Thanks to C. Castelli, Inside the Navy and www.InsideDefense.com.
Source: Inside the Navy, June 23, 2003, Vol. 16, No. 25, p 1.
© Inside Washington Publishers
In Operation Iraqi Freedom . . .
By Christopher J. Castelli
When the 1st Marine Division fought Saddam Hussein's forces in Iraq this year, the division knew locations of enemy forces and equipment but a dearth of human intelligence made enigmas of enemy commanders, according to a report by the division.
The lessons learned report does not mention weapons of mass destruction, but implies U.S. ground forces were not fully prepared to assess whether Iraqi commanders would, if given the opportunity, use such weapons.
“There was no available intelligence on the opposition commander's personalities, educations, decision-making styles or previous experiences,” states the May 29 report, lamenting the United States' failure to learn about enemy leaders though human intelligence (HUMINT), which uses human sources and foreign documents.
“We had an unprecedented level of resolution on the disposition of enemy equipment and near instant warning of activation of electronic systems or artillery fires,” the report states. “In many cases we maintained virtual surveillance of selected enemy forces. But, in spite of these capabilities we remained largely ignorant of the intentions of enemy commanders.”
U.S. intelligence is generally too focused on collecting various kinds of signals and images, the report argues.
The division, which fought as three regimental combat teams in Operation Iraqi Freedom under the command of Maj. Gen. James Mattis, prepared the report for Lt. Gen. James Conway, head of the I Marine Expeditionary Force.
The report was not intended for public release. A division spokeswoman declined to comment on the report and called it a draft because she said Conway had not approved its release. She also declined to comment on whether Mattis had sent the report to Conway yet.
Without much insight into the human dimension on the battlefield, the division had to guess what enemy commanders might do. The division made some limited strides in gathering HUMINT on Iraqi commanders using classified and unclassified sources, as well as the Internet, the report states.
There were, of course, big surprises in store for U.S. forces in Iraq. As the operation began, Conway not only thought Iraq's Republican Guard divisions had weapons of mass destruction, he also thought Iraqi commanders might use them on U.S. troops, he has said publicly. But that scenario never happened and no such weapons have since turned up.
“What the regime was intending to do in terms of its use of the weapons, we thought we understood or we certainly had our best guess, our most dangerous, our most likely courses of action that the intelligence folks were giving us,” said Conway in a May 30 video teleconference with reporters. “We were simply wrong. But whether or not we're wrong at the national level, I think, still very much remains to be seen.”
Know thy enemy?
While the 1st Marine Division was able to point “with some certainty” where Iraqi armor and artillery were deployed, “we were largely in the dark as to what they meant to do with it,” the report states. “This shortcoming was especially critical as much of the war plan was either based on or keyed to specific enemy responses. When the enemy 'failed' to act in accordance with common military practice, we were caught flat-footed because we failed to accurately anticipate the unconventional response. This was primarily due to a dearth of [human intelligence] on the enemy leadership.”
In trying to map out the opposition's reactions the division was largely relegated to open-source intelligence sources (public knowledge) and “rank speculation based on our own perceptions of the battlefield to make our assessments,” the report states.
In an effort to bridge the gap, the division created what it called “an understudy program” in which Iraqi corps and division commanders was assigned to Marine officers. Each understudy then attempted to learn as much as possible about “his” commander, including training, history and decision-making tendencies. Understudies sought out classified and unclassified information and even used Internet searches, the report states. This met with some success, but was limited to the amount of intelligence and public information available.
The understudies would brief the division commander and staff on all actionable intelligence obtained to assist in the planning process, states the report, noting understudies participated in war games and provided updates as the division began the “dynamic execution” phase.
The report recommends the Marine Corps institutionalize the understudy process.
Rehumanizing intelligence
In an indictment of U.S. intelligence capabilities that echoes criticisms raised by various observers after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the division's report bashes the U.S. military's reliance on intercepting signals and images, rather than human intelligence, which involves interrogations, informants and spies.
“Our technical dominance has made us overly reliant on technical and quantifiable intelligence collections means,” the report states. “There is institutional failure to account for the most critical dimension of the battlefield, the human one. As we saw demonstrated in [Operation Iraqi Freedom] the human aspect of the battle can be more important than the material one. Success on future battlefields requires that commensurate efforts be made to know the commander's mind as well as the disposition of his forces.”
The report recommends focusing national collection and analysis efforts on the idiosyncrasies of enemy leadership and building a national database that not only includes basic biographical data but also in depth assessments on how potential enemy commanders think and behave. Information about foreign military training curriculums and how this may influence their decision-making should be included, the report urges.
Looking inward, the report recommends boosting human intelligence efforts for the division and its regimental combat teams. The division's intelligence section did not have sufficient HUMINT representation at the division staff level and there was no such representation at the regimental staff level, the report concludes.
“The HUMINT reps provided did yeoman's work trying to keep up with the tremendous demand, but were stretched thin,” the report states.
The human intelligence capabilities provided to the division were “incredibly valuable and highly effective,” according to the report, which stresses “a definite need” to have HUMINT representation down to the regimental combat team level, including a limited analysis capability.
The planning, support, analysis and employment of assets are dependent on knowledgeable representatives advising the commanders and staff. But HUMINT assets were “frequently improperly employed, inadequately tasked and supported” at the tactical level, the report concludes.
There was insufficient HUMINT expertise at the staff level to do the planning in support of the unit's mission, the report continues.
There is also a lack of personnel to do analysis, according to the report. Analysis was not being done and was “pushed down” from higher levels, though there was no one to do it at the unit level, the report states. Having a staff HUMINT officer at the division level for planning and preparation phases of an operation would also be of great assistance, according to the division.