6 February 1999
Source:
http://www.usia.gov/current/news/topic/intrel/99020202.ppo.html?/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml
USIS Washington
File
_________________________________
02 February 1999
(Shelton stresses "imperative" of U.S. global engagement) (4040) Washington -- The top U.S. military officer says the United States must remain engaged in the world in order to deter emerging threats such as attacks on U.S. information systems, the use of weapons of mass destruction, and domestic and international terrorism. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton told members of the House Armed Services Committee February 2 that any of these "asymmetric threats" could be employed against the United States, and some already have been. He also said it is imperative for the United States to continue to be engaged because if it "were to withdraw from international commitments, forsake its leadership responsibilities, or relinquish military superiority, the world would surely become more dangerous and the threats to U.S. interests would increase." The engagement of U.S. military forces is "the best way of reducing the sources of conflict and preventing local crises from escalating," Shelton noted in his annual military posture statement. The chairman testified in support of the Clinton administration's Fiscal Year 2000 defense budget, which requests nearly $261 thousand million dollars in budget authority. Shelton focused, in his prepared statement, on the threat of terrorism. "More than a 'war,'" he said, "international terrorism is a part of the strategic environment that will not fade away" with the approach of the 21st century. "Our enemies will continue to test our resolve, both at home and abroad," he added. "While we cannot prevent every attack, we can lower both the threat and the consequences of terrorist incidents," Shelton noted, in part by using advanced technology. "Our intent is to develop the most advanced, reliable, and effective equipment and to field it when and where it's needed," he said. Given U.S. vulnerabilities to terrorism at home and overseas, Shelton noted, a new study has been commissioned to examine how the military services' anti-terrorism programs compare to "some of our allies' best efforts to combat terrorism at the strategic and operational levels." The results of the study, he said, "will be used to reevaluate our strategy and improve our techniques." Outlining the U.S. position on landmines, Shelton said the United States provides "more funding, trainers and other resources than any other nation" in support of the international demining effort. The chairman pointed out that the Defense Department (DOD) has trained "over one-quarter of the world's deminers to date and has demining programs in place in 21 countries." The United States is also committed "to providing world leadership to end the use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs)," Shelton said, "while ensuring our ability to meet our international obligations and provide for the safety and security of our armed forces." President Clinton has directed the Defense Department to stop using APLs everywhere except South Korea by the year 2003, he said. Shelton also said the President has instructed the Pentagon to "aggressively pursue and develop alternatives to APLs in Korea by 2006 and to search for alternatives to our mixed anti-tank systems that contain anti-personnel submunitions." If those alternatives can be identified and fielded successfully, the chairman said, the United States will sign the Ottawa Convention banning landmines by 2006. Following are excerpts of Shelton's remarks as prepared for delivery: (begin excerpts) SUPPORTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY Though the United States currently enjoys relative peace and security, the international security environment remains complex and dangerous. While the threat of global war has receded and former enemies now cooperate with us on many issues, very real threats to our citizens and interests remain. Though we currently face no peer competitor, openly hostile regional adversaries fielding potent forces have both the desire and the means to challenge the United States militarily. Additionally, in a number of cases, transnational movements threaten our interests, our values, and even our physical security here at home. And, while our military strength remains unmatched, state or non-state actors may attempt to circumvent our strengths and exploit our weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from our own. Attacks on our information systems, use of weapons of mass destruction, domestic and international terrorism, and even man-made environmental disasters are all examples of asymmetric threats that could be employed against us. Indeed, some already have. To deal successfully with these challenges, the National Security Strategy stresses the "imperative of engagement." If the United States were to withdraw from international commitments, forsake its leadership responsibilities, or relinquish military superiority, the world would surely become more dangerous and the threats to U.S. interests would increase. Within their capabilities, therefore, our Armed Forces are committed to engagement as the best way of reducing the sources of conflict and preventing local crises from escalating. The National Security Strategy also recognizes that America's security is a function of all elements of national power. The Armed Forces play a central role, of course, by focusing on the principal objectives outlined in the National Military Strategy -- to encourage peace and stability, and to defeat adversaries. To help ensure that all elements of American power are engaged, the military will continue working to improve interaction and coordination with the other government agencies that contribute to the common defense. Though peacetime engagement can reduce potential sources of conflict, the ability to fight and win our Nation's wars must remain the fundamental, overarching purpose of the military. The core military capability of deterring and, if necessary, defeating large-scale aggression in more than one theater, in nearly simultaneous time frames, defines the United States as a global power. The defense of American lives, territory and interests has been, and always will be, the principal mission of America's Armed Forces. Readiness Though military readiness has been challenged in many ways over the past year, our Armed Forces remain fundamentally capable of performing their assigned national security tasks. The combat operations conducted against Iraq in December demonstrated once again that our first-to-fight units remain very capable. Well-trained and fielding the best equipment in the world, our forward-deployed forces in the Persian Gulf executed a demanding range of missions flawlessly. As I told the Senate Armed Services Committee last September and again in January, we remain fully capable of executing our current strategy. As I highlighted in those hearings, however, the risks associated with the most demanding scenarios have increased. We now assess the risk factors for fighting and winning the 1st Major Theater War (MTW) as moderate and for the 2d MTW as high. As I have explained in the past, this does not mean that we doubt our ability to prevail in either contingency. We are not the "hollow" force of the 1970s, a force that I served in and know well. Nevertheless, increased risk translates into longer timelines and correspondingly higher casualties, and thus leads to our increasing concern. Over the past 12 to 18 months we have seen both anecdotal and measurable evidence of growing cracks in our readiness in such critical areas as aircraft maintenance, pilot retention, recruiting, and the "foxhole" strength of our combat units. Prolonged deployments in Southwest Asia, the Balkans, the Sinai, and elsewhere have taken a toll in readiness. The effects are apparent both in the areas of personnel and, to varying degrees, materiel readiness. The latter is also the result of aging combat systems and the demands placed on them in the last 10 years. And, as noted earlier, recruiting and retention efforts have been made tougher by a strong economy and a growing perception that military pay and benefits, including housing, medical care, and the retirement system, have eroded substantially. Reversing these trends will not be simple or easy; however, it is clear that the time has come to take decisive steps before the downturn in readiness becomes irreversible. In this regard, the substantial increases in readiness funding included in the President's FY 2000 budget are a significant and important step forward. ... Force Protection Wherever our forces are deployed, force protection is the top priority for commanders. The tragic bombings of our embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya reminded us that terrorists can strike anywhere, at any time. During my testimony last year, I noted that our adversaries, unable to confront or compete with the United States militarily, spend millions of dollars each year to finance terrorist organizations that target U.S. citizens, property and interests. Consequently, our Combatant Commanders and the Services continue to focus on force protection issues as a first order priority. Over the past year the Joint Staff conducted a comprehensive Mission Area Analysis to review the CINCs'(Commanders-in-Chief) and Services' Anti-Terrorism programs. We have also commissioned a study to examine how our program "stacks up" against some of our allies' best efforts to combat terrorism at the strategic and operational levels. Results from this study will be used to reevaluate our strategy and improve our techniques. We continue to conduct Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (100 this past year) worldwide in order to help the CINCs and Service Chiefs enhance their force protection posture. Lessons learned from these assessments are used to improve readiness and physical protection worldwide, providing commanders a benchmark from which to evaluate and reinforce their efforts to eliminate vulnerabilities and keep our people safe. Advanced technology also plays a key role in the fight against terrorism. Our intent is to develop the most advanced, reliable, and effective equipment and to field it when and where it's needed, using the Chairman's Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund in addition to resources allocated by the formal budget process. Our best efforts notwithstanding, we know that terrorism will remain a serious threat as we move into the 21st century. More than a "war," international terrorism is a part of the strategic environment that will not fade away. Our enemies will continue to test our resolve, both at home and abroad. To protect our forces, our citizens and our facilities, we must continue to move forward with renewed emphasis and awareness. While we cannot prevent every attack, we can lower both the threat and the consequences of terrorist incidents. Arms Control In a very real sense, one of the best ways to protect our troops and our interests is to promote arms control in its many different forms. In both the conventional and nuclear realms, arms control can reduce the chances of conflict, lower tensions, generate cost savings, and encourage peaceful solutions to international and intrastate disputes. In the conventional area, we remain committed to providing world leadership to end the use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs), while ensuring our ability to meet our international obligations and provide for the safety and security of our armed forces. The President has directed DOD to end the use of APLs outside Korea by 2003, to aggressively pursue and develop alternatives to APLs in Korea by 2006, and to search for alternatives to our mixed anti-tank systems that contain anti-personnel submunitions. Furthermore, the President announced that we will sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006, if we succeed in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our APLs and mixed anti-tank systems by then. Perhaps our greatest contribution to this worldwide problem is in the field of demining. Today, the U.S. leads the international demining effort, providing more funding, trainers, and other resources than any other nation. DOD has trained over one-quarter of the world's deminers to date and has demining programs in place in 21 countries. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process continues to evolve, with START I implementation proceeding even as we continue to push for final ratification of START II. Currently, all parties have exceeded START I Phase I (December 1997) reduction requirements and are already approaching Phase II (December 1999) limits. As for START II, although we have worked hard to address Russian concerns through the NATO Founding Act, the New York Protocols to the START II Treaty, and other initiatives, the prospects for ratification by the Duma remain uncertain. It remains our position that the Duma must ratify START II before formal negotiations can begin on START III. Our efforts to lower the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons coincide with efforts to control testing of nuclear weapons. In the 1999 State of the Union Address, the President asked the Senate to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, now, to make it harder for other nations to develop nuclear arms. To date, 152 nations have signed the treaty and 27 have ratified it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support the ratification of this treaty, with the safeguards package that establishes the conditions under which the United States would adhere to the treaty. Global Hot Spots Around the world, our military supports our strategy of engagement and is ready to respond to threats anywhere in the world. However, three specific areas occupy center stage: the Korean peninsula, the Balkans, and Southwest Asia. These areas pose the greatest potential threats to stability and consume more energy and resources than any others. Korea The divided Korean peninsula remains a potential flashpoint, with recent developments complicating an already tense security situation. North Korea represents one of the few major military powers capable of launching a major conventional attack on U.S. forces with minimal warning. Despite its collapsed economy and struggle to feed its own population, the North Korean government continues to pour resources into its military and to pursue a policy of confrontation with South Korea and its neighbors in the region. More than one million North Korean soldiers serve on active duty, the vast majority deployed within hours of the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) and South Korea's capital city, Seoul. Infiltration by North Korean special forces continues to exacerbate tensions between the two governments, and the recent launch of a previously unknown long-range variant of the Taepo Dong One ballistic missile represents a significant improvement in the North's capability to threaten the region and beyond. Finally, North Korea's repeated threats to walk away from the Agreed Framework that curtailed their nuclear production program have been unsettling to the international community. The North Korean threat remains one that we must -- and do -- take very seriously. We have pursued a number of initiatives in recent years to enhance the capabilities of both our forces forward-deployed on the peninsula and our reinforcing elements, as well as the forces of our South Korean allies. We now have better U.S. tanks, better infantry fighting vehicles and better artillery, as well as improved attack helicopters and aircraft, on hand in Korea. We have also deployed Patriot missile defense systems and improved surveillance capabilities, and assisted with a number of upgrades to South Korean forces. Our naval forces have greatly stepped up their anti-SOF (Special Operations Force) activities, while forward-deployed marine units stand ready to reinforce the peninsula on short notice. We have upgraded our prepositioned stocks as well, substantially improving our ability to reinforce the peninsula with ground troops from the continental United States. These actions have significantly improved our defensive posture. Still, the threat remains, and North Korea's substantial chemical and biological weapons capability, coupled with its continued pursuit of ballistic missile technology, will demand our attention for the foreseeable future. Southwest Asia Our recent military operations in Southwest Asia underscore how both our long-term interests and the prospect of continuing regional instability combine to keep the area a major source of concern. The ongoing disputes with Saddam Hussein and the military threat Iraq poses to its neighbors require a substantial, capable, and ready military force in the Persian Gulf region, as well as powerful reinforcing units in the U.S. prepared to move quickly should conditions require rapid deployment of additional assets. As we showed in December, we are ready to act swiftly, in concert with our coalition partners or alone if necessary, to protect U.S. interests and those of our friends and allies. Forces in the region include powerful land-based bomber and fighter forces, an aircraft carrier battle group with a significant number of cruise missiles, and strong ground forces that can be reinforced within days. In recent years we have built up our prepositioned stocks of weapons and supplies, considerably improved our' strategic lift, and developed a crisis response force in the United States that can deploy to the Gulf region on very short notice. The development of this force is one example of our efforts to reduce the number of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines deployed overseas on contingency operations, while still maintaining sufficient capability to meet our security needs around the world. Balkans The Balkans continue to be an area of intense U.S. interest and involvement. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 6,900 U.S. servicemen and women are deployed in support of the NATO multi-national Stabilization Force, or SFOR, down from 18,000 in 1996. This spring we will reduce the U.S. element by a further 10 percent in conformance with the SACEUR's (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) recent six-month review. U.S. troops are performing magnificently, providing a secure environment so that political and economic activities can go forward smoothly. No fatalities occurred in FY 1998, and the health and morale of our forces there remains high. SFOR operations in Bosnia over the past year have contributed to a number of successes. The recent elections were characterized by high voter turnout and an absence of violence -- real achievements given the recent history of that troubled region. Since 1996 more than 200,000 weapons have been destroyed, heavy weapons have been put into cantonment areas, and military parity has been established between the former warring factions. The recent activation of a Multinational Specialized Unit, composed of police organizations from several countries, has enhanced SFOR's ability to provide public security. These steps, and SFOR's success in sustaining a secure environment for the further implementation of civil tasks, have done much to reduce the chances of future conflict. The outstanding performance of U.S. and other NATO military units has enabled SFOR to fulfill the military tasks spelled out in the Dayton Accords. Nevertheless, success in achieving the civil, political, and economic tasks identified at Dayton has been slower in coming. The focus now must be on pressing forward with those tasks as we plan to reduce and eventually withdraw our ground forces from Bosnia. Elsewhere in the Balkans, the dangerous conflict between armed Albanian separatists and Serbian security forces in Kosovo has led to an international effort to stabilize the region by deploying a monitoring force provided by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The U.S. provides air verification platforms, and we have joined in NATO planning for possible military actions to stabilize the situation in the event of a large-scale humanitarian crisis. We are also participating in NATO planning for an Extraction Force in the event that further conflict threatens OSCE monitors, requiring "in extremis" evacuation from Kosovo. This force, composed of British, French, Italian, Dutch, Greek, Canadian, and Turkish units, is based in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), where we continue to provide Task Force Able Sentry, the U.S. contingent in the United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP). Funding for Contingency Operations Last year our Armed Forces benefited greatly from the prompt approval of the emergency supplemental for Bosnia and Southwest Asia. For FY 1999, our requests for regular and supplemental appropriations to fund these operations, totaling $1.9 billion and $850 million respectively, were also approved. This strong support has enabled us to execute these missions without taxing our already-stressed readiness and modernization accounts. We anticipate that the recent major humanitarian assistance effort in Central America following Hurricane Mitch will generate an additional supplemental funding request which will be submitted later this year, and it is possible that we may need to request additional funds for the conduct of Operation Desert Fox as well. National Missile Defense An important element to be considered in providing for the defense of America is National Missile Defense (NMD), particularly in light of developing ballistic missile programs that could pose a threat to the United States. The NMD program objective is to develop and provide the option to deploy a system that will defend the U.S. against a limited strategic ballistic missile attack by a rogue nation and to provide some capability against a small accidental or unauthorized launch from a nuclear-capable state. Our NMD program is structured to demonstrate a system-level capability that could permit a deployment decision as early as the Year 2000. This has been a very ambitious endeavor. Beyond the tremendous technological challenges associated with the development of an NMD system, we have also been striving to develop a system that could potentially be fielded sooner than is typically required for such an effort. The decision to deploy an NMD system will be based on several factors, the most important of which will be assessments of the threat and the current state of the technology. A threat is clearly emerging; however, the technology to "hit a bullet with a bullet" remains elusive. We will continue to press hard to develop an effective NMD system, very mindful that the growing threat is placing a deployment decision in clearer context. Modernizing the Force For most of this decade, current readiness funding has come at the expense of future modernization. During the early and mid-1990s, procurement accounts served as bill payers for short-term readiness, contingencies, and excess infrastructure. Consequently projected procurement funding necessary for modernizing the force repeatedly slipped further into the future with each succeeding budget year. Our goal is to meet programmed modernization targets by having a fiscally executable FY 2000 budget and FYDP (Five Year Defense Plan). Our current plans take us down that path. The previously programmed QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) adjustments to end strength, force structure, and modernization initiatives, combined with planned business efficiencies, provided resources that were redistributed to both modernization and current readiness accounts to yield a more stable and sustainable defense program. As a direct result, and in line with our QDR goals, procurement has increased from $49 billion in FY 1999 to $53 billion in FY 2000, with an increase of nearly $23 billion for procurement over the FYDP to address our most critical modernization needs. However, despite these adjustments, significant risk still remains. This risk stems from unprogrammed contingency operations, aging equipment, and unrealized efficiencies that could make achieving our future QDR procurement goals difficult. As long as we remain at current funding levels, we will continue to face the readiness vs. modernization dilemma. The time has come to act on our long-range readiness problem -- modernizing the force. We must act now to reverse the cycle of escalating maintenance costs prompted by aged and overworked systems. While the QDR gave us a roadmap to do so, our plan was contingent upon savings from two additional rounds of base, closures and greater efficiencies in DOD business practices. Without the additional BRAC (Base Realignment And Closure) rounds, the only real answer to achieving our programmed modernization targets is to adjust the budget top-line upwards. The U.S. is the dominant military power in the world today. Our armed forces are fundamentally sound and capable of fulfilling their role in executing our national security strategy. However, the combination of multiple, competing missions, recruiting and retention shortfalls, aging equipment, and fixed defense budgets has frayed the force. The warning signals cannot and should not be ignored. With the support of this Committee and the Congress as a whole, we can apply the right kind of corrective action now and avoid a downward spiral that could take years to overcome. As we look to the future, we should move forward with a clear understanding of what must be done and with confidence in America's sons and daughters in uniform. They represent the heart and soul of our Armed Forces, and it is our responsibility to ensure they remain part of a military worthy of their sacrifice and commitment. (end excerpts)