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8 April 2000
Source: Hardcopy from anonymous.
Note: Missing text appears cropped by xerox.
[33 pages, all marked "Unclassified."]
PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
FOR NSA/CSS SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES
[July 1979]
____________________________
C O N T E N T S
SECTION
A. SCOPE
B. GENERAL
C. DEFINITIONS
D. PERIMETER CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS
E. VAULT SPECIFICATIONS
F. SECURE AREA SPECIFICATIONS
G. SOUND ATTENUATION CLASSIFICATIONS
H. SECURITY ALARM SYSTEMS
I. BARRED WINDOW SPECIFICATIONS
J. TELEPHONE SECURITY
K. INTERCOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
L. ELECTRICAL/ELECTROMECHANICAL PROCESSING OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION
M. AUDIO SECURITY
N. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURE SURVEY
O. CONTROL OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION FACILITY
7/79
PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
FOR NSA/CSS SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES
[About two lines of text missing] in NSA/CSS contractor facilities.
By reference in the Contract Security Classification Specification, DD Form
254, these requirements become contract security requirements and shall be
applicable also to prospective contractor activities during a proposal effort.
These requirements supplement the Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding
Classified Information, DoD 5220.22M (ISM) and are issued pursuant to the
authority contained in Section IX of the ISM.
The contractor shall establish, maintain, and control a Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility (SCIF) in accordance with requirements set forth herein.
All activities involving SCI, including discussions, material handling and
storage, will be conducted within the SCIF. Formal accreditation in writing
by NSA, Industrial Field Security, M52 is required before the facility may
be used for SCI activities. To obtain accreditation the contractor will be
required to submit to NSA/CSS, Industrial Field Security, M52 a written request
enclosing a profile of the facility describing the security measures established
which satisfy the requirements set forth herein.
1. Alarm Systems - Those alarm devices, or families of alarms designed
to deter the penetration of a defined space. Different alarms may be employed
for this purpose, such as, volumetric alarms, and door alarms.
2. Alarm Transmission Line Supervision - The sending of a continuous
signal through an alarm line circuit such that any tampering with the alarm
line will cause the circuit characteristics to exceed a specified tolerance
and cause an alarm. Class A and AB supervision systems use digital and tone
type modulation over transmission lines with an interrogation and reply scheme.
The signal technique used for the interrogation is different than the reply.
Class A and AB systems cannot be compromised by the use of resistance, voltage
or current substitution techniques.
3. Balance Magnetic Door Switch - A magnetic switch so designed and
installed that opening the door will initiate an alarm. The switch operates
using a balanced magnetic field in such a manner as to resist defeat with
an external magnet. It signals an alarm when it detects either an increase
or decrease in the magnetic field strength.
4. Break-wire - A wire intended to be used in fabricating screens
and open wiring, and grooved stripping in various configurations necessary
to detect surreptitious and forcible penetrations of movable openings, floors,
walls, ceilings, and skylights.
5. Capacitance Alarm - An alarm in which a protected object is
electrically connected as a capacitance sensor. The approach of an intruder
causes sufficient change in capacitance to upset the balance of the alarm
and initiate a signal. Also called a proximity alarm.
6. Class - A GSA term which designates a category of security file
cabinet.
7. Closed Storage - The storage of Sensitive Compartmented Information
in properly secured GSA approved security containers within an accredited
facility while the facility is unoccupied.
8. Continuous Operation - This condition exists when a facility [line
missing] personnel who have continuous capability of detecting unauthorized
entry into the facility.
9. Fail Safe - A feature of a system or device that sets off an alarm
or trouble signal when the system or device malfunctions or loses power.
10. Federal Supply Schedule - A listing of logistical items prepared
and published by the General Services Administration.
11. Forced Entry - An unauthorized entry into a facility or storage
container in such a manner that evidence of the entry is normally discernible
by guard patrols, or occupants of the area.
12. Guard - A properly trained and equipped individual whose duties
include the protection of a Sensitive Compartmented Information facility.
13. Group 1 - The classification, assigned by GSA, of a lock which
is suitable for security purposes.
14. Group 1R- Same as Group 1 but with the addition of a radiological
protection feature.
15. Heat Detectors - A sensor which responds to either a temperature
above a selected value or a temperature increase which is at a rate of increase
greater than a pre-selected rate.
16. Lacing - A network of fine wires surrounding or covering an area
to be protected, such as a vault, glass panel or door. The network of wires
is concealed by a shield such as paneling in such a manner that an attempt
to break through the shield breaks the wire and initiates an alarm.
17. Open Storage - The storage of Sensitive Compartmented Information
material on shelves, in locked or unlocked containers, but not in GSA approved
security containers, within an accredited facility while such facility is
unoccupied by authorized personnel.
18. Secure Working Area - An accredited facility which is used for
handling, discussing and/or processing Sensitive Compartmented Information,
but where such information is not stored.
19. Sensitive Compartmented Information - All information and materials
bearing special controls indicating restricted handling within present and
future community intelligence collection programs and their end products
for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally
established. The term does not include restricted data as defined in Section
II, Public Law 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
20. Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility - A defined space,
i.e., a room, group of rooms, building, or other installation which has been
accredited in accordance with applicable NSA/CSS directives for the storage,
use, processing, or discussion of Sensitive Compartmented Information.
21. Surreptitious Entry - The unauthorized entry of a facility or
security container in such a manner that evidence of the entry is not discernible
by guard patrols or occupants of the area.
22. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Survey - A physical
and electronic examination of a SCIF to detect, locate and neutralize clandestine
listening devices and/or technical security hazards. Technical security hazards
are insecure conditions which could permit the technical penetration of an
area wherein sensitive information might be compromised.
23. Vibration Alarm - An alarm which responds to vibration of the
surface on which it is mounted. It has a normally closed switch which will
momentarily open when it is subjected to a vibration of sufficiently large
amplitude.
24. Volumetric Alarm - An alarm designed and employed to detect an
unauthorized person in a confined space when the space is normally unoccupied.
Such alarms would include ultrasonic, microwave, and infrared sensors.
1. General - The construction of and the physical protection for a
SCIF must either prevent or detect forced or surreptitious entry of the facility.
Further, a means must exist for the apprehension of any intruder before he
can gain access to classified material. The criteria for the construction
of perimeters is governed by whether the facility is in the United States
or not, and whether it is located at ground level or above/below ground level
according to the following situations: Open Storage, Closed Storage, Continuous
Operation, and Secure Working Area.
2. Common Criteria - Certain criteria, however, are common to every
facility and apply to all locations and situations. These are set forth as
follows:
a. Air Vents and Ducts - All air vents, ducts and similar openings
that breach a facility's perimeter will be protected and equipped as prescribed
below:
(1) All openings with one dimension six inches or less will be sound baffled
where appropriate to meet the requirements of Sound Transmission Class (STC)
45 or better.
(2) All other openings will be protected at the perimeter with the following,
installed in the order listed, progressing inward from the outer face of
the perimeter:
(a) Hardened steel bars one-half inch in diameter, meeting a 600 or 650 Brinell
rating, mounted six inches on center vertically and horizontally and welded
at all the intersections.
(b) An approved alarm device.
(c) Sound baffling where appropriate to meet the requirements of STC 45 or
better.
(3) In addition, all vents and ducts greater than 36 square inches will have
hinged access ports to facilitate the inspection of installed security devices
and to permit examination of the interior of the vent and duct runs for the
presence of unauthorized objects. Whenever possible these access ports should
be within the secure perimeter of the facility. However, if necessity dictates
that the port be outside the facility's perimeter, the following must be
accomplished:
(a) All hinges, hinge pins, and hasps will be secured against unauthorized
removal by, for example, spot welding, peening of mounted bolts, etc.
(b) Access ports will be secured by an approved [line missing].
b. Sound Attenuation - All facilities regardless of location or situation
must meet the specifications for sound attenuation as set forth in paragraph
G below.
c. Alarm Requirements - All facilities except those used for Continuous
Operations or Secure Work Areas as defined in paragraph C above, must meet
the requirements for security alarms as set forth in paragraph H below.
Facilities used for Continuous Operations or Secure Work Areas must meet
the alarm requirements only if there exists the possibility of surreptitious
entry of the facility. That determination will be made by NSA/CSS Industrial
and Field Security, M52.
d. Doors
(1) Normally there will be a singled controlled entrance to a facility. When
safety considerations require more than one door, only one of the doors will
be used as the entrance access control point. The other door(s) will be secondary
exits containing no frontal hardware and secured from the inside with bars
and brackets, sliding dead bolts, or panic hardware.
(2) Door requirements for Vaults and Secure Areas will be as stated in paragraphs
E and F respectively.
(3) Door(s) for all other areas will be metal, metal clad, or solid wooden
(one and three-quarter inch minimum thickness). The entrance access control
door will be equipped with a permanently mounted GSA approved Group 1 combination
lock and have an inside escape mechanism such as the Safemasters Model 50
Lock Extension. The entrance door will also be equipped with either a cypher
lock or a keyed knoblock as the convenience locking device during working
hours. Secondary exit door(s) if required will be of equal construction as
the entrance door containing no frontal hardware and locked as described
in paragraph d.1 above. Door hinges located on the door exterior will require
welding or peening the hinge pins to preclude removal.
3. Facilities in the United States at Ground Level - Facilities at
ground level or with windows, doors, vents, etc., readily accessible from
the ground must meet the construction criteria set forth herein as they apply
to the following situations:
a. Open Storage
(1) The facility must meet the specifications for vaults set forth in paragraph
E below. These requirements can be waived, however, if the facility is located
in a building that has:
(a) continuous personnel access control, and
(b) a 24-hour guard force capable of responding to an alarm within three
minutes or less, and
(c) a reserve guard force available to assist the responding guard in an
emergency.
(2) Windowless facilities meeting the above criteria may be constructed of
typical drywall or similar material. The walls must be installed from floor
to true ceiling solidly and permanently. However, if any part of the perimeter
wall, floor, or ceiling is also part of the building perimeter, such a wall,
floor, or ceiling must be constructed to the specifications for Secure Areas,
set forth in paragraph F below.
b. Closed Storage
(1) SCI must be stored in GSA approved containers having a resistance to
surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that of a Class 6 container.
(2) No special construction of the facility is required so long as floors,
walls, and ceilings are constructed to substantial, permanent material which
provides protection from surreptitious entry and which will offer visual
evidence of surreptitious or forced entry. Walls will be attached to floors
and true ceilings solidly and permanently. Windows readily accessible from
the ground will be protected against forced entry by equipping them with
steel bars or with alarms, or with both, (see paragraphs H and I below).
If the facility is located in a high crime--risk area, or in one that is
subject to civil disorders, steel bars should be used on windows instead
of, or into addition to, the alarms -- depending on the degree of risk in
the area. Visual access will be prevented by any one of the means described
in paragraph F below.
c. Continuous Operations
(1) No alarm or special construction is required other than that to meet
the sound attenuation requirements et forth in paragraph G below. However,
if any part of the perimeter wall, floor, or ceiling of the facility is also
part of the building perimeter, all windows and doors in such part will be
protected against forced entry by the use of bars and alarms as appropriate.
Also the floor, wall, or ceiling in such part of the facility must be constructed
of substantial material that provides protection against forced entry. If
there is a possibility of surreptitious entry, alarms will be used to detect
or prevent it.
(2) And adequate security force must be available to respond to the facility
on a timely basis in an emergency.
(3) Also, in an emergency, all SCI must be stored in containers secured with
GSA approved combination locks. If, however, the bulk or volume of the material
precludes this, then there must be an adequate, tested plan to protect, evacuate,
or destroy the material.
d. Secure Working Areas - The construction of, and the physical security
protection for, a secure working area must provide for the detection of forced
or surreptitious entry of the facility, including those areas above false
ceilings. Perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings may be constructed without
regard to the thickness or type of material so long as they will show evidence
of attempted forced entry and provide sound attenuation of STC 45 or better.
However, if there is a possibility of surreptitious entry, alarms and or
barriers must be used to prevent such entry.
4. Facilities in the United States Above or Completely Below Ground
Level - Facilities above or completely below ground level with no ready
access to exterior openings must meet the construction specifications set
forth herein as they apply to the following situations:
a. Open Storage
(1) The facility must be constructed to Secure Area specifications set forth
in Section 5 below. These requirements, however, may be waived if the facility
is located in a building that has:
(a) continuous personnel access control, and
(b) a 24-hour guard force capable of responding to an alarm within three
minutes or less, and
(c) a reserve guard force available to assist the responding guard in an
emergency.
(2) Facilities meeting the above criteria may be constructed of typical dry
wall or similar material. The walls must be installed from the floor to the
true ceiling, solidly and permanently, and all windows must be secured and
made inoperable.
b. Closed Storage
(1) SCI must be stored in GSA approved containers having a resistance to
surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that of a Class 6 container.
(2) No special construction of the facility is required so long as floors,
walls, and ceilings are constructed to substantial, permanent type materials
which provide protection from surreptitious entry and which will offer visual
evidence of surreptitious or forced entry. Walls will be attached to floors
and true ceilings solidly and permanently.
c. Continuous Operation
(1) No alarm or special construction is required other than to meet sound
attenuation requirements set forth in paragraph G below. If there is the
possibility of surreptitious entry, however, then alarms and/or barriers
must be used to prevent such penetration.
(2) In an emergency, all SCI must be stored in containers secured with GSA
approved combination locks. If, however, the bulk or volume of the material
precludes this, then there must be an adequate, tested plan to protect, evacuate,
or destroy the material.
d. Secure Working Area - The construction of, and the physical security
protection for, a secure working area must provide for the detection of forced
or surreptitious entry of the facility, including those areas above false
ceilings. Perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings may be constructed without
regard to the thickness or type of material so long as they will show evidence
of attempted forced entry and provide sound attenuation of STC 45 or better.
However, if there is a possibility of surreptitious entry, alarms and/or
barriers must be used to prevent such entry.
5. Facilities Outside the United States - The construction criteria
for facilities outside the United States are the same as those for facilities
within the United States except as follows:
a. Open Storage
(1) No waiver will be granted for the vault construction requirement of a
facility approved for open storage, which is located on ground level with
openings readily accessible from the ground.
(2) No waiver will be granted for the secure area construction requirement
of a facility approved for open storage which is located above ground or
completely below ground with exterior openings not readily accessible from
the ground.
(3) Open storage of SCI will be permitted only when the material is of a
size or configuration that precludes its being stored in the largest GSA
approved security container available.
b. Closed Storage
All SCI will be stored in GSA approved security containers having a rating
for both forced and surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that afforded
by Class 5 containers (vice the Class 6 requirement for facilities in the
U.S.). If the material is stored in an approved container having a rating
less than Class 5, then the facility must meet the Secure Area specifications
and alarm requirements set forth in paragraph H, below.
c. Continuous Operations
All SCI must be either located in GSA approved security containers that can
be secured in an emergency, or there must be an adequate, tested plan to
protect, evacuate or destroy such information in an emergency.
d. Secure Working Area
The construction of, and the physical security protection for, a Secure Working
Area must provide for the detection of forced or surreptitious entry of the
facility, including those areas above false ceilings. Perimeter walls, floors,
and ceilings may be constructed without regard to the thickness or type of
material so long as they will show evidence of attempted forced entry and
provide sound attenuation of STC 45 or better. However, if there is a possibility
of surreptitious entry, alarms and/or barriers must be used to prevent such
penetration.
1. Concept - The design, materials, specifications, and the criteria
for the construction of a vault must be such as to make it relatively
impenetrable to forced or surreptitious entry.
2. Minimum Specifications - Use of materials having thickness and
diameters larger than those specified is optional. The phrase "anchored to
or imbedded in the floor or ceiling" applies to the affixing of supporting
members and reinforcing to the true floor or ceiling, or the most solid existing
surface. Subfloors or false ceilings are not to be used for this purpose.
3. Reinforced Concrete Construction - For new construction and for
construction at ground level or below, the walls, floors and ceilings will
be a minimum thickness of eight inches of reinforced concrete. The concrete
mixture will have a minimum compressive strength of at least 3000 p.s.i.
Reinforcing will be accomplished with reinforcing bars a minimum of 5/8 inches
in diameter positioned centrally in the concrete pour and space horizontally
and vertically six inches on center. The bars will be tied together in the
contiguous walls and firmly anchored to and/or imbedded in the floor and
ceiling.
4. Steel Lined Construction - For above ground construction and in
existing structures, construction will be of steel plate a minimum of 1/4
inch thick. The steel plates are to be continuously welded to supporting
steel members of a minimum thickness equal to that of the plate. If the
supporting steel members are being placed in a contiguous floor and ceiling
of reinforced concrete, they must be firmly anchored to and/or imbedded in
the floor and ceiling.
5. Openings
a. A vault will be equipped with an approved vault door of the type presently
listed on the Federal Supply Schedule. The Class 5 door will be used with
reinforced concrete vaults. Where weight or construction is a factor and
a steel lined vault is used, the lighter Class 6 door is recommended.
b. Normally, a vault should have only one entrance. When a vault exceeds
1,000 square feet of floor space or has more than eight occupants, it should
have a minimum of two access points, one of which will be the safety exit.
When more than one entrance is required, each shall be equipped with the
approved door; but only one will be used for normal access. Doors without
exterior hardware will be used as secondary doors.
c. The use of a vault door for controlling daytime access to a facility is
not authorized, as continuous use will create undue wear on the door and
eventually weaken the locking mechanism causing malfunctioning. Therefore,
a vestibule with an access door which meets the sound attenuation requirement
of STC 45 or better should be constructed at the entrance. Such an access
door will meet the specified fire rating required by applicable building
and safety codes.
d. There will be no windows in a vault.
6. Additional Specifications - Vault area will be equipped with one
of the following:
a. An emergency escape which meets applicable building and safety codes.
The escape device will be designed and installed so that it will not be activated
by the exterior locking device nor actuated by drilling or rapping on the
door from the outside.
b. A decal containing procedures to be followed in an emergency and for operating
the escape device will be permanently affixed to the inside of the door.
c. Communications facilities and an alarm system or other signaling device
which will permit a person in the vault area to communicate with someone
on the outside to obtain release.
d. An emergency light.
e. At least one approved fire extinguisher installed near the door.
1. General- The construction of a Secure Area will be such that it
presents a formidable barrier against unauthorized physical penetration.
Whenever practical, Secure Areas will be located within buildings, facilities,
installations, or compounds which are subject to special access restrictions
and controls.
2. Walls
a. The walls will be of either reinforced concrete in excess of four inches
thick or solid masonry (stone or brick) in excess of eight inches thick.
b. Walls not meeting the above criterion will be reinforced on the inside
with steel plate not less than 1/8 inch thick. The plates at every vertical
joint are to be affixed to vertical steel members of a thickness no less
than that of the plate. The vertical members will be firmly anchored to the
floor and ceiling. The plates will be spot welded to the vertical members
by applying a one inch long weld every twelve inches. Meetings of the plates
in the horizontal plane will be continuously welded.
c. Walls of hollow masonry (blocks and tiles) are not considered adequate
and must be reinforced.
3. Floors and Ceilings
a. The floor and ceiling selected for a Secure Area will be at least a four
inch thickness of concrete.
b. Floors and ceilings not meeting this criterion must be reinforced with
steel plate 1/8 inch thick. Floor and ceiling reinforcement must be securely
affixed to the walls with steel angles welded or bolted into place.
4. Entrances
a. A Secure Area will be equipped with a GSA Class 6 vault door.
b. Normally, a Secure Area should have only one entrance. When a Secure Area
exceeds 1,000 square feet of floor space or has more than eight occupants,
it should have a minimum of two access points one of which will be the safety
exit. When more than one entrance/exit is required, each must be equipped
with the approved door; but only one door will be used for normal access.
Doors without exterior hardware will be used as secondary doors.
c. The use of a vault door for controlling daytime access to a facility is
not authorized, as this continued use will create undue wear on the door
and eventually weaken the locking mechanism causing malfunction. Therefore
a vestibule should be constructed at the entrance with an access door which
meets the sound attenuation requirement of STC 45 or better. Where applicable
building and safety codes require that the entrance meet a specified fire
rating, the access door must be of that rating.
5. Windows
a. It is preferable that Secure Area be windowless. However, where windows
do exist, they must be secured to prevent their being used for the removal
of classified material, unauthorized entry, visual access from the outside,
and eavesdropping.
b. Accessible windows, where required, will be secured with bars, installed
as specified in Section 9 below.
c. When visual access is a factor, the windows will be translucent or made
opaque by appropriate means such as the application of paint to both sides
of the glass or by sealing off with sheet metal, masonite, or hardboard.
Devices to include window shades, venetian blinds or drapes may be used to
restrict visual access through the window, depending on the nature of the
activities being protected, relative location of the windows, and environmental
factors.
d. If adequate air conditioning is available, windows will be sealed closed
permanently. Movable windows must be closed and securely fastened when the
area is not occupied by authorized persons.
1. General - This section provides acoustic isolation criteria (voice
range only) for SCIF construction.
2. Sound Transmission Classes - The term "Sound Transmission Class"
(STC), is used in the discussion of architectural acoustics to describe the
transmission attenuation afforded by various wall materials and other building
components. The following STC's satisfy the normal security requirements
of facilities used for SCI activities:
a. STC of 30 or better: loud speech can be understood fairly well; normal
speech cannot be easily understood.
b. STC of 40 or better: loud speech can be heard, but is hardly intelligible;
normal speech can be heard only faintly, if at all.
c. STC of 45 or better: loud speech can be faintly heard but not understood;
normal speech is inaudible.
d. STC of 50 or better: very loud sounds, such as singing, brass musical
instruments, or a radio at full volume, can be heard only faintly or not
at all.
3. Application - The above STC's are used in the listing that follows
to simplify the application of acoustic requirements of secure facilities
for various functions:
| a. |
|
Building Areas and Functions |
|
STC |
|
|
Office Space |
|
|
|
|
Executive Suite
|
|
45+ |
|
|
Private Offices
|
|
40+ |
|
|
Open Workspace
|
|
45+ |
|
|
"Lab"
|
|
40+ |
|
|
Conference Rooms |
|
|
|
|
Briefing or Conference Rooms
|
|
45+ |
|
|
Training.Plans Room
|
|
45+ |
|
|
Conference Rooms with movable partition
(including the partition)
|
|
45+ |
|
|
Auditoriums |
|
|
|
|
Auditoriums with sound reinforcement
(no speakers on the wall)
|
|
50+ |
|
|
Auditoriums without sound reinforcement
|
|
45+ |
|
|
Projection Rooms |
|
45+ |
4. Testing Procedures
a. Procedures for measuring the sound attenuation levels of a completed structure
can be found in, "Tentative Recommended Practices for Measurement of Airborne
Sound Insulation in Buildings," Publication No. E-336-67T, American Society
of Testing and Materials.
b. Another acceptable procedure is found in the DCI Security Committee
memorandum, "Sound Attenuation Test for Secure Conference Rooms," dated 7
Feb 78.
1. Purpose - This section establishes standards for security alarm
systems and provides guidelines for the selection and purchase of security
alarm system components for SCIFs.
2. General - The requirement for a security alarm system is dependent
upon a number of variables. The physical location of the facility, number
and type of guards, hours of operation, type of construction, and the degree
of threat, must all be considered in determining the extent of application
of alarms to a facility.
3. Concept - Whenever doors, and windows, or other openings into an
area where SCI is processed or stored are not under the direct and constant
control of authorized occupants, and are susceptible to forced or surreptitious
entry without prompt detection, a protective alarm system must be provided.
4. Security Alarm Components Criteria - A security alarm system or
alarm component which is to be used to protect SCI materials must have been
tested against, and passed, the revised Interim Federal Specification W-A-00450A
(GSA-F88), dated 16 February 1963, as subsequently amended.
5. Security Alarm Requirements
a. When determined that a facility will be protected by alarms the
following will be required:
(1) All perimeter doors will be equipped with high security balanced magnetic
door switches.
(2) Vault doors will be equipped with heat detectors and balanced magnetic
switches.
(3) The interior of all spaces not continually occupied by authorized personnel
will be protected by motion detection alarms.
(4) Areas above false ceilings will be alarmed in facilities which have been
approved for open storage of SCI. Areas above false ceilings in other facilities
will be alarmed in there is a possibility of surreptitious entry into the
area above the false ceiling.
(5) All vents and ducts which penetrate a facility's perimeter, and other
openings with both dimensions over six inches will be alarmed.
(6) Windows less than 18 feet from ground level, or otherwise accessible
from the roof, trees, or by other convenient methods, will be alarmed to
prevent entry without detection.
b. Exemptions - Mobile facilities, including those located on aircraft,
in vans and other type vehicles are exempt from the provisions of this section.
SCI is not permitted unattended in these facilities, unless appropriate security
safeguards are employed and prior approval has been granted by NSA Industrial
Security.
6. Annunciator Panel Supervision and Alarm Response Time Criteria
a. Personnel must be available at the alarm panel to monitor the panel
and either respond to an alarm from the protected facility or have the capability
of directing a response at any given time. Personnel used for panel duty
may not be used for additional duties that would require them to leave the
annunciator panel unattended.
b. A log shall be maintained by personnel supervising the communicator
panel which will reflect the status of the alarm system of the protected
facility at all times. The log shall record the time of each opening and
securing the area. In addition, each alarm annunciation shall [several
words missing] to be physically present at the protected facility once
the alarm has been sounded at the annunciator panel. Maximum acceptable response
times for personnel responding to an alarm at the protected facility are
as follows:
(1) Open storage: Not more than three minutes.
(2) Closed storage: Not more than five minutes.
(3) Secure Working Area: Not more than five minutes.
7. Alarm Transmission Line Supervision Criteria
a. When alarm transmission lines do not leave the perimeter of the
protected facility, electronic line supervision is not required.
b. When alarm transmission lines do not leave the perimeter of the
building housing the protected facility, transmission lines may be either
routed in electric metal tubing (EMT, joints epoxy sealed) and equipped with
a standard electronic line supervision system or, as an alternative, the
transmission lines may be protected by a Class A or Class AB high security
electronic line supervision system not in tubing.
c. Transmission lines routed in an environment not covered above must
be protected with either a Class A or Class AB high security electronic line
supervision system or routed in continuously welded or epoxy sealed threaded
steel conduit (not EMT).
8. Alarm System Installation Criteria - The following criteria are
applicable to the installation of all alarm systems:
a. All alarm control units, day/night switches, and the protected
area end of line supervision controls must be physically located within the
secured perimeter of the area which the alarms are protecting and equipped
with tamper switches.
b. A minimum of four hours standby power is required on all systems,
except when a system is connected to a local uninterrupted emergency power
source.
c. Alarm equipment that is installed on perimeter walls, ceilings,
vents/ducts, windows, emergency doors, etc., should remain in the "on" or
"secure" mode at all times, even when the area is occupied.
d. If all intrusion detection alarm equipment is installed on the
same system (a single transmission line pair), it will be wired so that only
the entrance door and interior alarm equipment (i.e., motion detection) is
shunted out of the system when the access/secure (on/off) switch is placed
in the "off" or "access" mode. Tamper switches must remain active at all
times.
9. Testing and Maintenance of Alarm Systems
a. All alarm systems must be adjusted and maintained at the highest
attainable sensitivity and/or tolerance that will provide optimum performance
and reliability without false or nuisance alarms. Optimum performance will
be determined from the manufacturer's stated specifications and by testing
the equipment upon installation and at least monthly thereafter. A record
of the monthly test will be maintained and will reflect the date of test
and any action taken in the event of malfunctions. Sample test procedures
are as follows:
(1) Motion Detection - Overt body motion walking through the protected
areas at the rate of one step per second for four seconds, in areas protected
by ultrasonic, microwave, and other motion detection devices.
(2) Door Switches - Actual opening of doors (or windows or other openings
using door switches) which are protected by balanced magnetic door switches.
(3) Capacitance Alarm - Attempts to push hands, arm, or legs through
the protected area (air ducts or vents); to touch an item being protected
(door, window, wall, etc.); or to move protected objects (security containers).
(4) Tamper Switches - Removal of the covers for sensors, alarm control
units, day/night switches, and end of the line supervision control units
should cause an alarm regardless of the status of the overall system. Covers
will be removed and tested individually.
(5) Vibration Detection - Hammering with a one-pound hammer or weight
on walls, floors, or ceilings protected by vibration detection equipment.
Preferably this should be done midway between detectors. Damage to surface
finished with wallboard, plaster, wood paneling, etc., (which are considered
fragile surfaces) may be avoided by placing a piece of heave scrap wood,
about two feet long, against the point where the blows are struck. Three
to six blows should cause an alarm.
(6) Other - Alarm system consisting of lacing or break-wire sensors
will be tested only by qualified alarm technicians with appropriate electronic
equipment. Alarm equipment which is used and test daily (i.e., door switches,
motion detection, etc.) needs no monthly testing.
b. In addition to the above, periodic unannounced openings of a facility
should be performed to test alarm response time and the ability of the guard
to implement alerting procedures associated with the alarm annunciations
during security hours. The tests should be conducted in the spirit of assisting
the guards in bettering their performance, thus increasing the security provided
the facility, but should not be so frequent as to be considered a nuisance
to guard personnel. Testing will be coordinated with the guard supervisor
who monitors the alarm systems.
1. Purpose - This section provides specifications for the installation
of steel bars on windows of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.
2. Types of Installation - The three techniques approved for the
installation of steel bars on facility windows are as follows:
a. Type A Installation - Requires a steel frame with steel bars welded
on it to be bolted to the inside of the facility window frame. Figure 1 gives
detailed specifications for this type of installation.
TYPE A
a. Steel Frame - Minimum of 3/8" thick by 3" wide.
b. Steel Bars - Minimum of 1/2" in diameter and placed not more than
6" apart vertically.
c. Horizontal Steel Supports - Minimum of 1/4" thick by 1 1/2" wide
and placed not more than 18" apart. The horizontal supports are to be drilled
so that the vertical bars can be passed through them and be spot welded in
place prior to installation.
d. All joinings of frame, bars, supports, at top, bottom and sides must be
welding.
e. Frame must be held in the masonry opening by using expanding masonry anchors
and steel screws that are not less than 3/8" in diameter by 3" long, with
screw heads welded to the frame.
f. Screws and expanding anchors are to be located in the center of the frame
width and placed every 12" around the entire frame; top, sides and bottom.
(Figure 1)
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b. Type B Installation - Requires imbedding the ends of steel bars
in the masonry window frame of the facility. Figure 2 gives detailed
specifications for this type of installation.
TYPE B
a. Steel Bars - Minimum of 1/2" diameter and placed not more than
5" apart vertically.
b. Horizontal Steel Supports - Minimum of 1/4" thick by 1 1/2" wide
and vertical nor more than 18" apart. The horizontal supports are to be drilled
so that vertical bars can be passed through them and be spot welded in place
prior to installation.
c. The ends of each vertical bar will be imbedded in the masonry a minimum
depth of 3".
d. The entire bar work will be located back in the masonry opening at least
4".
(Figure 2)
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c. Type C Installation - Requires a grillwork of steel bars to be
imbedded in the masonry walls immediately adjacent to the facility window
frame. Figure 3 gives detailed specifications for this type of installation.
TYPE C
a. One-half inch diameter steel bars are used to form a grillwork that is
to be imbedded into the masonry wall around the window opening. Vertically
the bars must be no more than 6" apart; horizontally, nor more than 18" apart.
Horizontally the bars must be welded to each vertical bar. The point where
the bar ends, both vertically and horizontally, and enters the masonry must
be a minimum of 4" from the edge of the opening. The angled bar ends extend
into the masonry a minimum of 4" with the bent end being a minimum of 3".
(Figure 3)
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To prevent telephone lines and telephone instruments that service a SCIF
from being used as clandestine listening devices, the following controls
will be required:
1. All incoming telephone cables and wires which penetrate a facility's
perimeter will enter the facility through one opening and be placed under
control at the interior face of the perimeter by the following:
a. All active incoming lines will be accounted for by the number of
pairs in use, by telephone and extension number, and the number of excess/unused
pairs in existence. The accounting will be updated whenever the status of
a pair of wires is changed.
b. All excess/unused incoming wires will be either removed or disconnected
and grounded in a manner which prevents their unauthorized use.
2. The number of telephone instruments servicing a SCIF will be limited
to those operationally necessary. All telephone instruments will be equipped
with a nonresonating ringer, a positive disconnect either automatic or manual
plug and jack, and, in certain installations a line filter. Specially designed,
for U.S. Government use, telephone instruments and associated security devices
are available from telephone companies in the Bell system. When planning
the telephone system for a SCIF, advance consultation with NSA/CSS, Industrial
Field Security, M52 is encouraged to obtain advice regarding recommended
telephone instruments, associated security devices, installation design,
and the required "certification of need" to obtain specially designed instruments
and devices.
Normally the installation of intercommunications equipment within a SCIF
is not authorized. If in the judgment of the contractor an overriding operational
requirement for intercommunications equipment exists, a request for approval
shall be submitted to NSA/CSS, Industrial Field Security, M52. In the event
the contractor's request is approved, guidance will be provided to the contractor
concerning the acceptable equipment, method of installation, and testing
requirements.
Classified information shall not be processed by electrical, electronic,
or electromechanical means until appropriate measures have been taken to
assess the risk of compromising emanations and precautions implemented as
appropriate. Contractors having a requirement to process classified information
by such means shall identify to NSA/CSS, Industrial Field Security, M52 the
requirement, the classification level of the information involved, the equipment
to be used, and a description of the physical environment where processing
will occur. Upon receipt of this information a determination will be made
as to the potential risk of compromising emanations and what protective measures
are to be taken.
In establishing physical security protection for a SCIF, sound attenuation
aspects, as well as the possibility of technical penetration must be considered.
Countermeasures can be effected by installation of proper equipment and suitable
construction, and enhanced by restrictions on classified conversation where
required. Privately-owned photographic equipment, radios, television sets
and tape recorders will not be permitted within the SCIF. Government or
contractor-owned mission essential electronic equipment may be permitted
within the SCIF; however, this electronic equipment must be subjected to
technical tests for clandestine surveillance devices and technical security
hazards. If these equipments are used to process SCI, the shall meet national
standards for TEMPEST.
1. NSA/CSS, Industrial Field Security, M52 will arrange for a Technical
Surveillance Countermeasure (TSCM) Survey to be conducted of contractor SCIFs
as follows:
a. As soon as possible after security control has ben established
and prior to commencement of SCI activities.
b. As soon as possible after major remodeling or expansion of an existing
facility, or a lapse in normal physical security protection.
c. On a recurring periodic basis as determined by NSA/CSS, Industrial
Security, M52.
2. The contractor will closely monitor the progress of any new
construction, remodeling, or expansion of SCIFs to permit as much advance
notification as possible to NSA/CSS, Industrial and Field Security, M52 as
to the completion date for the purpose of scheduling the TSCM Survey.
3. The contractor will ensure that there is no discussion within the
affected facility concerning pending or ongoing TSCM Survey. The knowledge
of a pending or ongoing TSCM Survey is classified and will only be disseminated
to those with proper clearance and need-to-know.
The contractor shall establish appropriate procedural security control measures
as follows:
1. Access to the SCIF shall be limited to:
a. Contractor personnel who possess appropriate SCI access
authorization(s) and have been specifically authorized access by NSA/CSS,
Clearance, M55 to the NSA/CSS contract(s) performed within. An access list
of such personnel shall be maintained in a current status and posted immediately
inside the entrance of the SCIF.
b. Official visitors who have been certified by NSA/CSS in writing
as possessing the appropriate SCI access authorization(s) and authorized
access to the contract(s) involved. A visitor register will be maintained
to record visits by name of visitor, employer, citizenship, clearance, date
and time of visit, purpose of visit and person(s) visited.
2. Essential access to the SCIF by custodial, maintenance, or other
uncleared persons shall be strictly controlled. Such person will be closely
escorted within the SCIF by individuals who possess the appropriate access
authorization(s). Prior to admittance of uncleared people, all occupants
of the SCIF will be specifically advised of the presence of uncleared persons
and all classified activities are to be suspended and classified material
stored during the period uncleared persons are present.
3. The SCIF shall be fully secure (all classified material properly
stored and perimeter door(s) locked and alarmed) during all periods whenever
the area is not occupied by authorized personnel.
4. SCIF entrance door locking devices will be as specified in paragraph
D.2.d., above. Access to the combination of the built-in combination security
lock will be limited to the minimum number of individuals required to open
the area. Access to the combination of the convenience cypher lock or keys
to the knoblock will be limited to individuals assigned to the area. All
combinations will be changed every six months or whenever someone who had
access no longer requires access or whenever it is suspected the combination
has been compromised. The lock cylinder will be rekeyed whenever a key has
been lost.
5. Where feasible, areas adjacent to the SCIF shall be kept clear
of obstructions to facilitate visual inspection of the exterior surfaces
of the SCIF.
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