25 November 2003. Thanks to B.
Six documents from the US Army Air Defense Artillery School, Ft. Bliss: http://airdefense.bliss.army.mil
1. Fort Bliss Casualty Assistance Notification Process, Command Lessons Learned2. Civilians on the Battlefield
4. Information Paper on Air Missile Defense
5. Troop Leading Procedures. June 03
6. Patriot Missile Defense Initial Lessons Learned in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Source:
http://airdefense.bliss.army.mil/qao/llr_toc.html
FORT BLISS CASUALTY ASSISTANCE NOTIFICATION PROCESS
COMMAND LESSONS LEARNED
1. ISSUE: Critical information was disseminated by the press prior to official notification to families.
DISCUSSION: Family members learned the names of the ambushed soldiers from television broadcasts prior to receiving official notification from Army officials. Army regulatory guidance, prevented officials from confirming or denying those identified by the media. The names of the ambushed soldiers were officially announced approximately four hours after the television broadcasts, and inquiries by affected family members were not answered until that time.
Due to the timing of the release by DA Casualty, Fort Bliss was instructed to notify the families of those soldiers declared as DUSTWUNs (DUty STatus, Where-abouts UnknowN). Three families were notified during the Family Assistance Center (FAC) update causing undue stress to family members and Fort Bliss officials. This could have been avoided if the regulation had allowed Fort Bliss officials to confirm the information published by the media.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Modify the notification procedures allowing confirmation once the media has released information.
OBSERVER/POC: COL Ben Hobson, Chief of Staff, 915-568-4303/3805,
DSN 978-4303/3805.
2. ISSUE: There are no clearly defined instructions for the notifying Primary Next of Kin (PNOK) or Secondary Next of Kin (SNOK) of POWs or missing soldiers.
DISCUSSION: Initial guidance by DA Casualty was that Casualty Notification Officers (CNOs) needed to notify in person only the PNOK of the missing soldiers. Forty eight hours after the initial notification, DA Casualty instructed the Fort Bliss Casualty Assistance Center (CAC) to have CNOs notify the SNOK of the missing soldiers in person as well. According to DA Casualty, the holdup in providing this face-to-face notification delayed the release of the names of the POWs and missing and deceased soldiers.
In addition, the initial script for the Casualty Assistance Officer (CAO) to brief the families identified the soldiers as DUSTWUNS. It was subsequently changed to state that some of the DUSTWUNS might be dead. The unclear interpretation of regulatory guidance or miscommunication produces secondary and tertiary effects in the Casualty Assistance process.
RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that both DA Casualty and the affected CAC have a clear understanding of regulatory guidance prior to initiating the notification process.
OBSERVER/POC: COL Tom Trumps, Garrison Commander, 915-568-2005/2833,
DSN 978-005/2833.
3. ISSUE: DA Casualty guidance initially prohibited Fort Bliss CAC from sharing the POW/Missing list with the Family Readiness Group (FRG) Leaders.
DISCUSSION: The affected FRG leaders were not allowed to know the names of the soldiers on the POW/Missing list. However, once the PNOK and SNOK were notified, family members quickly turned to the FRG leaders for answers and assistance.
One of the basic functions of the FRG is to provide comfort and support to the affected families. If FRG leaders are not informed, they cannot assist the families with those basic needs. In addition, FRG leaders can be an enormous resource for the CAO as these FRG leaders have personal insights and information about the families. CAOs are normally from different units or are based at installations nearest the PNOK/SNOK and lack such insight.
RECOMMENDATION: Upon notification of the PNOK/SNOK, grant FRG leaders access to the casualty list. Fort Bliss included the FRG leaders as early as possible to ensure they were empowered to facilitate notification and information flow.
OBSERVER/POC: COL Tom Trumps, Garrison Commander, 915-568-2005/2833,
DSN 978-2005/2833
4. ISSUE: The 507th Maintenance Company incident essentially turned into a mass casualty situation. As a result, multiple CNOs/CAOs from different installations were used in the notification/assistance process. Fort Bliss, as the “home” installation of the affected unit, was not informed until well after the fact and once all PNOK and SNOK were notified.
DISCUSSION: Due to the number of casualties, many PNOK and SNOK were notified by the Regional CAC. The regional CAC has responsibility for those PNOK and SNOK who live outside the Fort Bliss CAC area of responsibility.
DA Casualty is responsible for working the non-Fort Bliss CAC notifications. However, because the affected unit is assigned to Fort Bliss, it is critical for the Fort Bliss CAC to have visibility of the notification process. This includes timely status of family notification by other CACs. The Fort Bliss CAC must know immediately once PNOK and SNOK are notified to ensure that the Rear Detachment Commander and FRG Leader are proactive and prepared to address PNOK/SNOK concerns and questions.
RECOMMENDATION: When PNOK/SNOK must be notified by CACs outside of the unit’s home station, DA Casualty should contact the appropriate CAC to appoint a CNO to notify the family. The CNO must immediately coordinate with the “home” installation on status and progress of the notification process. This would alleviate the burden placed on Fort Bliss to have situational awareness on the notification process with regard to PNOK/SNOK.
OBSERVER/POC: COL Ben Hobson, Chief of Staff, 915-568-4303/3805,
DSN 978-4303/3805.
5. ISSUE: Lack of guidance to the families on how to deal with the media.
DISCUSSION: PNOK and SNOK were approached immediately by the media upon learning the casualty information. Initially, no PAO guidance was provided to the CACs. DA public affairs guidance to families of Army fatalities, wounded soldiers, and POWs was provided two and a half days after PNOK/SNOK notification began. Families, in the meantime, gave interviews with no guidance from the Army. The enemy has access to media sources and interviews given by family members can provide additional leverage to be used against the soldier. This is especially true with regard to the POW families.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Ensure all CNOs/CAOs have public affairs guidance that includes recommendations for the affected family members concerning the effects of making statements to the media. Given the speed with which the media operates, this guidance must be prepositioned for immediate implementation upon notification of casualties. This is especially important when soldiers are DUSTWUN or known POWs. Use the documents provided by SOCOM and the SERE School at Fort Bragg, NC. These documents answer the many questions and provide the necessary information a CAO, PNOK, or SNOK would need when dealing with the media.
OBSERVER/POC: COL Ben Hobson, Chief of Staff, 915-568-4303/3805,
DSN 978-4303/3805.
6. ISSUE: Rock Drills Work
DISCUSSION: The installation conducted two rock drills on casualty notification prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The first one was conducted approximately 45 days prior to commencement of operations and included all FORSCOM Rear detachment commanders, the Fort Bliss Casualty Office, the Fort Bliss CofS and CSM, and the leadership of the 32d AAMDC who participated from SWA via VTC.
The second rock drill was a “walk-through” with all key leaders the week prior to start of the ground war. Key additions to this event included the Chaplains, FRG leaders, and Family Assistance Center (FAC) experts. The rock drill familiarized all involved agencies of their responsibility and some of the issues they would face. Additionally, all possible CNOs/CAOs were brought in and briefed by the Fort Bliss CAC on their responsibilities. The rehearsal was instrumental for inexperienced personnel who have never performed this duty before. More importantly, the two events familiarized key personnel with the proper procedures to follow and whom to notify for assistance.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Installations should make this a standard TTP upon deployment of units for any major contingency. It should be part of the plan for the Rear Detachment Commander to execute.
OBSERVER/POC: LTC Andy Lambert, Director, DPTMS, 915-568-3393/2809,
DSN 978-3393/2809
7. ISSUE: Use of the FAC as a central meeting location.
DISCUSSION: Installations need a central meeting location that is easily accessible and able to accommodate families, FRGs, and installation staff that support the FAC. The location chosen by Fort Bliss was the Community Service Center. This location was superb for the FAC Operation and facilitated situational updates to the families through briefings in the main ballroom. It has sufficient phone lines (to include a 1-800 number that was activated prior to commencement of hostilities), is easily accessible, contains sufficient parking areas, and has a lounge area for families to gather. It contains separate rooms for private counseling. Most importantly, this facility is interior to Fort Bliss and away from the press positioned at the main gate allowing FRGs to meet without pressure from being on TV, etc.
RECOMMENDATIONS: For Fort Bliss, continue to utilize this facility for FAC operations. Ensure there is direct communications between the Fort Bliss Installation Operations Center (FBIOC) and the FAC to expedite transmission of all official information and message traffic. Ensure the 1-800 number is ready to be activated on short order.
OBSERVER/POC: Nancy Piper, Family Assistance Officer, 915-568-3503;
DSN 978-3503.
8. ISSUE: A single chain of command (C-2) for a mass casualty situation is critical.
DISCUSSION: Fort Bliss is a TRADOC installation. The 507th Maintenance Company is a FORSCOM unit belonging to the 5th Bn, 52nd ADA, 11th ADA Bde, 32d AAMDC here at Fort Bliss. The Fort Bliss Casualty Office belongs to the Garrison Command, Southwest Region, Installation Management Agency (IMA).
At the very start of this event, Fort Bliss as the TRADOC installation was the lead agent as events transpired. However, by the second day, Fort Bliss had to answer to not only the TRADOC chain of command, but also to FORSCOM, IMA, and elected officials. Because of the huge demand for information at all levels generated by this mass casualty incident, it is critical for the “home” installation to be the lead for C-2.
After about four days, Fort Bliss as the TRADOC installation was clearly established as the lead agent for the incident and was finally able to keep “other” commands and key entities informed using LNOs from their organizations.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The “home” installation should be in charge regardless of the MACOM to which the unit belongs. It is an installation responsibility to effect casualty notification IAW their AR 600-8-1 responsibilities (figure b-1).
OBSERVER/POC: COL Ben Hobson, Chief of Staff, 915-568-4303/3805,
DSN 978-4303/3805.
9. ISSUE: Tracking of returning soldiers (WIA or KIA).
DISCUSSION: It is essential that the “home” installation CAC be kept informed of the status and or location of returning soldiers (WIA or KIA). Initially, Fort Bliss was not informed of the status of the wounded soldiers and when they might return. In fact, Fort Bliss was not advised that three of the wounded 507th Maintenance soldiers had arrived at Walter Reed AMC. The first returning soldier to Fort Bliss, PFC Grubb, arrived by commercial aircraft. Had he not called from San Antonio, TX, we might not have met him at the El Paso International Airport.
However, we had better success in tracking the movement of soldiers’ remains only because we had to send escorts to Dover Air Force Base. By using DA Casualty information and issuing the escorts cell phones so they could update the Fort Bliss CAC, we were able to track the transfer of remains. Doing this allowed us to keep the CAOs informed and offered some consolation and comfort to the families as they desperately want to know about their loved ones.
NOTE: You will never be able to conciliate the families in this area as they are in search of information on how their loved one died. In our case, all remains were badly decomposed and were not viewable by the families. It will be some time before the autopsy results are forwarded to the families.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Tracking of remains and wounded soldiers is the responsibility of DA Casualty. After some disconnects, the process was better defined and executed. Additionally, transfer of wounded soldiers in CONUS is affected by MEDEVAC and must be coordinated with the local hospital to ensure they are also tracking movement and not miss an arrival.
OBSERVER/POC: COL Ben Hobson, Chief of Staff, 915-568-4505,
DSN 978-4505.
10. ISSUE: The Press in a Mass Casualty Situation
DISCUSSION: An incident of this magnitude quickly attracts national attention and the home station is quickly inundated with press requests. Fort Bliss immediately stood up a media center to control press access and manage press requests. The media center was previously used during high profile events such as Exercise Roving Sands. As the central point for the press, the media center allowed us to get our message across, limited the press’s access to the families, and denied access to the Family Assistance Center. Additionally, having one location for the press to gather daily made it easier for controlling interviews. Key personnel such as the Chaplain and Post Leadership went to the Media Center for the vast majority of the interviews.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Designate a location for a Media Center and develop a plan to manage the media and press requests.
OBSERVER/POC: Jean Offutt, Public Affairs Officer, 915-568-4505,
DSN 978-4505.
11. ISSUE: Preparing for and managing Chaplain support during casualty situations.
DISCUSSION:
You will immediately need every available Chaplain to cope with a mass casualty situation. Bring in your Chaplains very early and pair them up with the applicable CNO/CAOs. This is especially important when you review the various religious preferences of the families of those affected. We needed at least two Catholic Priests and had to resort to using one of our Contract Priests for notification. It also helps to check the PNOK and SNOK to see if you have any special language requirements. We had one family that predominately spoke Spanish and it helped to have a Catholic Priest who could communicate with them.
Brief your Chaplains often and ensure you watch for their spiritual fitness; making a number of notifications is hard on them, too. Also, remember to use your Chaplains not only for WIA or KIA notifications, but also to be with the CAO when he informs the families that their soldier is alive and well. This helps eliminate the perception that an approaching chaplain is the bearer of bad news. They are great counselors and provide a calm and soothing influence once notification is made.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Brief every Chaplain on your installation on CNO/CAP procedures because you never know which Chaplain will be deployed and you will need every one you have to carry out the mission. Not only will they participate in notification of the PNOK, but also the SNOK.
OBSERVER/POC: COL Fred Hudson, Center Chaplain, 915-568-4640,
DSN 978-4640.
12. ISSUE: Fort Bragg Support (SOCOM SERE School])
DISCUSSION: Shortly after 507th Maintenance Company incident occurred, we received some expert advice on preparing the families of the POWs to handle themselves when dealing with the media. After talking to COL Anderson, Ft. Bragg, NC, an entire package of material ranging from media advice to information papers was provided for use by the POW families and CAOs. Without asking for the help, we would not have known this expertise existed. It truly helped us “manage” the families much easier. This was our # 1 “positive” lesson learned from the dealing with the 507th Maintenance incident.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Installations should familiarize themselves with available resources, such as the SOCOM SERE School. It is a tremendous asset and should be immediately contacted upon realization of a POW incident.
OBSERVER/POC: COL Ben Hobson, Chief of Staff, 915-568-4303/3805, DSN 978-4303/3805.
Source:
http://147.71.210.21/qao/AAR%20Repository/TrendCivilians%20on%20the%20Battlefield.htm
Air and Missile Defense Training Center
Issue: Civilians on the Battlefield
Discussion: Units need to improve their handling of civilians on the battlefield. Generally, units are too trusting and sympathetic when dealing with civilians. All too often units suffer casualties because soldiers approach a civilian that is either armed or booby trapped. Soldiers often congregate at the Entry Control Point failing to disperse, thus creating confusion. We have observed during civilian scenarios that everyone wants to be in charge of the situation, the Quick Reaction Force Commander, the first sergeant and the battery commander. On the other end of the spectrum, we have observed units where no one wants to take charge. Either way is ineffective in dealing with civilians on the battlefield. Quick Reaction Force Commanders often lack the situational awareness to deploy their force. This often leads to friendly casualties.
Units are uncomfortable around the press and often mistake them for unfriendly civilians. On several occasions reporters have been detained and even engaged when all they wanted was a story. Units tend to leave reporters unaccompanied to wander on their own talking with whomever they want about whatever they want. This leads to the reporter divulging more information about the unit. Official interviewees normally offer up way too much information to reporters.
Lesson Learned: Units need additional training in dealing with the press and civilians on the battlefield.
Recommendation: Units should include Civilian scenarios in their training exercises.
Observer/POC: Mr. Tony Wyno, Force Protection Observer Controller, ext 568-5543, email: wynot@bliss.army.mil
Source:
http://147.71.210.21/qao/AAR%20Repository/Trend-Force%20Protection.htm
Air and Missile Defense Training Center
Issue: Force Protection June - 03
Discussion: Units need to improve all areas of force protection.
Generally, units lack the basic standards when it comes to Force Protection.
Specific observations include:
The principles of OKOCA are not being used when laying in fighting positions around a perimeter.
Lesson Learned: Units need additional training Force Protection
Recommendation: Units should go back to the basics of survival on the battlefield (Crawl, Walk, Run)
Observer/POC: Mr. Tony Wyno, Force Protection Observer Controller, ext 568-5543, email: wynot@bliss.army.mil
Source:
http://airdefense.bliss.army.mil/qao/llr_toc.html
QAO
19 Sep 03
Information Paper
SUBJECT: Operation Iraqi Freedom
1. References.
3rd Infantry Division’s AAR
32nd Army Air Missile Defense Command’s (AAMDC) AAR
Center for Strategic and International Studies’ AAR
2. Purpose. To provide the command with information concerning the performance of AMD weapon systems, interoperability, training issues, and procedures during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
3. Bottom Line. Although AMD soldiers and equipment performed admirable, we encountered training and interoperability issues that may have been a contributing factor in causing friendly fire incidents resulting in lose of life, damage and/or destruction to millions of dollars worth of equipment. This information paper and the lessons learned attached focus on the AMD operations in country, no reference to rail/air load operations, movement operations, RSOI, or redeployment.
4. Points of Major Interest and Facts. (DOTMLPF)
a. Issue: Integration/Defense Design with other PATRIOT BNs (US and Allied) and other weapon systems was done on the fly Lead: TSM-LT/DOTD (D,T,L)b. Issue: PATRIOT units’ focus on Table VIII qualifications limits their ability to execute assigned missions Lead: DOTD (D,T,L)
c. Issue: Patriot Engagement Operations Lead: DOTD (D,T)
d. Issue: General knowledge of PATRIOT initialization tabular data and its origin/impact on how the air battle is fought is minimal Lead: DOTD (T)
e. Issue: The battalion does not have a Force XXI battle command brigade and below required for battle tracking Lead: TSM-LT (D, M, F)
f. Issue: Software compatibility of AMDWS with the other ATCCS Lead: TSM-LT ( M, T)
g. Issue: Division command via TACSAT Lead: DCD/TSM-LT ( M,O,T )
h. Issue: Long-haul communication equipment is a major shortfall in current Patriot Brigades Lead: 32nd AAMDC/DCD/CORP Bde’s ( M,O,T )
i. Issue: No emphasis on integrating PATRIOT into the Joint Data Network in KU even though it is probable that PATRIOT will be the only platform that detects the short range ballistic missile threat Lead: TSM-LT/DOTD ( D,T, L)
j. Issue: Inadequate FAADC3I contractor support and Class IX availability and delivery Lead: TSM-LT/Units ( L, M)
k. Issue: Failure to receive tactical ballistic missile early warning through LINK-16 and mobile subscriber equipment network (MSE) TSM-LT/DCD/TSM-UT ( T, M, O)
l. Issue: Information flow between Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (KU), and Jordan did not occur. Information regarding anomalies experienced in various PATRIOT locations throughout the theater was not shared with each other Lead: DOTD/6x (L,T)
5. The Road Ahead. The USAADASCH staff will continue to analyze all the information provided, using the DOTMLPF concept to refine and update training procedures and processes. We are exploring ways our branch can be more involved with joint exercises, focusing on training the force to ensure sister branches are aware of our capabilities and limitations. We will insure training programs are developed and trained to standard. For additional information, please review the complete packet of lessons learned at (Tab A).
MAJ Douglas/QAO/ DSN 978-4843
APPROVED BY _______________
Source: http://147.71.210.21/qao/AAR%20Repository/TrendTroop%20Leading%20Procedures.htm
Air and Missile Defense Training Center
Issue: Troop Leading Procedures. June 03
Discussion: During the course of several AMDTC rotations with dozens of moves and changes of mission we have observed that Patriot Battery commanders and their subordinate units need to improve their troop leading skills. Leaders at the Battery level and below do not follow the Troop Leading Procedures. Rarely do Battery Commanders issue written or verbal warning orders and consequently information flow down to the soldiers in the battery suffer. It is often a surprise when they find out they have little to no time to tear down and move. We have observed units rely too heavily on their field SOP for unit moves. While SOPs are great for RSOP party composition, serial order and basic how a unit operates, each mission is different and should be treated as such. While the commander usually develops a plan, he or she does not issue it to the battery, so no one knows what is going on. To date we have seen only one Battery commander reconnoiter his new site, even when time is available. While we have observed unit commanders issue orders to NCOs they in turn do not issue it to their soldiers. To date only one commander has issued a Battery order to his entire unit. Five paragraph field orders are used at the battery kevel, but not down at the Platoon/Section level. Often changes of mission and unit moves are left to chance with no rhyme or reason as to why things happen. Probably the most Important step is Step 8-Supervise and we have observed very few units conduct inspections and rehearsals. This usually results in a host of problems that normally lead to lost vehicles or the unit not occupying their position in a timely manner (i.e. Missing Mission Assumption Time). All too often soldiers simply follow the vehicles in front of them not knowing where they are going or what the mission is. On those occasions where units have used sand tables for rehearsals few problems arose and in all cases the unit experienced remarkable success.
Lesson Learned: Proper Troop Leading Procedures increase the unit’s chance for success.
Recommendation: The Troop leading steps are a tried and proven method at the small unit level and we simply do not use them. Units at Battery level and below should use them for every move and mission change.
Observer/POC: Mr. Larry Newman, Senior Observer Controller, ext 568-5395, email: newmanj@bliss.army.mil
[Ft. Bliss source not provided]
Table of Content:
1) C2 of Patriot Forces
1-1 Patriot Defense Design Considerations
1-2 Table VIII Qualifications Insufficiently Prepare Units for Combat assigned missions
2) Patriot Engagement Operations
2-1 Patriot Engagement Operations
2-2 Patriot System Knowledge
3) Communications (AMD)
3-1 Force XXI Battle Command Requirements
3-2 Software Compatibility of AMDWS with the Other ATCCS
3-3 Division Command via TACSAT
3-4 Long-haul communication equipment shortfall
3-5 Integration PATRIOT into the Joint Data Network in KU
4) Personnel and Logistical Support
4-1 FAADC3I Contractor Support and Class IX Availability
5) Joint Air Operations
5-1 Tactical Ballistic Missile Early Warning
5-2 Information Flow Regarding Anomalies Experienced
6) Information on CID Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned 1-1
Issue: Integration/Defense Design with other PATRIOT BNs (US and Allied) and other weapon systems was done on the fly.
Discussion: No information, documentation, or test results were available to the war fighter on how to successfully integrate multiple PATRIOT BNs or other endospheric weapon systems. Units within Israel and Kuwait (KU) have been operating with Host Nation PATRIOT and other weapons systems for a number of years. However, no data on the impact of operating in this manner was available prior to the start of OIF. Two critical areas that need closer review:
- Having two units in separate BNs linked via PATRIOT Automated Data Information Link (PADIL) providing coverage of the same asset resulted in the inefficient use of FUs in maximizing coverage of additional assets- Impact of having two separate endospheric weapon systems sharing the same battle and space covering the same assets
Recommendation: The Lower Tier Project Office (LTPO) should assess the impact of employing the system the way it was used during OIF and publish the results. USAADASCH branch must analyze results and determine how to best employ the weapon system to maximize effective coverage of multiple assets based on these results and produce the appropriate updates to TTP.
Lead: TSM-LT/DOTD
Lessons Learned 1-2
Issue: PATRIOT units’ focus on Table VIII qualifications limits their ability to execute assigned missions
Discussion: For the majority of PATRIOT units table eight gunnery certification is viewed as an end point in the unit training cycle. Table eight focuses on only 5 mission essential tasks: march order the FU/BN fire distribution section (FDS), emplace the FU/BN FDS, conduct air defense operations, conduct missile reload operations, and conduct Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Position (RSOP). These tasks are for the most part conducted in a controlled environment with no other distractions.
This narrow focus on a limited number of tasks fails to train units on how to operate in a war time environment. The fixed site TBM only mentality has led PATRIOT units to believe that if they are successful at Table VIIIs they will be successful at war. Operation OIF highlighted some of the problems this approach has caused. PATRIOT units are not assessed on their ability to fight as part of an integrated task force. Units are not evaluated on their ability to provide highly qualified ADAFCOs to higher echelon units. Units are not assessed on their ability to develop and execute complex defense designs. Units are not assessed on their ability to receive a mission and execute it.
Table VIII certification is only one part of a unit’s training as it prepares for its annual external evaluation. At some point, a PATRIOT battery/ BN needs to be assessed on its ability to execute its mission and fight as part of a BN Task Force and / or higher echelon integrated task force.
Recommendation: USAADASCH relook what it takes to be “qualified”.
For a unit to be considered qualified, it should not only be trained in the key Air Defense Tasks, but it should also be trained and qualified to operate as part of a larger, integrated and most likely joint task force. This approach may lead to a totally new training model. Review, update, and change current battery / BN requirements and establish measurable tasks, conditions, and standards for PATRIOT Gunnery Tables. Key to raising the level of expertise across the PATRIOT force is the use of external evaluations that will be used to assess the ability of unit to successfully execute Air Defense missions under a variety of conditions. USAADASCH establish policies and standards for conducting external evaluations that require they be conducted by a team of certified experts that have been assembled and trained for this purpose.
Lead: DOTD
Lessons Learned 2-1
Issue: Patriot Engagement operations (D)(T)
Discussion:
Bridging the gap between MDMP (doctrinal and situational templates) and Patriot tactics, tabular entries, and firing doctrine
Reduce target identification uncertainty with engagement criteria tied to threat and friendly platformsIncrease friendly protect; procedurally and technically
Remote Launch Operations – capture technical and tactical requirements
Autonomous operations – “TBM Only” is no longer an option
Redundant Coverage – advantages and disadvantages
Based upon EMI, how far apart should Patriot Batteries be placed defending an asset
Incorporate tactical reasoning/decision making: Counter-TBM is not automatic; WCS “Free” for TBMs presents risk in the SRBM fight
Airspace Control and deconfliction remains a Joint problem
METT-TC relationship with tabular settings
Combat operations routine – verification of Mode IV; updating OPTASKLINK, radar registration
Recommendation: Include in new Patriot TTPs, doctrine during Joint Training Exercises and MRE standards
Lead: DOTD
Lessons Learned 2-2
Issue: General knowledge of PATRIOT Initialization tabular data and its origin/impact on how the air battle is fought is minimal.
Discussion: PATRIOT operators did not understand how the values for the systems initialization tabular entries were established. During discussion with soldiers in the area of responsibility (AOR) prior to and during OIF, it became clear that the operators did not understand the various tabular entries required for their system as outlined in the Tactical Standing Operating Procedure (TSOP), Area Air Defense Plan (AADP), and Special Instructions (SPINS). Operators did not know the purpose of the parameters, where it came from or why it was needed. When asked why a tabular entry was set to a specific value, the soldiers normally responded because the TSOP or the PATRIOT Information and Coordination Central (ICC) told us to set it to that number. The operators did not know why it was a particular number, who had established the value or what the setting would accomplish.
Lack of expertise in this area limited the PATRIOT unit’s ability to modify/change the weapon system parameters as the threat changes and provide accurate and timely input for the AADP and SPINS. Operators did not know what their system can and cannot do.
Recommendation: USAADASCH develop a formal training program to provide the PATRIOT operator with intermediate and advance level weapons system training. Recommend development of exportable training packages or courses that can be conducted via distance learning. Prior to assuming the duties of a PATRIOT TCO, TD, TCA, or TDA; soldiers should be required to complete these courses. These courses should be annotated in their training record.
Lead: DOTD
Lessons Learned 3-1
Issue: The Patriot battalion does not have a Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) required for battle tracking. (MO)
Discussion: The division fielded FBCB2 as the standard for blue force tracking. The ADA battalion was not included in the fielding. During combat operations, the battalion had to locate an FBCB2 on the battlefield to get situational awareness. Even this was limited since none of the air defense assets were displayed on the FBCB2 screen. Not only did the lack of FBCB2 systems in the battalion hinder situational awareness, all division fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and graphics were issued over FBCB2 , making it difficult for the battalion to track the battle and conduct simultaneous planning in support of the division.
Recommendation: At a minimum, issue one FBCB2 terminal to each battery, the battalion TOC, and the battalion commander; also ensure that each air defense weapon and radar system is displayed on the FBCB2 screen.
Lead: TSM-LT
C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment
3-1 PAT was/is not organic to DIV & therefore did not receive
FBCB2. Avail. of FBCB2s and addit. EPLRs will be a real problem
at this pt.
Lessons Learned 3-2
Issue: Software compatibility of AMDWS with the other ATCCS. (M)
Discussion: During operational planning and execution, the battalion is required to provide the division a current air picture superimposed over the current airspace control measures (ACMs). On demand, the division’s leadership may also request that maneuver graphics be projected so that they can see where aircraft are in relation to the ground forces. Currently, these products are manually input into AMDWS by either the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) or air battle management operations center (ABMOC) operators, a slow and tedious process. These operators are duplicating the efforts of other operators who are entering the same graphic control measures into the Maneuver Control System (MCS), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and the other ATCCSs.
Recommendation: Make the required software and hardware upgrades so AMDWS can communicate with the other ATCCSs so all the different graphic control measures can be uploaded via floppy disk or through the local area network (LAN).
Lead: TSM-LT
C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment
3-2 This is about making ABCS work....several systems still lack integration
sw.
Lessons Learned 3-3
Issue: Division command via TACSAT. (M/O)
Discussion: From the time we destroyed the enemy’s observation posts on the international border to the division’s closure on OBJ LIONS, the battlespace was so dispersed in width and depth that FM communications between any units larger than infantry or armor battalion/task force-sized elements was unfeasible. BCTs were often more than 40 kilometers apart, forcing the division command to conduct all command and control functions via TACSAT. Though extremely effective in allowing the BCTs to communicate with each other and with the division over great distances, many of the other division assets were left in the dark because they did not have the ability to monitor the network. Though the air defense battalion commander and his tactical operations center (TOC) had one TACSAT radio each to monitor the division command network, the battalion was not able to monitor any of the other TACSAT networks, such as division operations and intelligence (O&I), fire support, etc. The battalion also experienced the same problems the division had in trying to communicate through the depth and width of the division’s battlespace. Though it has the same communication requirements in terms of distance and number of networks as the division, the battalion was not allocated any resources to improve its ability to communicate internally. Though the battalion has a number of PRC-213 HF radios by MTOE, these radios are supposed to be used to pass SEW information and are unreliable at best. Although the division did receive some PRC-150 Harris HF radios that proved to be more reliable, only one was given to the battalion, hardly enough to assist it in conducting command and control within the unit. TACSAT radios proved reliable throughout the operation for the division. The same resources need to be provided to the division’s subordinate commands that have much the same requirements, to include the Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer (ADAFCO). Additionally, this issue highlights the need to have qualified ADAFCOs at higher echelon units to serve as an interface between them and Air Defense BNs and BDEs.
Recommendation: TACSAT radios need to be provided to the battalion and each battery so all battalion-level networks can be established as per our doctrine. If TACSAT radios are not available, then PRC-150 Harris HF radios must be fielded to replace these same networks.
Lead: DCD/TSM-LT
Lessons Learned 3-4
Issue: Long-haul communication equipment is a major shortfall in current Patriot Brigades. (M/O)
Discussion: 2-43 ADA Battalion was with the battalion responsible for coverage of assets from northern Kuwait to central Iraq, it became impossible for firing batteries of 2-43 to transmit their Patriot Air Defense Information Link (PADIL) with organic UHF/line of site radios. The ability to command and control a battery is the battalion’s primary focus and the communication tying the battery to the battalion is the single point of failure in preventing a fully mission capable ICC from controlling the fires and providing a higher level of ID engagement authority.
2-43’s MTOE authorized communication limited C2 connectivity as the maneuver piece spread firing batteries out over 340 kilometers. Because the Brigade was tasked to provide direct support to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, the Brigade S6 sought assistance from IMEF G6 to support the requirement for long-haul communications. Unfortunately, the IMEF had no AN/TRC-170 (TROPO) systems to spare.
TROPO is the ideal form of long-haul communication for battery to battalion in Patriot because of the issue with time delay over SATCOM that could make the link less accurate if the information sent from the ECS isn’t received by the ICC in 0.4 seconds or less. Because of the critical nature of command and control and the commander’s intent to keep batteries from performing autonomous operations, the Brigade S6 procured a deal with 11th Signal Brigade to receive 2 manned TROPO shelters and 2 unmanned TROPO shelters. The brigade manned the unmanned shelter with personnel assigned to 108th who had experience in the past with TROPO systems.
If a Patriot Battalion is given a mission to extend resources to the limits experienced, measures should be taken to ensure they have the ability to maintain C2 over the distance spanned and also provide the direct support maintenance to the equipment providing the service.
Recommendation: An MTOE and doctrinal change to ensure communication equipment is available
Lead: 32nd AAMDC/DCD/CORP Bde’s
Lessons Learned 3-5
Issue: Integrating PATRIOT into the Joint Data Network (JDN) in KU remained a significant challenge throughout the conflict
Discussion: Integrating PATRIOT into the JDN was accomplished; however, false tracks and ghost tracks caused by PATRIOT degraded the overall air picture to a point that for safety of flight issues their tracks were dropped. Limited attempts were made at radar registration to resolve this issue. Units were not allowed to transmit on the JDN until after they crossed the LD. This issue is even more disturbing given the high probability that PATRIOT may be the only sensor to pick up SRBMs.
Recommendation: USAADASCH participate in working groups/forums to integrate ground based air defense systems into the JDN. The joint community must be made aware of its importance. Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officers (ADAFCOs) must be trained on how to integrate PATRIOT into the NET and on procedures to trouble shoot problems that may arise.
Lead: TSM-LT/DOTD
C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment
3-3 Harris PRC-150 are not avail., limited qty avail. for SBCTs. TACSAT radio per btry being worked initally between TSM and DCD...initial draft "think Paper" exists...meeting of SMEs to be held next week.
3-4 Army should have and provide long haul comms...this shortcoming makes the argument for a SIG BN [with robust capab., to include long haul] organic/belonging to AMD.
3-5 This was/is a JTTP issue. If allowed, PAT could/would have participated
In JDN.
Lessons Learned 4-1
Issue: Inadequate FAADC3I contractor support and Class IX availability and delivery. (M)
Discussion: Because many of the FAAD/STC/Sentinel parts were under contractor control through the Contractor Logistics System (CLS), our ability to sustain combat power for Linebackers, Avengers, and Sentinels was problematic. The battalion had to rely upon telephone calls to CONUS and the use of FEDEX to secure and ship parts. Due to FAAD C3I.
Recommendation: The battalion experienced problems with the FAADC3I equipment and worked with civilian contractors to fix the problems. Some of the problems can and would have been fixed locally, if the necessary parts were available. Currently, the only contract support within theater is at Camp Doha, Kuwait, and they could not support the battalion once hostilities began.
Recommendation: Battalion needs to stock an authorized stockage list (ASL) from the Project Office for FAADC3I equipment (video cards, network cards, etc.).
Lead: TSM-LT/Units
Lessons Learned 5-1
Issue: Failure to receive TBM early warning (EW) through LINK-16 and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network. (M/O) *
Discussion: When Iraq launched the first TBMs against Kuwait City and the 101st Air Assault division’s assembly area on G-1, the division received no TBM EW via the LINK-16 and MSE network. Though we had a great tactical digital information link (TADIL)-J/Link 16 connection throughout the battle and regularly tracked well over 100 aircraft simultaneously, we were not able to receive any TBM EW digitally. In fact, the only TBM EW we received throughout the battle was by monitoring the Air Force EW tactical satellite (TACSAT) network. There are only two ways the division can receive digital TBM EW through the Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS) system: 1) directly from an Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI) and, 2) from another AMDWS that is hooked directly into an ADSI via MSE. Both have their shortfalls. First, the MSE based system required an MSE feed that was never stable and could not provide EW to AMDWS while on the move. Second, even though a TADIL-J feed can be received on the move and does not require MSE support, the relative short flight time of the missiles the enemy used and the time it took for joint tactical ground station (JTAGS) to identify and release the information through the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) network resulted in no TBM EW information to be distributed via TADIL-J.
Recommendation: The Army must invest in additional software and hardware improvements that would shorten the time it takes to process TBM EW information and release it to the units.
Lead: DCD/TSM-LT/TSM-UT
C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment
5-1 How to effect/do TBM EW is a JTTP issue. This could have
gone/been done any of many ways via any/multiple means...PSC-5s, CTT/JTTs,
etc. JTIDS not usual means for getting this info to non-ADA.…they
don't have means to receive.
Lessons Learned 5-2
Issue: Information flow between Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (KU), and Jordan did not occur. Information regarding anomalies experienced in various PATRIOT locations throughout the theater was not shared with each other.
Discussion: Spurious TBMs injected over the JDN by the Marine TAOC was observed in Jordan for a number of months prior to the start of OIF. TF 1-7 had experienced it since their arrival. This information was not shared with PATRIOT units supporting the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in KU. When the TAOC in KU came on line the injection of spurious tracks was not expected. Had the 1-7 experience been shared throughout the AOR then the problem with spurious TBMs injected by outside sources could have been minimized.
During discussions with soldiers in the AOR, ARM and TBM anomalies experienced by units in KU were not shared with units coming into theater or units in Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Bahrain. Methods for disseminating information throughout the PATRIOT force and a system to conduct theater-wide training to counter anomalies as they were observed not in place.
Recommendation: LTPO and USAADASCH establish a real time PATRIOT data collection site. Upon observing an anomaly or system failure units should be able to log on to the site and enter the information. Units would also be able to search the site for similar problems experienced by other units. LTPO and the US Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADASCH) would be responsible for reviewing the information entered on the site and recommending solutions to the unit’s problems.
Lead: DOTD/6x
The issue in 1-1 was simply we have never modeled the interaction between Patriot and Arrow. Therefore operators did not have sufficient information to develop TTPs. That modeling and the development of the TTPs was done just before the war. The second issue was the defense design in KU. We have never modeled, and therefore explored the dynamics, of defense design of 2-1 with KU units under them in a MICC/SICC relationship. Again, we did that modeling and analysis just before the war and discovered some possible unintended consequences with the defense design the unit had established.
3-1 The recommendation the originator makes, may not be the appropriate solution for the problem he describes.
2-1 We have been heavily engaged in the Army locking down the ABCS version and decided what is “Good Enough” funding and fixing and putting in the field next year. Those AMDWS issues will be fixed in our January version which will go to test at Ft Hood in April.
USAADASCH CID Insights From OIF Slide: Although implied, I would simply
state that all Army AMD platforms need the same PHID technologies used by
other Joint Services.
Ground to Air CID Insights:
The low reliability of positive electronic means of identification continues to mandate the upgrading of equipment, training and use of procedural methods of identification.
Exercising the Joint Identification Authority from the Area Air Defense Commander down to the lowest fight element is critical.
Every effort must be made to avoid autonomous fire units. Robust communications are key to CID.
Tactical Control Officers must continuously maintain situational awareness of all friendly and enemy activity.
Tactical Control Officers must continuously work to resolve and report all unknown tracks on their scopes.
Joint datalink architectures must be designed to support the identification and engagement authority functions.
New technologies/techniques as well as IFF and ESM upgrades must be explored
to provide positive friendly/hostile identification at the lowest command
level possible.
19/20 March: G-Day
Two Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles fired at Coalition forces in Kuwait were reported to have been successfully intercepted by air defenses. Another missile was reported to have landed near Camp Commando in Kuwait; no casualties were suffered. The Patriot batteries successfully intercepted and destroyed two tactical ballistic missiles during an attack on Kuwait at approximately 12:24 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. (4:24 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. EST). Their guidance and control system locked onto the ballistic missiles, successfully engaging the targets with Hit to Kill PAC III and Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM).
22/23 March
An RAF GR4 Tornado aircraft from RAF Marham, which was returning from an operational mission, was engaged near the Kuwaiti border by a Patriot missile battery. Both aircrew were killed. The next of kin have been informed.
23/24 March
Also in the vicinity of An-Nasiriyah, a United States Army supply convoy
was ambushed by irregular Iraqi forces. A number of American service members
were wounded in that action. As a result of that action, 12 U.S. service
members are reported missing.
24/25 March
During combat air operations at approximately 3:40 p.m. local time Monday, a U.S. F-16 fighter engaged a U.S. Patriot battery approximately 30 miles south of An-Najaf, Iraq. The F-16 pilot executed the strike against the Patriot while en-route to a mission near Baghdad. No soldiers were injured or killed by the strike. The incident is under review to ensure the future safety of the Patriot crews and aircrews.
28/29 March
USCENTCOM describes missile defense activity as follows: about 12 missiles have been fired. We believe them to be in the Ababil-100 or Al-Samoud family, and those have been launched from within Iraq toward Kuwait. We're seeing a rate of about one per day at this point, and all of the threatening launches have been intercepted by Patriot missiles. Additionally, we have established combat air patrols near the areas where most of the launches are occurring. We have been successful in destroying a number of launchers before and after they're fired, and we're actively hunting for them.”
1/2 April
US troops rescued a female soldier held prisoner by the Iraqis. US Marines captured at Al Hillah two of the Al Samoud II missiles which contravened UN resolutions.