JCS indicated that nuclear weapons would probably not be employed, at least initially. This led to a new cycle of planning actions, to establish HE capability. Augmentation units, required, to be capable of implementing Taiwan contingency plan and still maintain EMP posture: problem here because of HE restriction. One of the more startling complications of the Taiwan crisis since practically all planning for a number of years has been predicated on nuclear "compensator." Appears that NSC, as well as the general public, brackets all nuclear weapons together as horrible weapons of mass destruction. (must recognize that very great spread in yields of available nuclear weapons has made the weapons conventional). The US must be free to use suitable nuclear weapons at the onset of any conflict which involves overt Communist aggression.

Communications: West of Hawaii communications are 100% high frequency radio. As a result, due to even normal atmospheric disturbances, there were periods of six to eight hours when communications between such vital links as Clark, Taiwan, or Okinawa were completely. Instances were recorded also where comm system was so overburdened that essential instructions were delayed excessively. Possibility also of HF blackout. Contingency situation revealed: 1) how inadequate our present communications are; 2) How impotent we are, both operationally and supportwise when we don't have reliable communications.

((CHECK: How were operations and control actually affected?))

PACAF Intelligence estimate of July 23, 1958 predicted CHICOM moves in Taiwan Straits as diversions (to Middle East crisis), least likely to lead to all-out war.

Sept 9: If Chicom fails to interdict by artillery fire (started 23 Aug) they may utilize air-attack, especially against unloading. May be impossible to confine Chinat air, then; GRC may move against Mainland; with purpose to goad the Chicom into retaliatory actions which will involve direct clashes with the US forces in the Taiwan Straits.

Nov 12: appears that Chicom's motives were: diversion; fulfill planned countermeasure against GRC use of islands; goad GRC into attacking mainland, US involvement, then bring issue before UN, win UN recognition for Mao; counter domestic problems, associated with communication; Mao may be making a bid for top position in Bloc policy making and leadership

((Shows possibilities for war initiated by small ally--GRC, South Korea?--or by Chicom.)

Need for US both to show firmness, and to resist providing "provocation."))