27 May 1999. Source: Betrayal, Bill Gertz, Washington, D.C., 1999. ISBN 0-89526-317-3. Thanks to Bill Gertz.
See Betrayal excerpts: http://www.washtimes.com/investiga/gertz1.html
Selections from an Appendix of 59 images of classified government documents, pp. 219-84.
See other secret documents from the book:
http://cryptome.org/jya/tsdocs-gertz.htmhttp://cryptome.org/jya/dprkdoc-gertz.htm
[pp. 233-36]
These excerpts from a presidential directive order a major strategic weapons review, revealing plans for a dubious "grand bargain" with Russia to expand the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and make future treaty changes more difficult. (4 pages)
SECRET
PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW THIRTY ONE
U.S. POLICY ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES AND
THE FUTURE OF THE ABM TREATY (S NF)
Executive Summary
A. Context for Decisions
o On September l, 1993, the President approved the
recommendations from the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), including
SecDef's recommendations for a fundamental restructuring of
ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs.
o Specifically, the U.S. will pursue an $18 billion BMD
program between FY95 and FY99 that will include (1) $12
billion to provide for enhanced theater missile defense
(TMD) capability later this decade; (2) $3 billion for
maintaining national missile defense (NMD) as a technology
(R&D) program; and (3) $3 billion for a modest follow-on
technologies {FOT) and research and support (R&S) program.
o These decisions have profound implications for U.S. policy
in the areas addressed in this PRD:
-- Absent the emergence of a Third World ICBM threat or a
reversal of trends in our improving relationship with
Russia, there will be no acquisition program for NMD
systems. NMD will remain for the indefinite future as
a technology program, and 10-15 years would be required
to deploy a system were a decision taken to do so. As
a result, for all intents and purposes NMD ABM Treaty
amendment issues are now moot, notwithstanding the
goals Congress articulated in the Missile Defense Act
(MDA) as recently as one year ago.
-- The requirement for robust TMD programs has been
validated as a top priority of the United States; thus,
ensuring that the ABM Treaty is updated to reflect
changes in TMD technologies is more important than
ever.
o The decisions taken in this PRD also occur in the context of
a radically transformed international political landscape.
-- The Soviet Union has disintegrated.
-- Russia finds many of its ABM assets on foreign soil.
-- The Newly Independent States (NIS) are claiming co-
equal status for the purposes of succession to the ABM
Treaty as Ukraine and Belarus underscored at the
recently completed five-year ABM Treaty Review
Conference in Geneva.
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-- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
has heightened interest in early warning sharing and
cooperative TMD efforts.
o Taking all of this into account, this Review recommends a
comprehensive "grand bargain" for meeting U.S. national
security requirements in the changed circumstances of the
current international security environment and as recently
validated in the BUR.
-- In return for U.S. agreement to (1) multilateralize the
ABM Treaty and (2) defer indefinitely discussion of
amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow for more
robust NMD architectures beyond that currently
permitted by the ABM Treaty, Russia (and other
successor states intent on joining the Treaty) would
agree to TMD clarifications that allow the U.S. to
execute those TMD programs that the BUR has identified
as essential to U.S. national security requirements.
-- The U.S. would also be prepared to proceed with
sharing of early warning data, planning for use of ATBM
forces and TMD technology cooperation, recognizing that
the pace of these cooperative efforts would, at least
indirectly, be linked to our ability to move forward
with our own TMD programs.
B. Assessment of the Threat
B.I. Threat From Russia
o The collapse of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the end of
the Cold War has dramatically reduced the immediate poten-
tial for strategic nuclear war with Russia. Reflecting this
change, U S. strategic bombers are no longer on alert, and
U.S. nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from surface ships
and submarines (with the exception of SLBM warheads, which
remain at sea). Also, the U.S. has canceled a number of
strategic modernization programs, including rail-garrison MX
and Midgetman, and has stopped production of the Advanced
Cruise Missile and Trident Mark V warhead. In addition, the
United States is now engaged in a broad range of strategic
stability enhancement discussions with Russia, including
detargeting. (S)
o Nonetheless, while the immediate potential for strategic
nuclear war with Russia has dramatically reduced, Russian
strategic forces (currently consisting of 10,100 weapons)
remain on continuous alert and hold U.S. and NATO forces at
risk. (s)
o Even without further modernization, Russia will still be
able to retain a potent, but aging, strategic force through
the early 2000s (between 2,600-3,500 warheads). Without
further refurbishment, most of the existing strategic
systems will reach the end of their service life by 2010-
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2020; however, we expect maintaining the viability of
strategic nuclear forces to remain Russia's highest military
priority. (S)
o As long as Moscow maintains current security practices, the
possibility of an unauthorized launch is remote. During a
coup or widespread violence, there is the possibility that
the Russian General Staff might misunderstand or
miscalculate Western intentions and actions. Technical
deficiencies and growing gaps in Russia's ballistic missile
early warning and attack assessment capabilities increase
the possibility of such miscalculations. (S)
B.II. Threat From China
o The Chinese intercontinental missile threat is significantly
smaller than that posed by Russia, currently consisting of
only seven relatively inaccurate single-warhead ICBMs. By
the year 2000, Beijing probably will have some 24-28
missiles capable of reaching the CONUS, some of which may be
MIRVed. China's medium and intermediate range missile force
currently is composed of some 50 launchers, and is expected
to double within the next 10 years. (S)
B.II[I]. Threat From Others
o It is unlikely that any nations beyond Russia, China, and
possibly Ukraine will develop ICBMs capable of striking the
United States during the next 10-15 years; beyond 10-15
years, one or more nations that are hostile to the United
States may be able to indigenously develop ballistic
missiles that could threaten the United States. (S)
o A number of countries hostile to the United States currently
possess short- and intermediate-range missile systems that
are capable of threatening U.S. friends and deployed U.S.
forces. Of particular concern in this regard are North
Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Within the next 10-15 years,
the capabilities of these countries will be increased. (S)
-- By the turn of the century, in most cases where U.S.
forces could potentially be engaged in a large-scale
manner, it is likely that our adversary will
potentially possess WMD in some form. Theater
ballistic missiles are likely to be included in a
future adversary's arsenal of weapons, especially in
the Middle East and Southwest Asia, where missiles have
been used in four of the last six major wars, or
Northeast Asia, where North Korea deploys a number of
ballistic missiles.
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C. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems
C.I. Assessment: Requirements and Capabilities:
C.l.a U.S. NMD
o Prior to completion and approval of the BUR, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) adopted a requirement
for strategic ballistic missile defense specifying an
overall system performance high enough to ensure a threshold
effectiveness of 100% reentry vehicle (RV) negation (with a
probability of performance of 95%) against a 20 RV attack
launched within 10 seconds. The objective requirement calls
for the same effectiveness but against an attack of 200 RVs.
In light of the BUR decision to downgrade NMD to a
technology-only program, this JROC must be revisited. (S)
o Should the United States decide in the future that an
emerging Third World ICBM threat or a reversal of reform in
Russia required elevating NMD to a systems acquisition
program, the maximum level of defense that could be provided
10-15 years later by a single Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) site would be highly dependent on the assumed
characteristics of the threat and the suite of sensors used
to provide weapon targeting information. (S)
o Using currently available or near-term technologies, a
single site BMD architecture for the defense of the United
States located at Grand Forks that includes 100 Ground Based
Interceptors (GBIs) and 1 Ground Based Radar (GBR) and no
additional sensors can protect only the central United
States against missiles constituting a northerly threat.
-- The cost to deploy and maintain this system for 10
years is estimated as $15-17B in FY 88 dollars. (S)
o Additional sensors, such as an upgraded early warning radar
(UEWR) system, Brilliant Eyes (BE), GSTS, or additional
(remote) GBRs, could expand coverage provided by a single
BMD site to include the entire CONUS Each of the
additional sensor options could provide high levels (>90%)
of protection against single launches from proliferant
states. However, protection against multiple RVs from CIS
or China would vary depending on the type of additional
sensor system employed.
-- The cost to deploy and maintain each of these sensors
for 10 years is: $1B FY 88 for UEWR, $2-4B FY 88 for
GSTS, and $5-6B FY 88 for BE for 10 years of operation.
(S)
o Deploying two ABM sites (each one about in the middle of
each U.S. coast) would increase the effectiveness of
national missile defenses.
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[pp. 237-41]
President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 17 in 1993, making it the policy of the United States not to seek changes in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The policy effectively blocked the United States from building a national missile defense capable of protecting all fifty states from long-range missile attack. (5 pages)
SECRET SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 11, l993
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-17
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses and the
Future of the ABM Treaty (S)
This Presidential Decision Directive establishes and directs the
implementation of U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD)
and the Future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. (S)
Background
On April 26, 1993, Presidential Review Directive (PRD)-31 tasked
a comprehensive examination of U.S. BMD policy, focusing on the
following three areas:
-- The objectives the Administration should pursue as
priority in BMD. (S)
-- An assessment of what, it any, changes in the ABM Treaty
should be sought in light of these objectives and the
modalities for achieving any changes. (S)
-- A strategy for pursuing our BMD objectives with Russia and
with friends and allies. (S)
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The Review was completed by the Interagency Working Group (IWG)
on Arms Control and forwarded to the Deputies Committee on
November 13, 1993. It was considered by the Principals Committee
on November 22, 1993. (C)
U.S. BND Objectives and Program
Consistent with the assessment of the ballistic missile threat
contained in PRD-31, on August 30 1993 I approved the
recommendations from the Bottom Up Review (BUR), including the
Secretary of Defense's recommendations for a fundamental
restructuring of BMD programs. (C)
Specifically, the U.S. will pursue a BMD program between FY95 and
FY99 that will provide for:
-- [Illegible] theater missile defense (TMD) capability later this
decade. (U)
-- Maintaining national missile defense (NMD) as a technology
research and-development (R&D) program. (U)
-- A modest follow-on technologies (FOT) and research and
support (R&S) program. (U)
The TMD programs identified in the BUR will play a key role in
minimizing two critical dangers to U.S. security: regional
threats to U.S. interests and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). In general, our, TMD forces should:
-- Provide highly effective protection against limited tactical
ballistic missile attacks for forward deployed and
concentrated or dispersed expeditionary elements of the
armed forces of the United States and for the facilities and
forces of friends and allies of the United States. (U)
-- Effectively protect allied population centers. This
protection could provide the opportunity for U.S./allies to
execute military options in support of national objectives
with minimum interference from enemy missile-forces. (U)
ABM Treaty
Consistent with U.S. BMD programmatic objectives, the following
will be the policy of the United States with regard to the ABM
Treaty. (S)
-- ABM Treaty interpretations: The Administration has already
informed the Congress that it will adhere to the
traditional, or "narrow,["] interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
(U)
-- NMD ABM Treaty issues: The United States will not seek
amendments to the ABM Treaty to permit (1) expansion of the
number of ABM sites and around-based interceptors beyond
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those currentLy permitted (1 and 100, respectively); (2)
development, testing or deployment of space-based sensors
for direct battle management (i.e., satellites capable of
substituting for ABM radars) or (3) development, testing or
deployment of space-based interceptors. The United States
will, however, reexamine these options if a decision is
taken at some future date to elevate NMD to an acquisition
and deployment program. (C)
-- Brilliant Eyes (BE) ABM Treaty issues: The objective BE
space-based sensor system is not sufficiently defined to
determine its ABM Treaty implications. If, at some future
date, the USG concludes that the ABM Treaty would prohibit
the objective BE system, the USG will determine at that time
whether to seek changes or redesign the system to make it
consistent with the USG interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
However, the United States will not negotiate at this time
ABM Treaty amendments or otherwise seek formal agreement to
the objective BE system. (C)
-- Succession: The United States will agree to negotiate a
protocol that will multilateralize the ABM Treaty, i.e., to
give each of the Bishkek signatories, as well as Georgia and
Azerbaijan, the option of becoming parties to the ABM
Treaty. (C)
-- TMD/ABM clarification: The requirement for robust TMD
programs has been validated as a top priority in our defense
planning; thus, ensuring that the ABM Treaty is updated to
reflect changes in TMD technologies is more important than
ever. (U)
The U.S. will propose to our ABM Treaty partners that for
purposes of determining treaty compliance a TMD system would
not be deemed to have been "given the capability to counter"
a strategic ballistic missile (SBM) unless it had actually
been tested against an SBM. An SBM would, in turn, be
defined as having a maximum velocity greater than 5.0
km/second. (S)
-- Linkage: The U.S. will implicitly link our positions on
succession and TMD/ABM clarification. The U.S. will not
conclude one without the other. (S)
BMD Cooperation
The U S. will be prepared to discuss (1) sharing of ballistic
missile early warning information, (2) planning for use of ATBM
forces and (3) employing technology cooperation to assist in
forging a positive security relationship between the United
States and Russia and to serve as part of a general strategy to
address the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction. The United States will adopt a regional/
bilateral approach to BMD cooperation in each of the above three
areas. (C)
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In general, the degree to which we are willing no share
technology will depend on the country with which we propose to
cooperate. In the specific case of Russia, the extent to which
we would pursue missile defense technology cooperation would
depend on their continued prOgress in political and economic
reform; adherence to arms Control agreements and the Missile
Technology Control Regime and a willingness to enter into and
abide by a bilateral agreement on cooperative activities. (C)
The United States will, however, limit these cooperative programs
with Russia in two important ways:
-- First, the technology development should be generic and not
involve direct cooperation in any current U.S. system
development (i.e., joint space sensor technology programs
should include experiments not tied to BE or other
operational system development). (C)
-- Second, the United States should focus on jointly developing
new technology products rather than transferring existing
technology. Thus, only the carefully controlled U.S.
technology necessary for specific projects would be
incorporated into them. (C)
Our program with Russia will proceed on its own merits, although
the pace of cooperation will be implicitly linked to our ability
to move forward with our own TMD programs. That, in turn, will
require a forthcoming response from Russia (and the other New
Independent States that would be made Party to the ABM Treaty) on
our TMD/ABM demarcation proposals (C)
Encouraging other countries to acquire Anti-Tactical Ballistic
Missiles (ATBMs), and (as appropriate) sharing U.S. technologies
permitted by the MTCR, can further U.S. security interests in
some regions of the world, reduce escalatory tendencies that
unchecked offensive military capabilities can create and
contribute to U.S. counter-proliferation efforts. (C)
However, potential tensions and tradeoffs exist between pursuing
missile defenses and limiting or preventing proliferation. A
tension between our BMD efforts and our nonproliferation goals
may arise if and when we need to cooperate with a non-MTCR
country in the development or sale of missile interceptors.
Entering into such cooperation could easily put the U.S. in the
position of engaging in behavior that we would object to -- and
might have to impose sanctions on -- if it were carried out by
other countries. Thus, the U.S. will strictly limit the number
of non-MTCR states with which such cooperation occurs. (C)
The Department of Defense and Department of State will formulate
a specific proposal for (a) early-warning (b) TMD and (c)
technology cooperation with Russia (and, as appropriate, other
countries and/or regions) and submit it to the IWG on Arms
Control no later than January 7, 1994. (C)
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Negotiating Forum
The United States will use the Standing Consultative Commission
(SCC) as the forum for negotiating clarifications, modifications,
state succession and procedural applications of the ABM Treaty.
Meeting in the SCC will serve to reaffirm the Administration's
commitment to the ABM Treaty and will constitute a good faith
effort to cooperate with the Russians on issues over which they
have serious concerns. (C)
Higher-level political discussions should be used to reach broad
agreement on our basic implementation strategy and to set
parameters for the SCC sessions to follow. These discussions
will also be the main forum for articulating to the Russians our
revised BMD cooperation objectives, supplemented by technical
discussions in sub-level working groups. (C)
Implementation
The NSC staff will coordinate the taskings identified in this
PDD. (U)
[Signature]
William J Clinton
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