18 June 2003
Source: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03902t.pdf
United States General Accounting OfficeGAO
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 3:00 p.m. EDT
Monday, June 16, 2003Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security,
Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of RepresentativesHOMELAND SECURITY
Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland
Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade
Facilitation MissionsStatement of Richard M. Stana, Director
Homeland Security and Justice IssuesGAO-03-902T
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the longstanding challenge of balancing our nation’s security and commercial needs, an issue that is especially important in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that changed the nation’s security environment. Addressing this challenge now falls principally to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Border and Transportation Security directorate. Within this directorate, the responsibility has been assigned primarily to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP). BCBP consists of the inspections component of the former U.S. Customs Service; the Border Patrol and Inspections components of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); and a former component of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).1
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1 Following the creation of DHS and its absorption of Customs, the Secretary of the Treasury retained authority over Customs’ revenue functions.
Achieving the balance between security and commercial needs is greatly affected by BCBP’s commercial and border and immigration control workload. Regarding commercial workload, in fiscal year 2002, the former U.S. Customs Service processed 24.9 million trade import entries valued at over $1.1 trillion and collected $23.8 billion in duties and fees; it also processed about 6 million cargo containers arriving at U.S. sea ports. While the cargo workload has stabilized somewhat as a result of the recent global economic slowdown, it is likely to begin growing again when an economic recovery is underway at some point in the future, thus exacerbating the challenges BCBP faces. Regarding border and immigration control workload, in fiscal year 2002, inspectors at over 300 ports of entry inspected nearly 450 million travelers while the Border Patrol apprehended nearly 960,000 aliens trying to enter the U.S. illegally between the ports of entry.
BCBP faces many challenges as it performs its important missions. In my testimony
today, I make the following points:
My testimony today is intended to provide an overview based primarily on the results of work that we have completed in recent years, namely, our Performance and Accountability Series and High-Risk reports related to DHS, Justice and Treasury;2 DHS’s international mail and package inspection processes;3 DHS’s acquisition and deployment of radiation detection equipment;4 the Border Patrol’s southwest border strategy;5 DHS’s spending plans for its planned system to monitor the flow of foreign nationals in and out of the United States;6 and our investigators’ efforts to enter the country using fraudulent documents.7 My testimony also highlights our ongoing work related to cargo inspections and individual inspections at land ports of entry.8
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2 U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-03-95 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003); Major Management Challenges and Program Risks Department of Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C., Jan. 2003); Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the Treasury, GAO-03-109 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003); and High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003).3 U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Customs Service: International Mail and Package Inspection Processes at Selected Locations, GAO-02-967 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2002).
4 U.S. General Accounting Office, Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2002).
5 U.S. General Accounting Office, INS’ Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO-01-842 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2001).
6 U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning, GAO-03-563 (Washington, D.C.: June 2003).
7 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States, GAO-03-438T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003) and Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States from Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected, GAO-03-713T (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2003).
8 The cargo inspection work was requested by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. The individual inspections at land ports of entry work is being done pursuant to a mandate in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Since this work is ongoing and involves information that BCBP considers to be law enforcement sensitive, we are precluded from further discussing it in this unclassified statement.
BCBP has undertaken efforts to focus its enforcement on selecting and inspecting the highest-risk incoming cargo, while enabling legitimate cargo to be cleared in a timely manner. It has a number of initiatives underway aimed at improving its ability to identify potentially risky cargo for inspection. BCBP and Customs before it have longstanding efforts to use information, personnel, and technology to identify such cargo. These efforts pose a range of challenges, from the availability of threat assessments and actionable intelligence to the capability of nonintrusive inspection technology to detect potentially harmful contraband. From a trade facilitation perspective, BCBP has made some progress in implementing initiatives that are designed to improve the efficiency of its regulation of commercial activities. But additional challenges remain, including the need to improve its evolving trade compliance program and acquire a new trade processing system.
Major Cargo Security Initiatives
According to the Commissioner of BCBP, the priority mission is to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. This important
mission means improving security at our physical borders and ports of entry,
as well as extending the zone of security beyond our physical borders. BCBP
has a number of initiatives underway aimed at improving security,
including:
We have work underway to review most of these initiatives and will make our results available to the Subcommittee as soon as the work is completed.
Selecting Highest-Risk Cargo for Inspection
Separating high-risk cargo from low- or no-risk cargo is extremely important to BCBP because searching each and every cargo and traveler that enters the United States would cripple the flow of legitimate trade and travel and would require a huge resource commitment. Over the years Customs has recognized that it needed to identify what is high risk—and to do so as early in the process as possible—and target its limited resources accordingly. To select, or “target,” and inspect the highest-risk cargoes and travelers, BCBP relies on the use of threat assessments and actionable intelligence, the ability of inspectors to quickly discover or sense an unlawful cargo, and the use of nonintrusive inspection technology to detect potentially harmful contraband. Each of these poses challenges to BCBP.
Information is key to identifying high-risk cargo. Such information can come from manifests for air and sea shipments, from importers, or from intelligence units within or outside DHS. Accurate information can help BCBP make reliable risk determinations, particularly when it is used in DHS computerized models that help assess cargo risk. Obviously, when information or intelligence is incomplete or unreliable, it can adversely impact on BCBP’s ability to identify potentially risky cargo for inspection.
We are currently reviewing how BCBP is targeting cargo for further inspection and how such cargo is inspected at ports. In this regard, we are reviewing how BCBP developed the model used in targeting, how BCBP is handling the targets generated by the model at sea ports, and whether and how BCBP intends to evaluate targeting. Since this work is ongoing, and involves information that BCBP also considers to be law enforcement sensitive, we are precluded from discussing specific aspects of this matter in this unclassified statement. However, in the broadest terms, our work to date shows that BCBP’s targeting efforts face a range of challenges relating to threat assessments, actionable intelligence, and nonintrusive inspection technology.
Having sufficient numbers of well-trained and motivated staff is also key to identifying high-risk cargo. Inspectors and canine officers are trained to detect unusual or abnormal behaviors or circumstances that suggest a potential threat or unlawful activity. Many have developed a “sixth sense” in that they pick up on latent clues and unconnected information.
Nevertheless, these inspectors are challenged by the tight timeframes and pressures they work under to move legitimate cargo through the ports. Our recent work on the inspection of international mail showed that relying on inspectors alone can increase the risk that contraband enters the country. The inspection of incoming foreign mail remains largely a manual process that relies primarily on physical examination. We found several challenges relating to this process, but BCBP’s determination that our results were law enforcement sensitive precludes our discussing them here. However, at the time our work was completed, one courier was working with the former Customs Service to pilot test an advance manifest system—a computerized database that receives cargo manifest information. The database is intended to allow Customs to analyze incoming package information and make more informed decisions about what packages to inspect.
In addition to information and staff, technology provides for a more effective and efficient process. Large-scale x-ray and gamma–ray imaging systems, portal radiation monitors, and portable and hand-held radiation detection devices can reduce the need for costly, intensive inspections and save inspection time and resources.
As important as the use of technology is, there are certain limitations and challenges that need to be considered. For example, we reviewed Customs’ acquisition and deployment of radiation detection equipment. We found that some of the radiation detection equipment being used—radiation pagers—have a limited range and are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear material. Furthermore, experts we contacted did not view pagers as search instruments but rather as personal safety devices. We plan to report later this summer on BCBP’s acquisition and deployment of radiation detection equipment.
In trying to achieve the commercial-security balance, BCBP is challenged to ensure that antiterrorism efforts do not slow the flow of legitimate international commerce and travel. According to BCBP, it has worked with importers on concerns such as where their goods originated, the physical security and integrity of their overseas plants and those of their foreign suppliers, the background of their personnel, the means by which they transport goods, and those who they have chosen to transport their goods into the country. BCBP has reaffirmed to importers the importance of knowing their customers and has examined the security practices of their freight forwarders and the routes their shipments travel.
Although BCBP has made some progress in implementing initiatives that are designed to improve the efficiency of its regulation of commercial activities, additional challenges remain, particularly in view of the new and heightened emphasis on terrorism. These challenges include (1) continuing to improve its evolving trade compliance program and (2) acquiring a new trade processing system.
Implementing the Customs Modernization Act
Although tempered recently by the global economic slowdown, growth in the volume and value of imports continues to create profound challenges for BCBP to facilitate and enforce U.S. trade laws and regulations. The volume of trade is expected to surpass $2 trillion in the year 2006. To speed the processing of imports and improve compliance with trade laws, specifically, the Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act of 1993 (also known as the “Mod Act”),9 BCBP’s predecessor, Customs, developed an “informed compliance strategy.”
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9 P.L. 103-183, title VI. The Mod Act fundamentally altered the relationship between importers and, at the time, Customs by giving the importer the legal responsibility for declaring the value, classification, and rate of duty applicable to merchandise being imported into the United States. Customs, however, is responsible for determining the final classification and value of the merchandise. The Mod Act also gave Customs and importers a shared responsibility for ensuring compliance with trade laws.
In 1999, we recommended that the Customs Service develop and implement an evaluation of the effectiveness of its informed compliance strategy. Customs agreed with our recommendation and completed its Trade Compliance Strategy Study on May 24, 2001. The study indicated that the strategy improves compliance, but the impact on overall compliance rates is small. For example, one initiative, the Company Enforced Compliance Process (CECP), was to address large importers’ noncompliance that had a significant negative impact on the overall national compliance rates. According to the study, Customs was to punish noncomplying companies by imposing “confirmed risk” designations, increasing examinations, removing privileges, and referring for penalties.
However, the confirmed risk status was only used six times, and loss of privileges and referral for penalties were never used. The study concluded that CECP was not much of an enforced compliance process, and it was discontinued.
On the other hand, the study found that the companies’ compliance rates increased after they participated in the other initiatives such as compliance assessment and account management initiatives. While it is not possible to attribute the increase in compliance totally to these initiatives, the study concluded that these programs had a positive impact.
Acquiring a New Trade Processing System
Customs’ ongoing effort to acquire a new trade processing system is key to modernizing how Customs tracks, controls, and processes all commercial goods imported into and exported out of the United States. This large and complex system, known as the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), is expected to cost about $1.7 billion and is to replace Customs’ antiquated system. Expected benefits from ACE include speeding the flow of legitimate commerce into and out of the United States, identifying and targeting high-risk commerce requiring greater scrutiny, and providing a single interface between the trade community and the federal government for trade data. In April 2001, Customs awarded a 5-year contract, with options to extend the contract to not more than 15 years, to a system integrator responsible for developing and deploying ACE.
Successfully managing a project as large and complex as ACE is a challenging
undertaking. Over the last 4 years, we have reported on ACE and recommended
steps Customs needed to take to minimize project risks. To its credit, Customs
has taken action to implement our recommendations, as follows:
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10 Capability Maturity ModelSM is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University, and CMM is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The SA-CMM identifies key process areas that are necessary to effectively manage software-intensive system acquisitions. Achieving the second level of the SA-CMM’s five-level scale means that an organization has the software acquisition rigor and discipline to repeat project successes.
Customs has made progress in implementing some, but not all, of our recommendations. Moreover, because Customs is in the early stages of acquiring ACE, many challenging tasks remain before Customs will have implemented full ACE capability.
To prevent illegal entry of individuals into the United States between the ports of entry, BCBP has deployed significant resources but estimates significantly more are needed. Continued implementation of the southwest border strategy faces a range of challenges, including meeting hiring goals and obtaining needed approvals to deploy fencing and technology to implement its strategy while simultaneously addressing emerging concerns over illegal entry along the northern border, mitigating the negatives affects the strategy may have on communities that experience an increase in illegal alien traffic, and responding to continuing concerns over the safety of aliens who cross in remote and desolate areas. At our nation’s ports, BCBP faces an array of challenges, including improving inspectors’ ability to verify the identity of travelers and whether they can be admitted into the country, unifying and enhancing inspector training, and complying with the congressional mandate to implement a system to track the entry and exit of all aliens.
Deterring Illegal Entry between the Ports of Entry
Deterring illegal entry between the nation’s ports of entry will continue to be a challenge for BCBP. In previous work, we reported that the Border Patrol had estimated that significantly more resources would be needed to fully implement its border control strategy and that various factors had impeded the Border Patrol’s ability to implement its strategy as originally planned.
Since 1994, the Border Patrol has been implementing a phased strategy to increase deterrence to illegal entry beginning, first, with the areas that had the largest influx of illegal aliens. The strategy postulated that as resources were applied in one area, the flow of illegal alien traffic would shift to other locations along the southwest border where resources had yet to be applied.
In our last report on the southwest border strategy in August 2001, we reported that the Border Patrol estimated it would need between 11,700 and 14,000 agents, additional support personnel, and hundreds of millions of dollars in additional technology and infrastructure to fully implement the Southwest border strategy.11 We reported that it would take at least 5 more years (until 2006) to reach the minimum number of agents the Border Patrol believed it needed along the Southwest border if (1) the administration’s agent hiring goals at that time were maintained and met and (2) all new agents were deployed to the southwest border. However, this estimate was made before the September 11, 2001, attacks and the subsequent concerns regarding the need for additional resources to deter illegal entry along the northern border.
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11 See U.S. General Accounting Office, INS’ Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO-01-842 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2001).
BCBP continues to face hiring challenges to meet its estimated needs. The Border Patrol currently has about 9,500 agents deployed along the southwest border. While nearly a 3-fold increase from the 3,400 agents the Border Patrol had along the southwest border in 1994, it is still about 2,200 agents short of the minimum number, 11,700, the Border Patrol said it needed to fully implement the southwest border strategy. Currently, the Border Patrol has 567 agents deployed along the northern border.
We also reported on various factors that had impeded the Border Patrol’s ability to implement its strategy, some of which still appear to be problematic. For example, it had taken the Border Patrol longer to implement the strategy than originally planned because, among other things, the Border Patrol experienced difficulties hiring agents and delays in obtaining approvals needed to deploy technology and build fences.
The Border Patrol also recognized the need to make outreach efforts to communities because its initial failure to warn some communities about anticipated increases in illegal alien traffic caught community officials by surprise and angered some residents due to the negative effects the increased traffic had on the community. When apprehensions surged in communities into which the illegal alien traffic was reportedly pushed, officials and residents in one community reported experiencing loss of business, destruction of private property, and environmental degradation.
Concerns have been raised over the environmental impact of current plans to build additional fencing along the border in Arizona. A recent news article described how some local residents in the border area southwest of Tucson, Arizona, are patrolling the border to report illegal crossings raising the concern of law enforcement officials. The Border Patrol has realized its goal of shifting illegal alien traffic away from urban areas into more remote areas. However, rather than being deterred from attempting illegal entry, many aliens have instead risked injury and death by trying to cross mountains, deserts, and rivers. This prompted the Border Patrol to implement a Border Safety Initiative consisting of, among other things, a media campaign to warn aliens about the dangers of crossing illegally, as well as establishing search-and-rescue units.
We further reported in August 2001 that although alien apprehensions had shifted along the border as expected, overall apprehensions along the southwest border had continued to increase to over 1.6 million in fiscal year 2000—raising questions about the strategy’s effect on overall illegal entry along the southwest border. However, since then apprehensions along the southwest border have declined to less than 1 million in fiscal year 2002.
While there may be many reasons for the decline in apprehensions, in response to our recommendation, the Border Patrol has developed a plan designed to evaluate the impacts of its southwest border strategy. However, the evaluation has yet to be completed.
Our recent work at ports of entry and our ongoing work specifically at land border ports, indicate that BCBP inspectors continue to face challenges that those from their predecessor agencies also faced in balancing the need to identify violators of immigration and other laws while facilitating the movement of lawful travelers. Today, I will touch on several issues relating to the inspection of entry documents, inspector training, intelligence information needs of the field, and BCBP plans for implementing the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology system, known as the U.S. VISIT system.
Determining Traveler Admissibility
At land border ports of entry, inspectors must quickly make decisions about whether to admit a traveler into the United States or refer travelers for more intensive inspection if admissibility cannot be readily determined. Two of the factors that challenge inspectors’ ability to verify the travelers’ identity and admissibility are that (1) some travelers may enter the United States without having to present a travel document and (2) travelers can present a variety of documents to gain entry into the United States, some of which can be easily counterfeited.
First, some travelers do not need to present proof of citizenship at the border. U.S. and certain Canadian citizens are exempt from having to present any document upon entry. Instead, they can make an oral claim of citizenship, if this satisfies the inspector. According to immigration data, inspectors at land border ports intercepted nearly 15,000 people in 2002 who falsely claimed to be U.S. citizens in order to gain illegal entry, suggesting an unknown number of travelers successfully entered the United States this way.
Second, a variety of documents are accepted at ports, and many can be counterfeited or used fraudulently with apparent ease. With nearly 200 countries issuing unique passports, official stamps, seals, and visas, the potential for document fraud is great. A wide variety of documents can be presented for inspection—including more than 8,000 state and local offices issue birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and other documents, any of which could potentially be counterfeit. According to immigration data, inspectors at land ports intercepted nearly 60,000 fraudulent documents in fiscal year 2002, including over 10,000 U.S. citizenship-related documents.
Clearly, others have successfully gained access to this country using counterfeit documents. Earlier this year, we testified on how our investigators entered the country from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica through land, air, and sea ports of entry using fictitious names, and counterfeit driver’s licenses and birth certificates made using readily available software.12 INS and Customs Service inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and our investigators encountered no difficulty in entering the country using them.
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12 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States, GAO-03-438T (Washington D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003) and Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States from Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected, GAO-03-713T (Washington D.C.: May 13, 2003).
Unifying and Enhancing Inspector Training
BCBP will also face an array of challenges in ensuring that its border inspectors are adequately trained, including ensuring appropriate training is provided in the detection of fraudulent documents. For example, former INS and Customs inspectors are still being trained at separate basic training academies using two different curricula. If border inspectors are to wear “one face” at the border, a unified curriculum and training approach will need to be developed and implemented. These training challenges will continue beyond the academy—BCBP will also need to ensure that a field training program is established that meets the needs of the newest as well as experienced inspectors at the ports. For example, neither the former INS nor Customs agencies had a standard on-the-job training program for their inspectors working at land border ports. The prior work I mentioned in which our investigators used counterfeit documents to enter the United States, as well as our ongoing work at 15 land border ports, suggest that one training challenge for BCBP will be to ensure that both new and experienced border inspectors are capable of readily detecting fraudulent documents.
Meeting Field Intelligence Needs
Our ongoing work at land border ports suggests that the Bureau will also face challenges regarding the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence information in the field. The former INS recognized the need for more intelligence support in the field. In 1997, an INS-contracted study reported the lack of an intelligence capability at all INS locations, including districts and ports.13 More recent studies suggest needs in this area persist. Although some steps have been taken to bring the intelligence function to the field level, additional steps remain if the intelligence needs of the field are to be met. These challenges include, but are not limited, to decisions related to staffing and training, as well as merging intelligence positions from the former Customs and INS.
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13 INS Intelligence Program Strategic Plan, September 30, 1997 (submitted by LB&M Associates, Inc.).
Implementing the New U.S. VISIT System
One of the most significant challenges facing DHS at ports of entry is the implementation of the U.S. VISIT system. This significant undertaking is intended to capture both entry and exit data on travelers. It will also have many implications for operations at U.S. ports of entry, including expenditures, staffing, inspection procedures, and infrastructure. We reviewed INS’s fiscal year 2002 expenditure plan and associated system acquisition documentation and system plans. We reported that INS’s preliminary plans showed that it intended to acquire and deploy a system that will satisfy the general scope of capabilities required under various laws. However, we found that the initial plan did not provide sufficient information about INS commitments for the system, such as what specific system capabilities and benefits will be delivered, by when, and at what cost. We concluded that this lack of detail is a material limitation in the first plan that will become even more problematic in the future as the magnitude and complexity of the system acquisition increases, as will the importance of creating plans with the appropriate level and scope of information.14 Responsibility for implementing U.S. VISIT now resides in the Border and Transportation Security directorate. We are currently reviewing the fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan and will ascertain whether these problems were addressed.
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14 U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit system Expenditure Planning, GAO-03-563 (Washington D.C.: Jun. 2003).
We designated implementation and transformation of the new Department of Homeland Security as high risk based on three factors. First, the implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous undertaking that will take time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner. Second, components to be merged into DHS—including those that now form BCBP—already face a wide array of existing challenges, some of which we have described in this statement. Finally, failure to effectively carry out its mission would expose the nation to potentially very serious consequences.
In the aftermath of September 11, invigorating the nation’s homeland security missions has become one of the federal government’s most significant challenges. DHS, with an anticipated budget of almost $40 billion and an estimated 170,000 employees, will be the third largest government agency; not since the creation of the Department of Defense (DOD) more than 50 years ago has the government sought an integration and transformation of this magnitude. In DOD’s case, the effective transformation took many years to achieve, and even today, the department continues to face enduring management challenges and high-risk areas that are, in part, legacies of its unfinished integration.
Effectively implementing and transforming DHS may be an even more daunting challenge. DOD was formed almost entirely from agencies whose principal mission was national defense. DHS will combine 22 agencies specializing in various disciplines: law enforcement, border security, biological research, disaster mitigation, and computer security, for instance. Further, DHS will oversee a number of non-homeland-security activities, such as the Coast Guard’s marine safety responsibilities and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) natural disaster response functions. Yet, only through the effective integration and collaboration of these entities will the nation achieve the synergy that can help provide better security against terrorism. The magnitude of the responsibilities, combined with the challenge and complexity of the transformation, underscores the perseverance and dedication that will be required of all DHS’s leaders, employees, and stakeholders to achieve success.
Further, it is well recognized that mergers of this magnitude in the public and private sector carry significant risks, including lost productivity and inefficiencies. Generally, successful transformations of large organizations, even those undertaking less strenuous reorganizations and with less pressure for immediate results, can take from 5 to 7 years to achieve. Necessary management capacity and oversight mechanisms must be established. Moreover, critical aspects of DHS’s success will depend on well-functioning relationships with third parties that will take time to establish and maintain, including those with state and local governments, the private sector, and other federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities, such as the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, DOD, and the Department of Health and Human Services. Creating and maintaining a structure that can leverage partners and stakeholders will be necessary to effectively implement the national homeland security strategy.
The new department is also being formed from components with a wide array of existing major management challenges and program risks. For instance, one DHS directorate’s responsibility includes the protection of critical information systems that we already consider a high risk. In fact, many of the major components merging into the new department, including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FEMA and the U.S. Coast Guard, face at least one major problem, such as strategic human capital risks, critical information technology challenges, or financial management vulnerabilities; they also confront an array of challenges and risks to program operations. For example, TSA has had considerable challenges in meeting deadlines for screening baggage, and the agency has focused most of its initial security efforts on aviation security, with less attention to other modes of transportation. The Coast Guard faces the challenges inherent in a massive fleet modernization.
DHS’s national security mission is of such importance that the failure to address its management challenges and programs risks could have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizens’ health and safety, and our economy. Overall, our designation of the implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk area stems from the importance of its mission and the nation’s reliance on the department’s effectiveness in meeting its challenges for protecting the country against terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Seto J. Bagdoyan, Michael P. Dino, Darryl W. Dutton, Barbara Guffy, E. Anne Laffoon, and Lori Weiss.
Source: http://hsc.house.gov/testimony.cfm?id=16
Monday, June 16, 2003
Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez, Members of the Subcommittee, thank
you for this opportunity to testify. I am pleased to appear before you today
to discuss the strategy for securing our nation’s ports of entry while
ensuring a free flow of legitimate trade and travel.
As you know, on March 1, 2003, immigration inspectors of the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service, agricultural border inspectors of the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Border Patrol, and the U.S. Customs
Service merged to form the Bureau of Customs and Border and Protection (BCBP)
within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate of the Department
of Homeland Security. Now, for the first time in our country’s history,
all agencies of the United States government with significant border
responsibilities have been brought under one roof. With our combined skills
and resources, we will be far more effective than we were when we were separate
agencies. For example, immediately after BCBP was established, we were able
to ensure for the first time that all primary inspectors at our ports of
entry were provided with radiation detection equipment. In addition, this
unified chain of command, when coupled with Departmental emphasis on information
sharing throughout the law enforcement and intelligence communities, will
ensure that BCBP personnel have and share the information they will need
to do their job. I was honored to be appointed by the President to serve
as the Commissioner of U.S. Customs in September 2001, and now I have the
great privilege of serving as the first Commissioner of Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection.
The priority mission of BCBP is the homeland security mission. That means
BCBP’s priority mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the United States – plain and simple. And we are doing
everything we reasonably and responsibly can to carry out that extraordinarily
important priority mission.
BCBP also is continuing to perform the traditional missions of the predecessor
agencies that make up BCBP. These missions include apprehending individuals
attempting to enter the United States illegally; stemming the flow of illegal
drugs and other contraband; protecting our agricultural and economic interests
from harmful pests and diseases; protecting American businesses from theft
of their intellectual property; regulating international trade; collecting
import duties; and enforcing U.S. trade laws.
At BCBP, we know that we must perform both our priority and traditional missions
without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel. We have twin goals:
(1) increasing security, and (2) facilitating legitimate trade and travel.
These twin goals do not have to be mutually exclusive. They can and should
be achieved simultaneously. As we develop ways to make our borders more secure
against terrorism, we also have an opportunity to develop ways to ensure
the speedy flow of legitimate trade and travel. How do we do this? We do
it by building a smarter border. Three components of a smarter border that
I will discuss today are the use of advance, electronic information; the
extension of our zone of security beyond our physical borders; and the use
of non-intrusive detection technology. I will also briefly discuss the US
VISIT program that was recently announced by Secretary Ridge and that will
be overseen by the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.
One of the most important keys to our ability to build a smarter border –
to increase security without stifling legitimate trade – is information.
Good information, received electronically and in advance, enables us to more
accurately and more quickly identify – or target – what is “high
risk,” defined as a potential threat, and what is low risk or absolutely
no risk whatsoever. The separation of high risk from no risk is critical
because searching 100 percent of the cargo that enters the United States
is not possible, wise, or necessary. Even if the resources were made available
to do so, it would unnecessarily cripple the flow of legitimate trade to
the United States. When inspections were increased on September 11th, the
impact was immediate. Commercial trucks waited for as long as 10 to 12 hours
to get into the U.S. on the land border. This nearly brought our economy
to its knees.
What is necessary and advisable is searching 100 percent of the high-risk
cargo that enter our country. To do this, we need to be able to identify
what is high risk, and do so as early in the process as possible.
24-Hour Rule – Advance Information for Oceangoing Cargo
This past year, we worked closely with the trade community to develop an
advance manifest regulation addressing that issue with respect to oceangoing
cargo. The final version of that regulation, the so-called “24-hour
rule,” took effect on December 2, 2002. It requires the presentation
of accurate, complete manifest information on cargo destined for the United
States 24 hours prior to loading of a container on board a vessel at the
foreign port. The regulation also improves the quality of information presented,
because under the regulation, vague descriptions of cargo such as
“FAK” (Freight All Kinds) are no longer acceptable. When we receive
the information, the data is processed through BCBP’s Automated Targeting
System, and reviewed by our National Targeting Center, to identify high-risk
oceangoing cargo.
On February 2, 2003, BCBP began a strategy to ensure compliance with the
24-hour rule, following a 90-day grace period (which included 30 days following
the date of the rule’s publication) to permit the trade to adjust its
business practices. The compliance strategy has involved, for the first time,
issuing “no-load” orders and denying permits to unlade in the event
of non-compliance. We are seeing significant compliance with the rule.
Trade Act of 2002 – Advance Information for All Commercial Modes
Successful targeting of high-risk goods transported through other commercial
modes is as important as successful targeting of high-risk goods transported
by sea. As with oceangoing cargo, good information received earlier in the
process is the key to that successful targeting and the application of sound
risk management principles.
In the Trade Act of 2002, Congress recognized the importance of such advance
information by mandating presentation of advance data on all commercial modes,
both inbound and outbound. BCBP has worked through the consultative process
called for in the Trade Act of 2002 to determine the most appropriate advance
information requirements for land, rail, and air cargo. During this process,
we have met continuously with all segments of the trade. This will help us
ensure that the final rule for requiring this information meets the security
objectives of BCBP while also taking into account the realities of the businesses
involved in the different transport modes. We anticipate a proposed rule
being issued shortly, and a final rule being issued by the end of the calendar
year.
Advance Passenger Information System
Advance information is also critical to our efforts to identify individuals
who may pose a security threat. Before September 11th, 2001, air carriers
transmitted information on international airline passengers in advance of
their arrival to the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) on a purely
voluntary basis. Legislation enacted by Congress in late 2001 made submission
of this information mandatory. This information is obtained prior to arrival
in the U.S. for all passengers, and is transmitted electronically to BCBP’s
APIS.
An informed, enforced compliance plan instituted by BCBP has resulted in
99 percent of all passenger and crew information (including those pre-cleared
outside the United States) now being transmitted through APIS in a timely
and accurate manner. BCBP, through its combined customs and immigration
authorities, uses advance passenger information to evaluate and determine
which arriving passengers pose a potential terrorist risk.
Another important key to building a smarter border is extending our zone of security, where we can do so, beyond our physical borders – so that American borders are the last line of defense, not the first line of defense. We have done this on a far reaching basis by partnering with other countries on our Container Security Initiative, one of the most significant and successful initiatives developed and implemented after 9-11. We have also done this by partnering with Canada on the Free and Secure Trade Program and the NEXUS program, by expanding programs, like SENTRI, on the U.S./Mexico Border, and by partnering with the private sector with our Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
Container Security Initiative (CSI)
Oceangoing sea containers represent the most important artery of global commerce
– some 48 million full sea cargo containers move between the world’s
major seaports each year, and nearly 50 percent of all U.S. imports (by value)
arrive via sea containers. Approximately 6 million cargo containers arrive
at U.S. seaports annually.
Because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic and the opportunities
it presents for terrorists, containerized shipping is uniquely vulnerable
to terrorist attack.
In January, 2002, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) was unveiled to
address this threat. Under CSI, which is the first program of its kind, we
are identifying high-risk cargo containers and partnering with other governments
to pre-screen those containers at foreign ports, before they are shipped
to our ports.
The four core elements of CSI are:
CSI also involves stationing BCBP officers at the foreign CSI seaports to
do the targeting and identification of high-risk containers.
Importantly, CSI adds substantial security to containerized shipping without
slowing down the flow of legitimate trade. Containers that have been pre-screened
and sealed under CSI will not ordinarily need to be inspected again by BCBP
when they arrive at United States seaports. As I mentioned earlier, currently
100% of the containers identified as high-risk are being screened on arrival
to the United States. With CSI, it will usually be unnecessary to do this
screening here, if it has been done “there” – at a CSI port.
Since CSI was announced in January 2002, the program has generated exceptional
participation and support. The goal for the first phase of CSI was to implement
the program at as many of the top 20 foreign container ports – in terms
of volume of cargo containers shipped to United States seaports – as
possible, and as soon as possible. Those ports account for nearly 70 percent,
over two-thirds, of all cargo containers arriving at U.S. seaports. To date,
the governments representing 19 of the top 20 ports have agreed to implement
CSI. CSI has been implemented and is already operational in Le Havre, France;
Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Antwerp, Belgium; Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany;
Felixstowe, England; Yokohama, Japan; Singapore, Hong Kong, and Gothenburg,
Sweden. We are also operational at the Canadian ports of Halifax, Montreal,
and Vancouver. CSI will be operational at other CSI ports soon.
Just last week, Secretary Ridge and I announced Phase 2 of CSI. Under CSI
Phase 2, we will implement the program at other foreign ports that ship a
substantial volume of containers directly to the U.S., and at ports of strategic
importance in the global supply chain. To be eligible for CSI, ports must
meet the minimum standards for the program, that is, have acquired the detection
equipment and have the capacity and will to implement CSI with us.
Our expansion goals for Phase 2 include ports in the Middle East and other
strategic locations, such as the first Arab CSI port, in the United Arab
Emirates; ports in Turkey, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka; ports in Africa, such
as Durban, South Africa; and ports in Latin American countries such as Panama,
Argentina, and Brazil. Under Phase 2, we will also seek to include many
additional European ports, such as Gioia Tauro, Italy; Barcelona, Spain;
and Marseilles, France.
We believe that Phase 2 of CSI will have the same success of Phase 1. Governments
in many of these countries have already expressed an interest in participating
in CSI, and once we ensure that they meet the minimum standards necessary
for participation in CSI, we will conduct port assessments, sign agreements,
and begin implementation as rapidly as possible. In fact, as part of Phase
2, we have already signed CSI agreements with Malaysia and Sweden, covering
the two major ports of Malaysia and Gothenburg, Sweden, the main container
port for the Nordic countries. By the end of Phase 2, CSI will cover about
80% of all containers coming to the United States. We’ll cover nearly
100% of all Europe/U.S. transatlantic trade, and over 80% of transpacific
trade to the U.S. By the end of Phase 2, we will be well on our way to thwarting
any terrorist attempts to hijack our trading system.
Partnership with Canada
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we have worked closely with Canada to develop and implement initiatives that increase security and facilitate travel and trade at our shared 4,000 mile border. Many of these initiatives have been implemented under the Smart Border Declaration entered into between the U.S. and Canada in December 2001. This Declaration focuses on four primary areas: the secure flow of people; the secure flow of goods; investments in common technology and infrastructure to minimize threats and expedite trade; and coordination and information sharing to defend our mutual border. By benchmarking our security measures and sharing information, we are able to relieve pressure and congestion at our mutual land border.
Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
One of these initiatives is the Free and Secure Trade, or FAST, program.
Through FAST, importers, commercial carriers, and truck drivers who enroll
in the program and meet our agreed to security criteria are entitled to expedited
clearance at the Northern Border. Using electronic data transmission and
transponder technology, we expedite clearance of approved trade participants.
The FAST program fosters more secure supply chains, and enables us to focus
our security efforts and inspections where they are needed most – on
high-risk commerce – while making sure legitimate, low-risk commerce
faces no unnecessary delays.
FAST was announced by President Bush and Prime Minister Chretien in Detroit
in September 2002, and it is currently operational in 27 lanes at six major
crossings along the northern border. Eventually, FAST is projected to expand
to all 25 commercial centers located throughout the northern border.
NEXUS
With Canada, we have also implemented a program that enables us to focus
our resources and efforts more on high-risk travelers, while making sure
those travelers who pose no risk for terrorism or smuggling, and who are
otherwise legally entitled to enter, are not delayed at our mutual border.
This is the NEXUS program, under which frequent travelers whose background
information has been run against crime and terrorism indices are issued a
proximity card, or SMART card, allowing them to be waived expeditiously through
the port of entry.
NEXUS is currently operational at six crossings located at four major ports
of entry on the northern border: Blaine, Washington (3 crossings); Buffalo,
New York (Peace Bridge); Detroit, Michigan; and Port Huron, Michigan. We
also recently opened a new NEXUS lane at the International Tunnel in Detroit.
This summer, NEXUS will be expanded to the Rainbow, Lewiston, and Whirlpool
Bridges in New York. Other upcoming expansion sites for NEXUS include Alexandria
Bay, New York; and Sweetgrass, Montana.
Partnership with Mexico
We have continued important bilateral discussions with Mexico to implement
initiatives that will protect our southern border against the terrorist threat,
while also improving the flow of legitimate trade and travel.
With respect to cargo crossing our border with Mexico, for example, we will
be implementing a pilot FAST program on the southern border in El Paso, Texas
by September 2003. We also continue to work on a possible joint system for
processing rail shipments and on shared border technology.
SENTRI is another smart border initiative on our southern border. SENTRI
is a program that allows low-risk travelers to be processed in an expedited
manner through a dedicated lane at our land border with minimal or no delay.
SENTRI is currently deployed at 3 southwest border crossings: El Paso, San
Ysidro, and Otay Mesa, and expansion plans are being considered. In fact,
our SENTRI team met with their Mexican counterparts this spring to discuss
expansion logistics.
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
Any effort to “push our zone of security outwards” and protect
global trade against the terrorist threat must include the direct involvement
of the trade community. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism,
C-TPAT, is an initiative that was proposed in November 2001 began in January
2002, to protect the entire supply chain, against potential exploitation
by terrorists or terrorist weapons. Under C-TPAT, companies sign an agreement
with BCBP to conduct a comprehensive self-assessment of their supply chain
security and to improve that security – from factory floor to foreign
loading docks to the U.S. border and seaports – using C-TPAT security
guidelines developed jointly with the trade community.
Companies that meet security standards receive expedited processing through
our land border crossings, through our seaports, and through our international
airports, enabling us to spend less time on low-risk cargo, so that we can
focus our resources on higher risk cargo. C-TPAT is currently open to all
importers, air, sea, and rail carriers, brokers, freight forwarders,
consolidators, non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs), and U.S. Marine
and Terminal operators. As of October 1, 2002, C-TPAT eligibility for trucking
companies along the U.S./Canada border has been made available through the
Free and Secure Trade Program. (Participation in C-TPAT is a requirement
for bringing goods from the U.S. into Canada through the FAST lane.) We are
currently developing the mechanism and strategy to enroll foreign manufacturers
and shippers into C-TPAT. The intent is to construct a supply chain characterized
by active C-TPAT links at each point in the logistics process.
To date, over 3,422 companies are participating in C-TPAT to improve the
security of their supply chains. Members of C-TPAT include 71 of the top
100 importers and 32 of the 50 largest ocean carriers. To make sure that
C-TPAT is realizing its promise, BCBP is developing expertise in supply chain
security. In December 2002, we began providing training in the security
validation process to ten supervisory customs inspectors. We will provide
training to a second group of validators beginning June 16, 2003. In January
2003, these individuals started the validation process in cooperation with
our C-TPAT partners. To date, over 50 validations have been initiated.
Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology provides for a more effective and
efficient, as well as less invasive, method of inspecting cargo, compared
with drilling or dismantling of conveyances or merchandise. As we deploy
additional NII technology throughout the country, we increase our ability
to detect conventional explosives, nuclear weapons, radioactive components,
and other weapons of mass destruction. NII equipment includes large-scale
x-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems, portal radiation monitors, and a mixture
of portable and handheld technologies to include personal radiation detection
devices that greatly reduce the need for costly, time-consuming physical
inspection of containers and provide us a picture of what is inside the
container.
We are in the process of adding radiation detection systems and isotope
identifiers on the southwest border, radiation detection systems and Mobile
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS) on the northern border, Mobile
VACIS at seaports, isotope identifiers and x-ray equipment for international
mail, and isotope identifiers at Express Courier hubs, as well as additional
inspector positions for deploying and operating this equipment. This technology
will detect anomalies and the presence of radiological material in containers
and conveyances, with minimal impact to port operations in a fraction of
the time it takes to manually inspect cargo. CBP is also working closely
with the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology
Directorate to assure that the best equipment is procured and deployed in
a cost-effective manner, and that lessons learned from the current deployments
are applied to the development the next generation of technology.
Another border-related program that is currently being implemented, and that will rely on sophisticated technology and quick access to critical data, is the recently announced US VISIT program. Under this program, the Department of Homeland Security will implement a number of legislative requirements related to the entry and exit of visitors to the U.S. Once implemented, US VISIT will provide BCBP personnel with the capability to use biometric features – such as fingerprints, photographs, or iris scans-- to identify accurately people that are traveling into and out of the United States. In this way, US VISIT will strengthen and increase the reliability of our terrorist and other database checks on such individuals when they enter and exit the United States. As the Secretary has announced, US VISIT will be implemented at air and seaports by the end of calendar year 2003.
Mr. Chairman, I have outlined today several of the BCBP initiatives that
are helping us create a smarter border, one that enables us to carry out
our twin goals of increasing security and facilitating the flow of legitimate
trade and travel. The merger of all of the U.S. border agencies into one
agency, BCBP, in the Department of Homeland Security, creates new opportunities
for us to continue to build even smarter borders that strike the appropriate
and necessary balance between security and commerce. With the continued support
of the President, DHS, and the Congress, BCBP will do just that.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer
any of your questions.