6 February 1999
Source:
http://www.usia.gov/current/news/topic/intrel/99020208.tpo.html?/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml
USIS Washington
File
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02 February 1999
(Discusses international security, threats to US) (1810) Washington -- "The international security environment remains volatile, complex, and difficult," Defense Intelligence Agency Director General Patrick M. Hughes told a February 2 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. "This general global turmoil," he said in his opening statement, will "continue at least through the next decade." Of specific concern, he said, are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, intense ethnic conflict particulary in the Balkans, terrorist activities such as the African embassy bombings, and the development of longer-range missiles in North Korea and Iran. The United States should "anticipate an environment in which threats, challenges, and opportunities coexist," Hughes said. The military threats and challenges that the United States will encounter over the next two decades, according to Hughes, follow these themes: the US will continue to be confronted with a host of lesser dangers; the strategic nuclear threat to the US will endure; the threat posed by regional weapons of mass destruction will increase; and large regional forces will remain a substantial concern. Hughes predicts that "the global dynamic will continue to spur numerous regional and local crises," in particular in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Aegean, Africa, and South and Central Asia. The results of these continuing crises has already been "a dramatic increase in the operations tempo of US and allied forces," Hughes said. This increased engagement, he said, "limits the forces and resources available to respond immediately to other, more demanding, regional warfare contingencies." Furthermore, he warned that "these lesser crises can divert attention away from other, more significant, systemic global problems." Hughes also mentioned "rogues, renegades, and outlaws" such as Usama Bin Ladin who do not share the US view of the future. He said that such people will undertake any number of efforts to "avoid, slow, halt, prevent, or undo US intiatives and will continue to sponsor many kinds of anti-US activities." Another threat will come in the form of "critical enabling technologies" Hughes said. These will include nanotechnology which could be used to manufacture smaller, yet more destructive weapons; biotechnologies which could be used in biological agents; and information-related technologies, such as advanced encrytion, he explained. Following is the DIA text, as prepared for delivery: (begin text) Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead Statement for the Record Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA Director, Defense Intelligence Agency I am pleased to once again have the opportunity to provide the committee my views on the global threats and challenges confronting our nation over the next two decades. As we have witnessed during the past year -- with the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction highlighted by the nuclear detonations in India and Pakistan ... heightened tensions along the line of control in Kashmir ... disorder in Indonesia ... terrorist bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania ... North Korean and Iranian progress in developing longer-range missiles ... intense ethnic conflict, particularly in the Balkans and Central Africa ... internal uncertainty and economic crisis in Russia ... the devastating impact of Hurricane Mitch in Central America ... narcotics trafficking and its corrosive effects on governance in Colombia and surrounding countries ... Iraq's continued belligerence ... and growing concern with the direction North Korea is taking -- the international security environment remains volatile, complex, and difficult. I expect this general global turmoil to continue (and perhaps worsen) at least through the next decade, because the underlying causes -- political, economic, social, and technological -- remain largely in place. We should therefore anticipate an environment in which threats, challenges, and opportunities coexist, intertwine, and evolve seemingly at random. I am particularly concerned that the simultaneous occurrence of many "lesser" crises will result in a "net effect" that could diffuse our focus, dissipate our power and resources, cause us to be reactive, and ultimately, undermine our ability to shape the future. Against this backdrop of change, turmoil, and uncertainty, I see five central themes that will define the nature of the military threats and challenges we are likely to encounter over the next two decades. These themes expand upon points I have raised in prior testimony as the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and reflect more than ten years of my thinking about the future global security environment. -- No global military challenger on the scale of the former Soviet Union is likely to emerge, but the United States will continue to be confronted with a host of "lesser" dangers -- regional, transnational, and asymmetric. Terrorism will continue to be an important threat, particularly when terrorist acts include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Collectively, these lesser dangers represent a formidable barrier to the emergence of a stable, secure, and prosperous international order and will continue to absorb a great deal of the U.S. military's time, energy, and resources. -- The strategic nuclear threat to the U.S. will endure, but its character has and will continue to change significantly. While the number of Russian strategic warheads will shrink dramatically, Moscow will retain a potent delivery capability and rely increasingly on strategic forces. China will modernize and expand its relatively small and dated strategic deterrent force. Though less certain, I am increasingly concerned that adversaries -- notably North Korea and Iran -- will develop and field nuclear-armed missiles with intercontinental range. This more diverse and complex strategic nuclear threat environment affects Cold War thinking about nuclear deterrence, policy, force posture, and strategic targeting. -- The threat posed by regional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- already the greatest threat to deployed U.S. forces -- will increase. Several rogue states will likely join the nuclear club, chemical and biological weapons will be widely proliferated, and the numbers of longer-range theater ballistic and cruise missiles will increase significantly, particularly in the Middle East. This dynamic has the potential to fundamentally alter theater force balances, the nature of regional war and conflict, and U.S. contingency planning and execution. -- Large regional forces remain a substantial concern. A number of key regional powers -- China and possibly Russia at the high end, but also an unimpeded Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, and, at least through the near term, North Korea -- will field conventional military forces that are large and well-equipped by today's standards. The degree to which these "industrial age" forces can adopt and apply selected "high-end capabilities" -- WMD, missiles, satellite reconnaissance, global positioning, precision-strike, advanced radar, and so forth -- remains to be seen. In the right regional context, they could pose a significant threat to U.S. mission success, particularly in the period beyond 2010. The global dynamic will continue to spur numerous regional and local crises. Prolonged tensions in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Aegean, tribal and internecine disputes throughout many parts of Africa, continued hostility between India and Pakistan, ongoing border disputes between several nations, and ethnic and political conflict in resource-rich Central Asia -- all have the potential to erupt abruptly into active conflict. These trends, combined with declining military budgets worldwide, have had (and will continue to have) important consequences. -- First, there has been a dramatic increase in the operations tempo of U.S. and allied forces. Only a few advanced militaries possess the strategic mobility to project power to remote, undeveloped regions, and even fewer militaries have the communications, transportation, logistics, and intelligence support to stay in distant deployed sites for extended periods of time (particularly under threatening and sometimes lethal conditions). These frequent deployments sap resources and limit training time. -- Likewise, our increased daily global engagement posture limits the forces and resources available to respond immediately to other, more demanding, regional warfare contingencies. Anticipating a threat environment in which more than one situation (perhaps several) will require a direct military response simultaneously, is critical to contingency and operational planning. Numerous, simultaneous, smaller-scale crises could have a large-war impact. -- Finally, these "lesser crises" can divert attention away from other, more significant, systemic global problems. Given the general global condition, I expect the demand for humanitarian and other "peace operations" to remain high. The effect of this is that U.S. and allied forces may, of necessity, have to react to a continuing sequence of "emergencies" rather than devoting their capabilities toward the shaping of a more stable global order. Rogues, Renegades, and Outlaws. A number of individuals, subnational groups, and states -- Usama Bin Ladin and others with similar views, various international criminal and terrorist persons and organizations, and the governments and leaders of Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and others -- do not share our view of the future. They typically resent the dominant global role played by the U.S., and feel threatened by the rapid expansion of "western" (and particularly American) values, ideals, culture, and institutions. These entities generally recognize U.S. military superiority and seek to advance their ends while avoiding direct engagement with the U.S. military "on our terms." They will undertake any number of asymmetric and asynchronous efforts to avoid, slow, halt, prevent, or undo U.S. initiatives and will continue to sponsor many kinds of anti-U.S. activities. They frequently engage in behavior outside accepted international norms -- despotism, violent extremism, terror, and unacceptable use of military force -- as they struggle to improve their position while undermining the established or emerging order. While these entities are not at present linked by a widely shared unifying ideology, one could conceivably arise under the rhetoric of providing a counterpoint to U.S. power. Technology development and proliferation. I am very concerned about weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation and will address these issues separately. However, there are other critical "enabling" technologies -- including numerous "new sciences" -- that can dramatically affect the nature and capabilities of future threats. Some examples include: -- Nanotechnology ... packaging advanced capabilities and functions in very small and lightweight form using micro and sub-micro manufacturing and machining technology (in particular, building weapons systems that are smaller, faster, lighter, yet more destructive). -- Biotechnologies ... particularly the bioengineering of organisms created for very specific purposes (e.g. biological agents that will infect and incapacitate a specific group of people). -- Information-related technologies ... including advanced encryption, high volume data handling, complex computational capability, and offensive and defensive information warfare capabilities. Critical Uncertainties. There are numerous issues -- to include the great transitions underway in Russia and China, the future of the Korean peninsula, the prospects for lasting peace in the Middle East, the Balkans, and sub-Sahara Africa, evolving global and regional security structures and institutions, and an array of upcoming leadership changes -- whose outcome will dramatically impact the global security situation. Uncertainty about these and other key issues brings great stress to the international order. I can foresee no condition, power, or circumstance that is likely to emerge during the next 10-20 years that will transcend these factors and lead to a more stable and predictable global order. (end text)