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27 October 2007
http://www.defenselink.mil/atsdio/
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Source
George B. Lotz
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
A message from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Oversight (ATSD-IO), Mr. George B. Lotz, II:
Welcome to our home page. This site is intended to benefit all Department
of Defense (DOD) intelligence organizations and personnel. Executive Order
12333; its DOD implementing directive, DOD Directive 5240.1-R, and various
service and agency regulations place requirements on DOD intelligence components
and personnel. My staff is responsible for inspecting DOD intelligence
organizations worldwide to assure compliance with these documents; department,
service, and agency Inspector General organizations also inspect for compliance
regarding intelligence oversight. I hope the information posted here is helpful
to all of you in the establishment and conduct of your intelligence oversight
programs. Do not hesitate to contact us if you have questions or concerns
regarding intelligence oversight, or to comment on this site.
http://www.defenselink.mil/atsdio/documents/quickref.html
A QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE
FOR
REPORTING
QUESTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
YOU ARE
PROTECTED
Those reporting a questionable intelligence activity are protected
from reprisal or adverse actions associated with this reporting by anyone
in their entire chain of command.
WHAT IS A QUESTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITY?
Most intelligence personnel correctly associate questionable intelligence
activities with improper collection on
U.S.
persons; however, that is only one aspect of questionable intelligence
activities. The recent allegations of misconduct
and abuse of detainees by military, civilian, and contractor personnel involved
with the interrogations in
Iraq,
Afghanistan and
Guantanamo
are a prime example of questionable intelligence
activities. The purpose of the following is to
assist you in understanding this very important responsibility; a responsibility
that applies to everyone involved with an intelligence mission, whether you
have an intelligence specialty or not. But, to
answer the initial question:
A questionable intelligence activity is one that may
violate the law, any Executive Order (such as EO 12333,
United
States Intelligence Activities) or Presidential directive or applicable
Department of Defense policy (such as DoD 5240.1-R,
Procedures
Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United
States Persons), as well as your parent organization's specific guidance.
Examples of a questionable intelligence activity include, but are
not limited to, the following:
Alleged abuse and mistreatment of detainees and prisoners by or directed
by intelligence personnel.
Tasking intelligence personnel to conduct intelligence activities that are
not part of the organization's approved mission, even if they have the technical
capability to do so.
Providing intelligence services and/or products without proper authorization.
Failure to file proper use statements for imagery collection associated with
U.S.
persons.
Collecting information on
U.S.
persons, even through open source, when it is not part of the unit's mission.
Actions that are not inherently intelligence, such as fraud, waste and abuse,
personal misconduct, and minor security violations/deviations are not normally
processed through Intelligence Oversight channels.
There are administrative and judicial systems designed for these
activities. But, when in doubt, ask!
WHAT ARE YOUR
RESPONSIBILITIES?
You are assigned the responsibility under Procedure
14 of DoD 5240.1-R, to conduct only lawful intelligence
activities. The basis for this is to ensure that
in the process of defending the Constitution of the
United
States, we don’t compromise the very
values we have sworn to uphold and defend.
If you suspect that an activity you or others have been directed to conduct
may be improper, it is your responsibility to ask
questions. The first step would be to ask your
supervisor. If you are concerned that your supervisor
has not adequately addressed your concerns, then seek out your Intelligence
Oversight officer.
So, what do you do when you encounter a questionable intelligence activity?
You are assigned the responsibility
under Procedure 15 of DoD 5240.1-R,
to report what you believe is a questionable intelligence
activity to any of the following: your supervisor, intelligence oversight
officer, commander, unit legal advisor (either the judge advocate general
or general counsel) and/or your unit's inspector general.
Although we prefer that you use your chain of command, this is not
always practical. In those situations, you may
contact either the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Oversight or the DoD General Counsel's office directly.
INFORMATION CHECKLIST FOR
REPORTING
QUESTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITY
A key point to remember as you go through this process: do not
overlook proper security procedures. If the issue
you are concerned about is in controlled and/or classified channels, you
need to ensure that you bring the problem to the attention of those who have
the appropriate clearances.
1. What is your name and how can you be
contacted? Is there an alternate method to contact
you?
2. Do you wish to remain anonymous, that is,
either in reporting the questionable activity or providing your name but
having it protected as the source of the reporting?
3. If the nature of your concern is classified
what is the best way to get in contact with you, i.e., secure telephone,
SIPRNET, or JWICS?
4. Identify the activity and why you believe
it falls into the category of a questionable intelligence activity.
5. Identify those who you believe are involved
in this questionable intelligence activity.
6. If you have already brought this to the attention
of those in your chain of command or to your legal advisor or to the inspector
general, what was their response?
7. Do you believe you are being pressured
not to report this? Have
you been threatened with adverse action, such as a negative impact on your
fitness report?
8. Do you believe you are in danger because of
this reporting? If so, why?
Additional direct reporting options are available
on the ATSD(IO) controlled access websites:
SIPRNET:
www.atsdio.ismc.sgov.gov/atsdio
[restricted]
JWICS:
www.atsdio.ismc.ic.gov/atsdio/
[restricted]
http://www.defenselink.mil/atsdio/documents/documents.html
LIBRARY
Laws, Executive Orders, Directives, and
Regulations
http://www.defenselink.mil/atsdio/mission.html
MISSION AND HISTORY
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence Oversight)
BACKGROUND
The perceived need for a Department of Defense (DoD)
Intelligence Oversight (IO) program came about as a result of certain activities
conducted by DoD intelligence and counter-intelligence units against U.S.
persons involved in the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam War movements. During
the 1960s and 1970s, the United States experienced significant civil
demonstrations from protesters associated with these movements. Some of these
demonstrations were believed to be beyond the ability of civilian authorities
to control, and military forces were used to assist in the restoration of
order. Units deploying for this purpose discovered they needed basic
pre-deployment intelligence to perform their missions. The Army, designated
as executive agent for providing aid to civilian authorities, requested
assistance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When the FBI was
unable to provide the information needed, the Army began collecting it. Over
time, this collection mushroomed and led to abuse of the Constitutional rights
of our citizens. Eventually, DoD intelligence personnel were using inappropriate
clandestine and intrusive means to collect information on the legitimate
political positions and expressions of U.S. persons, accumulating that
information in a nationwide data bank, and sharing that information with
law enforcement authorities. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s:
Military counterintelligence special agents established, maintained, and
disseminated files on civil rights activists and organizers. These were not
legitimate DoD targets.
Counterintelligence special agents penetrated organizations such as the
"Resistors in the Army" and the "Friends of Resistors in the Army" and recruited
members of these organizations as informers. These organizations posed no
foreign threat.
So called "dissidents", actually U.S. persons who were exercising their First
Amendment rights, were placed under surveillance and their movements were
observed and recorded. These U.S. persons were not legitimate DoD
counterintelligence targets.
Radio communications of civil rights and anti-war demonstrators were intercepted
by military intelligence personnel. The interception of these communications
was improper.
Using media cover, military counterintelligence special agents infiltrated
the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. There was no legitimate
Defense investigative purpose for this action.
Information collected by Defense elements was routinely transferred to civilian
law enforcement authorities without evidence of criminal activity or relevance
to the law enforcement missions of the receiving authorities. This activity
was improper.
In the early and mid 1970s several Congressional
committees, including the Church, Pike, and Ervin committees, conducted
investigations and public hearings. After three and a half years of
investigation, these committees determined that what had occurred was a classic
example of what we would today call "mission creep." What had begun as a
simple requirement to provide basic intelligence to commanders charged with
assisting in the maintenance and restoration of order, had become a monumentally
intrusive effort. This resulted in the monitoring of activities of innocent
persons involved in the constitutionally protected expression of their views
on civil rights or anti-war activities. The information collected on the
persons targeted by Defense intelligence personnel was entered into a national
data bank and made available to civilian law enforcement authorities. This
produced a chilling effect on political expression by those who were legally
working for political change in domestic and foreign policies. Senator Ervin
concluded "the collection and computerization of information by government
must be tempered with an appreciation of the basic rights of the individual,
of his right to privacy, to express himself freely and associate with whom
he chooses." As a result of these investigations, DoD imposed severe restrictions
on future surveillance of U.S. persons, required that information already
in DoD files be destroyed, and established a structure to regulate future
DoD intelligence collection.
In 1976, President Ford issued an Executive Order
placing significant controls on the conduct of all intelligence activities.
Executive Order (EO) 11905, as the charter for the Intelligence Community,
included provisions for an intelligence oversight mechanism. Consequently,
the Secretary of Defense directed establishment of an Inspector General for
Intelligence in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, responsible for the
independent oversight of all DoD intelligence activities. EO 12036, signed
by President Carter in 1978, and the current Executive Order, EO 12333, signed
by President Reagan in 1981, continued the requirement for oversight to maintain
the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information by the
Intelligence Community, and the protection of individuals' constitutional
and statutory rights.
In November 1982, following the establishment of
the DoD Inspector General, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that
the Inspector General for Intelligence be redesignated as the Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) (ATSD (IO)). Today, the
ATSD (IO) reports on Intelligence Oversight activities at least quarterly
to the Secretary of Defense and, through him, to the Intelligence Oversight
Board (IOB), a standing committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB).
ORGANIZATION, MISSION AND FUNCTIONS
The ATSD (IO) is responsible to the Secretary of
Defense for the independent oversight of all intelligence, counterintelligence,
and intelligence-related activities in the Department of Defense. The
organization's charter can be found in
DoD Directive
5148.11. The ATSD (IO) ensures that all activities performed by intelligence,
counterintelligence, and intelligence related units are conducted in accordance
with Federal law, Executive Orders, DoD directives, regulations and policies.
The ATSD (IO) is also charged with the management
and direction of the DoD Intelligence Oversight program. The aim of the DoD
program is to institutionalize:
The orientation and training of all intelligence personnel in intelligence
oversight concepts,
An internal inspection program, and
A channel for the reporting of questionable or improper intelligence activities
to the ATSD (IO) and the DoD General Counsel, who are responsible for informing
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Included in the DoD IO program are the intelligence,
counterintelligence, and intelligence related units, staffs, and activities
of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Military Services, Defense Intelligence
Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
OVERSIGHT INSPECTIONS
The ATSD (IO) conducts vigorous and independent
inspections of DoD intelligence activities worldwide, ranging from intelligence
staffs at strategic headquarters to tactical intelligence activities in the
field. ATSD (IO) inspects all intelligence disciplines e.g. Human Intelligence,
Imagery Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Measurement and Signatures
Intelligence, as well as Counterintelligence. ATSD (IO) verifies that personnel
are trained in and comply with EO 12333 and DoD implementing authorities,
and that they are familiar with their obligation to report questionable or
improper intelligence activities.
The ATSD(IO) is also respsonsible for determining
the effectiveness of the Intelligence Oversight programs of the entire DoD
intelligence community. To accomplish this task, the inspection programs
of the Inspectors General of the Joint Staff, Military Services, Combatant
Commands, and DoD intelligence agencies are monitored.
INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS
At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, upon
request of other senior OSD officials, or on his own initiative, the ATSD
(IO) conducts special inquiries into allegations of questionable or improper
activities by DoD intelligence components. His staff of experienced professionals
can move rapidly and focus on difficult or sensitive issues. The ATSD (IO)
is authorized to obtain specialized support if needed from the DoD components.
The ATSD (IO) directs DoD components to investigate
allegations of illegal or improper activities by intelligence elements. The
ATSD (IO) reviews and analyzes reports of questionable activities received
from DoD intelligence components, the general counsels, and the inspectors
general of the Joint Staff, Military Services, Combatant Commands, and the
Defense intelligence agencies. Questionable activities of a serious nature
are investigated and the results are reported to the Secretary of Defense
and the Intelligence Oversight Board.
REPORTING
The ATSD (IO) is the designated DoD point of contact
with the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). As such, the ATSD(IO) is responsible
for the preparation of the quarterly intelligence oversight report submitted
to the IOB through the Secretary of Defense. This report is prepared in
coordination with the DoD General Counsel and describes significant DoD
intelligence oversight activities. It also includes the Intelligence Oversight
submissions of the Joint Staff, Military Services, Combatant Commands, National
Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office,
and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The ATSD (IO) responds to any
requests from the IOB concerning DoD intelligence.
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