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16 October 2008
By LARRY MARGASAK Associated Press Writer
Oct. 16, 2008, 8:05PM
WASHINGTON — Another frightening new government report is heightening fears about the safety of U.S. biodefense laboratories that study some of the world's deadliest germs. The latest worry: Intruders could easily break into two of the labs due to lax security.
Now some lawmakers and members of a new citizen coalition are asking whether it's time for a timeout in the expansion of the Bush administration's biowarfare defense program.
The Bush administration decided after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks that the nation needed to develop cures, drug treatments, vaccines and diagnostic tests to combat germs that could be used in a terrorist attack or accidentally released.
And, while U.S. officials say there are no known incidents where outsiders attacked anyone with germs from a U.S. lab, the FBI concluded last summer that a microbiologist at the Army's lab in Fort Detrick, Md., was responsible for anthrax attacks in 2001.
Two House lawmakers and members of a new citizen coalition — people "living in the shadow" of these labs — say the defensive biowarfare program has expanded too fast since Sept. 11, 2001. Security measures have not caught up, they said.
The latest government study, initially obtained by The Associated Press and released publicly Thursday, found that intruders could easily break into two laboratories handling organisms that could cause illnesses with no cure.
The AP identified the vulnerable lab locations as Atlanta and San Antonio. The Government Accountability Office did not identify the labs except to say they were classified as Biosafety Level 4 facilities — requiring the highest level of security. But the report included enough details for the AP — and others knowledgeable about such labs — to determine their locations.
In Texas, the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research features an outside window that looks directly into the room where the deadly germs are handled. The lab, which is privately run, also lacks sufficient security cameras, intrusion detection alarms or visible armed guards at its public entrances. Officials there said they will tighten security.
How many other research facilities in the U.S. have BSL-3 or BSL-4 laboratories?
Most facilities in the United States with infectious disease research programs have BSL-3 laboratories. In addition, many hospitals have areas that can be operated at this level; these areas are used for isolating patients with highly contagious diseases.
BSL-4 labs have the most stringent safety and security requirements. There are currently only four operational BSL-4 laboratory suites in the United States: at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, GA; at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick in Frederick, MD; at the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research in San Antonio; and at the University of Texas at Galveston.
A small BSL-4 facility exists on the NIH campus in Bethesda, MD, but it is currently being operated only at a BSL-3 level for research on important emerging infectious diseases. There is also a small BSL-4 glovebox capability at Georgia State University in Atlanta, GA.
http://www.sunshine-project.org/ibc/bb14.html
The Sunshine Project
Biosafety Bites (v.2) #14 (6 June 2006)
Cowboy BSL-4 in Texas Thumbs its Nose at the NIH Guidelines and the NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities
The Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research (SFBR) in San Antonio, Texas (http://www.sfbr.org) has BSL-4 containment, thousands of primates, and some of the world's most dangerous viruses, such as Ebola and Lassa (1). Founded in 1941 by a Yale-educated oil tycoon whose other scientific endeavors included a search for the Abominable Snowman (a.k.a. Bigfoot) (2), SFBR is something of a receptacle for biomedical research that can't find a place at other institutions, especially those more squarely in the public eye. This is especially true of SFBR's relationship with the University of Texas System.
SFBR does dirty work for other labs, including dangerous experiments challenging animals with anthrax spores (3) and controversial projects such as sequencing indigenous peoples' DNA (4), testing their medicinal plants (5), and making genetically engineered monkeys (6).
If SFBR's official agenda wasn't controversial enough, it also conducts secret government biological projects that the public will never learn about. SFBR's biolabs are ringed with razor wire and have government clearance for classified research. "Many of the staff possess security clearances and have considerable experience in classified research and collaborations with national defense agencies." wrote its President in 2002 (7). SFBR also wants the Department of Homeland Security's proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), a gigantic new 30 acre (12 ha) biodefense BSL-4 complex.
SFBR employs 400 and receives millions of dollars in federal biomedical grants every year, including participation in a National Institutes of Health (NIH) biodefense "Center of Excellence". It keeps the Bigfoot tradition alive with over 6,000 penned chimpanzees, baboons, macaques, and other primates, who alone receive about $6 million in NIH funding each year for their upkeep.
Despite its BSL-4 lab and extensive research involving biological weapons agents, SFBR refuses to comply with the NIH Guidelines on Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, the allegedly obligatory federal system that requires the establishment and operation of Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBC) to ensure the safety of biotechnology research. In fact, SFBR cannot - or will not - produce any real evidence that its IBC exists and fulfills its obligations.
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