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1146

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UTAH  84056-5609 
 

FOREWORD 

Description:  The purpose of this security classification guide is to provide the basis for assigning the degree of security protection for information, regardless of form, concerning the Minuteman and Peacekeeper weapon systems.  The Minuteman and Peacekeeper weapon systems include the Minuteman and Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), launch facilities (LFs), missile alert facilities (MAFs), missile support bases (MSBs), support equipment, test equipment/facilities and Minuteman/Peacekeeper operational codes.  This Guide should be used in conjunction with the MK11, MK 12, MK 12A, MK 21 Guides. 

AUTHORITY:  DoD 5200.1-R/AFI 31-401, Information Security Program Management and Executive order 12958, Classified National Security Information. 

OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY:  ICBM System Program Office, Ogden Air Logistics Center (OO-ALC/LM) 

ORIGINAL TOP SECRET CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY:  Commander, Ogden Air Logistics Center 
 
 

ORIGINATING OFFICIAL: 
 
 

THOMAS W. TAIT

Deputy Program Director

ICBM Systems Program Office 
 
 

COORDINATING OFFICIAL: APPROVING OFFICIAL:  
 
 

TIMOTHY G. HARDY, Lt Col, USAF RICHARD H. ROELLIG, Major General, USAF

Commander, 75th Security Forces Squadron Commander

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Table of Contents 

Section  Page 

• I General Instructions 1

• II Administrative Details 3

• III Performance Data 5

• IV Definitions 9

• V Distribution List 13 
  

• Attachment I (Minuteman)

• I Funding, Procurement and Production 1

• II Hardware Classification 3

• III Propulsion Subsystems 25

• IV Missile Guidance Set (MGS) Subsystem 27

• V Reentry Systems (RS) 29

• VI Improved Minuteman Physical Security System (IMPSS) Security Auxiliary 37

• VII Launch Facility Personnel Access Auxiliary System 41

• VIII Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS) Auxiliary System 43

• IX Communications - Electronics 45

• X Testing Program 47

• XI Operational Ground Equipment (OGE) 55

• XII Facilities 57

• XIII Operational Data 59

• XIV Nuclear Hardness & Survivability (NH&S) 67

• XV System Safety Fault Tree Analysis Results 79

• XVI Unauthorized Launch and Launch Action Studies 81

• XVII Minuteman II PEN AIDS MK21/MK21A PEN AIDS 83

• XVIII Minuteman III PEN AIDS (MK12/MK12A PEN AIDS) 87

• • Part A - Complete PEN AIDS System 87

• • Part B - Chaff Subsystem 89

• • Part C - Decoy Subsystem 93

• XIX Software and Data  97

• XX Rapid Message Processing  105 
  

Attachment 2 (Peacekeeper)

• I Funding, Procurement and Production 1

• II Missile Systems 3

• III Propulsion Subsystems 7

• IV Guidance and Control Subsystems 11

• V Basing 15

• VI Communications-Electronics-Status Authentication 19

• VII Operational Support Equipment (OSE) 23

• VIII Operational/Mission Planning Software 25

• IX Improved Minuteman Physical Security System (IMPSS) Security Auxiliary System 27

• X Nuclear Hardness & Survivability (NH&S) 31

• XI Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS) Auxiliary System 43

• XII Testing Program 47

• XIII Operational Data 55

• XIV Unauthorized Launch and Launch Action Studies 61

• XV System Safety Fault Tree Analysis Results 63

• XVI Hardware Classification  65

SECTION I 

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 

1. PURPOSE:  This Guide identifies information developed during various phases of the development, production, deployment and subsequent maintenance phases of the Minuteman and Peacekeeper weapon systems requiring protection in the interest of national security. 

2. OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY (OPR):  This Guide is issued by OO-ALC/LM.  Classification management of this Guide is the responsibility of 75 SFS/SFA.  Inquiries concerning content or interpretation of this Guide should be addressed to:  

       OO-ALC/LMDM     75 SFS/SFAI

       6014 Dogwood Ave    6010 Gum Lane

       Hill AFB UT 84056-5816    Hill AFB UT 84056-5825 

       DSN 777-3015     DSN 777-7811

       COMM (801) 777-3015    COMM (801) 777-7811 

3. CLASSIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS:  Send completely documented and justified recommendations for change through appropriate channels to the OPR if the security classifications in this Guide impose impractical requirements, or if operational conditions, technological changes in the state-of-the-art, or any other contributory factors indicate a need for changes.  Pending final decision, handle and protect the items of information involved at the highest of the present or recommended classifications.  Users of this Guide are encouraged to assist in improving and maintaining the currency and adequacy of this Guide.  

4. APPLICATION, REPRODUCTIONS, AND DISSEMINATION:  

a. Specified groups involved with Minuteman and Peacekeeper weapon systems, including industrial activities may make reproductions and extracts or selections of portions of this Guide. 

b. Distribution of this Guide includes those offices specified in DOD 5200.1-R and other interested Government agencies and contractor facilities. 

c. All agencies and offices requiring this Guide will be on an official distribution list whether it be primary distribution from this office or secondary distribution from the base or  unit focal point.  

5. "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" (FOUO):  For Official Use Only (FOUO) is not a security classification.  However, handle, protect, and dispose of FOUO information according to AFI 37-131, Freedom of Information Act Program  or the applicable industrial security guideline, DOD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual.  
 

6. MANUFACTURE, TEST, AND ASSEMBLY:  During manufacture, test, and assembly process, the classification assigned by this Guide applies at the earliest point whenever design, performance, and/or other classified characteristics can be derived from or traced to the system(s) identification herein.  
 

7. DISASSEMBLY AND REPAIR:  During disassembly and repair, the classification assigned by this Guide no longer applies at the earliest point where design, performance or other classified characteristics can no longer be derived from or traced to the system(s) identified herein.  

8. TEMPEST REQUIREMENTS:  TEMPEST requirements must be considered whenever classified automated data processing (ADP) will occur.  ADP refers to any electronic or electromechanical equipment which might process classified information.  
 

SECTION II 

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS 
 

1. PUBLIC RELEASE:  The fact that this Guide shows certain details of information as unclassified does not permit automatic public release of them.  Send proposed public disclosures of unclassified information regarding MM ICBMs to OO-ALC/PA, 7981 Georgia Street, Hill AFB, UT 84056-5824 for review before the date the proposer needs them for release.  

a. The term "information" applies, but is not limited to, articles, speeches, photographs, brochures, advertisements, displays, and presentations, on any phase of the MM or PK weapon system. 

b. Defense contractors and other agencies must screen all information they submit for determination of releasability to ensure it is both unclassified and technically accurate.  The letter of transmittal must certify this view.  Copies of the material may not be released outside official channels until the review process is complete.  If you find information during the review process that you suspect is classified, notify all holders of the document the degree of protection required.  When doubt exists concerning the classified status of a proposed release pertaining to this program, OO-ALC/LM makes the final decision.  The material submitted for review must include a valid suspense date, if applicable.  

c. Only information that has been reviewed and certified for public release may be released.  Submit information developed after initial approval for public release for review and further processing as outlined in a. and b.  

d. Material which requires an export license may not be entered into security review channels for public release approval to circumvent the licensing requirements of the Departments of State and Commerce.  

e. Obtain approval for planned or contemplated visits of public media representatives from OO-ALC/LM and OO-ALC/PA.  

2. RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES:  Any military activity or defense contractor receiving a request from a foreign government or representative thereof for classified information pertaining to the MM AND PK weapon system must send the request to OO-ALC/FMM/FDPO, Hill AFB, UT 84056.  Contractors who wish to honor such requests rather than send them to the Foreign Disclosure Office, must apply for an export license according to the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) and notify the military of their intent to apply for such license.  

3. RELEASE OF UNCLASSIFIED TECHNICAL INFORMATION (NOT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE)  TO U.S. CITIZENS OR FOREIGN NATIONALS RESIDING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY:  Any defense contractor must either obtain the approval from the cognizant military activity under the ITAR or apply for an export license to the Department of State under the ITAR and notify the military of their intent to apply for such license.  Material which requires an export license may not be entered into security review channels for public release approval in order to circumvent the license requirements of the Departments of State or Commerce.  

4. This publication of the ICBM Security Classification Guides incorporates the changes mandated in Executive Order 12958.  The following information is provided as a quick reference as to reasons for classification and declassification exemptions.  

• To be eligible for classification, information must fall within one or more of the categories of information listed in Section 1.5 of the Order.  These reasons are identified in the guide as 1.5.a, 1.5.b, etc.  

a. Military plans, weapons systems, or operations.  

b. Foreign government information.  

c. Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology.  

d. Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources.  

e. Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security.  

f. United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities.  

g. Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to the national security.  

• All information must be declassified or reevaluated within 10 years unless it meets one or more of the criteria established by the Order.  These exemptions are identified in the guide as X1, X2, etc.  

X1. Reveal an intelligence source, method or activity, or a cryptologic system or activity.  

X2. Reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction.  

X3. Reveal information that would impair the development or use of technology within a United States weapons system.  

X4. Reveal United States military plans or national security emergency preparedness plans.  

X5. Reveal foreign government information.  

X6. Damage relations between the United States and a foreign government, reveal a confidential source, or seriously undermine diplomatic activities that are reasonably expected to be ongoing for a period longer than 10 years.  

X7. Impair the ability of responsible United States Government officials to protect the President, the Vice President, and other individuals for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized.  

X8. Violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.  

SECTION III 

PERFORMANCE DATA 
 

1. The purpose of this section is to establish the philosophy of the classification of test data, raw and processed, and operational data.  Precise distinctions between unclassified and classified data or between data at various levels of classification cannot always be achieved.  Often, the decision as to proper classification of data depends upon the context in which the data is viewed or to the extent to which the source and nature of the data is apparent or, particularly in the case of raw data, on the availability of information on the format or storage or calibration conventions which are required in order to understand the information in the data.  Keeping the above factors in mind, judgment should be used in assigning classification.  

a. Data may be derived from flight test of components or the entire system.  The components flown may be operationally or experimentally configured.  The data may directly originate from:  

• (1) Instruments on the components flown:  accelerometers, temperature sensors, ablation gauges,†etc. 
  

• (2) Off-board instrumentation:  radars, cameras, optical sensors, radiometers, splash detectors, etc. 
  

b. Data may be derived from ground tests of components of the system.  The configuration may be either operational or experimental.  The data may originate from a variety of sources.  

c. Data may originate from theoretical studies, in the form of quantitative predictions or interpretations of system component performance under specified conditions.  

2. DATA DIFFERENTIATION: 

a. A collection of data is known as a record regardless of the physical form in which the data appears.  For the purposes of this Guide, it is proper to distinguish three types of data records.  

• (1) Raw data record.  The primary characteristics of a raw data record are that it contains data as recorded by a  sensor (often in real time) and no significant effort has been made to reduce, edit, select or interpret the data.  Raw data records commonly appear in one of the following forms: 
  

   Magnetic tapes

   Decks of computer cards

   Computer printouts (listings)

   Manuscript scratch sheets

   Oscillograph records

   Rough operator logs

   Photographic displays:

•        Ballistic camera plates (or prints)

•        Radar display films (RTI, A-Scope, etc)

•        Similar display films of other instruments, etc. 
  

• Raw data records generally have some, but a minimum of, identification and calibration information.  They have few or no annotations or comments relating to the intrinsic difference of the data but typically have comments on the operating conditions of the instrument generating the data (shutter speed, pointing angles, waveform transmitted, etc.) or on the operating condition of the instrument recording the data (framing rate, sweep speed, format conventions, etc.).  
  

• (2) Processed data record.  A processed data record generally appears in one of two forms:  
  

• (a) As a raw data record (or portion of one) plus commentary or annotations revealing the identity and significance of the record and of the information contained to an extent which could not have been derived from the raw data record itself.  Examples are:  
  

• An annotated RTI film with altitude markings and body identification. 
  

• An annotated ballistic or spectral camera print. 
  

• A computer listing of the contents of a (raw data) magnetic tape with the addition of revealing column headings and test identification. 
  

• (b) Information computed from a raw data record and presented in a revealing and intelligible format.  Examples are:  
  

• • A plot of missile signature versus altitude with identification of plotted parameters, their units and their source.  
    

• • A computer printout of the ballistic coefficient of a reentry body, identified as such.  
    

• In the first case above, the change from raw to processed data came about through the addition of information to the raw data record.  In the second case, the processed record is physically different from a raw data record.  In both cases, however, there is enough information for a casual reader to understand the meaning of the presentation.  
  

• The essence of a processed data record is that it displays significantly more information than is evident in the raw data record from which it was derived.  It may be said a raw data record contains data and a processed data record contains information.  This information tends to be narrow in scope and restricted in its application to the original data record.  
  

• (3) Analyzed data record.  Analyzed data records consist of presentations of processed data accompanied by textual material which comments in detail on the significance of the information shown.  Conclusions are drawn or implied.  The reader's attention is directed to peculiarities or to characteristic phenomena; features noted are often described as being "expected," "typical" or "normal," or conversely as being "unusual," "not previously seen," etc. 
  

• Commonly, the textual material is based on a set of raw or processed data more extensive than presented in the analysis.  Conclusions are listed which are believed to be valid and of practical importance across a variety of system conditions and, in particular, across a variety of possible future missile flights.  Little or nothing is required of the reader in any way of further calculation or interpretation. 
  

• Analyzed data tends to have overtones of practical application in that the behavior of operational configurations of the RS is discussed or suggested. 
  

• b. Classification of data records 
  

• (1) Raw data record.  In general, a raw data record is classified according to the level of information it might reasonably disclose to a reader.  Refer to appropriate portions of this Guide to determine those levels.  However, if: 
  

• (a) The record bears no identification which associates it with a specific system either directly* or inferentially**, and if 
  

• (b) The record does not disclose information which conflicts with other provisions of this Guide, then the raw data is UNCLASSIFIED. 
  

• • NOTE: Even if a raw data record contains identification to the MK 12 RS but other information is necessary to draw meaningful conclusions from the record, then the record is UNCLASSIFIED. 
    

• (2) Processed data record.  Specific provisions elsewhere in this Guide (primarily, but not solely, in Sections V, VI, VII, XIII and XVI) establish the classification of processed data when it is identified as being related to the MM weapon system, or to some component thereof. 
  

• (3) Analyzed data record.  Analyzed data records are, by their nature, difficult or impossible to strip of identity.  Hence, they are classified at the level of the most highly classified information disclosed as determined by this Guide.  If, however, the analyzed data record discloses significant operational characteristics of AVE (RS, G&C, missile), consideration must be given to classifying the analyzed data TOP SECRET even if no portion of the record is individually TOP SECRET.  In particular, if this or any analyzed data record discloses a system feature which provides a means of discrimination between decoys and RVs or between RV-bearing chaff clouds and non-RV-bearing chaff clouds, it must be classified TOP SECRET-FRD. If any analyzed data record represents vulnerability to the MM III or PK weapon systems, it must be classified TOP SECRET. 
  

• For example, the level of classification may in part depend upon whether the record is based on relating to the RS in an operational configuration or to the RS in experimental configuration.  Other matters equal, records based on operational configurations are more likely TOP SECRET candidates.  It is emphasized, however, that if the analysis of experimentally configured RS components has a direct and immediate application to the performance of an operationally configured RS, there may be justification for classifying the analyzed data record based on the experimental configuration as TOP SECRET. 
  

3. OPERATIONAL DATA: 

Operational data includes that data accumulated during normal operation of the weapon system recorded by the Expanded Missile Data Analysis System (EMDAS) and consisting of Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) failure, system status and Inertial Measuring Unit (I) Performance Data (IPD).  While these data elements may lead to classified data, they, in themselves, under the definitions provided by this Guide, do not provide information for the derivation of reliability and accuracy.  

   a. LRU failure and system status data  

LRU failure and system status data provides information that supports the determination of system and subsystem reliability.  Since this data provides only some of the factors required, it does not provide specified interval or stated condition; it is considered UNCLASSIFIED unless specifically classified in accordance with other sections of this Guide.

b. IPD 

IPD originates in the MGS as a result of normal alert operations.  These data express the ground performance of the inertial instruments and airborne computer computations relating to that performance.  While these data are used to measure stability and predict long term performance and are related to guidance accuracy, it is not sufficient to predict weapon system accuracy.  The official alert rate cannot be derived from IPD even though the operational status of some key components of the weapon system can be.  

SECTION IV 

DEFINITIONS 

a.  Access: 

• (1) Physical access:  The ability to manipulate an item either in person or remotely.  This implies capability to sample material, exchange, touch or conduct unauthorized tests. 
  

• (2) Visual access:  Access using sense of sight of the hardware.  Includes photos, drawings, sketches videos. 
  

b.  Assembly:  The first major subdivision of a component. 

c. Atomic weapon:  An atomic weapon as defined in Public Law 708, 83rd Congress, Section 11d, is any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means of transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable or divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as or for development of a weapon, weapon prototype or weapon test device.  See Reentry Vehicle (RV) Guides. 

d. Auxiliary system:  A separate function associated with the missile weapon system but not part of the missile itself (e.g., launch facility personnel access auxiliary system). 

e. Component:  The first major subdivision of a subsystem; e.g., the computer is a component of the guidance subsystem. 

f. Computer memory security check (CMSC):  A nonlinear compilation of memory content resulting in a characteristic number. 

g. Communications Security (COMSEC):  COMSEC is a process designed to protect any and all information that may be of possible intelligence value.  A designation or marking applied to all information concerning COMSEC exclusive of that designated CONTROLLED COMSEC ITEM or CRYPTO (former designation still in use). 

• (1) CONTROLLED COMSEC ITEM:  A designation or marking which identifies information exclusive of operational keying material which contains a cryptographic logic or which performs a critical COMSEC function. 
  

• (2) CRYPTO:  A designation or marking which identifies classified keying material and which indicates that the material requires special consideration with  respect to access, storage and handling. The ground rules for "CRYPTO" were changed a number of years ago but, at that time, it was determined that those items fielded under the old short titles could retain their CRYPTO caveat.  Presently, only the "key" used to protect communication is CRYPTO - not the equipment - unless the key is installed.  All new equipment will have the correct nomenclature when it is fielded. 
  

h. Configuration item (CI):  An aggregation of hardware/software or any of its discrete portions which satisfies an end use function and is designated by the government for configuration management.  The CI number and the Figure A (Fig A) number mean the same thing. 

i. Critical nuclear weapons design information (CNWDI):  Top Secret-Restricted Data or Secret-Restricted Data revealing the theory of operation or design of the components of a thermonuclear or implosion type fission bomb, warhead, demolition munitions or test device.  Information concerning arming, fusing and firing systems; limited life components; and total contained quantities of fissionable, fusionable and high explosive materials by type are excluded.  Among those excluded items are components that service personnel set, maintain, operate, test or replace.  See RV guides and the DOE/DOD Joint Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide and the Air Force Security Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons. 

j. Deployment module:  That portion of the post-boost vehicle (PBV) which consists of the means for mounting and releasing RVs and penetration aids.  It may or may not include the post-boost control system (PBCS). 

k. Formerly Restricted Data (FRD):  Information removed from the Restricted Data category upon determination jointly by the Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense that such information relates primarily to military utilization of atomic weapons and that such information can be adequately safeguarded as classified defense information.  

l. Hardness:  A measure of the ability of a system to withstand exposure to one or more effects of manmade hostile environments.  The resistance or degree of resistance to nuclear countermeasures or hostile environments such as neutron exposure or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) radiation.  This definition encompasses those environments resulting from normal handling; powered flight and/or atmospheric reentry of the vehicle are not included. 

m. Hardness critical item:  Any item at any assembly level which is launch essential and/or mission critical or could adversely impact launch-essential or mission-critical equipment if hardness were not considered. 

n. Latch-up time:  The time required by the security subsystem to detect and hold a security violation to assure interrogation of the Launch Facility (LF) by the Missile Alert Facility (MAF). 

o. Launch essential:  An item of equipment or a subsystem function or characteristic is launch-essential if it is required in order to launch the missile from its silo or whose malfunction would prevent such launch in a pre-, trans- or  post- nuclear attack environment. 

p. Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV):  The concept of a RV as an independent entity capable of altering its own course after release from the booster.  It does not cover manned vehicles. 

q. Minuteman (MM) Weapon System:  The MM weapon system includes the WS-133B or WS-133AM facilities, LGM30B, LGM30G missiles, MK11 Series, MK12 and MK12A RSs. 

r. Missile guidance set (MGS):  That portion of the missile which measures the missile position and attitude and provides control signals to all stages of the missile. 

s. Mission critical (MC):  An item of equipment or a subsystem function is MC if it is required to launch a missile within a given time span or to successfully complete the mission or whose malfunction would prevent such mission completion.  Successful completion of the mission includes: 

• (1)  RV delivered within acceptable CEP limits 
  

• (2)  RV retains proper fuzing control 
  

       (3)  System retains its retargeting capability 

       (4)  System retains redundancy in communications (cable and radio) 

       (5)  System retains valid status reporting capability 

       (6)  System retains specified emergency and extended survivability capability. 

t. Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV):  The concept of one booster carrying multiple reentry vehicles which can be aimed at separate targets. 

u. Peacekeeper (PK) Weapon System:  The PK weapon system consists of the LGM-118 missile, WS-133 AM missile alert and launch facilities modified with a unique PK canister system for support and launch of the PK missile, and MK21 RSs.     

v. Penetration aids (Pen aids):  Elements such as decoys and chaff which increase the probability of successful RV penetration of an area which is defended against ballistic missile attack. 

w. Post-boost vehicle (PBV):  That portion of a missile which performs its primary function after separation from the prime launch vehicle and which consists of a payload (single/multiple RVs and/or Pen Aids), structure and equipment for providing guidance and control, propulsion and deployment of the payload.  This includes PBCS and PSRE.

x. Propulsion system rocket engine (PSRE):  That portion of the PBV which provides linear acceleration in any direction attitude control and angular acceleration about the pitch and yaw axes. 

y. Reentry system (RS):  Portions of the ICBM or payload which have an active role to perform after third stage thrust termination.  This usually includes the RV, Pen Aids and Pen Aids wafer on the MM II and the support payload platform, Pen Aids and RVs on the MM III. 

z.  Reentry vehicle (RV):  That part of a ballistic missile designed to reenter the earth's atmosphere in the terminal portion of the trajectory.  Its prime purpose is to enable an internal payload to survive the severe environment encountered during reentry until impact or warhead detonation.  In the strictest sense of the word, the term RV automatically includes the payload or warhead. 

aa. Reliability:  The probability that an item will perform its intended function for a specified interval under stated conditions.  Normally data sets, such as those contained in maintenance failure/status reporting systems, are unclassified because they do not contain all the elements necessary to determine reliability as defined above.  If any data set describes a specific vulnerability or limitation, it will be classified in accordance with the specific area of this Guide covering the system/subsystem described by that data set. 

ab. Restricted Data (RD):  All data concerning (1) design, manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, (2) the production of special nuclear material or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy but shall not include data declassified or removed from the RD category pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 142. 

ac. SUAVE:  Silo Upgrade Addressing and Verification program. 

ad. Subassembly:  The first major subdivision of an assembly. 

ae. Subsystem:  The first major subdivision of a system, e.g., of the missile system, the propulsion subsystem. 

af. TSEC:  Transmission security designation used for COMSEC items. 

ag. Train:  As related to the weapon systems, the term "train" refers to a reentry train.  A reentry train consists of a series of objects in one of three configurations (i.e., chaff alone, RV with chaff or RV alone) which are deployed from a common RS and are targeted to arrive on the same target at  approximately the same time.  Any of the three configurations can also have its payload deployed in any train combination.  The reentry train is sometimes referred to as a cloud train due to the presence of chaff clouds after chaff deployment. 

ah. Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information:  Unclassified information pertaining to the physical protection of special nuclear material in accordance with Section 1123 of Public Law 100-180.  Interim procedures are contained in Under Secretary of Defense, Security Policy, Memorandum, Subject:  Interim Guidance for Identifying and Controlling Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UNCI) dated 18 Sep 1988. 

ai. Vulnerability:  The characteristics of a system which cause it to suffer a degradation (reduced capability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of each effect in a manmade hostile environment. 

aj. VNTK:  An acronym which stands for VN - vulnerability, T - type of device and K - constant.  It is a term used for assessing hardness achieved at a silo, squadron, wing or the force. 

ak. Weapon system:  All elements necessary to attain an operational missile capability, i.e., research and development, missiles, test and training programs, launch complexes, support bases, launch and support organizations, etc. 

SECTION V 
 

DISTRIBUTION 
 

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SECTION I 

FUNDING, PROCUREMENT AND PRODUCTION 
 

SECTION II 

HARDWARE CLASSIFICATION 

See USSTRATCOM SD 501-12 for items identified as requiring special handling. 

SECTION III 

PROPULSION SUBSYSTEMS 
 

SECTION IV 

MISSILE GUIDANCE SET (MGS) SUBSYSTEM 
 

SECTION V 

REENTRY SYSTEMS (RS) 

The national policy on nuclear weapons dictates that only limited information will be released.  Specifically no authority exists to divulge, confirm or deny the location at which special weapons are positioned, wherever they are positioned.  No questions will be answered regarding the employment of nuclear weapons in a particular situation.  The reply to questions on authority to employ nuclear weapons will be authorized by the President.  In reply to inquiries, use of the terms thermonuclear and hydrogen should not be used; atomic and nuclear should be avoided.  Replies should be phrased in such a way that they cannot be misconstrued as gratuitous official pronouncements.  Any unnecessary statements concerning US nuclear-capable deterrent forces should be restrained.  In accordance with established policy, the US does not discuss the arms carried by specific aircraft, vessels or other elements of its military forces and avoids drawing attention to the need for conducting continuous military operations with nuclear weapons.  Certain US weapons systems have been publicly identified as having a nuclear capability.  This identification does not in itself provide authority to release information concerning details of storage, handling, or transportation of nuclear weapons or components. 

Except where noted, the following guidance applies, as applicable, to both MM II and MM III. 

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SECTION VI 

IMPROVED MINUTEMAN PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM (IMPSS)

SECURITY AUXILIARY SYSTEM 
 

Unclassified information that pertains to security measures, including plans, procedures and equipment, for the physical protection of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) where unauthorized dissemination could have a significant adverse effect on public safety, the common defense and security due to illegal production of nuclear weapons, or the theft, diversion or sabotage of SNM should be considered for protection as DOD UCNI.  Material originated prior to dissemination of DOD UCNI interim procedures that is found in the normal course of business to contain UCNI will be protected as UCNI.  There is no requirement to conduct detailed files searches to retroactively identify UCNI.  However, as unclassified information pertaining to the physical protection of SNM is withdrawn from file, it should be reviewed to determine if it meets the criteria for protection as UCNI (and marked accordingly). 

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SECTION VII 

LAUNCH FACILITY PERSONNEL ACCESS AUXILIARY SYSTEM 
 

SECTION VIII 

AIRBORNE LAUNCH CONTROL SYSTEM (ALCS)

AUXILIARY SYSTEM 

Also see Worldwide Airborne Command Post System (WWABNCP) Security Classification Guide. 

SECTION IX 

COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS 
 

Higher authority communications terminals used in the Minuteman Weapon System to provide connectivity to the National Command Authority and other higher authorities may have performance parameters, modulation, signal processing, error correction, timing, and other characteristics that are classified.  The applicable communications system security classification guide should be consulted for classification determination of specific system characteristics. 

SECTION X 

TESTING PROGRAM 
 

The purpose of this section of the Guide is to establish the classification of information generated in preparation for, in support of, or as a result of flight and ground test operations.  Flight test operations are herein defined to include Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) flight tests.  Ground test operations are defined to include operational ground test programs such as, but not limited to, Simulated Electronic Launch Minuteman (SELM) where a modification to the weapon system or a subset of the weapon system is being evaluated without having missile flight as an objective.  In some instances, there may be a repetition of data presented in other sections of this Guide, but this was done intentionally to include all data pertinent to the testing community in one section of this Guide.  The classification guidance presented in this section is intended for flight test systems that are prepared and launched on the national test ranges as well as for ground tests conducted in the operational force, at Vandenberg AFB or Ogden ALC test facilities.  It is not intended to contradict or override the classifications assigned to operational deployed systems.  Depending on the configuration of the missile and the potential involvement of different Associated Operations on HQ AFSPC MM test launches, different RV and Associated Operation program Security Classification Guides may apply.  Review the missile configuration and list of approved Associated Operations from HQ AFSPC/DO for each mission (Glory Trip) to determine which other classification guides apply. 

SECTION XI 

OPERATIONAL GROUND EQUIPMENT (OGE) 
 

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SECTION XII 

FACILITIES 
 

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SECTION XIII 

OPERATIONAL DATA