16 February 2002
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http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=02021501.plt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml
US Department of State
International Information Programs
Washington File
_________________________________
15 February 2002
(Strategy includes diverse set of capabilities) (4990) The United States is developing a "New Triad" as the cornerstone of its 21st century defense strategy that comprises a diverse set of nuclear and non-nuclear, offensive and defensive capabilities, a top Pentagon policy official says. "The United States will transform its strategic planning from an approach that has been based almost exclusively on offensive nuclear weapons, to one that also includes a range of non-nuclear and defensive capabilities," Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith said February 14. "In particular, because deterrence will function less predictably in the future, the United States will need options to defend itself, its allies and friends against attacks that cannot be deterred." Feith, who testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), said that previously the United States could focus its strategic defensive apparatus on a single opponent, the former Soviet Union, and prepare for a few threatening contingencies. "We now need the flexibility to tailor military capabilities to a wide spectrum of contingencies, to address the unexpected, and to prepare for the uncertainties of deterrence," he said. And, he noted, the new defense strategy recognizes that Russia, unlike the former Soviet Union, is not an enemy. The New Triad encompasses nuclear forces and non-nuclear strike means, such as information warfare; passive and active defenses, notably missile defense; and a defense-industrial infrastructure to build and sustain these elements, he said. Included in the New Triad, and critical to its ability to function, are command, control and intelligence systems, he said. President Bush sent the NPR to Congress on January 8, the first such comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces since 1994. Of particular concern to the United States in the current era of uncertainty is the emergence of hostile regional powers armed with missiles and nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction, Feith said. "The emerging feature of the international landscape has rendered the failure to deter or promptly defeat a threat much more dangerous for all Americans," he said. "We can no longer take comfort in the belief that the conflict will be 'over there,' or that opponents will be deterred in predictable ways." Following is the text of Feith's testimony as prepared for delivery: (begin text) Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Senate Armed Services Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review February 14, 2002 Introduction The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces and to develop a long-range plan for the sustainment and modernization of United States strategic nuclear forces. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) constitutes the Department of Defense response to this requirement. We submitted the NPR to Congress on January 8, 2002. It is the first comprehensive review of nuclear forces since 1994, when the first Nuclear Posture Review was completed. The primary purpose of the 1994 review was to determine the strategic nuclear force structure to be deployed under the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). The current review of the U.S. nuclear posture differs from the 1994 review. The 1994 review assumed that the central strategic U.S. concern was managing a potentially hostile relationship between the two largest nuclear powers. The current review recognizes that the United States and Russia have a new relationship, and that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has created new challenges for deterrence. It defines the capabilities required of the nuclear forces in the new strategic environment, and in relation to other U.S. defense capabilities. Most especially, it recognizes that Russia, unlike the Soviet Union, is not an enemy. There is ground for mutual cooperation, and the United States is seeking to move beyond the outdated Cold War nuclear confrontation to develop a new strategic framework with Russia. A New Era The basic features of the Cold War shaped our approach to security, including the role and size of our nuclear forces and deterrence policies. Our current nuclear triad of ICBMs, bombers, and ballistic missile submarines, and the ways we have pursued deterrence and arms control negotiations, reflect the conditions of Cold War. The new features of the international system, particularly the types of threats we face, are dramatically different. Consequently, President Bush charged the Department of Defense with transforming our approach to defense, including nuclear weapons and missile defenses, to meet the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War we faced a single, ideologically hostile nuclear superpower. We prepared for a relatively limited number of very threatening conflicts with the Soviet Union. Much of the world was part of two competing alliances and the stakes involved in this competition were survival for both sides. We must never lose sight of just how dangerous the situation was. There was, however, considerable continuity and predictability in this competition of two global alliance systems. For decades, U.S. nuclear forces were organized and sized primarily to deter the Soviet Union, and there were few sharp turns in U.S.-Soviet relations. Based on the continuities of the international system at the time, the successful functioning of nuclear deterrence came to be viewed as predictable, ensured by a sturdy "balance of terror." Many argued that defenses which might lessen that terror by offering protection against Soviet nuclear attack would instead undermine the predictable "stability" of the balance of terror. The Cold War system of two competing blocs has been replaced by a new system, one with a broad spectrum of potential opponents and threatening contingencies. The continuities of the past U.S.-Soviet relationship have been replaced by the unpredictability of potential opponents who are motivated by goals and values we often do not share nor well understand, and who move in directions we may not anticipate. We no longer confront the severe but relatively predictable threats of the Cold War; instead we have entered an era of uncertainty and surprise. As the attacks of September 11th demonstrated, we must now expect the unexpected. What we can predict today is that we will face unanticipated challenges, a range of opponents -- some familiar, some not -- with varying goals and military capabilities, and a spectrum of potential contingencies involving very different stakes for the United States and its foes. These conditions do not permit confident predictions about the specific: threats against which we must prepare or the "stability" of deterrence. Of particular concern in this era of uncertainty is the emergence of hostile, regional powers armed with missiles and nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction. When the U.S. failed to deter or promptly defeat a challenge in the past, two great oceans generally provided protection to American civil life. Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology, however, increasingly is in the hands of brutal leaders who have few institutional or moral constraints and are motivated by an extreme hatred of the United States and the personal freedoms and liberties we hold dear. This emerging feature of the international landscape has rendered the failure to deter or promptly defeat a threat much more dangerous for all Americans. We can no longer take comfort in the belief that the conflict will be "over there," or that opponents will be deterred in predictable ways. As was illustrated by September 11th, we now confront enemies who are eager to inflict mass destruction on innocent civilians here and abroad, without regard for the possible cost. Transforming Defense What are the implications of these changes in the international system for how we think about security? Most basically, we must transform our forces and planning to meet the dramatically different conditions of the new security environment. Rather than focusing on a single peer opponent, and preparing for a few threatening contingencies, we now need the flexibility to tailor military capabilities to a wide spectrum of contingencies, to address the unexpected, and to prepare for the uncertainties of deterrence. We can no longer approach our military requirements by conveniently defining one or a few countries as the specified "threat," and then sizing our military capabilities against that defined threat. U.S. planning can no longer be so "threat-based" because, in an era of uncertainty, the precise source of "the threat" is unpredictable. Our defense preparations must now focus on, and be responsive to, a wide spectrum of potential opponents, contingencies, and threatening capabilities, some of which will be surprising. A capabilities-based approach to defense planning will look more at the broad range of capabilities and contingencies that the United States may confront in the future, as opposed to planning against a fixed set of opponents identified as the threat. Nuclear weapons will continue to be essential, particularly for assuring allies and friends of U.S. security commitments, dissuading arms competition, deterring hostile leaders who are willing to accept great risk and cost to further their evil ends, and for holding at risk highly threatening targets that cannot be addressed by other means. Instead of our past primary reliance on nuclear forces for deterrence, we will need a broad array of nuclear, non-nuclear and defensive capabilities for an era of uncertainty and surprise. The United States will transform its strategic planning from an approach that has been based almost exclusively on offensive nuclear weapons, to one that also includes a range of non-nuclear and defensive capabilities. In particular, because deterrence will function less predictably in the future, the United States will need options to defend itself, its allies and friends against attacks that cannot be deterred. A New Triad for a New Era The current nuclear triad is a legacy of the Cold War. It is exclusively nuclear and offensive. As part of the defense transformation, we will move to a New Triad. The New Triad comprises a more diverse set of nuclear and non-nuclear, offensive and defensive capabilities. These capabilities encompass nuclear forces and non-nuclear strike means (including information warfare), passive and active defenses (notably missile defense), and the defense-industrial infrastructure needed to build and sustain the offensive and defensive elements of the New Triad. Command, control and intelligence systems are also critical to deterrence. They form an integral part of the New Triad. This New Triad will provide the United States with the broad range of capabilities suitable for an era of uncertainty and a wide variety of potential opponents and contingencies. In some cases, where nuclear weapons may have been necessary for deterrence and defense in the past, the use of advanced non-nuclear strike capabilities or defensive systems may now be sufficient militarily, involve less risk for the U.S. and our allies, and be more credible to foes. In some cases, nuclear weapons may remain necessary to deter or defeat a particularly severe threat. The New Triad will provide the spectrum of offensive and defensive military capabilities, and the flexibility in planning necessary to address the new range of contingencies, including the unexpected and the undeterrable. The New Triad differs in a number of important ways from the current triad. In addition to the difference in its overall composition, the strategic nuclear forces of the New Triad are divided into two new categories: the operationally deployed force and the responsive force. The operationally deployed force includes bomber and missile warheads that are available immediately or within a matter of days. These forces will be available to address immediate or unexpected contingencies. Thus, our stated nuclear forces will correspond to our actual nuclear deployments, which did not occur during the Cold War. By using such "truth in advertising," we will no longer count "phantom warheads" that could be deployed, but are not. To address potential contingencies -- more severe dangers that could emerge over a longer period of time -- the responsive force augments the operationally deployed force, largely through the loading of additional warheads on bombers and ballistic missiles. Such a process would take weeks to years. The capability for force reconstitution provided by the responsive force allows significant reduction in the current number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads. This reduction can be achieved prudently and without the need for drawn out and difficult negotiations. In addition, the New Triad expressly serves multiple defense policy goals. Deterrence of nuclear or large-scale conventional aggression was viewed as the main objective of the Cold War triad. The deterrence of aggression, although still an essential aim, is just one of four defense policy goals for the New Triad. The capabilities of the New Triad, like other U.S. military forces, not only must deter coercion or attack, but also must assure allies and friends of U.S. security commitments, dissuade adversaries from competing militarily with the United States, and, if deterrence fails, decisively defeat an enemy while defending against its attacks on the United States, our friends, and our allies. Linking nuclear forces to multiple defense policy goals, and not simply to deterrence, recognizes that these forces, and the other parts of the New Triad, perform key missions in peacetime as well as in crisis or conflict. How well the New Triad serves these multiple goals-thereby enabling us to cope effectively with the uncertainty and unpredictability of the security environment is the standard for judging its value. The New Triad offers several advantages in this regard. Its more varied portfolio of capabilities, for example, makes it a more flexible military instrument. This greater flexibility offers the President more options for deterring or defeating aggression. Within the New Triad, nuclear forces will be integrated with, rather than treated in isolation from, other military capabilities. This creates opportunities for substituting non-nuclear strike capabilities for nuclear forces and defensive systems for offensive means. This does will not blur the line between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, but it will reduce the pressures to resort to nuclear weapons by giving U.S. Presidents non-nuclear options to ensure U.S. security. The New Triad reflects a capabilities-based approach to nuclear force planning and the type of defense transformation required in a new era. It deserves wide support. It gives the United States the greater strategic flexibility needed in an era characterized by surprise. It provides the basis for shifting some of the strategic requirements for dissuading, deterring, and defeating aggression from nuclear forces to non-nuclear strike capabilities, defensive systems, and a responsive infrastructure. As we reduce our nuclear forces to bring them into line with the security environment, the New Triad will mitigate the risks inherent in an increasingly fluid and dynamic security environment. Getting to the New Triad will require us to sustain a smaller strategic nuclear force, reinvigorate our defense infrastructure, and develop new non-nuclear strike, command and control, intelligence, and planning capabilities so that we possess the ability to respond to the kinds of surprises the new security environment holds. By taking these steps, we will reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons and build a New Triad that serves a broader range of American national security goals. Strategic Nuclear Forces in the New Triad The positive shift in the U.S. relationship with Russia is of great significance in considering today's nuclear force requirements. Russia is not the Soviet Union, nor is it an enemy. We no longer have to focus our energies on preparing for a massive Soviet nuclear first strike. Rather, we now seek a new strategic framework with Russia to replace the Cold War's balance of terror. President Bush has announced his decision to reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear force to 1700-2200 warheads over the next decade, a level informed by the analysis of the NPR. While roughly one-third the number of our currently operationally deployed warheads, this range is adequate to support our new defense policy goals, including the deterrence of immediate contingencies. It also preserves the flexibility and capability for reconstitution necessary to adapt to any adverse changes in the new security environment. These reductions, and other adjustments in our offensive and defensive capabilities, will be achieved outside the Cold War's adversarial and endless negotiating process that was centered on the balance of nuclear terror. Today, that competitive and legalistic process would be counterproductive. It would impede or derail the significant reductions both sides now want; it would lock both sides into fixed nuclear arsenals that could be excessive or inadequate in the future; and, by perpetuating the Cold War strategic relationship, it would inhibit movement to a far better strategic framework for relations. I would like to highlight five key findings of the NPR. Each needs to be well understood: 1. A New Relationship With Russia: Away From MAD. The planned reductions to 1700-2200 operationally deployed nuclear warheads are possible and prudent given the new relationship with Russia. We can reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads to this level because, in the NRR, we excluded from our calculation of nuclear requirements for immediate contingencies the previous, long-standing requirements centered on the Soviet Union and, more recently, Russia. This is a dramatic departure from the Cold War approach to nuclear force sizing, which focused first and foremost on sustaining our side of the balance of terror and mutual assured destruction (MAD). In the NPR we moved away from this MAD policy framework. This, of course, is not to imply that we will not retain significant nuclear capabilities, or that we can ignore developments in Russia's (or any other nation's) nuclear arsenal. Nuclear capabilities will continue to be essential to our security, and that of our friends and allies. Nevertheless, we no longer consider a MAD relationship with Russia the appropriate basis for calculating our nuclear requirements. MAD is a strategic relationship appropriate to enemies, to deep-seated hostility, and distrust. Russia is not our enemy, and we look forward to a new strategic framework: for our relations. 2. Reductions Plus Security. The President's plan for nuclear reductions permits us to cut the number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons by about 65percent, to levels far below current levels, without taking great risks with America's safety. The new relationship with Russia makes such cuts possible, and the President's plan prudently preserves our option to respond to the possible emergence of new threats. Some commentators say we should continue to reduce our forces without preserving our capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, but doing so would require an ability to predict the future with enough accuracy to ensure we will not be surprised or face new threats. Because the future almost certainly will, in fact, bring new dangers, we do not believe it is prudent to set in stone the level and type of U.S. nuclear capabilities. We have embarked on a program to deploy a New Triad that may allow us increasingly to rely on non-nuclear capabilities, and under the President's plan we have the option to adjust our nuclear forces down even further than now planned if appropriate. If severe new threats emerge, however, we must also retain the capacity to respond as necessary. The President's plan is a reasonable way to both reduce nuclear forces and prudently preserve our capability to adjust to the shifting requirements of a dynamic security environment. In the NPR we have recognized that force requirements are driven fundamentally by the realities of a changing threat environment, and we have adopted, in the capabilities-based approach, the commonsense standard that we must retain the flexibility necessary to adjust to and shape that environment. 3. New Emphasis on Non-nuclear and Defensive Capabilities. The President's plan, for the first time, emphasizes the potential for substituting non-nuclear and defensive capabilities for nuclear capabilities. In many likely cases involving an attack against us, our allies or friends, it will be far better to have non-nuclear and defensive responses available. For example, during the Cold War, one of the President's only options to limit damage to the United States was to strike the enemy's offensive weapons, raising the stakes in any confrontation. Defenses will offer the ability to limit damage to the United States without requiring America to "fire the first shot." In the case of an accidental launch of nuclear-armed missiles, defenses will give us the opportunity to destroy such weapons before they inflict any damage on the United States, its friends, or allies. The NPR, for the first time, explicitly calls for the integration of non-nuclear and defensive capabilities as part of our strategic triad. This is another reason we can move forward with deep nuclear reductions while being careful to preserve our security. The new non-nuclear and defensive capabilities that are emphasized in the NPR may also provide the basis for further nuclear reductions in the future, depending on their effectiveness. 4. A New Diverse Portfolio of Military Capabilities for a New World. The NPR's call for a New Triad begins the transformation of our strategic capabilities to suit a world that is very different from that of the Cold War. In the past we focused on the Soviet Union and a few severely threatening contingencies. We prepared our military to address this relatively narrow Cold War threat. Today the sources of the threats that face us are much more diverse and even unpredictable, as the September 11 attacks showed. The spread of missiles and weapons of mass destruction makes the current spectrum of potential opponents significant. Whereas in the past, only the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to American cities, in the foreseeable future, several countries -- and perhaps some non-state actors -- will present such a risk. Our defensive capabilities must take these new post-Cold War realities into account. The President's plan will transform our military to provide us with a new portfolio of capabilities to meet these new threats, even while reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons. This portfolio will enable us not only to tailor our force options to the range of potential contingencies and types of opponents, it will help us to shape the threat environment in the most benign directions possible. 5. The Rejection of Adversarial Negotiations. The rejection of the Cold War's adversarial-style of arms control negotiations represents a key change introduced in the NPR. The NPR moves us beyond the essentially hostile and competitive negotiations of the Cold War because such negotiations no longer reflect the reality of U.S.-Russian relations. We do not negotiate with Britain or France with regard to the permitted features of our respective nuclear capabilities. Although our relations with Russia are; not yet comparable to our relations with our allies, they are not based on Cold War hostilities. Were we to have put nuclear reductions on hold until we could have hammered out a Cold War-style arms control agreement with Russia, we would not be making the reductions we plan over the next decade. We would be under pressure to hold on to the weapons we no longer require as bargaining chips because that is the logic of adversarial arms control. Russia would be pressed by the same logic. We see no reason to try to dictate the size and composition of Russia's strategic nuclear forces by legal means. Russian forces, like our forces, will decline about two-thirds over the next decade. In truth, if the Russian government considers the security environment threatening enough to require an adjustment in its nuclear capabilities, it would pursue that adjustment irrespective of its obligations under a Cold War-style treaty. In fact, the Russian government did just that in 1995 with regard to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Because the security situation had changed, Russia did not meet its obligations to reduce its conventional forces to the proscribed levels. The Russian Defense Minister at the time stated that Moscow would not fulfill legal obligations that "bind us hand and foot." A highly dynamic security environment such as we now confront ultimately cannot be tamed by rigid, legal constructs, however sincerely entered into. It would be highly imprudent now to rigidly fix our capacity to respond to and shape such an environment by extending the negotiating practices of the Cold War into the future. We seek a new strategic framework in our relationship with Russia, not a perpetuation of the old. Reducing the Number of Nuclear Warheads Some now argue that the nuclear weapons removed from our strategic forces must be destroyed or the announced reductions would be "a subterfuge." The NPR, of course, calls for the destruction of some, but not all of the U.S. warheads removed from the operationally deployed force. We must retain these weapons to give the United States a responsive capability to adjust the number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons should the international security environment change and warrant such action. Presidents from both parties have long recognized the need for such a capability. For example, the previous Administration adopted a "lead and hedge" policy with regard to reductions below the levels required by the START II Treaty in the 1994 NPR. The last Administration planned to retain the U.S. ability to regenerate capabilities reduced by the START 11 Treaty as a "hedge" against the possibility that Russia might reverse its course towards democracy. The previous Administration continued that policy through its last day in office. The current Nuclear Posture Review makes a similarly prudent decision to maintain the ability to restore capabilities we now plan to reduce. The difference, however, is that the NPR's responsive force is not being sized according to the dictates of a possible resurgence in the threat from Russia. Instead, our new responsive capability is being defined according to how it contributes to the four goals of dissuading potential adversaries, assuring allies, deterring aggression, and defeating enemies. At this time, the appropriate size of our responsive force has not been determined. However, the analysis that helped determine the size of the operationally deployed force and the decision to pursue non-nuclear capabilities in the New Triad suggests that our responsive capability will not need to be as large as the "hedge" force maintained by the previous Administration. Given the era of uncertainty we now face, maintaining a responsive force is only prudent and consistent with the capabilities-based approach to our defense planning. Finally, the pace with which we reduce the nuclear stockpile will be determined in part by the state of our infrastructure and the very real limits of our physical plant and workforce, which has deteriorated significantly. For example, the United States today is the only nuclear weapon state that cannot remanufacture replacements or produce new nuclear weapons. Consequently, we are dependent on stored weapons to maintain the reliability, safety, and credibility of our stockpile and to guard against the possibility of a technical or catastrophic failure in an entire class of nuclear weapons. Other nuclear states are not bound by this limitation of their infrastructure. Repairing the U.S. nuclear infrastructure and building the responsive infrastructure component of our New Triad may well permit us to reduce the size of the nuclear stockpile needed to support the responsive force. In sum, the NPR develops an approach to reductions that provides an accounting of reductions that reflects "truth in advertising," protects conventional capabilities from efforts to limit nuclear arms, and preserves the flexibility necessary in an era of uncertainty and WMD proliferation. This is the only prudent path to deep reductions given the realities of the threat environment we face. Programs Developing and fielding the capabilities for the New Triad will require a dedicated effort over the next decade. Program development activities must be paced and completed in a manner such that the integration of capabilities results in the synergistic payoff envisioned for the New Triad. The Department has identified an initial slate of program activities that we propose to fund beginning in FY 2003. DoD Infrastructure. Funding for the sustainment of strategic systems will be increased. This effort will support surveillance and testing of weapon systems slated for life extension programs such as the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). We propose to conduct additional test flights for solid rocket motors and to increase our efforts for unique technologies for strategic systems, such as missile electronics and navigation. In addition, the Department will fund the development and qualification of radiation-hardened parts for strategic systems. Offensive Strike. Funding has been programmed for two specific advanced conventional weapon applications and one concept development program to explore options for advanced strike systems. The two advanced conventional strike applications include a fast-response, precision-impact, conventional penetrator for hard and deeply buried targets and the modification of a strategic ballistic missile system to enable the deployment of a non-nuclear payload. Missile Defense. The Department will conduct an aggressive R&D program for ballistic missile defense and we are evaluating a spectrum of technologies and deployment options. Strike Support. Advancements in offensive and defensive capabilities alone will be inadequate without enhancements in sensors and technology to provide detailed information on adversary plans, force deployments, and vulnerabilities. Such systems are critical in developing the advanced command and control, intelligence, and adaptive planning capabilities required to integrate all three legs of our New Triad. Therefore the Department has proposed additional funding for the development of advanced sensors and imagery, for improved intelligence and assessment, and for modernization of communications and targeting capabilities in support of evolving strike concepts. Conclusion. A half a century ago, in the midst of the Cold War, Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted in the House of Commons the "sublime irony" that in the nuclear age, "safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation." The Cold War is long over and new approaches to defense are overdue. As President Bush has stated, "We are no longer divided into armed camps, locked in a careful balance of terror.... 0ur times call for new thinking." The New Triad, outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, responds to the President's charge. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=02021502.plt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml 15 February 2002 Transcript: President Bush Seeks Peace Corps Expansion (Sending special assessment team to Afghanistan) (1630) President Bush announced that he is seeking to expand the Peace Corps by doubling its force of volunteers over the next five years to levels it had in the mid 1960s, when it was created during the Kennedy administration. Bush outlined his initiative February 15 to double the size of the Peace Corps and expand the number of countries in which Peace Corps volunteers are active. He also announced that a special Peace Corps assessment team will travel to Afghanistan to evaluate needs and opportunities for Peace Corps volunteers to assist the Afghan people in rebuilding their nation. (Note: More information about the Peace Corps is available on the Internet at www.peacecorps.gov.) Following is a transcript of Bush's remarks: (begin transcript) Office of the Press Secretary February 15 President Announces Plan to Strengthen Peace Corps REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE PEACE CORPS Dwight D. Eisenhower Executive Office Building 2:12 P.M. EST THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Welcome to the White House. When America was attacked on September the 11th, they thought our country would splinter into fear and selfishness. They thought we'd fall apart. They thought we didn't have any fiber or character. Instead, we've seen extraordinary acts of courage and compassion, and a renewed dedication to service. A spirit of sacrifice and service gave birth to the Peace Corps more than 40 years ago. We needed the Peace Corps then, and we need the Peace Corps today. My administration strongly supports the Peace Corps, and we're increasing our commitment to it. That starts by finding somebody who can serve ably as the Director. I have found such a man. I was honored to swear Gaddi in, in the Oval Office -- or watch his swearing-in today in the Oval Office, and I know he'll do a superb job in leading this important organization. Thank you for leaving your beloved California. Thank you for your sacrifice. And welcome to an administration that wants to do right by the Peace Corps. (Applause.) I also want to thank Elaine for your sacrifice, as well. I know it's hard to pull up your family and head east, but it's the right thing to do. It's the right thing to do to serve your country. And I'm so honored both of you all have come. And, Jason, thank you for being here, as well, to support your dad. I want to thank the first Peace Corps Director, who joined us today. I can't thank you enough, Sargent Shriver, for taking time out of your busy schedule to show up here to see this good man assume this important office. We're honored with your presence. We appreciate your service to the country, and thank you for coming. (Applause.) And we've got another former Director here today, too, a lady who serves in my Cabinet as the Secretary of Labor. She's doing a fabulous job there, just like she did for the Peace Corps, and that's Elaine Chao. Thank you for coming, Elaine. (Applause.) And Gaddi was such a big draw that he got another member of my Cabinet here, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Mel Martinez. Thanks for coming, Mel. I appreciate your being here. (Applause.) Two members of the United States House of Representatives have joined us: Gaddi's Congressman, Chris Cox -- thank you for coming, Chris. I thank you for being here. And a former volunteer, Tom Petri from Wisconsin. Thank you for coming. (Applause.) We hear from a lot of members of Congress about the importance of the Peace Corps, but no more clear voice about that than Chris Dodd, the Senator from Connecticut. I look forward to working with Chris to implement our mutual vision for making sure the Peace Corps fulfills its mission and hope. And speaking about that, I want to thank all the people who work at the Peace Corps -- those who work there now, those who have been volunteers in the past, are current volunteers. We're honored that you serve our nation, and you're welcome here in the White House, and thank you for coming. (Applause.) And finally, I think it's a great tribute to the Peace Corps that we've got a lot of members from the ambassadorial corps who are here. I want to thank you all for coming and taking your time. You understand the importance of the Peace Corps, and your presence here is a confirmation of its importance. And so we welcome you. Thank you for coming. For more than 40 years, the Peace Corps has sent Americans to serve their country by serving the world. America has a new kind of force today. I mean, we're not only a great country, a great economic engine, and obviously a great military, we're a great idea. The greatness of the country is in the values we believe in -- freedom and hope and opportunity. We're a nation founded on just valuable principles. And the power of the idea cannot, and will not, be stopped at our borders. The Peace Corps volunteers carry the American idea with them. They don't carry our culture; they carry universal values and principles that are so incredibly important for all of mankind. Peace Corps volunteers contribute in unaccountable ways to the countries to which they're assigned. They not only teach reading, English language skills, they introduce new business and farming methods, help spark economic development, promote training and modern technology, help fight the spread of HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases. They make an incredibly important contribution to our fellow mankind. You know, because we come from a society where women can be leaders, where people speak and worship freely, where the difference is a source of our strength, not a cause of war, a Peace Corps volunteer in the very life they live helps spread important values. Just the fact that somebody comes from a country that is so open, that in itself is an incredibly positive influence on the world. You know, the war has thrust upon us an enemy who hates every good -- everything the Peace Corps stands for. We long for peace in America. We've got to remember, we're fighting an enemy that really can't stand the values spread by the Peace Corps. Which means that the Peace Corps must be reinvigorated. The Peace Corps, itself, stands for what we fight for. And if we weren't to understand the role, if we were to shrink in our obligations, if we were not to allow the Peace Corps to expand, we would be doing exactly what the terrorists want us to do. And we're not going to let them cause us to abandon what we hold dear. I have called for twice as many Peace Corps volunteers over the next five years, to return the Peace Corps to the strength it had in the mid-'60s. Those new volunteers will be heading out to new destinations. They'll be returning to the republics of Central Asia. And within three weeks, a team will leave for Afghanistan, to address how the Peace Corps can assist that country in reconstruction. The Peace Corps is committed to returning to Peru, and to sending volunteers to East Timor, which will soon become the first country to gain independence in the 21st century. The Peace Corps will also explore ways to assist the governments of Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, and Chad, and Swaziland. And during my upcoming trip to Asia, I will explore with Chinese officials the possibility of an expansion of the Peace Corps program into China. And when these volunteers return home, they can also help educate Americans about the countries in which they serve. My administration has created what's called the USA Freedom Corps, to encourage citizens to give at least two years of their life to service to their country. And the Peace Corps is a vital part of this effort. For Americans looking for service opportunities, at home or abroad, they can find those opportunities in the USA Freedom Corps. If you're interested in the Peace Corps, get on the web -- on your computer, and dial up the USA Freedom Corps web page, which is usafreedomcorps.gov. Or just pick up your telephone, and dial 877-USA-CORPS. If you want to know about the opportunities the Peace Corps offers, call that number, or get on the web page. And we will help you serve our fellow mankind. You know, when President Kennedy -- Sargent Shriver's brother-in-law -- signed an executive order more than 40 years ago providing for the establishing of the Peace Corps, he spoke about a nation of men and women anxious to sacrifice their energies and time and toil to the cause of world peace and human progress. That mission hasn't changed. As a matter of fact, today the mission is needed more than ever. I look forward to working with the members of Congress to strengthen the Peace Corps, to reassert its independence, and to create new opportunities in other nations, as well as the ones I mentioned -- new opportunities in Muslim nations for us to spread the good story about the values, the universal values, we hold so dear. I believe Americans are still willing to sacrifice for causes greater than themselves. And the Peace Corps offers such a fantastic opportunity to do so. Gaddi Vasquez understands this, as well. And so it's with pleasure I introduce the newly sworn-in Director of the Peace Corps to the American people. May God bless you all. (Applause.) (end transcript) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov) _______________________________ http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=02021501.tlt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml 15 February 2002 Fact Sheet on President's Commitment to Strengthening the Peace Corps (Special team to visit Afghanistan to evaluate needs there) (670) The following Fact Sheet was released by the White House February 15: (begin White House Fact Sheet) THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary February 15, 2002 The President's Commitment to Strengthening the Peace Corps Today's Presidential Action: -- Today, President Bush outlined his initiative to double the size of the Peace Corps over the next five years and expand the number of countries in which Peace Corps volunteers are active. -- The President also announced that a special Peace Corps assessment team will travel to Afghanistan to evaluate needs and opportunities for Peace Corps volunteers to assist the Afghan people in rebuilding their nation. Background on the President's Commitment to Strengthen the Peace Corps: Launched on January 29, 2002 as part of President Bush's State of the Union Address, the USA Freedom Corps is an effort to foster a culture of responsibility, citizenship and service, building on the generous spirit of the American people. That effort begins with President Bush's two-year call to service -- his challenge that every American devote at least 4,000 hours to service to their community, our nation or the world. The USA Freedom Corps will work to offer expanded service opportunities for Americans at home and abroad through the newly created Citizen Corps, AmeriCorps and SeniorCorps, and the Peace Corps -- and in cooperation with volunteer organizations large and small. The USA Freedom Corps represents a broad call to action. One way the federal government can help to support action by willing volunteers is strengthening existing federal service opportunities -- including Peace Corps. The Peace Corps is unique among federal service programs because it allows Americans to serve in countries around the world. Through the USA Freedom Corps effort, President Bush seeks to strengthen the Peace Corps as an organization and offer the talent of Peace Corps volunteers to new countries around the world. -- Doubling the Size of the Peace Corps: There are currently 7,000 Peace Corps volunteers serving in 70 countries around the world. President Bush pledged to double the size of the Peace Corps over the next five years -- bringing the Peace Corps close to its peak enrollment levels of the mid-1960s. -- Increasing the Number of Countries Where Peace Corps Members Serve: President Bush will work to expand opportunities for American volunteers to serve in countries where the Peace Corps does not currently have a presence and where the needs for Peace Corps assistance may be great. This includes expanding Peace Corps service in Islamic countries. -- Within the next 6 months, a number of countries - including East Timor and Peru - will welcome Peace Corps volunteers. And, over the next two months, Peace Corps volunteers will be returning to the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia. -- Peace Corps assessment teams will be sent to countries like Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Swaziland and Chad to evaluate opportunities for service. -- Sending Crisis Corps Members to Assist the Rebuilding of Afghanistan: An assessment team of Peace Corps staff members and experienced Peace Corps volunteers - part of the Crisis Corps program - will travel to Afghanistan within weeks to evaluate opportunities for the Peace Corps to assist the Afghan people in rebuilding. -- Expediting Applications for Peace Corps Volunteers: President Bush also called for streamlining the application process for Peace Corps volunteers, as well as improving the management, information technology and other skills and training to expand opportunities for today's Peace Corps members. Since President Bush announced his USA Freedom Corps initiative on January 29, more than 2,775 potential Peace Corps volunteers have started applications and almost 7,000 men and women have contacted the Peace Corps to ask about volunteering. The Peace Corps estimates that there has been a 300% increase in volunteer interest. (end White House Fact Sheet) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=02021503.plt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml 15 February 2002 White House Report: Cheney Speech to Council on Foreign Relations (Says U.S. must take multifaceted approach to terrorism) (430) Vice President Richard Cheney told the Council on Foreign Relations February 15 that the United States must pursue a multifaceted approach to the problem of terrorism. Speaking at a Council luncheon in Washington, Cheney said that some moves the United States makes against terrorism will be public while others will probably never see the light of day. Discussing Iraq, Cheney said that country has a robust program to develop weapons of mass destruction, and has used them, both on its enemy, Iran, and on its own people. The Iraqi regime has also had dealings with terrorists such as Abu Nidal, who had an office in Baghdad, he said. Thus, he said, Iraq must be a state the United States focuses on. Discussing Iran in the question-and-answer session that followed the speech, Cheney said he has been "deeply disappointed" by the conduct of the Iranian government in recent months. Iran seems committed to trying to destroy the peace process in the Middle East, he said, and it continues to try to develop weapons of mass destruction, he added. Cheney stressed the "strategic dimension" of administration energy policy. Everything made and sold by the United States, even the "clean, quiet operation of a computer" made by U.S. companies, requires energy, he said. "We must continue our progress in energy efficiency and conservation, and we must increase energy production," he said. International trade benefits the United States both domestically and abroad, Cheney said, accounting for 26 percent of the U.S. economy and an even higher percentage of the agricultural sector. The production of one of every three acres in use by farmers and ranchers ends up being exported, he said. U.S. growth also fuels the world economy, Cheney noted. And it is the less-developed nations whose societies can benefit the most from investment by and free trade with the developed world, and especially the United States, he said. "[C]ommerce and open institutions" has transformed countries "once poor but now stable and prosperous" such as Japan, Chile and South Korea, Cheney said. (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=02021501.elt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml 15 February 2002 Transcript: Bush to Focus on Terror, Security, Economy in Asia Trip (National Security Adviser Rice briefs Feb. 14 on eve of departure) (4950) President Bush, who departs for a trip to Japan, South Korea and China February 15, will focus in his meetings on the three priorities outlined in his State of the Union address -- terrorism, homeland security and economic security -- says his National Security Advisor. Briefing reporters at the White House February 14, Condoleezza Rice also said the trip allows the president to highlight U.S. alliances, which have helped to keep the peace in the region for 50 years, and the importance of nurturing and strengthening these alliances. America's war on terrorism demonstrates "the continuing importance" of U.S. alliances with "the great democracies of Asia," Rice said. America's allies "have stood with us, providing not only sympathy, but military assistance necessary to help win the war, as well as a host of other help, including shutting down financial networks and working to bring the terrorists to justice," she said. During his February 16-22 trip, Rice said, President Bush will discuss economic issues in the three countries, including the need to open markets, and the importance for China specifically to live up to the commitments it made to become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). President Bush "will talk about tearing down barriers to trade between nations to create jobs here at home, raise living standards among our trading partners, and contribute to global political stability," Rice said. In Beijing, President Bush will raise the issues of religious freedom and human rights with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, according to Rice. The issue of China's weapons proliferation to countries such as Pakistan and Iraq will also be a topic of discussion, Rice continued. On the issue of Taiwan, Rice reiterated long-standing U.S. policy, saying "the United States doesn't want to see any unilateral change in the status quo." People "on both sides of the Straits need to resolve peacefully" the issue of Taiwan, she said. But, Rice told reporters, "the United States has certain obligations, under the Taiwan Relations Act, to help Taiwan defend itself. Those are the cornerstones of American policy toward Taiwan." When asked how President Bush's designation of North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" will affect South Korea's efforts to ease tensions with that country, Rice said President Bush "sees absolutely no contradiction" between calling the North Korean regime "precisely what it is, a secretive and repressive regime that is trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction," and the "very intensive efforts" by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung to "open up an avenue for North Korea to come across, to get out of its bad behavior, and to seek reconciliation" with Seoul. In response to a question on U.S. policy toward Iraq, Rice said the United States is "not in a position where the President is trying to make an imminent decision about how to deal with Iraq." President Bush "has made very clear that the world has a problem with Iraq and that the status quo is not acceptable," she said. "We're pursuing a range of policy options, including, for instance, trying to change the nature of the sanctions with Iraq." "But there's no doubt, this is a very dangerous regime, and the President is going to reserve his options," the national security advisor said. Following is the White House transcript of the event: (begin transcript) THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary For Immediate Release February 14, 2002 PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO ASIA The James S. Brady Briefing Room 4:52 P.M. EST DR. RICE: I have a brief statement about the President's upcoming trip to Asia, and then I'll touch on a few of the scheduled events, and I'll then turn to your questions. The President's upcoming trip to Japan, South Korea and China is a promise made and a promise kept. When the events of 9/11 necessitated cutting back his trip to the region last year, the President promised to return soon. And as you know, he's a man who does what he says, and so he is going to return to the region. This trip allows the President to advance U.S. interests on critical issues. He will highlight our strong alliances and the importance of nurturing and strengthening these alliances, which have helped to keep the peace in the region for 50 years. When he meets with the leaders of Japan, South Korea and China, the President will focus on the three priorities about which he talked in the State of the Union -- the war on terrorism, homeland security for the American people, and economic security. All three nations have made vital contributions to the war on terrorism. Shared intelligence and coordinated law enforcement efforts between these nations are some of the most effective ways to counter terrorism, not only in America, but in their countries, as well. The war against terrorism underscores the continuing importance of our alliances with the great democracies of Asia, and our allies have stood with us, providing not only sympathy, but military assistance necessary to help win the war, as well as a host of other help, including shutting down financial networks and working to bring the terrorists to justice. Finally, our own economic security is supported by free trade. The President will talk about opening markets, including agricultural markets. He will talk in China about the importance of WTO implementation. And he will talk about tearing down barriers to trade between nations to create jobs here at home, raise living standards among our trading partners, and contribute to global political stability. We will arrive in Tokyo on Sunday evening, and on Monday, the President and Mrs. Bush will visit the Meiji Shrine, a symbol of Japan's ability to cherish its culture as it embraces the modern world. While in Japan, he will meet privately with Prime Minister Koizumi, a well as hold expanded bilateral talks and a working lunch with the Prime Minister. On Monday evening, Prime Minister Koizumi will host a reception for the President and Mrs. Bush, followed by a small intimate informal dinner at a local restaurant. On Tuesday morning -- that means none of us are invited. (Laughter.) Tuesday morning, the President will breakfast with American and Japanese business leaders. The President will then address the Japanese Diet in remarks that will stress the importance of our alliance, and express appreciation for Japan's leadership role in Afghan reconstruction and international assistance efforts. He will also offer support for the Prime Minister's reform initiatives, and express confidence in the ability of the Japanese people to take on the economic difficulties which they currently face, in hopes for the long-term success of Japan's economy. Next, the President and Mrs. Bush will meet and lunch with their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor and Empress of Japan, at the Imperial Palace. The President and Mrs. Bush will then depart Tokyo for Seoul. On Wednesday morning, the President will meet privately with President Kim Dae-Jung, as well as hold expanded bilateral talks. He will then visit the observation post at the DMZ, where he will have lunch with American troops. The President will also visit the transportation corridor at Kaesong-Munsan Road and the Dorasan Train Station, symbols of the South Korean people's unfulfilled hope for reconciliation with the North. That evening, President Kim Dae-Jung and his wife will host a reception and dinner in honor of the President and Mrs. Bush at the Blue House. On Thursday morning, the President and Mrs. Bush depart Seoul for Beijing, where the President will meet with President Jiang Zemin and hold bilateral expanded talks. The President will visit the Cummins Bus Engine facility, a branch of an American-owned company in Beijing, that symbolizes the growing trade relations between our countries. That evening, President Jiang Zemin will host a dinner in honor of the President and Mrs. Bush. On Friday morning, the President will have a working breakfast with Premier Zhu Rongji. He will then visit Qinghua University, where he will address and take questions from students in remarks that will be broadcast nationally in China. In his remarks, the President will focus on values that are important to the United States, we believe important to the future of China, and we believe important to our future relations. The President and Mrs. Bush will then visit the Great Wall of China and depart Beijing for home. I'm now happy to take questions. Q: South Korea has what they call a sunshine policy with North Korea. President Bush calls North Korea part of the axis of evil. When those two leaders get together, how will they reconcile those two positions? DR. RICE: The President sees absolutely no contradiction between calling the North Korean regime precisely what it is, a secretive and repressive regime that is trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and therefore, is a danger to peace and stability -- not to mention being the merchant for ballistic missile technology around the world -- and efforts by the South Korean President, really very intensive efforts by the South Korean President, to try and open up an avenue for North Korea to come across, to get out of its bad behavior, and to seek reconciliation with the South. If you just look at the remarkable progress of South Korea, the effect of democratic institutions and markets -- and by the way, President Kim Dae-Jung is, himself, a symbol of that great democratic progress -- and then you look across at what the people of the North endure every day, you can see that the values that South Korea embodies are really so important to trumpet and to support. And that's what the President is going to be doing. But we believe that you can have a policy that speaks the truth, speaks clearly about the North Korean regime, and yet leaves open the possibility of dialogue. And we've made that offer to the North Koreans; they've yet to take us up on it. Q: Dr. Rice, can I follow on that? Is the tougher talk, though, a sign of some frustration that engagement might not be working and might not be getting the results we have been looking for, so trying a different approach to see if this works? RICE: Well, from the very beginning the President has been pretty clear about the nature of the North Korean regime -- from the very beginning. He's also been very clear, once the policy review was undertaken and done, that we wanted to put on the table with the North Koreans a complete agenda about missile transfers, about their indigenous nuclear program and about their indigenous missile program, as well as about measures that need to be taken to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula -- that that also was a strategy that we wished to pursue, dialogue about those issues. It's not frustration. We believe the ball is in the North's court. But the President is going to continue to speak clearly about the nature of the regime. Q: Can I follow up? I think you had used the word that North Korea is a bazaar for missile technology. RICE: That's bazaar, b-a-z-a-a-r. Q: Yes, exactly. What do you mean by that? Who are the North Koreans selling to? Is it other states, or do you have proof they're going to terrorist groups, as well? RICE: Well, it's, we believe, principally other states. I don't want to get too much into what we are seeing. But let's just say that the North Koreans have been known to go around with glossy brochures about their ballistic missiles. They are stocking a lot of the world right now. Q: During the trip of the President to China, will he specifically bring the issue of persecution against Falun Gong to the Chinese leader, Jiang Zemin? Because clearly, we know that's the most ongoing, most intensive, extensive and severe human right abuse. RICE: The President will clearly raise with President Jiang Zemin specific cases, as well as the broader issues of religious freedom and of human rights; absolutely. In fact, in his discussion in Shanghai, one of the longest exchanges that the President and Jiang Zemin had was about religious issues. So, yes, you can expect the President to raise those issues. Q: To follow up on that, if I may. To what extent do you expect weapons proliferation to come up in the talks with the Chinese? Who do you believe that they're proliferating to other than Pakistan? And have you discerned any shift in their attitude on proliferation since September the 11th? RICE: We believe that we have another chance with the Chinese to talk seriously about the proliferation issue. I can tell you that there has been some small progress, and we expect to try to extend that progress. You know that we had concerns not just about Chinese proliferation in Pakistan, but, for instance, we raised earlier in the administration concerns about what might be going on with Iraq. We continue to discuss those issues. It's not something that we expect is going to be solved overnight. But it is a very serious issue for the United States. It's been raised at every level, was raised by the President when he was in Shanghai, and it will be raised again during this visit. Q: Dr. Rice, following up on Kelly's question, do you believe that North Korea is exporting to Pakistan, specifically? RICE: I can't get into specifics of where we think the North is exporting. But we believe the North is exporting to just about anybody who will buy. Q: Can I have a follow on a different country, on China? Will the President reassure the Chinese that missile defense is not specifically aimed at them? RICE: The President offered to have a strategic discussion with the Chinese about these issues. And, by the way, for reasons having to do with kind of the history of the Cold War and arms control being locked up in that history, the United States has really not, as a country, engaged China on issues of strategic nuclear policy, and we want to do that. Clearly, the President has always said that our missile defense program is defensive in nature, it is not aimed at anybody, it is not intended to give the United States unilateral advantage. All peace-loving countries should be comfortable with our efforts to acquire missile defenses. And I think that's the message he will take to the Chinese and we're happy to have that discussion. Q: Dr. Rice, while in China, how much the President is going to discuss with the Chinese leaders about the Chinese and India relations, and also Kashmir issues and India-Pakistan, since General Musharraf was here? And also, General Musharraf has said that he blamed or some kind of allegations that India is testing another nuclear missile or nuclear -- so how much do you believe that? RICE: Well, we don't have any evidence at this point of that. But we will have a discussion with China about general issues of regional stability. Look, we don't see Pakistan or India as objects of discussion with any other country. What we do see is that there are a number of countries that are concerned about stability in South Asia, that want to try to help to encourage dialogue, that want to try and avoid the kinds of tensions that we've had in South Asia in recent months. And we believe that that's an interest that the Chinese share. And so, of course, I think we will want to discuss that. Yes, you can follow up. Q: And the tension is still there because the forces from both countries are aiming at each other and they are not saying that they do not rule out any war in the near future. RICE: I don't disagree that there are still very strong tensions there. We do believe that some progress has been made, largely as a factor of what President Musharraf has been doing since his speech about a month ago, and we've encouraged him to continue to make progress. The problem that we encountered when the Indian Parliament was attacked -- when democracy, the symbol of democracy, was attacked in India -- I think showed to everybody that terrorism was a threat, in this case not just to India, but it was also a threat to a stable and secular Pakistan. And what General Musharraf was saying was, my country cannot deal with terrorists and extremism and be a forward-looking, moderate Islamic country. And so that's a message that he's been carrying; it's a message we very much applaud. Q: You mentioned that there is a willingness to conduct dialogue with North Korea, and I believe you said that the ball was in their court. We understand that they have suggested they might be available for a dialogue if the United States would send a former President, someone of that rank, to initiate it. Would you entertain such an idea? RICE: I'm sorry, I missed the very first part, Bill. You said -- Q: Just mentioning that you said the U.S. was willing to have a dialogue with North Korea. RICE: Yes. Q: And you said, I think, that the ball is in their court. RICE: That's right. Q: It's my understanding that they have communicated that they would be willing to have a dialogue, but with somebody of rank, such as a former President. RICE: We have one President at a time. We have a Secretary of State. We have a number of lower-ranking officials with whom they can talk. I don't think we need any help from the outside. The North Koreans need to take up the offer. I'm sorry, you were trying to get clarification on something. Q: Yes, you mentioned something -- secular Pakistan? RICE: No, what I meant was that a Pakistan which is not given to religious extremism. Q: And another clarification -- (laughter) -- that the U.S. and China can play a -- RICE: His definition, not mine. Yes? Q: -- the U.S. and China can play a bigger role to solve the problem in South Asia? RICE: You got another question in there while I was giving you clarification. Look, the United States is always prepared to help in any way that it can. But we don't believe that this is something that mediation or facilitation is going to help. What will help is that the two parties decide that it's time for dialogue, and we are encouraging that. Q: Dr. Rice, since the State of the Union, there has been much rhetoric by the President, himself, and other senior members of the administration about dumping Saddam Hussein and going after Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Is that really saber-rattling, or does the United States intend to attack Iraq again? And, if so, when? (Laughter.) RICE: The fact of the matter is that, ever since this President came into office, we have said that Iraq is a problem. It is a country that has flaunted its obligations that it undertook in 1991 in the armistice after the Gulf War. It has kicked out international inspectors. It has tried periodically over the course of the last few years to get weapons of mass destruction. It threatens its neighbors; it can't find a way to say that its neighbors have a right to exist. The nature of this regime is not a secret to anyone. And that the Iraqi people would be better off with a regime that they deserve rather than the regime that they have is also no secret to anyone. Now, we are not in a position where the President is trying to make an imminent decision about how to deal with Iraq. He has made very clear that the world has a problem with Iraq and that the status quo is not acceptable. But we're pursuing a range of policy options, including, for instance, trying to change the nature of the sanctions with Iraq. But there's no doubt, this is a very dangerous regime, and the President is going to reserve his options. But this a very patient President. We've learned that about him. He speaks clearly, speaks plainly, and acts patiently and prudently. Q: Just to follow up, please? Under those range of options, I assume you're not ruling out the military option. RICE: We're not ruling out any options. Q: Does he plan to raise this thinking about Iraq with China, Tokyo and -- RICE: We'll talk about anything that anyone wants to talk about. We tend to talk about all regions when we're talking with a global power like the Chinese. Q: Do you get the feeling that in particular these countries want an explanation for why North Korea is part of the axis of evil? RICE: Oh, I think it's very clear why North Korea is a part of the axis of evil. These countries share several characteristics. These are repressive, closed regimes that are trying aggressively to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and in the case of the North Koreans, as I said, spreading technologies around the world. The North Koreans got on the list the honest way. Q: Will there be a joint statement, a Sino-U.S. statement, in memory of the 30 years anniversary of the Shanghai Communique and should we be prepared to hear a new statement on Taiwan? If yes, what kind of statement? Thank you. RICE: Of course. I think that -- look, U.S. policy on Taiwan is very clear and it can be easily restated -- I don't think it needs to be restated in a further statement -- and that is that the United States doesn't want to see any unilateral change in the status quo. This is an issue that people on both sides of the Straits need to resolve peacefully. But the United States has certain obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan defend itself. Those are the cornerstones of American policy toward Taiwan. That's not changed, and I don't think it needs particularly to be restated. Q: Who from the President's economic team is going on the trip? And what specifically does the President want Japan to do about its economy? RICE: The President is going to talk with the Japanese Prime Minister about the importance of getting the Japanese economy going again. It is the second largest economy in the world. He will talk about also U.S. responsibility to get the American economy going again. But, look, it is really up to the Japanese to design their economic program. It is no secret that there are a number of problems that the Japanese economy faces. They may talk specifically about those problems, but the President will do that privately. I don't think it's any secret to anyone that the Japanese have specific problems that they need to deal with. Q: -- economic team? RICE: It will be a standard traveling package with the Secretary of State, not an economic -- Q: -- U.S. want a dialogue with North Korea. What if North Korea does not listen to the dialogue? Then what measure United States should take? RICE: Well, the United States is very clear that we are going to keep our options open. Everyone at this point should be pressuring the North Koreans to stop doing what they're doing. What they're doing is very dangerous. The North Koreans have an agreement -- the KEDO Agreement, with the United States, Japan, to get light-water reactors, for instance -- the so-called framework agreement. They also have a responsibility to have IAEA safeguards in place before those light-water reactors go in. That's an issue that we need to talk about. But so far, the North Koreans seem to be uninterested in talking. So the President's statement was to simply put the North Koreans and also the rest of the world on notice that we have to get serious about stopping them. Now, one way that we can stop them is we can all make greater non-proliferation efforts in what they're doing with ballistic missile technology around the world. So we have a number of options with North Korea. When we say we want dialogue, we do want dialogue, but we want dialogue on some specific issues. We do not want dialogue for the sake of dialogue. That's not worth it. Q: And on that subject, you mentioned the unfulfilled hopes of the South Korean people for reconciliation and easing of tensions on the Peninsula. It seems a lot of people there feel that the President's rhetoric and the United States' attitude in the wake of September 11th are interfering with that, or that there's a divergence of interests now between the United States and South Korea. And how do you explain that there's not? Isn't now the U.S. main goal in regards to North Korea to contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? RICE: You can have several priorities with North Korea. And the most important priority for the United States is to get North Korea to stop doing the things that it's doing, so that it is not a danger to the Peninsula, a danger to the region -- and, it turns out now, a danger globally. We absolutely support the priority that the South Korean President places on lessening tensions on the Peninsula, on family reunification. Let's be realistic: The peace on the Peninsula has been kept not because of North Korean goodwill, but it has been kept because of the very strong alliance between the ROK and the United States. That includes the deployment of 38,000 American forces that are there for purposes of deterrence. I mean, there's a context here for why there's peace on the Peninsula, and that has to be kept in mind. And if there is to be reconciliation, if there is to be progress, it is going to have to be in the context of that strength being maintained. And so what the President recognizes is that by going to South Korea at this time, he can reaffirm the importance of that underlying pillar of peace and stability in the region, on which any reconciliation would ultimately be built. Q: A question about China's proliferation record. You mentioned certain progress, but yet the administration has imposed sanctions twice in the past six months. I understand there's some consideration for lifting the missile sanctions against Pakistan. Is that the case, and could you elaborate on what the progress was? RICE: We've made no decision on what to do in terms of proliferation -- in terms of lifting the sanctions on Pakistan, although we're looking at it very carefully. In terms of China, I would say that we've just had recently better discussions with the Chinese, more forthcoming discussions. But there is still a tremendous amount of work to do. And, yes, we will always sanction Chinese companies when they are engaged in some of the activities that they have been engaged in. Q: I understand they're supposed to be promulgating some export controls. Have they -- are they any closer to doing that? RICE: That's one of the issues that we've been discussing very recently. And it's our hope that they're going to act on that soon. Q: The Japanese economy is sinking deeper into recession, with really no tangible progress on the economic reforms there. Is the President more concerned about the Japanese economy now? Does he really support Prime Minister Koizumi's economic reform agenda without any reservation that he did at Camp David last June, or is he willing to give him advice in Tokyo as a friend? RICE: He is certainly willing to give advice as a friend. He recognizes that he's got a job here to do at home, also, to get the American economy moving. So they can have a discussion, I think, of how to get an economy growing again. There's no doubt that the Japanese economy is having serious problems. That is well-known to the Japanese, as well as it is well-known to the United States. But the President believes that Prime Minister Koizumi is a person who has the potential to really rally the Japanese people and Japanese society to take on these difficult problems. And that's really the role of the United States here, is to support that effort; not to try to micromanage the Japanese economy, but rather to support Prime Minister Koizumi in mobilizing Japan to do what Japan needs to do. Q: Any update on the terrorism threat and also on Daniel Pearl? RICE: I'm sorry, no update on Pearl. I don't have any further information or on the terrorism threat. Q: Dr. Rice, what assurances has the White House been given that the Qinghua speech will be broadcast in its entirety? And second, does the President have any plans to meet with Hu Jintao and if so, what will be the message to him? RICE: We don't have plans to meet separately with him. It may well be that they will see each other in some forum, but there's no planned meeting for the President with Mr. Hu. The Qinghua speech, we fully expect that the Chinese will broadcast the President's speech. Thank you very much. Q: Happy Valentine's Day. (end transcript) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)