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23 December 1998
Source: Hardcopy from National Technical
Information Service, 16 pp.
NTIS ADA341955
Defense Science Board
Task Force
on
SATELLITE
RECONNAISSANCE
January 1998
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington D. C. 20301-3140
DISTRIBUTION A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a
Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the
Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations
in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the
Department of Defense.
This volume is UNCLASSIFIED.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140
3 Feb 98
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGY)
SUBJECT: Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force Report on Satellite
Reconnaissance.
I am pleased to forward the final report of the DSB study on Satellite
Reconnaissance. The Chairman, Dr. Robert Hermann, and the Vice-Chairman,
Gen Larry Welch, USAF (Ret), established their team and reviewed both the
Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) and the Surveillance and Targeting Light
Satellite (Starlite) System. Their review included the operational, technical,
industrial, and financial aspects of these NRO and DARPA initiatives.
The Task Force arrived at five major recommended actions for the Department.
As they constructed these recommended actions, they also accounted for the
different points of view between those involved. Their major conclusions
are:
- The FIA must proceed on schedule to provide next generation systems and
FIA program decisions should be decoupled from Starlite program decisions.
- The objectives of Starlite are an appropriate basis for investment.
- The FIA should accommodate some of the Starlite attributes.
- The DoD should create a Military Space Radar Surveillance Program.
- The future roles and relationships of defense organizations need to evolve
to support future military operations.
I support these findings and recommend you forward the report for appropriate
action and distribution.
[Signature]
Craig I. Fields
Chairman
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140
January 20, 1998
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Report on Space Surveillance
The attached Report on Space Surveillance is forwarded in response to the
tasking Terms of Reference dated 23 September 1997. The study was requested
by Directors of DARPA and NRO to review the operational, technical, industrial
and financial aspects of NRO's Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) effort and
DARPA's proposal to demonstrate a space radar surveillance system (Starlite).
The report makes several recommendations:
- FIA must proceed on schedule with next generation systems and FIA program
decisions should be decoupled from Starlite program decisions. FIA comes
from a mature process that must provide a high confidence path to providing
for identified needs of the Nation and the Department. Starlite is a much
more speculative proposal involving questions of technical risk, product
value and cost. It should be judged on its own merit as an advanced technology
program.
- The objectives of Starlite are an appropriate basis for investment. Future
military operations will need the combination of day, night and all-weather
access, the rapid revisit of imagery and broad-area, moving-target surveillance
represented by this proposal. Achieving these objectives is best achieved
through the proliferation of low-orbit satellites that must and can be greatly
reduced in cost from past practices.
- The FIA should accommodate some of the attributes emphasized in the Starlite
proposal including increased application of MTI and reduced revisit times,
reduced classification of systems and product information and increased attention
to integrating FIA systems with military operations.
- The Department of Defense should undertake a program to create a Military
Space Radar Surveillance Program targeted to achieve broad-area, all-weather
and near continuous radar access for integration with military operations.
- The future roles and relationships of defense organizations need to evolve
for these missions. The treatment of roles and missions is of particular
interest because the report recommendations require some evolution of
relationships among the NRO, Military Departments and Joint Military
Organizations.
[Signature]
Dr. Robert J. Hermann
Task Force Chairman
CONTENTS
Introduction
Task Force Assessment
Appendix A (Terms of Reference)
Appendix B (Membership)
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT
ON
SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is in the process of creating a
Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) as a basis for acquiring the next generation
of imaging satellite systems and their associated ground control and processing.
At the same time, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is advocating
demonstrating a space radar surveillance system (Starlite) incorporating
advanced and higher risk technologies with cost and performance attributes
that could have future application to the FIA. The Directors of DARPA and
NRO have asked that a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force be established
to review the operational, technical, industrial and financial aspects of
each of these initiatives and recommend a course of action for the Department.
The Task Force membership is shown in Appendix B. It includes six members
that also served on the Small Satellite Group convened by the Director of
Central Intelligence in 1996 to review FIA approaches and alternatives.
The Task Force received a series of briefings from DARPA, NRO, National Imagery
and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Air Force, and the Joint Staff. These briefings
addressed plans for both sets of systems, the state of requirements definition,
and the status of the existing inventory. The issues raised involve resource
decisions, military operational concept choices and matters of roles and
missions of the Military Departments and several agencies.
How the Players See the Issues
While the following viewpoints were not explicitly presented to the Task
Force, we believe they reasonably represent important viewpoints and also
define the fundamental issues that need resolution.
An NRO Point of View
The NRO is developing, acquiring and operating Satellite Reconnaissance Systems
that respond to the needs expressed by the DCI, the Secretary of Defense,
the National customer, and the warfighter customer. The NRO is supporting
the research and development necessary to achieve that objective. These systems
are critical to the security of the U.S. Hundreds of decision makers and
thousands of analysts depend on their product. The current inventory of imaging
satellites has a finite life and the next generation is needed to assure
the continued availability of essential products. The NRO has conducted extensive
trade-off studies to define the architecture of the next generation system,
its system attributes and the process by which it will be acquired. An elaborate
process is in use for the government to define requirements to be satisfied
by the new set of systems. This process has matured to the point of an approved
draft statement of requirements. The acquisition process is well on its way
to definition. The NRO believes the result is an objective architecture as
modem and enlightened as the Department of Defense has ever undertaken.
The NRO is in the middle of a demanding task, already strained in resources
and schedule and the proposal by DARPA to design and build a radar satellite
system could be seen as troublesome in several aspects:
- The proposal could be perceived as competing with a segment of the FIA
without any reference to the requirements rigor associated with the FIA program
or a defined relationship with the rest of the FIA system. Further, the Starlite
approach is higher risk than NRO considers prudent given the need for continuity
in providing needed reconnaissance products. The Director of DARPA has stated
clearly it is not in competition since Starlite is on a riskier and longer
term path.
- This perception of competition is complicated by a potential future conflict
between the role of the NRO and Air Force plans for future migration of key
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities from aircraft to spacecraft.
The image of satellite based JSTARS and AWACS are projected as examples.
The Starlite program has been presented as a candidate approach to meeting
some future mission needs with emphasis on an "operational" vice "intelligence"
role. With this formulation, it is likely that the Air Force would expect
to be the follow on procurement agency after a successful demonstration.
- Starlite appears to need several hundred million for a two satellite
demonstration. The NRO fears that they might be the bill payer although they
are already short of the amount they think will be required to put FIA in
place on the required schedule.
A DARPA Point of View
DARPA has a responsibility to introduce advanced technologies, techniques
and concepts into the Department's process for creating armed forces. It
has done so for decades with notable successes to their credit. Up to now,
there has been little or no DARPA involvement in the satellite reconnaissance
business since NRO has been regarded as the cradle-to-grave custodian of
that segment of the Department's business to include pushing the kind of
innovation that has characterized DARPA's contributions to other force
capabilities. DARPA sees, that as NRO has matured and become more focused
on evolutionary improvements to satisfy their customers, there is a need
for the DARPA approach to help introduce more revolutionary (and higher risk)
technologies and concepts. The technologies incorporated in the Starlite
program makes it high risk and an on-orbit demonstration of the capabilities
is part of the necessary risk reduction. In particular, Starlite has the
potential to demonstrate several important attributes:
- The operational value of nearly continuous access. Precision weapons require
precision sensors to support their potential leverage. The availability of
nearly continuous, precise and rapidly reported target information would
provide for a major advance in military operations and support the U.S.
objectives of information and battlefield dominance.
- Reduced cost of ownership. By exploiting emerging technologies and the
industrial process in place or being created, DARPA believes it can design
and demonstrate system capabilities to provide nearly continuous access at
an affordable cost.
- Easier access by combat units. DARPA believes that by using direct downlink
access to combat units without security classification constraints, a potential
revolution in capability can be achieved.
- Enabling International cooperation. The unclassified, operational attributes
of a systems such as Starlite would be a useful vehicle for engaging Allies
in cooperating in satellite reconnaissance. Depending upon one's view of
this prospect, it could provide both resource and political leverage for
the United States.
Part of DARPA's responsibility is to put forward new technologies and concepts
where they see high value added potential. Starlite is representative of
the revolutionary programs that DARPA has moved forward in the past with
great success and the potential of this approach should not be bureaucratically
constrained.
An Air Force Point of View
The Air Force has recently made a corporate judgment that important surveillance
and reconnaissance functions which it now addressees in its Title X
responsibilities to organize, equip and train Air Forces should be migrated
to spacecraft. The family of current and planned aircraft systems that address
these needs have significant limitations that can be addressed by migrating
some of these capabilities to satellite systems.
The Air Force believes that as these missions are migrated to spacecraft
they will be responsible for acquisition and operation of these systems.
While it recognizes that the satellite as a military sensor evolved from
use in intelligence activities, the maturity of the technologies and the
evolution of precision, remotely operated weaponry dictates that space sensors
now become fully integrated into the operational military systems and culture.
Starlite promises significant characteristics of what the Air Force considers
to be needed in an operational system. It provides near continuous access,
direct and timely reporting for the purposes of supporting targeting, and
freedom from burdensome intelligence community security classifications and
handling procedures. It can be very much like a JSTARS in operational concept
without the range and shadowing problems and without the operational and
logistics footprint of a multi-aircraft system.
There is merit in each of the three view points described. The following
presents the Task Force perspective and set of recommended actions that we
believe accounts for the merit in each of the preceding viewpoints and that
can help avoid the expense and bureaucratic acrimony that might result if
they are not treated carefully.
The major conclusions of the Task Force are:
1. FIA Must Proceed on Schedule With Next Generation Systems.
The FIA program and the process that produced it will provide improved
capabilities while balancing cost, risk and performance for achieving the
next generation of space systems. Its development is integrated into the
Department of Defense decision process and the transparency of its creation
is as complete as ever achieved for an NRO system. Its schedule is already
strained and should not be subjected to the substantially increased risks
associated with the Starlite system.
FIA program decisions should be decoupled from Starlite program decisions.
FIA comes from a mature process that must provide a high confidence path
to providing for identified needs of the Nation and the Department. Starlite
is a much more speculative proposal involving questions of technical risk,
product value and cost. It should be judged on its own merit as an advanced
technology program. It is higher risk than is appropriate for the next generation
systems that will make up FIA and is not competitive with the next generation
FIA.
2. The Starlite System Objectives Are Important For Military Operations.
The Task Force believes the objectives of Starlite are an appropriate basis
for substantial investment. We believe that future military operations will
need the combination of day, night and all-weather access, the rapid revisit
of imagery and broad-area, moving-target surveillance represented by this
proposal.
We agree that achieving these objectives is best achieved through the
proliferation of low-orbit satellites. We also agree that, of necessity,
they must and can be greatly reduced in cost from past practices. Finally,
we agree that major effort and design is needed to integrate these space
systems into military force structures, weapons systems and on-going military
operations.
3. FIA Should Be Open to Some Starlite Attributes.
The FIA should accommodate some of the attributes emphasized in the Starlite
proposal. In particular;
- Increased consideration should be given to achieving Moving Target Indicator
(MTI) and rapid revisit image coverage on an evolutionary schedule.
- The fact of FIA systems should be unclassified and their essential operating
characteristics should be held no higher than SECRET. There may become aspects
of each program that should be more closely held but that is achievable without
incurring the hindrance to operations imposed by the strong propensity for
excessive classification. The data output from FIA should be at SECRET
classification or lower consistent with policy makers' and users' needs to
protect knowledge of what is being imaged.
- NIMA, NRO, The Military Departments and the Joint Staff should focus particular
attention on integrating PIA systems with military operations. It is our
judgment that a formal program that addresses operational concepts, system
architecture modifications, and the application of new technologies should
be organized. An important aspect of such a program will need to be education,
training and exercise participation.
4. A Modified Starlite Program Should be Initiated.
The Task Force recommends that the Department of Defense undertake a program
to create a Military Space Radar Surveillance Program targeted to achieve
broad-area, all-weather and near continuous radar access for integration
with military operations. We recommend that this program proceed with the
following considerations:
- The program should be designed to bring leading edge, higher risk, technologies
to provide needed capabilities (sensing, processing, distribution) to meet
warfighters' needs at lower cost. Accordingly, a technical risk reduction
program should be planned and executed. The program should make appropriate
use of existing and planned space systems, airborne systems and laboratory
investigation. An on-orbit demonstration system is likely to be needed to
complete the risk reduction program but, there are significant risk reduction
efforts that need to precede the on-orbit system so that the system definition
is more mature and can lead more directly to an operational prototype.
- The primary purpose of this system would be to support on-going military
operations and its design must emphasize integration with combat force systems.
The Task Force believes this argues for an eventual acquisition, organization
and training role for the Air Force under its normal Title X responsibilities.
Likewise, DARPA should be expected to play its normal role as a source of
innovation in military system capabilities. The NRO will need to participate
during this transition phase because of its historical role, its access to
space reconnaissance systems competence and the operational interaction between
NRO systems application and this new military system.
5. The Future Roles and Relationships of Defense Organizations Need to
Evolve for These Missions.
The Task Force believes that much of the intensity of differences involved
in this issue can be traced to the structural deficiencies in the assignment
and execution of roles and missions in this increasingly important area of
intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance in support of military operations.
We believe that adjustments must be made to avoid continuing and debilitating
struggles for turf for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the Task Force
offers the following recommendations:
- The NRO should continue as the acquiring and operating organization for
satellite sensor systems that are acquired primarily for intelligence and
strategic reconnaissance purposes. These systems will naturally migrate to
increasing attributes of real-time and precision and will have very important
capabilities for supporting military operations. These capabilities should
be exploited fully in support of military operations as priorities demand.
This calls for increasingly close cooperation between the NRO and the Military
Departments in serving the Warfighter's needs as these systems evolve.
- The Military Departments should transition to an increased role in space
sensor systems that are acquired primarily for the purpose of support to
on-going military operations and there is a premium for integration with
other weapon systems and military force operations. We believe the Air Force
is the logical Department to accept Title X responsibility for the Military
Space Radar Surveillance Program after DARPA has brought the technologies
to an acceptable level of risk. These systems will inevitably have attributes
that will be very important to the intelligence agencies of the Nation. These
systems should also be exploited to serve intelligence needs. Close cooperation
between the Military Departments and the NRO is needed to ensure the highest
return from development efforts and operational employment.
- The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence will
need to give special attention to preventing unnecessary redundancy and
exploiting the complementary value of the systems created in response to
these differing motivations.
- DARPA should continue to press innovation, and advanced technologies,
techniques and concepts into the Department's process for creating armed
forces in this area as it has done for decades in many other areas with notable
success. The objectives outlined for Starlite are worthy of their attention
and investment; The Task Force believes it would be appropriate for DARPA
to take the lead responsibility for the risk reduction phase of the Military
Space Radar System Program. We also believe that DARPA has much to offer
in the processing and exploitation segment of these mission areas.
- NIMA must increase its ability to assure effective integration of operational
and intelligence oriented space and airborne imagery systems. Since
all of these systems will have some similar characteristics and will be capable
of multiple applications, there is increased danger of real and apparent
overlap and duplication of resources as well as unwarranted restriction of
use. It is imperative that NIMA perform its role of rationalizing needs,
creating systems and procedures for processing and exploitation, and insuring
their proper application to multiple purposes.
- The Joint Staff should continue to develop its system decision process
for these mission areas. The Task Force was impressed with the progress reported
by J8 in developing a decision for surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities
that engaged the system developers, Services, and CINC staffs. The success
achieved with the Space Based Infrared (SBIR) System decision and the progress
projected for FIA using the Senior Warfighters Forum is impressive. In our
view, forcing the operational users and the system advocates into the same
venue where resource constraints and military value can be evaluated together
is a superior way to make the necessary trades for the Nation.
THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010
SEP 23 1997
ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Terms of Reference - Defense Science Board Task Force on Satellite
Reconnaissance.
You are requested to establish a Defense Science Board Study Task Force on
satellite reconnaissance. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is creating
a Future Imagery Architecture as a basis for acquiring the next generation
of imaging satellite systems and their associated ground control and processing.
In parallel, DARPA is advocating the development and demonstration of a
Surveillance and Targeting Light Satellite (Starlite) System with attributes
that may not be included in NRO's architecture. The Directors of DARPA and
NRO have asked that a Defense Science Board Task Force be established to
review the operational, technical, industrial, and financial aspects of each
of these initiatives and recommend a course of action for the Department.
The Task Force will be sponsored by USD(A&T). Director, DARPA and Director,
NRO will provide funding and other support as may be necessary. Dr. Robert
J. Hermann will be the Task Force Chairman and General Larry D. Welch, USAF
(Ret) will be the Task Force Vice-Chairman. Captain David E. Swanson, from
the NRO will be the Task Force Executive Secretary. Maj. Wynne Waldron, will
be the Defense Science Board Secretariat Representative. A final briefing
report is requested by 1 January 1998.
The Task Force will be operated in accordance with the provisions of P.L.
92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the
"DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated
that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within
the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any
member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.
[Signature]
R. Noel Longuemare
Acting Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology)
[Page on membership not provided]
Executive Secretary
Capt David Swanson, USAF
DSB Executive Secretary
Maj Wynne Waldron, USAF
OUSD(A&T)/DSB
* DSB Member
# Approved Consultant
@ Not Yet Approved DSB Consultant
[Signature]
USD(A&T) Approved
Date: 9/8/97
[Signature]
Chief of Staff for SecDef
Date: 9-22-97
[End]
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