

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

AFGSCI13-5301V3_GM1

20 June 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION C AFGSC/20 AF/MWs

FROM: AFGSC/A3 245 Davis Ave E Barksdale AFB LA 71110

SUBJECT: Air Force Global Strike Command Guidance Memorandum to AFGSCI 13-5301V3, *Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Operations*

- 1. This is an Air Force Global Strike Guidance Memorandum immediately changing AFGSCI 13-5301V3. Compliance with this Memorandum is mandatory. To the extent its directions are inconsistent with other Air Force publications, the information herein prevails, in accordance with AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*.
- 2. The following paragraphs have been amended:

3.13.1. Deleted.

Change para 3.13.1.1. to 3.13.1.

- 3. Personnel are authorized to strike through printed guidance and write-in the changes as referenced above.
- 4. The guidance in this Memorandum becomes void after 180 days have elapsed from the date of this Memorandum, or upon incorporation by interim change to, or a rewrite of AFGSCI 13-5301V3, whichever is earlier.

JAMES S. BROWNE Brigadier General, USAF Director of Operations

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND



AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND INSTRUCTION 13-5301, VOLUME 3

16 MAY 2011

Incorporating Change 1, 27 SEPTEMBER 2011

Nuclear, Space, Missile, Command and Control

RAPID EXECUTION AND COMBAT TARGETING (REACT) CREW OPERATIONS

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at

www.e-publishing.af mil for downloading or ordering.

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication.

OPR: A3I Certified by: HQ AFGSC/A3I

(Colonel Michael F. Nahorniak)

Supersedes: AFGSCI 10-1202, 1 Dec Pages: 33

2009

This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 13-5 *Nuclear Operations*. This instruction defines roles, responsibilities, and minimum requirements for REACT mission-ready operations for employment of the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and applies to 13S personnel assigned to Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), Twentieth Air Force (20 AF) and AFGSC Missile Wings (MW). This instruction does not apply to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. This instruction requires collecting and maintaining information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974 authorized by 10 USC 8013. Privacy Act system notice number F036 AF PC C, Military Personnel Records System, applies.

Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Form 847s from the field through Major Command (MAJCOM) publications/forms managers. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm. See Attachment 1 for a glossary of references and supporting information.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This interim change implements new guidance that clarifies requirements for REACT crew operations. Interim change guidance removes requirement for 20 AF to develop a photography checklist and a helicopter UHF test checklist, adds requirement to route clarification through 20 AF, revises instruction for devolution of SCP responsibilities within a squadron, clarifies instruction on the destruction of classified material during emergency situations, clarifies alert rotation and loading requirements, clarifies crew rest requirements, and addresses publication formatting errors in the attachments. A margin bar (|) indicates newly revised material.

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GENERAL INFORMATION

- **1.1. General.** This instruction is directive to Department of Defense (DoD) military personnel assigned to AFGSC mission ready operations duty positions at USAF Minuteman III ICBM units. This instruction, in conjunction with technical orders and other governing directives, prescribes guidance for the operations and employment of the Minuteman III ICBMs through all phases of conflict for missile combat crews (MCCs), but may not cover all circumstances. In those cases, use sound professional judgment. If within communications range of command and control agencies, deviations due to unusual circumstances should be pre-coordinated.
- **1.2. Mission.** The mission is to develop and provide safe, secure and effective combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations to support the President of the United States and Combatant Commanders.
- **1.3. Deviations and Waivers.** HQ AFGSC/A3 is the waiver authority for this instruction unless specifically stated otherwise. Waiver authority may not be delegated. Waivers will be granted on an individual and controlled basis.
 - 1.3.1. Submit waiver requests in memo or message format through 20 AF/A3 to HQ AFGSC/A3. Information in the waiver will include at a minimum, the specific requirement or reason the waiver is needed, and the waiver expiration. 20 AF/A3 will recommend approval or disapproval of the waiver request.
- **1.4. Supplements.** Individual paragraphs to this instruction may be supplemented by 20 AF in accordance with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*. The purpose of the supplement is to document the process by which units implement the requirements of this instruction. Supplements will not be less restrictive than the provisions of this or any other publication. AFGSC/A3 is the approving authority for 20 AF supplements.
- **1.5. Changes and Clarifications.** HQ AFGSC/A3I has overall responsibility for administration of this instruction. Suggestions for improving this instruction or requests for clarification are encouraged.
 - 1.5.1. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR), HQ AFGSC/A3I, 245 Davis Avenue, Barksdale AFB, LA 71110 or AFGSCA3IWorkflow@barksdale.af.mil using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication. Coordinate and route AF Form 847s through the appropriate functional's chain of command.
 - 1.5.2. Process requests for clarification via memorandum or message to HQ AFGSC/A3I through 20 AF/A3N.
 - 1.5.2.1. If a clarification request was initiated by telephone, units will follow up all requests in writing within one working day.
 - 1.5.2.2. HQ AFGSC/A3I will provide clarification to 20 AF for distribution.

PRE-DEPARTURE / DEPARTURE

2.1. Pre-Departure Briefings.

- 2.1.1. The wing must provide pre-departure briefings addressing mission-oriented factors and activities to ensure safe and accurate execution for all phases of a nuclear alert. As a minimum, the briefing will include the following:
 - 2.1.1.1. Weather and road conditions.
 - 2.1.1.2. Security measures and activities.
 - 2.1.1.3. Maintenance activities.
 - 2.1.1.4. Tests or exercises.
 - 2.1.1.5. Nuclear surety.
 - 2.1.1.6. Operations security (OPSEC) and Communications security (COMSEC).
 - 2.1.1.7. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
 - 2.1.1.8. Operational Risk Management (ORM).
- 2.1.2. All posting missile combat crew members (MCCM) and personnel dispatching for a field observation/evaluation, training alert or other alert related actions must receive the predeparture briefings prior to leaving Mission Support Base (MSB).
- **2.2. Vehicle Operations.** Government Motor Vehicles (GMVs) are the primary mode of transportation within the missile complex for combat crews.
 - 2.2.1. The senior ranking individual is ultimately responsible for safe vehicle operation and occupant safety; however, everyone shares responsibility for safety and mission accomplishment.
 - 2.2.2. Personnel will inspect the vehicle and complete/sign the AF Form 1800, *Operator's Inspection Guide and Trouble Report*.
 - 2.2.2.1. Conduct a vehicle inspection any time the vehicle is left unattended outside a secure area [e.g., Missile Alert Facility (MAF)]. Personnel will report suspicious items to security forces or local law enforcement.
 - 2.2.3. Personal items, technical order (T.O.) bags, MAF supplies and other duty equipment will be properly secured at all times (e.g., locked inside vehicle when unattended or secured with available safety harnesses during transport).
 - 2.2.4. Drivers must be trained and licensed on the vehicle being operated in accordance with AFI 24-301, Vehicle Operations, 20AFI 24-301, Transportation Control Center (TCC) Operations and Vehicle Operations Within and Outside the Missile Field Complex, and 20 AFI 91-1, Vehicle Safety for Twentieth Air Force Missile Field Operations. Personnel will use approved travel routes (primary or alternates) unless the appropriate authority authorizes deviations.
 - 2.2.5. Periodic rest stops are authorized.

- 2.2.5.1. When transporting critical/code components or positive control material (PCM), MCCMs will comply with EAP-STRAT Volume 3, *Positive Control Policy, Procedures and Coded Control Devices (U)*, and EAP-STRAT Volume 16, *ICBM Code Component Control Policy and Procedures (U)*, as applicable.
- 2.2.6. Communication with TCC or designated agency is mandatory anytime personnel depart MSB in a government vehicle.
 - 2.2.6.1. Very High Frequency (VHF) radios are the primary means of communication within the missile complex. If the VHF radio becomes inoperable due to a malfunction or loss of signal, a landline or cell phone is authorized to use for communication with TCC.
 - 2.2.6.2. A radio function check will be accomplished prior to departing MSB. If the VHF radio is inoperable, the vehicle or radio must be exchanged if operational equipment is available.
 - 2.2.6.3. Only transmissions dealing directly with mission support will be permitted. Transmission of classified or other sensitive information is strictly prohibited.
- 2.2.7. If an emergency or vehicle breakdown occurs in the missile complex, the operator and passengers will call the nearest Launch Control Center (LCC). 20 AF/A3NV will develop and maintain a 20 AF MCC Contingencies Checklist for MCCMs to accomplish as applicable.
- **2.3. Helicopter Travel.** Personnel being flown to a MAF will be processed through helicopter operations and briefed by the aircraft commander or designated representative in accordance with AFI 11-202v3, *General Flight Rules*.
- **2.4. Uniform and Gear Requirements.** Personnel are required to report for alert duty wearing the appropriate uniform and with all required gear readily available.
 - 2.4.1. The uniform for alert duty is the Flight Dress Uniform (FDU) or the maternity Airman Battle Uniform (ABU) as applicable. Reference AFI 36-2903, *Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel*, and AFI 36-2903_AFGSCSUP, *Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel*, for proper wear and other uniform questions.
 - 2.4.2. Prior to dispatch from MSB, personnel will have in their possession a complete set of technical orders that are properly posted and in good operational condition, military identification (ID) card, driver's licenses (state and any government-issued) and a 4-digit combination lock issued by the supply section.
 - 2.4.2.1. When directed by the operations group commander (OG/CC), personnel dispatching to the missile field will have in their possession all required winter weather gear items.
- **2.5. Technical Orders.** Operational systems and weapon systems will not be operated without validated and verified technical data or operations procedures. Once technical data or operational checklists are in place, crews will use and adhere to the directions of the technical data and checklists at all times when operating the systems.

- 2.5.1. Users will ensure their personal T.O.s are correctly posted, serviceable and properly marked or annotated as specified in this instruction and the provisions of T.O. 00-5-1, *Air Force Technical Order System*.
- 2.5.2. Every page of sections III, IV and V of each weapon system operations T.O. and communications T.O. must be covered with acetate. This will prevent technical data from being obscured by a wet-erase marker or other marking devices as well as minimize wear and other damage to the pages.
- 2.5.3. Annotations in T.O.s will not be directive in nature and will not obscure printed material or change the technical content or classification of the material being annotated. Changing the technical content includes, but is not limited to, adding, deleting, or supplementing checklist steps or technical information. The intent of authorized annotations is to remind MCCMs of other actions or procedures.
- 2.5.4. Users are responsible for prompt and accurate posting of revisions and changes to T.O.s in accordance with T.O. 00-5-1 prior to any event. An event is defined as weapon system classroom training, any Missile Procedure Trainer (MPT) session, evaluation, scheduled or standby alert and exercise or real-world recall.
 - 2.5.4.1. Users will ensure T.O. changes are posted as soon as possible during exercise or real-world recalls.
- 2.5.5. T.O.s that are not issued to any crew member or squadron and T.O.s that are not used for reference or training, are not required to be kept current.
- 2.5.6. Superseded and removed T.O. pages are to be destroyed by shredding to prevent disclosure of the contents or reconstruction of the document. Reference T.O. 00-5-1 for further T.O. destruction limitations and authorizations.
- **2.6. Technical Order Distribution Office (TODO).** Primary responsibility for the issue, transfer and return of missile operations technical manuals rests with the Operations Group Standardization and Evaluation Office (OGV).
 - 2.6.1. The TODO must be fully knowledgeable of technical order account management and distribution procedures (see AFPD 21-3, *Technical Orders*, TO 00-5-1, and TO 00-5-2, *Technical Order* (TO) Distribution System).
 - 2.6.1.1. One copy of the unclassified operations technical manual will be issued to each assigned crew member. The TODO may also issue sufficient copies to each missile squadron as a sub-account for distribution of one copy to each assigned crew member.
 - 2.6.1.2. The TODO will distribute and maintain two copies of the communications technical order at all LCCs and MPTs, as well as one copy at the Minuteman Enhanced Procedures (MEP) Trainer.
 - 2.6.2. The AFTO Form 22, *Technical Manual (TM) Change Recommendation and Reply*, is a recommendation for a specific T.O. improvement, correction of an error, or correction of an omission that prevents the adequate performance of the functions required for the mission.
 - 2.6.2.1. Proposed emergency, urgent and routine changes will be submitted to the TODO through the Technical Order Distribution Alternate (TODA). These submissions will be

reviewed by OGV for technical accuracy and, after approval from the TODO, will be forwarded to 20 AF/A3NV.

- 2.6.2.2. Units are encouraged to submit an AFTO Form 22 to OGV if there is information MCCMs are consistently annotating and does not meet the above criteria, but is worthy of T.O. inclusion. OGV is the final local approving or disapproving authority for all AFTO Forms 22 initiated against the missile operations technical manuals.
- 2.6.2.3. Ensure all submitted AFTO Forms 22 meet the criteria established in T.O. 00-5-1.
- 2.6.3. OGV must review all technical data to ensure technical accuracy before distribution. If the change is technically inaccurate, submit an emergency AFTO Form 22.
 - 2.6.3.1. OGV must identify all significant discrepancies to 20 AF/A3NV by telephone within 5 working days of initial receipt and in writing within 7 working days of receipt of initial distribution.

ALERT PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS

- **3.1. Status Briefings.** The on-coming MCCMs will receive status briefings from topside personnel in preparation for their alert shift.
 - 3.1.1. Crews will receive a briefing from facility managers (FMs) with information on the overall condition of the MAF, system degrades, pending maintenance activities, system tests, current and expected visitors and any other discrepancies or problems at the MAF.
 - 3.1.2. Crews will receive a briefing from the Flight Security Controller (FSC) with information regarding any personnel and maintenance at a launch facility (LF) or in the flight area, security situations in the flight area, condition of the security response vehicles and radios, road and response conditions, and any suspicious activity. MCCMs will reaccomplish this briefing after the current FSCs changeover with a new security forces crew.
- **3.2. Crew Changeover.** Crew changeover is a systematic process of transferring alert responsibilities from one crew to another. Both crews share responsibility for ensuring a comprehensive and accurate changeover is accomplished.
 - 3.2.1. [Wings III & V] If Launch Control Equipment Building (LCEB) inspections cannot be accomplished by the crew due to 48 hour or more operations, MCCMs will direct the FM to check the Diesel Electric Unit (DEU) and Shock Isolator Air Compressor (SIAC) per their technical data and conduct a visual check for any leaks and other easily identified discrepancies. *Note: For the remainder of this publication, all references to the LCEB will only pertain to Wings III & V.*<
 - 3.2.2. The LCC blast door will be closed as soon as possible after the entry or exit of the oncoming or off-going MCC. During periods of extended maintenance, the LCC blast door may remain open to allow movement of the maintenance team and their equipment. Combat crew commanders will use sound judgment and ensure the LCC blast door remains closed as much as possible.
 - 3.2.2.1. If maintenance must be performed during changeover, the crews will take all appropriate measures to ensure maintenance personnel do not observe the classified inventory.
 - 3.2.3. The on-coming crew will accomplish a changeover inventory to account for each COMSEC item listed on the AFCOMSEC Form 16, *COMSEC Account Daily Shift Inventory*. Non-COMSEC items will be inventoried using AFGSC Form 61, *Classified Material Daily Shift Inventory*.
 - 3.2.3.1. MCCMs will accomplish an inventory of all TOP SECRET, SECRET, COMSEC, USNAL 45B combinations and other cryptographic material or equipment in accordance with AFKAG 1N, Air Force Communications Security (COMSEC) Operations, EAP-STRAT Volume 3, AFI 31-401, Information Security Program Management and AFI 33-201v2, Communications Security (COMSEC)User Requirements.

- **3.3.** Checklists. MCCMs will strictly adhere to all checklists in a T.O. and US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) or other higher headquarters (HHQ) directives.
 - 3.3.1. 20 AF/A3NV will be responsible for generating standardized checklists to cover actions not addressed in a T.O. or other directives (e.g., 20 AF MCC Contingencies Checklist, 20 AF Severe Weather Checklist, etc).
 - 3.3.2. Units may develop local procedures specific to their wing when operations fall outside existing technical orders and HHQ regulations or checklists. Units will not supplement existing technical data with local procedures. Local procedures will not be used to re-create or consolidate existing technical data or HHQ regulations.
- **3.4. Field Direction.** While on alert, the MCC is in command of the flight area and is ultimately responsible for all activities, operations, maintenance, security, and personnel in the flight area.
 - 3.4.1. The MCC must exercise direct command and control during any actual or potential situation involving the safety and security of personnel or equipment.
 - 3.4.1.1. Once any LF is taken into local control or status out, the maintenance team chief will be responsible for the safe operation of the missile system in the LF. The MCC will resume responsibility when status monitoring capability is restored.
- **3.5.** Alternate Command Post/Squadron Command Post (ACP/SCP) Duties and Responsibilities. The ACP/SCP crews are responsible to lead their squadron and wing in executing the mission by ensuring the squadron carries out all nuclear surety and positive control measures as well as directing various daily actions.
 - 3.5.1. The ACP/SCP crews will consist of individuals that have been trained and certified in accordance with AFGSC Instruction (AFGSCI) 13-5301v1, *Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Training*.
 - 3.5.2. The ACP/SCP crews will direct and coordinate all Emergency War Orders (EWO) actions, targeting, exercise and other daily requirements.
 - 3.5.2.1. Although the ACP/SCP is responsible for accomplishing all additional duties, Primary Launch Control Center (PLCC) crews will support the ACP/SCP and ensure all duties are properly executed.
 - 3.5.3. Reference EAP-STRAT Volume 8, *ICBM and ALCS Procedures*, for additional ACP/SCP/Controlling Launch Control Center (CLCC) duties.
- **3.6. Assumption of ACP/SCP Duties.** In the event an ACP or SCP can no longer perform its function by becoming communications isolated or unable to monitor squadron weapons system status, another SCP or LCC must assume responsibility. 20 AF/A3NV will develop and maintain a 20 AF ACP/SCP/CLCC Assumption Checklist for MCCMs to accomplish when assuming responsibility.
 - 3.6.1. Reference Figure 3.1. for devolution of command when it is necessary for an SCP to assume ACP responsibilities.
 - 3.6.1.1. If no SCP is capable of assuming ACP responsibilities, ACP roles and responsibilities should go to the LCC with an ACP/SCP certified crew starting with the senior experienced combat crew commander. If no ACP/SCP certified crew is posted on

alert, responsibilities will go to the LCC with the senior experienced combat crew commander.

Figure 3.1. Devolution of Command.

BASE	DEVOLUTION OF COMMAND					
Malmstrom	K01	\rightarrow	G01	\rightarrow	A01	
F.E. Warren	I01	\rightarrow	A01	\rightarrow	O01	
Minot	I01	\rightarrow	C01	\rightarrow	M01	

- 3.6.2. If an SCP can no longer perform its function, CLCC responsibility should go to the LCC with an ACP/SCP certified crew starting with the senior experienced combat crew commander. If no ACP/SCP certified crew is posted on alert, responsibilities will go to the LCC with the senior experienced combat crew commander.
 - 3.6.2.1. The CLCC will be responsible for completing all ACP/SCP duties as stated in paragraph 3.6.
- 3.6.3. During times when SCP responsibilities will be transferred to a CLCC for an extended period of time, the squadron commander (SQ/CC) or operations officer (SQ/DO) is authorized to direct a specific LCC to assume the CLCC role and will inform crews of the CLCC during the squadron pre-departure briefing.
 - 3.6.3.1. When an SCP site is shutdown for an extended period, the combat crew assuming the alert at the CLCC must be ACP/SCP qualified.
- **3.7. Relief of Command.** Operations officers and above may direct relief of a crew or crew member on alert for personal or medical reasons and for unqualified performance in the field.
 - 3.7.1. An evaluator crew in an LCC may relieve a posted crew or crew member if such action is required to preclude loss of life or serious injury, violation of weapon system safety rules (WSSR) in accordance with AFI 91-114, *Safety Rules for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Systems*, or major damage to equipment.
 - 3.7.1.1. If, during the error determination process following an evaluation or observation, a crew member is rated unqualified in accordance with AFGSCI 13-5301v2, *Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Standardization and Evaluation*, the evaluators must relieve the appropriate crew member(s).
 - 3.7.2. The relieving individual must be combat mission ready (CMR) in the position being relieved. The relieving crew member(s) must inform the SCP and the squadron commander or operations officer of the change of command.
 - 3.7.3. If an evaluator crew relieves the on-duty crew of command to facilitate a standardization evaluation, the evaluator crew will be listed on the Missile Alert Duty Order (MADO) and complete changeover per weapon system operating instructions.
 - 3.7.4. HHQ evaluators or inspectors are not authorized to relieve a crew on duty in the LCC. If a crew member commits an error that is determined to be a restrictable field deviation or

receives an unqualified rating during an HHQ evaluation or observation in the LCC, the evaluation or inspection team chief will immediately inform the wing, operations group, and squadron commanders. The unqualified crew member(s) will be replaced as soon as possible. HHQ evaluators or inspectors are required to supervise the crew member(s) until they have been replaced.

- **3.8. Communication.** Maintaining effective communication is critical for the operations of the weapon system as well as the safety, security, command and control of the personnel and equipment in the missile complex.
 - 3.8.1. Crews will develop coordination between themselves to ensure commands and responses, actions and other communications are clear, unambiguous and professional to ensure procedures being accomplished in the LCC are warranted and that the correct procedures are accomplished in accordance with applicable technical orders and directives.
 - 3.8.2. For a scheduled communications outage, the MCC will ensure some form of backup communication is available with topside personnel.

3.8.3. DELETED.

- **3.9.** Crew Log Requirements. MCCs will use the electronic log to record events occurring during the alert. Should the console not automatically enter required log entry details, the crew must manually input the necessary details into the console. Logs will be written with sufficient detail so alert activities can be reconstructed.
 - 3.9.1. MCCs must use the electronic log unless the console is shutdown or electronic crew log capabilities are unavailable, at which point MCCs will use the AFGSC Form 524, *Missile Combat Crew Log*, to record events that occur during the alert. No alterations are authorized in the preprinted area. Units may subdivide the large lined sections and locally overprint the form. Classify the AFGSC Form 524 appropriately.
 - 3.9.2. Crews will archive crew logs every 24 hours in accordance with technical data. Archived disks or prints will be kept in the LCC for one week, unless audited by unit OGV. After one week, archives may be overwritten or destroyed unless directed otherwise.
 - 3.9.2.1. LCCs should have a minimum of 14 crew log archive diskettes to ensure primary and backup diskettes are available for seven days.
- **3.10. Status Tracking.** Detailed status tracking is critical for the situational awareness necessary for the safety, security and reliability of the weapon system and personnel.
 - 3.10.1. MCCs will track the status of all degraded sorties and LCCs in their flight or squadron as applicable. This includes Partially Mission Capable (PMC), off-alert, modified-alert, degrades affecting LF security and hardness degrades affecting launch capability.
 - 3.10.2. A detailed Operator Entered Status (OES) will be used and updated to document the status of an LF or LCC degrade within the flight. The OES will not be deleted until the issue has been completely resolved.
 - 3.10.3. When crews are notified by Missile Maintenance Operations Center (MMOC) that a fault is cycling status, they may suppress the fault with coordination from MMOC. This suppression must be logged to include initials from MMOC.

- **3.11. Combat Crew Aids.** MCCMs may develop charts, question banks, guides or other visual aids and processes to bolster proficiency, enhance changeover briefings and to ensure comprehensive tasks [e.g., Missile Guidance Set (MGS) removal and replacement] are completed correctly. However, these aids will not override or be used in lieu of T.O.s and other directives.
 - 3.11.1. Combat crew aids are prohibited during any form of evaluation or testing.
- **3.12. LCC Configuration and Storage.** LCCs will be configured and standardized according to the local guidance. OGV will be responsible to develop and maintain an LCC configuration chart. Squadrons will ensure LCCs are configured in accordance with the LCC configuration chart.
- **3.13. LCC Hardening.** MCCs will ensure the LCC is hardened in accordance with applicable directives or states of readiness to survive seismic and shock events and maintain maximum warfighting capability.
 - 3.13.1. 20 AF/A3NV will develop and maintain a 20 AF LCC Hardening Checklist for crews to accomplish when directed to higher states of readiness.
 - 3.13.1.1. MCCs will not accomplish Manual Hardening Procedure for exercises at the MAF unless directed by HHQ inspectors. During exercise higher states of readiness, MCCs will comply with hardness requirements except when prevented by operational or safety requirements.
 - 3.13.2. Any request to change or modify any portion of the LCC hardening configuration must be done by submitting an AF Form 1067, *Modification Proposal*, through OGV for approval coordination. Final approval authority will be 20 AF/A3 in coordination with HQ AFGSC/A3I.

3.14. Emergency, Contingency and Incident Procedures.

- 3.14.1. LCC Evacuation. Evacuating the LCC may be necessary for emergency or non-emergency situations. MCCMs will follow guidance in 20AFI 31-133, *Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Systems Security*, for entry into the Security Control Center (SCC) due to emergency LCC evacuation.
- 3.14.2. For contingency situations, such as an LCEB fire, serious injury, topside evacuation for a natural disaster, or a below ground alarm situation, personnel or responding team(s) will be allowed emergency entry to the elevator shaft area and LCEB in accordance with DoD S-5210.41-M/AFMAN31-108/AFGSCMAN 31-108, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual* and 20AFI 31-133.
- 3.14.3. 20 AF/A3NV will develop and maintain a 20 AF Severe or Hazardous Weather Checklist. MCCMs will accomplish appropriate steps of the checklist anytime severe or hazardous weather is reported in their flight area to ensure personnel working in the flight area are aware of the conditions.
- 3.14.4. MCCMs will accomplish appropriate steps of the 20 AF MCC Contingencies Checklist anytime a situation occurs involving an accident, unsafe condition or the potential for injury or death in the flight area.

- 3.14.5. Individuals who observe suspicious activity in the missile field will report it to the nearest LCC or Missile Security Control (MSC).
- 3.14.6. Dull Swords will be reported in accordance with AFI 91-221, Weapons Safety Investigations and Reports, and AFI 91-221_AFGSCSUP, Weapons Safety Investigations and Reports.
- **3.15. COMSEC, Missile Entry Control System/Missile Electronic Encryption Device** (MECS/MEED) and Classified Material. MCCMs are responsible for proper handling and safeguarding of COMSEC, MECS/MEED and other classified material.
 - 3.15.1. MCCMs will verify access authorizations and security clearance before allowing access.
 - 3.15.2. Transportation of COMSEC, cryptographic and classified material will be in accordance with AFKAG 1N, EAP-STRAT Volume 3, AFI 31-401, and AFI 33-201v2. Transportation begins when the MCC signs for and leaves the room where the material was issued, or when the MCC leaves the LCC. Transportation ends when the MCC arrives at the LCC or when the MCC reports to the responsible office and transfers the material.
 - 3.15.3. MCCMs will maintain an unbroken chain of document receipts for classified documents transferred to or from the LCC. Immediately report any physical, personnel, or cryptographic insecurity to the issuing agency or the affected squadron's commander or operations officer as soon as possible.
 - 3.15.4. Loading, usage and routine destruction of COMSEC, MECS/MEED and classified material will be in accordance with AFKAG 1N, EAP-STRAT Volume 3, AFI 31-401, and AFI 33-201v2.
 - 3.15.5. The MW/CC or designated representative may direct the emergency destruction of LCC classified material. During emergency situations requiring destruction of classified material, responsibility to direct emergency destruction rests with the missile combat crew commander (MCCC).
- **3.16. Civilian and Military Visitors.** MCCs can expect periodic visits to the MAF from military and civilian visitors. For the purpose of this instruction, civilian visitors encompass non-Department of Defense civilians and foreign military individuals. A military visitor encompasses U.S. military personnel not performing official duties at the MAF and/or in the LCC.
 - 3.16.1. With the exception of MCCMs listed on a MADO, all visitors and military members will be listed on a dispatch AFGSC Form 246, *Multiple Dispatch*, *Pre Dispatch/Approved Dispatch Notification*, or an Entry Authority List (EAL).
 - 3.16.2. Procedures must be implemented to protect classified information during site visits.
 - 3.16.2.1. The console is the duty station of the MCC and at no time will the on-duty crew relinquish control of the console to visitors.
 - 3.16.2.2. MCCMs will not allow visitors to interact with the weapon system, its associated components, or supporting equipment.
 - 3.16.2.3. MCCs will ensure adequate control of classified material is maintained to prevent physical or viewing access by unauthorized individuals.

3.16.3. Photography and Video Taping at MAFs and LFs. Official photography and audio or visual recordings at a MAF or LF are permissible as specified in DoD S-5210.41-M/AFMAN31-108/AFGSCMAN 31-108, 20AFI 31-133, T.O. 21M-LGM30F-12, Special Maintenance-Modification, Safety and Electromagnetic Interference Provisions; Wings I, III, V and VAFB, and EAP-STRAT Volume 16.

3.16.3.1. DELETED.

- **3.17. Maintenance Activity on the MAF.** Maintenance in the LCC will be accomplished by a qualified maintenance team. Maintenance accomplished by the MCC will be limited to procedures outlined in their technical data.
 - 3.17.1. MCCs may accomplish minor miscellaneous maintenance in the LCC. Such tasks would include, but are not limited to replacing plexi-glass on the console, replacing screws and replacing restroom fixtures.
 - 3.17.2. All discrepancies affecting the MAF, LCC or LCEB will be reported to the FM. The MCC and FM will obtain work orders from MMOC and Civil Engineering (CE) to correct discrepancies affecting the MAF, LCC and LCEB.
 - 3.17.3. Safety tags are required to be attached to material and equipment no longer safe to use because of defects, abuse, maintenance or wear. They are not intended for use as a reporting system; rather, they are warning devices. The AF Form 979, *Danger Tag*, AF Form 980, *Caution Tag*, AF Form 981, *Out of Order Tag*, and AF Form 982, *Do Not Start Tag*, are stored in the LCC and will be used in accordance with AFOSHSTD 91-501, *Air Force Consolidated Occupational Safety Standard*.
 - 3.17.4. Equipment annotations and identification labels may be necessary to relay important information in regards to optimum equipment configuration and the safety of the personnel in the LCC.
 - 3.17.5. Rivet Minuteman Integrated Life Extension (MILE) teams may require an LCC to be shut down for major maintenance projects ranging from a few days to a few weeks. MCCMs will comply with locally developed procedures during Rivet MILE maintenance.
 - 3.17.6. A temporary MAF gate may be used as a temporary barrier when conditions interfere with the normal operation of the permanent gate. The FSC will coordinate with MSC and the MCC when using the temporary gate.
- **3.18. Miscellaneous LCC Procedures.** Technical orders or other directives may not address every situation a crew member may encounter. This does not relieve the MCC of the responsibility to perform or coordinate any actions necessary to ensure optimum equipment configuration or operation, accountability for COMSEC or classified materials and general management of the flight area.

OPERATIONS SCHEDULING

- **4.1. Operations Scheduling.** Adherence to safe operating procedures and WSSRs is mandatory and has prime consideration in the planning, scheduling, briefing, and conduct of all activities. Development of a comprehensive scheduling plan to manage personnel resources, training and certification requirements is critical for efficient operations.
- **4.2. Operations Scheduling Office.** Operations schedulers are responsible to publish, post and monitor schedules for the crew force and initiate changes to the schedules based on proper tracking of qualifications, certifications and restrictions.
 - 4.2.1. The MADO will be published prior to the pre-departure briefing. The MADO will be authenticated and distributed before the alert duty period. MCCs listed on the MADO are authorized to pull alert at any LCC in the wing for which they are qualified.
 - 4.2.2. Availability of resources will determine a unit's ability to meet operational requirements. Schedulers will fill positions by applying the following priorities:
 - 4.2.2.1. Priority 1: Primary mission objectives.
 - 4.2.2.2. Priority 2: Training and evaluations.
 - 4.2.2.3. Priority 3: HHQ evaluations or inspections.
 - 4.2.2.4. Priority 4: HHQ directed missions, exercises, or system training.
 - 4.2.3. An operations scheduler will ensure affected squadrons are notified if a change was made to their schedule that is effective within 72 hours from the time the change was made.
 - 4.2.3.1. An operations scheduler will ensure a crew member on leave or temporary duty (TDY) is notified if a schedule change places or changes an event on their schedule during the first 72 hours of their scheduled return.
 - 4.2.3.1.1. Notifications will be made as soon as practical after the change is official, but not later than 12 hours prior to the scheduled event time.
 - 4.2.3.2. If a schedule change places an alert event on a crew member's schedule within 24 hours, an operations scheduler will notify the affected SQ/CC or SQ/DO for a schedule change approval. If approved, the crew member will be notified.
- **4.3. Crew Member Responsibility.** The operations scheduling office publishes the schedule for each crew member; however, ultimate responsibility for obtaining monthly training and other requirements rests with each crew member.
 - 4.3.1. MCCMs will ensure they are scheduled or have completed monthly codes, weapon system and EWO training as well as the monthly trainer ride. MCCMs will ensure they are scheduled to meet minimum alert requirements in accordance with AFGSCI 13-5301v1.
 - 4.3.2. MCCMs will ensure they have a current Preventative Health Assessment (PHA) on file.
 - 4.3.3. MCCMs are prohibited from consuming alcoholic beverages 12 hours prior to the squadron pre-departure briefing for their alert duty. These restrictions also apply to MCCMs

- scheduled for backup alert duty, or dispatching to the field for any reason (e.g., field observation, courier duty, training alerts, etc.).
 - 4.3.3.1. Possessing or consuming alcoholic beverages or controlled substances is prohibited within the confines of any MAF or LF, and while en-route to or from duty in the missile complex.
- **4.4. Crew Force Management.** The goal is to maximize crew force experience while sustaining staff manning at an adequate level for unit programs.
 - 4.4.1. Missile units will fill their company grade staff positions using internal resources to the maximum extent. When necessary, Permanent Change of Station (PCS) manning will be provided based on priorities determined by HQ AFGSC/A1 (in coordination with HQ AFGSC/A3TO), but careful planning and coordination should minimize these occurrences. Flexible application of Assignment Availability Code (AAC) 55 and AAC 39 will support this process.
 - 4.4.2. Individuals whose primary duties do not require CMR certification (e.g., plans, executive officers, protocol, codes) should not remain CMR certified. Officers selected for these positions will be near or at the end of their crew tour commitment. MCCMs should not fill these staff positions prior to completion of their AAC 55. Waiver requests will be in accordance with paragraph 4.13.5.
 - 4.4.3. Trained Personnel Requirements (TPR) are based on AAC 55 expiration dates; therefore units should not expect replacements for officers with AAC 55 waivers until the original AAC 55 expires. HQ AFGSC/A1 will coordinate with HQ AFGSC/A3TO on assignment actions of crew personnel with an AAC 55, as required.
 - 4.4.3.1. Waivers are not required when removal from CMR duty is the result of medical disqualification, permanent PRP decertification or if Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) has broken the AAC 55 to meet an Air Force-level PCS requirement.
- **4.5.** Crew Positions. CMR crew positions are normally filled with 13SX personnel. With the exception of foreign nationals, personnel with another Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) may fill CMR positions to gain operational experience.
 - 4.5.1. A CMR crew consists of a crew commander and a deputy. A CMR crew commander may be assigned two crew deputies if manning overages occur in the deputy commander position.
 - 4.5.1.1. The MCCC commands a two-person combat-ready crew during an alert. While on alert, the commander is normally responsible for 10 ICBMs; however, the commander may be responsible for as many as 50. The commander is accountable to the President, Secretary of Defense and the Commander USSTRATCOM for launch actions of those ICBMs.
 - 4.5.1.2. The Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander (DMCCC) is second in command of an ICBM flight while on alert in that flight.
 - 4.5.2. The MCCC is dual qualified upon upgrade to MCCC from DMCCC in the same weapon system.

- 4.5.3. Refer to AFI 36-2101, *Classifying Military Personnel (Officer and Enlisted)*, and the Air Force Officer Classification Directory (AFOCD) for the AFSC awarded to each crew position.
- **4.6. Crew Pairing.** MCCCs and DMCCCs are paired together to form a crew; however, two certified MCCCs may be paired together to form a dual qualified CMR crew. It is the responsibility of the crew to build coordination, proficiency and cohesiveness.
- **4.7. Alert Construct and Requirements.** LCCs are manned and conduct continuous operations 24 hours a day to execute the nuclear mission.
 - 4.7.1. The MCCC is responsible for the crew and all alert related duties at the commencement of the pre-departure briefing until all materials are transferred to the appropriate agencies upon return to MSB.
 - 4.7.2. An alert period starts when the MCC assumes command of the flight area and ends when they are relieved by another crew. Although an alert period is 24 hours, the actual time will vary pending early or late departure of crews due to extenuating circumstances on base or inclement weather.
 - 4.7.2.1. Under normal conditions, the MCC assumes command of the flight area and responsibility for operations when they sign for the Sealed Authenticator System (SAS) documents. If SAS is not on site, the MCC assumes command upon notifying the command post (squadron, alternate, or wing) that changeover is complete.
 - 4.7.3. Only CMR certified crews consisting of at least one MCCC, will perform alert duty at an operational LCC.
 - 4.7.4. Only crews trained and certified specifically in ACP/SCP duties and procedures will perform alert tours at the ACP or SCP.
 - 4.7.4.1. A crew posted to a shutdown ACP/SCP configured LCC is not performing any ACP/SCP alert duties; therefore, the crew does not have to be ACP/SCP certified.
- **4.8. Alert Credit.** Alert credit will be awarded to CMR certified MCCMs who assume command of the flight area with the intention of completing an alert period.
 - 4.8.1. Do not award alert credit if the MCC signs for the alert for situations such as a field phase evaluation.
 - 4.8.2. Duty shifts at Vandenberg AFB in support of any 576th Flight Test Squadron testing or evaluation will not count towards alert currency requirements.
 - 4.8.3. ACP/SCP certified crews will be awarded ACP/SCP alert duty credit upon completion of an alert at an operational ACP/SCP or at a CLCC. Although a CLCC is not ACP/SCP configured, ACP/SCP duties and responsibilities are still required and are performed.
 - 4.8.3.1. Schedulers will ensure ACP/SCP certified MCCMs perform at least one ACP/SCP alert duty every 3 calendar months at an operational ACP/SCP or CLCC.
 - 4.8.4. MCCMs posted on alert at a shutdown LCC will be awarded alert credit even if the alert is performed topside.
 - 4.8.4.1. ACP/SCP alert duty credit will not be awarded for any crew posted to a shutdown ACP/SCP.

- **4.9. Alert Rotation.** MCCMs can expect to see a routine schedule rotation during portions of each month to accommodate alert load and crew rest requirements.
 - 4.9.1. A typical rotation is defined as an alert with corresponding day off (O-day), followed by one day of scheduled or unscheduled activity before an alert on day four.
 - 4.9.2. A back-to-back alert is defined as an alert and O-day, immediately followed by another alert and O-day, taking place over four consecutive calendar days.
 - 4.9.2.1. Back-to-back alerts will not be scheduled unless approved by the OG/CC.
 - 4.9.2.2. Alerts extended due to inclement weather (48-hour alert or longer) or multiple days in the field as part of an A1/A2 or other modified crew pulling 12-hour shifts do not constitute back-to-back.
- **4.10. Alert Load.** The alert load for MCCMs will vary due to manning issues and states of readiness.
 - 4.10.1. Alerts extended due to inclement weather (48-hour alert or longer) or multiple days in the field as part of an A1/A2 or other modified crew will count as additional alerts. For example, an alert lasting 48 hours will count as 2 alerts and alerts lasting 72 hours will count as 3 alerts. Schedules should be adjusted accordingly.
 - 4.10.2. MCCMs in tactical squadrons are limited to a maximum of eight alert events (alerts and back up alerts) per month. Any request to schedule a crew member for more than eight alert events requires OG commander or deputy commander approval.
 - 4.10.3. The OG commander or deputy commander will determine the maximum monthly alert load requirements for MCCMs in OGV and Operations Support Squadron (OSS) as well as CMR flight commanders. These officers hold key CMR positions and the primary emphasis should be on performing their duties with an alert rate that ensures an adequate level of proficiency.
- **4.11. Backup Alert.** In addition to scheduled alerts, a crew member may be scheduled for backup alert duty in the event a scheduled crew member is not able to perform the alert.
 - 4.11.1. Backup alert duty starts at 0600L on the assigned day and ends at 0600L the following day.
- **4.12. Crew Rest.** The purpose of crew rest is to ensure the crew member is adequately rested before performing alert duties. Crew rest is free time, which includes time for meals, transportation, and rest. Rest is defined as a condition that allows an individual the opportunity to sleep.
 - 4.12.1. Crew rest is mandatory prior to performing alert duties, receiving classroom and MPT training or being administered an evaluation. MCCs must be given the opportunity for 12 hours of crew rest immediately prior to the pre-departure briefing time or scheduled event.
 - 4.12.1.1. During crew rest, MCCMs should have time for meals, transportation, and the opportunity for 8 hours of uninterrupted rest. Unusual circumstances may occur which may require the OG commander or deputy commander to place a crew on duty or accomplish training to meet mission requirements. Every effort shall be made to ensure those MCCMs have a minimum of 8 hours of uninterrupted rest.

- 4.12.2. Evaluations, crew training, MPT rides, or other mission-related duties will not be scheduled during a crew member's off-day or "O-day".
- **4.13. Crew Tour Commitment.** With the exception of Chief of Standardization and Evaluation offices, operations officers, squadron commanders and higher, MCCMs in CMR positions are placed on an AAC 55. The AAC 55 is intended to provide a stabilized crew force, a TPR validation tool and to ensure payback for Air Education and Training Command (AETC) training.
 - 4.13.1. The code is controlled by AFPC and may be terminated for a higher-level Air Force priority. Personnel with an AAC 55 must perform duty in a CMR position until an appropriate authority waives the AAC 55, the AAC 55 expires, or their active duty service commitment expires and they separate from active duty.
 - 4.13.2. An AAC 55 will start and end in accordance with AFI 36-2110, *Assignments*, and the AFPC Stabilized Tour Guide. The individual becomes available for reassignment during the assignment cycle when the AAC expires. The local Military Personnel Element (MPE) administers the AAC 55.
 - 4.13.2.1. AAC 55 dates will not be adjusted by local MPEs. For instances such as security clearance issues and extended DNIA status, units are encouraged to request extensions for members via the AFPC reclama process as appropriate.
 - 4.13.3. Follow-on assignments for officers at inactivating units will be determined through the AFPC assignment process.
 - 4.13.4. Officers applying for schools or special programs do not require an AAC 55 waiver prior to the selection board. This includes boards for flying training, AF Institute of Technology (AFIT) programs, Top Hand, and the AF Weapons School Program. Officers should contact HQ AFGSC/A3T for boards not listed above. If the officer is selected, the unit must process a waiver to accurately account for AAC 55 commitments.
 - 4.13.5. A waiver is required prior to removal of officers from duty in a CMR position if the AAC 55 has not expired. HQ AFGSC/A3 is the AAC 55 waiver authority; however, this authority is delegated to the 20 AF/CC for waivers of 7-12 months and wing commanders for waivers of 6 months or less. Documentation of 20 AF and unit waivers will be in accordance with local unit procedures and will include a roster of all MCCMs granted AAC 55 waivers, the purpose for the waiver, the original and new AAC 55 expiration dates.
 - 4.13.5.1. Recognizing the time-sensitive nature of Code Controller manning, HQ AFGSC/A3 will consider AAC 55 waiver requests of greater than 12 months in extenuating circumstances to meet mission requirements.
 - 4.13.6. The 20 AF/A3 is responsible for managing the AAC 55 process for 20 AF. The 20 AF/CC may delegate AAC 55 waiver authority to the 20 AF/A3.

OPERATIONAL TESTS, EXERCISES AND INSPECTIONS

- **5.1. General Information.** Exercising and testing the crew force is necessary to maintain proficiency; however, exercises, tests and inspections also provide collection agencies with important data needed to validate the operation of the weapon system.
 - 5.1.1. During an exercise or test, MCCMs on alert will participate and follow directives to the maximum extent possible.
 - 5.1.2. The crew member will not jeopardize operational mission requirements to accomplish test or exercise actions. Real-world emergencies or priorities may dictate that a crew needs to withdraw from a test or exercise. The MCCMs will coordinate with the ACP/SCP and all appropriate agencies to cancel, postpone or withdraw from a test or exercise. When priority actions are complete, the MCC will resume participation as applicable.
- **5.2. Tests and Exercises Requiring Crew Member Participation.** MCCMs will become familiar with the procedures for all tests and exercises in which they can expect to participate.
 - 5.2.1. Continuing Evaluation Program (CEP). Crews will receive periodic CEP communications tests from USSTRATCOM. CEP testing is used by higher headquarters to gather reliability data.
 - 5.2.2. OLYMPIC PLAY. OLYMPIC PLAY tests are initiated locally to assess missile alert force readiness. 20 AF/A3NV will develop and maintain a 20 AF OLYMPIC PLAY Processing Checklist for MCCMs to accomplish all required actions.
 - 5.2.3. Communications Exercises. Communications Exercises examine assets and procedures to provide end-to-end connectivity from warning sensors to national decision-makers to executing forces through the National Military Command System.
 - 5.2.4. Giant Ball. Giant Ball tests are periodically conducted to test UHF communications with the Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS). 20 AF/A3NV will develop and maintain a 20 AF Giant Ball Test Checklist.
 - 5.2.5. Security Reaction Exercises (SRE). Security forces may conduct exercises to evaluate security forces. Crews are required to react to all weapon system indications as well as any additional inputs provided by the initiating individuals, to include upgrading security situations or directing further security force response and termination as outlined in 20AFI 31-133.
 - 5.2.6. HHQ and Joint Exercises.
 - 5.2.6.1. The MIGHTY GUARDIAN exercises are a joint service force-on-force evaluation to determine if existing DoD, service and MAJCOM policies, standards, and equipment are realistic and sufficient to secure a Minuteman III launch facility in the current threat environment. The evaluation also exercises MAJCOM proposed changes or mitigations to determine their operational impact on weapons security.

- 5.2.6.2. The Global Thunder exercises are conducted by USSTRATCOM to demonstrate the ability of nuclear forces to execute operation plan (OPLAN) procedures and nuclear command, control and communication (NC3) processes.
- **5.3. Staff Assistance Visits (SAV).** Units may request assistance from HQ AFGSC, 20 AF or other wings to review programs for compliance with standards.
 - 5.3.1. Units will coordinate with HHQ SAV team or other units to determine the programs and depth of the review.
 - 5.3.2. HQ AFGSC-administered SAVs will be non-attributional. SAVs will not be treated as an inspection and no score/rating will be assessed.
 - 5.3.3. Nuclear Surety SAVs (NSSAVs) will be conducted in accordance with AFGSCI 91-120, *Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit (NSSAV) Program and Responsibilities*.
- **5.4. Inspections Affecting Crew Members.** Units are regularly inspected by higher headquarters to assess their operational warfighting capabilities and readiness. Refer to AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, for inspection details.
 - 5.4.1. Combat Capability Evaluation (CCE). The CCE provides the USSTRATCOM Task Force-214 (TF-214)/CC, an assessment of a unit's combat capability by evaluating technical proficiency, standardization, evaluation, training processes, programs and support.
 - 5.4.1.1. MCCMs may reference 20 AFI 90-1, *Combat Capability Evaluation (CCE)*, for details on the assessment.
 - 5.4.2. Compliance Inspection (CI). CIs are conducted to assess areas mandated by law as well as mission areas that are critical or important to the health and performance of organizations.
 - 5.4.3. Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection (NORI). The NORI is designed to evaluate and measure the ability of units to perform their wartime, contingency, or force sustainment missions in support of USSTRATCOM and Joint Chief of Staff-directed OPLANs. NORIs focus on force generation, employment, and reconstitution and require units to demonstrate their operational capability of nuclear and nuclear-support in a time-constrained environment.
 - 5.4.4. Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI). The NSI is designed to certify a unit's continued capability to perform its assigned nuclear mission and a unit's capability to manage nuclear resources while complying with applicable nuclear surety rules governing their nuclear mission. MCCMs must demonstrate their knowledge of weapon acceptance procedures, nuclear weapon system safety rules, and nuclear weapon control order handling and authentication procedures. The frequency in which the AFGSC/IG will conduct the NSI is in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3263.05, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection*.
- **5.5. Maintenance Training LF Considerations.** One launch facility at each wing contains an off-alert sortie without a re-entry system that is used for training maintenance teams. The sortie may be included in exercises and may be generated to simulated alert status during HHQ exercises, evaluations or inspections.

5.5.1. When the training LF is postured to simulated alert during exercises by either local or HHQ direction, a training reentry system (RS) may be installed and the LF may be manually unsafed. The MCCMs will perform all post-maintenance tests directed by MMOC.

ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROCEDURES

- **6.1. Duties Not Including Alert (DNIA).** This process ensures individuals with medical conditions that could affect mission accomplishment, cause mission degradation, or endanger personnel safety do not perform operational duties.
 - 6.1.1. Personnel assigned to Basic Mission Capable (BMC) or CMR positions who fail to meet the applicable medical standards established in AFI 48-123, *Medical Examinations and Standards*, will be placed in DNIA status and will not perform CMR/BMC duties on real-world systems.
 - 6.1.2. In accordance with AFI 48-123, pregnant crew members should be removed from alert duty after 24 weeks gestation. This standard may be modified as necessary for problem pregnancies.
 - 6.1.2.1. Pregnant crew members should continue to receive their required monthly training up to their date of delivery (as medical circumstances will allow). These crew members should become CMR as soon as possible after maternity leave is completed.
 - 6.1.3. Personnel in DNIA status who are not on convalescent leave, hospitalized, or assigned to quarters may perform additional duties as determined by the unit and competent medical authority to include receiving classroom and simulator instruction.
- **6.2. NetLink Usage.** The LCC NetLink system is government-provided hardware and software for conducting official and authorized government business. Usage will be in accordance with AFI 33-129, *Web Management and Internet Use*.
 - 6.2.1. MCCMs will practice proper information security (INFOSEC), COMSEC, computer security (COMPUSEC) and OPSEC at all times. Do not discuss or reveal information about the planning and conduct of sensitive or combat-related operations in email or other electronic LCC NetLink transmissions. NetLink is not authorized for classified information.
 - 6.2.2. MCCMs will use sound, professional judgment in determining whether or not the use of LCC NetLink will impact their alert responsibilities.
- **6.3. Modification Proposal.** The AF Form 1067 is used to propose a modification. OGV will be responsible for collecting all AF Form 1067s and is the final local approving or disapproving authority for all AF Form 1067s initiated for REACT discrepancies and modifications. OGV will forward approved AF Form 1067s to 20 AF/A3NV.
 - 6.3.1. Anyone may propose changes to the REACT system or report software anomalies using an AF Form 1067. The process used to make a change is dependent on the urgency of the change. There are three types of changes: Emergency, Urgent, and Routine.
 - 6.3.1.1. Emergency changes are changes that must be made immediately in order for the REACT system to function. Examples of emergency changes are software anomalies that prevent proper EWO commit or anything that causes the REACT console to be non-functional.

- 6.3.1.1.1. Notify the 20 AF/A3 of emergency changes within 6 hours. Initial notification may be made by phone, with the AF Form 1067 FAX or e-mail to follow. After duty hours and on weekends or holidays, contact the 20 AF/A3 through the 90th Missile Wing Command Post (WCP).
- 6.3.1.1.2. The 20 AF/A3 will immediately notify HQ AFGSC/A3I that an emergency change is in work. Within 6 hours, HQ AFGSC/A3I will notify the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) ICBM Systems Division and Higher Authority Communication/Rapid Message Processor Element (HAC/RMPE) Software Support Facility (HSSF) of the required change and then FAX or e-mail the approved AF Form 1067.
- 6.3.1.1.3. Special procedures may be necessary while some emergency changes are in work. 20 AF/A3 will determine when special procedures are necessary and after coordination with AFGSC/A3I, will forward instructions to units.
- 6.3.1.2. Urgent changes are changes that do not fit the emergency criteria, but are serious enough to warrant change without unnecessary delay.
- 6.3.1.3. Routine changes are changes that will improve system performance, but are not necessary to mission accomplishment.
 - 6.3.1.3.1. All urgent and routine changes are forwarded to 20 AF/A3NV for incorporation by the unit approval authority. The 20 AF/A3 will approve all AF Forms 1067 and forward valid changes to HQ AFGSC/A3I, who will forward approved changes to the AFNWC ICBM Systems Division.
- 6.3.2. The REACT Concept for Software Support (CSS) details the change process for the HAC/RMPE software. The CSS for HAC/RMPE software is an agreement between HQ AFGSC/A3T/A3I/A5/A6, 392 TRS/CC, and the AFNWC ICBM Systems Division.
- 6.3.3. For LCC configuration modification, 20 AF/A3NV will route modification requests through the appropriate 20 AF/A4 office. From there, the forms are forwarded to HQ AFGSC/A4 and Ogden Air Logistics Center (OO-ALC) at Hill AFB. The OO-ALC maintains configuration control over the MAJCOM's equipment and is the final determining authority for modification approval. AFGSCI 21-104, *Systems Requirements and Implementation Approval Process*, describes the LCC configuration approval process.
- **6.4. Operations Review Boards (ORB).** 20 AF will establish an ORB process to conduct an investigation to determine the cause of any abnormal system response. Examples of circumstances requiring an ORB include: major system degradation, indications of erroneous system response/procedures with significant mission impact, and significant events where the cause cannot be determined by initial assessment or when corrective action is beyond minimal retraining or minor procedural changes.
 - 6.4.1. The ORB convening authority is the 20 AF/A3 or the wing/group/squadron commander at the respective organizational levels. ORB composition is at the discretion of the convening authority. Inform 20 AF, HQ AFGSC/A3T, and HQ AFGSC/A3I via memorandum when an ORB is convened (electronic versions are acceptable).

- 6.4.1.1. Units will establish an ORB process to determine the cause of any abnormal system response. An abnormal system response may include the following: hardware or software anomalies, WSSR violations, or security deficiencies.
- 6.4.1.2. When to convene, composition, and report format will be left to unit discretion; however, the ORB should recommend corrective action(s) and suggest improvements to prevent a reoccurrence.
- 6.4.1.3. Unless directed by other DoD, Air Force, MAJCOM, or other agency direction, units will forward their ORB report to 20 AF/A3NV.
 - 6.4.1.3.1. ORB minutes will be approved at the next organizational level above the convening authority. Send a copy of ORB minutes to 20 AF, with information copies to HQ AFGSC/A3T and HQ AFGSC/A3I. Unclassified electronic versions are acceptable and should be sent to AFGSCA3TWorkflow@barksdale.af.mil and AFGSCA3IWorkflow@ barksdale.af.mil. Related classified information (up to SECRET) should be via **SIPRnet** sent to AFGSCA3TWorkflow@barksdale.af.smil.mil and AFGSCA3IWorkflow@barksdale.af.smil.mil.
 - 6.4.1.3.2. Forward an unclassified copy of ORB minutes documenting safety-related problems to HQ AFGSC/SEW at afgscsewworkflow@barksdale.af.mil. Related classified information (up to SECRET) should be sent via SIPRnet to afgscsewworkflow@barksdale.af.smil.mil.
- **6.5. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for New or Upgraded Systems.** Prior to IOC, the wing/group ensures operations, training, standardization, evaluation, and crew force management programs are developed and managed to provide adequate support to the new or upgraded system operations. The unit commander will report this status using Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) criteria (see AFI 10-201, Status of Resources and Training System). IOC declaration for AFGSC systems are managed in accordance with AFGSCI 10-604, Global Strike Operational Weapon System Management.

6.6. DELETED.

- 6.6.1. DELETED.
- 6.6.2. DELETED.

TIMOTHY M. RAY, Brigadier General, USAF Director of Operations

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION

References

20 AFI 24-301, Transportation Control Center (TCC) Operations and Vehicle Operations Within and Outside the Missile Field Complex

20 AFI 31-133, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Systems Security

20 AFI 90-1, Combat Capability Evaluation (CCE)

20 AFI 91-1, Vehicle Safety for Twentieth Air Force Missile Field Operations

AFGSCI 10-604, Global Strike Operational Weapon Systems Management

AFGSCI 13-5301v1, Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Training

AFGSCI 13-5301v2, Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Standardization and Evaluation

AFGSCI 21-104, Systems Requirements and Implementation Approval Process

AFGSCI 91-120, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit (NSSAV) Program and Responsibilities

AFI 10-201, Status of Resources and Training System

AFI 11-202v3, General Flight Rules

AFI 24-301, Vehicle Operations

AFI 31-401, Information Security Program Management

AFI 33-129, Web Management and Internet Use

AFI 33-201v2, Communication Security (COMSEC) User Requirements

AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management

AFI 36-2101, Classifying Military Personnel (Officer and Enlisted)

AFI 36-2110, Assignments

AFI 36-2903, Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel

AFI 36-2903_AFGSCSUP, Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel

AFI 48-123, Medical Examinations and Standards

AFI 90-201, Inspector General Activities

AFI 91-114, Safety Rules for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Systems

AFI 91-221, Weapons Safety Investigations and Reports

AFI 91-221_AFGSCSUP, Weapons Safety Investigations and Reports

AFKAG 1N, Air Force Communication Security (COMSEC) Operations

AFOSHSTD 91-501, Air Force Consolidated Occupational Safety Standard

AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records

AFPD 13-5, Nuclear Operations

AFPD 21-3, Technical Orders

CJCS 3263.05, Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection

DoD S-5210.41-M/AFMAN31-108/AFGSCMAN 31-108, Nuclear Weapon Security Manual

EAP-STRAT Volume 3, Positive Control Policy, Procedures and Coded Control Devices (U)

EAP-STRAT Volume 8, ICBM and ALCS Procedures (U)

EAP-STRAT Volume 16, ICBM Code Component Control Policy and Procedures

T.O. 00-5-1, Air Force Technical Order System

T.O. 00-5-2, Air Force Technical Order Distribution System

T.O. 21M-LGM30F-12, Special Maintenance-Modification, Safety and Electromagnetic Interference Provisions; Wings I, III, V and VAFB

Forms Prescribed

AFGSC Form 524, Missile Combat Crew Log

AFGSC Form 61, Classified Material Daily Shift Inventory

Forms Adopted

AF Form 1067, Modification Proposal

AF Form 1800, Operator's Inspection Guide and Trouble Report

AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication

AF Form 979, Danger Tag

AF Form 980, Caution Tag

AF Form 981, Out of Order Tag

AF Form 982, Do Not Start Tag

AFCOMSEC Form 16, COMSEC Account Daily Shift Inventory

AFGSC Form 246, Multiple Dispatch Pre Dispatch/Approved Dispatch Notification

AFTO Form 22, Technical Manual (TM) Change Recommendation and Reply

Abbreviations

AAC—Assignment Availability Code

ABU—Airman Battle Uniform

ACP—Alternate Command Post

AETC—Air Education and Training Command

AFB—Air Force Base

AFGSC—Air Force Global Strike Command

AFGSCI—Air Force Global Strike Command Instruction

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFIT—Air Force Institute of Technology

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFPC—Air Force Personnel Center

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFRIMS—Air Force Records Information Management System

AFSC—Air Force Specialty Code

ALCS—Airborne Launch Control System

BMC—Basic Mission Capable

CCE—Combat Capability Evaluation

CE—Civil Engineering

CEP—Continuous Evaluation Program

CI—Compliance Inspection

CJCSI—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CLCC—Controlling Launch Control Center

CMR—Combat Mission Ready

COMPUSEC—Computer Security

COMSEC—Communication Security

CSS—Concept for Software Support

DEU—Diesel Electric Unit

DMCCC—Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander

DNIA—Duties Not Including Alert

DoD—Department of Defense

EAL—Entry Authority List

EWO—Emergency War Order

FDU—Flight Dress Uniform

FM—Facility Manager

FSC—Flight Security Controller

GMV—Government Motor Vehicle

HAC—Higher Authority Communication

HHQ—Higher Headquarters

HQ—Headquarters

HSSF—HAC/RMPE Software Support Facility

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ID—Identification

IG—Inspector General

INFOSEC—Information Security

IOC—Initial Operational Capability

LCC—Launch Control Center

LCEB—Launch Control Equipment Building

LF—Launch Facility

MADO—Missile Alert Duty Order

MAF—Missile Alert Facility

MAJCOM—Major Command

MCC—Missile Combat Crew

MCCC—Missile Combat Crew Commander

MCCM—Missile Combat Crew Member

MECS—Missile Entry Control System

MEED—Missile Electronic Encryption Device

MEP—Minuteman Enhanced Procedures

MEPCT—Minuteman Enhanced Procedures and Classroom Trainer (alternate name representing a configuration used for the MEP)

MGS—Missile Guidance Set

MILE—Minuteman Integrated Life Extension

MMOC—Missile Maintenance Operations Center

MPE—Military Personnel Element

MPT—Missile Procedures Trainer

MSB—Mission Support Base

MSC—Missile Security Control

MW—Missile Wing

NAF—Numbered Air Force

NC3—Nuclear Command, Control and Communication

NORI—Nuclear Operation Readiness Inspection

NSI—Nuclear Surety Inspection

NSSAV—Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit

NWC—Nuclear Weapons Center

OES—Operator Entered Status

OG—Operations Group

OGV—Operations Group Standardization and Evaluation Office

OO—ALC – Ogden Air Logistics Center

OPLAN—Operation Plan

OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility

OPSEC—Operations Security

ORB—Operations Review Board

ORM—Operational Risk Management

OSS—Operations Support Squadron

PCS—Permanent Change of Station

PCM—Positive Control Material

PHA—Preventative Health Assessment

PLCC—Primary Launch Control Center

PMC—Partially Mission Capable

PRP—Personnel Reliability Program

RDS—Records Disposition Schedule

REACT—Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting

RMPE—Rapid Message Processor Element

RS—Reentry System

SAS—Sealed Authenticator System

SAV—Staff Assistance Visit

SCC—Security Control Center

SCP—Squadron Command Post

SQ—Squadron

SIAC—Shock Isolator Air Compressor

SORTS—Status of Resources and Training System

SRE—Security Reaction Exercise

T.O.—Technical Order

TCC—Transportation Control Center

TDY—Temporary duty

TF—Task Force

TODA—Technical Order Distribution Alternate

TODO—Technical Order Distribution Office

TPR—Trained Personnel Requirements

TRS—Training Squadron

UHF—Ultra High Frequency

USSTRATCOM—United States Strategic Command

VHF—Very High Frequency

WCP—Wing Command Post

WSSR—Weapon System Safety Rule