19 December 2002
See other confidential FCO messages: http://cryptome.org/fco-intel.htm
FCO is the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office.
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT BELOW Application: ARAMIS RTF Descriptor: CoveringPM: CovDescriptor: CovCaveat: Finalised: OfficialRecord: DocumentStatus: Registered CreatedBy: Migrated From ARAMIS FolderReferenceType: POLICY FOLDER DocumentStyle: OUTWARD TELEGRAM ProtectiveMarking: CONFIDENTIAL Caveat: FromInd: N/A FromOrg: FCO ToInd: N/A ToOrg: IMMEDIATE MOSCOW DocumentDate: 02/11/2000 RegisteredOn: 02/11/2000 SysDocumentDate: 02/11/2000 Subject: RUSSIA: VISIT BY SERGEI IVANOV: OVERVIEW Draft: ARAMIS folder reference: UNP020/006/00 FolderReference: UNP020/006/2000 AdditionalText: RegisteredBy: und38 DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT ABOVE STARTDOCUMENT: FROM EASTERN DEPT FCO TELNO 448 TO MOSCOW SUBJECT: RUSSIA: VISIT BY SERGEI IVANOV: OVERVIEW SUMMARY 1. Successful two day visit building links with Putin's closest adviser. Some valuable openings for follow up on Islam/terrorism and drugs. DETAIL 2. TUR reported the plenary talks held on 31 October with Sergei Ivanov, Secretary of the Russian Security Council. This telegram gives an overview of the visit. OBJECTIVE AND IMPRESSIONS 3. Ivanov visited the UK from 30 October - 1 November. The programme included calls at the FCO, No 10, Cabinet Office, MoD and Parliament. The purpose of the visit was to build links with the Security Council, which Putin is using as the main policy-making body for both domestic and foreign issues (Ivanov said that the Council spent 80% of its time on domestic affairs). It is a relatively small organisation (a staff of only 200) and its authority rests largely on Ivanov's personal closeness to Putin - they studied together at Leningrad University in the 1970s. 4. He came with the reputation of not being instinctively pro-western, but of knowing the West well. He spoke fluent English (though he insisted on using Russian for much of the time). 5. The visit was agreed when the PUS called on Ivanov in Moscow in May this year. SUBSTANCE 6. The full programme enabled us to cover a wide range of subjects in considerable detail with Ivanov. The key issues were: - Terrorism/Islam: as recorded in TUR, Ivanov seemed to recognise the need for a more advanced approach to this nexus of issues, including greater tolerance in the FSU of moderate Islam. He did not seriously advance the Islamic galactic plot theory. - Chechnya: no sign of a new approach to Chechnya, which he described as a "black hole" of terrorism. His suggestion in the plenary talks (TUR) that Russia would not be rebuilding infrastructure because of the security threat to any reconstruction was not encouraging. - Drugs: he suggested that the UK and Russian agencies should work more closely together and proposed talks between the FSB and a UK team. - Balkans: Ivanov repeated the Russian belief that the Kosovo local elections should not have been held as they excluded the Serb population. There was ore agreeent on the FRY where there was consensus over the need to establish stabiity. - Iran: not much give on Iran, where Ivanov defended present Russian engagement and their involvement in nuclear cooperation, saying that the latter was under IAEA safeguards and was not a proliferation risk. He claimed that China was the main supplier of technology to Iran. There was a glimmer of flexibility when he admitted that Russia might have an over-rosy view of Iran. - Middle East: Ivanov thought the US had overplayed their hand but agreed that the immediate need was to see some calm return to the streets. - Iraq: he gave no ground on Iraq, and one of his party suggested that Russia might soon invoke Article 50 of the UN Charter (allowing exemption from sanctions) to retrieve some of Iraq's debt to Russia, particularly in respect of civil aviation. - NATO: Ivanov reiterated Russia's negative view of NATO and saw little prospect of rapid improvement. From a psychological point of view it might be easier for Russia to work with the EU on defence, although he loosened up over dinner, claiming that Russia was not trying to split NATO and implying that part of the problem was the difficulty of bringing the military along. Ivanov used a brief discussion of UN issues to take a sideswipe at NATO, which must not be allowed to replace the UN as an international security guarantor. - NMD: Ivanov recognised that, irrespective of the outcome of the US Presidential elections, NMD and the ABMT would be key issues next year. Russia believed that the progress the US were making with North Korea would underline the rationale for NMD. Persuading the Koreans would be expensive, but worth it. Ivanov, while peddling the usual Russian arguments, did not rule out further amendment to the ABMT. - Information security: Chernov, one of Ivanov's staff at the PUS' dinner launched a diatribe about the threat which the internet and an "uncontrolled information space" posed to world security. He depicted the internet as the major global threat over the next 5-10 years. But Ivanov added that current Russian legislation on the media was one of the most liberal in the world. COMMENT AND FOLLOW-UP 7. The visit was clearly a success on both sides. Ivanov came over well - serious and authoritative, but tinged with humour. Particularly at ease with the SIS, but also socially, he tended to rigidity in the more formal meetings. The relationships within the delegation were not particularly open, and juniors were not encouraged to speculate. However, he clearly wanted to generate an impression of openness and goodwill, and to show that he (and Putin) take the UK seriously, and treat us as an important element in their links with the West. He referred several times to the PM's upcoming visit to Moscow. 8. A key question will be whether he can/will open up other parts of the Russian administration to a more productive dialogue with us, focussed on joint action rather than on statements of principles. Drugs and terrorism will be key test cases. 9. The PUS could write to Ivanov, underlining some of his main points and anticipating subjects likely to be covered by the Prime Minister in Moscow. Grateful for thoughts on this. 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