4 July 2002
The New York Times, July 4, 2002
Consider the following examples of products that are capable of limiting
how they are used:
Until recently, the after-purchase use of a product has been crudely controlled
via contracts, licensing or mechanical design, but now it can easily be
controlled through chips and cryptography.
Microsoft recently announced
Palladium, a plan for creating
secure computing platforms. The Palladium architecture creates an operating
environment that allows only digitally signed software to be executed. That
should, in principle, help eliminate computer viruses and other sorts of
security problems.
But Palladium can also be used for digital-rights management on your PC.
This means that only certified programs could be run, and only certified
content could be displayed. At the level of bits, censorship and digital-rights
management are technologically identical.
Ross Anderson, a computer security expert at the University of Cambridge,
described some
of the implications of Palladium at a recent conference in Toulouse, France.
What are the economic implications of technologies that can control
after-purchase use? The answer depends on how competitive the markets are.
Take the inkjet printer market. If cartridges have a high profit margin but
the market for printers is competitive, competition will push down the price
of printers to compensate for the high-priced cartridges. Restricting
after-purchase use makes the monopoly in cartridges stronger (since it inhibits
refills), but that just makes sellers compete more intensely to sell printers,
leading to lower prices in that market. This is just the old story of "give
away the razor and sell the blades."
But if the industry supplying the products isn't very competitive, then
controlling after-purchase behavior can be used to extend a monopoly from
one market to another. The markets for software operating systems and for
music and video content are highly concentrated, so partnerships between
these two industries should be viewed with suspicion. Such partnerships could
easily be used to benefit incumbents and to restrict potential entrants,
a point made by Mr. Anderson.
But there is another set of problems associated with controlling after-purchase
use: these technologies can reduce innovation.
Eric von Hippel, a professor at the Sloan School of Management at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has documented the importance of "user
innovation" in industries as diverse as integrated circuits and mountain
biking.
Professor von Hippel's surveys show that roughly a quarter of the users of
computer-aided-design software report developing innovations for their own
use. One-fifth of mountain bike users do the same thing.
Manufacturers invest heavily in research and development to discover new
uses for their products. But the users are often better innovators. After
all, the users are closer to the problem: they rely on the products every
day for a variety of tasks in a variety of environments, so it is not surprising
that they come up with uses the manufacturer never thought of.
Professor von Hippel argues that user innovation is such a strong force that
companies should provide tool kits that allow users to experiment with their
products.
Such innovation may be sharply curtailed if manufacturers are able to control
after-purchase use. Consider the three examples previously mentioned.
A hot area of computer-chip research design involves taking off-the-shelf
inkjet printers, loading the cartridges with magnetic ink and squirting
integrated circuits onto metalized plastic. That technology may revolutionize
integrated circuit production — but it definitely requires using products
in ways the manufacturer didn't intend.
What about cellphone batteries? There are now hand pumps that allow you to
produce enough juice to charge your own batteries. Inventors are experimenting
with putting such pumps in your shoes so you can charge your cellphone by
merely walking around. This would be great for users, but it is hard to
experiment with such technologies if you can use only certain power sources
in your cellphone.
Digital-rights management can also reduce innovation. The No. 1 song in England
today is a remix of a 30-year-old Elvis B-side single, "A Little Less
Conversation." Nike commissioned a Dutch disc jockey, JXL, to do the remix
for its World Cup ad campaign. He tweaked the instrumental balance and added
a techno back beat to create a fresh new sound.
That sort of thing will be simply impossible if digital rights management
becomes commonplace.
One might argue that impediments to user innovation could be overcome by
negotiation. After all, Nike got permission from Elvis's estate to do the
remix. Surely companies will see that it is in their interest to encourage
customers' innovations?
Maybe not. Typically, innovators need to experiment before they approach
manufacturers or rights owners. But once they have made the investment to
figure out whether the innovation is promising, their bargaining power is
reduced. At that point, the rights' owners hold all the cards, and they can
choose licensing fees to extract most of the benefits of the innovation.
That, of course, reduces the incentives for user innovation in the first
place.
Could the innovators approach rights owners before they experiment? Well,
anyone can claim to be an innovator. How would the rights owners know who
should get permission to circumvent their technology?
Either way, innovation is discouraged, hurting not only consumers but also
producers. Too much control can be a bad thing, particularly when innovation
is a critical source of competitive advantage.
New Chips Can Keep a Tight Rein on Consumers