secre. of Defense; subj: briefing for Secre. Dulles on nukes and effects (U), 9 December 58, signed Twining, JCS 2118/126 [F3]
Cruder reported on his conversations with a no. of Chinese officials
including Chiang. Chiang's principal point was the need to maintain air
superiority. Performance of ChiNat air force has been one of the bright
spots in the crisis. Chiang believes there is considerable unrest in PeiKing.
He cited the firing of Su Yu, Chief of Staff, who plugged for OSI venture.
Cruder believes Su was fired as scape goat. Chiang believes that K came to
PeiKing desiring to shift attention from the Middle East. Mao's military
advisers have been urging seizing of Q/Matsu. concurred in K's proposal
that he attack. Green light then given to occupy airfields [i.e., Chiang
believes that K talked Mao into the action.] Chiang said that since US will
not use atomic nukes it would strengthen Q defense.

M of C between Gen. Cruder and Chiang, Yu, Gen. Wang, Admiral Smoot, etc.
Taipei Nov. 8-9.
November 12, 1958 [R3]

December 9, 1958

The following is a text of the US/GRC agreement approved by DOD and State:
"With respect to military defense of the OSI complexes of KINMEN and Matsu,
the undersigned agree as follows: 1) Continued improvement of forces; 2) Due
to unusual conditions of terrain and logistics requirements, units on OSI shall
be modified; 3) Existing counter-battery artillery capability be augmented as
follows: a) KINMEN complex--a minimum of 12 240 howitzers, a minimum of 12
155mm guns; b) Matsu complex--240 mm howitzers -- 4 more when available, 155 mm
gun, 1 battalion when available; c) further study of need for more; d) Lacrosse
missile considered at later date; 4) Armor strength on KINMEN augmented: a)
A minimum of 1 tank battalion; b) study of tank strength;
5) Service and combat support units will not be increased and reduced if
possible;
6) Reduction of forces on KINMEN would include one infantry division + ad-
ditional and/or individuals so that there shall be a net reduction of not less
than 15,000 men with a target date of 30 June, 1959 for completion."

Memo for the Director, Office of Programming and Control from E. J. O'Donnell,
Rear Admiral, US Navy, Director FE Region ISA #1-17406/8; Subj: Implementation
of quid pro quo to support US/GRC agreement for reduction of forces on the OSI

December 31, 1958

In a letter to LeMay, Kuter noted that he will not harangue him with "well
known and irrefutable arguments which demand that all of our war plans be based
on the use of atomic weapons." He is alarmed by the growing trend of the Army-
Navy Pac-Com of adopting HE operations for limited war. JCS Direction to pre-
pare for non-atomic operations was adopted without any resistance from CINCPAC.
PAC AF was required to take drastic action to fight in manner for which it was
not, and would not be prepared to fight and have no chance of winning. Increased
conventional capability would be disastrous. The employment of PACAF extended
island and bomb warfare would completely deplete our war-making resources in a
few days.