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12 September 2007
[Federal Register: September 11, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 175)]
[Notices]
[Page 51807-51811]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr11se07-49]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Amended Record of Decision: Storage of Surplus Plutonium
Materials at the Savannah River Site
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Amended Record of Decision.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is amending the Record of
Decision (ROD) for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons--Usable
Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-
0229, 1996; Storage and Disposition PEIS). Specifically, DOE has
decided to take the actions necessary to transfer approximately 2,511
additional 3013-compliant packages \1\ containing surplus non-pit
weapons-usable plutonium metals and oxides to the Savannah River Site
(SRS), near Aiken, South Carolina. Approximately 2,300 containers will
be transferred from the Hanford Site (Hanford) near Richland,
Washington; 115 containers will be transferred from the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California; and 96 containers
will be transferred from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in
New Mexico. All 3013 containers will be shipped inside Type B shipping
packages (e.g., 9975 packages) in Safe Secure Transports (SSTs). In
addition, DOE could transfer the equivalent of about one thousand 3013
containers, in the form of unirradiated fuel assemblies originally
intended for the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) at Hanford, and
miscellaneous fuel pins that that were not put into fuel assemblies, to
the SRS.\2\ At a lower priority and only if adequate storage space is
available, DOE will transfer approximately five hundred additional 3013
containers from LLNL and LANL to provide operational flexibility in the
laboratories and to alleviate the demands there on storage capacity
needed to support nuclear weapons research missions. Surplus plutonium
in 3013-compliant containers will be stored in the K-Area Material
Storage (KAMS) facility and FFTF fuel will be stored in the K-Area
complex.
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\1\ A container that complies with DOE-STD-3013, Stabilization,
Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials.
\2\ The use of FFTF and the unirradiated fuel currently at
Hanford is being considered in conjunction with the evaluation of
reasonable alternatives in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP) Programmatic EIS. The planned shipment of the FFTF
unirradiated fuel to SRS is scheduled for the second half of Fiscal
Year 2009. If FFTF is still being considered as part of GNEP
following completion of the PEIS (expected in 2008), DOE may choose
not to ship the unirradiated FFTF fuel to SRS.
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This action will consolidate storage of surplus, non-pit weapons-
usable plutonium from Hanford, LANL, and LLNL at SRS, pending
disposition.\3\ DOE has prepared a Supplement Analysis (SA), Storage of
Surplus Plutonium Materials at the Savannah River Site (DOE/EIS-0229-
SA-4, August 2007), in accordance with DOE National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) regulations (10 CFR 1021.314) to determine whether
consolidated storage of this plutonium is a substantial change to the
proposed action or whether there are significant new circumstances or
information relevant to environmental concerns such that a supplemental
EIS or a new EIS would be needed. Based on the SA, DOE has determined
that no further review under NEPA is required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Based on DOE's current surplus plutonium disposition plans,
DOE expects to disposition the surplus plutonium stored in KAMs in
less than 20 years. DOE has analyzed the potential environmental
impacts of storage of such plutonium in KAMs for up to 50 years.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Copies of NEPA documents related to
this decision, including this Amended ROD, are available on DOE's NEPA
Web site at: http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa. To request copies of these
documents, please contact: The Center for Environmental Management
Information, P.O. Box 23769, Washington, DC 202-586-3769, Telephone:
800-736-3282 (in Washington, DC: 202-863-5084).
For further information concerning the storage of surplus, non-pit
plutonium at the SRS, contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA Compliance
Officer, Savannah River Operations Office, U.S. Department of Energy,
P.O. Box B, Aiken, South Carolina 29802, Telephone: (803) 952-8001, E-
mail: drew.grainger@srs.gov.
For information on DOE's NEPA process, contact: Ms. Carol M.
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance, GC-20, U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC
20585-0119, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
At the end of the Cold War, the United States declared large
quantities of plutonium and uranium surplus to the defense needs of the
nation. At that time, materials were in various forms and various
stages of the material manufacturing and weapons fabrication processes
and located at several weapons complex sites that DOE had operated in
the preceding decades. DOE began the process of placing these materials
in safe, stable configurations suitable for storage until disposition
strategies could be developed and implemented. Through a series of
decisions supported by appropriate NEPA analyses, DOE has decided to
store surplus, non-pit, weapons-usable
[[Page 51808]]
plutonium materials at SRS facilities pending disposition. DOE's
Supplement Analysis, Storage of Surplus Plutonium Materials at the
Savannah River Site, (DOE/EIS-0229-SA-4, August 2007), describes the
NEPA reviews and DOE's decisions regarding transportation and storage
of plutonium materials. Prior NEPA reviews and accompanying decisions
that are directly related to today's decision are described in the
following paragraphs.
In an April 19, 2002 (67 FR 19432), Amended Record of Decision
(ROD), DOE announced its decision to immediately consolidate long-term
storage in the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility at SRS of
surplus, non-pit plutonium from the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site (RFETS). In addition, DOE noted that cancellation of
the then-planned immobilization facility for surplus plutonium
disposition and the selection of the long-term storage alternative at
SRS removed the basis for the contingency contained in previous RODs
(which conditioned transport of surplus, non-pit plutonium from RFETS
to SRS on the selection of SRS as the site for the immobilization
facilities), and amended those RODs accordingly. DOE also stated that
long-term storage of surplus plutonium and the ultimate disposition of
that plutonium were separate actions, and that combining long-term
storage and disposition was not required to implement either decision,
and served no significant programmatic objective. Transfer of plutonium
materials from RFETS to SRS was completed in 2003 and these materials
are stored in 3013 containers inside 9975 shipping packages in the KAMS
facility. In the 2002 Amended ROD, DOE left unchanged it's prior
decision to store surplus, non-pit plutonium at Hanford, Idaho National
Laboratory (INL), and LANL, pending disposition (or movement to lag
storage at the disposition facility).\4\
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\4\ DOE indicated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD (DOE,
1997) that 0.3 metric tons of plutonium stored at LLNL was primarily
research and development and operational feedstock material not
surplus to government needs, and that the material would continue to
be stored for use at LLNL. DOE has since determined that there is no
programmatic need for this material, and that transferring the
material to SRS for long-term storage would reduce surveillance
costs at LLNL. In 1999, DOE determined that 3 to 4 metric tons of
plutonium material will be retained at the Idaho National Laboratory
for potential future use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the events of September 11, 2001, DOE revised the threat
criteria and the postulated capabilities of those who might perpetrate
acts of violence against DOE assets. As a result of this new threat
guidance, DOE determined that the consolidation of plutonium at SRS
into one location--KAMS--and enhancement of the security of that
location, would provide the most advantageous means to meet this
challenge and assure the safety and security of the stored material.
Therefore, DOE cancelled a project to install stored surveillance and
stabilization capability to ensure compliance with DOE-STD-3013 in F-
Area and decided to construct the K-Area Interim Surveillance (KIS)
project and the Container Surveillance and Storage Capability (CSSC)
project in the K-Area complex. DOE prepared an environmental
assessment, Safeguards and Security Upgrades for Storage of Plutonium
Materials at the Savannah River Site (DOE/EA-1538, December 2005) and
issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) in December of 2005,
to address the impacts of these and related security projects. The EA
addressed surplus plutonium materials in the SRS inventory as of
December 2005. The KIS Project, which became operational in June 2007,
and the CSSC project, which is currently scheduled for operations in
2010, will provide surveillance and stabilization capability and
capacity for storage of 3013 containers outside of KAMS (but in the K-
Area complex) adequate to support the surveillance program required by
DOE-STD-3013.
Decision: Consistent with DOE's prior decision to reduce over time
the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium are
stored, DOE has decided to consolidate storage of surplus, non-pit,
weapons-usable plutonium from Hanford, LANL, and LLNL at SRS, pending
disposition. Following appropriate congressional notification, in
accordance with section 3155 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2002 (Pub. L. 107-107), DOE will transfer, over a
period of about two to three years, approximately 2,511 additional
3013-compliant packages \5\ containing plutonium metals and oxides to
SRS. Approximately 2,300 containers will be transferred from Hanford,
115 containers will be transferred from LLNL, and 96 containers will be
transferred from LANL. All 3013 containers will be shipped inside Type
B shipping packages (e.g., 9975 packages) in Safe Secure Transports
(SSTs). All containers will be certified compliant with DOE-STD-3013
and Department of Transportation requirements prior to shipment, and
DOE will acquire and obtain certification of additional shipping
containers, if needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ A 3013 container has a maximum capacity of about 4.4
kilograms of plutonium. However, few containers have the maximum
amount of plutonium.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, DOE could transfer the equivalent of about one
thousand 3013 containers, in the form of unirradiated fuel assemblies
and miscellaneous fuel pins originally intended for the Fast Flux Test
Facility (FFTF) at Hanford, to the SRS.\6\ This material will be
shipped in Type B shipping packages, in SSTs, and stored in the K-Area
Complex in the Type B shipping packages, pending disposition. DOE will
monitor the condition of the shipping packages while in storage to
insure their integrity, including inspection of seals to monitor for
corrosion or leakage. DOE will continue to store RFETS and SRS surplus,
non-pit plutonium in approximately 2,800 containers inside Type B
shipping packages at SRS. Storage will be in compliance with applicable
Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) and Safety Analysis Reports
(SARs), and the total mass of stored plutonium will be significantly
less than 15 metric tons. DOE has previously evaluated storage of non-
pit surplus plutonium from RFETS and other DOE sites, as needed, in
KAMS (Supplement Analysis for Storing Plutonium in the Actinide
Packaging and Storage Facility and the Building K-105 at the Savannah
River Site. (DOE/EIS-0229-SA-1, July 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See footnote 2.
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In addition, DOE will transfer approximately five hundred 3013
containers from LLNL and LANL to remove surplus inventory, provide
operational flexibility, and to alleviate the demands there on storage
capacity needed to support nuclear weapons research missions. This
transfer will take place only if storage space is available in KAMS.
Space is limited by the number of storage positions allowed in
recognition of the spacing requirements dictated by the TSRs and SARs.
DOE could increase the number of storage spaces by modifying the
storage configuration after review, and revision as necessary, of the
safety authorization basis.
DOE will use the KAMS facility for consolidated storage. Nearby
areas of the K-Area complex, where the KIS is and CSSC will be located,
will be used for surveillance and restabilization activities. Storage
spaces necessary to support surveillance activities are available in
the K-Area complex. Unirradiated FFTF fuel will also be stored in the
K-Area complex.
Basis for Decision: DOE's decision to consolidate surplus plutonium
at SRS will reduce the number of sites with
[[Page 51809]]
special nuclear material; enhance the security of these materials;
reduce the risk plutonium poses to the public and environment; reduce
or avoid the costs associated with plutonium storage, surveillance and
monitoring, and security at multiple sites; and relocate the material
to DOE's planned site for surplus plutonium disposition. Plutonium
consolidation has been encouraged by independent reviews of DOE's
activities, including the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its
July 2005 report entitled Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to
Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium (GAO-05-665) and recently
by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). In its June 26,
2007, report to Congress, the DNFSB stated: ``The Board believes
consolidation of excess plutonium into a single, robust facility
suitable for extended retrievable storage is logical from a safety
perspective. DOE should aggressively pursue consolidation of its excess
plutonium.'' Furthermore, transferring within the next two to three
years all the surplus plutonium currently at Hanford to SRS would
enhance security and avoid the expenditure of about $200 million for
security upgrades to be compliant with DOE's 2005 Design Basis Threat
(DBT) guidance, as well as tens of millions of dollars more each year
for security and monitoring to continue storing the material at
Hanford.
Separately from the consolidation and storage activities DOE is
announcing today, DOE is preparing a Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for Surplus Plutonium Disposition at the Savannah River Site
to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of alternative methods
to disposition surplus, non-pit plutonium materials. The action
alternatives identified in the Notice of Intent (72 FR 14543; March 28,
2007) for this Supplemental EIS involve: (1) A glass can-in-canister
approach that would be installed in K-Area; (2) a ceramic can-in-
canister approach that would be installed in K-Area; and (3) the Mixed
Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, currently under construction at
SRS. In conjunction with any of these alternatives, DOE would utilize
the existing H-Canyon and Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for
the disposition of up to about four metric tons of surplus, non-pit
plutonium materials. DOE's selection of one or more of these
alternatives would ensure that surplus, weapons-usable plutonium that
is currently at SRS, or that would be shipped to SRS as a result of the
actions evaluated in this SA, would be placed in a form that would
facilitate a disposition path out of South Carolina.
Supplement Analysis: DOE prepared a Supplement Analysis (Storage of
Surplus Plutonium Materials at the Savannah River Site, (DOE/EIS-0229-
SA-4, August 2007) to determine if consolidating storage at SRS of
surplus, non-pit, weapons-usable plutonium from Hanford, LLNL, and LANL
represented new circumstances or information requiring preparation of a
supplemental EIS or a new EIS. The environmental impacts discussed in
the SA are described in the following paragraphs.
Transportation
DOE will ship plutonium materials compliant with the DOE-STD-3013
in 3013 packages inside Type B shipping containers (e.g., 9975
containers) from Hanford, LLNL, and LANL to KAMS at SRS using SSTs. DOE
will ship unirradiated FFTF fuel from Hanford to SRS in Type B shipping
packages (e.g., the Hanford Un-irradiated Fuel Package) in SSTs. At
KAMS, the 9975 containers will be received and stored; the 3013
packages will not be removed from the 9975 shipping containers. The
Type B shipping packages containing the unirradiated FFTF fuel will be
stored in the K-Area complex at SRS.
DOE previously evaluated the impacts of transporting 17 metric tons
of non-pit, surplus plutonium to SRS in the Surplus Plutonium
Disposition (SPD) EIS (DOE/EIS-0283, 1999), which addressed
alternatives for disposition and was tiered from the Storage and
Disposition PEIS. In the SPD EIS Alternative 3, DOE analyzed the
transportation of surplus pit and non-pit plutonium to SRS. Table L-1
of the SPD EIS summarized the material shipments; included were surplus
non-pit weapons-usable plutonium materials from Hanford, LLNL, LANL,
RFETS, and INL (Argonne National Laboratory--West). The Hanford
material specifically included FFTF fuel pins and assemblies.
Alternative 3 included shipment of a greater quantity of surplus, non-
pit plutonium materials to SRS than does the consolidation decision DOE
is announcing today.
In the SPD EIS, DOE estimated that normal (incident-free)
transportation operations could result in 0.024 latent cancer
fatalities (LCF) among transportation workers and 0.034 LCF in the
total affected population over the duration of the transportation
activities. In preparing the SPD EIS, DOE used a dose conversion factor
of 5 x 10-\4\ deaths per rem of dose to the affected
population. Currently, DOE recommends a dose conversion factor of 6 x
10-\4\ deaths per rem. Using the currently recommended dose
conversion factor, the estimated risk would be about 0.029 LCF among
transport workers and about 0.041 LCF in the total affected population.
In addition, DOE estimated that 0.019 nonradiological fatalities could
occur as a result of vehicular emissions. DOE also estimated the
impacts of accident scenarios, and in all cases the risk of a fatality
is less than one. No accidents occurred during shipment of the RFETS
plutonium to the SRS.
DOE has analyzed the impacts of transporting plutonium from
Hanford, LLNL, and LANL (as well as INL and RFETS) to SRS in the SPD
EIS. That analysis assumed that surplus non-pit plutonium would be
transported in Type B containers in SSTs, just as DOE will do for the
consolidation action announced today. DOE will make all shipments in
shipping packages with current certificates, consistent with Department
of Transportation requirements and DOE's prior NEPA reviews. The
transportation required to implement this action is a subset of the
transportation activities evaluated in the SPD EIS.
Storage
The KAMS facility requires no physical modification to accommodate
the proposed storage of surplus, non-pit, weapons-usable plutonium from
Hanford, LLNL, and LANL. The environmental impacts of storage of
fissile material at SRS were presented in the Interim Management of
Nuclear Materials EIS (DOE/EIS-0220, October 1995) and the Storage and
Disposition PEIS. These two EISs contain calculated annual impacts
presented over specific time periods. DOE also evaluated storage of
surplus plutonium materials from RFETS and other sites, as needed, in
3013 containers inside Type B shipping containers in KAMS, and
concluded that KAMS storage for up to 50 years did not represent
significant new information relevant to environmental concerns, and
that additional NEPA review was not required (DOE/EIS-0229-SA-01,
1998). The consolidated storage action DOE is announcing today involves
the same forms of surplus plutonium and the same shipping and storage
containers (which would be certified Type B containers), as DOE has
previously analyzed.
DOE has initiated two projects to provide the stored plutonium
surveillance and restabilization capability required as part of the
monitoring program that is an integral
[[Page 51810]]
part of DOE-STD-3013. The KIS project, which became operational in June
2007, provides limited, temporary surveillance capability until the
CSSC project is completed. Current plans call for the CSSC to be
operational in 2010. DOE completed an EA (DOE/EA-1538, December 2005)
evaluating the impacts of construction and operation of KIS and CSSC in
the K-Area complex (near but not in KAMS), and related security
upgrades in K-Area. Storage space adequate for the needs of the KIS and
CSSC surveillance activities are provided outside of KAMS and a limited
number of 3013 containers will be temporarily stored without Type B
shipping containers when CSSC becomes operational. DOE evaluated the
impacts of these actions in the EA, and determined the impacts would
not be significant (Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), (DOE/EA-
1538, December 2005). While the inventory in KAMS will increase as a
result of the transfer and storage of surplus non-pit plutonium from
Hanford, LLNL, and LANL, the number of 3013 containers stored outside
of KAMS, or undergoing surveillance activities requiring opening of the
cans, will not increase. The number of cans undergoing surveillance
activities is limited by the facility safety analysis and technical
safety requirements, and neither would change as a result of storing
more material in KAMS. Therefore, DOE's action is not different in
regard to surveillance actions than those DOE has previously evaluated
and found to be insignificant.
DOE has found no anomalous conditions in either the 3013 containers
or the stored plutonium material in the DOE-STD-3013 surveillance
program. Similarly, performance of the Type B shipping containers has
been as expected, with no instances of unacceptable performance. The K-
Area Structural Assessment Program, mentioned in the 2002 ROD, has not
revealed any condition or degradation that would affect the structural
integrity of the facility.
Unirradiated fuel from the FFTF facility at Hanford will be stored
in Type B shipping packages in the K-Area transfer bay in the K-Area
complex. Storage of FFTF fuel in Type B shipping containers in the K-
Area transfer bay will provide a level of safety equivalent to that
resulting from storage of plutonium in 3013 containers inside 9975
shipping packages in KAMS. In addition, DOE evaluated the storage of
irradiated tritium-producing burnable absorber rods in Type B shipping
containers (the same configuration for the storage of FFTF fuel) in the
K-Area transfer bay (DOE/EA-1528, Storage of Tritium-Producing Burnable
Absorber Rods in K-Area Transfer Bay at SRS, June 2005) and found the
environmental impacts to be insignificant (FONSI, DOE/EA-1528, June
2005).
Intentional Destructive Acts
DOE provides substantial safeguards and security measures for both
transportation and storage of plutonium. Safeguards and security are
designed to prevent theft or diversion of materials, and to prevent
exposure of workers and the public to radiation from the material
during transportation and storage. DOE recognizes that an attack
against surplus plutonium cargo may cause very undesirable
consequences, such as release of radionuclides into the environment.
Following the events of September 11, 2001, DOE is continuing to
consider and implement measures to minimize the risk and consequences
of potential terrorist attacks on DOE facilities and activities. DOE
conducts vulnerability assessments and risk analyses in accordance with
DOE Order 470.3A, Design Basis Threat Policy and DOE Order 470.4A,
Safeguards and Security Program. The safeguards applied to protecting
the K-Area complex involve a dynamic process of enhancement to meet
threats, and those safeguards will evolve over time. It is not possible
to predict whether intentional destructive acts would occur at these
locations, or the nature or types of attacks. Nevertheless, DOE has
evaluated security scenarios involving malevolent or terrorist acts in
an effort to assess potential vulnerabilities and identify improvements
to security procedures and response measures. The physical security
protection strategy is based on a graded and layered approach supported
by a guard force trained to detect, deter, and neutralize adversary
activities. Facilities are protected by staffed and automated access
control systems, barriers, surveillance systems and intrusion detection
systems.
Plutonium materials intended for consolidated storage would be
received and stored in the K-Area Complex. DOE evaluated accident
scenarios during storage of plutonium materials in the Interim
Management of Nuclear Materials EIS (DOE/EIS-0220, October 1995). DOE
finds that the accident impacts are representative of the potential
impacts of intentional destructive acts against the facilities proposed
for consolidated storage, particularly in light of the robust nature of
the facilities themselves and the improved security and response
measures that have been put in place in recent years.
In the SPD EIS, DOE evaluated the impacts of a severe accident
while transporting plutonium oxide material in Type B shipping
containers in Safe Secure Transports (SSTs). The hypothetical accidents
modeled for the impact assessment involve either a long-term fire or
tremendous impact of crushing forces. In the case of crushing forces, a
fire would have to be burning in order to spread the plutonium as
modeled. These accidents were assumed to cause a ground-level release
of 10 percent of the radioactive material in the SST. These accidents
fall within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's severity Category VIII,
with an accident frequency in rural areas of about 1 x
10-\7\ per year (once in 10 million years). DOE estimated
that if such an accident were to occur in an urban area as many as 114
cancer fatalities could result. In addition, the accident itself would
cause a number of non-radiological fatalities, depending upon the
specific circumstances.
In reviewing the nature and consequences of the accident scenarios
described in the SPD EIS, DOE finds that the consequences bound the
consequences of a hypothetical terrorist attack on an SST carrying
surplus non-pit plutonium. Because of the robust nature of the Type B
containers and the SSTs, and because shipments are protected, DOE finds
it unlikely that an attack could generate the forces required to
release as much material as postulated for a severe accident.
Therefore, DOE expects the potential consequences of a terrorist attack
on a shipment of surplus, non-pit plutonium to be equal to or less than
those of a severe accident.
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Report to Congress
In December 2003, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(DNFSB) issued a Report to Congress on Plutonium Storage at the
Department of Energy's Savannah River Site. The DNFSB is an independent
Federal agency chartered by Congress to provide recommendations to the
Department of Energy on the safety of defense nuclear facilities. The
Board's report contains proposals for enhancing the safety,
reliability, and functionality of plutonium storage at SRS; one
proposal concerns KAMS and four concern F-Area. However, subsequent to
issuance of the Board's report, DOE decided to utilize only KAMS and
the K-Area complex for storage of plutonium and for future
stabilization and packaging operations, and to deinventory F-Area of
all plutonium prior to the end of 2006.
[[Page 51811]]
With respect to KAMS, the Board proposed that fire protection
systems be installed and that unnecessary combustibles be eliminated.
In response to this proposal, the Department determined that fire
suppression equipment would be installed in the Neutron Multiplicity
Counting Room of KAMS, fire detection equipment would be installed
throughout KAMS, and the cable combustible load in the actuator tower
above KAMS would be removed. DOE completed removal of the actuator
tower cables in August 2006. DOE plans to begin installation of a fire
detection system in KAMS in 2007 and complete it in 2008. DOE also
plans to begin installation of a fire suppression system in the Neutron
Multiplicity Counting Room in 2008 and complete the installation in
2009.
In addition, the fire protection posture designed into KAMS was to
minimize both transient and fixed combustibles within the facility such
that the remaining worst possible fire could not cause a release of
plutonium. The walls separating the KAMS facility from the remainder of
the K-Reactor building were fabricated into a two-hour fire boundary.
Combustibles outside the facility fire boundaries were minimized,
contained, or mitigated to ensure the KAMS facility fire boundaries
were rated longer than any credible fire would burn.
Supplement Analysis Conclusion And Determination: DOE has fully
evaluated transportation of surplus, non-pit plutonium materials for
SRS and storage at SRS of such materials from Hanford and LANL in the
Storage and Disposition PEIS and SPD EIS. The action announced today,
consolidated storage of surplus, non-pit plutonium materials at SRS,
including transportation of the materials to SRS, is addressed in the
Storage and Disposition PEIS, the SPD EIS, and other NEPA reviews
addressed above. DOE evaluated the potential impacts of conducting
plutonium surveillance and stabilization activities required by DOE-
STD-3013 in the Environmental Assessment for the Safeguards and
Security Upgrades for Storage of Plutonium Materials at the Savannah
River Site, and found the impacts to be insignificant. Some of these
documents are now 10 or more years old. However, DOE has reviewed the
analyses and assumptions relevant to the potential environmental
impacts of the actions described herein and found any changes to be
insignificant.
DOE's 2007 SA shows that the potential environmental impacts
associated with the further consolidation of surplus non-pit, weapons-
usable plutonium from Hanford, LLNL and LANL would not be a significant
change from the potential environmental impacts associated with the
alternatives analyzed in previous NEPA reviews. DOE is not proposing a
substantial change that is relevant to environmental concerns. No
significant new circumstances or information bearing on the proposed
action and relevant to environmental concerns are presented by the
proposed consolidation of plutonium storage. Therefore, DOE does not
need to conduct additional NEPA review prior to transferring surplus
non-pit plutonium materials from Hanford, LLNL, and LANL to SRS for
consolidated storage pending disposition, as described above.
Issued in Washington, DC, this 5th day of September, 2007.
James A. Rispoli,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. E7-17840 Filed 9-10-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P