INTERNAL SECURITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM - PHOENIX

In the wake of the repulse of the Communist military attack in 1968 and the expansion of territorial security throughout much of South Vietnam in 1969, the contest with the Communists has shifted to a new level. Pursuant to COSVN Resolutions 9 and 14 the Communist strategy is now one of protracted war, conducted by a combination of political, organizational, terrorist and small unit guerrilla action, pending the occasion on which main force operations can be renewed. This brings into greater importance the role of the Viet Cong Infrastructure, the political and administrative organization through which the Communists control or seek to control the people of South Vietnam.

The VCI command and control structure has always been at the heart of the People's War. In the new strategy, however, it also has a primary operational role in terrorism, proselyting and penetration. To implement these, the VCI leadership must leave its protected base areas to seek direct contact with the population. In this fashion the power embodied in the military units now being dispersed from regiment to battalion to company to platoon strength and assigned guerrilla tasks would be matched by a concomitant growth of power inside GVN areas.

The coming battle thus is whether the VCI can indeed assert a "mafia" like power within GVN society during the coming years. The social, economic and political problems of Vietnam will indeed provide the "contradictions" relied upon by the Communists for re-entry into GVN life. Defense against them will require military and territorial strength, but must also depend upon internal
security forces, the community cohesion developed in Vietnamese society and the ability of the GVN to identify and initiate the resolution of its "contradictions" through the constitutional structure rather than seeing them exploited by the Communists.

As usual the People's War must be fought on many levels at once and no panaceas exist. Among the most important programs, however, at the level of contest during 1970 and 1971, are the Phoenix program and the National Police. The enemy has been slow to apply the strategy announced in COSVN Resolutions 9 and 14, in part because of his setbacks in pacification in 1969 and the Cambodian sanctuaries in 1970. The GVN, however, has also been slow in developing its tools for this new nature of the war, Phoenix and the National Police. On both sides, however, the race is now under way.

I. THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE - AN ASSESSMENT

The VC Infrastructure might be likened to the "establishment." It is not a defined Communist organization; it is a working concept for the GVN, uniting as one target the variety of organizational and political efforts the Communists carefully compartment and manipulate separately. It includes only the leading cadres, not all Communist functionaries in South Vietnam. These have been broken down by government decree into categories A (executive level, including all People's Revolutionary Party members) and B (cadre level leaders of Front organizations). These are defined in specific terms in the attached Green Book (Tab 1), detailing how various leaders of the enemy structure are viewed as members of the VCI. The VCI concept does not include C level (others in the political apparatus) or other supporters of the Communist effort in a
variety of military, political, logistics, espionage or paramilitary efforts. The Communists have a totally different breakdown into members of the party, members of the National Liberation Front, members of the Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces, the Revolutionary Committees, and the various associations of farmers, youth, women, etc.

The current estimated strength of the VCI is 63,082 (including 2,300 in COSVN), broken down as shown in the attached map showing the total in each province (Tab 2). Following it is the percentage of identified VCI in each province as distinct from those estimated (Tab 3). Also attached is a map showing the relative strength of the VCI per thousand province population, reflecting relative rather than absolute VCI strength in these areas (Tab 4). A third map displays the relative presence and influence of Revolutionary Committees, the VC pretention to governmental power (Tab 5). Also attached is a chart of HES appreciation of VCI presence and activities in the provinces (Tab 6).

Over the past three years the number of total VCI has steadily declined, as indicated on the attached chart (Tab 7). However, most of these changes have been as a result of reassessments and re-estimates, frequently using changed definitions or ones inadequately understood at the field level at which the figures were compiled, e.g., the tendency to include C level in the total estimates, the maintenance of identified VCI individuals on whom no report has been received for several years, etc. Within the next three months these figures should show a substantial improvement in accuracy thanks to a variety of steps that have been taken in recent months to strengthen them, e.g., use of VC geographic boundaries to prevent duplication when more than one GVN sub-division
is included within the same VC unit, centralizing VCI identifications by computer to prevent repetition in several district centers, etc. The coverage of this new system is shown in Tab 7-A).

Two overall conclusions can be drawn about VCI strength statistics:

a. VCI strength has actually declined in most areas of South Vietnam over the past two years. This is reflected in intelligence reports, Hoi Chanh debriefings, etc., outlining the VC difficulties in maintaining a command and control structure. For example, in VC Soc Trang Province the Deputy Chief of the Administrative Staff Office, Current Affairs Committee, defected and stated that the VC apparatus had lost some 1,500 party members over the past two years but had only been able to recruit 100 (FVS 23,112). In Long An Province, the VC established a zone structure to provide political leadership to two or more villages as it was unable to maintain the full village structure in each village. SR-2 and SR-3 have recently merged to form the Long An sub-region, in part a reflection of the difficulty of staffing two separate sub-regions. Other examples are contained in the attached summary (Tab 8). This decline in strength is the reflection of the total impact of the GVN's pacification program, especially the isolation of the VCI from much of the countryside which it formerly ruled unopposed.

b. VCI strength figures are undoubtedly still too high, if they are taken (as intended) to reflect leadership elements only. Also there is very little doubt that the qualitative value of the VCI apparatus has been reduced as a result of losses during 1968, 1969 and 1970 and replacement by less experienced cadre. Thus the figures can give a false impression as to the strength of the VC apparatus. This perception, however, must be supplemented
by the existence of followers, sympathizers and neutralists, all of whom can be a reservoir of support for the VC. These could provide new leadership and flesh out the VCI framework if stimulated by social problems, GVN ineptness or a revival of a Communist main force threat.

The best measure of VCI activity is in the statistics on terrorism. Tab 9 indicates the national trend of these statistics over the past three years, especially the surge in April of this year which has since been contained by a combination of the effect of the Cambodian operations and the greater degree of security existing in the countryside. Tab 10 is a listing of the victims of this tactic during 1970. Tabs 11, 12, 13 and 14 show the geographic dispersion of these terrorist incidents during the month of October, giving a view of the extent to which these affect the population of the country as a whole. Of note in these is the comparative absence of such incidents in Quang Tin, with its effective anti-VCI campaign and the concentration in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Hau Nghia. In MR 4, the comparative absence of non-casualty producing incidents suggests possible reporting only of those producing casualties. Terrorism is still very much a threat and the government's goal of reducing it by 50 percent during 1970 has by no means been accomplished.

The VCI is thus a current threat at the level the war is being waged today, with its primary tactics of terrorism, political proselytizing and penetration of the GVN structure. Its continuing existence poses an immediate and a longer term threat to constitutional government in South Vietnam. While the threat has declined over the past two years as the result of the entire pacification program, the current favorable atmosphere must be exploited to reduce the VCI to a long-term minimal or at least manageable level, in addition to reducing its impact in the organizational, terrorist or political arenas during the coming months of Vietnamization.
II. PHOENIX

During 1967, CAS developed the ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation) program, the forerunner of Phoenix. This was an initial effort to identify the political level of the enemy. In the MR 4 area, Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) provided an initial appreciation of the political and terrorist apparatus operating in the Saigon area. In December 1967 Prime Minister Huong issued a decree (attached) (Tab 15) calling for coordination by all services in a program aimed at the VC Infrastructure. This action had hardly begun before the Tet attacks of 1968, which required the entire attention of the GVN apparatus over the next few months. In July 1968, President Thieu issued a new Presidential directive (attached) (Tab 16) which established the current Phoenix program. Its principal characteristic was that it was a program, not an organization, to bring about collaboration, cooperation and coordination among all government agencies which could contribute to the identification and neutralization of the VCI. A combined intelligence effort was matched by a combined operations effort to utilize all the various agency tools for action against the VCI. Committees were established at the national, regional, province and district level, with the major stress on the last. A special US advisory effort was developed, utilizing available military officers who had little or no expertise in the subject. CAS personnel were gradually withdrawn from direct responsibility for the program (ending direct contact in July 1969), although they remained as participants in the coordination procedure on the American side and through their major liaison with the Vietnamese Special Police. An incidental problem during the growth of the program was its poor press image, highlighted by charges that it was a program of assassination, etc.
During the two and one-half years from July 1968 to December 1970, a series of actions were launched to improve and make more effective the overall Phoenix program. A summary of these gives a useful perspective to the current review:

a. Phoenix Structure. Operations centers were established at the national, regional, provincial and district level, as shown on the attached map (Tab 17). These centers are staffed as shown on the attached organizational charts (Tab 18). A training program for GVN officials working in the Phoenix program was initiated and has conducted the training shown in the attached chart (Tab 19). On the American side, advisory personnel have been assigned to this program as shown on the attached chart (Tab 20) and have been given the training shown in the attached chart and fact sheet (Tab 21).

b. Command Attention. On a number of occasions, the President and the Prime Minister stressed the importance of the program to assembled Region Commanders, Province Chiefs and other officials. A series of special seminars was held at the outset of the program at which the Prime Minister outlined its objectives. The program was included within the 1969 and 1970 Pacification and Development Plans, and was a prominent element of reviews of progress in the implementation of those plans. It is clear, however, that perception of the importance and even the nature of the VCI, plus the necessary programs to counteract it, was less than adequate on the part of many lower level officials, to include Province and District Chiefs. During 1969 these officials were heavily engaged in the expansion of territorial security, holding local elections, and a number of other programs of the Pacification and Development Plan. There was an inclination to leave the workings of the Phoenix program to the
S-2 or other junior officer, if not totally to the Americans, whose program it seemed to be. Among those officers who did focus on the need for action against the VCI, there was a tendency to develop a favorite unit to conduct vest pocket operations of this nature. The Phoenix institutional concept of a clearing house committee was never fully implemented. To improve performance in all areas, Standing Operation Procedure 3 (attached) (Tab 22) gathered outlined procedures for application throughout the nation in all DIOCCs and PIOCCs. While it has not generated any great spirit of coordination and offensive action against the VCI, it has provided certain basic procedures through which an increase of this spirit for other reasons can be implemented. In recent weeks there has been a marked rise in command attention to Phoenix, in the form of special meetings and inspections in MR 2 and MR 3, a national Phoenix Committee meeting on 1 December and Prime Ministerial seminars with all Region Commanders, Province Chiefs and Province Police Chiefs on 10 and 12 December.

c. National Police Role. In the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan the National Police were called upon to take a "leading role" in the Phoenix program and an effort was initiated to upgrade National Police capability, authority and responsibility for the program, maintaining the committee structure as a supporting effort. This culminated in May 1970 in the transfer of the Central Phung Hoang office from the Prime Minister's office to the Directorate General of National Police, and its establishment as a separate "bloc" therein. In the countryside, a gradual increase in Police participation in the program took place, although the current leadership of the DIOCCs and PIOCCs by service is as noted in the attached chart, demonstrating the continuing predominance of military leadership in the program (Tab 23). In some areas the Police did
take major responsibility for the program, handling it within the Special Police.
In Saigon this had great success, indicated by the decline of terrorist activity
and the numbers of terrorist nets rounded up there by professional intelligence
and police operations.

d. Identification. The first application of the program involved
the identification of VCI individuals and organizations. A collation of avail-
able information was made at DIOCCs and PIOCCs throughout the country. Over the
two and one-half years these identifications have successively improved, and the
overall estimate has declined. It is on the basis of this effort that current
claims are made of VCI identified and it is on the basis of the information
about their local organizations that the total estimate of 63,082 VCI is made,
as the knowledge of the position may exist where the identification of the
incumbent does not. Many of these identifications, however, are still weak or
duplicative due to lack of knowledge of enemy geographic unit, aliases, outdated
reports, VCI killed or otherwise disappeared, etc. In addition, there has been
a tendency to collate what information was available rather than to seek out
new information. The major thrust of the current program is on specific targeting,
although laying EEI requirements on friendly agencies is by no means developed
to the degree required. A new form of dossier designed to assist specific
targeting of individuals and collection of necessary operational intelligence
about them is now being used (attached) (Tab 24).

Associated with identification is the GVN's ID Card program,
designed to provide solid identification for all citizens over 15. Its current
status and that of the fingerprint center is shown on the attached charts
(Tabs 25, 26). Identifications which have resulted from this center are shown
in the attached chart (Tab 27). There is very little doubt that the VC are concerned about this ID Card program, as they have been collecting and destroying cards, counterfeiting them, endeavoring to tamper with them, etc.

The identification of VCI has also been the subject of an intensive effort at computer mechanization. The purpose has been to identify in a central computer individual VCI from records forwarded from local files. This has been extended to a "tracking system" by which this original identification can be updated when the individual is captured, additional information is found on him, information is found on him in other localities, he is sentenced, he is placed in prison, and he is released. See attached fact sheet (Tab 28). This is scheduled to produce management information in January 1971.

e. Quotas. Quotas have been assigned to all levels for the neutralization of VCI. Over three years, a successive hardening of the quota system was instituted in order to obtain maximum incentive toward elimination of higher level VCI. Thus, the quotas were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Captured, rallied, killed - All VCI</td>
<td>1,200 per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Captured, rallied, killed (A&amp;B level only)</td>
<td>1,800 per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Sentenced, rallied, killed (A&amp;B only)</td>
<td>1,800 per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Sentenced, rallied, killed (A&amp;B only, with the added requirement that the number sentenced must constitute at least 50 percent of the total)</td>
<td>1,200 per month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last is to focus attention on the need for specific targeting and sentencing rather than windfall KIAs or ralliers. A number of debates have occurred over quotas, but the GVN after review retains them for their incentive effect upon lower officials.
f. Operations. Since the VCI in great part now inhabit base areas away from populated zones, many operations against the VCI have a military character. Individual arrests, check point detentions, cordons and searches of populated zones, etc., exist but the most productive operations have been the targeting of individuals for neutralization in the course of larger scale raids on enemy base and safe areas or hiding places, or by ambushes on known enemy trails where VCI elements endeavor to regain contact with populated communities. A recent success occurred in Quang Tin Province, where the Province Chief has conducted several massive RF and PF simultaneous offensives against many targets, using small unit raid tactics. He has also developed a Phoenix operations unit, consisting of National Police Field Force (NPFF), Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), and Armed Propaganda Team (APT). Other areas depend heavily upon favored units such as the PRU or the RF intelligence and reconnaissance squads operating directly for the Province Chiefs and District. Cordons and searches of large communities have generally been found to be unproductive of VCI and are being discouraged, although the tactic is valid where carefully targeted. The National Police has substantially increased its contribution to the program by the establishment of village police stations, permitting direct knowledge of the local community and report through Police channels to Phoenix. Rewards have been authorized in the past. While little actual use has been noted of this technique, a new effort is being made in this area. In some areas the PSDF has provided a substantial contribution to the Phoenix program by its involvement of the total population of a community and its accurate information about VCI families in the area.
g. **Priority Provinces.** Eight provinces have an estimated 2,000 or more VCI (Tab 28-A). These have been given priority in assignment of advisors. In coordination with the Director General National Police, a program was recently instituted to concentrate special attention and Police emphasis in priority provinces. A third officer was added to the Province Phoenix Advisory Staff to assist in the coordination of Chieu Hoi and National Police Field Force assistance. In addition, one Counterintelligence NCO, language trained, is being assigned to provide liaison between the Province Interrogation Center and the PIOCC, and another NCO to provide liaison between the Chieu Hoi Center and the PIOCC. The DGNP has issued instructions for increased police efforts in these provinces. The next step in this program will be to expand it to the 12 provinces having 1,000 or more VCI.

h. **Legal Processing.** A variety of steps have been taken by the GVN to improve the legal handling of VCI after capture. Some of these have been to provide a greater component of justice in the proceedings. Among them are Decrees 757 and 2212 (Tab 28-B), outlining mandatory sentences for A&B VCI. With a reporting system reflecting the activities of the Province Security Committees, this has resulted in a considerable improvement in processing and sentencing VCI from the mid-1969 sample showing that 75 to 90 percent received less than 6 months sentence (Tab 29). Additional prosecutors have been sent to the provinces to assist in the proper legal handling of such cases, as shown in Tab 30, and they have been directed to ensure the proper functioning of the Province Security Committees (Tab 30-A). A series of requirements have been imposed upon the handling of VCI, to wit, notification of Village Chief (decrees attached) (Tab 31), time limit on detention before trial (decree attached) (Tab 32), and others. A number of other recommendations are currently under
study, such as a hearing by a member of the PSC, a defense attorney, and the other protections included in Article 7 of the Constitution (Tab 33).

i. Detention Procedures. The current detention population of Vietnam is shown in the attached chart (Tab 34). This represents a considerable increase in capacity from that of 1968 which evidenced great overcrowding. ERCG visits to civilian and correction detention centers have taken place as shown in the attached telegram (Tab 35). The computer tracking system will make more accurate reporting available at the central level on length of incarceration, capacity versus population, dispositions, etc. There are still problem areas in corrections and detention in terms of diet, occasional abuses, disciplinary problems, lack of segregation of types of detainees, etc. The attached fact sheet summarizes these problems and the actions currently under way to ameliorate them (Tab 36).

j. Rehabilitation. Little or no action has been undertaken on a consistent basis in Vietnam to rehabilitate detainees. The need for this can be seen from the following list of prisoners released to society from Correction Centers only:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Communist Criminals</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>21,887</td>
<td>18,942</td>
<td>40,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>23,309</td>
<td>18,962</td>
<td>42,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>17,072</td>
<td>12,880</td>
<td>29,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>24,412</td>
<td>21,088</td>
<td>45,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 (1 Nov)</td>
<td>14,045</td>
<td>20,445</td>
<td>34,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100,725</td>
<td>92,317</td>
<td>193,042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One- and two-year programs were tried in past years but died. At this time, an experiment is under way in Con Son based upon successful Nationalist Chinese
experience. There a selected inmate "battalion" is given special attention, privileges and guidance. Based upon the results of this experiment a decision will be made to extend the technique elsewhere. At the same time, certain areas have a reorientation program, primarily as the result of the initiative of an individual Province Chief or other official, e.g., Thua Thien. An effort is being made at this time to extend reorientation to all Communist detainees and to apply more sophisticated techniques such as segregation of classes of detainees as shown in the attached fact sheet (Tab 38). The possibility of a parole system is also being examined with the Ministries of Justice and Interior, as shown on the attached fact sheet (Tab 39). The tracking system mentioned above will enable identified Communist detainees to be followed upon release to their new residences and permit continuing police surveillance.

k. Information Program. On 1 October 1969, the Prime Minister initiated the Phoenix Public Information program. This was designed to surface Phoenix publicly, under the rationale of protecting the people from terrorism. The information program has essentially two elements: (1) general information about the need for and desirability of the Phoenix program, and (2) specific announcements of individual VCI whose capture is sought. This has compromised posters with photographs, name lists, descriptions of VCI organizations in villages and districts, TV spots, etc. The current goal is the public exposure of 100 percent of identified VCI. The attached fact sheet outlines the extent of the information program during 1970 (Tab 40).

1. Vietnamese Attitudes. A variety of explanations exist for the reluctance on the part of many lower level Vietnamese officials to have engaged fully in the Phoenix program. These include:
a. Penetration by the enemy: Certainly true in some degree but not a major drawback to the program.

b. It was considered an American program, pressed strongly enough to be carried with minimal Vietnamese participation.

c. Accommodation, or live and let live: This could have existed in areas where a rough balance of power had been achieved, although the shift in power over 1969 and 1970 removes this from much of the countryside.

d. Fear: In some areas individual targeting of VCI might bring rapid retaliation on the official or his family.

e. A complex of psychological attitudes, involving a certain grudging admiration for the VCI struggle, an inferiority complex with respect to it, and a disinclination to personalize the battle against fellow schoolmates, neighbors, etc.

The basic solution to this problem lies in command attention and pressure. As noted above, this is increasing and the quota system has played a substantial part in it. At the same time, public attitudes toward the Phoenix program measured by the Pacification Attitude Analysis System during 1970 displayed the results noted in the attached charts and fact sheet (Tab 41). This indicates a substantial rise in public understanding and acceptance of the program, of course to some degree related to the information effort that has been made to disseminate awareness of it.

III. NATIONAL POLICE

The National Police over the past 10 years has been a stepchild of the GVN, but one which has contributed considerably despite handicaps. A strong colonial tradition in the National Police is gradually dying out but it remains
reflected in certain attributes, such as concentration on the protection of the administration rather than the population, a sharp separation of the Special Police (Ex-Surete) from other Police operations and a strong bureaucratic tendency in the best French tradition. These, plus the very heavy obligations on the Police for the maintenance of public order and mere self protection have made it's contribution to the overall Phoenix program small, except in the field of intelligence. The military leadership of the country did not turn to the Police, but rather to its own "more reliable" military units, for serious actions against the enemy. The Special Police contributed a great deal in a number of areas and cases, but the remainder of the National Police was preoccupied with deserter apprehension, resources control, and support of GVN administrative activities.

A major step in the right direction occurred with the move of the National Police to the countryside, beginning with the 1969 program to press 50 percent of Police to the district level and below. A further step was the establishment of village police stations in 1,802 (to date) of the 2,100 villages of the nation. Through this more direct contact with the rural population, the Police has increased its contribution to internal security through population census and control measures, low-level intelligence collection and the provision of public services. The Police achieved an improved public image after Tet 1968, when they performed valuable public services and assisted substantially in the defense of the urban areas. Their subordination to Village Chief authority and increased participation involvement in district, province and region affairs under the respective Chief has also brought the National Police into an improved position of collaboration and coordination with the dominant military and administrative structure. While petty corruption is still a problem in many areas,
there has been a substantial improvement in the discipline and appearance of the normal National Policeman. As an overall result, the National Police is moving toward official and public appreciation of its contribution to the public weal, although it has many weaknesses still to overcome to fulfill the full role required in Vietnamese society. An indication of its low comparative status in Vietnamese opinion, but also its move upwards during the past year, can be seen from the attached PAAS results (Tab 42).

Personnel. The nub of the Police problem lies in personnel, to include:

a. Leadership. As shown in the attached profile (Tab 43), the National Police has a serious shortage of officer level leadership. This has been aggravated over the years by an inability to recruit individuals with educational qualifications, who were assigned instead to military forces. In a recent Prime Ministerial action, the Department of Defense has been directed to assign 2,000 officers as indicated on the attached fact sheet (Tab 44) to the National Police. This may be supplemented shortly by the appointment of the Director General of National Police as the Chief of Staff for the National Police to the President, giving him the prestige and convenience of direct access to the Presidential level in the same manner as the Chief of the Joint General Staff.

b. Strength. As shown in the attached chart (Tab 45), the National Police strength over the past years has greatly increased. From a low of 16,890 in 1963 (after the removal of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Force, now RF and PF, from the Ministry of the Interior), the National Police expanded until the General Mobilization Act of 1968. This omitted the National Police from draft deferment and to the contrary was utilized to forbid the National Police to recruit between the ages of 18 and 35. When National Police strengths
began to decline as a result, the RVN ordered 13,000 ARVN personnel into the National Police. These were provided between the period of October 1969 and June 1970, whereupon the decline in strength resumed. In the fall of 1970 an arrangement was made by which the National Police was authorized to recruit voluntarily from among three categories: (a) RD Cadre, 7,000; (b) RVNAF Category II (wounded or disabled), 5,000; (c) draft age males from villages and hamlets for service therein, 5,000. These steps have very little promise of filling the 17,000 requirement. Consequently, the RVN has recently directed that 25,000 military personnel be transferred to the National Police. This should solve the requirement for the immediate future, and an effort is being made to include NP among authorized draft deferments and permit recruitment of draft eligible personnel from 24 years up.

The National Police has developed strength levels needed for different provinces based upon the formula outlined in the attached fact sheet and chart (Tab 46). An effort is being made to coordinate this increase of National Police strength with a concomitant reduction of RF and PF spaces in areas no longer needing a large quantity of RF and PF, due to the changed security situation and the improved PSDF. The resulting RF/PF spaces would be reallocated to areas still undergoing expansion or having substantial territorial security problems. An effort has been made to stimulate such joint planning among DGNP, JCS and DG/PSDF for a number of months, under the CPDC. Very poor initial results have been obtained but it is once again being tried in the context of the recent 25,000 transfer directive.

c. Training. The National Police training programs and results are as shown on the attached charts (Tab 47). The National Police training program
appears well worked out, but much refresher and advanced training is still ahead. The Phoenix component of this training has been substantially increased as shown in the attached fact sheet (Tab 48).

Status. The National Police have been categorized as civil servants in the GVN establishment. This has created a variety of procedural and substantive difficulties in their management. A National Police statute has been under preparation by the National Police and advisors over many years, but has never been adopted at the government level. The Prime Minister recently directed the National Police to supply a full version of a National Police statute with an interim Prime Ministerial decree by which it could be placed into effect. The draft being submitted would be a comprehensive solution to the overall problem of Police status and management under the law. It reflects many years of effort by our Public Safety team, a British police advisory group working with it, CAS and our overall CORDS review. Personnel pay raises will be included in the increases being decreed for the GVN military and civil personnel as a whole (see Tab 48-A for a comparison of NP with other services pay).

Corruption and Inspection. Corruption has been an endemic problem with the Police in the past, due to poor discipline, poor personnel and low pay, plus the occasion for temptation at roadblocks, handling papers, etc. There has been an increase in the discipline of the National Police, as can be seen by its appearance, although corruption has by no means been eliminated. During the past year, cases of corruption were acted upon by the disciplinary machinery of the National Police as shown in Tab 49.

The Internal Security Bureau of the National Police, which has primary responsibility for investigating offenses within the force, has been
expanded from 40 to 600 personnel and its procedures and organization have been strengthened. The Central Inspection Corps of the National Police has been broadened to include regional inspection teams, and the scope and frequency of inspections has been increased as shown in the attached chart (Tab 50).

IV. NEUTRALIZATIONS

The record of neutralizations of VCI is as shown on the attached chart:

b. By province, 1970 (Tab 52).
c. By ratio of neutralized to VCI strength, 1970 (Tab 53).
d. By contributing force, 1970 (Tab 54).
e. District level and above, 1970 (Tab 55).
f. Priority categories, 1970 (Tab 56).

A study of September and October data indicates that the following percentage of the VCI neutralized were pre-identified, i.e., known prior to neutralization rather than being revealed as VCI by documents or interrogation after neutralization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rallied</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>57.5 (Tab 57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study also revealed that operations directed by or supported with information from Phoenix centers produced 82.9 percent of all VCI killed or captured in October, an increase over the three previous months (Tab 57-A). It also showed a lower kill to capture ratio for Phoenix directed or supported operations than for other operations.
An interesting (albeit statistically shaky) projection can be made from relating estimates of VCI strength and actual neutralizations (producing a factor for replacements) over 1968-1970. This suggests that the VCI might approach long-term minimal (and manageable) levels (5,000) in 1973 if 1970 trends continue (Tab 58). Statistics aside, this does not appear to be an unreasonable estimate. If anything, the event could occur sooner if current programs of improvement of the Police and other aspects of the Phoenix program are pressed.

V. ADVISORY SUPPORT

a. The overall Phoenix program is supported by CORDS/DOD/Phoenix, MACJ2/VCI, CORDS/USAID/Public Safety, and OSA, plus of course the incidental assistance given through such programs as territorial security (RF/IF), PSDF, Chieu Hoi, etc. Phoenix advisors specialize on the Phoenix program; Public Safety advisors primarily upon the ordinary workings of the National Police as a whole, MACJ2 on collation and analysis of the VCI, and OSA advisors on the Special Police. Coordination is maintained at national, regional and provincial level of these various liaisons with the same National Police structure.

b. Personnel. Advisory personnel for the various elements of the Phoenix program and National Police are as shown on the attached charts (omitting OSA advisors) (Tab 59).

c. Training for advisors has been gradually built up as shown in the attached charts (Tab 60). In the earlier days of the Phoenix program there was inadequate training and orientation and there were frequent occasions in which the advisor knew very little about the program. Since this was combined with a lack of focus of responsibility for the program on the Vietnamese side, there were frequent occasions on which inadequately trained and oriented advisors...
carried the major burden of the program in a district. Training has since been improved, although there are still aspects of it to be further improved.

d. Assistance. US financial and logistics assistance to the Phoenix program and the National Police are as shown on the attached charts (Tab 61), showing also the degree of GVN investment in these programs.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

1. The VCI is being reduced in numbers and in qualitative strength. It remains a threat, however, to Vietnam, both in the short-term process of Vietnamization, and in the longer term as a framework which could be fleshed out by additional manpower. This could be generated by a reappearance of large-scale NVA forces providing a band wagon, by GVN ineptness or overreaching causing a revulsion and search for alternatives, or a breakdown of GVN society caused by political, social or economic contradictions and chaos. The VCI can be reduced to a manageable long-term threat but can probably not be eliminated entirely. Its efforts to achieve legal status and penetrate GVN society are not likely to have great success in the absence of some overall settlement with North Vietnam.

2. The reduction of overall VCI strength has been a result of the entire GVN and allied war effort. This has included the military success against the VC/NVA, the pacification program as a whole, the constitutional political structure and the economic revival in the countryside of Vietnam. Phoenix has to date contributed little to this reduction, although it has been an element of the overall program and during the past year has substantially increased its role against the VCI target.

3. Phoenix suffered considerable growing pains as a concept and a program, but its perception of the VCI threat is achieving GVN and public acceptance, with a concomitant understanding of the need for a proper counter program.
4. The National Police in Vietnam has been behind the power curve in this military society for many years. Despite handicaps, it has contributed to the security of the nation and is slowly rising (albeit from the cellar) in public and GVN esteem. The importance of its contribution has become more obvious as the focus of the struggle has moved to the VCI and public perception thereof has grown. Thus there is not only a requirement, there is now an opportunity, to improve the National Police to fill its full role in a free Vietnamese society.

5. The US advisory program for the Phoenix program and for internal security in Vietnam generally, including the National Police, has had a variety of bureaucratic and substantive weaknesses. A number of these are being remedied. Others probably are in the nature of facts of life, e.g., the military one-year tour and the civilian staffing limitations. Nonetheless a number of improvements are called for in the US advisory effort.

6. Many steps need to be taken to improve the GVN internal security program and US assistance therefor. At the same time, no dramatic and sweeping actions can promise a rapid change in the overall atmosphere. The most important steps that can be taken are to increase understanding in both the GVN and the public of the nature of the VCI threat and the necessity for operations to protect the people and nation from it. This must be accompanied by a sustained effort to select and train proper personnel and engage in the patient and precise operations called for in the internal security field. This effort should be encompassed in a program to build a professional and responsive National Police, to contribute over the years to the internal security of South Vietnam.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The National Police should be headed by a two- or three-star General, personally selected and close to the President and Prime Minister. He should be directed to develop a plan to strengthen the National Police and to make it a full and accepted partner of the RVNAF as one of the national security forces of Vietnam. Full support should be provided to this effort from the American side.

2. The National Police statute should be passed and an interim decree utilized to implement its recommendations. It should include appropriate draft deferment for operational police. This is under current consideration and will be pressed (Tab 62).

3. The National Police should be given the leading role in the Phoenix program, but the Phoenix committee structure should be continued as a mechanism for the organization of support by other services. At the same time, the Phoenix program should be kept as a major command responsibility of Region Commanders, Province Chiefs, District Chiefs and Village Chiefs. It is included in the draft of the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan. The Phoenix Bloc of the National Police Headquarters should be matched at region, province and district to supervise National Police performance in the program and coordinate contributions from other agencies. To the extent feasible the DIOCCs and PIOCCs should be moved to National Police compounds and become the center for all anti-VCI operations.

4. The National Police should be increased to a force level of 112,000 by end-July 1971 and 122,000 by end-December 1971. Draft exemption should be extended to operational National Police. 2,000 officers should be transferred from RVNAF to the National Police. A detailed JTD for the National Police
should be established by province, district and village, following an overall formula reflecting population density, territory and the security situation. This will serve as a basis for the allocation of Police and reallocation of RF/PP, coordinated with PSDF. This must be a joint DGNP/JGS/PSDF staff exercise.

5. **Public Information.** An energetic Phoenix public information campaign must be continued. Names, aliases, photos, and other available information must be publicized with respect to 100 percent of identified VCI, in order to secure maximum public participation in their capture. This must be supplemented by an energetic public information program on the importance of the Phoenix program as a whole, and its contribution to protecting the population against terrorism and any revival of VC strength. The People's Information program must be used to inform and stimulate the active participation of all GVN civil and military personnel (officials, teachers, etc.) in Phoenix, outlining not only why they should collaborate but the specific steps they should take to help.

Phoenix has been made the No. 1 MACV Psyops priority in support of pacification, and a detailed public information program has been developed between JUSPAO, MACV and CORDS for discussion with the Ministry of Information, JGS/PolWar and the People's Information Committee. The National Police public information program must be expanded to improve the police image with the population.

6. **PSDF.** Maximum participation in the Phoenix program must become a primary responsibility of all PSDF members, both combat and support. All PSDF must be trained in the Phoenix program and their contribution to it per attached lesson plans (Tab 63). Specialist PSDF Phoenix and National Police auxiliaries must be developed within the PSDF, to support the National Police and the Phoenix program. A monthly seminar should be held by all PSDF units to discuss the overall Phoenix program, the identity and activities of the VCI.
in the neighborhood, and actions which could be taken by the PSDF to assist the struggle against the VCI. These seminars must be attended by National Police representatives in the village and by National Police representatives from the district or province to the extent feasible. The PSDF will be requested to report such information upwards, but the National Police must take the positive responsibility of going to local PSDF units to search out the information available there by interrogation.

7. The full protections of Article 7 of the Constitution must be included in the legal procedures applied to VCI. The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice must determine a method of granting a confrontation or hearing for the accused, defense counsel, and protection against improper methods of interrogation or detention. Prosecutors should be settled in all provinces. The Province Security Committee vote should be restricted to the Province Chief, the Province Council Chairman and the Prosecutor, pursuant to the recommendation of a Province Council Chairman at the Vung Tau meeting October 24. Close attention must be given to the workings of Province Security Committees, in terms of expedition of processing, accuracy of sentences, etc.

8. A reward program must be developed and specific terms thereof disseminated through National Police channels. This should include rewards in substantial figures for information leading to the arrest and conviction of most wanted individuals. These rewards should be handled through GVN channels rather than American, although US funds should be inserted to support the program at the national level if needed.

9. Intelligence collection must become a positive obligation of each level of command and all GVN services, not merely an intelligence service
responsibility. This must be obtained by personal visits to subordinate levels and the collection there of available information to be carried to the upper level for consolidation into files there. The Phoenix tradition of collating reports received must be replaced by a vigorous program of visiting subordinate levels and collecting information there, oral or written, for return to the central files at the next level. This must be a major responsibility of the National Police Phoenix Bloc at each level and the units contacted must include PSDF, village and hamlet offices, teachers, RF/FF units, village officials, etc.

10. Collation of intelligence on the VCI should be assigned to the Phoenix Center at district, province and region. These centers must act as staff sections for the appropriate commanders to keep them fully informed on the "VCI OB," i.e., the identities and organization of VCI in the area. The objective is to make each chief as aware of the details of the VCI structure and personalities as he is currently aware of the activities of local force and main force units. This information must be circulated and publicized so that all citizens may be aware of the opposition individuals and structure. Special arrangements will be needed to assign clear responsibility for coverage of VC boundaries which do not coincide with GVN and for coverage of regional organizations which frequently do not have a GVN counterpart, e.g., MR 5. Detailed intelligence on the VCI is still short and must be improved and made a working tool for the Police and other services.

11. A system of evaluation of the performance of Phung Hoang centers at district, province and region must be developed. This could be based on the ratios between population, estimated VCI, identified VCI, neutralizations, different ways in which neutralization was accomplished (KIA, rally, sentence), the responsible service (military, police or other), etc.
12. Training. All National Policemen must be trained in Phoenix and participation in its operations. In addition, all services which have a contribution to make to Phoenix must appoint designated officials for Phoenix liaison and these individuals must be given Phoenix training. This must be supplemented by overall orientation material for the entire government structure to be circulated through People's Information channels. The JGS, in coordination with the NOI, has developed a special intelligence training program which concentrates on Phoenix, to be implemented in early 1971. The program envisages the training of at least one member of each RF company and one member of each PF platoon. At least three members of each PSDP Key Inter-team are to be trained. Recommend that this training program be expanded subsequently in order to encompass all PSDP elements and to give greater depth of trained personnel in RF/PF units.

13. The NPFF must be utilized by the National Police as a leading enforcement arm for Phoenix operations. Their work must be fully coordinated and to the extent feasible merged into joint operations with PRU, APT, Special Police, RD Cadre, VIS, and PSDP, supplemented as necessary by RF/PF.

14. All Phoenix operations must be reported through Phoenix channels to remove duplication and inaccuracy in individual agency reports of Phoenix operations.

15. Two FBI officers should be invited to Vietnam for a review and recommendation with respect to improving the Phoenix effort. Their recommendations would be appropriate in the fields of positive operations against the VC, employee security within the GVN, fingerprint and other identification programs, coordination with local police, etc. They should work under CORDS.

16. A comprehensive program of upgrading the detention and correction system of Vietnam should be undertaken as outlined in the attached (Tab 64). This should be supplemented by an energetic system of inspection through the
Ministry of Justice reporting independently to the Prime Minister on the performance of the Ministry of Interior's Directorate of Corrections and DGNP.

17. An intensified program of reorientation and rehabilitation must be developed in correction and detention centers. This must primarily focus on re-education of middle level Communists and countering efforts of the VC to maintain shadow governments within these institutions. It must consist of individual consultation with detainees and a careful analysis of their attitudes, combined with incentives to encourage them to reject their prior allegiance. A trained corps of officers must be developed for this operation.

18. A qualified member of the Federal Bureau of Prisons should be requested for assignment to CORDS Public Safety staff to handle liaison and support of the Directorate of Corrections of the Ministry of Interior.

19. A parole system should be instituted as outlined in the attached proposal (Tab 39).

20. All DIOCCs should be supplied with thermofax or other automatic reproduction equipment. A review should be made of their transportation requirements and these filled as needed.

21. The Big Mack collection system as it affects VCI should be made into a National Police system for implementation through National Police channels with US advisory assistance. The US classification of VCI estimated and identified (one report within past year showing name and position) should be supplemented by the GVN confirmed category (three separate reports). The GVN should be urged to require that one of these last reports be within the past year.

22. Internal security should be added to the curriculum of the US Army Military Assistance Institute, Fort Bragg. This should include training in internal security intelligence, to include collection, interrogation, substantive knowledge of Communist apparatus and fronts; Police operations, detention...
procedures, rehabilitation procedures, etc. It should receive contributions from the International Police Academy, the Military Police School, and the intelligence community. Greater coordination should be established between the training of civil and military-advisors coming to Vietnam to work on the Police and Phoenix programs so that they come with a common basis for understanding their major responsibilities.

23. The first class of the US Army Military Assistance Institute, Fort Bragg, special Phoenix course has the following participants in its first session: 24 Lieutenants, 3 Captains, 1 Major. It is recommended that this course be given to a majority of Captains so that they can fill the Captain spaces called for at the DIOCCs in Vietnam or aspire to the PIOCC spaces which should be filled by Majors.

24. Develop a system of HES scoring which will better reflect the presence and activities of the VCI. The present scoring system weighs most heavily the military component of overall security and pacification. In a new system, a score will give full weight to the VCI as an element of a security rating. This will effectively establish the overall hamlet rating in the absence of a very wide variation on the development side. The attached fact sheet outlines the current state of this re-examination, which is being discussed with the GVN (Tab 65).

25. A strong effort must be made to eliminate the backlog in handling of fingerprints and issuing ID cards and an extensive program of application of this resource to Phoenix operations must be instituted.