19 December 2002

See other confidential FCO messages: http://cryptome.org/fco-intel.htm

FCO is the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office.


DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT BELOW
Application: ARAMIS RTF
Descriptor:
CoveringPM:
CovDescriptor:
CovCaveat:
Finalised:
OfficialRecord:
DocumentStatus: Registered
CreatedBy: Migrated From ARAMIS
FolderReferenceType: POLICY FOLDER
DocumentStyle: OUTWARD TELEGRAM
ProtectiveMarking: CONFIDENTIAL
Caveat:
FromInd: N/A
FromOrg: FCO
ToInd: N/A
ToOrg: IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
DocumentDate: 02/11/2000
RegisteredOn: 02/11/2000
SysDocumentDate: 02/11/2000
Subject: RUSSIA:  VISIT BY SERGEI IVANOV:  OVERVIEW
Draft:
ARAMIS folder reference: UNP020/006/00
FolderReference: UNP020/006/2000
AdditionalText:
RegisteredBy: und38

DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT ABOVE

STARTDOCUMENT:

FROM EASTERN DEPT
FCO TELNO 448 TO MOSCOW
SUBJECT:  RUSSIA:  VISIT BY SERGEI IVANOV:  OVERVIEW

SUMMARY

1.  Successful two day visit building links with Putin's closest
adviser.  Some valuable openings for follow up on Islam/terrorism
and drugs.

DETAIL

2.  TUR reported the plenary talks held on 31 October with Sergei
Ivanov, Secretary of the Russian Security Council.  This telegram
gives an overview of the visit.

OBJECTIVE AND IMPRESSIONS

3.  Ivanov visited the UK from 30 October - 1 November.  The
programme included calls at the FCO, No 10, Cabinet Office, MoD and
Parliament.  The purpose of the visit was to build links with the
Security Council, which Putin is using as the main policy-making
body for both domestic and foreign issues (Ivanov said that the
Council spent 80% of its time on domestic affairs).  It is a
relatively small organisation (a staff of only 200) and its
authority rests largely on Ivanov's personal closeness to Putin -
they studied together at Leningrad University in the 1970s.

4.  He came with the reputation of not being instinctively
pro-western, but of knowing the West well.  He spoke fluent English
(though he insisted on using Russian for much of the time).

5.  The visit was agreed when the PUS called on Ivanov in Moscow in
May this year.

SUBSTANCE

6.  The full programme enabled us to cover a wide range of subjects
in considerable detail with Ivanov.  The key issues were:
- Terrorism/Islam:  as recorded in TUR, Ivanov seemed to recognise
the need for a more advanced approach to this nexus of issues,
including greater tolerance in the FSU of moderate Islam.  He did
not seriously advance the Islamic galactic plot theory.
- Chechnya:  no sign of a new approach to Chechnya, which he
described as a "black hole" of terrorism.  His suggestion in the
plenary talks (TUR) that Russia would not be rebuilding
infrastructure because of the security threat to any reconstruction
was not encouraging.

- Drugs:  he suggested that the UK and Russian agencies should work
more closely together and proposed talks between the FSB and a UK
team.

- Balkans:  Ivanov repeated the Russian belief that the Kosovo local
elections should not have been held as they excluded the Serb
population.  There was ore agreeent on the FRY where there was
consensus over the need to establish stabiity.
- Iran:  not much give on Iran, where Ivanov defended present
Russian engagement and their involvement in nuclear cooperation,
saying that the latter was under IAEA safeguards and was not a
proliferation risk.  He claimed that China was the main supplier of
technology to Iran.  There was a glimmer of flexibility when he
admitted that Russia might have an over-rosy view of Iran.

- Middle East:  Ivanov thought the US had overplayed their hand but
agreed that the immediate need was to see some calm return to the
streets.

- Iraq:  he gave no ground on Iraq, and one of his party suggested
that Russia might soon invoke Article 50 of the UN Charter (allowing
exemption from sanctions) to retrieve some of Iraq's debt to Russia,
particularly in respect of civil aviation.

- NATO:  Ivanov reiterated Russia's negative view of NATO and saw
little prospect of rapid improvement.  From a psychological point of
view it might be easier for Russia to work with the EU on defence,
although he loosened up over dinner, claiming that Russia was not
trying to split NATO and implying that part of the problem was the
difficulty of bringing the military along.  Ivanov used a brief
discussion of UN issues to take a sideswipe at NATO, which must not
be allowed to replace the UN as an international security guarantor.

- NMD:  Ivanov recognised that, irrespective of the outcome of the
US Presidential elections, NMD and the ABMT would be key issues next
year.  Russia believed that the progress the US were making with
North Korea would underline the rationale for NMD.  Persuading the
Koreans would be expensive, but worth it.  Ivanov, while peddling
the usual Russian arguments, did not rule out further amendment to
the ABMT.

- Information security:  Chernov, one of Ivanov's staff at the PUS'
dinner launched a diatribe about the threat which the internet and
an "uncontrolled information space" posed to world security.  He
depicted the internet as the major global threat over the next 5-10
years.  But Ivanov added that current Russian legislation on the
media was one of the most liberal in the world.

COMMENT AND FOLLOW-UP

7.  The visit was clearly a success on both sides.  Ivanov came over
well - serious and authoritative, but tinged with humour.
Particularly at ease with the SIS, but also socially, he tended to
rigidity in the more formal meetings.  The relationships within the
delegation were not particularly open, and juniors were not
encouraged to speculate.  However, he clearly wanted to generate an
impression of openness and goodwill, and to show that he (and Putin)
take the UK seriously, and treat us as an important element in their
links with the West.  He referred several times to the PM's upcoming
visit to Moscow.

8.  A key question will be whether he can/will open up other parts
of the Russian administration to a more productive dialogue with us,
focussed on joint action rather than on statements of principles.
Drugs and terrorism will be key test cases.

9.  The PUS could write to Ivanov, underlining some of his main
points and anticipating subjects likely to be covered by the Prime
Minister in Moscow.  Grateful for thoughts on this.

COOK
YYYY
MAIN	13
EECA	13
EASTERN D	0
PROTOCOL D	0
PROTOCOL RHS//PALACE	0
ADDITIONAL   0
CAOFF1	0
CAOFF2	0
DFID2	0
FSA	0
MOD	0
NO 10	0
DTI	0
HMT	0
BANKE	0
ECGD	0
MAFF	0
BRICO	0
[HUGHES]
OCMIAN 9011

*************************************************
Additional Text Section
*************************************************



************* Copy To List Section Below ************

INFO PRIORITY OSCE POSTS, MODUK, ACTOR, WHIRL, SNUFFBOX
INFO PRIORITY CABINET OFFICE, ST PETERSBURG, ISLAMABAD, PEKING
INFO PRIORITY NEW DELHI, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK

****************** Time Stamp Section Below ************

OF 021643Z NOVEMBER 00


*************** Reference Section Below *************

TELNO 452

************ Actions Section Below **************


Action Officer:
und10

Action Taken:
Distribution list:
Float officer(s):
und02
und21
und39
und08
und40
und09
und24
und5
und11
und25
und12
und27
und14
und36
und16
und33
und17
und34
und18
und35
und37
und22
und44
und06
und07
und55
und47
gic1
und29
und03
und28
und19
und20
und41
und10
und26
gic2
und13
und38
und42
und15

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
06/11/2000

************ Actions Section Below **************


Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
REGISTERED

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
06/11/2000