28 December 1998
Source: http://web7.whs.osd.mil/corres.htm

DOD Directive 5100.20 The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service

DOD Directive 5100.23 Administrative Arrangements for the National Security Agency

DOD Directive 5100.35 Military Communications-Electronics Board (MCEB)

DOD Directive 5100.47 National Cryptologic School

DOD Directive 5100.85 Intelligence Systems Board (ISB)

DOD Instruction 5105.58 Management of Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

DOD Directive 5148.11 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO))

DOD Directive 5160.54 Critical Asset Assurance Program (CAAP)

DOD Directive 5200.1 DoD Information Security Program

DOD Directive 5205.8 Access to Classified Cryptographic Information

DOD Directive 5210.45 Personnel Security in the National Security Agency

DOD Directive 5210.70 DoD Cryptologic Training

For more publications see: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/index.html

Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5100.20

December 23, 1971

Administrative Reissuance Incorporating Through Change
4, June 24, 1991

ASD(I)

SUBJECT:  The National Security Agency and the Central
Security Service 

References:  (a)  National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No. 6

1.  PURPOSE 

This directive prescribes authorities, functions, and
responsibilities of the National Security Agency (NSA)
and the Central Security Service (CSS).

2.  CONCEPT 

2.1.  Subject to the provisions of NSCID No. 6, and
the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and pursuant
to the authorities vested in the Secretary of Defense,
the National Security Agency is a separately organized
agency within the Department of Defense under the direction,
supervision, funding, maintenance and operation of the
Secretary of Defense.

2.2.  The National Security Agency is a unified organization
structured to provide for the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
mission of the United States and to insure secure communications
systems for all departments and agencies of the U.S.
Government.

2.3.  The Central Security Service will conduct collection,
processing and other SIGINT operations as assigned.

 Declassified on May 22, 1990

by the Director of Administration and Management,

Office of the Secretary of Defense

(Authority:   E.O. 12356, April 6, 1982)

3.  DEFINITIONS 

3.1.  Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)  is a category of
intelligence information comprising all Communications
Intelligence (COMINT), Electronics Intelligence (ELINT),
and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT).

3.2.  COMINT  is technical and intelligence information
derived from foreign communications by other than the
intended recipients.   COMINT is produced by the collection
and processing of foreign communications passed by electromagnetic
means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by
the processing of foreign encrypted communications,
however transmitted.   Collection comprises search,
intercept, and direction finding.   Processing comprises
range estimation, transmitter/operator identification,
signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysts, decryption,
study of plain text, the fusion of these processes,
and the reporting of results.   COMINT shall not include:

3.2.1.  Intercept and processing of unencrypted written
communications, except the processing of written plain
text versions of communications which have been encrypted
or are intended for subsequent encryption.

3.2.2.  Intercept and processing of press, propaganda
and other public broadcasts, except for processing encrypted
or "hidden meaning" passages in such broadcasts.

3.2.3.  Oral and wire interceptions conducted under
DoD Directive 5200.24.

3.2.4.  Censorship.

3.3.  ELINT  is technical and intelligence information
derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic
radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation
or radioactive sources.   ELINT is produced by the collection
(observation and recording), and the processing for
subsequent intelligence purposes of that information.

3.4.  TELINT  is technical and intelligence information
derived from the intercept, processing, and analysis
of foreign telemetry.

3.5.  SIGINT  operational control is the authoritative
direction of SIGINT activities, including tasking and
allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription
of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT
information is collected, processed and reported.

3.6.  SIGINT resources  comprise units/activities and
organizational elements engaged in the conduct of SIGINT
(COMINT, ELINT or TELINT) activities.

4.  APPLICABILITY 

The provisions of this directive apply to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Department,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified
Commands, the National Security Agency, the Central
Security Service, and other Defense Agencies hereinafter
called Department of Defense Components.

5.  ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES 

5.1.  The SIGINT resources of the Department of Defense
will be structured to accomplish most efficiently and
effectively the SIGINT mission of the U.S.

5.2.  The National Security Agency shall consist of
a Director, a Headquarters, and such subordinate units,
elements, facilities, and activities as are assigned
to the National Security Agency by the Secretary of
Defense in his role as the executive agent of the Government
for the conduct of SIGINT.

5.3.  The Central Security Service is comprised of a
Chief, Central Security Service, a Deputy Chief, a jointly
staffed headquarters, Army, Navy/Marine Corps and Air
Force operating elements, and such other subordinate
elements and facilities as may be assigned to the Central
Security Service by the Secretary of Defense.

5.4.  The Director, National Security Agency, shall
also be the Chief, Central Security Service.

5.5.  The Director of the National Security Agency/Chief,
Central Security Service shall have a Deputy Director
for the National Security Agency and a Deputy Chief,
Central Security Service.   To provide continuity in
SIGINT matters the Deputy Director, National Security
Agency, shall be a technically experienced civilian.
  The Deputy Chief, Central Security Service, shall
be a commissioned officer of the Military Services,
of not less than two star rank, designated by the Secretary
of Defense.   The Deputy Chief will normally not be
selected from the same Military Service as the Chief.

5.6.  The Director and Deputy Director of the National
Security Agency shall be designated by the Secretary
of Defense, subject to the approval of the President.
  The Director shall be a commissioned officer of the
Military Services, on active or reactivated status,
and shall enjoy not less than three star rank during
the period of his incumbency.

5.7.  The Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
Central Security Service shall report to the Secretary
of Defense.

5.8.  The Commanders of the Service cryptologic organizations
and their subordinate activities which conduct SIGINT
operations will be subordinate to the Chief, Central
Security Service, for all matters involving SIGINT activities.
  In this role they will be designated as Service element
commanders and subordinate activities of the Central
Security Service.   Unless otherwise specifically provided
in this directive, the Service cryptologic organizations
will remain in their parent Services, for the purpose
of administrative and logistic support.

5.9.  The Secretary of Defense with the advice of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff may specifically designate other
SIGINT-related resources of the Department of Defense
which will be subordinate to the Chief, Central Security
Service for SIGINT operations.

6.  RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS 

6.1.  Subject to the direction, authority and control
of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, National
Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service shall:

6.1.1.  Accomplish the SIGINT mission of the National
Security Agency/Central Security Service.

6.1.2.  Act as principal SIGINT advisor to the Secretary
of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.   As principal SIGINT advisor
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director, National
Security Agency will keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff
fully informed on SIGINT matters.

6.1.3.  Exercise SIGINT operational control over SIGINT
activities of the U.S. Government to respond most effectively
to military and other SIGINT requirements.   In the
case of mobile military SIGINT platforms, he shall state
movement requirements through appropriate channels to
the military commanders, who shall retain responsibility
for operational command of the vehicles.

6.1.4.  Provide technical guidance to all SIGINT or
SIGINT-related operations of the U.S. Government.

6.1.5.  Formulate programs, plans, policies, procedures
and principles.

6.1.6.  Produce and disseminate SIGINT in accordance
with the objectives, requirements and priorities established
by the Director of Central Intelligence.   (This function
will not include the production and dissemination of
finished intelligence which are the responsibilities
of departments and agencies other than the National
Security Agency/Central Security Service.)

6.1.7.  Manage assigned SIGINT resources, personnel
and programs.

6.1.8.  In relation to the Department of Defense SIGINT
activities, prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense
a consolidated program and budget, and requirements
for military and civilian manpower, logistic and communications
support, and research, development, test and evaluation,
together with his recommendations pertaining thereto.

6.1.9.  Conduct research, development and systems design
to meet the needs of the National Security Agency/Central
Security Service and coordinate with the departments
and agencies their related research, development, test
and evaluation in the SIGINT field.

6.1.10.  Determine and submit to the Secretary of Defense
logistic support requirements for the National Security
Agency, and the Central Security Service, together with
specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible
departments and agencies of the Government should supply.

6.1.11.  Develop requisite security rules, regulations
and standards governing operating practices in accordance
with the policies of the U.S. Intelligence Board and
the U.S. Communications Security Board.

6.1.12.  Prescribe within his field of authorized operations
requisite security regulations covering operating practices,
including the transmission, handling, and distribution
of SIGINT material within and among the elements under
his control; and exercise the necessary monitoring and
supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations.

6.1.13.  Make reports and furnish information to the
U.S. Intelligence Board or the U.S. Communications Security
Board, as required.

6.1.14.  Respond to the SIGINT requirements of all DoD
components and other departments and agencies.

6.1.15.  Eliminate unwarranted duplication of SIGINT
efforts.

6.1.16.  Standardize SIGINT equipment and facilities
wherever practicable.

6.1.17.  Provide for production and procurement of SIGINT
equipments.

6.1.18.  Provide the Director of Central Intelligence
through the Secretary of Defense with such information
as required on the past, current and proposed plans,
programs, and costs of the SIGINT activities under his
control.

6.1.19.  Provide guidance to the military departments
to effect and insure sound and adequate military and
civilian SIGINT career development and training programs,
and conduct, or otherwise provide for, necessary specialized
and advanced SIGINT training.

6.1.20.  Provide technical advice and support to enhance
SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments, and conduct,
as authorized, SIGINT exchanges with foreign governments.

6.1.21.  Perform such other functions as the Secretary
of Defense assigns.

7.  AUTHORITIES 

7.1.  Subject to the authority, direction and control
of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, National
Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, is
specifically delegated authority to:

7.1.1.  Exercise SIGINT operational control over SIGINT
activities of the United States.

7.1.2.  Issue direct to any of his operating elements
such instructions and orders necessary to carry out
his responsibilities and functions.

7.1.3.  Have direct access to, and direct communications
with, any element of the U.S. Government performing
SIGINT functions.

7.1.4.  The authority in paragraphs 7.1.1.,7.1.2., and
7.1.3. above is subject to review, approval and control
in accordance with procedures determined by the Secretary
of Defense.

7.1.5.  Adjust as required, through the Service cryptologic
organizations, personnel resources under his SIGINT
operational control.

7.1.6.  Centralize or consolidate SIGINT operations
for which he is responsible to the extent desirable,
consistent with efficiency, economy, effectiveness,
and support to field commanders.

7.1.7.  Submit, as appropriate, concurrent/letter of
evaluation efficiency/fitness reports on the commanders
of subordinate elements of the Central Security Service
in accordance with parent Service procedures.

7.1.8.  Delegate SIGINT operational tasking of specified
SIGINT resources and facilities for such periods and
or such operational tasks as required or as directed
by the Secretary of Defense.

7.1.9.  Prescribe SIGINT procedures for activities to
whom he provides technical guidance.

7.1.10.  Prescribe, or review and approve security rules,
regulations and instructions, as appropriate.

7.1.11.  Conduct those SIGINT operations undertaken
in support of certain missions within the purview of
NSCID No. 5.

7.1.12.  Obtain such information and intelligence material
from the departments and agencies (Military Departments,
other Department of Defense agencies, or other departments
or agencies of the Government) as may be necessary for
the performance of the National Security Agency/Central
Security Service functions.

7.1.13.  Maintain a departmental property account for
the National Security Agency and the Central Security
Service headquarters.

7.2.  Other authorities, specifically delegated by the
Secretary of Defense or by other proper authority to
the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central
Security Service in other directives or issuances, will
be referenced in an Enclosure to this directive.

8.  RELATIONSHIPS 

8.1.  In the performance of its responsibilities and
functions, the National Security Agency/Central Security
Service shall:

8.1.1.  Coordinate actions, as appropriate, with other
DoD Components, and other departments and agencies of
the Government.

8.1.2.  Maintain direct liaison, as appropriate, for
the exchange of information and advice in the field
of its assigned responsibility with other DoD Components
and other departments and agencies of the Government.

8.1.3.  Coordinate with other DoD Components and other
departments and agencies of the Government to make maximum
use of established facilities to preclude unnecessarily
duplicating such facilities.

8.1.4.  Provide for direct liaison by representatives
of the intelligence components of individual departments
and agencies regarding interpretation and amplification
of requirements and priorities within the framework
of objectives, requirements, and priorities established
by the Director of Central Intelligence.

8.2.  Other DoD Components shall provide support, within
their respective fields of responsibility, to the Director,
National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service
as may be necessary to carry out his assigned responsibilities
and functions.

9.  ADMINISTRATION 

9.1.  To the extent applicable and consistent with the
functions assigned to the National Security Agency/Central
Security Service, Department of Defense policies, regulations
and procedures will govern.

9.2.  The National Security Agency/Central Security
Service will be authorized such personnel, facilities,
funds and other administrative support as the Secretary
of Defense deems necessary for the performance of its
functions.   Other DoD Components shall provide support
for the Agency/Service as prescribed in specific directives
or support agreements.

10.  CANCELLATION 

To the extent they are inconsistent herewith, DoD Directive
S-5100.20, "The National Security Agency," dated March
19, 1959, DoD Directive S- 3115.4, "Communications Intelligence,"
dated March 19, 1959, and DoD Directive S-3115.2, "Electronics
Intelligence," dated February 7, 1967 are hereby canceled.

11.  EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION 

11.1.  This directive is effective upon publication.

11.2.  To meet the provisions of this Directive, the
Director, National Security Agency will develop a plan
to implement this Directive including establishment
of the Central Security Service for approval by the
Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

11.3.  When the Central Security Service is established
under the terms of this Directive and the approved implementing
plan, all Department of Defense Components will review
their existing directives, instructions, and regulations
for conformity and submit necessary amendments thereto
to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
within ninety (90) days.

Enclosures - 1 

1.  Listing of Specific Delegations of Authority

E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

Listing of Specific Delegations of Authority by the
Secretary of Defense to the Director of the National
Security Agency

E1.1.1.  Administrative authorities required for the
administration and operation of the National Security
Agency, as prescribed in DoD Directive 5100.23, dated
May 17, 1967.

E1.1.2.  Authority to authorize or request the procurement
of cryptologic material and equipment by the Military
Departments, as prescribed in DoD Directive 5160.13,
dated March 20, 1956.

E1.1.3.  Authority to establish and administer programs
of training, as prescribed in DoD Directive 1430.4,
dated August 5, 1969.

E1.1.4.  Authority to assign the classification of TOP
SECRET, as prescribed in DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD
Information Security Program Regulation," authorized
by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 1, 1972.

E1.1.5.  Authority to determine the eligibility of individual
civilian officers and employees to transport or store
their privately owned motor vehicles at Government expense,
in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 1418.3,
dated June 28, 1965.



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5100.23

May 17, 1967

Administrative Reissuance Incorporating Through Change
2, November 1, 1985

SUBJECT:  Administrative Arrangements for the National
Security Agency 

References:  (a)  DoD Directive S-5100.20, "The National
Security Agency" 

(b)  DoD Directive 5100.23, "Administrative Arrangements
for the National Security Agency," August 25, 1959 (hereby
canceled)

1.  PURPOSE 

This Directive prescribes certain administrative arrangements
and delegates administrative authorities required for
the administration and operation of the National Security
Agency (NSA).

2.  ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 

The National Security Agency is a separately organized
agency within the Department of Defense under the direction,
authority and control of the Secretary of Defense who
acts as executive agent of the Government for the maintenance
and operation of the National Security Agency.   To
the extent applicable and consistent with the functions
assigned to the Agency, Department of Defense policies,
regulations, and procedures will govern the Agency's
operations.   When DoD directives, instructions, or
other authoritative issuances hereafter published refer
to DoD Components or Defense Agencies, these terms include
NSA unless the issuance itself specifically exempts
NSA, or the Agency had obtained an exception or modification
as provided below:

2.1.  Originators of DoD directives, instructions, and
substantive changes to these documents shall ascertain
and consider the views of the Director, NSA as appropriate.

2.2.  If the Director, NSA, determines that DoD issuances
would adversely affect the conduct of the mission of
the Agency or interfere with its security requirements,
he shall recommend to the Secretary of Defense exceptions
or modifications to these issuances within 90 days from
the date of their promulgation.

3.  ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 

The following specific arrangements and provisions will
be applied in the administration and operation of the
NSA:

3.1.  Programming, budgeting, financing, accounting,
and financial reporting activities of NSA will be in
conformance with policies established by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).   Disbursing services
will be provided by the Military Departments.

3.2.  The Director, NSA, will develop, in collaboration
with the Military Departments, and submit to the Secretary
of Defense, in accordance with applicable directives
consolidated cryptologic plans and programs, together
with the Director's recommendations as to requirements
for military and civilian manpower, operating costs,
investment in facilities and capital equipment, and
research, development, test and evaluation.

3.3.  The Director, NSA, shall make maximum use of the
established facilities and services of the Military
Departments and other DoD Components wherever practicable
to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.

3.3.1.  The Military Departments and other DoD Components
shall provide such support to the NSA within their capabilities
as may be necessary to carry out the assigned responsibilities
of the Agency.

3.3.2.  The need for and propriety of items procured
for the NSA shall be determined by the Director, NSA,
subject to DoD procurement regulations.

3.3.3.  Although the Agency will operate its own printing
plants, it will utilize the facilities of the Military
Departments for the disposal of printing, binding, and
related equipment that is surplus to the needs of the
Agency.   Such equipment will be removed promptly from
the Agency facility by the Military Department concerned.
  When such equipment is being replaced, it will be
removed concurrently with or prior to, as appropriate,
the delivery of the replacement items.   In other instances,
when it is necessary for the convenience of the Agency
that surplus printing equipment be removed prior to
its final disposition by a Military Department or the
General Services Administration, the cost of the removal
will be borne by the Agency.

3.3.4.  Other excess or surplus equipment and supplies
of the Agency will be disposed of in accordance with
DoD directives.

3.4.  Statistics, reports or information which will
disclose the organization or any function of the NSA,
any of its activities, or the names, titles, salaries,
or number of persons employed by the Agency will not
be released outside the DoD to any individual, organization,
or Government department or agency except when authorized
by the Director, NSA, the Secretary of Defense, or other
proper authority, or when required by law.   Statistics
and progress or status reports, including those pertaining
to personnel employed by or assigned to the NSA, which
are required by activities of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense will be submitted by the Agency to the Directorate
of Statistical Services, OASD(Comp), in accordance with
the provisions of DoD Instruction 7700.3.

3.5.  All military and civilian positions of the NSA
are hereby designated as "critical sensitive positions"
and will be treated as such in connection with investigative,
security clearance, and employment matters.

4.  DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 

An enclosure to this directive contains delegations
of the various administrative authorities required by
the Director, NSA to administer and direct the operations
of the Agency.

5.  EFFECTIVE DATE AND CANCELLATION 

This directive is effective upon publication.   Reference
(b) is hereby superseded and canceled.

Enclosures - 1 

1.  Delegation of Authority

E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY

E1.1.1.  Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary
of Defense, the following authorities, as required in
the administration and operation of the National Security
Agency, (NSA), are hereby delegated, subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
Defense, to the Director, NSA, or in the event of the
absence or incapacity of the Director, to the person
acting for him to:

E1.1.1.1.  Exercise the powers vested in the Secretary
of Defense by Sections 302 and 3101 of Title 5, United
States Code, and Sections 2 and 4 of Public Law 86-36,
as amended (50 USC 402 note), pertaining to the establishment
of positions; the fixing of basic compensation; the
employment, direction, and general administration of
civilian personnel of the NSA subject to the following
provisions:

E1.1.1.1.1.  Positions established at the basic compensation
equal to rates of basic compensation authorized for
Grades 16, 17 and 18 of the General Schedule (5 USC
5332) are subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Defense, and

E1.1.1.1.2.  The rates of compensation for positions
established under the provisions of Section 4 of Public
Law 86-36, as amended (50 USC 402 note) will be subject
to approval by the Secretary of Defense.

E1.1.1.2.  Fix rates of pay for wage board employees
in relation to prevailing rates for comparable job in
the locality.

E1.1.1.3.  Prescribe, as conditions of employment, that
NSA employees (a) must serve any place in the world
as the needs of the Agency dictate, and (b) must forego
personal unofficial travel when the Director, NSA, determines
that travel in the proposed area would constitue a hazard
to national security.

E1.1.1.4.  Administer oaths of office incident to entrance
into the Executive Branch of the Federal Government
or any other oath required by law in connection with
employment therein, in accordance with the provisions
of 5 USC 2903, and to designate in writing, as may be
necessary, officers and employees of the NSA to perform
this function.

E1.1.1.5.  Grant additional compensation to civilian
officers and employees of the National Security Agency
who are citizens or nationals of the United States,
in accordance with and not to exceed additional compensation
authorized by regulations of the State Department or
the Civil Service Commission, whichever is applicable,
for employees whose rates of basic compensation are
fixed by statute.

E1.1.1.6.  Establish advisory committees and employ
or procure the services of part-time advisors as consultants
and experts as approved by the Secretary of Defense
for the performance of NSA functions pursuant to the
provisions of 10 USC 173, 5 USC 3109, and the agreement
between the Department of Defense and the Civil Service
Commission on the employment of experts and consultants
dated July 22, 1959; and waive compliance with any part
or all of the requirements of rules 1, 2, and 3 in paragraph
V.A. of DoD Directive 5030.13, dated April 20, 1962,
for any advisory committee, other than an industry advisory
committee, when the Director, NSA finds that compliance
would render effective utilization of the committee
impracticable and that such waiver would be in the public
interest.

E1.1.1.7.  Establish an NSA Incentive Awards Board and
pay cash awards to, and incur necessary expenses for
the honorary recognition of (a) civilian employees of
the Government whose suggestions, inventions, superior
accomplishments, or other personal efforts, including
special acts or services, benefit or affect NSA or its
subordinate activities in accordance with the provisions
of 5 USC 4501-4506 and Civil Service Commission and
DoD regulations, and (b) military assignees to the Agency
whose suggestions, inventions scientific achievements
or other meritorious special acts or services in connection
with or related to their official duties benefit or
affect NSA or its subordinate activities in accordance
with 10 USC 1124 and DoD Directive 5120. 15, dated 3
December 1965.

E1.1.1.8.  Authorize persons to be provisionally employed
before the completion of a full field investigation
provided such persons are not given access to sensitive
cryptologic information while so employed, in accordance
with Section 302(a) of Public Law 88-290.   In an exceptional
case in which the Director makes a determination in
writing that his action is necessary or advisable in
the national interest, authorize the employment of any
person, or the detail or assignment of any person to
the Agency, and grant to any such person access to sensitive
cryptologic information, on a temporary basic pending
the completion of a full field investigation, provided
in such a case priority shall be given to the full field
investigation, in accordance with Section 302(a) of
Public Law 88-290, DoD Directive 5210.8, dated 15 February
1962, and 5210.45, dated 9 May 1964.

E1.1.1.9.  Provide for and establish boards of appraisal
to assist the Director in discharging his personnel
security responsibilities to appoint the members of
such boards and to make the determination that a person's
employment, detail, assignment, or access to classified
information is or is not in the national interest, in
accordance with Section 302(b) of Public Law 88- 290
and the provisions of Department of Defense Directive
5210.45.

E1.1.1.10.  Authorize the suspension, but not to terminate
the services of an employee in the interest of national
security in positions within the NSA, in accordance
with the provisions of 5 USC 3571, 5594, 7312, 7532,
Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953, as amended,
and DoD Directive 5210.7 dated September 2, 1966.

E1.1.1.11.  Clear persons for access to classified Defense
material and information under the custody or jurisdiction
of the NSA in accordance with the provisions of DoD
Directive 5210.8, dated February 12, 1962, and DoD Directive
5210.45, dated May 9, 1964.

E1.1.1.12.  Promulgate regulations governing the granting
or denial of industrial clearances for access to sensitive
cryptologic information and to regulate physical security
in industry or NSA sponsored contracts for sensitive
cryptologic materials, in accordance with Executive
Order 10065, as amended.

E1.1.1.13.  Conduct counterintelligence and personnel
security investigations relating to civilians and members
of the armed forces who are employed in, or assigned
to, the NSA.

E1.1.1.14.  Promulgate the necessary security regulations
for the protection of property and places under the
jurisdiction of the Director, NSA, pursuant to the provisions
of DoD Directive 5200.8 dated August 20, 1954.

E1.1.1.15.  Classify, declassify and downgrade or upgrade
the classification of defense information or material
for which the NSA has responsibility pursuant to Executive
Order 10501, dated November 5, 1953, as amended, and
DoD Directive 5200.1 , dated July 8, 1957, and to designate
in writing, as may be necessary, officers and employees
within the NSA to perform these functions.

E1.1.1.16.  Act, with respect to NSA employees, as agent
for the collection and payment of taxes imposed by Subtitle
C of Title 26, United States Code, and as such agent,
to make all determinations and certifications required
or provided for under Section 3122 of Title 26, United
States Code, and Section 205 (p) (1) and (2) of the
Social Security Act, as amended (42 USC 405 (p) (l)
and (2)).

E1.1.1.17.  Authorize and approve overtime work of NSA
civilian officers and employees of NSA in accordance
with the provisions of Section 550.11 of the Civil Service
Regulations.

E1.1.1.18.  Authorize and approve:

E1.1.1.18.1.  Travel for NSA civilian officers and employees
in accordance with Joint Travel Regulations, Volume
2, Department of Defense Civilian Personnel, dated July
1, 1965, as amended;

E1.1.1.18.2.  Temporary duty travel only for military
personnel assigned or detailed to NSA in accordance
with Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 1, for the Uniformed
Services, dated July 1, 1965, as amended;

E1.1.1.18.3.  Invitational travel to persons serving
without compensation whose consultive, advisory, or
other highly specialized technical services are required
in a capacity that is directly related to or in connection
with NSA activities, pursuant to 5 USC 5703.

E1.1.1.19.  Approve the expenditure of funds available
for travel by military personnel assigned or detailed
to NSA for expenses incident to attendance at meetings
of technical, scientific, or professional or similar
organizations in such instances where the approval of
the Secretary of Defense or his designee is required
by law (37 USC 412). 

E1.1.1.20.  Develop, establish, and maintain an active
and continuing Records Management Program, pursuant
to the provisions of Section 506 (b) and (c) of the
Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended (44 USC 396
(b)), and when authorized, operate a records center
pursuant to the provisions of 506 (c) of the Federal
Records Act of 1950 (44 USC 396 (c)).

E1.1.1.21.  Enter into and administer contracts in accordance
with applicable laws, DoD regulations and the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations, directly or through
a Military Department, a DoD contract administration
services component, or other Government Department or
agency, as appropriate, for supplies, equipment and
services required to accomplish the mission of the NSA.
  To the extent that any law or executive order specifically
limits the exercise of such authority to persons at
the Secretarial level of a Military Department, such
authority will be exercised by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Installations and Logistics).

E1.1.1.22.  Establish and use Imprest Funds for making
small purchases of material and services other than
personal for NSA when it is determined more advantageous
and consistent with the best interests of the Government,
in accordance with the provisions of DoD instruction
7280.1, dated January 5, 1962, and the Joint Regulations
of the General Services Administration -- Treasury Department
-- General Accounting Office, entitled "For Small Purchases
Utilizing Imprest Funds."

E1.1.1.23.  Establish and maintain appropriate property
accounts for NSA and to appoint Boards of Survey, approve
reports of survey, relieve personal liability and drop
accountability for NSA property maintained in the authorized
Departmental Property Account which has been lost, damaged,
stolen, destroyed, or otherwise rendered unserviceable,
pursuant to the provisions of applicable laws and regulations.

E1.1.1.24.  Act for the Secretary of Defense before
the Joint Committee on Printing, the Public Printer,
and the Director, Bureau of the Budget on all matters
pertaining to printing, binding, and publication requirements
of the NSA.

E1.1.1.25.  Publish advertisements, notices, or proposals,
in newspapers, magazines, or other public periodicals
as required for the effective administration and operation
of the NSA (44 USC 324).

E1.1.1.26.  Enter into support and services agreements
with the Military Departments, other DoD Components,
and other Government agencies as required.

E1.1.1.27.  The Director, NSA, may redelegate these
authorities, as appropriate, and in writing, except
as otherwise specifically indicated above or as otherwise
provided by law.



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5100.35

March 10, 1998

ASD(C3I)

SUBJECT:  Military Communications-Electronics Board
(MCEB) 

References:  (a)  DoD Directive 5100.35, "Military Communications-Electronics
Board," May 6, 1985 (hereby canceled)

(b)  Public Law 104-106, “Subdivision E of the Clinger-Cohen
Act of 1996,” February 10, 1996 (formerly the Information
Technology Management Reform Act of 1996)

(c)  Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Implementation
of Subdivision E of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (Public
Law 104-106),” June 2, 1997

(d)  DoD Directive 4650.1, "Management and Use of the
Radio Frequency Spectrum,” June 24, 1987

1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE 

This Directive reissues reference (a) to update the
mission, organization, functions, responsibilities,
and relationships prescribed herein.

2.  APPLICABILITY 

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the
Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter
referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").

3.  MISSION 

3.1.  The MCEB shall consider those military communications-electronics
matters, including those associated with National Security
Systems (NSS) as defined in reference (b), referred
to it by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DoD Chief Information Officer,
and other officials designated in section 5.2., below.

3.2.  The MCEB mission shall be, as follows:

3.2.1.  Obtain coordination among the DoD Components,
between the Department of Defense and other Governmental
Departments and Agencies, and between the Department
of Defense and the representatives of foreign nations
as to matters under MCEB jurisdiction.

3.2.2.  Provide guidance and direction to the DoD Components.

3.2.3.  Furnish advice and assistance, as requested.

4.  ORGANIZATION 

4.1.  The MCEB shall be composed of the following:

4.1.1.  The Director for Command, Control, Communications,
and Computer Systems, Joint Staff, (J-6), who shall
serve as the Chair.

4.1.2.  The Vice Director for Command, Control, Communications,
and Computer Systems, Joint Staff, (VJ6) representing
the Combatant Commands.

4.1.3.  The Director of Information Systems for Command,
Control, Communications, and Computers (C4), U.S. Army.

4.1.4.  The Director, Space, Information Warfare, Command
and Control, U.S. Navy.

4.1.5.  The Director, Communications and Information,
U.S. Air Force.

4.1.6.  The Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, U.S. Marine
Corps.

4.1.7.  The Assistant Commandant for Systems, U.S. Coast
Guard.

4.1.8.  The Director, Defense Information Systems Agency,
or designee.

4.1.9.  The Director, National Security Agency, or designee.

4.1.10.  The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
or designee.

4.2.  The Chair, MCEB, may request representatives from
the other DoD Components and Government Agencies to
participate with the MCEB on any matter in which that
Component or Agency has an interest.

4.3.  The MCEB shall be supported by a permanent Secretariat
provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.  FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

5.1.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall
provide overall guidance and direction to the MCEB.

5.2.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments, and
the Heads of the DoD Components shall refer military
communications-electronics and NSS matters to the MCEB
for coordination, or other applicable action.

5.3.  The Chair, Military Communications-Electronics
Board, shall:

5.3.1.  Preside at MCEB meetings or designate a member
to act as the Chair in his or her absence.

5.3.2.  Determine whether matters referred to the MCEB
are appropriate for MCEB consideration.

5.3.3.  Redirect matters referred to the MCEB if the
Chair, MCEB, determines that such matters are best accomplished
by referral to another DoD Component.

5.3.4.  Determine whether issues referred to the MCEB
can be resolved by MCEB action.

5.3.5.  Inform the DoD CIO of all MCEB-related matters,
which may have an impact on the responsibilities of
the CIO as provided in the Secretary of Defense’s Memorandum
(reference (c)).

5.3.6.  Make decisions for the MCEB when consensus is
not reached on matters referred to the MCEB.

5.3.7.  Determine the subsequent disposition of matters
referred to the MCEB that are not resolved by MCEB action.

5.3.8.  Establish administrative and procedural arrangements
for the MCEB, to include managing the MCEB Secretariat.

5.3.9.  Provide a conflict resolution forum for frequency
spectrum issues.

5.3.10.  Recommend guiding policy and develop procedures
in support of radio frequency management functions and
requirements of the Military Departments, the Combatant
Commands, and Defense Agencies, in accordance with DoD
Directive 4650.1 (reference (d)).

5.3.11.  Develop, review, and implement procedures for
participation in the DoD Electromagnetic Compatibility
Program.

5.3.12.  Coordinate changes to, and promulgate allied
communications publications and joint Army, Navy, and
Air Force publications.   Determine format, assign printing
responsibilities, and distribute communications-electronics
publications, except those communications security publications
that are the responsibility of other DoD elements.

5.3.13.  Develop, review, and coordinate joint and allied
communications-electronics operating procedures.

5.3.14.  In accordance with the procedures of the OSD
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the
approval of U.S. positions, coordinate and participate
in the development of changes to joint and allied principles,
technical standards, and procedures for obtaining interoperability,
compatibility, and standardization of C4 equipment,
including communications-electronics standardization
agreements (STANAGs) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
  Manage the DoD review process when ratification of
any communications-electronics STANAGs is under consideration
and serve as office of record for all ratified agreements.

5.3.15.  Develop and process the DoD position for negotiation
with representatives of other nations on communications-electronics
matters for which the MCEB is responsible.

5.3.16.  Communicate directly with all the DoD Components,
with the other Departments and Agencies of the Government
and with representatives of other nations on communications-electronics
and NSS matters for which the MCEB is responsible.

5.3.17.  Establish and direct, as required, subsidiary
panels to support MCEB activities.

5.3.18.  Coordinate membership for applicable allied
technical panels and working groups.

5.3.19.  Serve as the United States principal member
to the Combined Communications-Electronics Board.

5.4.  The Members of the MCEB shall:

5.4.1.  Participate in the activities of the MCEB and
vote on matters placed before the MCEB for decision.

5.4.2.  Designate an alternate whom, when participating
in MCEB activities for his or her principal, shall have
plenary power to act for same.

5.4.3.  Request, individually or as a group, reconsideration
by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, as applicable, of a decision made by
the Chair, MCEB, under paragraph 5.3.6. above.   Such
a request shall be submitted through the Chair, MCEB,
for comment.   When reconsideration by the Secretary
of Defense is requested, the request also shall be accompanied
by the comments of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

6.  ADMINISTRATION 

6.1.  The permanent MCEB Secretariat shall consist of
military and civilian personnel, with necessary funding
support, provided by the Director for Command, Control,
Communications and Computers (J-6), the Joint Staff.

6.2.  The Heads of DoD Components shall provide qualified
personnel (within their capability and normally on an
additional duty basis) when requested by the Chair,
MCEB, to serve on subsidiary MCEB panels.

7.  RELATIONSHIPS 

7.1.  The Chair, MCEB, shall make reports and furnish
recommendations on the activities of the MCEB to the
Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

7.2.  The Chair, MCEB, shall provide information on
MCEB actions to, and coordinate activities with, the
DoD CIO.

8.  EFFECTIVE DATE 

This Directive is effective immediately.



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5100.47

April 30, 1965

ASD(SIS)

SUBJECT:  National Cryptologic School 

References:  (a)  DoD Directive S-3115.2, March 19,
1959

(b)  DoD Directive S-3115.4, March 19, 1959

1.  PURPOSE 

This Directive provides for the establishment of the
National Cryptologic School as a professional educational
institution of the National Security Agency (NSA).

2.  MISSION 

The National Cryptologic School will conduct courses
of instruction related to cryptologic functions designed
to:

2.1.  Enhance the preparation of selected military officers
and civilian personnel for important command, staff,
and policy-making positions in the national and international
security structure.

2.2.  Prepare military and civilian personnel for duty
in cryptologic and related activities.

2.3.  Assist the broad career development of military
and civilian personnel assigned to cryptologic functions.

3.  APPLICABILITY 

The provisions of this Directive apply to all Components
of DoD.

4.  FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the
Director, NSA shall:

4.1.  Operate and control the National Cryptologic School.

4.2.  Determine the level and scope of courses of instruction
to be offered by the School for both resident and non-resident
use, as required for accomplishment of cryptologic missions,
and establish the necessary training programs and courses.

4.3.  Establish for the School:

4.3.1.  The total enrollment and allocation of student
quotas for resident courses.

4.3.2.  Criteria for selection of students for resident
courses.

4.3.3.  Prerequisites and regulations for participation
in correspondence courses.

4.4.  Reallocate equitably unfilled quotas for resident
courses.

4.5.  Select the Chief, National Cryptologic School.

5.  ADMINISTRATION 

5.1.  The staff and faculty will be provided from civilian
and military personnel on duty with NSA and by detail
from the Military Departments to the School for specific
training requirements.

5.2.  Clerical support for specialized and advanced
courses conducted by the School for the departments
will be provided by NSA.

5.3.  Except as provided below, NSA will be responsible
for programming, budgeting, and financing of expenses
incident to the National Cryptologic School:

5.3.1.  The pay, allowances (including subsistence)
of military personnel, and the permanent change of station
travel costs of military and civilian personnel assigned
to the staff or faculty of the School will be borne
by the DoD Components from which assigned.

5.3.2.  Pay, allowances and travel costs (not integral
to courses of instruction) of military and civilian
personnel assigned as students at the School will be
borne by their respective sponsoring DoD Components.

5.3.3.  Equipments peculiar to cryptologic missions
and required to support specialized and advanced training
for the Military Departments will be programmed, budgeted
and provided to the School by the DoD components in
accordance with established DoD procedures and the related
Combined Cryptologic Program.

5.4.  The Director, NSA, shall report annually to the
Secretary of Defense on the operations of the School,
including recommendations as appropriate.

6.  AUTHORITY 

The appropriate provisions of DoD Directives S-3115.2
and S-3115.4 (references (a) and (b)) apply to the Director,
NSA, and his designees, in the discharge of the functions
and responsibilities assigned by this Directive.

7.  EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION 

This Directive is effective upon publication.   Its
provisions will be implemented as determined by the
Director, NSA.



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5100.85

June 27, 1995

ASD(C3I)

SUBJECT:  Intelligence Systems Board (ISB) 

References:  (a)  Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," March
23, 1994

(b)  Title 10, United States Code

(c)  Title 50, United States Code

(d)  Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence
Activities," December 4, 1981

(e)  DoD Directive 5137.1, "Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
(ASD(C3I))," February 12, 1992

(f)  DoD Directive 5100.35, "Military Communications-Electronics
Board," May 6, 1985

(g)  DoD Directive 5205.9, "Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP)," April 7, 1995

1.  PURPOSE 

This Directive establishes a joint ISB (hereafter referred
to as "the Board") composed of representatives of the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.
  The Board is to ensure the interoperability of automatic1
intelligence information systems is met effectively
and efficiently, in a manner conducive to national security,
and consistent with the authorities and duties of the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence
under references (b), (c), and (d).

   

____________________

 1 Reference (a) uses "automatic" rather than "automated"
in systems such as this.

2.  APPLICABILITY 

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Combatant
Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities
(hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").

3.  DEFINITIONS 

3.1.  Automatic Intelligence Information Systems.  
 Electronic data processing and communications systems
and facilities, and related operating standards and
procedures used in or intended for use in the collection,
processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence;
includes automatic systems that support the exchange
and dissemination of intelligence data through transformation,
indexing, storage, retrieval, presentation, telecommunications,
and teleprocessing.

3.2.  Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP).  
 A program for planning and budgeting Defense-wide initiatives
and activities that provide intelligence information
and support to multiple DoD customers.   Included are
the Defense Cryptologic Program; the Defense Imagery
Program; the Defense Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
Program; and the Defense General Intelligence and Applications
Program.

3.3.  National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP).
   A planning and resources management program for which
responsibility has been assigned by the President to
the Director of Central Intelligence and having components
as defined in 50 U.S.C. 401.a. (reference (c)).   Included
are the program on the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense
Intelligence Program, and certain other programs within
the Department of Defense.   Also included are the foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence programs of the
Departments of State, Treasury, and Energy, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

3.4.  Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).
   Those DoD intelligence activities planned and programmed
by the sponsoring organization as required for support
of the planning and conduct of tactical military operations
by United States Armed Forces.

4.  ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 

4.1.  The ISB 

4.1.1.  The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence
and Security) (DASD(I&S)), representing the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) and the Executive Director
for Intelligence Community Affairs representing the
Director of Central Intelligence, shall Co-Chair the
Board, which shall meet on the call of either Co-Chair.

4.1.2.  Members of the Board shall be senior representatives
of the:

4.1.2.1.  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

4.1.2.2.  NFIP Program Managers.

4.1.2.3.  JMIP Program Managers.

4.1.2.4.  Military Service TIARA Managers.

4.1.2.5.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4.1.2.6.  Director, Defense Information Systems Agency.

4.1.2.7.  Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation.

4.1.2.8.  Community Open Source Program Office.

4.1.2.9.  Chairperson, Military Communications-Electronics
Board.

4.1.2.10.  Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Headquarters
(HQ), Department of the Army.

4.1.2.11.  Director of Naval Intelligence, Department
of the Navy.

4.1.2.12.  Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, HQ,
Department of the Air Force.

4.1.2.13.  Director of Intelligence, HQ, U.S. Marine
Corps.

4.1.3.  The Co-Chairs may invite other organizations
having an interest in automatic intelligence information
systems to be represented at the Board sessions on an
ex-officio basis, or to participate in the Board meetings
when matters germane to their interests are addressed.

4.2.  The Intelligence Systems Secretariat (ISS) 

4.2.1.  ISS (hereafter referred to as "the Secretariat")
shall operate under the guidance of the Co-Chairs of
the Board.

4.2.2.  The Secretariat Director shall be appointed
by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence.   The Deputy Director
shall be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.

4.2.3.  As the staff element of the Board, the Secretariat
shall be staffed jointly by the Department of Defense
and non-DoD intelligence elements.

4.2.4.  The Secretariat Director may establish subcommittees,
working groups, and advisory bodies, as necessary, to
support activities of the Board.

4.2.5.  With approval of the Board Co-Chairs, the Secretariat
Director may invite U. S. Government organizations not
represented on the Board to participate in specific
programs or activities sponsored by the Board.

5.  RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS 

5.1.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence, under DoD
Directive 5137.1 (reference (e)), as the principal staff
assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense for information management matters, shall
represent the Secretary of Defense on Board-related
matters.   In the exercise of these responsibilities,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence shall:

5.1.1.  Issue relevant DoD policy guidance, as necessary.

5.1.2.  Nominate to the Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretariat
Director, and consult with the Director of Central Intelligence
on appointment of the Secretariat Deputy Director.

5.1.3.  Ensure appropriate participation by the DoD
Components in activities of the Board and the Secretariat,
including DoD representation in the Secretariat.

5.1.4.  Ensure that the Secretariat shall operate under
the guidance and direction of the Board Co-Chairs, and
serves as the supporting staff element of the Board.

5.2.  The Intelligence Systems Secretariat shall, in
cooperation with the intelligence functional managers,
provide administrative support to the Board, and shall
conduct the day-to-day staff activities necessary to
support accomplishment of the Board's responsibilities.

5.3.  The Intelligence Systems Board shall:

5.3.1.  Advise and make recommendations, under the guidance
of its Co-Chairs, to the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence on policy and requirements
on the design, development, acquisition, and operation
of automatic intelligence information systems and architectures
used by the DoD Components and by non-DoD organizations
within the NFIP concerning:

5.3.1.1.  Enhancing interoperability of existing and
planned automatic intelligence systems designed or intended
for intelligence support to the U.S. Armed Forces.

5.3.1.2.  Integrating and enhancing interoperability
among automatic intelligence information systems functioning
within or among elements of the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA
aggregate.

5.3.1.3.  Improving interoperability between intelligence
and military command and control systems.

5.3.1.4.  Defining interorganizational intelligence
information architectures.

5.3.1.5.  Establishing an automatic intelligence information
systems management security policy.

5.3.1.6.  Defining and coordinating common information
handling standards and procedures.

5.3.1.7.  Developing program and budget guidance affecting
the development and operation of automatic intelligence
information systems.

5.3.1.8.  Evaluating and adopting new and improved automatic
intelligence information management technologies.

5.3.1.9.  Designating a DoD or NFIP Component to serve
as the Executive Agent for processes or activities of
common concern.

5.3.1.10.  Identifying priority automatic intelligence
information systems that require funding support for
acquisition and/or operations.

5.3.1.11.  Designating of an Executive Agent(s) to implement
and operate automatic intelligence systems as a service
of common concern.

5.3.2.  Emphasize the means to enhance the interoperability
of existing and planned automatic intelligence information
system support to operational military components.

5.3.3.  In the interest of furthering interoperability
of present and planned automatic intelligence information
systems, serve as the channel for communications and
other interface between the DoD Components represented
on the ISB and the Military Communications-Electronics
Board (MCEB) under DoD Directive 5100.35 (reference
(f)).   In this interface role, review and provide recommendations,
as appropriate, on all communications between the ISB
member Components and the MCEB that relate to automatic
intelligence information systems and architectures.

5.4.  The Chairperson of the Military Communications-Electronics
Board shall provide a senior member to serve as a member
of the ISB, and ensure that communications between the
MCEB and the DoD Components represented on the ISB are
sent to the ISB Secretariat for review by the ISB if
they relate to automatic intelligence information systems
and architectures.

5.5.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

5.5.1.  Provide senior-level representation to serve
on the Board.

5.5.2.  Provide qualified representatives, as coordinated
with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence to the Secretariat
on a detail, non-reimbursable, rotational basis.

5.5.3.  Participate, where appropriate, in working groups
and panels established by the Secretariat Director to
address tasks assigned by the Board Co-Chairs.

5.5.4.  Provide information and data to the Secretariat
as required to enable the Board to fulfill its responsibilities.

5.5.5.  Upon designation by the Secretary of Defense
and Director of Central Intelligence, and with arrangements
for necessary funding, serve as the Executive Agent
for implementation and/or operation of automatic intelligence
information systems as a service of common concern.

6.  EFFECTIVE DATE 

This Directive is effective immediately.



DODI 5105.58  Management of Measurement and Signature Intelligence
(MASINT), February 9, 1993, ASD(C3I)

**** Text of the Regulation ****
References:  (a)  DoD Directive 5137.1, "Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence," February 12, 1992
(b)  DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency,"
May 19, 1977
(c)  DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities,"
April 25, 1988
(d)  Title 10, United States Code
(e)  National Security Act of 1947
(f)  Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence
Activities," December 4, 1981


A.  PURPOSE


This Instruction assign responsibilities for the central management of
MASINT within the Department of Defense, pursuant to references (a), (b),
and (c), to ensure that U.S. Government intelligence and Defense
operational, acquisition, and other needs for MASINT are met effectively
and efficiently in a manner conducive to national security and consistent
with the authorities and duties of the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence under references (d), (e), and (f).


B.  APPLICABILITY


This Instruction applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, the Defense
Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively
as "the DoD Components").


C.  DEFINITION


MASINT.  Technically derived intelligence (excluding Signals
intelligence and traditional imagery intelligence) that, when collected,
processed, and analyzed, results in intelligence that locates, tracks,
identifies, or describes the signatures sources.  It includes the advanced
(distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target data processing
and exploitation of data from overhead and airborne imagery collection
systems.  MASINT data can be acquired from a variety of satellite,
airborne, or shipborne platforms; remotely piloted vehicles; or from
mobile or fixed ground-based collection sites.  Its sensors include, but
are not limited to, radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear,
radiation, detection, spectroradiometric, and seismic systems, as well as
gas, liquid, and solid materials sampling systems.


D.  RESPONSIBILITIES


1.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence, as the designated principal staff
assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for
intelligence matters under DoD Directive 5137.1 (reference (a)), shall be
responsible for MASINT policy development, program oversight and
evaluation, and resource management.


2.  The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, shall:


a.  Provide central management for MASINT in accordance with DoD
Directive 5105.21 (reference (b)), DoD Directive 5240.21 (reference (c)),
and this Instruction.


b.  Establish a Central MASINT Office (CMO) within the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), which shall be responsible for providing
support to the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), and other Federal Government Departments and Agencies on MASINT
matters relating to national security.  The Director, DIA, shall exercise
authority, direction, and control over the CMO.  The CMO shall consist of
a Director, appointed by the Director, DIA, a central MASINT tasking
authority, and such other subordinate organizational elements as the
Director, CMO, establishes within the resources made available.  The
Director, CMO may also have direct access to the Director of Central
Intelligence as required to fulfill Intelligence Community requirements.


c.  Provide administrative support to the Director, CMO, including
personnel, budget execution, and contracting services.  The Director, CMO,
may also receive administrative support, to the extent permitted by the
law and approved by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
Intelligence, from the Central Intelligence Agency or other Departments or
Agencies of the Federal Government.  Resources for the CMO shall be
provided through the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and the
budget aggregation known as "Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities," in accordance with applicable planning, programming, and
budgeting system procedures.


d.  Ensure that the Director, Central MASINT Office, shall:


(1)  Organize, direct, and manage the CMO and all assigned resources.


(2)  Manage the establishment of national MASINT collection
requirements consistent with the guidance received from the Director of
Central Intelligence under E.O. 12333 (reference (f).


(3)  Provide responsible MASINT support to the Department of Defense,
the CIA, and, as appropriate, other Federal Government Departments and
Agencies, including the coordination of MASINT collection tasking,
collection processing, exploitation, and dissemination.


(4)  Task MASINT collection elements of the Department of Defense to
meet national intelligence requirements, including requirements
established by the Director of Central Intelligence, in accordance with
the "National Security Act of 1947" and E.O. 12333 (references (e) and
(f)), except that the Director, CMO, shall advise MASINT collection
elements on collection of MASINT to meet such national intelligence
requirements when the collection element both (a) is assigned to, or under
the operational control, of the Secretary of a Military Department or a
commander of a unified or specified combatant command and (b) is not
allocated by the Secretary of Defense to meet national intelligence
requirements.


(5)  Advise MASINT collection elements of the Department of Defense on
the collection of MASINT to meet non-national intelligence requirements.


(6)  Establish the architectures for MASINT tasking, collection,
processing, and dissemination in the Department of Defense, in
coordination with the DoD Components and consistent to the maximum
practicable extent with the overall functional architectures of the
Department of Defense.  Also, to the extent authorized by the heads of
other Departments or Agencies with MASINT tasking, collection, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination functions, establish the architectures for
MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination in
those other Departments and Agencies.


(7)  Establish, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
Information Systems Agency and the DoD Components, as appropriate,
standards for MASINT systems for which the Department of Defense has
responsibility and ensure compatibility and interoperability for such
systems, and, to the extent authorized by the heads of the other
Departments or Agencies with MASINT systems, establish standards and
ensure compatibility and interoperability for the systems of those other
Departments or Agencies.


(8)  Serve as the functional manager for the MASINT programs in the
NFIP consistent with applicable guidance received from the Director of
Central Intelligence in accordance with the "National Security Act of
1947" and E.O. 12333 (references (e) and (f)).


(9)  Serve as the functional manager, an advisor to the ASD(C3I) and
the DoD Components, for the MASINT programs in the budget aggregation
known as the "Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities".


(10)  Evaluate the performance of MASINT components of the Department
of Defense in meeting national and non-national intelligence requirements
and, to the extent authorized by the heads of the other Departments or
Agencies with MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination functions, evaluate the performance of the MASINT components
of those other Departments or Agencies in meeting national and non-
national intelligence requirements.


(11)  Develop and make recommendations on national and non-national
MASINT policy, including relationships to international matters, for the
approval of appropriate Federal Government officials.


(12)  In coordination with the appropriate DoD Components, support and
conduct research, development, test, and evaluation activities related to
MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination,
consistent with applicable law and DoD Directives.


(13)  Protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure, in accordance with guidance received from the Director of
Central Intelligence under the "National Security Act of 1947" and E.O.
12333 (references (e) and (f)).


(14)  In coordination with the appropriate DoD Components, establish
standards for training personnel performing MASINT tasking, collection,
processing, exploitation, and dissemination functions.


(15)  Advise the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
Intelligence on future needs for the MASINT systems.


(16)  Coordinate the use of MASINT systems that support military
forces in exercises.


(l7)  Make use of established facilities and services in the
Department of Defense or other governmental Agencies, to the extent
permitted by law, whenever practicable, to achieve maximum efficiency and
economy.  Special emphasis will be made on maximizing the use of existing
personnel, facilities and services of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Further, resources of the Central Intelligence Agency and other
Departments or Agencies will be used to the extent authorized by the
Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other Departments and
Agencies of the Federal Government.


(l8)  Perform such other functions related to MASINT as the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence may direct.


3.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall support the Director, CMO,
in carrying out assigned functions by the following:


a.  Ensure compliance with national intelligence tasking issued under
paragraph D.3.d above.


b.  Ensure compliance with the architectures and standards established
by the Director, CMO, under paragraphs D.3.f and D.3.g above.


c.  Assist the Director, CMO, in the Director's assigned
responsibility as functional manager for national and tactical MASINT
programs under paragraphs D.3.h., D.3.i. and D.3.n. above.


d.  Submit MASINT collection requirements to the Director, CMO,
through appropriate validation authorities.


E.  EFFECTIVE DATE


This Instruction is effective immediately.


CHARLES A. HAWKINS, JR.
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5148.11

July 1, 1994

DA&M

SUBJECT:  Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) 

References:  (a)  Title 10, United States Code

(b)  DoD Directive 5148.11, "Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)," December 1, 1982
(hereby canceled)

(c)  Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence
Activities," December 4, 1981

(d)  DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities,"
April 25, 1988

(e)  through (k), see enclosure E1.

1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE 

Under the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense
by Section 113 of reference (a), this Directive reissues
reference (b) to update the responsibilities, functions,
relationships, and authorities of the ATSD(IO), as prescribed
herein.

2.  APPLICABILITY 

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Combatant
Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, and the
DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively
as "the DoD Components").

3.  DEFINITION 

3.1.  Propriety.    Refers to the standards for intelligence
activities promulgated in Executive orders, Presidential
Directives, and DoD Directives.   Other terms used herein
are defined in references (c), (d), and (e).

4.  RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS 

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Oversight shall be responsible for the independent oversight
of all intelligence activities in the Department of
Defense.   In this capacity, the ATSD(IO) shall ensure
that all activities performed by intelligence units
and all intelligence activities performed by non-intelligence
units, are conducted in compliance with Federal law
and other laws as appropriate, Executive orders and
Presidential Directives, and DoD Directives System issuances.
  In the exercise of this responsibility, the ATSD(IO)
shall:

4.1.  Develop intelligence oversight policy and, in
coordination with the General Counsel of the Department
of Defense (GC, DoD), issue intelligence oversight guidance
to the DoD intelligence components, including regulatory
guidance implementing intelligence oversight aspects
of E.O. 12333 (reference (c)).

4.2.  Review, in consultation with the GC, DoD, all
allegations that raise questions of the legality or
propriety of intelligence activities in the Department
of Defense.

4.3.  Investigate intelligence activities that raise
questions of legality or propriety.

4.4.  Conduct vigorous and independent inspections of
the DoD Components that engage in intelligence activities
for the purpose of verifying that personnel are familiar
and in compliance with E.O. 12333 (reference (c)) and
its DoD implementing documents.   At the request of
senior leadership of the Department, and as practicable,
the ATSD(IO) will assess and evaluate the performance
of DoD's intelligence activities during the course of
scheduled inspections and site visits.   Reports in
these areas of special interest will be provided to
the requesting official and the Secretary of Defense
for information.

4.5.  Monitor investigations and inspections conducted
by the DoD Components related to intelligence activities,
evaluate the findings and, if appropriate, submit recommendations
for corrective action to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense.

4.6.  Report the following to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and the Intelligence Oversight
Board of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, established under E.O. 12863 (reference (f)),
at least quarterly, in consultation with the GC, DoD:

4.6.1.  Any significant oversight activities undertaken;
and

4.6.2.  Any DoD intelligence activities of questionable
legality or propriety, the investigative action on them,
an evaluation of completed investigations, and the action
taken on completed investigations.

4.7.  Participate as a member of the Defense Counterintelligence
Board (DoD Directive 5240.2, reference (g)).

4.8.  Pursuant to DoD Directive 5240.12 (reference (h)),
review and conduct an annual financial audit of all
funds generated by DoD Intelligence Commercial Activities,
and report the results to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.

4.9.  Review DoD clandestine intelligence activities
to ensure compliance with special constraints and controls.

4.10.  Evaluate the effectiveness of the DoD intelligence
components' efforts to protect HUMINT sources, in accordance
with DoD Directive S-5205.1 (reference (i)).

4.11.  Participate in the Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations
approval process.

4.12.  Conduct liaison with Federal intelligence and
law enforcement agencies (e.g., Central Intelligence
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Drug Enforcement
Administration) at the national level and field locations,
as required, to ensure DoD intelligence activities and
DoD intelligence support to law enforcement agencies
are being conducted properly.

4.13.  Review the DoD sensitive support provided to
the DoD Components and other Federal Agencies, pursuant
to DoD Directive S-5210.36 (reference (j)), to ensure
compliance with DoD policy.

4.14.  Coordinate, as appropriate, with the DoD Inspector
General (DoD IG) on matters relating to the DoD IG's
area of responsibility in accordance with DoD Directive
5106.1 (reference (k)).

4.15.  Perform such other functions as the Secretary
of Defense may prescribe.

5.  RELATIONSHIPS 

5.1.  In the performance of assigned responsibilities
and functions, the ATSD(IO) shall serve under the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense,
and shall:

5.1.1.  Report directly to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense.

5.1.2.  Coordinate and exchange information with other
OSD officials, heads of the DoD Components, and other
Federal officials having collateral or related functions.

5.1.3.  Use existing facilities and services of the
Department of Defense and other Federal Agencies, when
practicable, to avoid duplication and to achieve maximum
efficiency and economy.

5.2.  Other OSD officials and heads of the DoD Components
shall coordinate with the ATSD(IO) on all matters related
to the responsibilities and functions cited in section
4., above.

6.  AUTHORITIES 

The ATSD(IO) is hereby delegated authority to:

6.1.  Obtain reports, information, advice, and assistance,
consistent with DoD Directive 8910.1 (reference (l)),
as necessary, in carrying out assigned functions.

6.2.  Communicate directly with the heads of the DoD
Components and, with notification to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Commanders of the
Unified Combatant Commands, as necessary, in carrying
out assigned functions.

6.3.  Request such temporary assistance from the DoD
Components as may be required for the conduct of inspections
or investigations, to include personnel, facilities,
and other services.   Requests for needed support shall
be made in accordance with established procedures.

6.4.  Communicate directly with the Intelligence Oversight
Board of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, the Director of Central Intelligence, other Federal
officials, representatives of the legislative branch,
members of the public, and representatives of foreign
governments, as appropriate, in carrying out assigned
functions.

6.5.  Have complete and unrestricted access to all available
intelligence-related information, regardless of classification
or compartmentation, from all DoD Components and personnel,
as required, in carrying out assigned functions.   This
includes specifically the authority to:

6.5.1.  Require an Inspector General or other cognizant
investigative official of a DoD Component to report
allegations of improprieties or illegalities of intelligence
activities by, or within, a DoD Component; and

6.5.2.  Obtain information on the status, proceedings,
and findings or to obtain copies of reports of investigations
or inspections of such allegations.

6.6.  Deal directly with the head of the element inspected
or investigated, conduct interviews, take depositions,
and examine records incident to an inspection or investigation
of any DoD Component, as required, in carrying out assigned
functions.

7.  EFFECTIVE DATE 

This Directive is effective immediately.

Enclosures - 1 

1.  References, continued

E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES, continued

(e)  DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities
of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States
Persons," December 1982, authorized by DoD Directive
5240.1, April 25, 1988

(f)  Executive Order 12863, "President's Intelligence
Advisory Board," September 13, 1993

(g)  DoD Directive 5240.2, "Department of Defense Counterintelligence,"
June 6, 1983 

(h)  DoD Directive 5240.12, "Department of Defense Intelligence
Commercial Activities," December 2, 1992

(i)  DoD Directive S-5205.1, "Acquisition and Reporting
of Information Relating to National Security (U)," January
31, 1983

(j)  DoD Directive S-5210.36, "Provision of DoD Sensitive
Support to DoD Components and Other Departments and
Agencies of the U. S. Government (U)," June 10, 1986

(k)  DoD Directive 5106.1, "Inspector General of the
Department of Defense," March 14, 1983 

(l)  DoD Directive 8910.1, "Management and Control of
Information Requirements," June 11, 1993 



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5160.54

January 20, 1998

USD(P)

SUBJECT:  Critical Asset Assurance Program (CAAP) 

References:  (a)  DoD Directive 5160.54, "DoD Key Asset
Protection Program (KAPP)," June 26, 1989 (hereby canceled)

(b)  DoD Directive 3020.36, "Assignment of National
Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities
to Department of Defense Components," November 2, 1988

(c)  DoD Directive S-3600.1, "Information Operations
(IO) (U)," December 9, 1996

(d)  DoD 5160.54-R, "Industrial Facilities Protection
Regulation," March 1977, authorized by this Directive

(e)  through (n), see enclosure 1

1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE 

This Directive:

1.1.  Reissues reference (a) to update DoD policies
and responsibilities for the protection and assurance
of DoD and non-DoD Critical Assets worldwide, to support
the requirements of reference (b), and to implement
the policies established by reference (c) as they pertain
to Critical Assets that are, include, or depend upon
Information Systems.   (See definition E2.1.9.)

1.2.  Expands the requirement to identify Critical Assets
and assure their integrity, availability, survivability,
and capability to support vital DoD missions across
the full range of military operations.

1.3.  Provides for an integrated infrastructure vulnerability
assessment and assurance program based on an analysis
of the identified Critical Assets using risk management
principles.   The risk management-based analysis provides
the information necessary to effectively allocate available
resources necessary for assurance.

1.4.  Continues the authorization to publish reference
(d), and authorizes the publication of DoD 5160.54-M,
consistent with DoD 5025.1-M (reference (e)).

2.  APPLICABILITY 

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the
Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter
referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").

3.  DEFINITIONS 

The terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure
2.

4.  POLICY 

It is DoD policy to:

4.1.  Identify and ensure the availability, integrity,
survivability and adequacy of those assets, (domestic
and foreign) whose capabilities are deemed critical
to DoD Force Readiness and operations in peace, crisis,
and war by providing for their protection from all hazards;
mitigating the effect of their loss or disruption; and/or
planning for timely restoral or recovery.   The level
of assurance appropriate for each asset is a risk management
decision of the owning or controlling DoD Component,
made in coordination with those dependent on the asset,
and based on its criticality, the threat, and resources
available.

4.2.  Recognize that critical DoD equipment, facilities,
and services are dependent upon non-DoD assets -- the
international and national infrastructures, other facilities
and services of the private sector, and those of other
Government Departments and Agencies; and that non-DoD
assets essential to the functioning of DoD Critical
Assets are also Critical Assets of concern to the Department
of Defense.   Critical Assets include information systems
and computer-based systems and networks that can be
distributive in nature.

4.3.  Recognize that in peacetime responsibility for
protecting non-DoD Critical Assets and designing their
security rests primarily with the civil sector owners
and with local, State, and Federal law enforcement authorities
and that responsibility for protecting non-U.S. Critical
Assets rests with the appropriate national authority.
  However, the Department of Defense must participate
with the civil sector, emergency preparedness and law
enforcement authorities in planning for Critical Asset
assurance during an emergency, and must be prepared,
in concert with the appropriate authorities and within
defense priorities, to assist in their protection during
emergencies, including natural disaster, physical or
technical attack, and technological or other emergency
that seriously degrades or threatens DoD operations.
  (See DoD Directives 3025.1, 3025.12, and 3025.15,
references (f) through (h).)

4.4.  Provide an integrated asset and infrastructure
vulnerability assessment and assurance program for the
protection and assurance of DoD and non-DoD Critical
Assets worldwide through the CAAP.   The CAAP must provide
a comprehensive and integrated decision support environment
to represent the relationship between Critical Assets
and force readiness and operations in peace, crisis
or war that can be used to assess the dependencies,
vulnerabilities and effects of the disruption or loss
of Critical Assets or supporting infrastructures on
their plans and operations.   The CAAP must also provide
the capability for Critical Asset assurance analysis,
planning, prioritization, resource programming and response
necessary to mitigate the disruption or loss of Critical
Assets.   It must also ensure that the collection, retention,
and dissemination of CAAP information are in compliance
with applicable U.S. law, statutes, directives, and
policies as delineated by the established intelligence
oversight program.   See DoD Directive 5240.1 and DoD
5240.l-R (references (i) and (j)).

5.  RESPONSIBILITIES 

5.1.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:

5.1.1.  Provide policy direction and guidance for the
development and implementation of CAAP as an element
of national security emergency preparedness.

5.1.2.  Represent the Secretary of Defense with other
Federal Departments and Agencies and with industry in
the development, review, and approval of standards for
the assurance of all Critical Assets and coordinate
such agreements as may be appropriate for this program.

5.1.3.  Develop and lead a process for annual program
review of the CAAP with the Components and the DoD Executive
Agent that includes an analysis of the program effectiveness
in meeting goals and objectives, an assessment of the
performance of organizations in accomplishing their
roles and responsibilities, a review of threats and
technologies, and the status of planning and analysis
for the assurance of Critical Assets to ensure compliance
with this Directive.

5.1.4.  Exercise classification authority for CAAP,
and publish classification guidance.

5.1.5.  Establish, support and provide the Co-Chair
(with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
for the Critical Infrastructure Protection Working Group
(CIPWG).

5.1.6.  Maintain and revise this Directive.

5.2.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology shall:

5.2.1.  Comprehensively integrate the policies established
by this Directive in acquisition policy guidance, to
include the Federal Acquisition Regulations System (reference
(k)); develop assurance standards; and ensure that internal
and external infrastructure protection, mitigation,
detection, reaction and recovery measures are designed
into the acquisition process, systems being developed
and acquired, and the supporting industrial base.

5.2.2.  Foster research on infrastructure systems assurance
and analysis and promote development of infrastructure
interdependency analysis.   Identify technologies that
represent threats to Critical Assets or related infrastructures
(e.g., information or command and control systems),
countermeasures technologies for existing or emerging
threats, and technologies that may have inherent susceptibilities
or vulnerabilities.

5.2.3.  Provide policy to assess and mitigate infrastructure
dependencies and vulnerabilities of specific DoD installations,
facilities and supporting private sector facilities
and systems.

5.2.4.  In accordance with instructions from the DoD
Executive Agent, provide DoD installations and facilities
database support to facilitate maintenance of Critical
Assets data by the DoD Components for inclusion in the
CAAP.

5.3.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence shall:

5.3.1.  Integrate the policies established by this Directive
into policy guidance and standards promulgated for functional
areas assigned by DoD Directive 5137.1 (reference (l)).
  Ensure, in consultation with Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology, infrastructure dependencies
and protection, mitigation, detection, reaction and
recovery measures are considered during command, control,
communications, intelligence, information and security
systems development and acquisition.   Ensure that intelligence,
counterintelligence, and security countermeasure programs
support the protection, survivability, availability,
integrity and recovery of Critical Assets.

5.3.2.  Provide the Co-Chair (with the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) for the CIPWG.

5.3.3.  Require the Director, Defense Investigative
Service (DIS), to:

5.3.3.1.  Conduct, in coordination with the appropriate
DoD Component and with permission of the owners, on-site
surveys, to include vulnerability analyses to physical
and technical threats, for each non-DoD Industrial and
Infrastructure Critical Asset designated by the DoD
Executive Agent as requiring on-site survey.

5.3.3.2.  Maintain liaison with the DoD Executive Agent,
the responsible DoD Component, and consult with industry,
as appropriate.   Develop CAAP survey procedures in
coordination with the DoD Executive Agent, and support
courses of instruction to orient and train Government
and industry personnel on CAAP surveys.   Obtain technical
assistance from other Components, as required.

5.3.4.  Require the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), in coordination with the National Security Agency
(NSA), the DIS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and the Director, Central Intelligence, to develop
procedures for continuous analysis of the hostile intelligence;
special operations; and technical, terrorist, criminal
and other transnational threats to Critical Assets and
Infrastructures; develop and maintain a Critical Asset
and Infrastructure Threat Assessment, and advise the
DoD Executive Agent, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the DoD Components of hostile threats to
Critical Assets and Infrastructures in their areas of
responsibility as evolving threats become known.   These
activities must be accomplished within the provisions
of DoD Directive 5240.1 and DoD 5240.1-R (references
(i) and (j)).

5.3.5.  Require the Director, National Imagery and Mapping
Agency, to support the DoD Executive Agent's requirements
for imagery and maps needed for CAAP.

5.3.6.  Require the Director, Defense Information Systems
Agency, to:

5.3.6.1.  Provide, in conjunction with the DoD Components,
for the assurance of the Defense Information Infrastructure
(DII) and mitigation of the effects of its loss or disruption.

5.3.6.2.  Coordinate with the National Communication
System (NCS) to identify National Information Infrastructure
(NII) assets critical to the DoD operations and National
Security and Emergency Preparedness telecommunications.
  Identify to the DoD Executive Agent and the appropriate
DoD Components the Critical Assets of the DII and the
NII whose disruption or loss would seriously affect
DoD operations and the nature of those effects.   Coordinate
with the DoD Executive Agent, the DoD Components, and
the NCS regarding actions taken to increase the reliability,
redundancy, protection, and restoral of information
systems supporting Critical Assets.

5.3.6.3.  Provide for overall coordination of the Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT) activities of the DoD
Components and their interface with CERT-related activities
of the Federal Government (to include the FBI), the
NSA for national security systems, and private sector.

5.4.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.4.1.  Ensure identification of Critical Assets necessary
for the execution of Deliberate and Crisis Action Plans
and plan for mitigation of their loss or disruption.
Identify those Critical Assets to the DoD Executive
Agent.

5.4.2.  Ensure that disruption and loss of Critical
Assets, to include supporting national infrastructures,
are scripted and responded to in Joint Exercises.

5.5.  The Secretary of the Army, as the DoD Executive
Agent, shall:

5.5.1.  Develop, implement and administer the CAAP to
meet the requirements described in subsection 4.4.,
above.   Obtain Critical Asset nominations from the
DoD Components, integrate them into the CAAP, and program
and provide CAAP resources for support of CAAP decision
support systems, analytic and management activities.
  Provide the capability for each DoD Component to use
the CAAP for identification, analysis and assurance
of assets critical to its operations.   In coordination
with the DoD Components, establish priorities for infrastructure
analysis and remediation, recommend actions to the Components
based upon the CAAP and DIA threat analysis, and review
the CAAP annually with the Under Secretary of Defense,
for Policy (USD(P)) and the Components.

5.5.2.  Develop, publish and administer DoD 5160.54-R
(reference (d)), and 5160.54-M, consistent with DoD
5025.l-M (reference (e)).

5.5.3.  Coordinate with other Departments and Agencies,
as required, to solicit nominations of Infrastructure
Assets critical to national defense applications.  
Designate non-DoD Industrial and Infrastructure Critical
Assets that require on-site surveys and vulnerability
assessments.   Coordinate with DIS regarding conduct
of industrial Critical Asset site surveys and vulnerability
assessments.

5.5.4.  Ensure that regulations, plans, and procedures
governing military support to law enforcement in civil
disturbances, as promulgated under DoD Directive 3025.12
(reference (g)), facilitate response by the DoD Components
to protect Critical Assets under any conditions or circumstances
covered by that Directive.

5.6.  The Secretary of the Navy shall require the Program
Manager, Joint Program Office for Special Technology
Countermeasures, to provide the infrastructure assurance
analysis and vulnerability assessment support to the
DoD Executive Agent.

5.7.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

5.7.1.  Identify those assets critical to their operations
(to include the supporting DoD and non-DoD infrastructures
and other civil sector facilities and services), nominate
those Critical Assets for inclusion in the CAAP, conduct
risk assessments, and designate their category of importance
in accordance with the instructions of the DoD Executive
Agent.

5.7.2.  Retain overall responsibility for the assurance
of the Critical Assets subject to their authority or
control.   Program and provide for increased Critical
Asset reliability, security and redundancy; plan for
their disruption or loss and subsequent restoral; and
develop systems that are less dependent upon vulnerable
infrastructures and systems.   Program and provide for
supplemental integrated infrastructure vulnerability
assessment and assurance capability when requirements
exceed organic capabilities.   Provide for a CERT capability.

5.7.3.  Include a contractual requirement for cooperation
in vulnerability assessments and assurance planning
when contracting for private sector facilities, services
and products, and consider all-hazard assurance of service
when awarding contracts.

5.7.4.  Review annually all Critical Asset nominations
and recommend changes in accordance with the instructions
of the DoD Executive Agent.   Review the CAAP annually
with the USD(P) and the DoD Executive Agent.   Provide
senior (flag or senior executive service) representation
on the CIPWG.

5.7.5.  Assign personnel to the Executive Agent to support
the CAAP and comply with the requirements of the DoD
Executive Agent in accordance with this Directive.

5.7.6.  Require that commanders of DoD installations
conduct an annual review with all tenant activities
of all Critical Assets associated with their installation,
to include supporting DoD and non-DoD infrastructures
and other civil sector facilities and services upon
which the Critical Assets depend.   This review shall
include the validation of data on facilities and their
dependencies, an examination of Installation and tenants'
plans for increasing reliability, reducing vulnerabilities,
mitigating hazards to and the restoration of Critical
Assets, and a review of these plans with the FBI, local
emergency services personnel (including local law enforcement),
the National Guard, and the representatives of critical
infrastructure and support service providers, as appropriate.
  Assist tenant activities in direct coordination with
local providers of critical infrastructure and other
support services necessary to the operation of the their
Critical Assets.   Require that commanders of DoD Installations
report through their chains of command the review results
to the DoD Executive Agent so that plans and requirements
can be fully coordinated and supported across the Department.

6.  INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 

The collection of installations and facilities data
identified in paragraph 5.2.4., above, is assigned Report
Control Symbol DD-A&T(A)760, and the collection of Critical
Asset data identified in paragraphs 5.5.1. and 5.7.1.,
 above, is assigned Report Control Symbol DD-POL(A)1747,
in accordance with DoD 8910-M (reference (m)).   The
information collections in paragraphs 5.3.3.1., 5.3.4.,
and 5.7.6., above, are exempt from licensing in accordance
with reference (m).

7.  EFFECTIVE DATE 

This Directive is effective immediately.

Enclosures - 2 

1.  References

2.  Definitions

E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES, continued

(e)  DoD 5025.l-M, "DoD Directives System Procedures,"
August 1994, authorized by DoD Directive 5025.1, June
24, 1994

(f)  DoD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil
Authorities (SCA)," January 15, 1993

(g)  DoD Directive 3025.12, "Military Assistance for
Civil Disturbances," February 4, 1994

(h)  DoD Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to
Civil Authorities," February 18, 1997

(i)  DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities,"
April 25, 1988

(j)  DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities
of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States
Persons," December 1982, authorized by DoD Directive
5240.1, April 25, 1988.

(k)  Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations, "Federal
Acquisition Regulations System," October 1, 1996

(l)  DoD Directive 5137.1, "Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
(ASD (C3I))," February 12, 1992

(m)  DoD 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of
Information Requirements," November 28, 1986, authorized
by DoD Directive 8910.1, June 11, 1993

(n)  DoD Directive 5200.8, "Security of DoD Installations
and Resources," April 25, 1991

E2.  ENCLOSURE 2

DEFINITIONS

E2.1.1.  Assurance.    In the context of CAAP, assurance
is a process of identifying assets deemed critical to
the Department of Defense in peacetime, crisis and war;
assessing the potential threats to these assets and
the capabilities they provide; quantifying the likely
non-availability to the Department of Defense under
various hazard scenarios; identifying potential actions
that can be taken to restore those assets (or functionality
they provide) if they are lost, damaged, corrupted,
or compromised; and identifying and recommending options
to protect, mitigate, and improve the availability of
these Critical Assets to the DoD organizations that
own, use, and control them.   It includes a range of
activities to systematically inform planners and decisionmakers
of the probability of availability and quality (e.g.,
integrity, reliability, confidentiality, survivability,
endurability, capacity, adequacy) of specific assets
or services under given scenarios; quantifying the likely
impact of non-availability to the military operation
or defense activity; and identifying and prioritizing
options to improve the likelihood of the availability
of specific assets or services in specific scenarios.
  Examples of assurance activities that can improve
the likelihood of asset availability include protection
(preventing, by whatever means, the disruption or corruption
of an asset); mitigation or moderation of the effects
of disruption or corruption (by controlling the damage,
providing alternative services, and reducing demand
on the asset); and planning for and providing timely
restoral or recovery.   Alternatively, plans can be
made to absorb the loss of otherwise anticipated services.
  Assurance of a Critical Asset is the responsibility
of the owning or controlling DoD Component.

E2.1.2.  Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT).  
 An organization chartered by an information system
owner to coordinate and/or accomplish necessary actions
in response to computer emergency incidents that threaten
the availability or integrity of its information systems.

E2.1.3.  Critical Asset.    Any facility, equipment,
service or resource considered essential to DoD operations
in peace, crisis and war and warranting measures and
precautions to ensure its continued efficient operation,
protection from disruption, degradation or destruction,
and timely restoration.   Critical Assets may be DoD
assets or other government or private assets, (e.g.,
Industrial or Infrastructure Critical Assets), domestic
or foreign, whose disruption or loss would render DoD
Critical Assets ineffective or otherwise seriously disrupt
DoD operations.   Critical Assets include both traditional
"physical" facilities or equipment, non-physical assets
(such as software systems) or "assets" that are distributed
in nature (such as command and control networks, wide
area networks or similar computer-based networks).

E2.1.4.  DoD Executive Agent.    The individual designated
by position to have and to exercise the assigned responsibility
and delegated authority of the Secretary of Defense,
as specified in this Directive.

E2.1.5.  DoD Infrastructure.    Infrastructure owned,
operated or provided by the Department of Defense. 
 DoD Infrastructures include the DII, C4ISR, Space,
Financial Services, Logistics, Public Works (includes
DoD-owned or -operated utilities, roads, rails and railheads
and their interface to commercial and other Government
Systems), Personnel, Health Affairs and Emergency Preparedness.
  See also definitions of Infrastructure and National
Infrastructure, below.

E2.1.6.  DoD Installation.    A facility subject to
the custody, jurisdiction, or administration of any
DoD Component.   This term includes, but is not limited
to, military reservations, installations, bases, posts,
camps, stations, arsenals, or laboratories where a DoD
Component has operational responsibility for facility
security and defense.   Examples are facilities where
orders or regulations for protection and security have
been issued by the military commander or other specified
DoD official under provisions of DoD Directive 5200.8
(reference (n)).   Both industrial assets and infrastructure
assets, not owned by the Department of Defense, may
exist within the boundaries of a military installation.

E2.1.7.  Industrial Asset.    Any factory, plant, building
or structure used for manufacturing, producing, processing,
repairing, assembling, storing, or distributing a product
or components that supports a DoD Component.   A Critical
Industrial Asset is an industrial asset deemed essential
to DoD operations or the functioning of a Critical Asset

E2.1.8.  Information Assurance.    Information Operations
that protect and defend information and information
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication,
confidentiality, and non-repudiation.   This includes
providing for restoration of information systems by
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.
  (See DoD Directive S-3600.1, reference (c).)

E2.1.9.  Information System.    The entire infrastructure,
organination, personnel and components that collect,
process, store, transmit, display, disseminate and act
on information under reference (c).

E2.1.10.  Infrastructure.    The framework of interdependent
networks and systems comprising identifiable industries,
institutions, and distribution capabilities that provide
a continual flow of goods and services essential to
the defense and economic security of the United States,
the smooth functioning of government at all levels,
or society as a whole.

E2.1.11.  Infrastructure Asset.    Any Infrastructure
facility, equipment, service or resource that supports
a DoD Component.   A Critical Infrastructure Asset is
an infrastructure asset deemed essential to DoD operations
or the functioning of a Critical Asset.

E2.1.12.  National Infrastructure.    Those infrastructures
essential to the functioning of the nation and whose
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating
regional or national impact.   National infrastructures
include telecommunications, electrical power systems,
gas and oil transportation and storage, water supply
systems, banking and finance, transportation, emergency
services, and continuity of government operations.

E2.1.13.  Technical Attack.    An attack that can be
perpetrated by circumventing or nullifying hardware
or software protection mechanisms, or exploiting hardware
or software vulnerabilities, rather than physical destruction
or by subverting system personnel or other users.



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5200.1

December 13, 1996

ASD(C3I)

SUBJECT:  DoD Information Security Program 

References:  (a)  DoD Directive 5200.1, subject as above,
June 7, 1982 (hereby canceled)

(b)  Executive Order 12958, “Classified National Security
Information,” April 20, 1995, as amended

(c)  Information Security Oversight Office Directive,
“Classified National Security Information,” October
13, 1995

(d)  DoD Instruction 5230.21, “Protection of Classified
National Security Council and Intelligence Information,”
March 15, 1982 (hereby canceled)

(e)  through (i), see enclosure l

1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE 

This Directive:

1.1.  Reissues reference (a) to update policy and responsibili-ties
for the DoD Information Security Program under references
(b) and (c).

1.2.  Replaces references (d) through (f) .

1.3.  Continues to authorize the publication of DoD
5200.1-R (reference (g)), in accordance with DoD 5025.1-M
(reference (h)).

2.  APPLICABILITY 

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the
Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter
referred to collectively as “the DoD Components”).

3.  DEFINITIONS 

3.1.  Compromise.   A communication or physical transfer
of classified information to an unauthorized recipient.

3.2.  Information.   Any knowledge that may be communicated
or documentary material, regardless of its physical
form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced
by or for, or is under the control of, the Department
of Defense.

3.3.   National Security.   The national defense or
foreign relations of the United States.

4.  POLICY 

It is DoD policy that:

4.1.  National security information shall be classified,
declassified and safeguarded, in accordance with national-level
policy issuances.   Misclassification shall be avoided.

4.2.  Declassification of information shall receive
equal attention with classification to ensure that information
remains classified only as long as required by national
security considerations.

4.3.  The volume of classified national security information
shall be reduced to the minimum necessary to meet operational
requirements.

4.4.  An active security education and training program
shall be established and maintained to ensure that DoD
military and civilian personnel who require access to
classified national security information in the conduct
of official business are familiar with their responsibilities
for protecting such information from unauthorized disclosure.

5.  RESPONSIBILITIES 

5.l.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence shall:

5.1.1.  Serve as the Senior Agency Official for the
Department of Defense under subsection 5.6.(c) of E.O.
12958, as amended (reference (b)).

5.1.2.  Direct, administer, and oversee the DoD Information
Security Program to ensure that the program is efficient,
recognizes assigned authorities and responsibilities,
and that appropriate management safeguards are in place
to prevent fraud,waste, and abuse.

5.1.3.  Approve, when appropriate, requests for exceptions
to DoD Information Security Program policies and procedures.

5.1.4.  Approve and publish DoD Instructions and Publications,
as necessary, to guide, direct, or help DoD Information
Security Program activities, consistent with DoD 5025.1-M
(reference (h)).

5.1.5.  Encourage liaison between the DoD Components
and industry; professional associations; academia; Federal,
State, and local government organizations; and international
organizations to acquire information that may be of
use in improving the DoD Information Security Program.

5.1.6.  Assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology, as required, in implementing the DoD
Acquisition Systems Protection Program, both by establishing
security policy and providing technical security support
to that program.

5.2.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:

5.2.1.  Direct, administer and oversee that portion
of the DoD Information Security Program pertaining to
Special Access Programs, foreign government (including
North Atlantic Treaty Organization) classified information,
the National Disclosure Policy and security arrangements
for international programs.

5.2.2.  Approve, when appropriate, requests for exception
to policy involving any programs listed in paragraph
5.2.1., above.

5.3.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs shall:

5.3.1.  Direct and administer a DoD Mandatory Declassification
Review Program under subsection 3.6. of E.O. 12958 (reference
(b)).

5.3.2.  Establish policies and procedures for processing
mandatory declassification review requests, including
appeals consistent with subsection 3.6.(d) of reference
(b) and Section 2001.13 of the Information Security
Oversight Office Directive (reference (c)), which make
maximum use of DoD Component resources and systems established
to implement DoD Directive 5400.7 (reference (i)).

5.4.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology shall serve as the office of primary
responsibility and provide day-to-day direction and
management of the DoD Acquisition Systems Protection
Program.

5.5.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments, as
Agency Heads under reference (b), and the Heads of the
Other DoD Components, shall:

5.5.1.  Designate a senior agency official for their
respective Departments who shall be responsible for
the direction and administration of the Department’s
information security program, to include active oversight,
classification, declassification and security education
and training programs to ensure effective implementation
of reference (b) and DoD 5200.1-R (reference (g)).

5.5.2.  Ensure that funding and resources are adequate
to carry out such oversight, classification, declassification
and security education and training programs.

5.5.3.  Consider and take action on complaints and suggestions
from persons in or outside the Government regarding
the Department’s Information Security Program.

5.6.  The Director, National Security Agency, shall,
as the designee of the Secretary of Defense, when necessary,
impose special requirements on the classification, declassification,
marking, reproduction, distribution, accounting, and
protection of and access to classified cryptologic information.

6.  EFFECTIVE DATE 

This Directive is effective immediately.

Enclosures - 1 

1.   References

E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES, continued

(e)  DoD Instruction O-5230.22, “Security Controls on
the Dissemination of Intelligence Information,” August
17, 1988 (hereby canceled)

(f)  DoD Directive 5200.12, “Conduct of Classified Meetings,”
July 27, 1992 (hereby canceled)

(g)  DoD 5200.1-R, “Department of Defense Information
Security Program Regulation,” January 17, 1997 authorized
by this Directive

(h)  DoD 5025.1-M, “DoD Directives System Procedures,”
August 1994, authorized by DoD Directive 5025.1, June
24, 1994

(i)  DoD Directive 5400.7, “DoD Freedom of Information
Act Program,” May 13, 1988



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5205.8

February 20, 1991

ASD(C3I)

SUBJECT:  Access to Classified Cryptographic Information


References:  (a)  National Telecommunications and Information
Systems Security Policy (NTISSP) No. 3, "National Policy
for Granting Access to U.S. Classified Cryptographic
Information," December 19, 1988

(b)  Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence
Activities," December 4, 1981

(c)  National Telecommunications and Information Systems
Security Instruction (NTISSI) No. 4001, "Controlled
Cryptographic Items," March 25, 1985

(d)  DoD 5200.l-R, "Information Security Program Regulation,"
June 1986, authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June
7, 1982

(e)  through (i), see enclosure E1.

1.  PURPOSE 

This Directive establishes under reference (a) a program
to govern the granting of access to classified cryptographic
information that is owned, produced by or for, or is
under the control of the Department of Defense and is
in accordance with reference (b) to protect national
security information.

2.  APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE 

This Directive:

2.1.  Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Unified
and Specified Commands, the Defense Agencies, and the
DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively
as "the DoD Components").

2.2.  Applies to all members of the U.S. Armed Forces,
civilian employees of the Department of Defense and
employees of agents of the DoD Components who have access
to classified cryptographic information.   The term
"agents," as used herein, refers to contractors, consultants,
and other persons affiliated with the Department of
Defense.

2.3.  Pertains to persons whose duties require continuing
access to classified cryptographic information.   (See
section 3., below.)   Accordingly, this Directive concerns
those persons assigned:

2.3.1.  As cryptographic material custodians, alternates,
or their equivalents.

2.3.2.  As producers or developers of cryptographic
key or logic.

2.3.3.  As cryptographic maintenance, engineering, or
installation technicians.

2.3.4.  To supply points where cryptographic keying
materials are generated or stored, and to those having
access to such materials.

2.3.5.  To secure telecommunications facilities located
on the ground, on board ship, or on communications support
aircraft and whose duties require keying of cryptographic
equipment.

2.3.6.  To prepare, authenticate, or decode nuclear
control orders (valid or exercise).

2.3.7.  Any responsibility requiring or enabling access
to classified cryptographic media.

2.4.  Is not applicable to individuals whose duties
are to operate (not to key or maintain) systems using
cryptographic equipment.

2.5.  Excludes Controlled Cryptographic Items as defined
in NTISSI No. 4001 (reference (c)).

3.  DEFINITION 

3.1.  Classified Cryptographic Information, with respect
to this access program, is specified as:

3.1.1.  Cryptographic key and authenticators that are
classified pursuant to DoD 5200.l-R (reference (d))
and are designated as SECRET CRYPTO, or TOP-SECRET CRYPTO.

3.1.2.  Classified cryptographic media that embody,
describe, or implement a classified cryptographic logic,
to include, but not be limited to, full maintenance
manuals, cryptographic descriptions, drawings of cryptographic
logic, specifications describing a cryptographic logic,
and cryptographic computer software.

4.  POLICY 

It is DoD policy that a person may be granted access
to classified cryptographic information, as specified
in sections 2. and 3., above, only if that person:

4.1.  Is a U.S. citizen;

4.2.  Is a civilian employee of the Department of Defense,
a member of a Military Service, a DoD-cleared contractor
or employee of such contractor, or is employed as a
DoD representative (including consultants of the Department
of Defense);

4.3.  Requires access to perform official duties for,
or on behalf of, the Department of Defense;

4.4.  Possesses a security clearance and personnel security
investigation appropriate to the level of the classified
cryptographic information to be accessed, in accordance
with DoD 5200.2-R (reference (e));

4.5.  Receives a security briefing appropriate to the
cryptographic information to be accessed;

4.6.  Acknowledges the granting of access by signing
a cryptographic access certificate;

4.7.  Agrees to report foreign travel and any form of
contact with foreign citizens, in accordance with DoD
5200.2-R (reference (e)); and

4.8.  Acknowledges the possibility of being subject
to a non-lifestyle, counterintelligence scope polygraph
examination administered in accordance with DoD Directive
5210.48 (reference (f)).

5.  RESPONSIBILITIES 

5.1.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence shall oversee
and review the implementation of this Directive.

5.2.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

5.2.1.  Control access to classified cryptographic information
in accordance with section 4., above.

5.2.2.  Establish, implement, and administer a cryptographic
access program within their respective organizations.
  This program shall include providing Cryptographic
Access Briefings (sample in enclosure E2.) and executing
Cryptographic Access Certificates (sample in enclosure
E3).

5.2.3.  Implement, in accordance with DoD Directive
5210.48 (reference (f)), a counterintelligence scope
polygraph examination program in support of this Directive.

5.2.4.  Maintain records on all individuals who have
been granted cryptographic access or have had their
cryptographic access withdrawn, and arrange for retention
of Cryptographic Access Certificates or legally enforceable
facsimiles in accordance with the DoD Component records
disposition schedules.

5.2.5.  Accept as valid the cryptographic access granted
by other DoD Components.

5.2.6.  Deny or withdraw cryptographic access to those
individuals who fail to agree to or comply with the
specific criteria identified in section 4., above.

6.  EFFECTIVE DATE 

This Directive is effective immediately.

Enclosures -  3 

1.  References, continued

2.  Sample - Cryptographic Access Briefing

3.  SD Form 572 - Cryptographic Access Certification
and Termination

E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES, continued

(e)  DoD 5200.2-R, "DoD Personnel Security Program,"
January 1987, authorized by DoD Directive 5200.2, December
20, 1979

(f)  DoD Directive 5210.48, "DoD Polygraph Program,"
December 24, 1984 

(g)  DoD Directive 5220.22, "DoD Industrial Security
Program," December 8, 1980 

(h)  DoD 5220.22-R, "Industrial Security Regulation,"
December 1985, authorized by DoD Directive 5220.22,
December 8, 1980

(i)  DoD 5220.22-M, "Industrial Security Manual for
Safeguarding Classified Information," March 1989, authorized
by DoD Directive 5220.22, December 8, 1980

E2.  ENCLOSURE 2

SAMPLE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS BRIEFING

 You have been selected to perform duties that will
require access to classified cryptographic information.

   It is essential that you be made aware of certain
facts relevant to the protection of this information
before access is granted.   You must know the reason
why special safeguards are required to protect classified
cryptographic information.   You must understand the
Directives that require these safeguards and the penalties
you may incur for the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized
retention, or negligent handling of classified cryptographic
information.   Failure to properly safeguard this information
could cause serious or exceptionally grave damage, or
irreparable injury, to the national security of the
United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign
nation.

 Classified cryptographic information is especially
sensitive because it is used to protect other classified
information.   Any particular piece of cryptographic
keying material and any specific cryptographic technique
may be used to protect a large quantity of classified
information during transmission.   If the integrity
of the cryptographic system is breached at any point,
all information protected by the system may be compromised.

  The safeguards placed on classified cryptographic
information are a necessary component of Government
programs to ensure that our nation's vital secrets are
not compromised.

 Because access to classified cryptographic information
is granted on a strict need-to-know basis, you will
be given access to only that cryptographic information
necessary in the performance of your duties.   You are
required to become familiar with (insert, as appropriate,
Department or Agency implementing Directives covering
the protection of cryptographic information).   Cited
Directives are attached in a briefing book for your
review at this time.

 Especially important to the protection of classified
cryptographic information is the timely reporting of
any known or suspected compromise of this information.

  If a cryptographic system is compromised, but the
compromise is not reported, the continued use of the
system can result in the loss of all information protected
by it.   If the compromise is reported, steps can be
taken to lessen an adversary's advantage gained through
the compromise of the information.

 As a condition of access to classified cryptographic
information, you must acknowledge that you may be subject
to a non-lifestyle, counterintelligence scope polygraph
examination.   This examination will be administered
in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.48 and applicable
law.   The relevant questions in this polygraph examination
will only encompass questions concerning espionage,
sabotage, or questions relating to unauthorized disclosure
of classified information or unreported foreign contacts.

  If you do not, at this time, wish to sign such an
acknowledgment as a part of executing a cryptographic
access certification, this briefing will be terminated
at this point and the briefing administrator will so
annotate the cryptographic access certificate.   Such
refusal will not be cause for adverse action but will
result in your being denied access to classified cryptographic
information.

 You should know that intelligence services of some
foreign governments prize the acquisition of classified
cryptographic information.   They will go to extreme
lengths to compromise U.S. citizens and force them to
divulge cryptographic techniques and materials that
protect the nation's secrets around the world.   You
must understand that any personal or financial relationship
with a foreign government's representative could make
you vulnerable to attempts at coercion to divulge classified
cryptographic information.   You should be alert to
recognize those attempts so that you may successfully
counter them.   The best personal policy is to avoid
discussions that reveal your knowledge of, or access
to, classified cryptographic information and thus avoid
highlighting yourself to those who would seek the information
you possess.    Any attempt, either through friendship
or coercion, to solicit your knowledge regarding classified
cryptographic information must be reported immediately
to (insert appropriate security office).

 In view of the risks noted above, unofficial travel
to certain communist or other designated countries may
require the prior approval of (insert appropriate security
office).   It is essential that you contact (insert
appropriate security office) if such unofficial travel
becomes necessary.

 Finally, you must know that, should you willfully or
negligently disclose to any unauthorized persons any
of the classified cryptographic information to which
you will have access, you may be subject to administrative
and civil sanctions, including adverse personnel actions,
as well as criminal sanctions under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) and/or the criminal laws
of the United States, as appropriate.

E3.  ENCLOSURE 3

SD FORM 572 - CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS CERTIFICATION AND
TERMINATION



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5210.45

May 9, 1964

SUBJECT:  Personnel Security in the National Security
Agency 

References:  (a)  Public Law 88-290, An Act to Amend
the Internal Security Act of 1950

1.  PURPOSE 

The purpose of this directive is to prescribe policies
and procedures to implement Public Law 88-290 the objective
of which is to strengthen personnel security In the
National Security Agency.

2.  PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARD 

No person shall be employed in, or detailed or assigned
to, the National Security Agency, and no person shall
have access to classified information of the Agency,
unless his employment, detail, or assignment to the
Agency, or his access to classified information of the
Agency, is clearly consistent with the national security.

3.  FULL FIELD INVESTIGATION 

3.1.  No person shall be finally employed in the National
Security Agency until he has been the subject of a full
field investigation.   A person may, however, be provisionally
employed before the completion of a full field investigation
in his case, but he may not be given access to sensitive
cryptologic information while he is so employed.   His
provisional employment is conditional upon the successful
outcome of a full field investigation in his case.

3.2.  No person shall be assigned or detailed to the
Agency without the agreement of the Agency that its
security requirements are met; each such person shall
be the subject of a full field investigation in connection
with such assignment or detail unless he has a current
security clearance for sensitive cryptologic information
which was granted under the same or equivalent standards
as are prescribed by the Agency.

3.3.  The Director of the Agency may, in an exceptional
case, temporarily waive the requirement for a full field
investigation if he personally determines in writing
that such action is advisable in the national interest
and is clearly consistent with the national security.
  In such a case priority shall be given to the full
field investigation.   This authority of the Director,
NSA, cannot be redelegated.

4.  BOARDS OF APPRAISAL 

4.1.  The Director of the Agency shall establish one
or more boards of appraisal of three members each to
be assigned personnel security responsibility as set
forth below.   Members of a board shall be senior officials
with broad experience, shall be specially trained for
their duties, and shall have been the subject of a full
field investigation, and have been cleared for access
to classified information, in connection with their
appointment

4.2.  The Director of the Agency shall refer to a board
those cases in which he determines that there is a doubt
as to eligibility for access to classified information
of an employee or person assigned or detailed to the
Agency.   The board shall appraise the loyalty and suitability
of persons whose cases have been referred to it and
advise the Director whether access to classified information
by such persons is clearly consistent with the national
security.   In applying the foregoing standard, the
board shall use the criteria which have been prescribed
by the U.S. Intelligence Board and Department of Defense
Directive 5210.8 dated February 15, 1962.

4.3.  Proceedings of a board shall not include notice
to the individual, right to a hearing, or appeal from
an adverse recommendation.   A board shall submit to
the Director a report and recommendation on each case
referred to it.   The report shall not be made available
to the person.   No person shall be cleared for access
or continued access to Agency classified information
contrary to the recommendation of a board except on
the authority of the Director or, upon the referral
by the Director, of the Secretary of Defense.   In such
a case, the Director or the Secretary shall make a determination
in writing that the employment, detail, assignment or
access is in the national Interest.

4.4.  Appraisal by a board is not required before action
may be taken under Section 14 of the Act of June 27,
1944, Chapter 287, as amended (5 U.S.C. 863), Section
l of the Act of August 26, 1950, Chapter 803, as amended
(5 U.S.C. 22-1), or any other similar provision of law.
  The objective in establishing the boards(s) is to
assure further that the access of each person to classified
information is clearly consistent with the national
security in consonance with the requirements and standards
of the U.S. Intelligence Board and the Department of
Defense.

5.  TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 

5.1.  Section 303(a) of Public Law 88-290 authorizes
the Secretary of Defense to terminate employment of
any officer or employee of the National Security Agency
in his discretion whenever (1) he considers such action
to be in the interest of the United States, and (2)
he determines that the procedures prescribed in other
provisions of law that authorize the termination of
employment of that officer or employee cannot be invoked
consistently with the national security.   The Secretary's
action to terminate employment is final.   The statute
provides, however, that the individual whose employment
has been terminated under this authority may seek or
accept employment in any other Government Agency provided
that the Civil Service Commission determines he is eligible
for such employment.

5.2.  When the two conditions cited above do not exist,
the Director, NSA, shall, when appropriate, take action
pursuant to other provisions of law, as applicable,
to terminate the employment of a civilian officer or
employee.   The Director shall recommend to the Secretary
of Defense the exercise of the authority of Section
303(a) only when the termination of the employment of
a civilian officer or employee cannot, because of paramount
national security interests, be carried out under any
other provision of law.

6.  IMPLEMENTATION 

Proposed implementing regulations of the National Security
Agency shall be coordinated with the General Counsel
of the Department of Defense prior to their publication.

7.  EFFECTIVE DATE 

This directive becomes effective immediately.



Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5210.70

November 3, 1980

ASD(C3I)

SUBJECT:  DoD Cryptologic Training 

References:  (a)  National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No.6 (NSCID No. 6)

(b)  DoD Directive S-5100.20, "The National Security
Agency and the Central Security Service," December 23,
1971

(c)  DoD Directive 5100.47, "National Cryptologic School,"
April 30, 1965

1.  PURPOSE 

This Directive establishes uniform policies, standards,
and procedures for the conduct of cryptologic training;
and assigns responsibilities to ensure that adequate
and responsive training within the various Components
of the Department of Defense is carried out.

2.  APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE 

2.1.  The provisions of this Directive apply to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military
Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter called "DoD
Components").   As used herein, the term "Services"
refers to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

2.2.  Its provisions encompass all elements of the Department
of Defense engaged in cryptologic and cryptologic-related
training that supports operations contained in the Consolidated
Cryptologic Program (CCP) or Tactical Cryptologic Program
(TCP).

3.  DEFINITIONS 

3.1.  Cryptologic Training.    Institutional training
in skills unique to the cryptologic mission.

3.2.  Common Cryptologic Training.    Training in identical
skills that are essentially similar for personnel of
more than one Military Department or for the National
Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS).

3.3.  Unique Cryptologic Training.    Training in cryptologic
skills that is either used by only one of the DoD Components
engaged in cryptologic operations, or sufficiently dissimilar
among the DoD Components as to make consolidated or
collocated intercomponent training infeasible.

3.4.  Cryptologic-Related Training.    Training that
is a prerequisite for, or an adjunct to, cryptologic
training and job performance when the subject matter
is not in itself cryptologic but is of overriding importance
to the conduct of cryptologic operations; the noncryptologic
applications of such subjects are excluded.

4.  POLICY 

The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central
Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS), as principal signals
intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (NSCID No. 6. (reference (a))
and DoD Directive S-5100.20 (reference (b))), shall
ensure the technical adequacy of all cryptologic training.

5.  RESPONSIBILITIES 

5.1.  The Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
Central Security Service, shall:

5.1.1.  Submit requirements to the OSD for inclusion
in the Consolidated Guidance (or Intelligence Annex
thereto) for the direction of programming and budgeting
for Military Department cryptologic and cryptologic-related
training programs, and provide program manager's guidance
for cryptologic training.

5.1.2.  Review Military Department program submissions
on cryptologic and cryptologic-related training.

5.1.3.  Provide technical guidance, minimum standards,
and support for all course development and all ongoing
cryptologic and cryptologic-related training.

5.1.4.  Review course documentation to ensure the technical
adequacy of cryptologic and cryptologic-related course
content.

5.1.5.  Maintain and operate the National Cryptologic
School (NCS) in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.47
(reference (c)).

5.1.6.  Coordinate, with the Military Departments, proposed
changes to training requirements, resources, and courses
as initiated by NSA/CSS, to include training development
for new systems and the procurement of technical training
equipment.

5.1.7.  Establish, in coordination with the Military
Departments, policy, missions, objectives, standards,
curricula, and types and sources of training used to
satisfy requirements.

5.1.8.  In cooperation with the Military Departments,
provide for the periodic review and analysis of all
common and unique cryptologic training courses to determine
the potential for interservice or intercomponent consolidation
and/or collocation.   When such action is determined
to maintain or enhance the effectiveness of training
and to be economical, arrange for the consolidations
and/or collocations or, as appropriate, make recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense for decisions on specific
courses of action.

5.1.9.  Establish, in coordination with the Military
Departments, an evaluation and information feedback
system that incorporates Military Service evaluation
methods.

5.1.10.  Establish a Cryptologic Training Council to
provide a forum wherein policy matters, training issues,
and other related topics may be addressed.   The Council
shall be chaired by the Training Director, NSA/CSS (TDNC),
and be composed of representatives from each Military
Department and the NSA/CSS.

5.1.11.  Prescribe administrative procedures for compliance
with appropriate security directives pertaining to special
clearance requirements for all NSA/CSS personnel involved
with cryptologic training and curriculum development.

5.2.  The Training Director, National Security Agency/Central
Security Service shall serve as the principal executive
for DIRNSA/CHCSS in matters related to cryptologic training.

5.3.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

5.3.1.  Incorporate guidance from OSD and the NSA/CSS
in the development of cryptologic training, planning,
programming, and budgeting documents.

5.3.2.  Coordinate, with NSA/CSS, deviations and proposed
changes to training requirements, resources, and courses
initiated by the Military Departments, to include training
development for new systems and the procurement of technical
training equipment that affect the capability to execute
training programs.

5.3.3.  Assemble and maintain, for all DoD Components,
a current record of all DoD common and unique training
requirements and programs under their cognizance.

5.3.4.  Establish, maintain, and operate cryptologic
training schools that provide training for DoD Components
agreed upon among the Military Departments and the DIRNSA/CHCSS.

5.3.5.  Provide cryptologic instructional material for
Reserve components, correspondence students, and proficiency
training for all military personnel.

5.3.6.  Provide facilities for the use of DoD Components
for training that can be effectively and efficiently
conducted on a collocated basis.

5.3.7.  Coordinate actions with NSA/CSS and maintain
liaison with other DoD Components and appropriate Government
Departments and Agencies on matters that affect the
conduct and development of assigned cryptologic training
programs.

5.3.8.  Prescribe administrative procedures for compliance
with appropriate security directives pertaining to special
clearance requirements for all personnel of their respective
Military Departments involved with cryptologic training
and curriculum development.

6.  PROCEDURES 

6.1.  Personnel shall be assigned to the staffs and
faculties of the cryptologic training schools by their
respective Military Services.

6.2.  Manpower authorizations for joint Service staffs
and faculties shall be prorated among the Military Departments,
based upon participation in terms of student weeks.

6.3.  The Military Departments and NSA/CSS shall program
and budget for all expenses incidental to the operation,
maintenance, and base-operating support of their respective
cryptologic training schools.

6.4.  The pay, allowances, and permanent change of station
travel and per diem costs of Military Department personnel
assigned as faculty or staff of the cryptologic training
schools shall be borne by the sponsoring DoD Component.

6.5.  NCS administrative financial functions shall be
conducted in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.47 (reference
(c)).

6.6.  The regulatory controls for cryptologic training
shall be defined in a series of NSA/CSS circulars that
shall be initiated by DIRNSA/CHCSS and coordinated with
the Military Departments.

7.  EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION 

This Directive is effective immediately.   Forward two
copies of implementing documents to the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Command, Communications, Control and Intelligence)
within 120 days.