10 May 2003. One of the Intelligence
Community Black Actions series.
Source:
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/intro7.html
(and following)
1945-1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment |
________________________________________________________________
Psychological and Political Warfare
Introduction
The documentation on this subject is fragmentary and episodic, and it appears that many early records no longer exist. Very little policy documentation on projects and operations under psychological and political warfare programs has been found, and those documents that have been retrieved tend to be random and scattered in their subject matter. In addition to the paucity of early documents on this subject, it is also possible that in many instances the written record was deliberately kept to a minimum. Making allowance for major gaps, the main outlines of the formative period can be traced, however, and the documentation that has survived gives a sense of the motives and concerns of the major participants in the debate over psychological and political warfare and how it should be handled within the government.
When the functions of OSS were divided after its dissolution by Executive Order 9621, the War Department inherited the capabilities for "special operations" which had been employed in organizing and assisting resistance movements in Europe in World War II, and for "morale operations" or "black propaganda." General Magruder and his War Department superiors were concerned to maintain intact the OSS capability in secret intelligence until some decision could be made at the national level about a successor organization. But there was no apparent concern to preserve "s.o." or "m.o." capabilities and they were quickly liquidated; in fact, the process was well underway before the OSS was dissolved. In the formative period of the national intelligence structure, there was considerable discussion and debate about clandestine intelligence gathering but no attention seems to have been paid to covert operations.
Indeed, in September 1947 the General Counsel of CIA wrote an opinion in which he concluded that it had not been the intent of Congress that such activities should be conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency and that they could not be undertaken without first obtaining Congressional authorization and funding. (Document 241) From this memorandum, it appears that there was some discussion at the time about cooperation with nascent resistance movements in Western Europe but even this, Counsel concluded, would require Congressional authorization.
In the meantime, the subject of covert political action was coming onto the policy agenda through another route, the growing interest in "psychological warfare." Since 1946, a subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), later designated the State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee (SANACC), had been charged with developing a plan for wartime psychological warfare and for making whatever peacetime preparations were required to move quickly to a wartime footing in this field. By October 1947 such a plan had been prepared, but it was noted at the time that it related solely to planning for wartime or threat-of-war situations and that SWNCC had not been authorized to look into peacetime psychological warfare.
At this point, however, concerns about the situation in Western Europe began to focus attention on peacetime "psychological operations" in support of U.S. foreign policy. SANACC was a forum for the expression of those concerns. Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Hillenkoetter was one of those who urged that the subject be put on the agenda, and there were similar urgings from Forrestal, Souers, Harriman, and others. By the latter part of 1947 an effort was made to distinguish between the variety of subjects that had been bundled together under the rubric of "psychological warfare": overt and covert propaganda, and domestic and international information programs.
In early November, the heads of the military services concluded at a War Council meeting that peacetime psychological warfare should be undertaken only in the foreign field (i.e., no domestic program) and that it was a Department of State responsibility. Moreover, the War Council concluded that there should be a "black" (covert) as well as a "white" (overt) program and that the "black" program should also be run by the Department of State, albeit with the advice and consultation of the Director of Central Intelligence and a military representative. On November 7, a SANACC subcommittee made approximately the same proposal. (Document 249)
At its second meeting on November 14, 1947, the National Security Council considered the SANACC paper. Secretary of State Marshall distanced himself from it, expressing concern at the use of the term "warfare" and asking whether the proposed program would conflict with his policy of only telling the truth on the Voice of America. The three service secretaries also backed off, stating that they did not believe the military should be involved in such activities. (Document 250)
The Council remanded the paper to the NSC staff for revision, thereby separating overt foreign information activities from "psychological warfare" and covert action. One "stream" became NSC 4 and NSC 43, establishing Department of State responsibility for foreign information programs, and the other "stream" became NSC 4-A (Document 253) and, somewhat later, NSC 10/2, dealing with covert action.
Also at this point began a jurisdictional battle over how much "outside" supervision and control there would be over covert actions. As the NSC staff worked to develop an acceptable proposal, it became clear that the responsibility for these operations would be lodged in the Central Intelligence Agency but that some sort of monitoring mechanism would be created. The dividing lines were already being drawn. As early as December 2, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Brigadier General Edwin Wright wrote to the CIA representative on the NSC staff:
"All concerned must appreciate that this Agency is and must be the sole agency to conduct organized foreign clandestine operations. To sabotage this principle can only lead to chaos in this type of operation.
"Whatever Agency is chosen to indicate the type of Black operations to be conducted, or the material and/or propaganda to be disseminated--the Central Intelligence Agency must alone be the Agency to determine how the material is disseminated. The pattern of our foreign operations will not permit supervision of these activities by other agencies if it is to be maintained as an efficient and secure operation and the conduct of Black psychological operations must fit into the over-all operational pattern." (Document 251)
Two weeks later, George F. Kennan, Director of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, was advising the Acting Secretary, in anticipation of an NSC meeting on the issue, "that whereas it is desirable to establish the authority for the proposed operations, the Council should be frankly informed that before giving our consent to any such activities we would wish to consider most carefully the need therefor. Furthermore, we would want to examine the situation in all its aspects in case of any suggested operation, and to judge each case strictly on its merits." (Document 256)
At its meeting on December 17, the NSC approved a directive (NSC 4-A) which "directs the Director of Central Intelligence to initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security." The directive also charged the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for "ensuring that such psychological operations are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and overt foreign information activities." (Document 257)
NSC 4-A did not settle the issue. By March, Secretary of Defense Forrestal was seeking an NSC review of how the NSC 4 series was being applied in practice. Moreover, as a result of a SANACC subcommittee report on wartime psychological warfare, the idea of creating a separate organization for both peacetime and wartime psychological operations, perhaps directly under the NSC, was being raised. The subject was once more docketed on the agenda of the NSC which, at its meeting on April 2, 1948, asked the NSC consultants to review "certain aspects" of the NSC 4 series. (Document 266) The consultants did so later that month; their report admonished the Director of Central Intelligence to work with "anti-Communist democratic forces in foreign countries, particularly those which are politically left of center" and to move faster in the psychological operations area. (Document 267)
In the meantime, the Department of State was becoming increasingly unhappy about CIA's performance under NSC 4-A. The Policy Planning Staff had been considering various aspects of "political warfare," and on May 3, 1948, approved a paper entitled "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare," which proposed a program of support for "liberation committees," "underground activities behind the Iron Curtain," and "support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the Free World." Organizationally, the paper proposed the establishment of a directorate of political warfare operations within the NSC secretariat, under a director appointed by and responsible to the Secretary of State. The director would be assisted by a staff drawn from the State and Defense Departments (at least "initially") and would "have complete authority over covert political warfare operations conducted by this Government." The proposal did not mention the Central Intelligence Agency except to say that the covert operations it was conducting should be brought under the authority of the proposed directorate. (Document 269)
The battle touched off by the Policy Planning Staff proposal is difficult to follow in its details and ramifications because of gaps in the documentation, but the main outline of the conflict is clearly visible. The NSC staff seems to have adopted the substance of the proposal, judging by the draft reports that were being prepared and debated at this time, although it made some amendments in the details, such as renaming the Director of Political Warfare the "Director of Special Studies" and placing the office directly under the NSC. Commenting on the proposal, George Kennan wrote to Secretary Marshall and Under Secretary Lovett on May 19:
"Organizationally, the ideal solution would be to place the Director of Special Studies, for cover and intelligence reasons, under the Director of CIA. S/P did not recommend this solution because, at the present time, the CIA set-up in respect both to personalities and organization is not favorable to such a development and it is not likely that there will be any material change in this situation in the near future. We therefore reluctantly decided to let the CIA sleeping dog lie and recommend a separate organization which might at a later date be incorporated in CIA." (Document 276)
Allen Dulles was a new and important participant in the "political warfare" debate that flared up again in the spring of 1948. Dulles was chairman of the survey group appointed by the NSC in February to evaluate the effectiveness of the CIA. In May 1948, the survey group was more than 7 months from submitting a report but, aware of the controversy that had broken out, Dulles and his colleagues prepared a brief report on "Relations between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence." Dulles introduced a new element by proposing that the conduct of secret operations and the collection of secret intelligence should be run by single director who might either be under the Director of Central Intelligence or directly under the NSC. The argument perhaps was weighted slightly in favor of the latter alternative by Dulles' statement that he and his colleagues had independently decided to consider in their final report whether secret intelligence should continue to be a CIA responsibility. (Document 275)
It was this proposal that led Kennan to recommend to Marshall and Lovett that they should meet with Secretary of Defense Forrestal and present a joint invitation to Dulles to replace Hillenkoetter as Director of Central Intelligence, or become director of secret operations/secret intelligence under Hillenkoetter, or become director of special studies under the NSC. (Document 276)
At an inconclusive NSC meeting on May 20, NSC 10--the designation for the Director of Special Studies proposal--was deferred for action at the next meeting. (Document 277) Kennan prodded Lovett again. He apparently had been in touch with Dulles and knew he would be in Washington in late May. He had also been in touch with Forrestal or his staff and said that Forrestal was prepared to come to Lovett's office to discuss NSC 10. Kennan's tone in his memorandum to Lovett was pessimistic: "If the Executive Branch does not act soon to firm up its ideas as to what should be done along these lines," Kennan wrote, "the possibility of getting secret funds out of Congress for covert operations will be lost. If this is not done now, it will mean that this Government has given up hope of conducting effective political warfare activities for the duration of this administration." (Document 279) Kennan also told the Under Secretary that if NSC 10 were not adopted, he would have to recommend abrogation of NSC 4-A, "which is not working out well."
Forrestal, Lovett, and Dulles met late in May (Document 280) and agreed on a proposal with the following elements:
1) CIA was the proper place for secret operations as well as secret intelligence.
2) Both subjects should be handled by a new "Special Services Unit" within CIA.
3) The unit would have a "considerable measure of autonomy within CIA" and its director could appeal to the NSC in case of differences with the Director of Central Intelligence.
4) The director of the special services unit would be recruited from outside CIA and approved by the NSC.
5) The director of the special services unit would have access to and receive policy guidance from the Departments of State and Defense.
6) The system described above would be a "provisional arrangement subject to review at a later date."
The proposal was circulated to NSC members and debated at length at the Council's meeting on June 3, 1948. The discussion was not conclusive but the participants strongly emphasized the importance of political guidance for covert operations. There was also fairly widespread (although mildly expressed) criticism of CIA, with some participants also raising doubts about whether CIA had legal authority to conduct covert operations. After discussing a proposal for an advisory panel on covert operations, the Council again remanded the issue to the staff for a new draft proposal. (Document 283)
By this point, both the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency were becoming exasperated by the failure to reach an agreement. When Souers and the NSC staff proposed (apparently on the basis of a suggestion by Hillenkoetter) an arrangement under which the DCI would be responsible for ensuring that covert activities were consistent with U.S. foreign policy, and in which there would be an advisory panel of one State and one Defense member to provide "authoritative policy guidance" and assist the DCI in the preparation of all plans, Kennan wrote to Lovett "that the arrangements which it envisages might easily operate to cause embarrassment to this government." He continued:
"It is our view that these things, if they are to be done at all, must be done under the intimate direction and control of this Department. If this cannot be arranged (and I understand the difficulties which stand in the way), I think it would be better to withdraw this paper entirely and to give up at this time the idea of attempting to conduct political warfare." (Document 286)
This proposal was modified a few days later by another draft, which has not been found, but, from references to it in other documents, apparently emphasized the autonomy of the Director of Special Studies within CIA. Reacting to it, Hillenkoetter wrote to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the NSC:
"I should like to suggest that, since State evidently will not go along with CIA operating this political warfare thing in any sane or sound manner, we go back to the original concept that State proposed. Let State run it and let it have no connection at all with us. It seems to me that this is the only thing that will satisfy State in any way and rather than try to keep a makeshift in running order, subject to countless restrictions which can only lead to continued bickering and argument, I think maybe the best idea is to go back and make the OSP work for State alone." (Document 287)
By mid-June, when the draft had become NSC 10/1 (apparently close to what Hillenkoetter had complained about in the preceding letter), Kennan was recommending to Lovett and Marshall that despite its serious defects they approve the draft, which was "probably the best arrangement we can get at this time." (Document 289)
Finally, on June 17, 1948, the NSC approved NSC 10/2, which:
1) established an Office of Special Projects in CIA to conduct covert operations;2) specified that it should be headed by "A highly qualified person" nominated by the Secretary of State and acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence;
3) provided that the head of the Office of Special Projects should report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence, but "To the maximum degree consistent with efficiency" the office would operate independently of other components of the Agency;
4) made the DCI responsible for ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense, that covert operations were consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and
5) mandated that disagreements be referred to the NSC. (Document 292)
Despite the approval of NSC 10/2, the controversy about covert operations continued. The separation of CIA's secret intelligence and secret operations functions was again brought forward as an issue by the Dulles Report. Although a head of covert operations was proposed by the Department of State and accepted by the DCI, and although the arrangements functioned for a time as originally designed, the system established under NSC 10/2 was distasteful to the Central Intelligence Agency. Eventually, the concept of a head of secret operations who had a special relationship with the NSC, special responsibilities and ties to the Departments of State and Defense, and a quasi-autonomous status within CIA was discarded, and the secret operations and secret intelligence functions were merged under a single head. These developments, however, occurred after 1950.
241. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Houston) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, September 25, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-805, Item 12. Secret. Attached to a brief transmittal note from Houston to Hillenkoetter summarizing the contents. See the Supplement.
SUBJECT
CIA Authority to Perform Propaganda and Commando Type Functions1. A review of the National Security Act reveals two provisions which might be construed as authority for CIA to engage in black propaganda or the type of activity known during the war as S.O., which included ranger and commando raids, behind-the-lines sabotage, and support of guerrilla warfare. Section 102 (d) (4) provides that it shall be the duty of the Agency to perform for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. Section 102 (d) (5) provides that the Agency shall perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may direct. Taken out of context and without knowledge of its history, these Sections could bear almost unlimited interpretation, provided the service performed could be shown to be of benefit to an intelligence agency or related to national intelligence.
2. Thus, black propaganda, primarily designed for subversion, confusion, and political effect, can be shown incidentally to benefit positive intelligence as a means of checking reliability of informants, effectiveness of penetration, and so forth. Even certain forms of S.O. work could be held to benefit intelligence by establishment of W/T teams in accessible areas and by opening penetration points in confusion following sabotage or riot. In our opinion, however, either activity would be an unwarranted extension of the functions authorized in Sections 102 (d) (4) and (5). This is based on our understanding of the intent of Congress at the time these provisions were enacted.
3. A review of debates indicates that Congress was primarily interested in an agency for coordinating intelligence and originally did not propose any overseas collection activities for CIA. The strong move to provide specifically for such collection overseas was defeated, and, as a compromise, Sections 102 (d) (4) and (5) were enacted, which permitted the National Security Council to determine the extent of the collection work to be performed by CIA. We do not believe that there was any thought in the minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence Agency under this authority would take positive action for subversion and sabotage. A bitter debate at about the same time on the State Department's Foreign Broadcast Service tends to confirm our opinion. Further confirmation is found in the brief and off-the-record hearings on appropriations for CIA.
4. Aside from the discussions of normal departmental expenses for CIA as a whole, approval was given to the unvouchered funds requested by the Director of Central Intelligence mainly for the specific purposes of conducting clandestine intelligence operations outside the United States. We believe that there was no intent to use either the vouchered or unvouchered funds for M.O. or S.O. work. Either of these activities would require establishment of a new branch of office, employment of considerable personnel, the procurement of huge quantities of all types of goods and materials, and large sums for expenses of administrative support and incidentals. We believe this would be an authorized use of the funds made available to CIA. It is our conclusion, therefore, that neither M.O. nor S.O. should be undertaken by CIA without previously informing Congress and obtaining its approval of the functions and the expenditure of funds for those purposes.
5. There is, however, one function now being properly performed by CIA which is so closely related to the matters discussed above as to be mentioned in connection therewith. An important by-product of the clandestine intelligence function is the acquisition of extensive information on plans in Western Europe for establishment of resistance movements in the event of further extension of Communist control. These plans include training of agents and W/T's, organizing groups, providing outside contacts, and every other form of resistance. It is on such groups that M.O. and, particularly, S.O. would depend for most efficient function.
6. It is felt that this body of information might be the basis for consideration by the National Security Council, or a sub-committee thereof, in order to form a basic policy of cooperation with planned or actual resistance movements and to assign the implementation of such policy to the proper agency or body. If such implementation were then assigned to CIA, it would, we feel, still be necessary to go to Congress for authority and funds.
Lawrence R. Houston/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
242. Memorandum From the Secretary of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (Moseley) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Washington, October 15, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1. Secret.
SUBJECT
Proposal for a National Psychological Warfare OrganizationIn accordance with procedure whereby the more important papers under consideration by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC)/1/ are brought to your and the Secretary's attention, it is believed that you will be interested in SWNCC 304/6/2/ which proposes the establishment in time of war or threat of war of a National Psychological Warfare Organization. This paper is a report of the SANACC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations which consists of full time representatives of State, CIG and the Armed Services, who have been directed to study and propose plans for the conduct of psychological warfare in time of war or threat of war. (Mr. Ralph Block, OIE, is Chairman of this Subcommittee.)
/1/Earlier known as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).
/2/Dated September 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1) See the Supplement.
This paper proposes for approval (Tab A)/3/ the plans for a Psychological Warfare Organization which in time of war or threat of war would be either under the National Security Council or the reconstituted State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee. This organization would be empowered to provide unified direction and authoritative coordination of the national psychological warfare effort and activities, and operations related thereto. It would be headed by a director, appointed by the President; the director also to be chairman of a policy planning board which would include representation from the JCS, CIG and the Armed Services. The paper further recommends that the Organization should be provided with the necessary allocations of manpower, funds, facilities, etc.
/3/Although the source text identifies two enclosures, SENC 304/1 and SWNCC 304/6, it does not specify which is at which Tab A. SWNCC 304/1, which was forwarded to the National Intelligence Authority for concurrence on December 12, 1946, has not been found. (Memorandum by Earman; Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-243, Job 84-00473R, Box 3, Folder 1)
The paper concludes (Tab B) that a psychological warfare specialist category should be established and training instituted now in the Army, Navy and Air Force and that rosters of available people for this type of work should also be made up by the State Department, CIG and the Armed Services.
The paper also brings out the facts that:
a. The SANACC Subcommittee is the only peacetime organization of the Government charged with the preparation of policies, plans and studies for employment of psychological warfare in time of war.
b. The Department of State and the Military Establishment have no funds appropriated for psychological warfare purposes.
c. No psychological warfare specialist reserves exist within the Military Establishment or the Department of State.
d. Adequate training of personnel for psychological warfare would require a training school, recruitment policies and measures, and an extensive training period.
It should be pointed out that the terms of reference of the SANACC Subcommittee authorize it to prepare policies and plans for employment only in time of war or threat of war, and that it is not authorized to conduct psychological warfare in peacetime. Thus, the plans proposed in the paper relate only to a wartime agency except for the proposals that there be created now a psychological warfare category by the Armed Services and that rosters of available personnel be prepared.
243. Memorandum by the Army Member of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (Pixtou)
SANACC 304/8
Washington, undated.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1. Secret. Transmitted under an October 20 transmittal note from the committee secretariat.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
1. With the question of the functioning of the National Security Council still undetermined and with the SANACC now being reconstituted, I consider it premature and unnecessary at this time to determine the agency to whom the proposed psychological warfare agency shall be accountable. I recommend, therefore, that this remain a problem for future determination in the light of subsequent developments in the organization and operation of the National Security Council and the SANACC. Subject to this reservation I approve SANACC 304/6./1/
/1/See footnote 2, Document 242.
2. I note that the terms of reference of the Subcommittee limit its considerations to those within the time frame of war or threat of war as determined by the President. I am of the opinion that the changing tenor of events of the past few months has raised for serious consideration the problem of determining the desirability or necessity of engaging in deliberate coordinated psychological effort on a national scale at the present time. I recommend, therefore, that the Subcommittee be directed to consider and make recommendations as a matter of urgency, on the problem "Should the U.S. at the present time utilize coordinated psychological measures in furtherance of the attainment of its national objectives? If so, what organization is required and what should be its terms of reference?"
244. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
Washington, October 22, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1. Secret.
SUBJECT
Psychological WarfareREFERENCE
SWNCC 304/6 dated 30 September 1947/1//1/See footnote 2, Document 242.
The Central Intelligence Agency approves SWNCC 304/6 dated 30 September 1947 subject to the following provisions:
1. In view of the fact that the functioning of the National Security Council is still undetermined, and the fact that SWNCC is now being reconstituted, I recommend that the decision of determining the agency to whom the Psychological Warfare Agency shall be accountable be deferred at this time. When the question does arise, however, I recommend that study and thought be given to assigning accountability of the Psychological Warfare Agency to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. The paper envisages guidance for a Psychological Warfare Agency which will be established in time of war or threat of war as determined by the President. I am of the opinion that conditions now indicate that psychological warfare measures be instituted now as a matter of urgency. I, therefore, recommend that the Ad Hoc Subcommittee undertake a study and submit recommendations on the program "Should the U.S. at the present utilize psychological warfare measures in furtherance of the attainment of its National objectives."
RH Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN245. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Secretary of Defense Forrestal
Washington, October 24, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1. Secret.
The attached memorandum/1/ from Secretary Harriman is a very persuasive and accurate appraisal of the need for psychological warfare operations to counter Soviet-inspired Communist propaganda, particularly in France and Italy.
/1/Not found.
Secretary Harriman, however, leaves the question of appropriate organization somewhat indefinite. It seems to me that this problem could be solved fairly simply along the following lines:
(a) Continue and support the strengthening of the overt activities of the Information Division of the Department of State.
(b) Assign the conduct of covert activities to the Central Intelligence Agency, since it already has contacts and communications with appropriate organizations and agents in foreign countries.
(c) Establish policies for both of the above activities and coordinate their operations by means of a full-time interdepartmental board under the chairmanship and supervision of the Department of State, with representatives from the National Military Establishment and CIA.
It is my understanding that sufficient unvouchered funds to initiate these activities might be obtained from CIA or the Military Establishment. Also, I understand the Department of State already has a qualified psychological warfare expert serving as chairman of a subcommittee of SANACC which deals with this subject.
SANACC, incidentally, has formed a special group to prepare a recommendation for the President that the United States initiate this type of operation, which I understand will be transmitted through the National Security Council.
Sidney W. Souers/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Souers signed the original.
246. Memorandum From the Assistant Executive Secretary (Lay) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, November 3, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Psychological WarfareREFERENCE
SANACC 304/10/1//1/Dated November 3. (Ibid., RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 1) See the Supplement.
The organization proposed in SANACC 304/10 does not appear to offer a practical solution for the following reasons:
a. It is proposed to establish it under either the National Security Council or the Committee of Two. The Council appears inappropriate since it is only advisory to the President and was not legally designed to supervise interdepartmental activities, with the sole statutory exception of CIA. The Committee of Two/2/ is an informal body like its predecessor, the Committee of Three,/3/ which never to my knowledge undertook to supervise interdepartmental organizations. SANACC, on the other hand, already supervises two interdepartmental organizations (Military Information Control and the Security Advisory Board) which are similar in character to that required for the coordination of foreign information and psychological warfare activities.
/2/The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
/3/The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, who met informally under this rubric from 1944 to 1947.
b. SANACC 304/10 proposes a full-time working group headed by a specially appointed director, with separate funds and personnel. This would only create another governmental agency. Its director would be usurping the functions of the head of the State Department's Information Service. Finally, a request for separate funds for the proposed organization would jeopardize the security of psychological warfare operations.
A much less complicated and more effective organization could easily be built along the following lines: Establish, under SANACC, a board whose functions would be to formulate coordinated policies and plans for the conduct of foreign information and psychological warfare activities and, upon their approval by SANACC, to coordinate the implementation of such policies and plans. This board would be composed of officials in the various departments and agencies who are responsible for the conduct of foreign information and psychological warfare activities. The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs should be chairman. The other members should consist of the official in CIA charged with covert activities, and any officials in other Government departments who are responsible for similar activities. The members of the board should jointly furnish the funds and the personnel required to form a full time staff for the board.
The above plan would have the following benefits and advantages:
a. An established interdepartmental coordinating body, SANACC, would furnish policy direction which incorporated the views of the State Department and the Departments of the National Military Establishment.
b. A separate agency, with a new director, separate budget, and additional personnel, would not be required.
c. The formulation of policies and plans and the coordination of their implementation would be in the hands of the officials responsible for the actual conduct of foreign information and psychological warfare activities.
James S. Lay, Jr./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
247. Memorandum From the Deputy Director (Wright) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, November 4, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-807, Item 4. Secret.
SUBJECT
Psychological Warfare1. You are aware that I have been keeping in close touch with the subject of Psychological Warfare and the various studies being conducted in connection therewith. It now appears that the latest SANACC conclusions will be aired today in a full committee meeting. You (or your Deputy) have been invited to attend and I urgently recommend that you (or your Deputy) be fully briefed as to the desires of the NSC prior to this meeting.
2. The subject of Psychological Warfare has been an active issue with SWNCC since 6 June 1946 (see SWNCC 304) and has been under urgent consideration since the formation of SANACC. While techniques and organization of a Psychological Warfare Agency have been argued pro and con, all parties are agreed on the following:
a. The present world situation requires the U.S. immediately to develop and utilize strong and concerted measures designed to produce psychological situations and effects favorable to the attainment of U.S. national objectives.
b. The organization to carry out the proposed project should be operated within the framework of the National Security Council.
3. At one period of the SWNCC (later SANACC) studies there was proposed an organization which, with minor changes, could efficiently carry out the national program envisaged. (See paragraph 31 of SSE 1, 1 August 1947--SWNC Subcommittee Special Studies and Evaluations.) After further studies were conducted, however, it has become apparent to me that thought is being focused on another inter-departmental coordinating committee completely unable to do an efficient job in this important field. The SANACC ad hoc Committee on Psychological Warfare has stated their latest proposal under date of 3 November in SANACC 304/10./1/ This proposal would only provide, in my estimation, the following:
/1/See Document 246.
a. An inter-departmental committee to sit over another inter-departmental committee with a "Director" in between.
b. The nucleus of another national intelligence organization.
4. As you know, I have recently discussed these matters with General Donovan and other individuals with wartime experience in Psychological Warfare organization and technique. I urgently recommend that, if you and the NSC concur, we present to SANACC our views on this matter as follows:
a. The immediate development of an organization, within the framework of the NSC, to implement both white and black psychological warfare designed to the attainment of U.S. national objectives.
b. The proposed organization to be under the control and direction of a "Director" appointed by the President from military or civil life. (See Annex I, herewith.)
c. "The Director" to be the chairman of a Planning and Policy board composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air, the Central Intelligence Agency, and such other government agencies whose participation may be necessary or desirable.
d. The Organization be so established as to be easily merged into the Military Establishment in the event of war or threat of war.
e. The necessary authority, guidance, information, and resources of manpower, funds, facilities, and materials be provided to enable the organization its efficient functioning in the achievement of national aims.
f. The Organization to be authorized to merge into a national effort all activities and operations related to psychological warfare using established agencies where practicable.
g. The Organization to be fully responsible for the planning, development, and coordination of all phases of the national program of radio, press, publications, and related propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information in the national interests.
E. K. Wright/2/
Brigadier General, USA/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Annex I
SUBJECT
Psychological WarfareReference is made to paragraph 4. b., of basic Memorandum, herewith.
1. You will remember that General Donovan in my recent discussion with him, was positive in his opinion that all Psychological Warfare be conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency. He agreed that it would be desirable if it could be done under proper cover. His recommendation in this regard was as follows:
a. The "Director" mentioned in my basic memorandum should actually be appointed by the President as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense--with the specific understanding that he was actually under the operational control of the Director of Central Intelligence.
b. That the knowledge of this operational control be known only to the fewest possible individuals.
2. General Donovan of course is a firm believer, as are most of those people having operational experience in this field, in the principle that the greatest propaganda success will be found in the field of Black operations. He, therefore, feels the organization must be so operated as to foster the use of Black methods. Since such methods are solely within the jurisdiction of CIA, General Donovan feels the Director of Central Intelligence should be firmly in control of the entire operation, both White and Black.
3. I submit this separate paper for your consideration since I know you are fully cognizant of the magnitude of the whole project. Personally I would like to see the proposed "Director" appointed as the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense with the Director of Central Intelligence and an Assistant Secretary of State designated as Advisory Consultants.
E. K. Wright/3/
Brigadier General, USA/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
248. Memorandum From the Deputy Director (Wright) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, November 4, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-807, Item 4. Secret.
The results of the War Council/1/ Meeting held this date generally took the following line in connection with an organization to carry out psychological warfare measures. The position of the Security Council was that any propaganda measures in time of peace were a primary function of the State Department and that in any case should not be handled by the Security Council as such since it is in effect an advisory group to the President.
/1/A group consisting of the Secretary of Defense, the three service secretaries, and the three service chiefs, established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the Secretary of Defense on "broad policy pertaining to the armed forces."
It was decided that the project for carrying out psychological warfare will be restricted solely to the foreign field and would be under the direct supervision of an Assistant Secretary of State. The Assistant Secretary of State to carry out these functions to be appointed from among individuals to be recommended in the next two or three days by the members of the War Council.
It was decided that insofar as public knowledge was concerned that this new organizational set up would deal only in what is known as White propaganda. However, it was agreed that the fullest advantage of any propaganda measures would have to be obtained in the field of Black propaganda. That, therefore, the Assistant Secretary of State to handle this project would have as Advisory Consultants, the Director of Central Intelligence and a military representative to be selected by the War Council.
The Security Council is cognizant of the fact that they will have to issue a directive to the Director of Central Intelligence to provide him the legal status for assisting the State Department in carrying out our phase of operations in this field.
New subject:
At the SANACC conference this afternoon the Committee was confused by a statement made by Mr. Whitney, Assistant Secretary of Air, that the War Council intended to appoint a Director to carry out these operations under the Assistant Secretary of State mentioned above. This was not the intent nor the expression of the War Council. Their discussions with regard to the appointment of an individual to carry out the project had to do with the appointment of a new Assistant Secretary of State.
I have already submitted to Admiral Souers the name of David K.E. Bruce, currently an Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and have indicated that tomorrow I will furnish him additional names for consideration.
E. K. Wright/2/
Brigadier General, USA/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
249. Report by an Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
SANACC 304/11
Washington, November 7, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of the Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees--State Department, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Box 55, File 304, 381, Psychological Warfare Pt. 2. Top Secret. Although dated November 7, SANACC amended and approved the report on November 13, and the last 2 pages of the source text bear the typed notation "Revised 13 November 1947." The source text is an enclosure to two memoranda, neither printed. (Ibid.) The first is a November 13 covering note from the SANACC secretaries explaining the changes. The latter is another note by the SANACC secretaries, dated November 7, which indicates that the text amended and approved by SANACC was a revised version of the report originally submitted by the ad hoc committee on November 3 and designated as SANACC 304/10. (Ibid.) See the Supplement for SANACC 304/10.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
The Problem
1. To determine whether at the present time the U.S. should utilize coordinated psychological measures in furtherance of the attainment of its national objectives; if so, what organization is required and what should be its terms of reference.
Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion
2. a. The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the U.S. and is employing coordinated psychological, political and economic measures designed to undermine all non-Communist elements in foreign countries which are capable of opposing Soviet aspirations.
b. The ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine the prestige of the U.S. and the effectiveness of its national policy but to weaken and divide foreign opinion to a point where effective opposition to Soviet aspirations is no longer attainable by political, economic or military means.
c. In conducting this campaign, the USSR is utilizing all such meas-ures available to it through satellite regimes, Communist parties, and organizations susceptible to Communist influence.
d. The U.S. is not now employing coordinated psychological meas-ures to counter this propaganda campaign or to further the attainment of its national objectives.
e. The extension of economic aid to certain foreign countries, particularly in Europe, is one of the principal means by which the U.S. has undertaken to defend its vital interests. The extent of this aid and other U.S. contributions to world peace is unknown to large segments of the world's population. Inadequate employment of psychological measures is impairing the effectiveness of these undertakings.
f. None of the existing departments or agencies of the U.S. Government is now charged with responsibility for utilizing coordinated psychological measures in furtherance of the attainment of U.S. national objectives.
g. Taking into account the foregoing considerations the ad hoc Committee has reached the following Conclusions:
Conclusions
3. The present world situation requires the U.S. immediately to develop and utilize coordinated measures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives and to counteract effects of anti-American propaganda.
4. It is considered that the initial steps to implement paragraph 3 above should be designed to provide closer coordination of policies, more effective integration of existing facilities, and intensification of psychological measures.
5. a. The Secretary of State should be charged with responsibility for the general direction and coordination of psychological measures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives and to counteract effects of anti-American propaganda. It is assumed that this responsibility will be delegated to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, hereinafter referred to as the Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary should be assisted by an informal group composed initially of representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force Departments, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and subsequently of other departments or agencies at his discretion.
b. All participating departments and agencies should be directed to insure the most effective utilization of all their appropriate facilities, and to perform such additional functions as may be necessary, for the execution of approved policy decisions.
c. The Assistant Secretary should be furnished with qualified full-time personnel from each participating department or agency, headed by a director appointed by the Secretary of State. The major responsibilities of the Director should be to implement the policies and plans established by the Secretary of State by:
(1) Obtaining the most effective utilization and coordination of all informational facilities and of related psychological activities within the participating departments and agencies;
(2) Providing effective liaison with other departments and agencies whose related activities can be profitably employed;
(3) Initiating and developing for the approval of the Assistant Secretary specific plans and programs designed to influence foreign opinion in a direction favorable to U.S. interests and to counteract effects of anti-American propaganda.
6. As a matter of priority, the Assistant Secretary should take steps to determine the need for such funds as may be necessary to insure performance of the responsibilities assigned in paragraph 5 above.
7. The Assistant Secretary and Director should be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency with appropriate foreign intelligence.
8. The Assistant Secretary should be furnished with classified information necessary for the fulfillment of his responsibilities by the participating departments.
9. In carrying out the responsibilities assigned in paragraph 5 above, the Assistant Secretary and the Director should maintain the closest possible liaison with the SANACC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations, in order that the latter may adequately fulfill its responsibilities.
10. The utmost secrecy should be observed with regard to the contents of this report.
Recommendations
11. It is recommended that:
a. SANACC approve the above Conclusions.
b. After approval by SANACC, the Conclusions of this paper be forwarded to the National Security Council for appropriate action.
250. Memorandum of Discussion at the 2d Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, November 14, 1947.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1-4, control of exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe, U.S. Maritime Commission, U.S. position with respect to Italy, and base rights in Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores.]
5. Psychological Warfare (SANACC 304/11)/1/
Secretary Marshall requested that the title of this paper be changed to eliminate the word "warfare."/2/
/1/Document 249.
/2/Hillenkoetter told his staff meeting on November 18 "Mr. Marshall does not like term 'PW' and does not seem to favor the idea of psychological warfare at this time." (Minutes of Staff Meeting, November 18; Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-01731R, Box 31, Folder 3)
[1 paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Mr. Lovett and Admiral Hillenkoetter explained that the intent was only to ensure that all psychological activities were coordinated with our foreign policy and our information program. The Secretary of State was therefore given the responsibility for general coordination of all such activities.
Secretary Royall, speaking also for Secretary Forrestal and Secretary Symington, stated that the Military Establishment did not believe that it should have a part in those activities. He therefore suggested deletion of the provisions for an advisory group and a director.
The National Security Council:
Referred SANACC 304/11 to the National Security Council Staff for revision in the light of the comments at the meeting.
[Here follows discussion of agenda item 6, review of the world situation as it relates to the security of the United States.]
251. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Wright) to the Chief of the Interagency Coordinating and Planning Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (Childs)
Washington, December 2, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HS-74, Item 1. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
NSC Notes on Psychological OperationsReference is made to your attached notes on Psychological Operations./1/ That paragraph relating to the placing of a special panel of Army, Navy, and Air Force planners within CIA (or elsewhere), to give special attention to psychological operations to insure very close cooperation abroad--is very alarming.
/1/Not found. The memorandum appears to refer to discussions at the NSC staff level about the prospective NSC directive on psychological warfare.
All concerned must appreciate that this Agency is and must be the sole agency to conduct organized foreign clandestine operations. To sabotage this principle can only lead to chaos in this type of operation.
Whatever Agency is chosen to indicate the type of Black operations to be conducted, or the material and/or propaganda to be disseminated--the Central Intelligence Agency must alone be the Agency to determine how the material is disseminated. The pattern of our foreign operations will not permit supervision of these activities by other agencies if it is to be maintained as an efficient and secure operation and the conduct of Black psychological operations must fit into the over-all operational pattern.
It is possible that the actual situation is not known or appreciated by all members of the NSC staff. If you feel this is so I would be very happy to discuss it with them.
EKW
Brigadier General, USA252. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the Members of the National Security Council
NSC 4
Washington, December 9, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting. Confidential. Copies sent to the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. For an early version of this document, see the memorandum from "REN" to Souers, November 25, and the two undated attachments (ibid.) in the Supplement.
COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES
REFERENCES
a. SANACC 304/11
b. NSC Action No. 11/1//1/NSC Action No. 11, taken at the NSC meeting on November 14, referred SANACC 304/11 to the NSC Staff for revision based on the comments at the meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
At its second meeting the National Security Council referred SANACC 304/11 to the National Security Council Staff for revision in the light of the comments at the meeting. The enclosed report has been prepared pursuant to that directive, after consultation with representatives of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It is recommended that the National Security Council approve the enclosed report and authorize its submission to the President, with the recommendation that he approve the "Conclusions" contained therein and direct that they be implemented by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.
Sidney W. Souers/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure/3/
/3/Confidential. The word "Draft" at the top of the first page has been crossed through. The typewritten date December 9 was changed by hand to December 17.
National Security Council Memorandum
NSC 4
Washington, December 17, 1947.
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES
The Problem
1. To determine what steps are required to strengthen and coordinate all foreign information measures of the U.S. Government in furtherance of the attainment of US national objectives.
Analysis
2. The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the US and is employing coordinated psychological, political and economic measures designed to undermine non-Communist elements in all countries. The ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine the prestige of the US and the effectiveness of its national policy but to weaken and divide world opinion to a point where effective opposition to Soviet designs is no longer attainable by political, economic or military means. In conducting this campaign, the USSR is utilizing all measures available to it through satellite regimes, Communist parties, and organizations susceptible to Communist influence.
3. The US is not now employing strong, coordinated information measures to counter this propaganda campaign or to further the attainment of its national objectives. The extension of economic aid to certain foreign countries, particularly in Europe, is one of the principal means by which the US has undertaken to defend its vital interests. The nature and intent of this aid and other US contributions to world peace is unknown to or misunderstood by large segments of the world's population. Inadequate employment of information measures is impairing the effectiveness of these undertakings.
4. None of the existing departments or agencies of the US Government is now charged with responsibility for coordinating foreign information measures in furtherance of the attainment of US national objectives. Upon the Department of State devolves the principal responsibility, under the President, for the formulation and execution of American foreign policy and the conduct of American foreign relations.
5. Facilities now existing in the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in the field of foreign information or which can be utilized in this field are listed in the Appendix/4/ hereto.
/4/The appendix, not found, lists agencies and offices of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force involved in the dissemination of information overseas.
Conclusions
6. The present world situation requires the immediate strengthening and coordination of all foreign information measures of the US Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of its objectives and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda.
7. It is considered that the initial steps to implement paragraph 6 above should be designed to provide closer coordination of policies, more effective integration of existing facilities, and intensification of foreign information measures.
8. a. The Secretary of State should be charged with formulating policies for and coordinating the implementation of all information meas-ures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of US objectives and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda. It is assumed that these functions will be exercised by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, hereinafter referred to as the Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary should consult with an informal group composed of representatives of other appropriate departments and agencies.
b. Appropriate departments and agencies should be directed to insure the most effective coordination and utilization of their appropriate facilities for the implementation of approved foreign information policies.
c. The Assistant Secretary should be assisted by a staff including qualified full-time personnel detailed from each appropriate department or agency. This staff should assist the Assistant Secretary in implementing the policies and plans established by the Secretary of State by:
(1) Obtaining the most effective utilization and coordination of all federal foreign information facilities;
(2) Initiating and developing for the approval of the Assistant Secretary specific plans and programs designed to influence foreign opinion in a direction favorable to US interests and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda.
9. As a matter of priority, the Assistant Secretary should coordinate the determination of the requirement for funds necessary to insure performance of the functions assigned in paragraph 8 above.
10. The Assistant Secretary should be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency with appropriate coordinated foreign intelligence.
11. The Assistant Secretary should be furnished by the appropriate departments with classified information necessary for the fulfillment of his responsibilities.
12. In carrying out the functions assigned in paragraph 8 above, the Assistant Secretary should maintain the closest possible liaison with the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee.
253. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the Members of the National Security Council
NSC 4-A
Washington, December 9, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting. Top Secret.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
REFERENCE
SANACC 304/11/1//1/Document 249.
1. The National Security Council at its second meeting referred SANACC 304/11 to the NSC Staff for revision in the light of the comments at the meeting.
2. SANACC 304/11 appears to be designed to accomplish the following two related but separate purposes:
a. To initiate steps looking toward the conduct of covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities.
b. To ensure that all overt foreign information activities are effectively coordinated.
3. Therefore, in the interest of security and clarity, the Staff of the National Security Council has prepared separate reports to the National Security Council designed to achieve each of the above purposes. This report deals with the purpose described in 1-a, while NSC 4/2/ deals with the purpose stated in 1-b.
/2/Document 252.
4. The enclosed draft directive to the Director of Central Intelligence is believed to be an appropriate and adequate action by the Council with reference to covert psychological operations abroad. This directive contains the following desirable provisions:
a. It specifies the reason and the authority for the Council's action;
b. It grants sufficient authority to the Central Intelligence Agency; while
c. At the same time it ensures that Central Intelligence Agency will conduct such operations in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign policy, overt foreign information activities, and diplomatic and military operations and intentions abroad.
5. The names of appropriate departments and agencies to be represented on the panel referred to in subparagraph 3-a, will be recommended by the NSC Staff in a separate memorandum./3/
/3/Document 255.
6. It is therefore recommended that the National Security Council approve and issue the enclosed directive to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Sidney W. Souers/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure/5/
Draft Directive to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, undated.
/5/Top Secret. Paragraph 3 of this draft was dropped in the final version and replaced by a paragraph that made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for ensuring that psychological warfare operations were consistent with U.S. foreign policy. See the attachment to Document 257.
1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S. Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations.
2. The similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations. Hence, under authority of Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council directs the Director of Central Intelligence to initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security.
3. In order to insure that such psychological operations are in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign policy, overt foreign information activities, and diplomatic and military operations and intentions abroad, the Director of Central Intelligence is charged with:
a. Obtaining approval of all policy directives and major plans for such operations by a panel to be designated by the National Security Council.
b. Coordination of operations with the senior U.S. diplomatic and military representatives in each area which will be directly affected by such operations.
4. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to require the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose operational details concerning its secret techniques, sources or contacts.
254. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, December 15, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting. Top Secret.
1. Reference is made to NSC 4-A (Report to the National Security Council by The Executive Secretary on Psychological Operations) as distributed under date of 9 December 1947,/1/ with particular reference to the proposed Directive To The Director of Central Intelligence.
/1/Document 253.
2. In the event the subject project is implemented, it is requested that consideration be given to rewording paragraph 3.b., of the proposed Directive to The DCI as follows:
"b. The senior U.S. diplomatic representative in each area, and the military commander in each occupied area, will be kept informed of psychological operations being conducted in areas under their jurisdiction."
3. We feel the suggested rewording will satisfy the intent of the original wording and will--
a. Provide greater security to our organized covert operations, and
b. Will follow the existing interdepartmental agreement that the senior U.S. representative in each foreign area is responsible for the coordination of all overt intelligence activities.
RH Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN255. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the National Security Council
Washington, December 16, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Representation on the panel recommended in NSC 4-A/1//1/Document 253.
It is recommended that the panel referred to in paragraph 3-a of the draft directive in NSC 4-A consist of one representative from each of the following Departments:
Department of State
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air ForceAt the suggestion of General Gruenther, it is also recommended that the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be invited to designate a representative who shall sit with the above panel as an observer.
Sidney W. Souers
256. Department of State Briefing Memorandum
Washington, December 17, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 4. Top Secret. The date is handwritten on the source text. The memorandum has neither an addressee nor a sender, but presumably it was intended for Under Secretary Lovett, who was Acting Secretary at the time. The document is a briefing paper for the NSC meeting held December 17.
COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES(NSC 4) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (NSC 4-A)
I. Discussion
The NSC Staff has revised SANACC 304/11 (the psychological warfare paper) and prepared two separate reports, one which plans the coordination of foreign information measures in overt operations (NSC 4), and the other initiating steps working toward covert psychological operations (NSC 4-A).
NSC 4 (Tab A),/1/ which has the approval of the Department as indicated in Mr. Sargeant's memorandum (Tab B) proposes:
/1/Document 252.
(a) The Secretary of State should be charged with formulating and coordinating the implementation of all information measures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of US objectives and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda. It is assumed that these functions will be exercised by the Assist-ant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, who should consult with an informal group composed of representatives of other appropriate departments and agencies.
(b) Appropriate departments and agencies should be instructed to insure the most effective coordination and utilization of their appropriate facilities, and
(c) The Assistant Secretary should be assisted by a staff including qualified full-time personnel detailed from each appropriate agency.
NSC 4-A (Tab C)/2/ entitled Psychological Operations provides that covert psychological operations shall be conducted by the CIA and a draft directive to the Director of CIA is enclosed with the report. This directive authorizes CIA to initiate and conduct covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet-inspired activity provided that the approval of all policy directives and major plans are obtained from a panel to be designated by the Council. This panel will probably consist of representatives of State, Army, Navy, Air and perhaps the JCS.
/2/Document 253.
In the memorandum, (Tab D),/3/ Mr. Kennan indicates that whereas it is desirable to establish the authority for the proposed operations, the Council should be frankly informed that before giving our consent to any such activities we would wish to consider most carefully the need therefor. Furthermore, we would want to examine the situation in all its aspects in case of any suggested operation, and to judge each case strictly on its merits.
/3/Not found.
II. Recommendations
It is recommended:
(a) That you approve NSC 4 Coordination of Foreign Information Measures, and
(b) Approve NSC 4-A Psychological Operations with the understanding that we are only approving the establishment of the authority for the proposed operations.
(c) That you indicate to the Council our views on such activities as indicated above.
Tab B/4/
/4/Secret.
Memorandum From the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Sargeant) to Acting Secretary of State Lovett
Washington, December 15, 1947.
SUBJECT
Report to National Security Council on Coordination of Foreign Information Measures1. The attached report/5/ is a revision of SANACC 304/11 drafted by the NSC staff in the light of comment at the second meeting of the National Security Council.
/5/Not attached. Reference is to a draft of NSC 4, possibly Document 252.
2. It is recommended that the report be approved by the Department.
3. Significant changes in the original SANACC paper have been made as follows:
(a) All reference to "psychological measures" has been eliminated;
(b) Paragraph 6 provides for "the immediate strengthening and coordination of all foreign information measures of the U.S. Government . . . ."
(c) Paragraph 8a assumes that the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, acting for the Secretary of State, will "consult with" rather than "be advised by" an informal group composed of representatives of other appropriate departments and agencies in formulating information policies and coordinating the implementation of all information measures.
(d) "Other appropriate departments and agencies" are not specified in the report, but it is understood that they shall include, initially, the Departments of Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
4. The report contains no recommendation regarding implementation of Paragraph 3b, which provides that "appropriate departments and agencies should be directed to insure the most effective coordination and utilization of their facilities . . . ." Presumably, such a directive would be issued by the Committee of Two. This point should be clarified, however, as the Secretary of State would not be in a position to carry out his responsibilities without a clear directive to the participating departments and agencies./6/
/6/In the margin next to this paragraph is the following handwritten note: "Secretary of State would have authority to issue these directives under President's approval of the paper. S/S-H.W. Moseley."
5. I understand Mr. Kennan has briefed you on another aspect of this problem which will be discussed at the National Security Council meeting. If possible, I should like to discuss briefly with you the relationship between these two aspects.
HHS
257. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, December 17, 1947.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting. Top Secret. Central Intelligence Agency records contain a typescript copy that apparently was made from a signed copy; it is identical to the source text. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-773, Job 83-00036, Box 5, Folder 8) Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 173-175.
SUBJECT
Psychological OperationsREFERENCE
NSC 4-AAt its fourth meeting the National Security Council amended and approved the draft directive to the Director of Central Intelligence contained in NSC 4-A./1/
/1/The NSC minutes for the Council's 4th meeting on December 17 refer only to NSC 4, noting simply that it was adopted without change and subsequently submitted to the President for approval. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting) There is no mention of NSC 4-A in the minutes. The amendment referred to in the undated directive to Hillenkoetter involved paragraph 3, where the proposal for an advisory panel was eliminated. See the enclosure to Document 253. Souers submitted NSC 4 to the President for approval under a memorandum of December 17. Truman approved NSC 4 on December 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC Minutes, 4th Meeting) The file contains no mention of the President's approval of NSC 4-A.
This directive, as approved by the National Security Council, is transmitted herewith for appropriate action.
Sidney W. Souers/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment/3/
/3/Top Secret.
National Security Council Directive to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S. Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations.
2. The similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations. Hence, under authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council directs the Director of Central Intelligence to initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged with ensuring that such psychological operations are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and overt foreign information activities, and that appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), are kept informed of such operations which will directly affect them.
4. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to require the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose operational details concerning its secret techniques, sources or contacts.
258. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Assistant Director for Special Operations (Galloway)
Washington, December 22, 1947.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-917, Job 83-00036, Box 6, Folder 11. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Foreign Information Measures1. This Agency has been directed by the National Security Council to supplement the foreign information activities of the U.S. Government by covert psychological operations. Further, we have been charged with insuring that such operations are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and overt information activities, and that appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government, both at home and abroad, are kept informed of such operations which will directly affect them.
2. It has been determined that the Office of Special Operations will be the operational unit for the conduct of covert psychological operations in accordance with the directive of the National Security Council to this Agency.
3. Attached hereto, for your information and guidance, is Copy No. 18 of NSC 4./1/ This document will be utilized as the basic policy directive for the operations considered herewith.
/1/Document 252.
4. It is desired that you take immediate steps to prepare a plan for the conduct of covert psychological operations, utilizing wherever practicable existing facilities of your office and the other offices of this Agency. Your recommendations reference the following specific matters will be submitted at the earliest practicable date:
a. Proposed Organizational Chart for a Foreign Information Branch, Office of Special Operations.
b. Proposed Table of Organization, Staff and Field, for the conduct of covert psychological measures.
c. Proposed plan of liaison with appropriate departments and agencies of the Government.
d. Estimate of funds required for fiscal years 1948 and 1949.
R. H. Hillenkoetter/2/
Rear Admiral, USN/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
259. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Washington, February 17, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.6/2-1748. Top Secret.
In connection with the decision of the National Security Council regarding psychological warfare operation, I believe it would be advisable if you were to tell Mr. Wisner, in the absence of Mr. Saltzman, that the work of the SANACC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluation/1/ should be promptly brought to a conclusion and the subcommittee dissolved. Because of security considerations, Mr. Wisner should not be informed of the reasons lying behind your instructions, but he can be told that this is in response to higher level decision.
/1/The designation for the SANACC subcommittee that dealt with psychological warfare.
George F. Kennan
260. Office of Special Operations Directive No. 18/5 (Interim)
Washington, February 24, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2154, Job 83-00739R, Box 3, Folder 19. Secret. On February 24 Office of Special Operations Personnel Order No. 25 announced the designation of Thomas G. Cassady as Chief of the Special Procedures Branch. (Ibid., HS/CSG-2155, Job 83-00739R, Box 3, Folder 20) See the Supplement.
ACTIVATION OF SPECIAL PROCEDURES BRANCH
1. In accordance with instructions of the Director of Central Intelligence, and pending formal authorization, a Special Procedures Branch within the Office of Special Operations was activated effective 1 January 1948.
2. The Chief, Special Procedures Branch, will draft an appropriate amendment to S.O. Directive No. 18, setting forth the functions and responsibilities of the branch in detail, which, when approved and published, will supersede and supplant this directive.
3. The Chief, Special Procedures Branch, will be directly responsible to the Assistant Director for Special Operations.
Alan R. McCracken
261. Memorandum From the Chief of the Special Procedures Group (Cassady) to the Deputy Chief of the Special Procedures Group (Dulin)
Washington, March 11, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-609, Job 83-00036, Box 4, Folder 10. Secret.
SUBJECT
Conversations with Mr. Charles Davies,/1/ State Department/1/Reference is probably to John P. Davies.
1. On March 1, I visited Mr. Davies to state that we had, after my discussions pro and con, arrived at the conclusion that the most effective method of penetrating the iron curtain would be via clandestine radio situated in an artificially created sterile area of our occupied zone. Inasmuch as the execution of this plan would involve considerable expenditure of public funds, the hiring of personnel, etc., we did not want to undertake such a commitment without clearing with State, for the reason that State was soon to take over the administration of the American zone in Germany. Aside from that fact, I further stated that we desired at all times to cooperate with State in the prosecution of our new endeavor.
2. Mr. Davies called today to ask me to come over. He apologized for being ten days in coming back to me and said finally he had been able to get to Mr. Cannon/2/ who, as I understood it, had talked in turn to Mr. Lovett pertaining to this matter. Mr. Davies states that Mr. Lovett's reaction was that he wanted to know very little about our project but in principle he had no objection. Mr. Cannon's attitude was that we have the green light but State wanted to be apprised of our progress and proposed operations in order that they would not conflict with State's policies. This I agreed to do.
/2/Presumably George Kennan.
262. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Forrestal to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, March 26, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Pol & Psych Warfare 1948-50, Box 11. Top Secret. On March 30 Souers sent Forrestal's memorandum to NSC members, noting that it would be on the agenda of the April 2 meeting. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
SUBJECT
NSC 4 Series (Coordination of Foreign Information Measures)1. Several months have elapsed since the National Security Council approved the NSC 4 Series, dealing with foreign information activities. I believe that both the State Department and CIA have begun setting up the staff organization to carry out their respective responsibilities under this program. Since the Council's action the international situation has become more critical and it is more important than ever that our foreign information activities be effectively developed and that they be coordinated with the other phases of our foreign and military policies.
2. Therefore, I recommend that the National Security Council assure itself that the NSC 4 Series is being satisfactorily implemented and that the programs thereunder are being conceived and carried out in full accord with the intentions of the National Security Council and in effective coordination with political and military plans and activities. I request that this question be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the National Security Council and suggest that at that time the Council direct the staff consultants to look into this problem on its behalf and submit an early report with my necessary recommendations.
James Forrestal/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Forrestal signed the original.
263. Office of Special Operations Directive No. 18/5
Washington, March 29, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2154, Job 83-00739R, Box 3, Folder 19. Top Secret.
ACTIVATION OF SPECIAL PROCEDURES GROUP
1. Authorization
In accordance with the authorization contained in the memorandum for the Assistant Director for Special Operations from the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 22 March 1948, Subject: "Additional Functions of the Office of Special Operations,"/1/ the "Special Procedures Group," as activated 1 January 1948 under the name "Special Procedures Branch," is confirmed effective 22 March 1948.
/1/Not found. A draft of this memorandum, dated February 26, is in Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 83-00036, Box 9, Folder 16.
2. Functions
The basic function of Special Procedures Group will be to engage in covert psychological operations outside the United States and its possessions, for the purpose of (1) undermining the strength of foreign instrumentalities, whether government, organizations, or individuals, which are engaged in activities inimical to the United States, and (2) to support United States' foreign policy by influencing public opinion abroad in a direction favorable to the attainment of United States' objectives.
3. Definition of Covert Psychological Operations
As used herein and as conducted within the Office of Special Operations, covert psychological operations may include all measures of information and persuasion short of physical in which the originating role of the United States Government will always be kept concealed.
4. Chief of Special Procedures Group
In accordance with directives and policies of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, the Chief of Special Procedures Group shall exercise direction over all covert psychological operations outside the United States and its possessions. In carrying out this responsibility, he will:
a. Act as adviser to the Assistant Director relative to covert psychological operations and submit to him, for approval, specific directives on covert psychological operations for field implementation through the facilities of the Chief of Operations.
b. As directed by the Assistant Director, make recommendations for the final approval of all proposed covert psychological operations from the standpoint of their conformity to United States' foreign policy, suitability of general program content and objectives, and the commitment of funds.
c. Exercise direct control and supervision over all personnel and functions of the Washington office of Special Procedures Group.
d. Exercise general program and technical direction over all field representatives engaged in covert psychological operations, coordinating closely with the Chief of Operations who will exercise operational field control over such representatives.
e. Maintain close planning and operational liaison with the Chief of Operations in connection with plans, directives, and other matters relating to covert psychological operations which require implementation through the facilities and resources of the Chief of Operations.
f. Provide for the development of program plans to implement policies and directives applicable to the activities of Special Procedures Group.
g. Provide for all necessary operational action, including the preparation of detailed operational directives, required for the execution of approved program plans and projects developed by or delegated to Special Procedures Group.
h. Establish a project control over all field operations involving covert psychological operations.
i. Maintain, as directed by the Assistant Director, such liaison with the Department of State, or other authority charged with formulation of foreign policy, as may be necessary to obtain guidance on United States' foreign policy and objectives, as they affect the operations of Special Procedures Group.
j. Issue, with the approval of the Assistant Director, directives defining the editorial and political policies to be followed in conducting covert psychological operations in the field.
k. Establish, for approval of the Assistant Director and on the basis of United States' foreign policy and aims, the basic program objectives and targets for covert psychological operations.
l. In accordance with liaison requirements and procedures of Budget and Liaison Control, establish and control authorized liaison of Special Procedures Group with other elements of Office of Special Operations, Offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, and other United States Departments and Agencies which provide for direct liaison on secret operational matters.
m. Develop and maintain, as directed by the Assistant Director, such liaison with private individuals, organizations, or institutions in the United States as may be necessary to the effective conduct of covert psychological operations abroad, keeping Budget and Liaison Control generally informed of such liaison.
n. Insure that operations of Special Procedures Group do not conflict with or overlap the open foreign informational activities of the Department of State and, to that end, effect such liaison and coordination with the Department of State as may be directed by the Assistant Director.
o. Coordinate with the Chief of Administrative Services to insure full support of operations of Special Procedures Group by Office of Special Operations administrative and supporting services.
p. Insure adequate training for all personnel engaged in covert psychological operations, using for such purpose the facilities of the Training Staff of Office of Special Operations and, with practical limits, making available to the Training Staff, for lecture and other instruction in covert psychological operations, experienced personnel of Special Procedures Group.
q. Provide for the conduct of inspections of local activities of his office and, when directed by the Assistant Director, of overseas operational activities involving covert psychological operations, effecting the necessary coordination with the Chief of Operations.
r. For the purpose of insuring proper policy and program coordination in the field, take appropriate measures in coordination with the Chief of Operations and through his field facilities, for keeping the chief diplomatic representative in an area or the Chief United States Commanding Officer in an occupied zone generally informed of covert psychological operations.
5. Deputy Chief
a. Acts for the Chief of Special Procedures Group in his absence.
b. Performs such duties as may be assigned by the Chief.
c. Maintains over-all supervision of the activities of Special Procedures Group to insure the proper execution of directives and policies relating to Special Procedures operations.
6. Chief of Plans Section
As directed by the Chief of Special Procedures Group, the Chief of the Plans Section:
a. In General
Shall be responsible for defining the program objectives of covert psychological operations, developing programs in line with such objectives and preparing directives defining the editorial and political policy to be followed in the conduct of field operations.
b. In Particular
(1) Shall, on the basis of United States' foreign policy and foreign objectives of the Central Intelligence Agency, define and currently maintain the basic program objectives and targets for covert psychological operations and prepare, as required, field directives defining such objectives and targets.
(2) Shall, on the basis of United States' foreign policy and aims, prepare field directives defining the editorial and political policy, theme, and general line to be followed in the conduct of covert psychological operations, insuring that such directives are consistent with United States' foreign policy as it affects covert psychological operations.
(3) Shall initiate and develop, as directed by the Chief, Special Procedures Group, programs, themes, and ideas for covert psychological operations in the field.
(4) Shall, as a basis for evaluating and countering foreign propaganda or other psychological activity directed against the United States, conduct a continuing selective analysis of foreign news and other informational sources, including pertinent intelligence collected by Central Intelligence Agency and other informational materials available to Central Intelligence Agency.
(5) Shall conduct, for the purpose of developing background data and information for covert psychological operations, research relating to foreign news and events, international propaganda and the psychological and political character of operational targets, including individuals, groups, and organizations.
(6) Shall initiate or develop, in response to requests from authorized sources, editorial production, in complete or substantive form, for transmission to overseas stations for operational use.
(7) Shall analyze and evaluate, to the extent practicable, the results of covert psychological field operations in terms of their propaganda or psychological effectiveness.
(8) Shall assist in the training of personnel engaged in covert psychological operations, insofar as training relates to the functions of the Plans Section.
7. Chief, Operations Section
As directed by the Chief of Special Procedures Group, the Chief of the Operations Section:
a. In General
Shall be responsible to the Chief of Special Procedures Group for the operational aspects of covert psychological operations and assure proper coordination between Chief of Operations, Office of Special Operations, and Special Procedures Group in the field implementation of policies and programs relating to covert psychological operations.
b. In Particular
In carrying out these general responsibilities, the Chief of the Operations Section:
(1) Shall prepare detailed plans and instructions and take any other necessary, authorized action to implement basic policies, programs and directives received from the Chief of Special Procedures Group.
(2) Shall establish a project control over all approved covert psychological operations to provide for the controlled expenditure and proper accounting of funds used for covert psychological operation and a constant review of authorized projects, including assignments, progress, cost and effectiveness of agents and informers used in covert psychological operations.
(3) Shall inform the Chief, Administration and Services, Office of Special Operations, of operational plans and insure adequate joint planning with interested elements of his offices to support the implementation of such plans.
(4) Shall assist in the training of personnel engaged in covert psychological operations insofar as such training relates to the functions of the Operations Section, Special Procedures Group.
(5) Shall coordinate with the Training Branch and the Personnel Division, Office of Special Operations, the training of new staff employees, advising both of the detailed training requirements of Special Procedures Group.
(6) Shall keep Budget and Liaison Control generally informed of liaison with private individuals, organizations, or institutions in the United States, as referred to in c.(2)(j) below.
c. Liaison Responsibilities
The Chief, Operations Section, will conduct liaison and coordinate with the Chief of Operations, Office of Special Operations, on covert psychological matters requiring field implementation through facilities and resources of his office for the following purposes:
(1) General
(a) In the field implementation of covert psychological operations, to make available to the Chief of Operations, Office of Special Operations, any required information, data, facilities, or other services at the disposal of Special Procedures Group.
(b) Within limits approved by the Chief of Operations, Office of Special Operations, to consult with operating elements of his office concerning operational possibilities for covert psychological operations, and the acquisition of operational information required by Special Procedures Group in the planning of such operations.
(c) To insure that proposed plans and projects of Special Procedures Group are operationally practicable from the standpoint of field capabilities and conditions.
(2) Particular
Specifically, the purpose of such liaison will be to effect, in accord-ance with arrangements approved by the Chief of Operations, coordination with the Deputy Chief of Operations for Counter Espionage, the Deputy Chief of Operations for Plans and Projects, and appropriate Foreign Branch Chiefs, on the following matters relating to covert psychological operations of Special Operations.
(a) Development of agent cover and related possibilities in connection with planned covert psychological operations.
(b) Objectives, recruiting, engagement, and training of covert personnel who will engage in covert psychological operations.
(c) Briefing, assignment, and movement of covert psychological operations. Such personnel will not be reassigned, transferred, or moved in any manner inconsistent with their current assignments, without prior approval of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, except where emergency conditions justify independent action in the field.
(d) Obtaining operational information and data for field directives and for the development of methods, techniques, and plans for use in connection with approved or planned covert psychological operations.
(e) Providing guidance and assistance to field representatives engaged in covert psychological operations, including useful background information, comments, and criticisms on methods and sources and technical advice.
(f) Obtaining reports from the field on the progress, results, and status of covert psychological objectives.
(g) Establishing the program objectives and targets for covert psychological operations.
(h) Following up action taken by the field on directives pertaining to covert psychological operations.
(i) Developing long-range plans and projects for covert psychological operations.
(j) Employment, on a covert basis, of individuals in the United States, including American citizens and foreign nationals, for information and other operational services in connection with current or planned covert psychological operations overseas.
(k) Security investigations of all personnel of Special Procedures Group other than the staff to be used in the Washington office.
8. S.O. Directive No. 18/5 (Interim), dated 24 February 1948,/2/ is rescinded and superseded by this Directive.
/2/Document 260.
Donald H. Galloway
Assistant Director
Special Operations264. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Allen) to Acting Secretary of State Lovett
Washington, March 31, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 4, Box 4205. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Coordination of Foreign Information MeasuresAt the National Security Council meeting on Friday/1/ you may be pressed to agree to a proposal by the Armed Services to set up immediately a psychological warfare organization. The more enthusiastic representatives of the Armed Services would apparently like to begin actual psychological warfare operations at the earliest possible moment. I suggest that you go slow on any positive commitments along this line until we can go into the matter further.
/1/April 2.
It is important to remember that psychological warfare is in its essence a political activity and in Russia and Great Britain among other places is and has been traditionally an instrument of the Foreign Office. Under a National Security Council Directive of December 9, 1947 (NSC-4), it is clearly recognized that the State Department has jurisdiction in the matter and this point should be maintained. Claims which may be advanced by the War Department that the State Department has been lax in taking any action under NSC-4 are exaggerated to say the least. We have taken a good deal of action under this directive already as the attached will indicate.
Following approval of NSC-4 by the President on December 18th, 1947, letters were sent out on January 2nd, 1948, by Mr. Lovett to the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, requesting them to designate representatives to consult with Mr. Allen, in order to carry out the NSC-4 Directive.
The Central Intelligence Agency named its representative on January 5th, the Air Force on February 4th, the Army on February 5th, and the Navy not until March 9th.
On March 10th the first meeting of this informal Inter-departmental Consultative Group was set for March 15th. Mr. Allen chaired this meeting, and called upon representatives of the other Departments to prepare written memoranda on the overseas activities of their Departments falling within the scope of NSC-4, and to name representatives to the full-time Working Staff called for by NSC-4, the duties of which were (1) to coordinate all federal foreign information facilities, and (2) to initiate and develop for the approval of the Assistant Secretary specific plans and programs in the foreign information field.
Further meetings of the Consultative Group were held on March 18th and March 29th with Mr. Allen in the Chair each time. At these meetings there was informal discussion of the functions of the Consultative Group and of the full-time Working Staff, with a view to carrying out NSC-4 as early as possible. April 12th was agreed upon as the earliest target date by which the Working Staff members would be designated by the other Departments and commence activities. Appropriate office space and working facilities have been held ready by the Assistant Secretary since March 15th. A member of Mr. Allen's staff has also been ready since the inception of the Consultative Group to serve as Executive Secretary of the full-time Working Staff.
A list of proposed projects on which the Working Staff shall commence its duties has been prepared; these are to be integrated with the projects of the OIE, so as to avoid duplication or overlapping.
265. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Information and Educational Exchange (Stone) to Acting Secretary of State Lovett
Washington, April 1, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 4. Top Secret. Following his handwritten initials above the subject line Stone wrote: "(In the absence of George Allen.)"
SUBJECT
Proposed Creation of Psychological Warfare AgencyWith reference to the question of foreign information activities which Mr. Allen mentioned in his memorandum/1/ to you yesterday, and which will come up for discussion in the meeting of the National Security Council on Friday,/2/ there is additional information which you should have as background:
/1/Document 264.
/2/April 2.
I am informed that the Armed Services are again pressing to set up an independent psychological warfare agency under the National Security Council at the earliest possible moment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved a paper recommending such action. The paper which had gone to Admiral Leahy is in the form of an amendment to an earlier report of the SANACC Subcommittee which has been studying future plans for a wartime psychological warfare organization. If Admiral Leahy approves, the paper in question will come up before the SANACC Committee at a meeting next Wednesday, April 7, at which time the Department will have an opportunity to state its position.
I have discussed this matter with George Allen (who is in New York today) and checked with operating division who are concerned in the Department. The consensus is that no new organization should be set up at this time for the following reasons: 1) Except in time of war, psychological warfare is essentially a political activity and the responsibility must rest with the Secretary of State. 2) The National Security Council has placed this responsibility with the Secretary in NSC-4, under which Assistant Secretary Allen is responsible for coordinating all foreign information activities . Mr. Allen is now discharging this responsibility, operating through a consulting group and working staff composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Forces and CIA. 3) The wartime plans prepared by SANACC Subcommittee have not been completed and are not suitable for immediate application.
The above is for your information in the event this matter comes up at the meeting of the National Security Council tomorrow.
WTS
266. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 9th Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, April 2, 1948.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1 and 2, U.S. policy in Korea and U.S. position on short-term assistance to China.]
3. Coordination of Foreign Information Measures (Memo for the NSC from the Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 30, 1948.)/1/
/1/See the source note, Document 262.
Mr. Lovett read a memorandum/2/ from Assistant Secretary Allen, stating that the Department of State believed that no new psychological warfare authorization should be set up now because in peacetime the State Department should control this activity, as provided in NSC 4. Mr. Lovett also described the steps that had been taken so far in implementation of NSC 4.
/2/Document 264.
The National Security Council:/3/
/3/The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 42. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
Directed the NSC Consultants to review the implementation of certain aspects of NSC 4 series and to submit to the Council an early report with any necessary recommendations.
[Here follows discussion of agenda item 4, internal security.]
267. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the Members of the National Security Council
Washington, April 26, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 4, Box 4205. Top Secret. In a May 10 note to Lovett, Kennan referred to a report "made after the National Security Council Consultants had met with the Director of Central Intelligence to review the implementation of foreign information measures," and he recommended that he be authorized informally to tell Souers that the Department approved the Consultants' two recommendations. (Ibid., Policy Planning Staff Files, 1947-1953, Box 11A) See the Supplement. This referenced report is probably the source text.
SUBJECT
Coordination of Foreign Information MeasuresREFERENCES
a. NSC 4 Series
b. NSC Action No. 42/1//1/See Document 266.
Pursuant to directive by the National Security Council (Reference b), the NSC Consultants have reviewed the implementation by the Director of Central Intelligence of certain aspects of the NSC 4 Series. Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, participated in this review.
Taking into consideration the fact that only four months have elapsed since the issuance of the initial directive to the Director of Central Intelligence, and the difficulties of screening personnel both as to security and qualifications for such duties the NSC Consultants and Mr. Allen feel that satisfactory progress has been made. They also believe that existing organizational relationships both at home and abroad appear to be developing satisfactorily.
At Mr. Allen's suggestion, the Director of Central Intelligence was advised to concentrate so far as possible upon the use of anti-Communist democratic forces in foreign countries, particularly those which are politically left of center. The Director of Central Intelligence also was requested to project these operations forward, both as to scope and area coverage, as rapidly as possible.
The NSC Consultants recommend that the National Security Council:
a. Approve the above findings.
b. Direct the NSC Consultants to undertake a similar review and report in approximately two months.
Sidney W. Souers
268. Memorandum by the Chief of the Special Procedures Group, Central Intelligence Agency (Cassady)
Washington, undated.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-909, Job 83-00036, Box 6, Folder 11. Secret. No addressee is indicated on the source text. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Approximate Date--1 May 48."
POLICY LIAISON FOR SPG ACTIVITIES
1. Since black propaganda activities may have a direct relationship to both the foreign policy of the U.S. and the responsibility of the Director of CIA for conducting operations consistent with such policy, it is recognized that close and continuing policy liaison must be maintained between SPG and the proper foreign policy authority of the U.S. Government. For its day-to-day activities, it is recommended that SPG rely on the Department of State as the primary outside source for policy direction and guidance. In addition, it is possible that the National Security Council may, from time to time, request CIA, through SPG, to undertake certain programs and activities which may not have originated exclusively at the suggestion of the State Department. However, any such programs or activities would necessarily have to be consistent with foreign policy of the U.S. as established by the State Department. Therefore, it would seem that the primary source and authority for foreign policy and, consequently for policy direction for SPG activities, is the Department of State.
2. Regarding the question of how policy direction from the proper level at the Department of State can be transmitted to SPG, it is believed that this could be effectively achieved by the following arrangement:
a. Foreign policy of the U.S. Government, as reflected and expressed in the overseas informational program of the U.S., is already currently stated in policy directives issued by the CIE (Voice of America) in the State Department to its foreign informational offices throughout the world. It is understood that these directives are issued on a weekly, and sometimes on a daily, basis. They specifically state what the U.S. Government seeks to achieve through its overseas informational program in terms of our foreign policy and general objectives. They are, therefore, both an expression of foreign policy and an indication of how foreign policy is to be promoted through the overseas informational media available to the U.S. Government. It is recommended, therefore, that these informational directives of CIE be likewise made available to SPG for policy guidance in connection with its black propaganda activities. In making these directives available to SPG, the State Department would be free to modify the directives, if necessary, so as to adapt them better to the needs of black propaganda.
3. As a channel for communicating these directives, and any additional appropriate comment, from the State Department to SPG, it is proposed that SPG appoint a liaison officer for the purpose of effecting the necessary liaison with the State Department in this particular field. It is believed that liaison within the Department of State should be made with a high ranking staff officer attached to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. The rank and position of this State Department officer should be such as to enable him to obtain prompt and authoritative action on all policy matters affecting SPG activities. He should likewise be in a position to assist SPG in obtaining information, data, material, etc., from OIE and from other branches of the State Department which might be helpful to SPG. In this connection, the OIE has undoubtedly accumulated much information and data concerning the overseas informational picture which would be of direct interest to SPG, and this latter Group should be in a position to draw freely on this material for its black propaganda operations.
4. In addition to the current directives issued by the State Department for the foreign offices of OIE, it is conceivable that the Department of State, through the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, will wish to transmit to SPG supplemental propaganda themes and lines, and possibly even general target objectives. In such cases, SPG would likewise be guided by such supplemental directives and, to the extent possible within its limitations, endeavor to implement such directives operationally.
5. Moreover, general programs and general capabilities of the SPG would, under this liaison arrangement, be brought by the SPG Liaison Officer to the attention of his opposite number in the Office of the Assist-ant Secretary for Public Affairs. The SPG Liaison Officer would also bring to the attention of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, for State Department consideration, any suggested propaganda themes and general programs which might be originated by SPG and which are not covered by the directives received from the Department of State. SPG would not, however, reveal to the Department of State operational methods and techniques, or other classified operational details, involved in the conduct of black propaganda activities. There is no objection to revealing to the State Department the broad, general character of SPG programs and the general capabilities of SPG, but such specific operational details as to how, by whom and specifically where and through what channels SPG activities will be conducted should not be revealed in our liaison arrangement with State, primarily because (1) of the highly secret nature of such operations and (2) because the State Department, for its own protection, should remain in ignorance of such details so as to be in a position to deny knowledge thereof and thereby avoid possible diplomatic embarrassment.
6. Summed up, the foregoing liaison arrangement is one which can be effected quickly and simply. U.S. foreign policy, as reflected in the informational program of the U.S. Government, is already being currently established in connection with the activities of OIE. This policy, in the form of OIE directives, is specifically stated on a day-to-day and week-to-week basis. It would be a simple matter, through proper liaison with the Office of Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, to transmit such directives, with any additional appropriate comment, to SPG for its basic policy direction. SPG would thereby be receiving approved foreign policy directives of the U.S. Government which have been authorized and issued at the proper policy making levels of the State Department. This entire matter of policy liaison and direction for black propaganda activities of SPG is just that simple in its essence and solution.
TG Cassady
269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum
Washington, May 4, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An earlier, similar version, April 30, is ibid., RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1944-47: Lot 64 D 563, Box 11. The Policy Planning Staff minutes for May 3 state: "There was a discussion of the Planning Staff Memorandum of April 30, 1948 on the inauguration of organized political warfare. This paper was generally approved and Mr. Kennan will present it tomorrow for discussion at a meeting of NSC consultants." (Ibid., Box 32)
The Problem
The inauguration of organized political warfare.
Analysis
1. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic meas-ures (as ERP), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.
2. The creation, success, and survival of the British Empire has been due in part to the British understanding and application of the principles of political warfare. Lenin so synthesized the teachings of Marx and Clausewitz that the Kremlin's conduct of political warfare has become the most refined and effective of any in history. We have been handicapped however by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting context outside of all political context, by a national tendency to seek for a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations--the perpetual rhythm of [struggle, in and out of war.]/1/
/1/Although the following page of the source text indicates in an unidentified hand that 3 lines were missing from the bottom of the previous page, a comparison with the April 30 version of the memorandum cited in the source note above identified that only the 6 words in brackets were missing.
3. This Government has, of course, in part consciously and in part unconsciously, been conducting political warfare. Aggressive Soviet political warfare has driven us overtly first to the Truman Doctrine, next to ERP, then to sponsorship of Western Union [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This was all political warfare and should be recognized as such.
4. Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of political warfare--one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government.
5. Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged by the full might of the Kremlin's political warfare, we cannot afford to leave unmobilized our resources for covert political warfare. We cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to scramble into impromptu covert operations [1 line of source text not declassified].
6. It was with all of the foregoing in mind that the Policy Planning Staff began some three months ago/2/ a consideration of specific projects in the field of covert operations, where they should be fitted into the structure of this Government, and how the Department of State should exercise direction and coordination.
/2/Although the following page of the source text indicates that 3 lines were missing from the bottom of the previous page, a comparison with the April 30 version of the memorandum cited in the source note above finds that no words were missing.
7. There are listed below projects which have been or are now being suggested by the Staff:
a. Liberation Committees.
Purpose: To encourage the formation of a public American organization which will sponsor selected political refugee committees so that they may (a) act as foci of national hope and revive a sense of purpose among political refugees from the Soviet World; (b) provide an inspiration for continuing popular resistance within the countries of the Soviet World; and (c) serve as a potential nucleus for all-out liberation movements in the event of war.
Description: This is primarily an overt operation which, however, should receive covert guidance and possibly assistance from the Government. It is proposed that trusted private American citizens be encouraged to establish a public committee which would give support and guidance in U.S. interests to national movements (many of them now in existence) publicly led by outstanding political refugees from the Soviet World, such as Mikolajczyk and Nagy. The American Committee should be so selected and organized as to cooperate closely with this Government. The functions of the American Committee should be limited to enabling selected refugee leaders [to keep alive as public figures with access to printing presses and microphones. It should not engage in underground activities.]/3/
/3/The words in brackets were taken from the April 30 version; see footnote 1 above.
What is proposed here is an operation in the traditional American form: organized public support of resistance to tyranny in foreign countries. Throughout our history, private American citizens have banded together to champion the cause of freedom for people suffering under oppression. (The Communists and Zionists have exploited this tradition to the extreme, to their own ends and to our national detriment, as witness the Abraham Lincoln brigade during the Spanish Civil War and the current illegal Zionist activities.) Our proposal is that this tradition be revived specifically to further American national interests in the present crisis.
[1 heading and 2 paragraphs (21-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
c. Support of Indigenous Anti-Communist Elements in Threatened Countries of the Free World.
Purpose: To strengthen indigenous forces combatting communism in countries where Soviet political warfare is a threat to our national security.
Description: This is a covert operation again utilizing private intermediaries. To insure cover, the private American organizations conducting the operation should be separate from the organizations mentioned in previous projects. [3 lines of source text not declassified] This project is a matter of urgency because the communists are reported to be planning the disruption of ERP through labor disturbances in France. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
d. Preventive Direct Action in Free Countries.
Purpose: Only in cases of critical necessity, to resort to direct action to prevent vital installations, other material, or personnel from being (1) sabotaged or liquidated or (2) captured intact by Kremlin agents or agencies.
Description: This covert operation involves, for example, (1) control over anti-sabotage activities in the Venezuelan oil fields, (2) American sabotage of Near Eastern oil installations on the verge of Soviet capture, and (3) designation of key individuals threatened by the Kremlin who should be protected or removed elsewhere.
8. It would seem that the time is now fully ripe for the creation of a covert political warfare operations directorate within the Government. If we are to engage in such operations, they must be under unified direction. One man must be boss. And he must, as those responsible for the overt phases of political warfare, be answerable to the Secretary of State, who directs the whole in coordination.
9. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
10. The National Security Council Secretariat would seem to provide the best possible cover for such a directorate. Such cover would also permit a direct chain of command from the Secretary of State and be a natural meeting ground for close collaboration with the military establishment.
Recommendations
11. There should promptly be established, under the cover of the National Security Council Secretariat, a directorate of political warfare operations to be known as the Consultative (or Evaluation) Board of the National Security Council.
12. The Director should be designated by the Secretary of State and should be responsible to him.
13. The Director should have initially a staff of 4 officers designated by the Department of State and 4 officers designated by the Secretary of National Defense.
14. The Board should have complete authority over covert political warfare operations conducted by this Government. It should have the authority to initiate new operations and to bring under its control or abolish existing covert political warfare activities.
15. Specifically, (a) the four projects mentioned in paragraph 7 above should be activated by the Board and (b) covert political warfare now under CIA and theater commanders abroad should be brought under the authority of the Board.
16. The coordination of the above covert operations with the overt conduct of foreign policy should, of course, be accomplished through the offices of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State.
270. Draft Proposed NSC Directive
Washington, May 5, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. For another version, see the draft NSC directive, May 4 (ibid.), in the Supplement.
1. There is hereby established under the NSC the position of Director of Special Studies. The Director shall be nominated by the Secretary of State and appointed by the NSC.
2. The Director should have initially a full time staff of four representatives assigned from the Department of State and one representative each from the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the CIA, and one member to be designated by the Secretary of National Defense.
3. For the purpose of coordinating covert operations as defined in this paper, in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Director, under the direction of the National Security Council:
a. To arrange for the preparation, by his own staff or other agencies as appropriate, of plans for covert operations.
b. To review all such plans, and if he approves them to arrange for their execution by appropriate agencies.
c. To review the execution of such operations to insure that they are being conducted in accordance with approved plans, provided that nothing contained herein shall require the disclosure of secret intelligence sources and methods.
d. To arrange for the development of a program for the conduct of covert operations in time of war or national emergency to include such matters as organization, training, equipment and logistical support.
4. The Director of Special Studies is charged with ensuring that such covert activities are consistent with US foreign policies and overt activities and that appropriate agencies of the US Government both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area) are kept informed of such operations which will directly affect them.
5. The Director is charged with giving timely notification of intended plans and operations to directly interested governmental agencies. Any disagreements arising should be resolved by the staff of the Director in their respective agencies, and in event of no resolution of important features of the plans or operations, the matter shall be referred to the NSC.
6. Covert operations are understood to be all planned measures exclusive of armed conflict by recognized military forces and overt information emanating from a legitimate source designed to influence the thought, morale, and behavior of a people in such a manner as to further the accomplishment of national aims.
271. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, May 5, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret.
1. Reference is made to the draft of the proposed NSC Directive establishing the functions of a Director of Special Studies--as distributed this date./1/ This Agency desires to place itself on record as follows:
/1/Document 270.
a. If it appears desirable, in the interest of national security, to designate an individual responsible for the planning and coordination of psychological warfare activities, this Agency feels the individual should be the present chief of current activities in that field. War-time activities in that field should be a natural growth and expansion of peace-time activities. The individual responsible for future planning should be identical with the individual responsible for current planning and operations.
b. The existing operation and its liaison with the Department of State is handicapped only by the absence of a State Department officer having authority to represent the Department in regard to over-all policies.
c. It is assumed that the word "all", in the first line of paragraph 3 of the subject draft paper, is a typographical error in view of the provisions of NSC 4-A and NSCID 5.
d. If the National Security Council feels, in opposition to subparagraphs a, b, and c, above, that a necessity still exists for the appointment of a Director of Special Studies, it is urgently recommended that one of two actions be taken, as follows:
(1) Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposed directive be changed to read substantially as follows:
"2. The Director should have initially only the necessary clerical staff to perform his designated functions.
"3. For the purpose of planning covert psychological operations for implementation by the operating Agency, in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Director, under the Direction of the National Security Council:
"a. To develop a program for the conduct of both overt and covert psychological operations in time of war or national emergency.
"b. To plan for emergency or war-time organization, training, equipment and logistical support."
(2) Divorce the existing covert psychological operations from the control and operation of CIA by the rescission of NSC 4-A and place it under the control and operation of a new Agency. Security in the conduct of this sensitive operation cannot be maintained except through control by one Agency.
2. It will be noted that the proposed draft directive provides for the full control of covert psychological operations without the responsibility. It is not believed this is the intent of either the Congress or the National Security Council as indicated in NSC 4-A, NSCID 5, and the National Security Act of 1947.
RH Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN272. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, May 6, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret.
Reference is made to the attached draft copy of a proposed NSC Directive/1/ to be discussed by your Staff on 7 May 1948. We have advised our representative to present our views on the subject paper, as follows:
/1/Most likely a reference to Document 270.
1. We feel the appointment of a Director of Special Studies for purposes other than war-time planning is a dangerous duplication of existing assigned functions.
2. We desire to call attention to the fact that this Agency, acting under NSC 4-A, has made considerable strides in the subject field, has obligated itself to a considerable expenditure of funds for equipment, transportation, and experienced personnel, and has made firm commitments for clandestine psychological operations outside the United States for a long period of time. Interference with this activity infers a disruption of current activities and the possibility of serious breaks in security.
3. We feel that paragraph 3 of the proposed directive, if issued, should be changed to read as follows:
"3. For the purpose of planning for war-time or emergency covert psychological operations, in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Director, under the direction of the National Security Council:
"a. To arrange for the preparation, by his own staff or other agencies as appropriate, of plans for war-time or emergency covert psychological operations.
"b. To be prepared to recommend area and material priorities in the field of psychological warfare in the event of emergency or state of war.
"c. To develop a program for the organization, training, equipment, and logistical support for war-time or emergency covert psychological operations."
4. We must call attention to the fact that paragraph 4 of the proposed directive is an exact duplication of this Agency's directive under NSC 4-A.
5. We must call attention to the fact that paragraph 5 of the proposed directive is an exact duplication of our present arrangement under NSC 4-A.
6. We feel that paragraph 6 of the proposed directive should either be eliminated as being out-dated by events or that the word "psychological" be added after the word "covert" in the first line of that paragraph and the words "and overt information emanating from a legitimate source" be deleted.
7. We feel that the proposed directive infers the necessity for a rescission of NSC 4-A and the reestablishment of covert psychological functions under an Agency other than CIA. It is a step toward placing secret intelligence and Special Operations (in the accepted international sense) under separate agencies. We respectfully invite attention to our own experience and the experience of other nations in this regard. There is no question but that war-time operations require a division between combat (or tactical) psychological warfare and strategic psychological warfare. From the standpoint of national security, we strongly urge a realistic understanding of our current needs as balanced against our needs in the event of war.
8. In view of the above, we again urgently recommend that the present operations under NSC 4-A be not jeopardized and that war-time planning be placed in the hands of the facility conducting current activities in the subject field.
RH Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN273. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, May 11, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-807, Item 22. Top Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian in 1953. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, p. 201.
SUBJECT
Psychological Operations1. Reference is made to the proposed NSC Directive, as drafted 7 May 1948,/1/ pertaining to covert (psychological) operations. This Agency has several times, during the discussion phases of this proposed directive, placed itself on record as opposed to the plan on which the proposed directive is based. The proposed directive, if enacted, will establish a staff function providing for Authority in a delicate field of operation--without the Responsibility.
/1/The May 7 draft has not been found.
2. This Agency again strongly urges that the provision of NSC 4-A, as written, be continued without change. If the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel the need for emergency and wartime planning in the covert psychological warfare field, then we again suggest that advance planning be made the responsibility of the facility currently in operation.
3. However, if the National Security Council approves this proposed draft of 10 May 1948,/2/ the Central Intelligence Agency, of course, will cooperate to the best of its ability in an endeavor to make a going concern of the proposed Special Studies organization.
/2/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2) See the Supplement.
R. H. Hillenkoetter/3/
Rear Admiral, USN/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.
274. Draft Report by the National Security Council
NSC 10
Washington, May 12, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. Transmitted under a covering note from Souers to the NSC submitting the report for consideration at an early meeting. For a May 10 draft of this report, see the Supplement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2)
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL STUDIES
The Problem
1. To consider measures for the furtherance of covert operations in the interest of our national security.
Analysis
2. The means employed by a nation in pursuit of its national objectives may be both overt and covert. They range in time of peace from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP), and "white" informational activities, to such covert operations as unacknowledged support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" propaganda and encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.
3. Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged in a "cold war" by the full might of the Kremlin, the United States cannot afford to leave unmobilized or unemployed its resources for covert operations. The United States cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to reply upon improvised covert operations as was done at the time of the Italian elections.
4. In NSC 4-A/1/ provision was made for the conduct of certain covert psychological (propaganda) operations. The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee has considered such matters as utilization of refugees from the USSR in the United States national interest (SANACC 395),/2/ plans for evacuation of key foreign personnel (SANACC 396), demolition of oil facilities (SANACC 398), and psychological warfare (SANACC 304)./3/ In connection with psychological warfare, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, have been referred to the National Security Council for consideration. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that from the military point of view "there should be established, as soon as practicable, under the National Security Council, a Psychological Warfare Organization, but with its peacetime scope and activities limited to that of a working nucleus for planning and coordination" (SANACC 304/14)./4/ The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State has also recommended that covert operations be immediately instituted under unified direction./5/
/1/Document 257.
/2/The SANACC numbers refer to series rather than to individual papers.
/3/See, for example, Document 249.
/4/JCS memorandum for SANACC, undated (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-291) and SANACC memorandum for the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, April 12. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2) See the Supplement for both; the JSC memorandum is filed under date of January 1948.
/5/See Document 269.
5. In the light of the above considerations, there is a need for an organization which is designed to strengthen and extend current covert operations in the interest of our national security and to provide for plans and preparations for the conduct, in time of war, of covert operations and of the overt phases of psychological warfare. The establishment of such an organization will require the revision of NSC 4-A.
Conclusions
6. The proposed National Security Council Directive in Annex A should be approved, and if approved, the proposed revision of NSC 4-A in Annex B should be approved
Annex A/6/
/6/Top Secret. The proposed directive is a further revision of Document 270.
Proposed NSC Directive
1. There is hereby established under the National Security Council the position of Director of Special Studies. The Director shall be nominated by the Secretary of State and appointed by the National Security Council.
2. The Director should have initially a staff of four members assigned from the Department of State, one service member each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and one member from the Central Intelligence Agency. The Secretary of Defense may assign a member if he so desires. The staff members will act both as assistants to the Director, in the performance of his duties, and as liaison between him and their respective agencies.
3. It shall be the duty of the Director, under the direction of the National Security Council:
a. To be responsible for the preparation by his own staff or by other agencies, as appropriate, of plans for all covert operations. It is intended that each operating agency will develop the details of that part of a plan covering its own operations.
b. To review all such plans and, if he approves them, to arrange for their execution by appropriate agencies.
c. To review the execution of such operations to insure that they are being conducted in accordance with approved plans, provided that nothing contained herein shall require the disclosure of secret intelligence sources and methods.
d. To develop an over-all program for the conduct of covert operations and overt phases of psychological warfare in time of war or when directed by the President, to include organization, training, equipment and logistic support, and to arrange for initiation of such training and preparations in time of peace as necessary for the prompt initiation of such a program.
4. The Director is charged with:
a. Giving timely notification of intended plans and operations to each government agency represented on his staff through the respective staff members and to other government agencies which may be affected. Problems arising in connection with the formulation of plans for or the conduct of operations shall be resolved directly between the Director and the agency or agencies involved.
b. Insuring that such covert activities are consistent with US foreign policies and overt activities and that plans for war-time covert operations and psychological operations are consistent with and complement Joint Chiefs of Staff approved plans for military operations.
5. The ends envisaged in this paper will require unvouchered funds other than those already appropriated.
6. As used in this directive "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (excluding armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and counter-espionage) which are conducted or sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to propaganda; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.
7. "Overt psychological warfare" referred to herein shall be construed to mean information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding at home and abroad of the status and progress of any war effort in which the United States may be engaged and of the war policies, activities and aims of the Government.
Annex B/7/
/7/Top Secret.
Draft Revision of NSC 4-A
1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts and covert operations of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.
2. The similarity of operational methods involved in covert operations and covert intelligence activities makes the Central Intelligence Agency an appropriate agency to conduct such operations. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102 (d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council:
a. Directs the Director of Central Intelligence to continue, within the limit of available funds, such covert propaganda operations as may be arranged with and approved by the Director of Special Studies in accordance with the latter's directive from the National Security Council.
b. Authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to conduct such other covert operations as may be arranged by the Director of Special Studies in accordance with the latter's directive from the National Security Council.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged with ensuring that appropriate agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), are kept informed of such operations which will directly affect them.
4. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to require the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose operational details concerning its secret intelligence techniques, sources or contacts.
275. Memorandum From the Intelligence Survey Group to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, May 13, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 4. Top Secret. The NSC appointed the Survey Group in February 1948 to evaluate the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence system generally. Its members were Allen Dulles, who served as chairman, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson.
SUBJECT
Interim Report No. 2: Relations between Secret Operations and Secret IntelligenceIn connection with our study of the intelligence operations of the Government, particularly those of CIA, we have been informed that a plan for developing certain other covert operations is being submitted to the NSC. As we understand it, such operations would be directed particularly towards affording encouragement to the freedom-loving elements in those countries which have been over-run by Communism and toward combating by covert means the spread of Communist influence.
We understand that it is suggested that a Director of Special Studies, to be nominated by the Secretary of State, and appointed by the NSC, with a staff of nine members assigned from the Department of State, the armed services and CIA, be given the responsibility to develop and give general direction to a program of covert operations as indicated above, including work in the covert psychological field, which under NSC 4a has already been initiated in CIA.
The question of policy involved in these measures is not directly within our terms of reference. However, these projects have an important bearing on the future of the intelligence operations of CIA, and, for this reason, we feel justified in commenting on this phase of the subject.
We suggest, in particular, that further attention should be given to the means for the carrying out of the special operations contemplated and the relation between these operations and the proper conduct of secret intelligence.
A central planning and coordinating staff, as proposed in the new plan, is essential, but the centralized control of operations is equally important. In this delicate field, actual control must be exercised by the Director, who should be in intimate touch not only with plans and policies but also with the details of the operations. We do not believe that these types of operation can be "farmed" out to various existing agencies of the Government without jeopardizing their effectiveness and involving serious security risks. In particular, it would be dangerous to have several unrelated and uncorrelated clandestine operations carried out in such sensitive areas as those behind the Iron Curtain. There would be duplication of effort, crossing of wires in the use of clandestine agents, and serious risk for the chains and agents used in the respective operations. In our opinion, the Director and staff, if removed from actual operations, as apparently contemplated under the proposed NSC directive, would not be able to control this situation.
In carrying out these special operations, the Director and his staff should have intimate knowledge of what is being done in the field of secret intelligence and access to all the facilities which may be built up through a properly constituted secret intelligence network. Secret operations, particularly through support of resistance groups, provide one of the most important sources of secret intelligence, and the information gained from secret intelligence must immediately be put to use in guiding and directing secret operations. In many cases it is necessary to determine whether a particular agent or chain should primarily be used for secret intelligence or for secret operations, because the attempt to press both uses may endanger the security of each.
The special operations contemplated will require a staff operating abroad both under State Department and other cover, as in the case of secret intelligence. Unless the personnel for both operations is under one overall control in Washington, even though a measure of insulation is provided in the field, there is likely to be overlapping of activities and functions in critical areas which will imperil security.
The Allied experience in the carrying out of secret operations and secret intelligence during the last war has pointed up the close relationship of the two activities. The British, for example, who had separate systems during the war, have now come around to the view that secret intelligence and secret operations should be carried out under a single operational head and have reorganized their services accordingly.
We recommend:
1. That a Director, subject to appropriate policy guidance as suggested in the proposed NSC directive, should be made responsible for all forms of covert activities, including secret intelligence, secret operations, clandestine psychological work and such other covert operations as may be assigned to the Director by the NSC.
2. That each branch of these covert activities should be under a chief reporting to the Director.
3. That the Director should be immediately responsible to the NSC or to the Director of CIA as the NSC might determine.
The practical effect of the decision reached under point 3 would be to determine whether CIA should continue to be charged with the collection of secret intelligence. It would, in any case, continue to be the recipient of all intelligence collected by the Director of Special Studies, and even if secret intelligence were removed from its control, CIA might be used as a "cover" agency for the new operations.
It had been our intention to reserve for our final report our recommendations as to whether the collection of secret intelligence should or should not continue to be a function of the CIA, as we had wished to complete our survey of the entire intelligence set-up before dealing with this key question.
However, if the NSC should now determine that a program of secret operations is to be undertaken, and desires any further views from us as to how this would affect the handling of secret intelligence, we shall be glad to submit a report on this subject.
276. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) and Secretary of State Marshall
Washington, May 19, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563. A May 11 version of this memorandum (ibid.), is in the Supplement.
Attached is an NSC paper, Director of Special Studies, dated May 10, 1948./1/ This is an important matter--expansion of covert activities and establishment of a central directorate over all such activities. I would be glad to explain it personally to you, if you wish.
/1/Document 274.
The underlying paper has been cleared with Bohlen but not with other offices of the Department because it intimately involves NSC 4-A, a document knowledge of which for security reasons has been limited to you, Assistant Secretary Allen, and the Policy Planning Staff. It is, however, based largely on and adheres to the fundamental principles of one prepared by this Staff, entitled "Political Warfare"./2/ Our paper on political warfare was made available to Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Allen, and the four geographical offices. They either gave affirmative approval or indicated no objection. I therefore feel that the attached NSC paper would be generally acceptable to them.
/2/Document 269.
Outside of this Department, the underlying NSC paper has been cleared by the other consultants to the NSC and, I understand, it has been approved in principle by Mr. Forrestal and the JCS.
The recommendation that the Director of Special Studies (covert operations) be directly under the NSC does not represent the ideal solution sought in the attached NSC paper. Organizationally, the ideal solution would be to place the Director of Special Studies, for cover and intelligence reasons, under the Director of CIA. S/P did not recommend this solution because, at the present time, the CIA set-up in respect both to personalities and organization is not favorable to such a development and it is not likely that there will be any material change in this situation in the near future. We therefore reluctantly decided to let the CIA sleeping dog lie and recommend a separate organization which might at a later date be incorporated in CIA.
Subsequent to approval of the attached paper by the NSC consult-ants, I received a copy of a memorandum to Admiral Souers from the Survey Group headed by Allen Dulles (Tab A)./3/ Dulles hits the organizational problem head on, recommending (a) removing secret intelligence from CIA and placing it, with covert operations, under a separate director or (b) placing covert operations under CIA--which we feel should not be done at this time. I have high regard for Dulles' experience and knowledge in this field and, therefore, attach great weight to his recommendations. But the implications of his recommendations are so far-reaching that I think they should be discussed by you and Mr. Forrestal rather than in the lower levels of NSC.
/3/Document 275.
Meanwhile, time is running out on us. If we are to engage effectively in intelligent, organized covert activities, appropriations must be obtained from the Congress. Congress, however, is soon to adjourn. Therefore, if we are to get into operation in this field before the end of summer, Congress must be approached immediately with a request for the necessary funds.
Recommendations:/4/
/4/There is no indication on the source text that Marshall approved or disapproved the recommendations.
It is recommended that :
1. You approve the principle underlying the attached NSC paper that this Government expand and bring under unified direction its covert activities;
2. You propose to Mr. Forrestal that together, in your discretion, you invite Dulles either to (a) replace Hillenkoetter as Director of CIA, with covert operations under him, or (b) assume directorship of covert operation and secret intelligence under Hillenkoetter, or (c) accept the position of Director of Special Studies as recommended in the attached NSC paper;
3. If Dulles accepts, you ask him (a) to present for your and Mr. Forrestal's approval his plans for covert operations and (b) immediately to approach Congress for the funds necessary to conduct these operations;
4. If Dulles declines, you ask him to recommend a Director of Special Studies as proposed in the underlying NSC paper.
George F. Kennan/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
277. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 11th Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, May 20, 1948.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret. Prepared on May 21. According to the minutes of the 11th meeting, the following persons were present: Secretary of State Marshall; Secretary of Defense Forrestal; Secretary of the Army Royall; Secretary of the Navy Sullivan; Secretary of the Air Force Symington; NSRB Chairman Hill; Under Secretary of State Lovett; DCI Hillenkoetter; NSC Executive Secretary Souers; and Assistant Executive Secretary Lay. (Ibid.)
[Here follows discussion of agenda item 1, U.S. position on support for Western Union and other related free countries.]
2. Director of Special Studies (NSC 10)/1/
/1/For the draft of NSC 10, see Document 274.
Mr. Lovett said that the subject report is intended to provide for an expansion of our covert activities. He said that he had not had time to match up the subject report with the comments of the Dulles survey group. He would, therefore, like further time to study this matter.
Secretary Royall said that he was opposed to creating new organizations. He asked why CIA could not direct these activities instead of setting up a Director of Special Studies.
Mr. Lovett said that from the beginning of the National Intelligence Authority it was the general feeling that CIA should have no police duties for fear that it would become a Gestapo. He was afraid that if CIA undertook to conduct these covert operations, the Congress might be afraid that it was becoming a gestapo.
Secretary Royall felt that setting up another organization would merely result in duplication of what CIA is doing.
Secretary Forrestal noted that one important consideration is that, if intelligence activities are to be effective, they must be secret.
Mr. Souers noted that comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not yet been received.
Mr. Lovett said that although the JCS comments would be interesting, it must be remembered that we are not talking about wartime activities but rather about activities to be conducted at the present time. He noted, however, that the covert operations were of a type which the State Department could not conduct.
Secretary Forrestal said that these operations must not be conducted on an ad hoc personal basis as in the past.
Mr. Lovett said that he had talked with Senator Bridges/2/ who had at one time offered to appropriate $50,000,000 for this type of operation.
/2/Senator Styles Bridges, Republican-New Hampshire.
Admiral Hillenkoetter noted that the Director of Special Studies could not properly conduct sabotage and counter-sabotage. He felt that current operation should be done as at present by CIA but should be taken over by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in wartime.
Mr. Lay explained the background of this report. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed the creation of a nucleus psychological warfare operation immediately. SANACC concurred in this proposal and submitted it to the NSC for consideration. The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State had proposed an organization to conduct political warfare. The NSC Staff considered both of these proposals and prepared the subject report which envisaged a Director of Special Studies under the NSC who would control, but not conduct, all covert operations. The Dulles survey group on the other hand proposed that both covert operations and secret intelligence activities be performed by a single Agency, either under CIA or directly under the NSC.
The National Security Council:/3/
/3/The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 47. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
Deferred action on this report until the next meeting of the Council.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 3-8, protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures, scheduling of NSC meetings, documents resulting from conversations with the British regarding the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, U.S. policy on atomic warfare, review of the world situation as it relates to the security of the United States, and NSC status of projects.]
278. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the National Security Council
Washington, May 24, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. The memorandum was originally addressed to Souers and was readdressed for circulation to the members of the Council. The only other difference between the original and the circulated version was the addition of footnote 2 below to the latter.
SUBJECT:
Covert (Psychological) Operations1. With regard to the discussions at the National Security Council meeting the other afternoon on this subject, I wish to present the following idea which I think possesses many advantages. I believe a plan worked out, as suggested below, would overcome almost all of the objections raised, and I believe it would be in consonance with the Dulles-Jackson-Correa paper/1/ and would satisfy the State Department's demands for a directing hand in what forms of propaganda are to be used and what underground resistance movements are to be supported. Furthermore, the suggested plan would be in consonance with NSC 4-A and would answer the objections of the Secretary of the Army regarding the establishment of a new Agency and regarding making the National Security Council an operating body. Also, I believe this suggested plan would receive the warm support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and certainly would be in line with the intent of Congress as derived from conversations with both Senators and Representatives.
/1/Document 275.
2. To begin with, in the proposed paper/2/ on a Director of Special Studies, as presented, it is necessary to divide "Covert Operations" into two sections: (1) those operations that will be carried out in peace time and (2) those that will be carried out only during war time or during a period when the outbreak of war is imminent. The first group of such operations, those to be carried out in peace time, will involve black propaganda, including morale subversion, assistance to underground movements, and support of resistance movements. The second group, which it is very obvious that the United States would not perform except in relation to war or when war was so close that it was felt it could not be avoided, are the positive operations involving sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, subversion against hostile states, guerrilla support, and evacuation. The above division appears to be a most logical one inasmuch as it is very difficult to believe that we would send in parties to accomplish physical destruction in any phase of a "cold" war.
/2/NSC 10. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. To carry out this concept, it is suggested that a paper be prepared to set forth the following points:
(a) To provide in the State Department a high-level liaison officer for covert operations. This officer should be of sufficient stature to have the authority to pass on the forms of propaganda to be employed and to tell the Central Intelligence Agency that it is the policy of the United States to support such-and-such an underground or resistance movement and to deny such support to another underground or resistance movement. (It has been the lack of any such liaison with authority that has really caused the present discussions.)
(b) Covert operations of the first group, involving black propaganda, assistance to underground movements, and support of resistance movements, to be carried on in peace time, shall be conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with NSC 4-A and in accordance with the policies derived from the liaison officer mentioned in (a) above.
(c) Covert operations of the second group, involving sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, etc., which are not to be carried on in peace time but only in war time or in a state of emergency, to be considered and planned now by a committee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with members from the Armed Services and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is to be emphasized that only "planning" is to be done now for this second group of operations.
(d) Both groups of operations in war time or emergency will naturally fall under the military commander. Upon the outbreak of war or in a state of emergency, the organization conducting covert operations in (b) above should be lifted bodily from the Central Intelligence Agency and placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in relation to the plans for the covert operations mentioned in (c) above.
(e) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be kept informed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the measures undertaken under (b) above, in order that the transition from a peace time status to a war time status can be made smoothly and efficiently.
RH Hillenkoetter
279. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Washington, May 25, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files, 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Box 719, Pol & Psych Warfare. Top Secret.
We are concerned here in the Staff about the political warfare question. If the Executive Branch does not act soon to firm up its ideas as to what should be done along these lines, the possibility of getting secret funds out of Congress for covert operations will be lost. If this is not done now, it will mean that this Government has given up hope of conducting effective political warfare activities for the duration of this administration.
If nothing is done along the lines recommended in NSC 10, this Staff will have to recommend that the State Department press for the abrogation of NSC 4-A, which is not working out well.
If you want further information on the background of this project, I would suggest that you talk with Davies,/1/ of my staff, who is thoroughly familiar with it.
/1/John P. Davies, Jr.
I understand that Allen Dulles is arriving in Washington on Thursday and will be here through Saturday morning. He is fully acquainted with the NSC 10 project and it is our hope that he will head the organization. During his stay here, he will make himself available for discussion and comment on NSC 10. We are informed by Mr. Forrestal's office that Mr. Forrestal is so strongly in favor of implementation of NSC 10 that he is prepared to come over to the Department to discuss the problem with you and Mr. Dulles if you wish./2/
/2/Next to this paragraph a handwritten annotation from Lovett reads: "I think we ought to meet with Forrestal promptly. L"
GFK
280. Memorandum of Meeting
Washington, May 28, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. Drafted on June 1 presumably by Blum. For background information on this meeting, see Document 279.
MEMORANDUM ON A MEETING HELD IN MR. FORRESTAL'S OFFICE ON FRIDAY, 28 MAY 1948 TO CONSIDER NSC-10
"DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL STUDIES"
PRESENT
Messrs. Forrestal, Lovett, Allen Dulles and Blum; also for the first part of the meeting, General Gruenther and Admiral Hillenkoetter; for the latter part of the meeting, Mr. SouersAdmiral Hillenkoetter briefly reviewed the CIA view regarding NSC-10, pointing out particularly that a distinction should be made between covert operations in time of peace, which should be assigned to CIA, and those covert operations which would only be carried out in time of war, and responsibility for the planning of which should be assigned to the JCS.
General Gruenther reviewed the informal view of the JCS as developed at their Wednesday meeting. He said that the JCS seemed to favor, in principle, having secret operations as well as secret intelligence in CIA, but said that they had questions as to CIA's ability to handle this task. He asked whether Hillenkoetter would be prepared to accept the idea of an advisory panel (as in NSC-10) if the operations were placed in CIA. Hillenkoetter replied in the affirmative.
After Admiral Hillenkoetter and General Gruenther had left the meeting, the discussion continued and the following agreement was reached by Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Lovett.
(1) The present head of the Office of Special Operations in CIA should be replaced.
(2) Responsibility for both secret intelligence and secret operations should be assigned to CIA under the new head appointed under (1).
(3) This new office should have considerable autonomy within CIA, and its head should be authorized to appeal directly to the National Security Council in case of differences arising between him and the Director of Central Intelligence.
(4) Allen Dulles, present at the meeting, was asked whether he would accept the new post. He replied that he did not think so, but that he would give his final decision in a few days.
(5) Names of other persons who might fill the new post were considered.
281. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the National Security Council
Washington, June 2, 1948.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's File, Subject File. Top Secret. Attached to another copy of this document is an earlier draft of the proposal with handwritten changes. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2)
SUBJECT
Establishment of a Special Services Unit in CIAREFERENCE
NSC 10The enclosed proposal on the above subject, which is suggested as a possible alternative to the Conclusions in NSC 10, represents the results of an informal discussion between the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, and Mr. Allen W. Dulles./1/
/1/Document 280.
At their request the enclosure is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council in connection with NSC 10, which is scheduled as Item 1 on the Agenda for the NSC 12th Meeting on Thursday, June 3./2/
/2/See Document 283.
Sidney W. Souers
Enclosure/3/
/3/Top Secret.
Proposal Submitted to the National Security Council
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL SERVICES UNIT IN THECENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Further consideration of the problem of developing our activities in the field of covert political warfare leads to the following points which, it is suggested, should serve as a basis for the further consideration of this problem by the National Security Council.
CIA provides the legal structure within which covert political activities can be conducted and it is already charged under NSC 4-A with the conduct of covert psychological operations abroad. In addition, CIA is already charged by National Security Council Directive No. 5 with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad, which operations are by their nature very closely related to covert political activities as contemplated in NSC 10. It, therefore, seems desirable for legal, as well as operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert political activities, but to place the responsibility for this work within the legal structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and closely relate it to secret intelligence.
The principal objection to this proposal arises out of doubt as to whether CIA is presently so constituted that it can effectively handle this problem which is so different from CIA's primary task of coordinating intelligence activities and correlating and evaluating intelligence relating to the national security. There is also fear lest covert operations develop in a manner inconsistent with our foreign and military policies.
These considerations lead to the following general conclusions and recommendations:
(1) Responsibility for both secret intelligence and secret operations, including covert psychological activities, should be placed in a new Special Services unit to be created in CIA.
(2) This unit should have a considerable measure of autonomy within CIA and its directors should be authorized to appeal directly to the National Security Council in case of differences arising between him and the Director of Central Intelligence.
(3) A highly qualified person recruited from outside the present ranks of CIA and approved by the National Security Council should be appointed to head the new unit in CIA.
(4) Provision should be made so that the chief of the newly created unit has access to and receives policy guidance from the Department of State and the Military Establishment.
(5) It is understood that this is a provisional arrangement subject to review at a later date.
The following actions should be taken if the National Security Council approves in principle the foregoing points:
(a) The Department of State, the National Military Establishment, and CIA should jointly request funds for the proposed operation.
(b) The Executive Secretary, National Security Council, should be directed to prepare a detailed directive covering the above points for approval by the Council.
282. Memorandum From George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) and Secretary of State Marshall
Washington, June 2, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563. Top Secret.
The text of the paper regarding the establishment of a Special Serv-ices unit in CIA, attached to the June 2nd memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council,/1/ conforms with my understanding of Mr. Lovett's views as a result of his conversation with Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Dulles.
/1/Document 281.
The Policy Planning Staff suggests that the detailed directive referred to in the final paragraph (b) of the paper be drafted in the first instance by a representative to be designated by the Secretary and one to be designated by Mr. Forrestal. Mr. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff has been following this subject for the Department. He is temporarily abroad on an official mission. Mr. Butler of the Planning Staff is handling this part of Mr. Davies' work.
George H. Butler/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
283. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 12th Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, June 3, 1948.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret. Prepared on June 4.
The following notes contain a brief summary of the discussion at the 12th meeting of the National Security Council on June 3, 1948.
1. Director of Special Studies (NSC 10)
Mr. Lovett explained the proposal which resulted from discussion between Messrs. Forrestal, Lovett and Dulles, at which General Gruenther and Admiral Hillenkoetter were also heard./1/ Mr. Lovett said that this proposal was a possible method of meeting the problem to enable the Council to move rapidly in getting the necessary funds.
/1/See Document 280.
Admiral Hillenkoetter noted the statement that the principal objection was whether CIA could handle this job. He said that no protest or doubts had been expressed up to the present. The Office of Special Operations in CIA is practically autonomous now. However, Admiral Hillenkoetter thought that the proposed right of appeal to the Council by the Director of that office was totally wrong. Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that CIA now has qualified people. The man heading this work is a Mr. Cassidy who worked with General Donovan in France. Admiral Hillenkoetter, therefore, did not see the need to put in another man who could get necessary policy guidance. Admiral Hillenkoetter wondered why he himself could not be given such guidance.
Mr. Lovett said that the Dulles recommendations revolved around having secret intelligence, covert operations and psychological warfare all under one man who in turn would be under Admiral Hillenkoetter. Mr. Lovett drew a distinction between the overall function of CIA and these covert operations which were a specialized extra curricular activity.
Secretary Forrestal said that the proposals also took account of the criticisms that CIA should not be an operating organization. These would be answered in part by making a separate unit for covert operations from the parts of CIA which discharged its coordinating and evaluating functions. Secretary Forrestal said that the real thing to face is the feeling that a military organization cannot deal with the political subtleties in this activity. He felt that we must have a very able man with a civilian type of mind.
Mr. Lovett pointed out that CIA is intended to be a civilian agency.
Secretary Forrestal said that it comes down to getting a man who will be acceptable to Admiral Hillenkoetter, the type such as Mr. Dulles.
Admiral Hillenkoetter said that he had started carrying out NSC 4-A by getting Mr. Cassidy who was recommended by General Donovan and by David Bruce. Mr. Cassidy is a broker and banker from Chicago.
Mr. Lovett said that another point about the right of appeal arose in part from the feeling that it might be necessary, because of the multiplicity of military interests, for the NSC to compose any differences that arise.
Mr. Souers pointed out that NSC 4-A originally proposed an advisory panel which was stricken out. The result has been that there has been no authoritative guidance. If no official tie-in is established, there is the danger that this activity will be celled off.
Admiral Hillenkoetter said that the organization chart provided a tie-in with State, but it was not official enough.
Secretary Royall said that he agreed with Admiral Hillenkoetter's comments. Secretary Royall had no faith in the proposed right of appeal. He felt that if you gave a man responsibility, you should give him the full authority to run it.
Mr. Hill agreed with Secretary Royall.
Secretary Forrestal said that he was confident Mr. Cassidy could do the job. Admiral Hillenkoetter agreed and said that Mr. Cassidy came with the best recommendation.
Mr. Lovett said that he certainly could not ask for more than CIA had done [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
Mr. Whitney said that there were many papers on this subject. He pointed out that there is a JCS paper/2/ along the lines of Admiral Hillenkoetter's view which had been monitored by General Vandenberg who feels quite strongly on this subject.
/2/Not found.
Mr. Lovett said that the wording of the second principle in the Forrestal-Lovett proposals did not adequately convey their thought. They had understood that the Director of the special unit would only be authorized to report to the NSC on matters which affected the interests of other agencies in this activity.
Admiral Hillenkoetter felt that this still has the same objectionable features.
Mr. Souers pointed out that part of this activity is extra curricular to CIA. Secret intelligence is all right, but the other activities envisaged are not normal CIA functions.
Admiral Hillenkoetter felt that the other activities should be either in CIA or set up entirely separate.
Secretary Forrestal said that their proposals were an effort to preclude setting up a separate agency but still to recognize the complexities in this field. He said that they were trying to deal with the realities arising out of the criticisms in Congress and elsewhere on this subject. He agreed that Admiral Hillenkoetter must be allowed to keep his finger on this activity, but felt there should still be a channel to the NSC.
Secretary Royall said that this activity carried a lot of responsibility since it is felt to be questionable morally in some quarters. He didn't see how the NSC could give responsibility without authority.
Secretary Forrestal said that giving it completely to CIA would not meet the criticisms regarding military influence.
Secretary Royall felt that if CIA was not civilian in nature, it was the fault of the NSC because CIA is supposed to be above the military. If it is not, he felt that the NSC should correct the situation. His first choice is to give it to CIA. The second choice would be to create a separate organization. His third and last choice would be to retain the right of appeal.
Mr. Lovett noted that the Dulles recommendations were that this activity be placed either under the NSC or under CIA as the NSC desires. He understood that the Dulles point would be met by a tightly knit unit under CIA, but he was concerned because this goes beyond CIA legislative authority. There is no legal authority for this activity except that residing in the NSC. He, therefore, felt it was necessary to have an umbilical cord to the NSC.
Mr. Souers noted that Mr. Kennan had made the point that State wants to work with partisan groups in this country. He was afraid that this activity would be destroyed if they had to work with an intelligence agency. Mr. Souers pointed out that in peacetime State has the biggest stake. [1 line of source text not declassified] When this is not done the operations are likely to go astray. There must, therefore, be a direct channel to State for policy guidance.
Admiral Hillenkoetter pointed out that CIA has a channel to State and that CIA can operate properly if State will indicate what it wants.
Mr. Lovett said that the proposed activity goes beyond the type of work done [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He felt there must be some way, if funds are to be obtained, to show that NSC authority flows directly into this unit.
Mr. Souers said this means that there must be an advisory group which can come up to the NSC when it is not satisfied.
Secretary Royall said that he doesn't want any Army representative to have anything to do with this activity. He felt it was no concern of the military in peacetime.
Secretary Forrestal pointed out that the military were in the middle of the activities [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
Secretary Royall felt that they shouldn't have been unless they were called in. In wartime the military should run it. He felt that the military should stay out of the political field, which includes this activity.
Mr. Lovett noted that the Army is already in political activities regarding bases and other questions.
Secretary Royall said that the military only presented their views to State on this subject. He thought the military should give advice only.
Mr. Lovett said that no Department, and certainly not State, should have any part in the conduct of the covert operations. State, however, must be consulted and he thought that there would probably also be some military aspects.
Secretary Forrestal said that there were two practical aspects regarding obtaining necessary funds. First, it is not clearly legal for CIA to conduct these activities. Secondly, they must be tied into the State Department.
Mr. Lovett said that, if funds are to be obtained, the NSC must move quickly. He suggested that the proposal should be altered to delete the right of appeal. Instead, all authority would be vested in the head of CIA who would have an advisory panel which could report directly to the NSC if they disagreed with Admiral Hillenkoetter.
Admiral Hillenkoetter suggested, and Mr. Lovett agreed, that this panel might be modeled on the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Admiral Hillenkoetter noted, however, that the relations of this new panel with IAC would have to be carefully defined.
Mr. Lovett said that it was hard for the NSC to define the specific organization. He suggested, therefore, that the Council refer NSC 10 back to the Staff to prepare a new paper, reflecting the approach discussed in the meeting. He felt this paper should bring in the views of Secretary Royall and Admiral Hillenkoetter.
The National Security Council:/3/
/3/The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 56. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
Referred NSC 10 back to the NSC Staff for the preparation of a substitute report reflecting the discussion at the meeting.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 2-8, preparations for demolition of oil facilities in the Middle East, handling of SANACC papers submitted for consideration by the NSC, U.S. position regarding the use of military power in Greece, NSC status of projects, U.S. position with respect to Soviet-directed world communism, policy on atomic warfare, and trade with Eastern Europe.]
284. National Security Council Memorandum
Washington, June 4, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text but it was probably prepared by the NSC staff on the basis of the discussion at the preceding day's meeting of the Council.
PRINCIPLES TENTATIVELY APPROVED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1. Responsibility for both secret intelligence and secret operations, including covert psychological activities, should be placed in a new special services unit to be created in CIA.
2. This unit should have a considerable measure of autonomy within CIA.
3. A highly qualified person recruited from inside or outside the present ranks of CIA and approved by the National Security Council should be appointed to head the new unit in CIA.
4. Provision should be made so that the chief of the newly created unit has access to and receives policy guidance from the Department of State and from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the extent that military questions are involved.
5. It is understood that this is a provisional arrangement subject to review at a later date.
285. Memorandum From the Assistant Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, June 7, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret.
Attached is the proposed NSC Directive which is based upon your paper of June 4, 1948 on the establishment of an Office of Special Serv-ices./1/
/1/Not printed. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
As indicated in our phone conversation this morning, the attached will be discussed at an NSC Staff meeting at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow in Room 224, Old State Building.
James S. Lay, Jr./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment/3/
/3/Although there were editorial changes and some rearrangement of paragraphs, this draft closely follows the text of the CIA draft mentioned in the covering memorandum and footnote 1 above. The major difference between the two versions is that the NSC reworking broadens the authority of the Operations Advisory Committee and gives its members a right of appeal to the NSC in disputes with the Director of Central Intelligence.
PROPOSED NSC DIRECTIVE
1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts and covert operations of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency provides the legal structure within which all covert activities can be conducted and it is already charged under NSC 4-A with the conduct of covert psychological operations abroad. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency is already charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. These latter operations are by their very nature closely related to covert operations. It therefore seems desirable, for legal as well as operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but to place the responsibility for this mission within the legal structure of the Central Intelligency Agency and closely relate it to espionage and counter-espionage operations under the overall control of the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that:
a. Responsibility for the conduct of covert operations, including covert psychological operations conducted pursuant to NSC 4-A, in peacetime and for planning for such operations in time of war or national emergency, shall be placed in a new Office of Special Services to be created within the Central Intelligence Agency.
b. The Office of Special Services shall have, for security reasons, a considerable measure of autonomy within the Central Intelligence Agency.
c. A highly qualified person recruited from either inside or outside the Central Intelligence Agency, nominated by the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National Security Council, shall be appointed to head the Office of Special Services.
d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that:
(1) Covert operations are consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities, and that plans for wartime covert operations are consistent with and complement Joint Chiefs of Staff approved plans for military operations.
(2) Appropriate agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), are kept informed of such operations which will directly affect them.
e. To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging the responsibilities in d above, there shall be established an Operations Advisory Committee composed of one representative of the Secretary of State and one representative of the Secretary of Defense. These representatives may have such assistants and staffs as are required by them. The functions of this Committee shall be:
(1) To furnish authoritative policy guidance on covert operations to the Director of Central Intelligence.
(2) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the preparation of all plans for such operations. Where disagreement arises between the Director of Central Intelligence and one or more members of the Operations Advisory Committee over such plans, the matter shall be forwarded to the National Security Council for decision.
f. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes will be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.
4. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (excluding armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and counter-espionage) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to propaganda; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.
5. This Directive supersedes the directive contained in NSC 4-A, which is hereby cancelled.
286. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Washington, June 8, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Box 719, Pol & Psych Warfare. Top Secret. The source text contains the handwritten annotation, "Contents presented orally 6/8/48."
The Staff of the National Security Council has under discussion the attached paper/1/ relating to secret operations. It is our understanding that the paper represents the results of discussions which took place at a full Council meeting on June 3.
/1/This memorandum has two attachments, Documents 284 and 285.
This is a project which I believe emanates largely from the initiative of the Policy Planning Staff, which has been trying for several months to help devise some means by which this Government could conduct political warfare as an integral part of its foreign policy.
The proposal embodied in the attached paper does not appear to us to meet this need, and we feel that the arrangements which it envisages might easily operate to cause embarrassment to this Government.
It is our view that these things, if they are to be done at all, must be done under the intimate direction and control of this Department. If this cannot be arranged (and I understand the difficulties which stand in the way), I think it would be better to withdraw this paper entirely and to give up at this time the idea of attempting to conduct political warfare.
This is a heavy decision to take, because our policy in Europe, in particular, will remain severely hampered in application unless it is supplemented in this way. But two of the most important elements of our European policy: namely, the administration of the ERP, and the control of policy with respect to Germany, have already passed largely out of the hands of this Department; and rather than have a third major factor of European policy handled elsewhere in the Government, I think it would be better not to have it handled at all.
I therefore ask permission to inform Mr. Souers that the State Department wishes to withdraw this paper./2/
/2/There is no indication in the source text whether the recommendations were approved or disapproved.
I further recommend that this Department request the cancellation of NSC 4, which is not operating satisfactorily.
Should you not wish the enclosed paper to be withdrawn from the agenda of the NSC, I would appreciate it if you would let me know whether there are any modifications of it you would wish to have made before it comes before the Council for final approval.
George F. Kennan
287. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)
Washington, June 9, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC-807, Item 25. Top Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on March 26, 1953. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 203-205.
Dear Jimmy: The attached represents our general thinking about the new draft./1/ I should like to suggest that, since State evidently will not go along with CIA operating this political warfare thing in any sane or sound manner, we go back to the original concept that State proposed. Let State run it and let it have no connection at all with us. It seems to me that this is the only thing that will satisfy State in any way and rather than try to keep a makeshift in running order, subject to countless restrictions which can only lead to continued bickering and argument, I think maybe the best idea is to go back and make the OSP work for State alone.
/1/Reference is to a draft NSC directive of June 8 not found but referred to in the enclosure.
I am sending this letter for your own information and, of course, for Admiral Souers and have made it separate in order that it need not be forwarded with our comments on the last draft.
Sincerely,
R. H. Hillenkoetter/2/
Rear Admiral, USN/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.
Attachment/3/
/3/Top Secret. The source text is a copy transcribed for the CIA Historian on March 26, 1953.
Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)
Washington, June 9, 1948.
SUBJECT
Proposed NSC Directive1. The draft directive of 8 June 1948 is considered much weaker and less satisfactory than that of last Friday, 4 June./4/ Further, the latest draft is much more inconsistent and much less organizationally sound than the 4 June paper.
/4/See Document 285.
2. For example, in para. 2 of the draft of 8 June, reasons are stated why the new office should be placed under the Central Intelligence Agency--then along in para. 3c are stated a number of restrictions on what can and cannot be done, all of such restrictions leading to confusion and chaos. Suppose the Director of Central Intelligence is out of town, then does the work of the Special Projects stop, does it "free wheel", or does it work with the Acting Director of Central Intelligence? All of this remains in doubt by the statement "the head of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence." In the present set-up of the Central Intelligence Agency, the head of any branch can see the Director of Central Intelligence any time desired--the door is always open. It would seem that a new branch should come in, in a similar manner. The need for special measures, security or otherwise, exists as much for our present Office of Special Operations as it would for the new Office of Special Projects, and the present set-up does not seem to hamper the Office of Special Operations, nor can I see why a similar set-up should hamper the Office of Special Projects.
3. Also, what is meant by "to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency"? Does this mean that the Office of Special Projects will have its own administrative staff, its own budget staff, its own communications net, its own services, etc. and etc? And, who is to decide what is the "maximum degree consistent with efficiency"--the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chief of Office of Special Projects, the National Security Council, or who? This paragraph cannot be accepted as is. I should much prefer the working of the corresponding paragraph (3b) in the draft of 4 June.
4. It would seem that either the National Security Council has confidence in the operation of the Office of Special Projects by the Central Intelligence Agency or it has not. If such confidence exists, then the Central Intelligence Agency should be directed to operate the new office subject to a general declaration of policy by the National Security Council. If such confidence does not exist, then the Central Intelligence Agency should not be expected or directed to operate the Office of Special Operations in any manner.
R. H. Hillenkoetter/5/
Rear Admiral, USN/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.
288. Note by the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the National Security Council
NSC 10/1
Washington, June 15, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council NSC 10/2. Top Secret. Addressed to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. The typed date on the cover sheet of June 18 has been changed by hand to June 15.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
Reference: NSC 10
At its 12th meeting the National Security Council referred NSC 10 back to the NSC Staff for the preparation of a substitute report reflecting the discussion at that meeting./1/
/1/See Document 283.
Pursuant to the above action, the enclosed draft National Security Council Directive, prepared by the NSC Staff as a substitute for NSC 10, is submitted for consideration by the National Security Council at its 13th meeting to be held on Thursday, June 17, 1948.
Sidney W. Souers/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure/3/
/3/Top Secret. The draft directive closely resembles an earlier version, dated June 10, which was sent to the NSC Consultants for comment in a June 11 memorandum from James S. Lay, Jr., the Assistant Executive Secretary. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2) See the Supplement.
PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. It therefore seems desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility for them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the overall control of the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that in time of peace:
a. A new Office of Special Projects shall be created within the Central Intelligence Agency, and under the policy guidance of an Operations Advisory Committee to be established shall plan and conduct covert operations; and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime.
b. A highly qualified person, nominated by the Secretary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National Security Council, shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Projects.
c. The Chief of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. For purposes of security and of flexibility of operations, and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency.
d. There shall be established an Operations Advisory Committee composed of one representative of the Secretary of State and one representative of the Secretary of Defense. These representatives shall be provided assistants and staffs as necessary by their respective Secretaries. The functions of this Committee shall be:
(1) To furnish authoritative policy guidance on covert operations to the Director of Central Intelligence.
(2) To assist in the preparation of all plans for such operations. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central Intelligence and a member of the Operations Advisory Committee over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision.
e. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:
(1) Ensuring through the Operations Advisory Committee that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities, and that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are accepted by the latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations.
(2) Informing, through appropriate channels, agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), of such operations as will affect them.
f. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare will be conducted by the Office of Special Projects under the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible for the planning of economic warfare.
g. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.
4. Covert operations, in time of war or emergency when the President directs, shall be conducted under appropriate arrangements to be recommended by the Office of Special Projects in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the National Security Council.
5. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.
6. This Directive supersedes the directive contained in NSC 4-A, which is hereby cancelled.
289. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) and Secretary of State Marshall
Washington, June 16, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Box 719, Pol & Psych Warfare. Top Secret.
Attached is the draft of NSC 10/1/1/ on the subject of covert activities. It has been drawn up to meet the requirements contained in the 4-point statement approved by the NSC on June 4, 1948./2/
/1/See the enclosure to Document 288.
/2/Document 284.
Since this paper was prepared on the basis of a top-level NSC decision, it has not been circulated in the Department for clearance.
I do not think that this arrangement will meet the more important needs of this Government for the conduct of political warfare, as urged by John Foster Dulles, Anne O'Hare McCormick and many other people. It draws too sharp a distinction between operations and planning. It is too remote from the conduct of foreign policy. And we will not be likely to find a suitable person to head it.
Nevertheless, I think we had better accept the paper. My reasons are these:
(a) It is probably the best arrangement we can get at this time.
(b) It is important that some funds be obtained from Congress this year for minor activities of this nature.
(c) We will at least know where we stand in these matters.
You will note that as the paper is now drafted, it would be up to the Secretary of State to nominate the person to be appointed Chief of the Office of Special Projects under the Director of Central Intelligence.
George F. Kennan/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
290. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) and Secretary of State Marshall
Washington, June 17, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Box 719, Pol & Psych Warfare. Top Secret.
With further reference to the draft of NSC 10/1/1/ which is on the agenda of today's meeting of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have now examined this paper and have asked that paragraph 4 be re-drafted as follows:
/1/See the enclosure to Document 288.
"4. In time of war or national emergency or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the execution of covert operations in military theaters shall be under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
I find this wording reasonable and appropriate, from the standpoint of this Department.
George F. Kennan/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
291. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 13th Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, June 17, 1948.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret. Prepared on June 18. According to the minutes of the 13th meeting, the following persons were present: Forrestal, Lovett, Royall, Sullivan, Symington, Hill, Hillenkoetter, Souers, and Lay. (Ibid.)
[Here follows discussion of agenda item 1, trade relations with Eastern Europe.]
2. Office of Special Projects (NSC 10/1)/1/
/1/See the enclosure to Document 288.
Mr. Souers read the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,/2/ which proposed a change in paragraph 4 of NSC 10/1.
/2/Not found.
Secretary Royall said he had the same doubt as at the last meeting concerning paragraph 3d. He said that he still hates to see any part of the National Military Establishment given the responsibility for policy guidance on such activities during peacetime.
Mr. Lovett recalled that at the last meeting the Council had discussed the choice between the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff to represent the military point of view. He thought the Council had agreed upon representation by the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Souers stressed his belief that the State Department must dominate these activities in peacetime.
Mr. Lovett agreed, but also felt that, as long as we have military and naval attaches, the Agency conducting these activities must have military advice on long-range plans.
Secretary Forrestal recalled that the current proposal was based upon the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Secretary Royall said that he would prefer that military representatives merely be kept advised of these activities but not given responsibility for them as the subject paper appears to do.
Mr. Lovett felt that we would only be kidding ourselves if we think that either the political or military agencies can be relieved of the responsibility.
Secretary Symington thought that there was a great deal in what Secretary Royall said. Secretary Symington felt that the wording concerning policy guidance was very broad and tended to give the military broad responsibility in the field in peacetime. He thought that the National Security Council was the place where the State Department tells the military what our foreign policies are.
Mr. Lovett did not agree with this view. He felt that the NSC was a work room to reconcile advice to the President from both political and military points of view.
Secretary Royall thought that the reference to an Operations Advisory Committee should be stricken from the paper and a general paragraph substituted therefor.
Mr. Lovett expressed the firm belief that the National Security Council would be held responsible for these activities regardless of the language in this directive.
Secretary Royall thought that CIA should ask for advice when it needed it and that the military should give this advice only when military questions were involved.
Secretary Forrestal said that this activity must represent a composite of both political and military interests.
Secretary Royall said that in peacetime this is not a proper field for military operation.
Mr. Lovett believed that the military does have responsibility and must, therefore, be tied in.
Secretary Royall felt that to make the military responsible for covert operations gets into a dangerous field.
Secretary Symington agreed with Secretary Royall. Secretary Symington expressed the fear that these activities would be made public and there would be a tendency to discredit the military agencies more than the civilian.
Mr. Lovett pointed out that the military agencies are now involved in the NSC in the relation of four to one. He believed that the military should be represented on a staff planning level even if they were not in the line of authority. Mr. Lovett pointed out that, if any future Pearl Harbor occurs, it cannot be said that State did not tell the military what was going on. There is now complete interchange of advice through the National Security Council and all members thereof will be held responsible if any future Pearl Harbor occurs.
Mr. Lay suggested, and the Council approved, the deletion of paragraph 3d and amendments in paragraphs 3a and e.
The National Security Council:/3/
/3/The following paragraph and note constitute NSC Action No. 65. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
Approved the directive in NSC 10/1, subject to deletion of paragraph 3d and amendments to paragraphs 3a and e and 4.
Note: Amended directive subsequently issued as NSC 10/2./4/
/4/Document 292.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 3-6, Turkish arsenal aid, U.N. temporary commission in Korea, review of the world situation as it relates to the security of the United States, and NSC status of projects.]
292. National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects
NSC 10/2
Washington, June 18, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. Although undated, this directive was approved by the National Security Council at its June 17 meeting and the final text, incorporating changes made at the meeting, was circulated to members by the Executive Secretary under a June 18 note. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. NSC 10/2 and the June 18 note are also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 213-216.
1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. It therefore seems desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility for them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the over-all control of the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that in time of peace:
a. A new Office of Special Projects shall be created within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct covert operations; and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime.
b. A highly qualified person, nominated by the Secretary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National Security Council, shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Projects.
c. The Chief of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. For purposes of security and of flexibility of operations, and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency.
d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:
(1) Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State/1/ and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central Intelligence and the representative of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision.
/1/According to an August 13 memorandum from Davies to Kennan, Kennan was subsequently appointed as the representative of the Secretary of State. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563) See the Supplement.
(2) Ensuring that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are accepted by the latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations.
(3) Informing, through appropriate channels, agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), of such operations as will affect them.
e. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare will be conducted by the Office of Special Projects under the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible for the planning of economic warfare.
f. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.
4. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orders therefor will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President.
5. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.
6. This Directive supersedes the directive contained in NSC 4-A, which is hereby cancelled.
293. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Chief of Naval Operations (Denfeld)
Washington, June 18, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-605, Job 83-0036, Box 4, Folder 10. Top Secret. The source text is a transcript made for the CIA Historian in December 1952.
SUBJECT
Project for high level balloon research and development1. The Central Intelligence Agency has developed an effective method of penetrating the Iron Curtain with the use of high level balloons.
2. Naval officers with special technical training and essential background of upper air conditions are required to effectively carry out this project. It is requested that the Chief of Naval Operations issue the necessary directive to implement this project as discussed and approved verbally between representative of this office and Admiral Denfeld, Vice Admiral Price/1/ and Rear Admirals Cassady/2/ and Inglis. Liaison officers are prepared to furnish detailed information for use in preparation of necessary details.
/1/Probably Vice Admiral J. D. Price, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air).
/2/Probably Rear Admiral John H. Cassady, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air.
3. U.S. Air Force participation will be required and approval for such participation has been given by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. This will include full cooperation with the Navy in implementing the project upon receipt of an official request from the Chief of Naval Operations.
4. You will appreciate the fact that because of the nature of this project this letter should be shown only to those officers who "need to know."
294. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Washington, June 30, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Box 11A. Top Secret.
The following are my suggestions, in the order named, for persons whom the Secretary could nominate as Chief of the Office of Special Projects under the Central Intelligence Agency:
Frank Wisner
Mathias F. Correa
Irving Brown (representative of A.F. of L. in Paris and a very able and active citizen)
Norris Chipman (Foreign Service Officer in Paris)
Francis Stevens (now Chief of the Russian Division)
John Davies (member of my Staff)I am told there is little likelihood of getting Correa. I have no information as to Brown's availability and feel that this would have to be considered a political appointment to be discussed first with William Green.
I have placed Wisner at the head of the list on the recommendations of people who know him. I personally have no knowledge of his ability, but his qualifications seem reasonably good, and I should think that it would be relatively easy to spare him for this purpose.
George F. Kennan
295. Memorandum From the Chief of the Special Procedures Group (Cassady) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, June 30, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-615, Job 83-00036, Box 4, Folder 10. Secret. Sent to Colonel Donald H. Galloway, the Assistant Director for Special Operations, for Hillenkoetter. The source text is a transcript made for the CIA Historian in December 1952.
SUBJECT
Covert Propaganda to Exploit Tito-Cominform Dispute1. The Cominform denunciation of Marshal Tito, and his firmly defiant stand, constitutes the first major open break in the satellite front which the Soviet Union has established in Central Europe.
2. The situation arising therefrom tends to arouse dissension and confusion in the world structure of Communism and invites exploitation by prompt, effective propaganda measures through every available medium, with the idea of achieving:
a. A lessening of Moscow control over satellite governments.
b. An increase of friction between leading Communist groups and individuals, with consequent decline in the effectiveness of world Communism as an agency of Soviet expansion.
c. Conditions more favorable to the overthrow of Communist governments in satellite nations and to the strengthening of non-Communist governments.
3. The propaganda opportunities of the Cominform-Tito dispute were recognized in the counter-statement issued by the Yugoslav Central Committee.
4. The situation finds the United States and the Marshall Plan nations unable to take full advantage of the propaganda openings which are presented. [4 lines of source text not declassified]
[14 paragraphs of source text (37-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
296. Memorandum From Commander Robert Jay Williams to the Chief of the Special Procedures Group (Cassady)
Washington, July 23, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-606, Job 83-00036, Box 4, Folder 10. Secret. The source text is a transcript made for the CIA Historian in December 1952. Williams was the chief of "Project Ultimate," which appears to be the same as the plan discussed in Document 293.
SUBJECT
Project Ultimate, Critical Delay in1. In the original plan for Project Ultimate as submitted to this agency by Captain Orville, it was indicated that it would be desirable to initiate operations in the European theatre as soon as possible. For this reason every effort was made to complete technical development by 1 July and to be prepared for operations not later than 1 August.
2. Continuing delay in implementation of this project is jeopardizing whatever success it might have. A study of weather conditions in the proposed operating area has revealed that many factors will work against the project after 1 November. These factors include increased risk in launching due to unfavorable ground conditions; less favorable wind conditions which may result in depositing the load over neutral territory, and considerably less effect in the target areas due to difficulty of finding the leaflets on snow-covered ground.
3. When all of these factors are considered together, it may be concluded that the value of this project after 1 November may be so little as to argue against its inception during the winter months. It is, therefore, requested that every effort be made to obtain permission to start the project immediately in order that satisfactory weather conditions anticipated in September and October may be taken advantage of to insure an effective operation.
297. Memorandum for the Record by the Chief of the Special Procedures Group (Cassady)
Washington, August 6, 1948.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-607, Job 83-00036, Box 4, Folder 10. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
298. Memorandum of Conversation and Understanding
Washington, August 6, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-771, Job 83-00036, Box 5, Folder 8. Top Secret. The source text is a transcript prepared for the CIA Historian on March 27, 1953.
SUBJECT
Implementation of NSC 10/2/1//1/Document 292.
The following is a memorandum of conversation had and understanding arrived at at a conference in Mr. Souers' office on the morning of Friday, August 6, 1948. Present at the meeting were Messrs. Souers, Kennan, Blum, Wisner, Admiral Hillenkoetter, and Colonel Yeaton.
1. Mr. Kennan opened the meeting with a statement that the conference had been requested in order to clarify certain points and to make certain that there was general understanding and agreement concerning the manner in which the contemplated implementation of NSC 10/2 would be carried out. He stressed the fact that political warfare is essentially an instrument of foreign policy and accordingly that the activity which serves this aim must function to the fullest extent possible as a direct instrumentality of the Departments of State and of the National Military Establishment. It is recognized that because of certain of its attributes this activity should be placed within the framework of CIA and must therefore be conducted with due deference to the organizational requirements of that body. It must nevertheless be recognized that it must take its policy direction and guidance from the Departments of State and the National Military Establishment and for this purpose the operating chief of the new Office of Special Projects must have the fullest and freest access to representatives of these two Departments who have been designated by them as their respective points of contact. Mr. Kennan further stated that it must be considered that the activity is a major political operation and that it must have special recognition as such, as well as the greatest flexibility and freedom from the regulations and administrative standards governing ordinary operations. Finally, Mr. Kennan made the point that as the State Department's designated representative he would want to have specific knowledge of the objectives of every operation and also of the procedures and methods employed in all cases where those procedures and methods involve political decisions.
2. Mr. Souers indicated his agreement with Mr. Kennan's thesis and stated specifically that it has been the intention of the National Security Council in preparing the document/2/ that it should reflect the recognition of the principle that the Departments of State and National Military Establishment are responsible for the conduct of the activities of the Office of Special Projects. (The Department of State taking pre-eminence in time of peace and the National Military Establishment succeeding to the pre-eminent position in war time.) Mr. Souers expressed the view that this principle is manifest in the document.
/2/Reference is to NSC 10/2.
3. Admiral Hillenkoetter expressed the opinion that the new activity would be given sufficient scope and flexibility to accomplish its objectives by the contemplated setup within the organization of CIA. He pointed to the fact that the present Office of Special Operations also enjoys a large measure of freedom and autonomy within CIA, and that it has many special privileges. Admiral Hillenkoetter agreed with Mr. Kennan's statement that the political warfare activity should be conducted as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and subject in peacetime to direct guidance by the State Department. He insisted that it was essential for the State Department to accept the political responsibility, giving decisions in regard to individual projects, and he was critical of the fact that at times in the past the handling of individual cases had been turned over to him by the State Department without any political guidance. (Mr. Kennan agreed that it was necessary that the State Department assume responsibility for stating whether or not individual projects are politically desirable and stated that as the State Department's designated representative he would be accountable for providing such decisions.)
4. Admiral Hillenkoetter pointed out that the organization being set up is to some extent parallel to the British arrangement, except that the British Chiefs of Staff have made military units available to their special operations people. There was some discussion as to who would be responsible for organizing and training units for special military operations, and Colonel Yeaton said that a JCS paper on this subject is in proc-ess of completion. It was agreed that the Office of Special Projects should propose and take a continuing interest in the necessary preparation and training of military units.
5. Mr. Wisner said that it would be necessary that the head of the new Office of Special Projects have continuing and direct access to the State Department and the various elements of the military establishment without having to proceed through the CIA administrative hierarchy in each case. Admiral Hillenkoetter agreed to this point, but said that it would be necessary that he be kept informed in regard to all important projects and decisions. Mr. Wisner concurred. It was agreed that the designated representatives of the State Department and the National Military Establishment would be kept informed of all problems and that they would attempt to reconcile any differences between their respective Departments concerning political and military guidance and advice given to the Office of Special Projects. In the event that the two representatives are unable to resolve their differences, the matter would be referred to the Secretaries of State and of the National Military Establishment.
6. Mr. Blum raised the question as to what would happen to Mr. Raymond Murphy under the new arrangement. Mr. Kennan said that he thought Mr. Murphy should come under the Chief of the new office. Admiral Hillenkoetter doubted whether this was desirable, but said that he would be willing to leave that up to the Chief of the new office.
7. The question was raised as to possible difficulties in dealing with foreign nationality groups in the United States for the purpose of developing operations abroad. Mr. Blum said that he had the impression that CIA was experiencing difficulties in its dealings with foreign nationality groups because of the restrictions imposed by the FBI. Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that although it was necessary to secure FBI approval for all contacts, this had not been too difficult a problem for CIA.
8. Mr. Kennan said that it might be desirable for the new operation to be able to work through some kind of public "American freedom committee" in dealing with foreign nationality groups in the United States. It was pointed out that there had been a number of suggestions for setting up some kind of committee of this nature.
9. Mr. Wisner said that the head of the new office would require broad latitude in selecting his methods of operations, for example, as to whether he would use large numbers of Americans working abroad or whether he would work primarily through foreign groups. He did not think the new chief should be committed to any existing methods of operations. Admiral Hillenkoetter agreed to this statement. Mr. Wisner also pointed out that the new position would also require considerable assistance from other Government Departments and agencies, including State and the National Military Establishment, and he raised the question whether the necessary help would be available. Admiral Hillenkoetter said that he felt there was a general spirit of cooperation in all the departments. It was agreed that Mr. Kennan and Colonel Yeaton would be responsible for soliciting the help of the State Department and the National Military Establishment respectively and that if any major troubles arose in obtaining cooperation from other departments, the problem could be referred to the National Security Council.
10. Mr. Wisner stated to Admiral Hillenkoetter that there were a number of internal organizational matters concerning which he felt there should be some discussion and clarification, but that these might be more appropriately discussed in a separate meeting between himself and Admiral Hillenkoetter. Admiral Hillenkoetter agreed that this was important and suggested an early meeting for this purpose.
11. It was agreed that a memorandum of the conference should be prepared and circulated to all who attended for their concurrence. Mr. Wisner undertook to prepare this memorandum in consultation with Mr. Blum and Colonel Yeaton, who had likewise taken notes on the discussion.
Frank G. Wisner/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
August 12, 1948.
The individuals whose names appear below and opposite the spaces provided for their respective initials, being all of the participants in the conversation hereinabove referred to, acknowledge that this memorandum comprises an accurate record of the conversation and further that the views therein set out correspond to their conception of the manner in which the activity shall operate./4/
/4/None of the names has been initialed on the source text.
Rear Adm. R.H. Hillenkoetter
Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton
Mr. Robert Blum
Mr. George Kennan
Mr. Sidney W. Souers
Mr. Frank G. Wisner299. Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 18th Meeting of the National Security Council
Washington, August 19, 1948.
//Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File. Top Secret. Prepared on August 20.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1-3 regarding Berlin, U.S. internal security and SANACC.]
4. Office of Special Projects (NSC 10/2)/1/
/1/Document 292.
Mr. Souers reported on the action taken in implementation of NSC 10/2. He stated that the Department of State, with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence, had nominated Mr. Frank G. Wisner for the position of Director of the Office of Special Projects. He also reported that, as provided in NSC 10/2, the Secretary of State had designated Mr. George F. Kennan as his representative for NSC 10/2 affairs and the Secretary of Defense had designated Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton both as his and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's representative. Mr. Souers reported further that a method of operation has been agreed upon by the representatives of the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to the initial procedures of the Office of Special Projects.
The National Security Council:/2/
/2/Paragraphs a-c constitute NSC Action No. 95. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Record of Actions, Box 55)
a. Approved the nomination by the Department of State, with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence, of Mr. Frank G. Wisner as Director of the Office of Special Projects.
b. Noted the designation of representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided in NSC 10/2.
c. Noted that a method of operation has been agreed on by the representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
[Here follows discussion of agenda item 5 regarding Palestine.]
300. Central Intelligence Agency General Order No. 10
Washington, August 27, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2155, Job 83-00739R, Box 3, Folder 20. Secret.
SUBJECT
Organization1. The activation of the Office of Policy Coordination, effective 1 September 1948, is hereby announced.
2. Mr. Frank G. Wisner is announced as Assistant Director for Policy Coordination.
3. Detailed directives reference the functions of the Office of Policy Coordination will be the subject of separate orders.
For the Director of Central Intelligence:
E. K. Wright
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director301. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Lovett to Secretary of Defense Forrestal
Washington, October 1, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/10-148. Top Secret. Drafted by Kennan on September 30. Sent to Lovett for signature under cover of a September 30 note from Kennan that reads: "Mr. Wisner is going to encounter, as one of his first major obstacles, the problem of cooperation with the Army in Germany. He has asked us to give him a boost in this respect. Here it is." (Ibid.)
My Dear Mr. Secretary: As you know, the Office of Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency, established under NSC 10, is preparing to discharge its mandate to conduct political warfare. This political warfare program in Europe will be effective only if it receives the whole-hearted cooperation of the United States military authorities in Germany. Among other things, it may be necessary for the Director of the Office of Policy Coordination to make certain requests of these authorities concerning (a) political activity among refugees from the Soviet world and (b) handling of bona fide political refugees and deserters from the Soviet Zone. There may be other requests of this nature which will have to be made.
The Department of State considers that political warfare will be an important factor in the implementation of United States policies in the coming period. If effectively conducted, it may affect materially the possibilities for the achievement of United States objectives by means short of war.
For this reason, considerations of foreign policy require, in the view of this department, that every effort be made to assist the Director of the Office of Policy Coordination in the implementation of his programs. In particular, it hopes that he will have the full cooperation of the United States military establishment in Germany which is a key territory from the standpoint of political warfare.
It will be appreciated if you will instruct the American Military Governor in Germany, General Clay, in the sense of the foregoing.
Sincerely yours,
Robert A. Lovett/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Lovett signed the original.
302. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Wright to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)
Washington, October 8, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, OCB 10/2-10/5. Top Secret.
Reference is made to your Memorandum/1/ of 8 October 1948, addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence and pertaining to the action of the National Security Council in amending our directive in connection with NSC 29./2/
/1/Not found.
/2/Not printed. NSC 29, a paper entitled "Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries," was approved by the NSC at its 19th meeting on September 2. At that meeting the Council expressed concern over the vulnerability of Venezuelan petroleum installations to hostile action and instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to refer to the Office of Special Projects the preparation of a plan for the security of the facilities. (Memorandum of discussion at the 19th meeting of the NSC, September 3; Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Subject File) At its 23d meeting on October 7, the NSC amended this decision to provide that it should be carried out by the CIA but not by the Office of Special Projects. (Memorandum of Discussion at the 23d meeting of the NSC, October 8; ibid.)
It would be appreciated if this Agency could be informed of the considerations which prompted the decision of the Security Council to amend their original directive. The implementation of our functions in connection with NSC 29 can best be accomplished if we have full knowledge of any new considerations brought to the attention of the Council.
It is strongly recommended that Central Intelligence be represented at Security Council meetings when matters pertaining to CIA operations are discussed.
E. K. Wright/3/
Brigadier General, USA/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
303. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to Acting Director of Central Intelligence Wright
Washington, October 11, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, OCB 10/2-10/5. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Amendment of Directive to the Director of Central Intelligence re NSC 29REFERENCE
Memo for Executive Secretary, NSC, from Acting Director of Central Intelligence, same subject, dated October 8, 1948 (CIA 22896-a)/1//1/Document 302.
In response to the reference memorandum, the main consideration mentioned in the NSC meeting which prompted the amendment of the original directive on this subject, was the fact that this directive placed an excessive burden on the recently organized Office of Special Projects which was not commensurate with the other more urgent and important projects for which this Office was created. The point was also made that the NSC 29 project was not necessarily an appropriate function of the Office of Special Projects, since many of the activities required by this project might be overt in nature.
The propriety of having the Council tell the Director of Central Intelligence which part of his organization he should use for a given project was discussed. In this connection it was pointed out that, whereas the intelligence organization of CIA was created by statute under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Office of Special Projects, which is not truly an intelligence operation, was created by the NSC itself to operate independently of other components of CIA to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency. Incidentally, this independence of operation of the Office of Special Projects is also recognized more specifically in a "Memorandum of Conversation and Understanding" which the Director of Central Intelligence has initialled./2/
/2/Document 298.
The principle that CIA should be represented at NSC meetings when matters pertaining to CIA operations are discussed is recognized by the Council, as indicated by the attendance of the Director of Central Intelligence at all Council meetings when he is in Washington. No provision was made for such representation at the last meeting, since it was not anticipated that CIA operations would be on the agenda for that meeting.
Sidney W. Souers/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
304. Letter From Secretary of Defense Forrestal to Acting Secretary of State Lovett
Washington, October 13, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, 101.61/10-1348. Top Secret.
My dear Mr. Secretary: I have received your letter of 1 October 1948,/1/ which brings to my attention the need for obtaining the cooperation of the United States military authorities in Germany in order that the Office of Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency may effectively discharge its mandate to conduct political warfare.
/1/Document 301.
I wish to assure you of my wholehearted agreement with you in regard to the importance of political warfare and the desirability of obtaining the full cooperation of the United States military authorities in Germany with respect to those measures, mentioned in your letter, which will support the political warfare program.
With my approval, Mr. Wisner, Director of the Office of Policy Coordination, has discussed this problem with the appropriate authorities in the Department of the Army. They have expressed complete agreement with the proposals in your letter and are transmitting their views to General Clay. Mr. Wisner will be informed of General Clay's comments and of further developments in this matter.
Sincerely yours,
Forrestal
305. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Washington, October 29, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563, Pol & Psych Warfare. Top Secret.
A cardinal consideration in the establishment of Wisner's office under NSC 10/2 was that, while this Department should take no responsibility for his operations, we should nevertheless maintain a firm guiding hand.
If we are to do this, a small body of personnel--perhaps no more than five men--who have Foreign Service and Departmental experience must be designated to guide Wisner's operation, both from within this Department and within Wisner's own office.
I realize the necessity of this and Wisner is genuinely anxious to have this type of help. But we have both met with stubborn resistance from our own personnel people.
This resistance is caused in part by the fact that our personnel, necessarily uninformed of NSC 10/2, do not understand the overriding importance of the assignments which we request. Consequently, with no sense of proportion they resist the release of officers who are assigned to functions of relatively minor importance and their appointment to the job which Wisner and I wish them to take.
Because of the high security classification of NSC 10/2, it is impossible for me to reason with our personnel people on this score. I am therefore reluctantly persuaded that the only way to cut the gordian knot is to ask Peurifoy to instruct the personnel division chiefs along the lines of the attached memorandum/1/ prepared for your signature.
/1/Reference is to an October 29 memorandum from Lovett to Peurifoy, not printed. See the Supplement.
George F. Kennan
306. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, October 29, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2155, Job 83-00739R, Box 3, Folder 20. Secret. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 241-242.
SUBJECT
OPC ProjectsREFERENCES
(a) National Security Directive 10/2
(b) Memorandum of 28 October 1948 from the Director to ADPC re: Fiscal Year 1949 Budget/1//1/Not found.
1. During your absence, OPC has been holding a series of meetings of an Advisory Council which consists of high-level, security-cleared representatives of Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS and State. These representatives were nominated by the respective Secretaries to assist in formulating and coordinating policies for OPC in accordance with the charter outlined in reference (a). Although this preliminary planning has not yet been completed, the overall program is beginning to take shape along the following general lines of clandestine activity:
Functional Group I--Psychological Warfare
Program A--Press (periodical and non-periodical)
Program B--Radio
Program C--Miscellaneous (direct mail, poison pen, rumors, etc.)Functional Group II--Political Warfare
Program A--Support of Resistance (Underground)
Program B--Support of DP's and Refugees
Program C--Support of anti-Communists in Free Countries
Program D--Encouragement of DefectionFunctional Group III--Economic Warfare
Program A--Commodity operations (clandestine preclusive buying, market manipulation and black market operation)
Program B--Fiscal operations (currency speculation, counterfeiting, etc.)Functional Group IV--Preventive Direct Action
Program A--Support of Guerrillas
Program B--Sabotage, Countersabotage and Demolition
Program C--Evacuation
Program D--Stay-behindFunctional Group V--Miscellaneous
Program A--Front Organization
Program B--War Plans
Program C--Administration
Program D--Miscellaneous2. Until the overall plans and policies were formulated, it was obviously impossible to present an accurate or realistic outline for budgetary allocations as set forth in reference (b). However, the senior staff officers of OPC are currently working on such specific plans which I shall be in a position to review with you in the very near future.
3. In the meantime, we have had no alternative but to accept certain sub-projects which have been literally thrust upon us, such as the old Umpire Project/2/ which was inherited from SPG, and Dr. Hilger, Czech Refugee Group. You may be sure that we have done everything possible to hold such emergency assignments to a minimum. In those instances where we had no alternative, we have limited our commitments and have set up ear-marked funds to control expenditures.
/2/A plan for broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from the U.S. Zone of Germany.
Frank G. Wisner/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
307. Memorandum for the File
Washington, November 16, 1948.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-453, Job 83-00036, Box 3, Folder 4. Secret.
SUBJECT
Relationship and proposed course of dealing as between OPC and ECA; memorandum of conversation between H1, H2 and FGW/1//1/The identities of H1 and H2 are conjectural, although they are obviously senior officials of the Economic Cooperation Administration and/or the ECA representation in Europe. Among possible identifications are Paul G. Hoffman, the ECA Administrator; W. Averell Harriman, the U.S. Special Representative in Europe; and David K.E. Bruce, the head of the ECA mission in Paris.
1. On the afternoon of November 16, I had a very extensive conversation with H1 and H2 at their office and the following are some of the most important features of this conversation.
2. I explained generally our significance and I mentioned a few of the thoughts which we have had in connection with our possible usefulness to the mission of ECA in Europe. H2 wanted to know whether we would be handling the ECA counterpart fund arrangement in Italy and I told him that we would take this over as soon as we were in a position to do so. He then spoke of France, saying that the situation there was most critical and that he believed that everything should be done by way of giving support to the anti-communist elements of French labor. [28 lines of source text not declassified] H1 having reentered the room the conversation broadened out to a detailed discussion of the situation in general within France. H1 and H2 are both of the opinion that the Marshall Plan is less successful, less understood and less appreciated in France than in any other Western European nation. They are very concerned about this and they proposed that a fully coordinated all out effort should be made to regain control of the situation which has slipped so badly. They requested me to take the lead in working out an overall plan for [1 line of source text not declassified] building up the Marshall Plan in France and combating the communist efforts to wreck it. H2 is very keen about this and wants to follow up early next week. I suggested that as the first step he and I should meet with George Kennan to discuss this problem and to block out the work. I further stated that by the time this meeting occurs, I would endeavor to have ready in rough form a memorandum raising the various possibilities which had occurred to me. [2 lines of source text not declassified] They both stressed that time is of the essence and that matters have taken such a serious turn in France that no effort should be spared. H1 said that he had been devoting some thought to various types of overt publicity and H2 said that his people in Paris had also been thinking about this but with the general conclusion so far that obviously self-serving and American financed publicity might do more harm than good. He was not satisfied with this conclusion and agreed with H1 that it was a matter of method and presentation. H1 then suggested that it might be possible to use ECA counterpart funds for the publication of a "report" on the Marshall Plan aid, mentioning quantities and the uses to which the aid had been put. [3 lines of source text not declassified] H2 undertook to cable Al Friendly/2/ to get his reaction. H2 then stated that he believed the military should be interested in this overall program since the situation in France is crucial to their plans for Western European defense. If France falls out of line, the whole military defense program (Western Union Military Alliance) will crumble. H1 then stated that moving picture might be employed. He thought that what the French need most is a rejuvenation of spirit and he believed that an extensive showing of the recently released "Joan of Arc" might have an electrifying effect upon French psychology. He asked me to send a qualified person to see this movie and to give him a report on its possible effect upon the French people.
/2/Chief of Information in the office of the U.S. Special Representative in Europe.
3. The conversation having turned toward the subject of French morale and its effect upon the political situation, I then asked H2 for his view about the prospects of deGaulle's accession to power. He replied at length stating that although this appears to be an odds-on bet, he felt that it would be very bad and that it might well result in an impossibility of dealing constructively with the French on either military or economic matters. [3 lines of source text not declassified] I mentioned that certain very competent observers of the French political situation had become convinced that deGaulle's accession to power was inevitable and had suggested that we should start laying our plans with a view to establishing a basis of dealing with deGaulle. I wondered what H2 thought of this. He first replied that it would be "playing with fire". Later on, however, he seemed to modify his position by stating that we should certainly establish better contacts with deGaulle and his people than we now have. Moreover, toward the close of the conversation and in commenting upon the overall program, H2 was at pains to make it clear that this should be done on a completely "non-partisan" basis. H1 agreed with H2 that the whole emphasis should be laid upon French economic recovery and the successful working of the Marshall Plan. I was left in some doubt as to the strength of H2's conviction in regard to the deGaulle business.
[2 paragraphs (14 lines of source text) not declassified]
F.G.W./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
308. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State (Kennan) to the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)
Washington, January 6, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-759, Job 83-00036, Box 5, Folder 8, Top Secret.
Mr. Wisner:
I have examined carefully the volume entitled "OPC Projects Fiscal 19-9-1950"./1/
/1/Not found.
In my opinion, this presentation contains the minimum of what is required from the foreign policy standpoint in the way of covert operations during the coming year. There may be one or two instances in which we will have to ask you to add to the list of functions set forth in this representation.
As the international situation develops, every day makes more evident the importance of the role which will have to be played by covert operations if our national interests are to be adequately protected.
George F. Kennan
309. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in France (Bruce)
Washington, April 26, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2065, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 12. No classification marking. The source text is annotated with somewhat confusing marginalia, which suggest that another version of this document may exist.
[6 paragraphs (19 lines of source text) not declassified]
The Department of State has instructed Mr. Caffery to take up with the French Prime Minister the question of removing the ration on newsprint in France and making it freely available so that at least part of the pre-war large Paris information press could get going again. Mr. Caffery has not yet reported the results of his démarche, if any, to the French Prime Minister, but a telegram has gone forward to him in the last few days requesting him to please press the matter. If this is not successfully completed by the time you get back to Paris, I should be grateful if you would do what you can to press it.
F. G. Wisner/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
310. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Members of His Staff
Washington, June 1, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-342, Job 83-00036, Box 2, Folder 11. Secret. Addressed to "Messrs. Offie, Frank [and] Lindsay." There is no typed or written signature on the memorandum but the level of the conversation and the context of the file in which the source text was found point to Wisner as the drafter.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Mr. John McCloy1. Last night I talked for about forty-five minutes with Mr. McCloy pursuant to the suggestion which had been made to Mr. McCloy on my behalf by Mr. Robert Murphy. I explained to Mr. McCloy the general significance and origin of OPC and then I took up with him certain aspects of our present and prospective operations in Germany. In the latter regard I mentioned in particular the conversations and exchange of communications which I had had with General Clay in regard to the radio broadcasting activity from Germany. In this connection I filled him in on the background and significance of the developments regarding the formation of the various refugee national committees and the New York Committee, pointing out that General Clay had said that he saw no problem in allowing duly authorized representatives of "really responsible and broadly representative" national committees of refugees to enter Germany and there to arrange for broadcasts. I also told him of our current rather modest activities in Germany today, emphasizing the point that up until the present time our people have had no authorization from us to engage in any activities aimed at targets within the U.S., British or French zones. In this connection I said that the British were a bit ahead of us and that we were considering bringing ourselves abreast of their activities, at least to the extent of authorizing our people to undertake on a selective basis--fully approved from here in advance--campaigns calculated to discredit the communist activities and leadership within our zone.
2. Mr. McCloy stated that he thought he understood the nature of our program and he seemed to be impressed by my statement that the original architects of the whole deal included Messrs. Lovett, Harriman, Forrestal, Kennan, Marshall, et al. He wanted to know whether and to what extent he would be kept informed of our activities in Germany and what precautions would be taken to make certain that our activities there would not interfere re conflict with his responsibilities for policy and administration. I told him that we would be prepared to keep him as fully advised as he might deem desirable--but that we felt he would probably arrive at the conclusion that he would not want to know the minutiae of our business. He replied that he wanted to be kept generally informed but he wanted to make certain of this. I said that we were looking forward to getting to Germany soon a top level representative who would be of such stature and caliber as to be able to represent our activities to him.
311. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff to the Counselor of the Department of State (Kennan)
Washington, September 7, 1949.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-761, Job 83-00036, Box 5, Folder 8. Top Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
312. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Johnson to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter
Washington, October 6, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2051, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 12. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Support of Covert Operations of CIAWith reference to your memorandum request for supply bases, dated 11 May 1949,/1/ I have received the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and give you herewith the position of the Department of Defense with respect to the principles on which we will support covert operations of CIA. These principles of operation will generally apply regardless of the particular form of the organization to conduct various covert operations and are given without reference to present or future organizational structure.
/1/Not found.
As Secretary of Defense I recognize the importance of covert foreign operations under present world conditions, and I intend to take measures to support such operations. I have great concern, however, regarding the proper location of administrative responsibility for these operations and, pending further study, I reserve my position with respect to whether this responsibility should reside in your Agency. Since these operations effectively conducted constitute one of the best ways of supporting our national defense in time of peace and contribute importantly to success in war, I am proceeding to state herein the reasonable conditions on which the Defense Department will cooperate in the planning and conduct of such operations.
There are two very important factors which I believe must be emphasized as this organization for covert operations develops. First, the organization must assume autonomous responsibility and be so effectively obscured as to assure that neither the President nor the Secretaries of State or Defense will be placed in a position of having to answer publicly for its activities.
The second factor, and this derives partially from the first, concerns financial support of these operations. As indicated in NSC 10/2, operational funds are hereafter to be provided out of the CIA budget. As we reduce expenditures and personnel within the Department of Defense, you and your Assistant Directors must understand that there may be less money and manpower available to contribute to these and other functions of your Agency unless such contributions are of substantial value to U.S. national security.
With the foregoing in mind the following principles will constitute the basis for Department of Defense support of covert operations.
We recognize that the equipment which will be required to carry out covert operations, either in peace or in war, should be available in the areas in which required. There are, however, certain differences between the peacetime scope and the wartime scope of Department of Defense participation in and support for such operations of the Office of Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency. NSC 10/2 directs the Office of Policy Coordination in time of peace "to plan and conduct covert operations" and "in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime." In addition, NSC 10/2 states that "in time of war or national emergency, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and execution of covert operations in military theaters shall be under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
Peacetime and wartime differences are not involved in the currently prescribed method of financing covert operations. NSC 10/2 states that after fiscal year 1949 "operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency budget requests." It is, therefore, expected that the Department of Defense will be reimbursed by transfer of funds from the Central Intelligence Agency for most of the material and services furnished.
As a general rule, covert operations planned and conducted by the CIA in time of peace should not be inconsistent with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States military policies, and should not be undertaken if specifically disapproved by the Department of Defense. The participation of the Department of Defense therein will be subject to the following general conditions:
a. Captured enemy equipment at the disposal of the Department of Defense and equipment which has been or may be declared surplus will be made available upon request by CIA without reimbursement, except for expenses incident to rehabilitation, packing, crating, transportation and any storage costs incurred through utilization of other than military facilities;
b. Subject to consideration of other requirements, military equipment and supplies in stock in the several Departments will be made available on a reimbursable basis upon request of the CIA. In this connection, military equipment and supplies with distinctive markings which would indicate the Department of Defense as their source will not be transferred unless such markings can be altered or obliterated to prevent such identification;
c. Military type supplies not available under a. and b. will, upon request by the CIA be procured by the Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis;
d. Personnel, supplies, and equipment will be transported to overseas storage points under military control and supplies and equipment will be stored and protected at such points without reimbursement where additional, extraordinary expenses to the Department of Defense are not involved. Details regarding the designation of storage points and the storage, protection, readying for use, and release of supplies and equipment must be arranged locally with the United States military commander of the area (including unified commands) who must first receive appropriate military instructions from the appropriate Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where the Service incurs additional, extraordinary expenses in providing transportation or establishing and maintaining at overseas points dumps for covert operations, the CIA must make reimbursement therefor. However, military commanders may provide, to the extent that they are able to do so without adversely affecting normal military operations, necessary military personnel at overseas storage points without reimbursement for services, such personnel to be available for normal military duty only; and
e. Peacetime movement of supplies and equipment from military overseas storage points to areas in which or from which covert operations are to be launched will be the responsibility of the CIA. The Department of Defense would expect further that very special and effective precautions would be taken by the CIA to insure that such operations cannot be attributed to the Department of Defense.
Where the Department of Defense requests or embraces particular operations in covert support of specific military missions (e.g., the establishment of escape and evasion organizations), special arrangements for support and reimbursement will be made in each instance.
With respect to plans and preparations for covert operations to be conducted in military theaters in time of war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion, with which I concur, that, consistently with NSC 10/2, the following conditions and limitations must apply:
a. The operations for which military equipment and supplies are to be stocked must first be integrated in the war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and any actual preparations must be specifically approved by them;
b. Military supplies and equipment for wartime covert operations will be made available from stock or procured on a reimbursable basis subject to consideration of other requirements. Special arrangements may be necessary in the procurement of highly specialized supplies for such operations; and
c. All details regarding the integration of military personnel for technical, security, and other purposes, in connection with covert operations, and all details regarding dumps of operational supplies, aircraft and aircraft equipment (including location of these supplies and equipment), must, after integration in each instance with war plans indicated in a. above, and with Joint Chiefs of Staff policy guidance, be locally coordinated with and agreed to by the representatives of the CIA and of the Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the theater concerned.
It should be pointed out that the foregoing views do not cover the actual conduct of covert operations in military theaters under JCS control in time of war since this is more properly an integral part of war plans.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that detailed arrangements for the matter discussed herein can be made through designated representatives of the Department of Defense until such time as a military organization to work with the CIA on covert operations is established.
If the above arrangements are satisfactory to you, I will issue the necessary directives to the Services to execute them. Please let me have your views at early convenience.
Louis Johnson/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.
313. Letter From Secretary of Defense Johnson to Secretary of State Acheson
Washington, October 7, 1949.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Executive Secretary of the NSC, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: At our luncheon on September 23, 1949, we discussed the location and various aspects of certain special activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. I expressed to you my very great concern at the present situation, and we both agreed that on an interim basis we should make special and direct arrangements to provide policy guidance for these activities.
I am familiar with your arrangements in the State Department whereby Mr. Kennan serves as your adviser on these activities, and in accordance with our understanding I am designating Brigadier General John Magruder, U.S. Army (Retired), as my special adviser on these activities. He will be particularly concerned with the subject contained in NSC 10/2, but in addition, and for the purpose of providing the necessary integration of other interrelated matters, he will concern himself on my behalf with NSC 4 and NSC 43 series. Your Department and mine under this arrangement can then proceed to guide these activities in a direction that we deem mutually desirable, and likewise to seek agreement respecting an appropriate organizational setting for the activities comprised in NSC 10/2.
The designation of General Magruder as my policy representative does not alter the previous arrangements for the Joint Chiefs of Staff representation in NSC 10/2 and NSC 43 matters.
I am also informing the three Secretaries of the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, of my action.
Sincerely yours,
Louis Johnson/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.
314. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Joseph A. Frank of the Office of Policy Coordination
Washington, October 13, 1949.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2301, Job 83-00764R, Box 1, Folder 9. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Recommended Lines of Thought for Operational Planning1. At the weekly meeting in Mr. Webb's office Tuesday afternoon/1/ I covered practically all of the subject matter upon which I had been briefed by yourself and the others who attended the morning briefing session, and a considerable amount of interest was shown on the part of Mr. Webb and General Magruder, in particular. Toward the conclusion of the session, Mr. Webb began to spark off a number of ideas and as he warmed to his subject, he began to produce some very useful thoughts. All of the others present at the meeting were much impressed about his grasp of the significance and operational possibilities of the OPC activity, and General Magruder was especially enthusiastic in his comment upon Mr. Webb's suggestions.
/1/October 11.
2. In view of the fact that Mr. Webb has taken this degree of personal interest and has gotten to the point of generating some lines of policy guidance to us, I believe that we would be well advised to do what we can to develop some refinements, and ultimately to produce some plans and projects along the lines of Mr. Webb's recommendations. We will surely be asked from time to time in the future what we are doing about his proposals, and in addition there is no doubt that he has got hold of some useful thoughts.
3. The first line of thought developed by Mr. Webb originated with a discussion of the situation in Yugoslavia, and the fact that Tito's performance and the Tito heresy are causing the Cominform more disturbance and woe than any single thing which has occurred since the war. [20 lines of source text not declassified]
4. Mr. Webb went on from this to propose that we should put considerable effort into spreading the story of the Tito heresy, and moreover that we should endeavor to induce similar developments in other Communist areas and within the Communist Parties of free areas. [9 lines of source text not declassified]
[1 paragraph (6-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
6. Mr. Webb made reference to the article on Tito by Hamilton Fish Armstrong in the current issue of the Atlantic Monthly magazine, and whereas he agreed that it could not be effectively used in its present form because of its American origin and authorship--he said that we should draw material from it which should be caused to appear in disguised forms.
[1 paragraph (39 lines of source text) not declassified]
FGW
ADDENDUM
You will recall that in the talk which Mr. Kennan gave in Q Bldg. this morning, he listed as the first and perhaps the most serious weakness in the international position of the U.S. the inadequate and unsatisfactory character of the situation as regards Germany and Japan. In this connection he stated specifically that for the improvement of the German situation, it is absolutely essential that the German people be able to see the prospect of a position for themselves as full-fledged members of the Western European community, and that this will require the development of a better understanding between the German people and the peoples of the Western European countries. (These may not be his exact words but it is the sense of what he said.) I believe that this serves to reinforce Mr. Webb's suggestion as outlined in paragraph 7 of the foregoing memorandum and that we may therefore with confidence proceed to work up the outlines of one or more projects calculated to accomplish the desired result.
I believe that it would be useful for you to make this memorandum available to your senior staff officers.
315. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to Secretary of Defense Johnson
Washington, October 18, 1949.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. The source text indicates that a copy was sent to the Executive Secretary of the NSC.
SUBJECT
Support of Covert Operations of CIAREFERENCE
Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, above subject, 6 October 1949/1//1/Document 312.
1. The reference memorandum reduces to four basic principles the supply support of CIA covert operations by the Department of Defense:
a. The Department will expect reimbursement from CIA for the costs of supplies and their storage and transportation when additional or extraordinary costs to the Department are involved, unless such expenses are unmistakably associated with particular operations requested or embraced by the Department of Defense in covert support of specific military missions.
b. Operations should be consistent with U.S. military policies and approved by the Department of Defense prior to implementation in time of peace, support details to be arranged with the local U.S. military commander concerned.
c. Precautions should be taken to insure against identification of the Department of Defense with operations in process.
d. Operations, planned to be conducted in military theaters in time of war, should be in accordance with plans integrated in the war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and should have local coordination and agreement in the theater concerned.
2. These principles are generally agreeable to this Agency and are accepted subject to:
a. Any deviations which may be directed by the President or the National Security Council.
b. Any modifications agreed to in specific instances between the Department and CIA. (For example, at this time, the presence of additional conventional American equipment in China and on the Greek frontier would create no security risk.)
3. It would appear that the best hope for the smooth, prompt, and, where necessary, flexible implementation of the arrangements you detail lies in the creation of the "military organization to work with the CIA on covert operations," to which you refer in the next to the last paragraph on page 4 of the reference memorandum. I, therefore, urge that this organization be brought into being as soon as possible and recommend that it be vested with such discretionary power as will contribute to smooth relations between CIA and the Department of Defense.
R.H. Hillenkoetter/2/
Rear Admiral, USN/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.
316. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Mr. Miller of His Staff
Washington, June 21, 1950.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/CSG-2066, Job 83-00739R, Box 2, Folder 12. Secret.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Mr. Averell Harriman1. In my conversation of recent date with Mr. Harriman (which took place immediately following your talk with him) he made a number of points which I considered to be worth recording, and I believe that the appropriate members of your staff should know about it.
[2 paragraphs (19-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
4. Mr. Harriman expressed concern about the American position at the moment in the cold war and strongly emphasized the fact that it is essential for this Government to recapture the peace mantle from the Russians. The emphasis in official statements of all kinds as well as our unofficial activities should be concentrated on the theme "Peace-Peace-Peace" even though we get tired of hearing ourselves say it. He does not feel that the situation in France at the moment is quite as serious as reported by Mr. Bruce, although he does acknowledge that unless we can change our apparent position, it may become so. He considers that it would be difficult to overcome the pacifism and neutrality of the editors of Le Monde by any ordinary efforts. He stated that Messrs. Bruce and Bohlen have been working on certain of these people, but without noticeable success. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
F.G.W./1/
/1/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.