17 July 2003
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Media Note
Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC
July 16, 2003
The Department of State Announces the Release of “Foreign Relations,
1964-1968, volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January
1969”
The major foreign policy decisions and problems relating to Vietnam faced by President Lyndon Johnson and his key foreign policy advisers during the last 4 ½ months of his administration are the main issues covered in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969, released by the Department of State on July 16, 2003. The volume is part of the Department’s ongoing program to make available the official documentary record of American foreign policy in the Foreign Relations series. Volume VII completes the coverage of the Johnson administration’s policies on the war; previous documentation on the 1964–August 1968 period was published in volumes I–VI in the 1964–1968 subseries.
The documents highlight the Johnson administration's slow and agonizing internal deliberations over how to arrange formal four-party peace negotiations on Vietnam at Paris. A good part of this search for peace was carried out during the 1968 Presidential election amid suspicions by the Democratic and Republican candidates, and President Lyndon Johnson himself, that the respective Presidential candidates were using the peace process to influence the election. In addition, both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) had their own demands regarding the procedures and modalities of the formal peace process, all of which had to be reconciled. This volume is the account of how the Johnson administration achieved the opening of formal, four-party peace talks at Paris.
President Johnson and his principal foreign policy advisers, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Assistant to the President Rostow, and other official and unofficial advisers became almost exclusively concerned with the goal of starting the formal peace negotiations at Paris. The administration was split between hard liners, including the President himself, and so-called doves. The hard liners refused to stop U.S. bombing of North Vietnam without a promise from Hanoi that it would withdraw from the Demilitarized Zone, cease its attacks on South Vietnamese cities, and accept South Vietnamese representatives at the peace table. The doves, Secretary of Defense Clifford and Chief Paris negotiator Averell Harriman, favored stopping the bombing in the hope of moving the peace process forward.
A main theme of the volume is how the doves eventually convinced the President that North Vietnam, under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union, would agree to his demands.
A second major theme of the volume is the interaction between the peace negotiations and the Presidential election. Vietnam was a major campaign issue debated strenuously by Republican candidate Richard Nixon, Democratic candidate Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and independent candidate Governor George Wallace. The prospect of imminent peace talks had the potential to influence the elections. This theme is developed principally through the extensive use of transcripts of Johnson’s phone calls, as the President sought to convince the three candidates to support his conditions for a bombing halt and for opening the formal peace talks.
The volume’s third major theme is how the Johnson administration had to persuade, cajole, and coerce the Republic of Vietnam and President Thieu to accept the deal that the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the help of the Soviet Union, essentially worked out at the end of October 1968. Much to Johnson’s dismay, South Vietnam refused to agree to terms before the Presidential election. Not until January 16, 1969, did all four parties agree to the modalities of the talks—shape of the table, use of flags or nameplates, speaking order, etc. On January 18, 1969, just 2 days before the Johnson administration left office, the peace talks officially began.
The Office of the Historian has prepared a summary of the volume. For further
information, contact Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the Foreign
Relations series, at (202) 663-1131; fax: (202) 663-1289; e-mail:
history@state.gov. The texts of the
volume, the summary, and this press release will soon be available on the
Office’s Web site:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus.
Copies of volume VII can be purchased from the Government Printing Office
at http://bookstore.gpo.gov/.
[End]
Released on July 16, 2003
Volume VII
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968
Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Editor: Kent Sieg
General Editor: Edward C. Keefer
United States Government Printing Office
Washington
2003
Department of State Publication 11041
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing office
http://bookstore.gpo.gov/index.html
Summary
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations and Terms
Names
Index to Document Numbers
|
Document Numbers |
Document Dates |
|
September 1-October 1, 1968: Efforts To Move the Peace Talks Forward; the Ohio Exercise |
|
| 1 through 24 | Sep 2-20, 1968 |
| 25 through 43 | Sep 21-Oct 1, 1968 |
|
October 2-15, 1968: The Breakthrough in Paris |
|
| 44 through 62 | Oct 2-12, 1968 |
| 63 through 74 | Oct 12-15, 1968 |
|
October 16-25, 1968: Negotiating the Understanding |
|
| 75 through 96 | Oct 16-21, 1968 |
| 97 through 122 | Oct 21-25, 1968 |
|
October 26-31, 1968: The Bombing Halt |
|
| 123 through 141 | Oct 26-29, 1968 |
| 142 through 169 | Oct 29-31, 1968 |
|
November 1-12, 1968: South Vietnamese Abstention From the Expanded Peace Conference; the Anna Chennault Affair |
|
| 170 through 192 | Nov 1-4, 1968 |
| 193 through 212 | Nov 4-12, 1968 |
|
November 12-30, 1968: South Vietnamese Participation in the Paris Peace Talks |
|
| 213 through 226 | Nov 12-19, 1968 |
| 227 through 242 | Nov 20-30, 1968 |
|
December 1, 1968-January 20, 1969: Resolution of the Procedural Delays and the Opening of the Expanded Peace Talks |
|
| 243 through 260 | Dec 1-19, 1968 |
| 261 through 287 | Dec 20, 1968-Jan 19, 1969 |
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VII
Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
(This is not an official statement of policy by the Department of State;
it is intended only as a guide to the contents of this volume.)
Since 1861, the Department of State’s documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States has constituted the official record of the foreign policy and diplomacy of the United States. Historians at the Office of the Historian collect, select, arrange, and annotate the principal documents that make up the record of American foreign policy. The standards for preparation of the series and general guidelines for the publication are established by the Foreign Relations of the United States statute of October 28, 1991. (22 USC 4351, et. seq.) Volumes in the Foreign Relations series are published when all necessary editing, declassification, and production steps have been completed.
The documents in this volume are drawn primarily from the Department of State Central Files, the papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson and his advisers at the Johnson Library in Austin, Texas (including excerpts from tape recordings of the President’s phone calls), the decentralized lot files of the Department of State, the historical files of the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the files of the National Security Council, the records of the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the files of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Almost all of the documents printed here were originally classified. The Information Response Branch of the Office of IRM Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, in concert with the appropriate offices in other agencies or governments, carried out the declassification of the selected documents in accordance with the applicable provisions of Executive Order12958.
The following is a summary of the most important issues covered in the volume. Parenthetical citations are to numbered documents in the text.
Introduction
This volume covers a period of 4½ months culminating in mid-January 1969 when the Johnson administration finally achieved, after much agonizing deliberation and consultation, formal four-party peace talks on Vietnam. In the fall of 1968 peace seemed beyond President Johnson's grasp, even though talks were taking place in Paris between the United States and its North Vietnamese adversaries. These two-party peace negotiations were deadlocked over Johnson's insistence on reciprocal guarantees for the complete cessation of the bombing of North Vietnamese territory. Within weeks, dramatic changes created the groundwork to bring together the two parties in formal talks on substantive issues of a peace settlement. The peace talks struggled to move to formal session while the United States held its Presidential election amid suspicions by the Democratic and Republican candidates, and the President himself, that their respective opponents were using the peace process to influence the election.
Movement Toward Final Peace Talks
President Johnson firmly believed that a hard line approach to the negotiations would compel the North Vietnamese into an agreement on formal four-party peace talks that would justify a bombing halt. "If we can stay for a few weeks with our present posture in Vietnam, we can convince the North Vietnamese that they won’t get a better deal if they wait," he confided to his staff during a September 4, 1968, meeting at the White House. (4) The North Vietnamese had refused to discuss any assurances of reciprocity throughout the late spring and summer of that year. During the fall, however, the impasse slowly began to ease. One minor but significant indication was the so-called "nuanced language" used by the North Vietnamese during a private meeting on September 15 with the American negotiators in Paris, W. Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance. The general feeling was that this might represent a breakthrough. (14) In a subsequent meeting of his foreign policy advisers, Johnson insisted that any breakthrough meet his three minimal requirements for a halt: withdrawal of enemy forces from the demilitarized zone (DMZ), a termination of attacks on major South Vietnamese cities, and admission of the South Vietnamese Government (GVN) to a seat at the conference table. Johnson was also adamant about not stopping the bombing without concessions from Hanoi. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford had tried repeatedly without success to persuade the President to end the bombing for the sake of moving the peace process forward. (15) The Soviet Union began to exercise greater initiative in pressing the North Vietnamese to moderate their stance on reciprocity for a bombing cessation. A meeting between Presidential Special Assistant Walt Rostow and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin on September 10 led to a message from the Soviet Government that appeared to indicate readiness on the Communist side to move forward if the United States terminated its bombing and related military actions. (9)
In separate meetings with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the President, and the rest of the Cabinet, Harriman, who had returned from Paris during the third week of September for consultations in Washington, failed to convince Johnson that termination of the bombing, the only trump card he held, would be worth playing without firm assurances of DRV reciprocity. (19, 20) The doves within the administration remained convinced that the North Vietnamese had gone more than far enough to ensure that a bombing halt would not be in vain. (22) On September 18 the Department of State instructed the delegation in Paris to press the North Vietnamese for agreement on the issue of South Vietnamese representation at the talks as an important element in "facilitating" a complete bombing halt by the United States. (23) Harriman and Vance responded that a more direct link had to be established between agreement on South Vietnamese representation at expanded talks and the termination of the bombing of North Vietnam. On September 25 the delegation submitted a revised proposition to the North Vietnamese delegates. (32) Meetings between Harriman and Vance and Soviet diplomats in Paris, as well as other indications through third-party sources in Norway, suggested that the Soviets were prepared to pressure the North Vietnamese into substantive peace talks. (26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34)
North Vietnamese reluctance to negotiate on terms acceptable to Johnson was not the only problem he had to contend with during the period covered in the volume. The United States was involved in a bitter Presidential election campaign in which Vietnam was the principal issue. In a September 30 speech at Salt Lake City, Democratic Presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey, the sitting Vice President, began to distance himself from Johnson’s Vietnam policy by publicly stating a unilateral U.S. bombing halt was an "acceptable risk for peace." (40) Although Johnson refrained from public criticism of Humphrey’s new position, his lack of any political assistance or public support of Humphrey during critical moments of the campaign made it clear how he viewed his Vice President’s public statement. In a private conversation with Senator Everett Dirksen (R-Illinois), the President questioned Humphrey’s speech but acknowledged that Humphrey’s position did not diverge too far from the position of the administration. (42) What most annoyed the President was Harriman's tacit approval of the Humphrey speech. (50, 51)
Toward a Breakthrough on Negotiations
The last weeks before the election brought a dramatic breakthrough at Paris. In an October 2 meeting with Harriman and Vance, the North Vietnamese delegates requested further clarification on the three prerequisites for a complete bombing halt. (45) In expectation that a breakthrough would soon follow, Vance immediately returned to Washington for a brief round of consultations. (49) On October 9 the U.S. delegation in Paris reported that the North Vietnamese had addressed the issue of GVN participation in the talks, the issue that had remained deadlocked for months. (54) Two days later Hanoi's representatives requested a clarification from the U.S. delegates as to whether the United States would end the bombing of North Vietnam if Hanoi accepted the Saigon government’s presence at the talks. (58) The next day Vance received a message from the Soviet Embassy in Paris, which more strongly reiterated the North Vietnamese agreement to hold substantive talks after a complete bombing halt. (60) During this period, the President called upon his top advisers, and South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu as well, to review the North Vietnamese proposal. (61) Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker assured the President that Thieu concurred. (62, 64, 66)
The road to peace talks was still not clear. On October 14-15 the administration debated a new condition for a halt. Wary of a last-minute effort to take advantage of any halt, hawks within the administration convinced the President to insist upon a 24-hour maximum interval between the cessation of bombing and the start of the expanded talks. (67-70, 72, 73) Hanoi's representatives reacted strongly to what they perceived as a "new condition." (76) In an October 16 conference call briefing the three primary Presidential candidates, Humphrey, Richard Nixon, and George Wallace, Johnson cautioned them not to say anything publicly that would undermine the ongoing negotiations. All three candidates expressed unanimous support for the negotiating process. (80)
President Thieu, however, began to equivocate on his previous commitment to the peace process by raising a series of objections and procedural concerns. Starting with concerns regarding participation of the NLF as a "separate entity," his objections only increased as the days went by. Thieu insisted that the National Liberation Front (NLF) should not have an equivalent status to South Vietnam and should appear at the Paris negotiations only as a part of the North Vietnamese delegation. (87, 89) The Johnson administration believed that it could work out a satisfactory resolution to the problem of NLF representation and of other issues, such as the seating arrangements for the two sides. (94) On October 21 North Vietnamese delegation chief Xuan Thuy proposed a joint communiqué for release by the United States and North Vietnam, so that "there be no further misunderstandings" in light of "the statements coming out of Saigon." Thuy insisted that both sides devise a secret minute of the October understandings and stated that Hanoi would only accept a lengthy interval between a bombing halt and the beginning of formal negotiations. (95) Such a delay was unacceptable to Washington.
The last days of October, however, saw progress in Paris and Washington. The Soviet Embassy in Paris and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin communicated the strong desire of the Soviet Union to see substantive talks begin quickly. (92, 98) On October 22 the Soviet Government proposed "splitting the difference" between the two delegations on the time interval, a proposal that both Harriman and Vance supported. (99, 101) President Johnson and his advisers decided to agree to this 3-day interval. (103, 104) In addition, by October 24, the U.S. Embassy in Saigon had arranged an apparent agreement with the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister on most of the remaining procedural problems with South Vietnam. (118) On October 24 a Soviet diplomat in Paris told Vance that "his government was deeply interested in finding a solution and that he was acting under the instructions of his government." (119) Dobrynin assured Rostow during an October 25 meeting that the U.S. representatives had expressed themselves "very clearly" on the "facts of life" prior to a full halt and the opening of talks and that the North Vietnamese understood the U.S. position. (122)
Progress toward a breakthrough accelerated during the last week before the election. On October 27 Thuy proposed that talks begin on November 2 if the United States terminated the bombing on October 30. "We have now got everything we have asked for," Vance reported to Washington. "We should accept." (128) In a meeting that evening at the White House, the President’s advisers were virtually unanimous in their support for moving ahead on the basis of this new position. Johnson first wanted a candid assessment regarding the impact of the halt on U.S. troops in Vietnam from the field commander there, and he directed that General Creighton Abrams return to Washington. (129) Arriving in the early morning of October 29, Abrams immediately met with Johnson and other senior officials. Following a review of the breakthrough, the President pointedly asked Abrams if implementation of the three key parts of the understanding would further endanger U.S. forces in Vietnam. Abrams assured the President that the cessation would not result in further casualties and that the enemy would not be able to take advantage of the halt and undertake any further offensive actions. He added that he had no reservations regarding the implementation of the halt; indeed, providing the enemy kept to the understanding, the halt would work out to a military advantage to the United States. Johnson decided to go ahead with the bombing cessation. (139)
The Position of South Vietnam
It was at this moment that the South Vietnamese Government began to equivocate on participation in the expanded talks. On October 29 Thieu informed Bunker that the November 2 date was too soon for him to have his representatives ready to attend. (149) Johnson was outraged but still hoped for the successful initiation of the peace process. In order to give Thieu more time, Johnson opted for a postponement of a few days. (151) The President and his advisers already believed there was a conspiracy to derail the negotiations to help the Republicans in the election. Anna Chennault, an associate of Republican Presidential candidate Richard Nixon and co-chair of Women for Nixon, had been in contact with Bui Diem, South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States. "There is no hard evidence that Mr. Nixon himself is involved," Rostow reported in an October 29 memorandum to the President. "Exactly what the Republicans have been saying to Bui Diem is not wholly clear as opposed to the conclusions that Bui Diem is drawing from what they have said." (145) During the regular Tuesday luncheon with his foreign policy advisers, Johnson expressed dismay at Bunker’s reports on his unsuccessful efforts to arrange a meeting with Thieu. Thieu's uncharacteristic unavailability seemed to confirm Johnson's belief in a conspiracy between the Republicans and the South Vietnamese. Presidential Consultant Maxwell Taylor suggested that "it may be sinister, or it may be ineptitude," while Johnson prophesized that "Nixon will doublecross them (the South Vietnamese) after November 5," election day. (148) Later that day South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thanh informed Bunker that the dispatch of a delegation to Paris would require approval from his country’s National Assembly. Bunker assessed that the GVN would not be ready to go ahead at the current time. (149) Concerned about proceeding to Paris without the GVN aboard, Johnson agreed to a further postponement of 2 days in order to give Bunker more time. (150) He also sent to Saigon a stern letter that Bunker could use. (151, 155)
In contrast, by October 30 the North Vietnamese definitively dropped their demand for a secret minute of the understandings. (158) In light of these developments, members of the administration universally objected to Thieu’s latest effort to stall the talks. (161) Johnson decided to proceed with the announcement of the bombing halt on October 31, which would be followed by talks on November 6, in order to give the South Vietnamese the maximum amount of time to consider joining in the expanded negotiations. (167) On October 31 Bunker reported that Thieu was "coming around," but informed Thieu of Johnson’s decision to proceed regardless of the GVN’s official stance on the expanded talks. (165) The President’s speech announcing the halt aired that evening. (169)
Prompt opening of expanded talks proved elusive. On November 1 Thieu announced that on the next day he would deliver a speech regarding the talks. Johnson dispatched a message for Bunker to deliver to Thieu admonishing him to "move forward together in Paris," but Thieu refused to see Bunker before he made his speech. (175). On November 2 Thieu publicly stated that he would not send a delegation to the expanded talks in Paris, effectively preventing the convening of the four-party meetings. (178) In turn, the North Vietnamese refused to accept further meetings solely between U.S. and DRV representatives. (196) Late in the evening of November 2 Johnson discussed with Senator Dirksen, his old colleague and an intimate of both Nixon and Chennault, the connection between the Republicans and the South Vietnamese. The President described the actions of Nixon’s supporters as "treason" and instructed Dirksen to transmit a warning to Nixon that he must act to prevent any adverse impact upon the Paris talks. (181) On November 3 Johnson called Senator George Smathers (D-Florida), who had been in contact with Nixon. Smathers stated that Nixon denied any knowledge of the affair, and the President countered that he had documented proof of a Republican connection to the GVN. (186) Apparently at the urging of both Dirksen and Smathers, Nixon made a telephone call to Johnson that afternoon to disclaim personally any involvement with the entire affair. (187) In light of Nixon’s denials and Johnson’s own reticence about revealing the full range of government surveillance and wiretapping of Chennault and Diem, the decision was made not to make public the information gathered regarding the Republican-South Vietnamese connection. (192-194) In a close vote, Nixon won the 1968 Presidential election. (199)
With 2½ months still remaining in office, President Johnson was determined to open substantive talks, but Thieu would not see Bunker for a week. (203, 206) When they did meet, Bunker unsuccessfully pressed Thieu to dispatch a delegation to the expanded conference. Bunker reported afterward that Thieu "wants to find a way out of the situation in which he finds himself." (208) Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Bundy also delivered a stern admonition to Bui Diem. (210) In addition, Johnson asked Nixon to transmit to Thieu a message pressuring him to join the Paris talks. (205, 207, 209) It was not until a November 11 meeting with Nixon that Johnson secured the President-elect’s promise to present a "united front" on Vietnam. At that time, Nixon agreed to communicate formally to the South Vietnamese his desire that they participate in the Paris talks. (211) At the President’s behest, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, in a November 12 news conference, strongly rebutted continuing recalcitrant statements coming out of Saigon. (213) Agreement between the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments on a joint position relating to negotiating issues was worked out during November. (217, 228) In Paris the U.S. delegation’s protest of enemy attacks on unarmed American reconnaissance planes as well as its shelling of certain South Vietnamese cities helped to re-establish trust with South Vietnam. (222-228, 233) On November 26 Thieu finally agreed to dispatch a delegation to Paris, and made a public announcement the following day. (235, 236)
The official talks still did not begin. South Vietnam raised a series of procedural issues, the most prominent of which were the particular use of flags and name plates, the speaking order of the participants, and the physical arrangement of the conference, including most notably the shape of the conference table. On the latter issue, the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front (NLF) insisted on a four-sided table to emphasize equality between the parties, while the United States and especially the GVN favored a two-sided arrangement that did not obviously give the NLF equal footing with the GVN. (250, 260, 264) On January 2, 1969, the North Vietnamese relented on their requirement that made flags and nameplates contingent upon the acceptance by the other side of a continuous round table. (268, 269) On January 7 Johnson sent Thieu a strongly worded message to desist from the "continued stalemate on present lines" that was undermining public support within the United States for South Vietnam. (276) Thieu continued to refuse to consider such a trade-off from his original position on the shape of the table. (277-279) Pressure on Thieu from Washington coupled with the involvement of Soviet diplomats eventually overcame this impasse. On January 13 the Soviet Ambassador in Paris directed his subordinate to propose a resolution: a round table with two smaller rectangular tables at opposite sides; no flags or nameplates; and speaking order arranged by the drawing of lots. (280, 281) Both the North Vietnamese and the American delegations agreed to this proposal on January 15, as did both South Vietnam and the NLF the next day. (283, 284) On January 18 the first meeting between the four parties, which focused solely on modalities for the substantive talks, was held. (286) The Johnson administration left office on January 20, 1969, with the knowledge that peace talks were finally underway.
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.
Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.). The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.
Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series
This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the 5 years (1964-1968) of the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. The subseries presents in 34 volumes a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of President Johnson's administration. This volume documents U.S. policy toward Vietnam from August 1968 to January 1969. Volumes I-VI cover Vietnam from 1964 through August 1968.
Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VII
The editor of the volume sought to present documentation that explained and illuminated the major foreign policy decisions and problems on Vietnam faced by the President and his key foreign policy advisers during the last 4 and 1/2 months of his administration. The documents highlight the Johnson administration's slow and agonizing internal deliberations on how to achieve formal four-party peace negotiations on Vietnam in Paris. A good part of this search for peace was carried out during the 1968 Presidential election amid suspicions by the Democratic and Republican candidates, and President Lyndon Johnson himself, that the respective Presidential candidates were using the peace process to influence the election. In addition, both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) had their own demands for the procedures and modalities of the formal peace process, all of which had to be reconciled. This volume is the account of how the Johnson administration achieved the opening of formal four-party peace talks in Paris.
President Johnson and his principal foreign policy advisers, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Assistant to the President Rostow, and other official and unofficial advisers became almost exclusively concerned with the goal of starting the peace negotiations in Paris. The administration was split between hard liners, including the President himself, and so-called doves. The hardliners refused to stop U.S. bombing of North Vietnam without a promise from Hanoi that it would withdraw from the Demilitarized Zone, cease its attack on South Vietnamese cities, and accept South Vietnam represent-atives at the peace table. The doves, Secretary of Defense Clifford and Chief Paris negotiator Averell Harriman, favored stopping the bombing in the hopes of moving the peace process forward. A main theme of the volume is how the doves eventually convinced the President that North Vietnam, under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union, would agree to his demands.
A second major theme of the volume is the interaction between the peace negotiations and the Presidential election. Vietnam was a major campaign issue debated strenuously by Republican candidate Richard Nixon, Democratic candidate Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and Independent candidate Governor George Wallace. The prospect of imminent peace talks had the potential to influence the elections. This theme is developed principally through the extensive use of transcripts of Johnson's phone calls as the President sought to convince the three candidates to support his conditions for a bombing halt and for opening the formal peace talks.
The volume's third major theme is how the Johnson administration had to persuade, cajole, and coerce the Republic of Vietnam and President Thieu to accept the deal that the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the help of the Soviet Union, essentially worked out at the end of October 1968. Much to Johnson's dismay, South Vietnam refused to agree to terms before the Presidential election. Not until January 16, 1969, did all four parties agree to the modalities of the talks--size of the table, use of flags or nameplates, and speaking order. On January 18, 1969, just 2 days before the Johnson administration left office, the peace talks officially began.
Editorial Methodology
The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.
Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.
Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.
The first footnote to each document indicates its source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.
Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.
The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation
The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not attempt to review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on problems that come to its attention.
The Advisory Committee has not reviewed this volume.
Declassification Review
The Information Response Branch of the Office of Information Resources Management Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.
The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.
The final declassification review of this volume, which began in 2000 and was completed in 2002, resulted in the decision to withhold no documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 1 document, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 7 documents. The information was excised to protect intelligence sources and methods, in keeping with requirements of Executive Order 12958. The editor is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and the result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide an accurate account of U.S. policy toward Vietnam from August 1968 through January 1969.
Acknowledgments
The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library of the National Archives and Records Administration, especially Regina Greenwell and Charlaine Burgess, who provided key research assistance. The editor also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of historians at the Central Intelligence Agency, especially Scott Koch, the staff of the Center of Military History, Sandra Meagher at the Department of Defense, and the staff of the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, for their valuable assistance in expediting research of this volume.
Kent Sieg collected documentation for this volume and selected and edited it, under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. Rita M. Baker and Vicki E. Futscher did the copy and technical editing, and Susan C. Weetman coordinated the declassification review. Max Franke prepared the index.
Marc J. Susser
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Sources for the Foreign Relations Series
The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.
The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files for these years have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Most of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to Archives II.
The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, President Richard Nixon, and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The editors of the series also had full access to the files of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the records of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sources for Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VII
In preparing this volume, the editor made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. The large Vietnam Country File within the National Security File was one of the most important sources. Other useful components of the National Security File were the Files of Walt Rostow and Memoranda to the President. For Johnson's meetings on Vietnam, the Tom Johnson Notes were the most valuable collection, although Meeting Notes Files and the National Security Council File, National Security Council Meetings were also useful. The Johnson tape recordings of both telephone conversations and meetings in the Cabinet Room, were another key source from the Johnson Library. In fact, this volume relies more heavily upon Johnson Presidential recordings than any previous volume in the 1964-1968 subseries. The Papers of Clark Clifford and George Elsey, were also valuable. In addition, the editor researched files of the Nixon Presidential Materials at the National Archives, College Park, Maryland. The most valuable files were the National Security Council Files, Paris Talks/Meetings, and Kissinger Office Files, Kissinger Administrative and Staff Files, Transition.
Second in importance to the records at the Johnson Library were the records of the Department of State in Record Group 59 at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. The most important were the A/IM Files of Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance, Lot 93 D 82, which contain telegraphic and other reports of their discussions at Paris. Other Department of State records at Archives II of value were the IS/OIS files relating to the records of the Paris Peace Conference, Lot 90 D 345, and Ambassador Bunker's personal files, Lot 74 D 417. The Central Files of the Department of State in Record Group 59 that were of most value were POL 27 VIET S, the central file for military operations that became a catchall for information on Vietnam, and POL 14 VIET/OHIO, a file relating to peace negotiations.
Of the records at the Department of Defense, which were viewed at the Washington National Records Center, the most significant was the official files of Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, OSD Files, FRC 73 A 1250.
At the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, the Averell Harriman Papers proved a most valuable collection.
For intelligence issues, DCI (Helms) Files, the DCI Executive Registry Subject Files, the Files of DCI's Special Assistant for Vietnam, George Carver, and some Directorate of Operations Files at the Central Intelligence Agency, proved useful.
Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration.
The following list identifies the particular files and collections consulted in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the Department of State records are in process, and many of those records are already available for public review at the National Archives.
Unpublished Sources
Department of State
Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.
Lot Files. For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and Records Administration below.
INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99
National and Special Intelligence Estimates, 1952-1985.
INR/IL Historical Files
Historical Intelligence files maintained in the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research and still under Department of State custody.
INR/REA Files: Lot 90 D 99
National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates,
1952-1985.
INR/RSB Files: Lot 90 D 320
Soviet-Asia relations, 1965-1978.
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State
Subject-Numeric Central File. The subject-numeric system is divided into broad categories: Administration, Consular, Culture and Information, Economic, Political and Defense, Science, and Social. Within each of these divisions are subject subcategories. For example, Political and Defense contains four subtopics: POL (Politics), DEF (Defense), CSM (Communism), and INT (Intelligence). Numerical subdivisions further define the subtopics. The following are the principal files consulted for this volume:
AID (US) VIET S, U.S. aid to South Vietnam
DEF 4 SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
E US-VIET S, economic relations, U.S.-South Vietnam
E VIET S, economic affairs, South Vietnam
E 12 VIET S, land reform, South Vietnam
FN 12 VIET S, balance of payments, South Vietnam
ORG SAIGON, organization and administration, Saigon Embassy
POL IT-US, political relations, U.S.-Italy
POL 17 NOR CHICOM, diplomatic representation, Norway-China
POL 17-1 NOR-US, accreditation, U.S.-Norway
POL NOR-VIET N, political relations, Norway-North Vietnam
POL UK-US, political relations, U.S.-United Kingdom
POL 7 US, visits and meetings of U.S. officials
POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON, Head of State, the President
POL 27 US/HUMPHREY, Vice President's assessment of military affairs
POL US-USSR, political relations, U.S.-Soviet Union
POL 1 US-USSR, general policy, U.S.-Soviet Union
POL 17 US-VIET N, diplomatic representation, U.S.-North Vietnam
POL 15-1 VAT, correspondence and meetings with the Pope
POL 27-7 VIET, prisoners of war, Vietnam
POL 27-12 VIET, war crimes, Vietnam
POL 27-14 VIET/ASPEN, peace negotiations code named Aspen
POL 27-14 VIET/BAMBOO, peace negotiations code named Bamboo
POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE, peace negotiations code named Crocodile
POL 27-14 VIET/KILLY, peace negotiations code named Killy
POL 27-14 VIET/LION, peace negotiations code named Lion
POL 27-14 VIET/MARIGOLD, peace negotiations code named Marigold
POL 27-14 VIET/NIRVANA, peace negotiations code named Nirvana
POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO, peace negotiations code named Ohio
POL 17 VIET N, diplomatic and consular representation, North Vietnam
POL 1 VIET S, general policy, South Vietnam
POL 1-1 VIET S, contingency planning, South Vietnam
POL 12 VIET S, political parties, South Vietnam
POL 15 VIET S, Government of South Vietnam
POL 15-1 VIET S, head of state/executive branch, South Vietnam
POL 23-9 VIET S, civil disturbances and revolts, South Vietnam
POL 27 VIET S, military operations, South Vietnam
POL 27 VIET S/MARIA, cease fires, South Vietnam
POL 27-7 VIET S/BUTTERCUP, prisoner exchanges, South Vietnam
POL 27-14 VIET S, truce talks, South Vietnam
POL 30 VIET S, defections, South Vietnam
REF VIET, refugees, Vietnam
REF VIET N, refugees, North Vietnam
Lot Files
A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82
Correspondence, telegrams, and records of meetings of HARVAN (Harriman and
Vance) mission to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1968-1969. Includes
background material on Vietnam peace negotiations 1962-1969.
AmEmbassy-Saigon Files: Lot 75 F 193
Files and telegrams from classified and unclassified central subject files
of the American Embassy in Saigon, 1950-1974.
Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240
Files of William P. Bundy as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, 1964-1969.
Bunker Files: Lot 74 D 417
Files of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, including telegrams, personal and
presidential messages, and correspondence, 1967-1973.
Bunker Files: Lot 77 D 146
Files containing Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's official and personal
correspondence, speeches and statements, interviews, and briefing books,
1967-1973.
EA Files: Lot 74 D 246
Records relating to the Paris Peace Negotiations on Vietnam, 1966-1973.
EA Files: Lot 71 D 10
Files on the Paris Peace Talks, 1966-1968.
EA Files: Lot 72 D 33
Background papers on Asia, 1967-1968.
EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 128
Files of weekly reports on Vietnam peace negotiations, 1967-1968.
EA/ACA Files: Lot 72 D 175
Miscellaneous files of the Asian Communist Affairs Office, 1961-1969.
EA/VN Files: Lot 72 D 207
Files on the Manila Summit, the Clifford-Taylor trip to Southeast Asia, the
Tet Offensive, and background material, 1964-1968.
EA/VN Files: Lot 73 D 141
General files of the Interagency Vietnam Working Group.
EA/VN Files: Lot 73 D 461
Files on politics, defense, rural development, and elections in South Vietnam,
1967-1969.
EA/VN Files: Lot 74 D 51
Military files containing the record of the air war in Vietnam, 1963-1970.
EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167
Files on Vietnamese political-military affairs and meetings and trips of
senior U.S. Government officials with Vietnamese and Asian leaders, 1963-1969.
EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 303
Files relating to the Free World Assistance in Vietnam, 1963-1971.
INR/REA/SA Files: Lot 75 D 352
South Vietnam Country files, 1968-1970.
IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345
Chronological records of the Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969.
IS/OIS Files: Lot 92 D 306
Telegrams transmitting the weekly reports of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
to the President, 1967-1973.
Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 410
Files of Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, 1958-1973.
Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271
Files of Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, 1966-1969.
Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460
Files of Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Foy Kohler concerning
his discussions with Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, 1967-1968; discussions
between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko,
1962-1968.
Komer Files: Lot 69 D 303
Files of Robert W. Komer, 1949-1969.
Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192
Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, including texts of speeches,
miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological
files, and memoranda of telephone conversations.
S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461
Files of Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman concerning Vietnam peace
negotiating channels, 1967-1968.
S/S-I Files: Lot 72 D 316
National Security Action Memoranda Nos.1-371, 1961-1968.
S/S-I Files: Lot 72 D 318
National Security Council meeting memoranda and agenda, 1966-1968.
S/S-S Files: Lot 68 D 453
International conference chronologies and briefing papers, 1967-1968, including
background material for the Vice President's East Asian trip, Ambassador
at Large W. Averell Harriman's Near Eastern and European trip, and the
President's visit to Australia.
S/S-S Files: Lot 69 D 217
Administrative history of the Johnson administration; foreign policy fact
books for Republican candidates; transition books, 1968.
S/S-S Files: Lot 70 D 207
Vietnam briefing books and reports, contingency studies, and background papers
on negotiations, 1965-1968.
S/S-S Files: Lot 70 D 48
Miscellaneous Vietnam reports and briefing books, 1949-1968, including briefing
books on negotiating initiatives and Senate committee reports.
S/S-S Files: Lot 71 D 228
Transition books for the incoming Nixon administration, December 1968.
S/S-S Files: Lot 76 D 435
U.S./U.S.S.R. conversations on Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 1961-1968.
Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the United States
Saigon Embassy files of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, 1967-1973
Record Group 200, Records of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1961-1968
Record Group 273, Records of the National Security Council
National Security Action Memorandums
Record Group 407, Records of the U.S. Army Adjutant General's Office
Westmoreland v. CBS Litigation Collection, 1966-1972
Record Group 472, Records of the U.S. Army in Southeast Asia
Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Command Information Publications
Assistant Chief of Staff
Office of Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development
Office Files, 1966-1969
Phung Huang Directorate
Plans, Policy, and Programs Directorate
Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia
William Colby Files, Job 80-M01009A
DCI (Helms) Files, Jobs 80-R01580R, 80-B01721R, 80-R01720R, 80-M01044A, 80-B01285A, 85-T00268R
DDI Files, Job 80-B01721R
DDO/ISS Files, Jobs 78-32, 78-06425A, 78-0064235A
DO/EA Files, Jobs 79-00207A, 80-00088A, 80-00106A
Executive Registry Subject Files, Jobs 80-R51580R, 80-R01284A
O/DDI Files, Job 78-T02095R
SAVA (Carver) Files, Jobs 80-R01284R, 80-R012850R, 80-R01720R
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas
Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson
National Security File
Agency File
Country File
Intelligence File
International Meetings and Travel File
Files of Robert Komer
Head of State Correspondence
Special Head of State Correspondence
Komer-Leonhart File
Memos to the President
Name File
National Intelligence Estimates
National Security Action Memorandums
National Security Council Histories
National Security Council Meetings File
Files of Walt Rostow
Files of Bromley Smith
South Vietnam and U.S. Politics
Speech File
Subject File
Unarranged Files
Office Files of the White House Aides
George Christian
James R. Jones
Harry McPherson
Special Files
Meeting Notes File
Office of the President File
President's Appointment File (Diary Backup)
Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations
Reference File--Vietnam
Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room
White House Central Files
Confidential File
Subject File
Reference Files, Vietnam
Other Personal Papers
Clark Clifford Papers
George Elsey Papers
Alain Enthoven Papers
Morton Halperin Papers
Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings
William Jorden Papers
Oral History Collection
Dean Rusk Papers, Personal Appointment Books
Paul C. Warnke Papers, John McNaughton Files
William C. Westmoreland Papers
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.
Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Southeast Asia Files, 1966-1968.
Nixon Presidential Materials Project
National Security File
Agency Files
Name Files
Paris Talks/Meetings
HAK Office Files, Country Files, Far East, Vietnam, Negotiations
National Security Council, Washington, D.C.
Johnson Administration Intelligence Files including records of the 303 Committee
Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland
Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470
Files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1961-1968.
McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77-0075
Vietnam Files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1961-1968.
OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467-2468, FRC 73 A 1250
Office of the Secretary of Defense Files.
OSD/General Counsel Files: FRC 75 A 0062
Files on the Pentagon Papers.
OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, FRC 69 A 6216, FRC 72 A 1498-1499, FRC
72 A 7500-7515, FRC 73 A 1350-1352, FRC 83 A 0119-0129
Files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
W. Averell Harriman Papers
Paul H. Nitze Papers
Henry A. Kissinger Papers
National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
Andrew Goodpaster Papers
Lyman Lemnitzer Papers
Maxwell Taylor Papers
U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
Robert Komer Papers
DepCORDS/MACV Files
Files of the Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development, Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam.
William Colby Papers
Creighton Abrams Papers
Thomas Thayer Papers
William C. Westmoreland Papers
History File, History Backup, and COMUSMACV Message Files, 1964-1968.
U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Army Chiefs of Staff Collection
Creighton Abrams Papers
William DePuy Papers
Richard Gard Papers
Harold K. Johnson Papers
Bruce Palmer Papers
John Paul Vann Papers
William C. Westmoreland Papers
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Headquarters Archive
Douglas Pike Collection
Published Sources
Documentary Collections
Barrett, David M. Lyndon B. Johnson's Vietnam Papers: A Documentary Collection. College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 1997.
Council on Foreign Relations. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1968-69. New York: New York University Press, 1972.
Herring, George, ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1983.
The Pentagon Papers: The Department of Defense History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, The Senator Gravel Edition. 4 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.
Pike, Douglas, ed. The Bunker Papers: Reports to the President From Vietnam, 1967-1973. 3 vols. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1990.
U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 1968-1969. Washington, 1968-1969.
U.S. House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
Memoirs
Bui Diem with David Chanoff. In the Jaws of History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987.
Bundy, William P. A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998.
Califano, Joseph A. The Triumph & Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.
Chennault, Anna. The Education of Anna. New York: Times Books, 1979.
Clifford, Clark, with Richard Holbrooke. Counsel to the President: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1991.
Colby, William. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989.
DeLoach, Cartha Dekle. Hoover's FBI: The Inside Story by Hoover's Trusted Lieutenant. New York: Regnery Publishing, 1995.
Humphrey, Hubert. Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics. New York: Garden City, Doubleday, 1976.
Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York: Rhinehart and Winston, 1971.
Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years. Boston: Little Brown, 1979.
McNamara, Robert S., with Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books, 1995.
McPherson, Harry. A Political Education. Boston: Little Brown, 1972.
Nguyen Cao Ky. Twenty Years and Twenty Days. New York: Steinard Day, 1976.
Nixon, Richard M. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grossett and Dunlop, 1978.
Palmer, Bruce. The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1984.
Rostow, Walt W. The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. New York: Macmillan, 1972.
Rusk, Dean, as told to Richard Rusk. As I Saw It. New York: W.W. Norton, 1990.
Taylor, Maxwell. Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir. New York: W.W. Norton, 1972.
Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976.
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
AAA, antiaircraft artillery
ADA, Americans for Democratic Action
AID, Agency for International Development
A/IM, Office of Information Management, Bureau of Administration
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States
Arc Light, codename for U.S. B-52 bombing strikes in Southeast Asia
ARVN, Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
Aspen, codename for U.S. peace negotiations through Swedish channels
B-52, USAF strategic bomber
Barrell Roll, codename for U. S. air operations over northern Laos
Bus (Buzz), nickname for General Earle Wheeler
C, Confidential
C-130, USAF transport plane
CAP, series indicator for outgoing White House telegrams
CAS, controlled American source
CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG, Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Republic of Vietnam
Chieu Hoi, Republic of South Vietnam's repatriation program for the Viet
Cong
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSARPAC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific
CIP, Commercial Import Program
CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMC, Clark M. Clifford
COMUSMACV, Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CORDS, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
COSVN, Central Office for South Vietnam
CVT, Congress of Vietnamese Trade Unions
Daniel Boone, clandestine U.S.-ARVN reconnaissance operations into Cambodian
border areas
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
Delto, Department of State telegram to the Paris Delegation
Dep, Deputy
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DFF, Democratic Freedom Force
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DIOCC, Defense Intelligence Office Command Center
DMZ, Demilitarized Zone
DOD, Department of Defense
DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/ACA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of Asian Communist
Affairs
EA/VN, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Vietnam Working Group
EST, eastern standard time
Exdis, exclusive distribution
FOMIN, foreign minister
FRC, Federal Records Center
FULRO, United Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Race, a movement for
Montagnard autonomy
FWMAF, Free World Military Assistance Forces
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
GME, George M. Esley
GMT, Greenwich Mean Time
GON, Government of Norway
GVN, Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
HARVAN, Harriman-Vance mission to the Paris peace talks
HES, Hamlet Evaluation System
HHH, Hubert H. Humphrey
ICBM, Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
ICC, International Control Commission
ICEX, Infrastructure Coordination and Exploitation
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DDC, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Deputy Director for
Coordination
INR/IL, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison
INR/REA, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Research and Analysis
for East Asia and Pacific
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs
IS/OIS, Office of Information Services
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum
JGS, Joint General Staff, Vietnamese Armed Forces
JUSPAO, Joint United States Public Affairs Office
KIA, killed in action
LBJ, Lyndon Baines Johnson
Lien Minh, National Alliance for Social Revolution
Limdis, limited distribution
LOC, line of communication
M-16, U.S. military field rifle
MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MiG, Soviet-built fighter aircraft
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLF (also NFL, FNL), National Liberation Front
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NM, nautical miles
NMCC, National Military Command Center
NMICC, National Military Intelligence Coordination Center
Nodis, no distribution
Noforn, no foreign distribution
NP, National Police
NPFF, National Police Field Force
NSA, National Security Agency
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
NSF, National Salvation Front
NVA, North Vietnamese Army
NVN, North Vietnam
OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
O/B, order of battle
Ohio, codename for secret peace initiative mediated by the Norwegian
Government
ONE, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAVN, People's Army of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
PF, Popular Forces
PFF, Police Field Forces
PHN, Paul H. Nitze
Phoenix, U.S. military-supported program against the Viet Cong
infrastructure
Phung Hoang, South Vietnamese Government-sponsored program to attack the
Viet Cong infrastructure
P.L., Public Law
PM, Prime Minister
PNO, numbering system for recorded conversations
POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants; political
POLAD, Political Adviser
POW, prisoner of war
Prairie Fire, interdiction operations in Laos
PW, prisoner of war
PX, post exchange
RD, Revolutionary Development
recce, reconnaissance
reftel, reference telegram
RF, Regional Forces
RG, Record Group
ROK, Republic of Korea
Rolling Thunder, codename for program of U.S. air operations in North
Vietnam
RP, route packages
RT, Rolling Thunder
RVN, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
S, Secret
SAM, surface to air missiles
SAVA, Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency
SC, Security Council
SEA, Southeast Asia
Sea Dragon, naval interdiction operations along the North Vietnamese coast
up to the 20th parallel
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away
from Washington
septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Shining Brass, codename for cross-border operations into Laos and the DMZ
Sitrep, situation report
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOG, Studies and Observation Group
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
Steel Tiger, codename for U.S. air strikes against the Ho Chi Minh Trail
in Laos
SVN, South Vietnam
SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations
TASS, official Soviet news agency
TCC, troop contributing countries
Todel, State Department telegrams to the delegation in Paris
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State while away
from Washington
TS, Top Secret
TV, television
U, unclassified
UAW, United Auto Workers
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UPI, United Press International
US, United States
USAID, United States Agency for International Development Mission
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USMACV, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations
VC, Viet Cong
VCI, Viet Cong Infrastructure
VIET, Vietnam
Viet Cong (Vietcong), South Vietnamese and American term for soldiers of
the National Liberation Front
VN, Vietnam; Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Department of State
VNAF, South Vietnamese Air Force
VNCC, Vietnam Coordinating Committee
VNQDD, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnamese Nationalist Party)
VP, Vice President
WH, White House
Z, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Abrams, General Creighton, Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Acheson, Dean, former Secretary of State 1949-1953 and informal adviser to the President
Agnew, Spiro T., Vice-Presidential nominee of the Republican Party; after November 5, Vice President-elect
Albert, Carl, Representative (D-Oklahoma)
Algard, Ole, Norwegian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China
Allott, Gordon, Senator (D-Colorado)
Ball, George, Representative to the United Nations, May 14-September 25, 1968
Beech, Keyes, reporter, Chicago Daily News
Berger, Samuel R., Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam
Black, Eugene, Adviser to the President on Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development
Bogomolov, Sergei, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy in Paris
Brown, General George S., Commander, 7th Air Force
Brown, Harold, Secretary of the Air Force
Bui Diem, South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States
Bundy, McGeorge, President, Ford Foundation and informal adviser to the President
Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Bunker, Ellsworth, Ambassador to Vietnam
Calhoun, John A., Political Officer, Embassy in Saigon
Califano, Joseph, Special Assistant to the President
Carver, George A., Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs to the Director of Central Intelligence
Chapman, General Leonard, Marine Corps Commandant
Chennault, Anna, Co-chair, Women for Nixon
Christian, George A., Special Assistant to the President and White House Press Secretary
Clifford, Clark M., Secretary of Defense
Colby, William, Deputy Director, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, to November 1968; thereafter Director
Dang Duc Khoi, Special Assistant to the Vice President, Republic of Vietnam
Davidson, Daniel I., Special Assistant to the Ambassador-at-Large and member, U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Davis, Saville, reporter, The Christian Science Monitor
De Gaulle, Charles, President of France
Debré, Michel, French Minister of Foreign Affairs
Deepe, Beverley, correspondent, The Christian Science Monitor
DeLoach, Cartha Dekle, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Dirksen, Everett, Senator (R-Illinois)
Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Duong Van Minh, General, exiled South Vietnamese general
Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States, 1953-1961
Elsey, George M., Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Enthoven, Alain, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis
Finch, Robert, California Lieutenant-Governor and adviser to Presidential candidate Richard Nixon
Flowerree, Charles C., staff member, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Ford, Gerald R., Representative (R-Michigan)
Fortas, Abe, Associate Justice, Supreme Court
Fowler, Henry (Hugh), Secretary of the Treasury
Ginsburgh, Robert N., member, National Security Council Staff
Goldberg, Arthur J., former Representative to the United Nations and informal adviser to the President
Goodpaster, General Andrew J., Deputy Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Gorton, John, Australian Prime Minister
Goulding, Phil G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Gromyko, Andrei, Soviet Foreign Minister
Ha Van Lau, Deputy Chief, North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Habib, Philip C., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and member, U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Halperin, Morton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Plans and Arms Control)
Hardesty, Robert, Assistant to the President
Harlow, Bryce, adviser to the Nixon Presidential campaign and the President-elect's spokesman
Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador-at-Large; Head, U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Helms, Richard R., Director of Central Intelligence
Herz, Martin F., Country Director, Cambodia and Laos, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Hickenlooper, Bourke, Senator (R-Iowa)
Ho Chi Minh, President, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Hoang Xuan Lam, General, Republic of Vietnam Commander, I Corps
Holbrooke, Richard C., staff member, U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Holdridge, John, Deputy Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Hoover, J. Edgar, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President
Jackson, Henry, Senator (D-Washington)
Johnson, Lyndon B., President
Johnson, W. Thomas (Tom), Assistant Press Secretary to the President
Jones, James R. (Jim), Special Assistant to the President
Jorden, William J., member, U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Kaplan, Harold, member, U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Karamessines, Thomas, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Under Secretary of State
Kissinger, Henry A., informal adviser to the Nixon Presidential campaign and principal foreign policy adviser to President-elect Nixon
Komer, Robert W., Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and Special Assistant to the Ambassador to Vietnam, to October 28; thereafter Ambassador-designate to Turkey
Kosygin, Alexei, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
Kuchel, Thomas, Senator (R-California)
Le Duc Tho, Special Adviser to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Le Nguyen Thang, General, Republic of Vietnam Commander, III Corps
LeMay, Curtis, Vice Presidential candidate, American Independent Party
Loan. See Nguyen Ngoc Loan
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Ambassador-at-Large to May 7, 1968; Ambassador to Germany after April 22, 1968
Mai Van Bo, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Representative to France
Mansfield, Mike, Senator (D-Montana)
Marks, Leonard, Director, United States Information Agency
McCain, Admiral John S., Commander in Chief, Pacific
McCloskey, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, and Department Spokesman
McConnell, General John P., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
McCormack, John, Speaker of the House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts)
McGovern, Goerge, Senator (D-South Dakota)
McNamara, Robert S., President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
McPherson, Harry C., Special Counsel to the President
Middleton, Harry, Staff Assistant to the President
Moorer, Admiral Thomas, Chief of Naval Operations
Mundt, Karl E., Senator (R-South Dakota)
Murphy, Robert, Adviser to President-elect Nixon and Head of the Transition Team
Negroponte, John, staff member, U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Ngo Minh Loan, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Ambassador to Norway
Ngo Quang Troung, General, Republic of Vietnam Commander, 1st Division, I Corps
Nguyen Cao Ky, Vice President, Republic of Vietnam; after December 8, also Adviser to and Coordinator of the South Vietnamese Delegation at the Paris Peace Talks
Nguyen Chan, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Nguyen Dinh Trinh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Minh Vy, member, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Nguyen Ngoc An, Chieu Hoi Minister, Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Ngoc Loan, General, Director General of Police, Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Thanh Le, member and spokesman, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Nguyen Van Thieu, President, Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Van Vy, Minister of Defense and Minister of Veteran's Affairs, Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Xuan Phong, member, South Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Nitze, Paul H., Deputy Secretary of Defense
Nixon, Richard M., Republican candidate for President to November 5; thereafter President-elect
Oberemko, Valentin, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in France
Palmer, General Bruce, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Vietnam
Park Chung-hee, President, Republic of Korea
Percy, Charles, Senator (R-Illinois)
Perry, Jack, Political Officer in the Embassy in France
Pham Dang Lam, Republic of Vietnam observer at the Official Conversations on Vietnam to December; thereafter head of the Republic of Vietnam delegation to the expanded Peace Talks in Paris
Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Phan Hien, member, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Phan Quang Dan, Minister of State and Chieu Hoi Minister, Republic of Vietnam
Pursley, Colonel Robert E., Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Read, Benjamin H., Executive Secretary, Department of State
Rebozo, Bebe, friend and adviser of Richard Nixon
Ridgway, Rozanne, Political Officer, Embassy in Oslo, Norway
Rivers, Mendel, Representative (D-South Carolina)
Roche, John, Special Assistant to the President
Rostow, Walt W., Special Assistant to the President
Rowe, James R., Washington lawyer
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State
Russell, Richard B., Senator (D-Georgia)
Sainteny, Jean, unofficial French envoy to North Vietnam
Sidle, Winant, Major General, Chief, MACV Office of Information
Smathers, George A., Senator (D-Florida)
Smith, Abbott, Admiral, Chairman, National Board of Estimates
Smith, Bromley, Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Symington, Stuart, Senator (D-Missouri)
Taylor, Admiral Rufus, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Taylor, Maxwell, General, Special Consultant to the President
Thanh Le, see Nguyen Thanh
Thanom Kittikachon, Prime Minister of Thailand
Thant, U, United Nations Secretary-General
Thompson, Llewelyn E., Jr., Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Tibbets, Margaret Joy, Ambassador to Norway
Ton That Thien, Minister of Information, Republic of Vietnam
Tower, John G., Senator (R-Texas)
Tran Buu Kiem, member, National Liberation Front Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Tran Chanh Thanh, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Vietnam
Tran Lu-Y, Refugee Minister, Republic of Vietnam
Tran Thien Khiem, Minister of Interior, Republic of Vietnam
Tran Van Don, Senator, Republic of Vietnam
Tran Van Huong, Prime Minister, Republic of Vietnam
Tran Van Lam, Senator, Republic of Vietnam, and chief of unofficial South Vietnamese Delegation in Paris.
Trueheart, William, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Truong Dinh Dzu, political leader, Republic of Vietnam
Vance, Cyrus R., member, U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Vo Nguyen Giap, General, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Vuong Van Bac, member, South Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Wallace, George, American Independent Party candidate for President
Wallner, Woodruff, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in France
Walsh, John P., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State
Warnke, Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International and Security Affairs
Westmoreland, General William C., Army Chief of Staff
Wheeler, General Earle G., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Xuan Thuy, Chief, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Zorin, Valerian, Soviet Ambassador to France
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
References are to document numbers
Abrams, Gen. Creighton W., 5, 16, 42, 44, 51, 126, 167, 171, 197, 211, 249
Assassination threat, 3, 4
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 35, 38, 62, 64, 66, 105, 108, 109, 129, 134, 135, 140, 148, 234
Military situation in Vietnam:Cambodia, hot pursuit into, 253
Cease-fire option, 140
Communist offensives, 4, 8, 253
Communist strategy, 61, 62, 66
DMZ activity, 66, 227, 244, 248
Laos bombing, 140
Pacification counter-offensive, 234
Paris peace talks and, 66
Psychological warfare, 140Nuclear reactor at Dalat, proposed deactivation, 215
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF/ARVN), 44, 140
RVN participation in peace talks, 143, 148
Agnew, Spiro T., 31, 188, 207, 212
Albert, Carl, 8, 135, 166
Algard, Ole, 25, 28, 33
Allen, 16
Allott, Gordon, 22
Alsop, Joseph, 180
An. See Nguyen Ngoc An.
Anna Chennault affair. See Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks.
Arends, Leslie, 8, 166
Arms control, 237, 238
Attacks on RVN cities. See under Bombing halt leading to formal talks;
under Military
situation in Vietnam:
Cambodia, hot pursuit into, 253
Cease-fire option, 140
Communist offensives, 4, 8, 253
Communist strategy, 61, 62, 66
DMZ activity, 66, 227, 244, 248
Laos bombing, 140
Pacification counter-offensive, 234
Paris peace talks and, 66
Psychological warfare, 140 Nuclear reactor at Dalat, proposed deactivation, 215
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF/ARVN), 44, 140
RVN participation in peace talks, 143, 148
Agnew, Spiro T., 31, 188, 207, 212
Albert, Carl, 8, 135, 166
Algard, Ole, 25, 28, 33
Allen, 16
Allott, Gordon, 22
Alsop, Joseph, 180
An. See Nguyen Ngoc An.
Anna Chennault affair. See Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks.
Arends, Leslie, 8, 166
Arms control, 237, 238
Attacks on RVN cities. See under Bombing halt leading to formal talks;
under Military situation in Vietnam.
Bac. See Vuong Van Bac.
Bailey, Charles W., 72
Bailey, John, 255
Ball, George, 4, 35, 36, 38, 41, 42, 49, 50, 51, 70, 109, 123, 168, 187,
255
Baskakov, 2
Beech, Keyes, 189, 223
Benti, Joseph, 156
Berg, David, 50
Berger, Samuel R., 17, 57, 64, 75, 87, 93, 114, 118, 120, 136, 140, 170,
175, 178, 189, 203, 243, 249, 270, 273
Black, Eugene, 5, 41
Bo. See Mai Van Bo.
Board of National Estimates, 16
Boggs, Hale, 166, 255
Bogomolov, Sergei, 2, 34, 141, 241, 284
Bohlen, Charles E., 218
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 3, 69, 137, 234, 255
Abrams' position, 35, 108, 109, 129, 134, 135, 140
Administration discussions, 35, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 103, 104, 112, 121, 129, 139, 140, 148, 161, 167
Announcement of, 30, 71, 72, 93, 104, 106, 108, 110, 135, 136, 139, 152, 153, 156, 158, 161, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 173, 184
"Attacks on RVN cities" issue (see also Violations of bombing halt agreement under Paris peace talks), 19, 23, 42, 46, 55, 67, 68, 129, 132, 140, 161
Bundy's proposal, 63, 68, 77, 106
Clifford's position, 15, 69, 70, 140, 161, 213, 219, 223, 225
"Complete and unconditional halt" issue (see also Joint secret minute of understanding below), 101, 107, 135
Congressional leadership, Johnson's consultations with, 109, 135, 166
"DMZ re-establishment" issue (see also Violations of bombing halt agreement under Paris peace talks), 19, 23, 26, 29, 35, 39, 40, 43, 45, 46, 55, 111, 129, 132, 139, 140, 161
DRV strategy, 214
DRV troop withdrawals and, 56
DRV-U.S. discussions, 7, 14, 24, 32, 54, 58, 71, 76, 84, 95, 116, 124, 128, 149, 157, 158
Helms' position, 140
Humphrey's campaign speech re, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 50
Interval between bombing halt and beginning of talks, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 86, 88, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115, 116, 117, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 129
JCS position, 68, 69, 70, 108, 161
Johnson's conversations with Nixon re, 38, 53
Johnson's message to military commanders, proposed, 191
Johnson's position, 4, 5, 70, 140, 141
Johnson's public remarks, 72
Joint secret minute of understanding, 95, 99, 101, 110, 116, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 132, 149, 153, 155, 157, 158
LeMay's position, 121
Military consequences of halt, 35, 38, 68, 103, 105, 111, 140
Momyer's position, 111
Nixon's position, 38
Ohio channel of communication and, 25, 28, 29, 33
Political and public reaction in U.S., 69, 106, 108, 109, 173, 188
Postponements, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 153, 155, 182
Presidential campaign in U.S., impact on, 70, 123, 125, 129, 255
Presidential candidates informed about, 80, 113, 135, 139, 140, 166, 168
Reciprocity problem, U.S. handling of, 133
Reconnaissance flights and (see also Violations of bombing halt agreement under Paris peace talks), 35, 65, 67, 68, 177
"Resumption of bombing" issue, 35, 49, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 108, 109, 130, 132, 134, 140
Rostow's position, 131
Rusk's position, 69, 70, 140
RVN participation in peace talks and, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 32, 34, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46, 50, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 65, 67, 140
RVN position, 62, 64, 200
Security breaches re negotiations, 75, 77, 86, 93, 107, 115, 122, 189
Soviet-DRV contacts, 41, 101
Soviet involvement, U.S. encouragement, 15, 18, 20, 26, 34, 50, 51
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 2, 9, 26, 34, 47, 60, 88, 98, 99, 101, 107, 122, 130, 141, 150
Taylor's position, 140
Troop contributing countries and, 68, 70, 71, 75, 79, 135, 140
Westmoreland's position, 69
Wheeler's position, 69, 140
Boye, 25
Brandt, Willy, 211
Brown, Gen. George S., 140, 211
Brown, Harold, 167, 233
Bui Diem, 63, 87, 144, 189, 222, 228, 240, 258, 261
Paris peace talks, 89, 176, 210, 250, 258, 264
Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks, 145, 161, 194, 207, 232
RVN participation in peace talks, 154, 176, 201, 207, 209, 210, 219
Bundy, McGeorge, 63, 68, 77, 106
Bundy, William P., 19, 23, 29, 51, 57, 63, 65, 73, 74, 78, 79, 82, 85, 86,
90, 93, 94, 110, 115, 118, 152, 153, 154, 175, 176, 179, 183, 193, 201, 204,
206, 209, 210, 226, 230, 235, 238, 244, 257, 258, 261, 271, 272, 276, 280
Bunker, Ellsworth, 16, 42, 89, 126, 142, 171, 174, 197, 201, 203, 229, 235,
240, 243, 249, 264, 287
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 62, 64, 66, 75, 105, 108, 109, 136, 155, 165, 167, 182, 189, 200, 214, 219, 255
Military situation in Vietnam, 8, 44, 61, 62, 66, 91, 214, 259, 265, 285
Nuclear reactor at Dalat, proposed deactivation of, 215
Ohio channel of communication, 25
Paris peace talks:DRV-RVN contacts, proposed, 208
DRV strategy, 66, 214
DRV-U.S. meetings, proposed, 183, 190, 193
Military situation in Vietnam and, 66, 214
Procedural arrangements, 96, 182, 259, 270, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278
"Proceeding without RVN" option, 182, 214
Propaganda re, 114
RVN as head of delegation, proposed, 206, 208, 216, 217, 219, 222
RVN delegation membership, 228, 236
RVN domestic situation, impact on, 242
RVN participation, 24, 140, 143, 146, 149, 155, 159, 162, 170, 175, 178, 200, 206, 208, 214, 219, 222, 228, 236
RVN strategy, 259
RVN-U.S. joint position on negotiating issues, 208, 222, 226, 228
"Status of participants" issue, 87, 90, 94, 96, 114, 136, 170, 178, 200, 208, 217Republic of Vietnam (RVN) (see also RVN subheadings above):
Civil defense program, 91
Corruption, 91
Coup rumors, 57
Economic situation, 91, 285
Land policy, 44
Lien Minh political front, 91, 230, 251
Minh's return, 44, 91
Paris peace talks' impact on domestic situation, 242
Political situation, 91, 265, 285Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF/ARVN), 44, 91
Weekly reports, 44, 91, 259, 285
Burke, John, 57, 209, 210, 258
Burkley, Dr., 244
Burma, 220
Calhoun, John A., 222
Califano, Joseph, 38, 123
Cambodia, 5, 140, 220, 253
Carmichael, Stokely, 104
Carver, George A., Jr., 11, 16, 94, 201, 256
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 96
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 67
Coup in RVN, rumors, 17
Lien Minh political front, 11, 230
Military situation in Vietnam, 37, 72, 263
Paris peace talks, 94, 114, 258, 263
Phoenix program, 256
RVN participation in peace talks, 67, 201, 225, 235
Chan. See Nguyen Tho Chan.
Chapman, Gen. Leonard, 69, 167
Chennault, Anna, 173, 186, 191, 194, 207, 212, 232
China, People's Republic of, 9, 220
Christian, George A., 3, 4, 12, 22, 35, 38, 67, 68, 69, 72, 103, 104, 140,
148, 150, 152, 156, 168, 189, 202, 227, 231, 234, 238, 244, 248, 257, 272
Cleveland, Harlan, 4
Clifford, Clark M., 10, 23, 36, 42, 63, 67, 78, 115, 123, 166, 167, 193,
228, 235, 274, 287
Arms control, 237, 238
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 139, 255Abrams' position, 129, 140
Administration discussions, 35, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 103, 104, 112, 121, 129, 139, 140, 148, 161
Announcement of, 72, 106, 139, 153, 156, 161, 173
"Attacks on RVN cities" issue, 68, 161
Bundy's proposal, 106
Clifford's defense of administration policy, 213, 219, 223, 225
Clifford's position, 15, 69, 70, 140, 161
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 35, 161
Interval between bombing halt and beginning of talks, 73, 103, 104
Johnson's message to military commanders, proposed, 191
Joint secret minute of understanding, 121
Military consequences, 140
Political and public reaction in U.S., 69, 106
Postponement of halt, 153
Presidential campaign in U.S., impact on, 70
Reconnaissance flights and, 68
"Resumption of bombing" issue, 68, 70
Soviet involvement, U.S. encouragement of, 15
Troop contributing countries and, 68Military situation in Vietnam, 3
Attacks on RVN cities, 257
Cambodia, hot pursuit into, 253
Casualties, 274
Communist infiltration from DRV, 231
Communist offensives, 4, 8, 253, 274
Congressional hearings on, 22
DMZ activity, 211, 227, 248
Laos bombing, 202, 248, 274
Nixon's briefings, 211
Reconnaissance flights, attacks on, 231, 234, 238
Status reports on, 246
Withdrawal of troops, 12, 35, 238, 244Nixon transition, 211
Nuclear reactor at Dalat, proposed deactivation of, 215
Paris peace talks, 1, 150, 161, 202, 213, 227, 231, 237, 244, 248, 258, 272, 274, 275
Presidential campaign in U.S., 12, 255
Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks, 161, 191, 192, 194, 195
RVN participation in peace talks, 140, 148, 150, 161, 180, 202, 204, 229
Thieu, attitude toward, 195
U.S. policy on Vietnam, 180, 195, 202
Colby, William, 197, 249
Communist insurgency. See Military situation in Vietnam.
Communist subversion in Southeast Asia, 220
Congress, U.S., 5, 22, 69, 109, 135, 166
Connally, John, 108
Cooper, John Sherman, 51
Corcoran, Maj. Gen. Charles A., 249
Corcoran, Thomas, 173
Corner, F. A., 79
Crane, Kent, 212
Cronkite, Walter, 189
Curtis, Carl, 51
Cushman, Lt. Col. Robert E., 140
Czechoslovakia, 122
Daley, Richard, 255
Dan. See Phan Quang Dan.
Dang Duc Khoi, 219, 258, 264, 277
Daniel, Price, 4, 167
Davidson, Daniel I., 20, 25, 28, 29, 33, 58
Davis, Jeanne, 179
Davis, Nathaniel, 4, 35
Davis, Saville, 192, 194
Debré, Michel, 51, 52
Deepe, Beverly, 194
De Gaulle, Charles, 168
DeLoach, Cartha Dekle "Deke," 212
Deming, Frederick, 231
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) (see also Bombing halt leading
to formal talks; Military situation in Vietnam; Paris peace talks), 214,
220
Ohio channel of communication, 1, 20, 25, 28, 29, 33, 43
Papal peace initiative, 4, 5
Presidential campaign in U.S., interest in, 28
RVN non-participation in peace talks, preference for, 214
Soviet Union, relations with, 9
Diem. See Bui Diem.
Dirksen, Everett M., 5, 31, 36, 42, 81, 135, 166, 207
Johnson's conversations with, 31, 38, 42, 81, 113, 181, 205, 232
Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks, 181, 188, 192, 232
RVN participation in peace talks, 205, 207, 209
DMZ. See under Bombing halt leading to formal talks; under
Military situation in Vietnam; under Paris peace talks.
Doan Cong Lap, 57
Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., 1, 67, 68, 164, 218, 241
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 9, 18, 82, 86, 98, 100, 107, 115, 122, 130, 177
Paris peace talks, 92, 98, 122, 130, 177, 218
Do Cao Tri, Gen., 17
Don. See Tran Van Don.
Dong. See Pham Van Dong.
Dubs, Adolph, 218
Duc. See Nguyen Phu Duc.
Dulles, John Foster, 255
Duong Van Minh, Gen., 17, 44, 91, 140
Dzu. See Truong Dinh Dzu.
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 31, 69, 106, 112, 135, 161, 202
Elsey, George M., 15, 161, 191, 195, 202, 223, 229, 238
Engel, David, 233
Enthoven, Alain, 1
Evans, Rowland, 50
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 209, 212
Fessenden, Russell, 211
Finch, Robert, 187
Finney, Thomas, 50
Fitzgibbon, George, 51, 77
Ford, Gerald R., 8, 31, 113, 135, 166, 168
Fortas, Abe, 140, 255
Foster, William, 161
Fowler, Henry, 4, 35, 167, 231, 234
France, 263
Franklin, Maj. Gen. Wesley C., 220
Fried, Edward, 4, 231, 234
Fulbright, J. William, 207, 237
Gandhi, Indira, 72
Geneva Conference of 1962, 226, 228
Geyelin, Philip, 180
Giai, 25
Giap. See Vo Nguyen Giap, Gen.
Ginsburgh, Robert N., 13, 46, 56, 71, 117, 150, 167
Gleysteen, Dirk, 183, 210
Goldberg, Arthur J., 31, 42, 77
Goodpaster, Gen. Andrew J., 140, 148, 150, 151, 211, 244, 249
Goritsky, 241
Gorton, John, 68, 79, 86
Goulding, Phil G., 15, 191, 223
Graham, Katharine, 180
Gromyko, Andrei, 47, 51, 68
Habib, Philip C., 7, 71, 86, 120, 150, 152, 157, 184, 203, 208, 226, 240,
241, 245, 250, 260, 263, 287
Hai. See Tran Van Hai, Gen.
Halperin, Morton, 223
Hardesty, Robert, 167
Harlow, Bryce, 31, 181, 244
Harriman, W. Averell, 26, 28, 33, 60, 66, 94, 96, 98, 107, 109, 119, 122,
123, 149, 173, 174, 176, 178, 179, 184, 201, 206, 208, 210, 211, 216, 217,
218, 219, 222, 226, 227, 228, 235, 236, 244, 260, 264, 276, 279, 284
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 255Announcement of, 152, 158
"Attacks on RVN cities" issue, 19, 55, 132
Clifford's defense of administration policy, 213
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 19, 45, 55, 132
DRV-U.S. agreement, 158
DRV-U.S. discussions, 7, 24, 32, 54, 58, 76, 84, 95, 116, 124, 128, 158
Humphrey's campaign speech re, 50
Interval between halt and beginning of talks, 76, 82, 84, 88, 95, 99, 110, 115, 116, 124, 128
Joint secret minute of understanding, 95, 116, 124, 128, 132
Postponements, 150
Reciprocity problem, U.S. handling of, 133
"Resumption of bombing" issue, 49, 132
RVN participation in peace talks and, 19, 24, 27, 32, 45, 54, 55, 58
Soviet involvement, U.S. encouragement of, 20
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 2, 47, 88, 141Johnson, assessment of, 255
Military situation in Vietnam, 21, 241, 248
Ohio channel of communication, 20, 25, 43
Paris peace talks, 22, 248, 246Assessment of future prospects, 263
Bilateral DRV-U.S. meetings, proposed, 183, 185, 193, 196, 203
CIA support for U.S. delegation, 263
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 245
French influence on, 263
Guidance for Nixon administration negotiators, 287
Instructions for U.S. representatives, 23, 65, 110, 127
Presidential campaign in U.S. and, 45
Private meetings, 3, 7, 13, 14, 24, 32, 45, 54, 58, 84, 95, 116, 124, 128, 158, 287
Procedural arrangements, 93, 120, 198, 239, 240, 261, 269, 271, 280, 281, 283
"Proceeding without RVN" option, 185
Recall, possible, 50, 51
RVN as head of delegation, proposed, 203
RVN delay in arrival, 240
RVN delegation membership, 241
RVN intransigence, 188
RVN proposal for three-phase approach, 261
RVN participation, 7, 2, 19, 24, 27, 32, 45, 54, 55, 58
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 2, 241
"Status of participants" issue, 21, 241, 261
Violations of bombing halt agreement and, 233, 241, 248
"Withdrawal of troops" issue, 20Presidential campaign in U.S., 20, 45, 50, 51, 255
Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks, 213
Republic of Vietnam political situation, 255
Rusk, criticism of, 255
U.S. policy on Vietnam, assessment of, 255
Harris, Louis, 108
Hasluck, Paul, 51
Ha Van Lau, 7, 26, 32, 43, 54, 95, 224
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 55, 132, 149, 184DRV-U.S. agreement, 157, 158
DRV-U.S. discussions, 84, 116, 124, 128, 149, 157, 158
Interval between halt and beginning of talks, 84, 116, 124, 128
Joint secret minute of understanding, 116, 124, 128, 149, 157
Soviet-DRV contacts, 101Military situation in Vietnam, 233, 260
Paris peace talks:DRV-U.S. meetings, proposed, 184, 196
First procedural meeting, 286
Private meetings, 45, 84, 116, 124, 128, 158, 184, 196, 221, 233, 234, 245, 260, 284, 287
Procedural arrangements, 184, 196, 245, 260, 278, 280, 282, 284
Violations of bombing halt agreement and, 221Reconnaissance flights, attacks on, 233
Helms, Richard, 3, 4, 12, 16, 17, 22, 37, 166, 167, 211, 220, 230, 234, 235, 238, 256, 275
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 35, 67, 68, 72, 104, 139, 140, 148
Johnson's assessment of, 207
Lien Minh political front, 11
Military situation in Vietnam, 72, 202, 227, 238, 244
RVN participation in peace talks, 140, 201
Herz, Martin F., 118, 120, 136, 178, 217, 222, 243, 270, 273, 287
Hickenlooper, Bourke, 173
Hixon, Robert C., 161
Hoang Duc Nha, 230
Hoang Xuan Lam, Gen., 109
Ho Chi Minh, 2, 4, 5
Holbrooke, Richard C., 7, 233, 250
Holyoake, Keith, 51, 79
Hoopes, Townsend, 63
Hoover, J. Edgar, 209, 252
Hornig, Don, 202
Hughes, Col. Donald, 244
Hughes, Thomas L., 12, 43, 48
Humphrey, Hubert H., 1, 4, 12, 31, 36, 77, 103, 106, 113, 148, 172, 207
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 50, 80, 135, 166, 168, 255
Johnson's conversations with, 39, 80, 166, 168
Paris peace talks, 5, 80, 227
Presidential campaign in U.S., 12, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 50, 51, 108, 168, 173, 199, 255
Humphrey, Muriel, 168
Huong. See Tran Van Huong.
Ignatius, Paul, 167
Indonesia, 220, 262
Jackson, Henry, 22
Japan, 262
Javits, Jacob, 51
Johnson, Lady Bird, 207
Johnson, Luci, 168
Johnson, Lyndon B., 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 44, 54, 58, 84, 88, 91, 92, 95, 96,
99, 101, 119, 122, 124, 136, 149, 152, 162, 165, 184, 196, 203, 206, 210,
217, 218, 225, 226, 228, 234, 236, 237, 241, 245, 259, 262, 268, 269, 285
Arms control, 238
Ball's conversation with, 41
Ball's resignation from UN, 36
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 4, 5, 46, 55, 70, 72, 137, 140, 141, 255Abrams' position, 35, 108, 109, 129, 134, 135, 140
Administration discussions, 35, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 103, 104, 112, 121, 129, 139, 140, 148, 161, 167
Announcement of halt, 30, 72, 93, 104, 106, 135, 139, 153, 156, 161, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 173
"Attacks on RVN cities" issue, 42, 67, 68, 129, 140
Bundy's proposal, 77, 106
Clifford's defense of administration policy, 213
"Complete and unconditional halt" issue, 135
Congressional leadership, consultation with, 109, 135, 166
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 39, 111, 129, 139, 140
DRV troop withdrawals and, 56
DRV-U.S. discussions, 71
Humphrey's campaign speech re, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 50
Interval between halt and beginning of talks, 71, 72, 73, 76, 77, 86, 97, 100, 102, 103, 104, 108, 109, 115, 116, 117, 123, 125, 129
Johnson's conversations with Nixon re, 38, 53
Johnson's message to military commanders, proposed, 191
Joint secret minute of understanding, 121, 123, 125, 126
Military consequences, 35, 38, 68, 111, 140
Momyer's position, 111
"Nuanced language" by DRV, 14
Political and public reaction in U.S., 69, 106, 108, 109, 173, 188
Postponements, 146, 147, 151, 153
Presidential campaign in U.S., impact on, 70, 123, 125, 129
Presidential candidates informed about, 80, 113, 135, 139, 140, 166, 168
Reconnaissance flights and, 35, 67, 68
"Resumption of bombing" issue, 49, 67, 68, 69, 70, 108, 109, 130, 134, 140
Rostow's position, 131
Rusk's position, 140
RVN participation in peace talks and, 38, 42, 45, 50, 59, 67, 140
RVN position, 62
Security breaches re negotiations, 75, 77, 86, 115, 189
Soviet-DRV contacts, 41
Soviet involvement, U.S. encouragement of, 20, 50, 51
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 47, 122, 130
Troop contributing countries and, 70, 135, 140Cambodia, 5, 253
Clifford's views on Johnson's position, 195
Dirksen, assessment of, 207
Dirksen's conversations with, 31, 38, 42, 81, 113, 181, 205, 232
Final comments as President, 286
Harriman's assessment of, 255
Helms, assessment of, 207
Honolulu Conference, proposed, 51, 52
Humphrey's conversations with, 39, 80, 166, 168
Kosygin's communications with, 122, 130, 138, 141, 164, 177, 255
Mansfield's conversation with, 77
McNamara's conversation with, 171
Military situation in Vietnam, 3Attacks on RVN cities, 202, 257
Cambodia, hot pursuit into, 253
Cease-fire option, 140
Communist end-of-year offensive, possible, 252, 253, 254
Communist infiltration from DRV, 231
Communist strategy, 6, 62
Congressional hearings on, 22
DMZ activity, 202, 227, 244, 248
Laos bombing, 172
Nixon's briefings, 252
Pacification counter-offensive, 91
Psychological warfare, 140
Reconnaissance flights, attacks on, 231
Status reports on, 22, 246
U.S. planning for future operations, 18
U.S. strategy during bombing halt, 172
Withdrawals of troops, 12, 35Nixon's conversations with, 38, 53, 80, 166, 187, 207, 211
Nixon transition, 211
Ohio channel of communication, 1, 20, 25
Papal peace initiative, 4, 5
Paris peace talks (see also RVN participation in peace talks below), 1, 22, 287DRV-U.S. meetings, proposed, 229
Harriman's recall, possible, 50, 51
Harriman's status report, 246
Johnson-Kosygin communications re, 122, 130, 138, 141, 164, 177, 255
Johnson's final comments as President, 286
Johnson's message to Thieu re start of substantive talks, 142
Nixon's briefing, 252
Procedural arrangements, 272, 275, 276, 279
"Proceeding without RVN" option, 150, 151, 213, 227, 229
RVN as head of delegation, proposed, 204, 206
RVN delay in arrival, 244
RVN-NLF secret talks, proposed, 224
RVN participation in peace talks, 38, 42, 45, 50, 59, 67, 140, 143, 146, 148, 150, 151, 160, 163, 171, 172, 175, 188, 200, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 229
RVN proposal for two-phase approach, 258
"Status of participants" issue, 123
United front by U.S. politicians, 5, 80, 81
Vance's assessment of, 49
Violations of bombing halt agreement and, 221, 231, 248Presidential campaign in U.S., 12, 31, 42, 50, 51, 70, 123, 125, 129, 108, 168, 173, 199, 255
Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks, 140, 145, 146, 148, 163, 168, 173, 181, 186, 187, 188, 192, 194, 207, 212, 232
Rowe's conversation with, 173
Russell's conversations with, 109, 125, 172
RVN Armed Forces (RVNAF/ARVN), 140
RVN political situation, 140
Thieu's communications with, 142, 151, 160, 175, 276, 277, 279
Johnson, Tom, 8, 12, 22, 35, 36, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 103, 104, 112, 121,
129, 139, 140, 148, 150, 152, 156, 202, 211, 227, 234, 237, 238, 244, 248,
272, 275
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (see also Wheeler, Gen. Earle G.), 35,
51, 68, 69, 70, 108, 161, 211, 253, 274
Jones, James R. "Jim," 108, 140, 166, 168, 181, 184, 200, 205
Jorden, William J., 22, 51, 103, 258, 264
Kalb, Marvin, 72, 146
Kapenstein, Ira, 50
Kaplan, Harold, 22, 50, 51
Kaplow, Herb, 187
Karamessines, Thomas, 11, 94, 96, 114, 144, 148
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 18, 19, 23, 29, 51, 55, 65, 71, 154, 167, 175,
183, 204, 206, 218, 226, 247, 255
Kennedy, Edward M., 1, 50
Kennedy, John F., 135, 172
Khiem. See Tran Thien Khiem.
Khoi. See Dang Duc Khoi.
Kilday, Lowell, 272
Kirk, Roger, 243
Kissinger, Henry A., 244, 262, 266
Klein, Herbert, 123
Komer, Robert W., 16, 44, 197, 255
Kosygin, Alexei N., 1, 9, 15, 20, 68, 69, 150, 172, 237
Johnson's communications with, 122, 130, 138, 141, 164, 177, 255
Kraft, Joseph, 50, 180
Kuchel, Thomas, 22, 166
Ky. See Nguyen Cao Ky.
Ky (DRV official), 260
Laird, Melvin, 8
Lam. See Hoang Xuan Lam, Gen.; Pham Dang Lam; Tran Van Lam.
Laos, 59, 69, 140, 172, 202, 220, 247, 248, 262, 274
Latin America, 125
Lau. See Ha Van Lau.
Leddy, John M., 4
Le Duc Tho, 2, 66, 238, 241
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 24, 27, 32, 54, 55, 58
Paris peace talks, 3, 7, 13, 20, 24, 32, 54, 58, 287
Le Nguyen Khang, Gen., 91
Levinson, Lawrence, 167
Lien Minh political front, 11, 91, 230, 251
Lincoln, Frank, 246
Linder, Harold, 5
Lipscomb, Glenard, 35
Livesay, R. Eugene, 274
Loan. See Ngo Minh Loan; Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Gen.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 211, 287
Long, Russell, 106
Lu-Y. See Tran Lu-Y.
Lyng, 33, 43
Macy, John, 246
Mai Tho Truyen, 91
Mai Van Bo, 266, 284
Malaysia, 220
Malik, Adam, 238
Manac'h, Etienne, 282, 283, 284
Manatos, Mike, 5
Mansfield, Mike, 5, 31, 51, 72, 77, 135, 166, 168, 207, 209
Marcos, Ferdinand, 68, 75
Marder, Murrey, 50, 51, 248
Marks, Leonard, 4, 35, 167
Marshall, John, 79
Martin, William McChesney, 231
McCarthy, Eugene, 1, 36, 50, 255
McCloskey, Robert J., 104, 194, 217
McCone, John, 31
McConnell, Gen. John P., 69, 103, 111, 140, 227, 244, 274, 275
McCormack, John, 8, 42, 113, 135, 166
McGovern, George, 1, 264
McGrory, Mary, 264
McNamara, Robert S., 171, 255
McPherson, Gen., 274
McPherson, Harry C., Jr., 56, 73, 140, 148, 152, 156, 161, 168
Middleton, Harry, 167
Military situation in Vietnam (see also Bombing halt leading to formal
talks), 3, 16, 18, 220, 243
Attacks on RVN cities, 21, 162, 202, 257
Cambodia, hot pursuit into, 253
Casualties, 91, 274
Cease-fire option, 4, 16, 129, 140, 224
CIA report on, 72
Communist infiltration from DRV, 231
Communist offensives, 4, 8, 9, 16, 37, 91, 252, 253, 254, 274
Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, 140
Communist strategy, 6, 8, 44, 61, 62, 66
Congressional hearings on, 22
Covert operations in DRV, 48
DMZ activity, 5, 66, 202, 211, 218, 221, 227, 233, 241, 244, 245, 248
Laos bombing, 140, 172, 202, 248, 274
Nixon's briefings, 211, 252
Pacification counter-offensive, 44, 91, 197, 234, 249, 259
Paris peace talks and, 66, 214
Phoenix program, 256
Political and psychological factors, 263
Prisoners of war, 260, 267
Psychological warfare, 140, 197
Reconnaissance flights, attacks on, 218, 221, 231, 233, 234, 238, 241
Soviet-U.S. discussion, 218
Status reports on, 22, 44, 246, 274
Tet offensive, 285
U.S. strategy during bombing halt, 172
Withdrawal of troops, 12, 35, 56, 238, 244, 265
Minh. See Duong Van Minh, Gen.
Mitchell, John, 146
Momyer, Gen. William, 111, 140
Moorer, Adm. Thomas, 69, 167, 257, 274
Movement to Struggle for Peace, 263
Moyers, Bill, 51
Mundt, Karl, 22
Murphy, Charles, 231, 246, 255
Murphy, Capt. Frank M., 220
Murphy, Robert, 238
Muskie, Edmund, 5, 207
National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 50-68, 220
National Liberation Front (NLF) (see also "Status of participants" issue
under Paris peace talks), 224, 267
National Security Council (NSC) meetings, 4, 35, 167, 234
Negroponte, John, 7, 26, 34, 58, 119, 184, 287
Nelson, William E., 11
Ne Win, Gen., 220
Ngo Minh Loan, 20, 28
Ngo Quang Troung, Gen., 109
Nguyen Be, 249
Nguyen Cao Ky, 17, 75, 91, 93, 94, 165, 170, 201, 263
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 136, 189
Paris peace talks, 90, 94, 114, 136, 144, 159, 200, 219, 235, 236, 241, 250, 258, 261, 270, 277
RVN political situation, 140
Nguyen Minh Vy, 84, 157, 158, 184, 233
Nguyen Ngoc An, 208, 240, 250
Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Gen., 91
Nguyen Phu Duc, 144, 170, 228, 270, 273
Nguyen Thi Binh, Madame, 184, 207, 233, 247, 286
Nguyen Tho Chan, 20, 25, 28, 33, 43
Nguyen Van Huong, 11, 230
Nguyen Van Huyen, 235
Nguyen Van Kieu, 148, 163, 178, 223
Nguyen Van Thieu, 4, 9, 12
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 62, 64, 75, 79, 93, 94, 103, 104, 109, 136, 151, 165, 167, 189, 200, 219, 225
Clifford's attitude toward, 195
Johnson's communications with, 142, 151, 160, 175, 276, 277, 279
Military situation in Vietnam, 16, 44, 91, 197, 249, 265
Paris peace talks (see also RVN participation in peace talks below), 144DRV-RVN contacts, proposed, 208
Johnson's message re start of substantive talks, 142
Procedural arrangements, 85, 270, 273, 276, 277, 279, 283
"Proceeding without RVN" option, 151
Propaganda re, 114
RVN as head of RVN-U.S. delegation, proposed, 203, 208, 222
RVN delay in arrival, 244
RVN delegation membership, 228, 235, 236
RVN domestic situation, impact on, 242
RVN proposal for two-phase approach, 258
RVN-U.S. joint position on negotiating issues, 208, 222, 225, 228
"Status of participants" issue, 87, 89, 90, 94, 114, 136, 170, 178, 179, 200, 208, 225Popular support for, 200
Republic of Vietnam (RVN):Coup rumors, 17, 57
Economic situation, 91
Land policy, 44
Lien Minh political front, 11, 230, 251
Minh's return, 44
Paris peace talks' impact on domestic situation, 242
Political developments following peace agreement, 265
Political situation, 91, 140, 263RVN participation in peace talks:
Nixon's urging Thieu to participate, 202, 209, 210
RVN decision to participate, 219, 222, 225, 228, 235, 236
RVN refusal, 161, 170, 171, 172, 178, 200, 225
Timing concerns of RVN officials, 140, 143, 146, 148
U.S. pressure on RVN, 150, 151, 159, 160, 162, 208
Nguyen Van Tho, 274
Nguyen Xuan Phong, 250, 286
Nitze, Paul H., 4, 15, 35, 63, 94, 161, 167, 180, 191, 215
Nixon, Pat, 207
Nixon, Richard M., 1, 36, 52, 68, 172, 207, 211, 238, 244, 262
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 38, 50, 53, 70, 80, 113, 123, 135, 166
DRV's fear of, 214
Johnson's conversations with, 38, 53, 80, 166, 187, 207, 211
Military situation in Vietnam, brief-ings on, 211, 252
Paris peace talks, 5, 80, 211, 252, 277
Presidential campaign in U.S., 31, 42, 123, 199
Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks, 140, 145, 163, 173, 181, 186, 187, 188, 192, 207
RVN participation in peace talks, 200, 202, 205, 207, 209, 210
Norway. See Ohio channel of communication.
Novak, Robert, 50
Nuclear reactor at Dalat, proposed deactivation of, 215
Nuclear war, 9
Oberemko, Valentin, 2, 26, 34, 60, 88, 99, 101, 119, 218, 280, 281, 284
O'Brien, Lawrence, 50
O'Dwyer, Paul, 255
Ohio channel of communication, 1, 20, 25, 28, 29, 33, 43
Okun, Arthur, 5, 8
Oslo channel. See Ohio channel of communication.
Palmer, Gen. Bruce, 69, 167, 274
Papal peace initiative, 4, 5
Paris peace talks (see also Bombing halt leading to formal talks;
Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks), 1, 16, 22, 174, 287
Arms control and, 237
ARVN military activity as threat to, 140
Cessation of offensive actions leading to substantive talks, proposed, 10
"Change of RVN government" issue, 47
CIA support for U.S. delegation,
263
Designated spokesmen. See Procedural arrangements below.
Difficulties for U.S. created by RVN intransigence, 188
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 183, 245, 247
DRV-RVN contacts, proposed, 208
DRV strategy, 66, 214, 247
DRV-U.S. meetings, proposed, 183, 184, 185, 190, 193, 196, 202, 203, 229
Dual-track approach, 266, 274
First procedural meeting, 286
"Four party" formula. See "Status of participants" issue below.
French influence on, 263
Guidance for Nixon administration negotiators, 266, 287
Harriman and, 246, 263
Harriman's involvement in Humphrey's campaign, 50, 51
Instructions for U.S. representatives, 23, 65, 74, 78, 110, 127, 149, 233
Johnson-Kosygin communications re, 122, 130, 138, 141, 164, 177, 255
Johnson's final comments as President, 286
Johnson's message to Thieu re start of substantive talks, 142
Kissinger-Bo secret contacts, 266
Language and translation. See Procedural arrangements below.
Laos, 247
Military situation in Vietnam and, 66, 214
Name of conference. See Procedural arrangements below.
Nixon's briefing, 252
NLF participation. See "Status of participants" issue below.
Number of people. See Procedural arrangements below.
Order of speaking. See Procedural arrangements below.
"Our side/your side" formula. See "Status of participants" issue below.
Phase One-Phase Two proposal, 2, 133
Postponement of first expanded meeting, 199
Presidential campaign in U.S. and, 45, 51
Press coverage of first meeting. See Procedural arrangements below.
Private meetings, 3, 7, 13, 14, 24, 26, 32, 45, 54, 58, 84, 95, 116, 124, 128, 158, 184, 196, 221, 233, 234, 245, 260, 284, 287
Private meetings, continuation after start of substantive talks, 84, 238, 247
Procedural arrangements, 85, 93, 94, 96, 98, 118, 120, 176, 182, 184, 196, 198, 239, 240, 245, 250, 252, 259, 260, 261, 264, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 278, 279Agreement on, 282, 283, 284
Soviet compromise proposal, 280, 281, 282
U.S. pressure for RVN acceptance, 275, 276, 277
"Proceeding without RVN" option (see also DRV-U.S. meetings, proposed above), 150, 151, 161, 179, 182, 185, 193, 213, 214, 227, 229Propaganda re, 114
Rusk's attitude toward, 248
RVN as head of RVN-U.S. delegation, proposed (see also RVN-U.S. joint position on negotiating issues below), 203, 204, 206, 208, 216, 217, 219, 222
RVN delay in arrival, 240, 244
RVN delegation membership, 228, 235, 236, 241
RVN domestic situation, impact on, 242
RVN-NLF secret talks, proposed, 224
RVN participation (see also "Proceeding without RVN" option above; Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks):Bombing halt leading to formal talks and, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 32, 34, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46, 50, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 65, 67, 140
Bunker's position, 24
DRV position, 214
DRV-U.S. discussions, 7, 24, 32
Nixon's urging Thieu to participate, 202, 205, 207, 209, 210
NLF participation and. See "Status of participants" issue under Paris peace talks.
Paris peace talks--Continued
RVN participation--Continued
RVN decision, 219, 222, 225, 228, 235, 236
RVN refusal, 149, 161, 170, 171, 172, 178, 180, 188, 200, 225
RVN terms for, 96, 209
Soviet-U.S. discussions re, 2, 34
Timing concerns of RVN officials, 140, 143, 146, 148
Troop contributing countries and, 179
U.S. pressure on RVN (see also Nixon's urging Thieu to participate above), 150, 151, 154, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163, 175, 176, 178, 193, 200, 201, 204, 206, 208, 229RVN proposal for three-phase approach, 261
RVN proposal for two-phase approach, 258
RVN strategy, 247, 259
RVN-U.S. criticisms of one another, 258
RVN-U.S. delegation meeting, 250
RVN-U.S. joint position on negotiating issues, 90, 206, 208, 210, 222, 225, 226, 228, 264
Seating arrangements. See Procedural arrangements above.
Soviet advice for U.S., 241
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 2, 26, 34, 92, 98, 101, 119, 218, 241
"Status of participants" issue (see also Procedural arrangements above), 4, 21, 87, 89, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 101, 104, 110, 114, 119, 123, 136, 170, 178, 179, 200, 208, 217, 225, 226, 241, 250, 261
Swift completion, Rostow's argument for, 122
Thieu's attitude toward, 144
United front by U.S. politicians, 5, 80, 81, 211
Vance's assessment of, 49
Violations of bombing halt agreement and, 183, 218, 221, 231, 233, 241, 248
Withdrawal of troops issue, 13, 20, 26, 247
Park Chung-hee, 68, 156, 172
Paul VI, Pope, 4, 5
Peace talks (see also Paris peace talks):
Ohio channel of communication, 1, 20, 25, 28, 29, 33, 43
Papal peace initiative, 4, 5
Pearson, Drew, 123
Percy, Charles, 255
Perry, Jack, 2, 241
Pham Dang Lam, 87, 96, 120, 149, 154, 236, 240, 250, 282, 283
Pham Van Dong, 2
Pham Van Minh, Lt. Col., 258
Phan Quang Dan, 17, 91
Philippines, 220
Philpott, Maj. Gen. Jammie M., 220
Phoenix program, 256
Phong. See Nguyen Xuan Phong.
Presidential campaign in U.S. (see also Republican-RVN conspiracy
re peace talks), 12, 20
Ball's resignation and, 36, 50
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, impact of, 70, 123, 125, 129, 255
DRV interest in, 28
Harriman and, 50, 51, 255
Humphrey's campaign speech on bombing halt, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 50
Humphrey's handling of bombing halt, 168, 173
Johnson's position, 31, 42, 108, 173, 255
Nixon's victory, 199
Paris peace talks and, 45, 51
Prisoners of war, 260, 267
Pursley, Col. Robert, 10, 15, 191, 223
Raborn, Adm. Arthur, 207
Rather, Dan, 146
Read, Benjamin H., 3, 19, 23, 29, 58, 65, 73, 74, 78, 79, 82, 85, 86, 90,
92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 101, 105, 107, 110, 115, 116, 118, 119, 122, 124,
127, 128, 142, 143, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 165,
167, 174, 175, 176, 193, 196, 203, 206, 226, 245, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284
Rebozo, Bebe, 207
Reconnaissance flights. See under Bombing halt leading to formal talks;
under Military situation in Vietnam.
Reid, Ogden, 51
Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks, 140, 143, 145, 146, 148, 161, 163,
168, 173, 181, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 194, 195, 207, 212, 213, 232
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) (see also Military situation in Vietnam;
Paris peace talks; Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks; RVN participation
in peace talks):
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 62, 64, 75, 93
Civil defense program, 91
Communist political program, 16
Corruption, 91
Coup rumors, 17, 57, 140
Economic situation, 91, 243, 285
Election outcomes, possible, 9
Land policy, 44
Lien Minh political front, 11, 91, 230, 251
Minh's return, 44, 91, 140
Movement to Struggle for Peace, 263
Paris peace talks, impact on domestic situation, 242
Political developments following peace agreement, 265
Political situation, 91, 140, 243, 255, 262, 263, 285
U.S., attitudes toward, 91, 242
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF/ARVN), 44, 91, 140, 285
Resor, Stanley, 167
Reston, James, 180
Ridgway, Rozanne, 25, 28, 33
Rivers, Mendel, 109
Robb, Chuck, 109, 202
Roberts, Chalmers, 264
Roberts, Juanita, 106
Rogers, William, 277
Rostow, Eugene, 140
Rostow, Walt W., 8, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 23, 29, 35, 36, 37, 39, 54, 56, 58,
65, 67, 70, 74, 75, 88, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 99, 101, 110, 111, 114, 119,
124, 135, 136, 149, 150, 152, 162, 165, 166, 167, 175, 183, 184, 188, 193,
196, 200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 210, 211, 225, 226, 231, 234, 235, 236, 245,
264, 269, 275, 276
Arms control, 238
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 3, 131, 137, 140, 255Administration discussions, 68, 69, 72, 73, 103, 104, 112, 121, 129, 139, 140, 148, 161
Announcement, 30, 71, 153, 156
"Attacks on RVN cities" issue, 46, 140
Clifford's defense of administration policy, 213
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 46
DRV-U.S. agreement, 157
DRV-U.S. discussions, 71
Humphrey's campaign speech re, 40
Interval between halt and beginning of talks, 76, 84, 97, 102, 103, 104, 116, 117, 122, 129
Johnson's message to military commanders, proposed, 191
Joint secret minute of understanding, 121, 122
Military consequences, 38, 68, 140
"Nuanced language" by DRV, 14
"Resumption of bombing" issue, 66
RVN participation in peace talks and, 45, 46, 59
RVN position, 62
Security breaches re negotiations, 122, 189
Soviet involvement, 18
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 9, 47, 122, 130
Troop contributing countries and, 71, 140Clifford's views on Rostow's approach to Vietnam, 195
Laos, 59, 202, 262
Military situation in Vietnam, 4, 6, 18, 21, 62, 66, 129, 202, 218, 227, 238, 244, 248, 252, 253, 256
Nixon transition and U.S. policy on Vietnam, 262
Ohio channel of communication, 25
Paris peace talks, 49, 66, 122, 252, 287Johnson-Kosygin communications re, 122, 130, 138
Procedural arrangements, 252, 268, 272
RVN as head of RVN-U.S. delegation, proposal re, 204
RVN-NLF secret talks, proposed, 224
RVN participation, 45, 46, 59, 148, 163, 204, 209, 213
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 218
"Status of participants" issue, 21, 89
Thieu's attitude toward, 144
Violations of bombing halt agreement and, 221Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks, 140, 145, 163, 181, 192, 194
RVN political situation, 9, 262
Southeast Asian monitors for Vietnam settlement, 262
Rowe, James, 173
Rusk, Dean, 5, 7, 9, 36, 66, 75, 114, 142, 154, 164, 166, 167, 176, 218,
231, 234, 235, 241, 258, 261
Arms control, 237, 238
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 3, 255Abrams' position, 135, 140
Administration discussions, 35, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 103, 104, 112, 121, 129, 139, 140, 148
Announcement, 72, 93, 110, 135, 153, 156, 169
"Attacks on RVN cities" issue, 19, 23, 67, 68
Bundy's proposal, 68
"Complete and unconditional halt" issue, 107, 135
Congressional leadership, Johnson's consultations with, 135
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 19, 23, 29
Humphrey's campaign speech re, 40, 50
Interval between halt and beginning of talks, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 82, 85, 86, 94, 98, 100, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 115, 123, 129
JCS position, 108
Joint secret minute of understanding, 110, 121, 123, 125, 126, 155
Military consequences, 68, 105, 140
Political and public reaction in U.S., 188
Postponements, 146, 147, 153, 155
Presidential campaign in U.S., impact on, 70, 123, 129
Presidential candidates informed about, 135, 139
Reconnaissance flights and, 35, 65, 67, 68, 177
"Resumption of bombing" issue, 67, 70, 108
Rusk's position, 69, 70, 140
RVN participation in peace talks and, 19, 23, 27, 29, 50, 65, 67
Security breaches re negotiations, 93, 107, 115, 189
Soviet involvement, U.S. encouragement of, 50, 51
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 47, 98, 107
Troop contributing countries and, 68, 79, 135, 140Clifford's relationship with, 274
Harriman's criticism of, 255
Honolulu Conference, proposed, 51, 52
Military situation in Vietnam, 5, 8, 22, 129, 211, 227, 238, 244, 248, 253, 257
Nixon's conversation with, 52
Nixon transition and U.S. policy on Vietnam,, 211
Ohio channel of communication, 29, 43
Paris peace talks, 1, 22, 174, 246, 247, 287Arms control and, 237
"Change of RVN government" issue, 47
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 183, 245
DRV-U.S. meetings, proposed, 183, 193, 202, 229
Harriman's recall, possible, 50, 51
Instructions for U.S. representatives, 23, 65, 74, 78, 110, 127
Johnson-Kosygin communications re, 177
Procedural arrangements, 85, 93, 94, 98, 118, 271, 272, 275, 276, 283
"Proceeding without RVN" option, 150, 193, 227, 229
Rusk's attitude toward, 248
RVN as head of RVN-U.S. delegation, proposal re, 206
Rusk, Dean--Continued
Paris peace talks--Continued
RVN intransigence, 188
RVN participation in peace talks, 19, 23, 27, 29, 50, 65, 67, 140, 143, 146, 148, 150, 155, 170, 175, 179, 188, 193, 202, 204, 206, 207, 209, 229
RVN-U.S. joint position on negotiating issues, 90, 206
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 92, 98
"Status of participants" issue, 4, 90, 92, 94, 98, 110, 123, 179
Thieu's attitude toward, 144
Violations of bombing halt agreement and, 183, 248Presidential campaign in U.S., 12, 20, 50, 51, 123, 129, 168
Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks, 143, 146, 181, 188, 192, 194, 212
Republic of Vietnam, coup rumors, 57, 140
Russell, Richard B., 5, 22, 69, 106, 109, 125, 126, 172
Ryan, Gen. John, 140, 167
Sainteny, Jean, 266
Sanders, Harold Barefoot, 8, 166
Schlesinger, Arthur, 173
Schwartz, Lou, 189
Scranton, William, 202
Shriver, R. Sargent, 115
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 5, 220
Singapore, 220
Sisco, Joseph, 35, 234
Smathers, George, 70, 72, 186, 187, 188, 192, 232
Smith, Abbot, 16
Smith, Bromley, 4, 35, 69, 150, 167, 209, 234, 241, 258, 272
Smith, Hedrick, 51
Smith, Howard K., 51
Smith, Rick, 72
Southeast Asia after Vietnam (NIE 50-68), 220
Southeast Asian monitors for Vietnam settlement, 262
Souvanna Phouma, 220
Soviet Union, 220, 255
Arms control, 238
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 122, 132Interval between halt and beginning of talks, 82, 86, 88, 98, 99
Joint secret minute of understanding, 99
RVN participation in peace talks and, 60
Soviet-DRV contacts, 41, 101
Soviet involvement, U.S. encouragement of, 15, 18, 20, 26, 34, 50, 51
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 2, 9, 26, 34, 47, 60, 88, 98, 99, 101, 107, 122, 130, 141, 150DRV, relations with, 9
Military situation in Vietnam, 218, 241
Ohio channel of communication, 25, 28
Paris peace talks, 47, 92, 241, 280, 281Johnson-Kosygin communications re, 122, 130, 138, 141, 164, 177, 255
RVN participation, 2, 34, 60
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 2, 26, 34, 92, 98, 101, 119, 218, 241
Spivak, Larry, 187
Stennis, John, 22
Stewart, Michael, 51
Stuart, Richard K., 48
Sung, 25, 28
Symington, Stuart, 22, 223
Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 3, 31, 67, 68, 121, 129, 138, 139, 140, 148, 202,
254
Taylor, Vice Adm. Rufus, 256
Tcherniakov, Yuri N., 122
Tet offensive, 285
Thailand, 220, 249
Thanat Khoman, 79
Thanh. See Tran Chanh Thanh.
Thanom Kittikachon, 71
Thant, U, 35
Thien. See Ton That Thien.
Thieu. See Nguyen Van Thieu.
Tho. See Le Duc Tho.
Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., 1, 4, 108
Thompson, Sir Robert, 249
303 Committee, 230
Thuy. See Xuan Thuy.
Tibbetts, Margaret Joy, 33
Tito, Josip Broz, 20
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 5
Ton That Thien, 17, 219, 222, 225
Tower, John, 50, 173, 186, 192, 207
Tran Chanh Thanh, 75, 77, 85, 94, 96, 114, 136, 165, 170, 216, 217, 222,
225, 226, 228, 236, 240, 287
Paris peace talks, 87, 90, 118, 120, 149, 159, 178, 235, 270, 273, 278
Tran Lu-Y, 91
Tran Quoc Buu, 11
Tran Thien Khiem, 17, 57, 91, 219
Tran Van Don, 9, 11, 230
Tran Van Hai, Gen., 91
Tran Van Huong, 9, 12, 17, 91, 200, 285
Tran Van Lam, 228
Tri Quang, Thich, 91
Troung. See Ngo Quang Troung, Gen.
Troung Chinh, 44
Trueheart, William, 48
Truong Dinh Dzu, 9, 17, 91
Twain, Mark, 70
United Nations, 35
Utkin, 241
Vance, Cyrus R., 10, 28, 33, 66, 74, 94, 96, 98, 122, 123, 174, 176, 178, 179, 206, 208, 210, 211, 216, 217, 219, 222, 226, 228, 236, 276, 279
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 255Announcement of, 152, 158, 184
"Attacks on RVN cities" issue, 55, 132
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 26, 55, 132
DRV-U.S. agreement, 157, 158
DRV-U.S. discussions, 32, 54, 58, 71, 76, 84, 95, 116, 124, 128, 149, 157, 158
Interval between halt and beginning of talks, 76, 84, 88, 95, 99, 101, 110, 115, 116, 119, 124, 128
Joint secret minute of understanding, 95, 99, 116, 119, 124, 128, 132, 149, 157
Postponement, 146, 147, 149, 150
Reciprocity problem, U.S. handling of, 133
"Resumption of bombing" issue, 49, 132
RVN participation in peace talks and, 26, 27, 32, 34, 54, 55, 58, 60
Soviet involvement, U.S. encouragement of, 26, 34
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 2, 26, 34, 60, 88, 99, 101, 150Kissinger, letter to, 266
Military situation in Vietnam, 233, 241, 244, 245, 260
Ohio channel of communication, 43
Paris peace talks, 49CIA support for U.S. delegation, 263
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 245
DRV-U.S. meetings, proposed, 183, 184, 185, 193, 196, 203
First procedural meeting, 286
Guidance for Nixon administration negotiators, 266
Instructions for U.S. representatives, 23, 65, 110, 127, 149
Private meetings, 3, 7, 13, 24, 26, 32, 45, 54, 58, 84, 95, 116, 124, 128, 158, 184, 196, 221, 233, 234, 245, 260, 284, 287
Procedural arrangements, 93, 184, 196, 245, 250, 260, 261, 268, 269, 271, 278, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284
"Proceeding without RVN" option, 185
RVN as head of RVN-U.S. delegation, proposal re, 203
RVN delegation membership, 241
RVN intransigence, 188
RVN participation, 2, 26, 27, 32, 34, 54, 55, 58, 60
RVN proposal for three-phase approach, 261
RVN-U.S. delegation meeting, 250
Soviet-U.S. discussions, 2, 26, 34, 101, 119, 241
"Status of participants" issue, 101, 119, 241, 250, 261
Violations of bombing halt agreement and, 221, 233, 241
"Withdrawal of troops" issue, 26Presidential campaign in U.S., 50, 51
Republican-RVN conspiracy re peace talks, 146
Van Dyke, Theodore, 50
Vien, Gen., 150, 151
Vietnam. See Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV); Republic of Vietnam
(RVN).
Vo Nguyen Giap, Gen., 35
Vraalsen, 25, 28, 33
Vuong Van Bac, 250
Vy. See Nguyen Minh Vy.
Wallace, George, 42, 80, 135, 166, 172, 187, 199
Waller, Sir John, 79
Walsh, John P., 57, 221, 271, 276
Walsh, Lawrence, 287
Walske, Carl, 215
Walt, Gen. Lewis, 173, 274
Walters, Maj. Gen. Vernon A., 238
Ware, Maj. Gen. Keith, 21
Warnke, Paul, 10, 15, 161, 195, 215, 223, 238, 244, 248, 258
Watson, Marvin, 168
Westmoreland, Gen. William C., 69, 109, 125, 167, 172
Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 8, 125, 166, 167, 238
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 69, 234Abrams' position, 35, 134, 140
Administration discussions, 35, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 103, 104, 112, 121, 129, 139, 140, 148, 161
Announcement of, 72, 139, 153, 156
"DMZ re-establishment" issue, 139
Interval between halt and beginning of talks, 71, 72, 103, 104, 129
Military consequences of halt, 35, 68, 103, 140
Postponements of, 153
"Resumption of bombing" issue, 35, 68, 134, 140Military situation in Vietnam, 3
Attacks on RVN cities, 202
Cambodia, hot pursuit into, 253
Cease-fire option, 4, 129, 140
Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, 140
Communist third offensive, 4
DMZ activity, 202, 244, 248
Nixon's briefings, 211
Pacification counter-offensive, 234
Reconnaissance flights, attacks on, 234, 238
Status reports on, 22
Withdrawal of troops, 35, 244Nixon transition and U.S. policy on Vietnam, 211
Paris peace talks, 10, 140, 150
White, William S., 287
Wiggins, James Russell, 140, 161, 234
Withdrawal of troops. See under Military situation in Vietnam;
under Paris peace talks.
Xuan Thuy, 7, 32, 58, 152, 184
Bombing halt leading to formal talks, 55, 158DRV-U.S. agreement, 158
DRV-U.S. discussions, 54, 58, 71, 76, 84, 95, 116, 124, 128, 158
Interval between halt and beginning of talks, 76, 84, 95, 116, 124, 128
Joint secret minute of understanding, 95, 116, 124, 128, 158
RVN participation in peace talks and, 58
Soviet-DRV contacts, 101Paris peace talks, 3, 13, 24, 45, 54, 58, 84, 95, 116, 124, 128, 158, 287
Zorin, Valerian, 2, 241, 280
Zumwalt, Rear Adm. Elmo, 140
Zwick, Charles, 5, 8, 38
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21590.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
1-24
September 1-October 1, 1968: Efforts To Move the Peace Talks Forward; the Ohio Exercise
1. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
September 2, 1968, 10:10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, September 2, 1968, 10:10 a.m., Tape F68.06, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Clifford, in Washington, called the President at his Texas ranch, where Johnson was staying August 23 to September 3. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Clifford: But by the time you got back, say Wednesday,/2/ I think you're coming back--we could then have a memorandum. If we can't agree, then we can set forth the items where we are in agreement and then others that we could sit down, maybe just the four of us, and talk out, because I think we are getting to a point where possibly because of an unsuccessful offensive on their part, possibly because of a concern on their part about the political situation in the U.S., that they see nothing ahead of them, there may be the possibility still in the next 3 or 4 months where great progress can be made.
/2/September 4.
President: I agree with all that. I think that's a good plan. My thinking is this, and maybe you can understand, if you have this little background--I'll try not to be too long--maybe you can weigh this in your drafting. Number one, I think a basic weakness of this government is that we do not come up with enough of possible outlines and suggestions and proposals for the other side to look at and evaluate and amend and moderate and so forth. And I think we just say we'll go on fighting, we'll stop the bombing, if you'll stop everything. But you're not going to stop anything. That's our position, period.
Now, I happen to be one that never thought this was going to be a short operation over there. And I think it's going to take time and I think it's very likely to go into a long time in the next administration unless we surrender and pull out. And then I think it'll in time come back, flame in again, and get hot, much wider territory. I would like for our record to show that our people are seeking peace so much, yearning for it so much that every month or so that we say, well, if this wouldn't work, maybe this would. I would naturally like for that to go through our people in Vietnam--uh, in Paris--now that we have these contacts. It seems to me that we have a great obligation and duty to give them more than we do give them. They've got to sell real silk socks like I did when I was a kid, and when they just gave me four colors, I couldn't do much business. But when they expanded the lot, and I had about eighteen, I could really move them. And I think we've got to give them some more colors to look at.
So I have tried to encourage State as well as our shop to be thinking of anything that we could legitimately give, and we could give our bombing, and what could we get that they could live with. Of course, if they'd re-establish the DMZ, I think we could get the JCS and everybody to go along. I don't see how they could do that because that would be a signal that the South's not going to get any more help, and so on and so forth, and there's two Vietnams. But if we could find out, and I just plain don't know, this is detail and technicality, we ought to find out if we were in their place what they could live with that we could live with. Now, I'm not about to run on that platform--run out on it. I don't want to wiggle from it one goddamn inch. I'm not a McCarthyite at all. I think he's wrong. I think he's unsound. I think that McGovern's unsound. I think Teddy Kennedy's unsound. Now maybe that that'll be our policy in January and maybe Humphrey will come to that. But I honestly believe that their views--those in the Pentagon, among your civilians, the Enthovens and that group, and a bunch over in State too, I just believe they're unsound. Now maybe, maybe they're not. But I would like, though, on my own to try to have something more than we've got.
Now I was very interested and encouraged by your thought that here was something we could offer, and if they didn't--they'd have to take one of three courses. The thing that I found wrong with it was that I didn't think that you had the experience in stopping the bombing that I had had, and I think that it was kind of a professorial, idealistic, unrealistic approach to assume that we could ever stop the damn thing and get back in. And then I thought you were a little fuzzy on really whether we would get back in or not, whether you'd just come charging and say you damn right we will. That one had a little more appeal to me. And third, I didn't think we could do any of that before the convention anyway because it'd be for political purposes. So, my thinking is, A--I want new proposals any damn kind, I'll pay a reward for them.
Clifford: All right. [chuckle]
President: By God, I'll pay a premium, just like we do on our pole cats down there we sell. If it's got a little white on its back, I'll give a little extra. We used to ship them up to Funston's in St. Louis where you lived. But anybody that'll get us something that we can live with that might conceivably perhaps be appealing to them, so A--Averell can present it, B--so the Pope could have something that's new that he could say, "I believe this could be done," because I'm very anxious to give him a little something to chew on, because I'm holding him. Otherwise, he'll be against us if we just keep on not ever finding anything for him. I want someday without hurting anything to do that. Third, at Oslo, I want something besides just the plain ABCs./3/
/3/Reference is to the indirect channel to the North Vietnamese through the Norwegians; see footnote 5, Document 20.
Clifford: Yes.
President: Now I don't have the staff right under me that can come up with eighteen proposals. Defense has a group over there that I know want peace. And Rusk has a group of policy planners and so forth, and Rostow. So I have said to Rusk, please, please, spend the next month on getting us some initiatives here. I'm not really for putting them out in public. I'm for saying to Kosygin, "Now, you tell us that here on Czechoslovakia this is none of our damn business, and here's generally about how our people feel about what's going on, and we think it's just as dangerous, more dangerous, in Eastern Europe than you think it's dangerous in Southeast Asia. So, we feel this very strongly, and this is our view. Now here's how we feel about Southeast Asia. You say that you think that you "have reason to believe" that something would come. Well, I have reason to believe we could do this if your reason to believe is any good, and give him something, I don't know what the hell it is, that he could work on.
Clifford: Yeah.
President: At the same time, I would tell Averell, "Now here, we're going to do this with Kosygin, we're going to do this with the Pope." I would like when Nixon comes in on January 21, and he says, "Okay, what is it this crowd did? What did you do last year?" And I would say, "Well, Rusk and Clifford proposed on September the 3d that we go this far, and we did. And on September the 9th, we said to the Pope this. And on September the 18th, we said to Harriman this." Or maybe Harriman first, and then the Pope, and then Kosygin.
Clifford: Right.
President: Now that's all I'm saying. That's rather disjointed. But I'm not trying to get a letter off to Kosygin yesterday.
Clifford: That's good.
President: I'm just trying to say to him, "For God's sakes, let's get something that will be sure." Now, I really don't think it's going to come to much. But I want to be an optimist. Now I said to Humphrey, "What I'd like to do is to be able to say to Harriman, 'Now I've talked to Humphrey and Nixon, and you can tell the North Vietnamese there's going to be no division in this country, that we're going to be one man until a new President takes office and they don't need to count on any divisions among us.'" And Humphrey said, "That's fine by me," and Nixon had in effect said that to me before. "Well," I said, "let's wait 'til next week and I'll be back up there." Well, goddamnit, he went right to the newspaper and called a press conference and said that this is what he thought ought to be done. Now you can see Nixon's not likely to accept Humphrey's proposal. But he just doesn't understand. Now I would hope that next week we could get a couple of sentences that would say something like that and let Rusk quietly communicate it to Harriman, let Vance tell them some evening, that here's what we're authorized to say on behalf of Nixon and Humphrey and the President.
Clifford: I've got the picture. That's very helpful. I'll have my notes ready and the three of us'll meet tomorrow. I'd like to come up with something so we have--in any event, I'll have a paper for you on Wednesday so you can look at it./4/
/4/Not found.
President: All right.
Clifford: And it will have some ideas in it and that may spring other ideas.
President: Well, what we could do, if you want to, Wednesday, before we have our [National] Security Council meeting, you could come in. I hear a lot better sometimes than I read from you. I think you're the best pleader I ever heard. So I would like to have you outline for me any thoughts that you have. Now, I had thought seriously of asking you to come down here over Labor Day and come in and just sit here and talk like in a full day like I've talked in ten minutes here. I concluded against it. I talked to Rusk on the phone and told him what I thought instead, and I concluded against it for two reasons. One was, I didn't know how quite to do it without Rusk being in on discussing this kind of proposal. And the second thing--I don't want to take you away from your golf Labor Day. And third, we had miserable weather anyway, and it's a long six hours on a jet that can be used absorbing a little rest for the week ahead. I do think, a propos what you said the other day, that you might say to Jim Jones, "Now let's do this in a quiet period, and give me--I don't want but 15 minutes. My guess is it'll take an hour. Heh, heh. So, let's just set aside an hour and let's be damn sure we set it so another meeting won't be crowding us. And let me try to explain some things, and let the President ask some questions and maybe explain his feeling to me." And then I think we might either--the four or five of us--go out on a boat and visit around some if we still have sunshine or [Camp] David, or something maybe next week, and continue to probe. I'd like to let Nitze run the Department, and Katzenbach, and Brom Smith, and let you and Rusk and Walt try to figure out things that A--will give us some hope of success, that B--will at least be treating the American people fair, and C--that we'll damn sure look good before an investigating committee in February when they say what in the hell did you do.
Clifford: That all makes a lot of sense. What we need is exactly what you have in mind. It's what I need. I mentioned it before. It's a chance to sit down where we don't have to be careful or cautious for somebody else that's there. But with this--with the four of us, I can speak completely freely, and I'm sure they can, and I feel that you can. And that's really what we need. We can take it all apart. And I can make any kind of suggestions, and Dean [Rusk] feels free to knock them down, and I can knock his down, and out of it can come something. The record is important, but I still feel that out of it can come something that in my--as I've said all along, it will be the crowning glory of your administration.
President: Well, we just sure don't want to be just the kind of hot-heads and hard-heads and stubborn Dutchmen that won't consider anything. It's awful hard to consider something when you haven't got something.
Clifford: Yeah.
President: And I have this feeling too. Tommy [Llewellyn] Thompson is going back. Before he goes back, I'm going to talk to him. Nixon's anxious to talk to him too. I would like very much to give Thompson a pretty good feel of several things that might perhaps maybe have some appeal where he can have something besides just greetings and the damn formal stuff when he gets back talking to his people and can kind of have something to try to appeal to them with./6/ So, I'm going to try to see him Wednesday or Thursday. And maybe out of that, before we get a letter, we can say, now, here, would you try this on for size with them.
/6/In a meeting with Dobrynin on September 6, Thompson informed him that the President would be willing to overlook any potential domestic criticism and meet with Kosygin to discuss strategic matters. Thompson's memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Document 293.
Clifford: Mm-hmm.
President: Okay.
Clifford: Thank you.
2. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, September 3, 1968, 1807Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-September 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Plus. Received at 2:53 p.m.
20314/Delto 682. From Harriman and Vance.
1. We saw Zorin at Soviet Embassy morning September 3 for meeting of slightly over an hour./2/ (Bogomolov being on leave, Oberemko and Perry interpreted and Soviet press attaché Baskakov took notes on Soviet side.)
/2/The meeting between Harriman and Zorin took place at 11 a.m. In a memorandum of this conversation drafted the same day, Perry noted that it was the first meeting since the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips and Missions, Paris Peace Talks, Chronological Files, September-November 1968)
2. It was noticeable that Zorin's attitude was more forthcoming and unargumentative than in any of our previous talks. He seemed at pains to stress positive aspects of situation regarding Vietnam talks, and to pass up opportunities to start usual polemics about US position. Zorin commented at outset that he had been occupied elsewhere than with Vietnam, and Harriman replied that call on him was made in hopes of getting his attention back to the Vietnamese problem. Otherwise East European situation did not come up except that Harriman mentioned that these events would harden US opinion.
3. We led off by saying that our visit was to take stock of the situation, and pointed out failure of talks with DRV on his Phase One-Phase Two proposal. We pointed to the increased attacks in the last two weeks and to the resumption of the use of Soviet-made rockets in indiscriminate shelling of Saigon and Danang. We gave him the details of the heavy civilian casualties resulting from the indiscriminate attacks. We also pointed out the heavy and senseless losses being incurred by NVA in last two weeks.
4. We then referred to the Soviet Government's message to Ho Chi Minh (cited Moscow 5351)/3/ which in spite of the militant language of the message indicated that the Soviet Union was still interested in a political settlement of the Vietnam conflict. We stated that Hanoi's continual refusal to give any indication of what would happen after the bombing stopped was an unreasonable position, and suggested that it was time for the Soviet Govt to use its influence or its ingenuity to find a way to permit a halt in the bombing and thus the commencement of substantive discussions. We asked that this be called to the attention of his government. We pointed out that the President as late as August 19 had indicated that we could not take the next stop until we had reason to believe that Hanoi was prepared seriously to move with us in deescalating the war and in seeking peace./4/
/3/Dated September 2. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Soviet Union, Vol. XXI)
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 332.
5. After promising to report this to Moscow, Zorin gave his impression of recent talks with North Vietnamese in Paris, saying their position had not changed and that they would not move until US stopped bombing. Zorin recounted his conversation with Le Duc Tho at yesterday's North Vietnamese reception, in which Tho pointed out to Zorin Pham Van Dong's anniversary statement, which Zorin told us contained a sentence in the same vein as Moscow's message which we had referred to, namely, Dong had stated that stopping the bombing would play a positive role in reaching a political settlement. He said that Le Duc Tho had stressed that this statement by Pham Van Dong "correctly set forth" Hanoi's position. Zorin said when he told Le Duc Tho he was seeing the Americans next day, Le Duc Tho referred to Pham Van Dong's statement and added that "this was the message" he would like delivered to the Americans. When we asked Zorin if he believed a political settlement was really possible, Zorin said he could not give yes or no answer, but thought "the possibility existed for moving ahead." Zorin added that Hanoi representatives in Paris did not feel themselves able to make any step towards us that would be taken as concession, given present mood in Hanoi. We asked if he meant mood within Politbureau, and Zorin said Le Duc Tho told him Politbureau was unanimous on this point.
6. Zorin added that his belief now was that North Vietnamese no longer considered they could achieve their objectives by military means, and thought it necessary to move towards a settlement by political means. He stressed that this was not their original position, and gave impression that USSR had influenced Hanoi in this direction. He said his current impression was that Hanoi was ready to talk seriously about a political settlement and that "they had their positions ready."
7. We brought up question of necessity for GVN inclusion at substantive talks. We explained that Hanoi had said it was ready to enter into serious talks after bombing halted, but at same time said it would not agree to include GVN. We questioned how serious Hanoi was since there could not be serious talks without inclusion of GVN representatives. We indicated that there was no obstacle to NLF or alliance being represented, but it was essential that GVN be represented on our side. Returning to this question later, Zorin asked if we believed Hanoi would sit at same table with GVN representatives. We replied this was essential. After some discussion, Zorin stated that while the representation question posed difficulties, he did not believe it constituted an unsurmountable obstacle. He added that if US followed wise policy, he thought this obstacle could be overcome.
8. In course of discussion Zorin brought up Democratic Convention and said he thought if Democrats hoped to win they would have to change position on stopping bombing. We attempted to correct some of Zorin's misconceptions about US opinion, ending up by emphasizing that in our view best time to make progress towards a settlement was right now. We said that US had seized on Zorin's Phase One-Phase Two proposal, hoping this would be a possible bridge; but this had not been working out, and we urged USSR to use its influence promptly to find another bridge.
Harriman
3. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, September 4, 1968, 1:23-2:23 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Top Secret. Drafted by Christian. The meeting was a regular Tuesday Luncheon. Attending were the President, Rusk, Clifford, Helms, Wheeler, Taylor, Rostow, and Christian. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) An agenda for this meeting prepared by Read is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Presidential Luncheon Memoranda.
The President: Tell us about our meeting in Paris.
Secretary Rusk: It was standard. There was not much progress. North Vietnam blasted American politics. But the tea break produced an agreement for a Saturday meeting--a private talk./2/ We might press Hanoi for a response on something, to tell us what parts they can agree to. I believe we are at a real watershed here. If North Vietnam takes the DMZ, it means the jig is up for them in South Vietnam. The same applies to us if we stop the bombing without reciprocal action. It is important that we make no public move until Saturday./3/
/2/At the tea break during the formal session on September 4, Tho and Thuy agreed to meet privately with Harriman and Vance 3 days later. (Telegrams 20340/Delto 668 and 20347/Delto 689 from Paris, both September 4; ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-September 1968) In a telephone conversation with Read that day, Harriman suggested that Tho had considered the upcoming private meeting as an indication of goodwill on the part of the North Vietnamese, noting that "there were just little hints around at the tea break conversations that they realized what they would have to do." (Notes of Telephone Conversation between Read and Harriman, September 4; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Read, Benjamin H.)
/3/For the meeting on September 7, see Document 7.
The President: What is the military situation?
Secretary Clifford: There is more activity, but we don't know whether this is the third offensive. The attacks are not coming off very well. It may be Abrams spoiling the operations. I heard about a plan to assassinate General Abrams because he has been so successful.
Their losses are substantial. Their actions don't seem to have much plan or program.
General Wheeler: I asked General Abrams to increase his personal security arrangements--and also that of his staff and Ambassador Bunker. I agree with General Abrams that the enemy has been trying to mount an offensive, without success.
[Omitted here is discussion of East Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the Pueblo crisis, and Australia.]
Walt Rostow: On the Saturday meeting, it is important that we decide the minimum conditions for a bombing halt. We've listed many things but kept it flexible. It is conceivable Ambassador Harriman should have it in his pocket.
Secretary Rusk: I'd be inclined not to give this to Harriman Saturday, but find out what Hanoi will propose. Their willingness to talk to Saigon and the DMZ would be the gut.
[Omitted here is additional discussion of East Asia and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.]
Walt Rostow: A cease-fire format might be the easiest way to reach contact with the Government of North Vietnam about a willingness to talk about the details of a cease-fire plan.
[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated matters.]
4. Summary Notes of the 590th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, September 4, 1968, 5:07-7:29 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5, Tab 72. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Attending were the President, Rostow, Humphrey, Rusk, Clifford, Ball, Nitze, Fowler, Helms, Wheeler, Marks, Thompson, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness Price Daniel, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John M. Leddy, Ambassador to NATO Harlan Cleveland, Smith, Christian, Edward Fried of the NSC Staff, and White House aide Nathaniel Davis. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XVII, Document 93.]
Vietnam--The President asked Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, and General Wheeler to brief the group on current Vietnam problems.
Secretary Rusk: In Paris, we have had no response to our insistence on knowing what the North Vietnamese will do if we halt the bombing. In the talks, the North Vietnamese have attacked the Vietnam policy statements of both U.S. political parties. We have not presented our minimum position in Paris, because we want to keep the door open to almost any move which the North Vietnamese may make. So far, the North Vietnamese have been entirely negative but they may not always continue to be. Hanoi must accept participation of the South Vietnamese Government in the negotiations. In the United States, much has been made of the National Liberation Front as representing some of the South Vietnamese people. This is a phony issue. The NLF is not a real government and cannot be compared with the Saigon government.
In Vietnam, political progress has been substantial. The pacification program is improving. Serious efforts are being taken to fight corruption. The elected legislature of South Vietnam is working.
The President: We should be outgoing to the South Vietnamese Senators who are now visiting in the United States. We should spend time with them and be as helpful as possible. Numbers of our Congressmen go to Saigon, are seen by President Thieu, and are welcomed by the Vietnamese. We should take this opportunity to see that their Senators are well received here.
Secretary Rusk: President Thieu has grown considerably during the time he has been President. He is wise, reasonable, and is prepared to go much further than Hanoi in an approach to peace.
The President: If we can stay for a few weeks with our present posture in Vietnam, we can convince the North Vietnamese that they won't get a better deal if they wait. If we can hold where we are, a break will come from their side. Some of Hanoi's work is being done for them by people in the United States. Some 1,000 votes at the convention went to a proposed platform plank which called for a change in our policy. Hanoi is not only affected by military developments in Vietnam, but also by Congressional debates. But the military situation is basic.
(The President asked that no notes be taken of following comment which he made to the group.)
We have many irons in the fire and not all of them are in the newspapers. There has been an exchange with the Pope who sent an emissary to make a peace proposal to Ho Chi Minh. Ho turned him down flatly./2/ This reveals the present attitude of Hanoi very clearly--directly from the ranking Hanoi leader.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 333 and footnote 4 thereto.
Secretary Clifford: For some weeks we have had reports that Hanoi would launch a third offensive. The North Vietnamese are impelled to try again despite their heavy losses in the Tet and in the May offensives. Even though the level of combat is higher, it is difficult to say whether the third offensive has started because General Abrams' spoiling operations may have kept the North Vietnamese from carrying out their original plan. General Abrams' spoiling operations have been very effective. Our intelligence is better and is better used with the result that the North Vietnamese forces have been kept off balance. As an indication of the effectiveness of General Abrams' strategy, we have received a hard report that the North Vietnamese will try to assassinate him.
The North Vietnamese face a serious problem. They feel they can't go back to guerrilla tactics. Probably they will continue for awhile with their present efforts. As a result, both South Vietnamese and U.S. casualties will be higher. The question is whether the North Vietnamese, however, can carry on for very long at the present high rate of their casualties.
General Wheeler: In the view of General Abrams, the third offensive has started. His most recent assessment (copy attached) is that the enemy has four courses of action open to him. The first course, and the one the enemy prefers, would be to continue the war along present lines and at about the current level of intensity. The second course would be to continue fighting but stretch out present attacks over a longer period of time. The third course would be to fall back to only guerrilla activity. The last course would be to propose a cease-fire-in-place. (Tab E)/3/
/3/Not identified and not found.
A cease-fire-in-place is a dangerous course of action for us. It would mean that we would be giving up a block of South Vietnamese territory to the enemy.
The Vice President: Requested General Wheeler to explain in greater detail why a cease-fire would be dangerous to us.
General Wheeler: The North Vietnamese would hold certain areas inside South Vietnam. It is not like the situation in the Korean War when there was a fixed military line separating North and South. Thus, the North Vietnamese would be in a position to organize politically the areas they held. Access to these areas by the Saigon government would be in doubt.
There would be no problem with a cease-fire limited to an area where military talks could take place.
Mr. Rostow: Rather than referring to a cease-fire, we should use the language included in the Honolulu Communiqué, i.e., total cessation of hostilities./4/ Any cease-fire proposal becomes so complicated that it is difficult to see how we could live with it.
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 303.
General Wheeler: General Abrams is confident that we can handle anything the enemy tries to do to us. We can not only keep up with the enemy but also get ahead of him. General Abrams is right when he says that South Vietnamese units have performed well--some with distinction. The improvement in the performance of the ARVN is a very hopeful sign for the future.
Mr. Rostow: Cited the high North Vietnamese casualty rates (12,000 during the May offensive as compared with 8,500 in August) as proof of the greatly increased intensity of the war, and concluded by summarizing other parts of the Abrams telegram referred to above.
5. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, September 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. No classification marking. The President discussed the same matters in a telephone call with Muskie at 2:47 p.m. later that day. (Ibid., Transcripts and Recordings of Telephone Conversations) A full record of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
President Johnson's Notes on Meeting in Cabinet Room, Friday, September 6, 1968, With the President, Senator Dirksen, Senator Mansfield, and Secretary Rusk, 10:15 a.m. They Were Joined at 10:37 by Director Zwick, Art Okun and Mike Manatos and at 11:35 a.m. by Harold Linder
The President told the group he had three or four subjects he wanted to bring up and discuss in some detail. The President said he would ask Secretary Rusk to bring you some information on some of the problems also.
The President said we wanted to be careful about how we deal with some of the East European countries--especially Germany. He said that Senators Mansfield and Dirksen both had been quite interested in our troops in Eastern Europe.
The President reported that it seems that we had both the Vice President and Mr. Nixon on board to the effect that they are not going to say anything that would indicate to Hanoi that they would get a better deal out of them than they can get out of us between now and January and the Vice President gave the President assurances as late as the day before that that was his attitude and it had always been Mr. Nixon's attitude. The President pointed out that sometimes some of their aides talked for them indicating they might do this or might do that. He reported that Mr. Nixon had assured him that he would make no statement that would indicate any weakness. He said that he told Mr. Humphrey about it and suggested to Humphrey and Humphrey made it in a public proposal which Mr. Nixon could not accept. He said he was stunned--said he had already taken that position so that caused it to get knocked down./2/
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 345.
The President said he thought he would wait a week or two and try to approach it in another form, but that we did have some hopes. He said, however, that although we had hope, we did not have any assurances. He said there were conversations going on that you don't read about all the time and they are also making other attempts in other Capitals.
The President said:
"We read Ho Chi Minh's letter. He wrote back. This is very confidential, but he wrote back to the Pope and told him that he would let the Pope come to Hanoi and we thought the Pope had a very reasonable request, a very earnest one, a very genuine one./3/
/3/See ibid., Document 333 and footnote 4 thereto.
"I think that if the people of this Country knew that this religious leader was trying to pull us together and really had all along leaned a little bit because they had been a little soft on our position. They had asked us to do this and do that. And while at the Ranch he sent his man down there to see me and asked me what he could tell them. And I went just as far as we dared go and told him we looked upon the trip with favor."
Senator Mansfield asked, both Hanoi and Saigon?
The President reported both Hanoi and Saigon. He then wrote Ho Chi Minh and said that he would like to come to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh wrote back and told the Pope there was no use for his coming. The President said if that could be made public, it would arouse some folks that think we could do business with the communists.
Senator Dirksen asked if that was initiated by the Pope.
The President said yes, but before he proposed it to Hanoi the Pope sent his messenger over and he came to the Ranch and we did not give any notice of his coming. The President said he outlined to him what he could say and told him that the bombing would be stopped if they would do almost anything. The President said just give him some tangible evidence that they would react to it. He said he thought it would make His Holiness very pleased, but His Holiness came right back to the President and said that he was not very pleased--that he did not communicate with the State Department, that he was a private individual and did not want anybody to know it. The Pope got in touch with Hanoi and they turned him down. He then came back to the President through the same source and gave the President the letter from Ho Chi Minh to the Pope just saying that there was no use coming.
The President said:
"And now we have other meetings going on in addition to Paris that are scheduled that we hope will bring something out if we don't mislead them. We just photograph the wrong signals. We make them believe that if they just hang on a little more why I will have to give in or they will force me to do so and so. Now I want you all to know one thing. If I don't have anybody here except me, I'm not going to give in. And any of you normally know that. So there is no use of any pressure speeches or anything else that is going to do one damn bit of good until January 20 on advice about doing something that I believe is wrong. And I am willing to go 60 percent of the way, and lean and stretch, but I am not willing to stop the bombing unless they make some move. I have already stopped 90% of it and I already stopped it eight times. Now I am just not going to do it. So all we can do is kill a bunch of men by doing it."
The President reported that General Abrams had told him that if we stop the bombing we will automatically increase, within ten days, the enemy's capabilities several times, that his men will be fired upon from across the DMZ and will not be saved, that he will have to withdraw them./4/
/4/See ibid., Document 337.
The President said we were not going to be following the McCarthy line and he thought the Legislative ought to know so that we just don't have any doubts about that. He said if the new President wants to do it, they can take this position if they want to--that they did not expect President Johnson to be advising them what to do. The President said:
"I am the only President and we are not going to tell him what he ought to do while he is President. I told Humphrey that's the position I would take if I were you. That's what Nixon is saying and if Humphrey says the same thing--we are not going to give you any better deal and then I think that we can save some lives that may bring this thing to an end. If we don't, then when they get in and get the responsibility they want. That's first.
"Second, if the Congress does not agree to what I am doing, all you have to do is to repeal your Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Dick Russell put it in there so you could do it by majority vote and if the majority feels that way and wants to withdraw these troops on their own, they can do that. Now all you have to do is one man make a motion and then move to favor it. And you could get a vote right quick. And I suspect that you might get a majority, but I don't want it to be my blood. I want it to be the brave men who advocate it and let them get on record and stay there the rest of their life. So I hope that we can pull through these 30 or 40 days or whatever time you are going to be here until the new Administration comes in without unnecessary squabbling.
"Now last, before the convention, they built up and we had a hell of a week. We lost over 400 men and they lost--they have lost 8800 in ten days. That was really costly. How much of that is false hope that they have I don't know, but we want to try to not disabuse them. I don't want to make any more hard speeches, but you see we have plenty of communists without this stuff and it starts out in Hanoi and then it goes to Saigon and then Kosygin writes a letter or two--then every specialist in town starts speculating Johnson is going to stop the bombing.
"So these poor Hanoi people think I may do it. So then they play their cards accordingly. Now we are willing to do it, when they show signs that it would not endanger us. Now our platform says that we will stop the bombing when it will not endanger American lives. Now a man that takes the position that he is going to stop it when it does endanger them is in a hell of a poor position I think with the American people and he certainly will be with these men. So that's about the war." [Omitted here is discussion of the Symington Amendment to reduce funding for troops in Germany, the situation in Czechoslovakia, NATO force posture, and European security.]
Secretary Rusk then gave a rundown on the situation in Vietnam at the present time.
The President reported that Eugene Black was wanting to make a trip to Asia in connection with the Asian Development Bank and while he was there he would like to see Sihanouk so permission was asked for Black to see Sihanouk and he responded that he would see Black. The President briefed Black on what he could tell Sihanouk. This dealt mostly with boundaries which we thought would be acceptable to him, that we had no interest in doing anything but helping him, what we had in mind was the development of the area and what we thought the communists were doing to his country and try to show him what we knew they were doing there. He said to tell him we had the pictures and there was no question but what they are using his country as a base to kill our people every day./6/
/6/Eugene Black was the President's Special Adviser on Asian Economic and Social Development. Johnson had met with Black on September 5 and announced Black's trip to the Philippines, Japan, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam at a press conference on September 6. "I have asked him to pursue plans for the Mekong Basin program for development for peaceful purposes," the President noted. See Department of State Bulletin, September 30, 1968, pp. 330-335. Black reported on his trip in a meeting with the President on October 28; see ibid., October 28, 1968, p. 434.
Secretary Rusk said in looking at things that are of key importance to us, both from a diplomatic and military side, we are inclined to attach great importance to the renewal of the DMZ.
Senator Dirksen asked Secretary Rusk if when he said restore the DMZ he meant respect the DMZ.
Secretary Rusk said that was correct. Let the international observers get back in there, both sides stay out of the DMZ, don't fire until they cross the DMZ, don't use it for infiltration, don't station troops there or anything of that sort.
[Omitted here is discussion of Supreme Court nominations, the budget, and the economy.]
6. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, September 6, 1968, 1:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Vietnam, July-December 1968. Secret; Sensitive.
Mr. President:
Herewith a tentative judgment which, of course, could be overturned by new facts tomorrow./2/
/2/Rostow is referring to a telegram from Abrams setting forth these alternatives. It is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 337.
1. The enemy may have opted for the second of Abrams' four alternatives; that is, a stretch-out of military operations at relatively low casualty rates.
2. The enemy may have decided to shift his weight away from the cities to provincial areas and the countryside.
3. Since the enemy's military operations always have a political purpose, his political situation may be this:
--He failed in his attempt to soften the Democratic convention on Vietnam.
--He is most actively engaged in trying to build up his political organization in the countryside for bargaining purposes and, possibly, for a cease-fire situation. Rural and provincial military operations could help in this effort.
--He may be planning to conserve military assets for a program of steady, limited pressure, rather than dramatic major action, as a background to serious negotiations; but we will require some days--or a few weeks--to make this judgment.
--Or he may be planning a program of limited pressure and conservation of assets so he has bargaining strength in the early months of 1969, as a new President takes stock.
4. A part of the background to these speculations is evidence derived from communications in Vietnam and reports of special meetings that usually precede or follow major policy decisions in Hanoi which affect military operations in the South:
--There has been a great deal of unusual activity in high-level communications recently. This began on August 27 with a series of lengthy, urgent messages from the B-3 Front Headquarters which controls most of the II Corps area to the High Command in Hanoi. Then on September 2 Hanoi High Command sent an unusual high precedence message to COSVN.
--During the past several days the Military Affairs Committee of COSVN has been engaged in unusual activity which included the transmission of a number of "decrypt immediately" messages to its subordinates.
--We have information from scattered points of meetings of political cadre. At least one of these appeared to be rather urgent in that the unit itself was going into combat without some of its officers who were attending a meeting.
--A COSVN Military Intelligence Conference is scheduled to be held on September 15 and will last 10 to 12 days. Tactical representatives from various units were directed to be present.
W.W. Rostow/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
7. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, September 7, 1968, 1555Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, Harvan-(Incoming)-September 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 12:26 p.m.
20522/Delto 699. From Harriman and Vance.
1. We met for three hours this morning September 7 with Le Duc Tho, Xuan Thuy and Ha Van Lau, with their interpreter and note taker. Habib and Negroponte accompanied us. At their request, meeting took place in same North Vietnamese house as Vance/Lau talks.
2. Most of the time was taken up by an endless harangue by Le Duc Tho, explaining in great inaccurate detail that we had lost the war and failed in political field. Tho concluded by saying that he had not yet finished his statement, the balance of which he would like to make at our next meeting. He was not prepared, he said, to say anything further today. He said although he would listen to our comments today, we would prefer to complete his full statement before we did. We decided it was better to hear him out before responding.
3. Our next meeting is set for Thursday September 12 at 3 o'clock, with an outside possibility of meeting Tuesday September 10. They agreed to establish at our next meeting a calendar of longer and frequent private meetings. We also agreed at their initiative to keep everything said at these private meetings secret. If we were queried about them, we would simply state "we never comment on any allegations or rumors about private discussions."
4. At the beginning of the meeting, we stated it seemed to us that it was the responsibility of the negotiators in Paris to find a way to remove the roadblocks that were preventing progress. Perhaps this could be done by seeking areas of agreement. We stated there were two principal points we wanted to make. Both sides agreed on the objective of stopping the bombing, and proceeding to serious talks to reach a peaceful settlement. However, we differed on the question of the circumstances under which the bombing could be stopped, and what we mean by moving to serious talks. On the first point, they were familiar with the President's emphasis on his concern in what will happen in the area of the DMZ. This matter had been discussed between Ambassadors Vance and Lau, and we thought that we might not be so far apart since Lau had indicated that if we on our side ended military activity in the DMZ, they "would know what to do." On the second point, we stated that we had continually made it definite that we could not have serious talks about the political future of South Viet-Nam without the inclusion of representatives of the GVN. This is a must. We were prepared to have them include the NLF or others on their side. However, we could have bilateral talks on bilateral subjects such as future relations between our two countries which they had previously raised.
5. We also mentioned the President's statement of August 19, "This administration does not intend to move further until it has reason to believe that the other side intends seriously to join with us in de-escalating the war and moving seriously towards peace," and Pham Van Dong's statement of September 2, "Moreover, in Paris we are raising a very just and well-founded demand which will have a positive effect on the seeking step by step of a political settlement for the Vietnam problem."/2/ We suggested discussing their significance.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 332, and The New York Times, September 3, 1968.
6. Le Duc Tho's monologue then followed. Detailed account reported septel,/3/ but we think that INR could probably write it without our report.
/3/Telegram 20523/Delto 700 from Paris, September 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, Harvan-(Incoming)-September 1968) In a September 8 covering note transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, Rostow wrote: "Nothing new except the full text of Tho's diatribe." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel-Paris Delto XII, 9/1-13/68)
7. Comment: Le Duc Tho at the close of meeting stated that he agreed in principle to meet privately "many hours a day and many days a week." We will know more about the significance of this statement when we see the calendar at next Thursday's meeting. Our impression is that Tho is under instructions to make sure that we understand Hanoi's contentions and to avoid giving any impression they are negotiating from weakness. Tho's offer to hold frequent private meetings, coupled with his underscoring of the importance of secrecy of these meetings may indicate they are preparing for meaningful discussions./4 /
/4/In a September 10 memorandum to Rusk, in which he summarized the individual assessments of delegation members, Holbrooke noted that "the Delegation believes that Tho is leading up to something new." (Ibid., Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68)
Harriman
8. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, September 9, 1968, 5:45-7:24 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification markings. This was an off-the-record meeting with the bipartisan Congressional leadership. Attending were the President, Rusk, Clifford, Rostow, Special Assistant Harold Barefoot Sanders, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Arthur Okun, Director of the Bureau of the Budget Charles Zwick, Tom Johnson, and Congressmen McCormack, Albert, Ford, Melvin Lair, and Leslie Arends. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
[Omitted here is discussion of the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.]
Secretary Clifford:
Vietnam
We do not know if this is the beginning of the enemy's third offensive. General Abrams has been conducting spoiling operations./2/
/2/Abrams reported on the military situation in Vietnam in telegram MAC 12129 to Wheeler, September 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 407, Westmoreland v. CBS Litigation Collection, MACV Backchannel Messages to Westmoreland, 1-30 September, 1968 [Folder 1 of 2]) In memorandum CM-3465-68 to Rusk, September 11, Wheeler relayed Abrams' assessment of the likelihood of a unilateral cease-fire by the NVA and Viet Cong. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
The first two weeks in August there were 2 bn attacks.
The second two weeks in August there were 11 bn attacks.
First 2 weeks in August, there were 71 small unit attacks.
Second 2 weeks in August, there were 145 small unit attacks.
First two weeks in August there were 4200 enemy killed in action.
Second two weeks in August there were 9700 enemy killed in action.
First two weeks in August the statistics were (5X1 and 6X1 enemy vs. friendly): 801 friendly, 332 U.S.
Second two weeks in August: 1600 friendly, 716 U.S.
There is an increased effectiveness on the part of ARVN which has been noted.
Ambassador Bunker says these attacks differ. They did not start at once.
The enemy command is now trying to hold down casualties.
They need a dramatic victory badly.
General Abrams has been able to blunt the offensive.
[Omitted here is discussion of Latin America, the Korean peninsula, Israel, and NATO.]
Secretary Rusk:
Paris Talks
We have tried to offer Hanoi quite a menu. 1. Troop levels. 2. DMZ. 3. Attacks on cities. 4. Political settlement. 5. Laos. 6. Cambodia.
They won't talk. Hanoi won't talk to Saigon. We have not been able to do any business. If North Vietnam would do almost anything we might be able to get something going.
Both candidates want peace before January if we can get it. Nobody can tell us what would happen if we stopped the bombing.
It is hard to say don't hit the enemy while they are seven miles away--that's rude--hit them when they are two miles away. If there is one shred of interest in peace on the other side, we are ready to talk. Hanoi is rigid in its stance.
The enemy has had 76% of casualties of the May offensive.
The enemy has three options:
1. Increase the tempo of attacks for limited period--all out effort.
2. Curtail offensive--pull back.
3. Maintain offensive posture. Stretch it out.
The military commanders believe he is likely to choose alternative 3. The enemy's major goal is Saigon--to weaken South Vietnam's people's confidence in their government. They must gain a psychological advantage over the United States here in the U.S.
They aim to weaken our will here at home.
At no place was there a request for more men or material from our men in Vietnam.
[Omitted here is discussion of European strategic security.]
Secretary Clifford: 1. Some North Vietnamese commanders are getting orders they know they cannot carry out. 2. North Vietnamese troops are defecting. 3. The number of weapons the enemy is abandoning is going up. 4. The level of troop training is lower.
Yet they can still conduct a military effort against us.
[Omitted here is discussion of budgetary matters.]
9. Editorial Note
The diplomatic exchange code-named Chlodnick between the United States and the Soviet Union involved the arrangement of a summit conference between President Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin to discuss arms control, the Middle East, and Vietnam. Discussions of the summit took place primarily in Washington. On the evening of September 9, 1968, Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin met with Walt Rostow at the latter's home. The following discussion on Vietnam is excerpted from Rostow's September 10 memorandum to the President and Secretary of State Rusk on his meeting with Dobrynin:
"5. Dobrynin then turned to Vietnam and talked at very great length, making, in the end, the following points:
"--He continued to regret that we had not responded more positively to Kosygin's statement that 'he and his colleagues had reason to believe, etc.'
"To the best of Dobrynin's knowledge, this was a unique message to the United States. He had hoped that if we could not act immediately upon it we would come back with a proposition which 'Kosygin and his colleagues' might press on Hanoi.
"--He then raised the subject of the third offensive. With striking candor he said: 'Now that the Democratic Convention is over, the offensive may subside.' If there was a lull in the level of violence in South Vietnam, would we be willing to stop the bombing? He then introduced the familiar argument that we were 'a great country dealing with a small country' and we could afford to be generous. I said the question was not one of generosity, but of the lives of American soldiers and our allies. There is also the critical matter that if they were not prepared for reciprocity at this stage, I did not see how a stable peace could be negotiated for Southeast Asia. The negotiation of a peace would have to confront certain hard facts about the presence of North Vietnamese forces in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. If we evaded the question of reciprocity on the bombing, we might then be confronted with a similar stubbornness and unwillingness to face reality with respect to the GVN in Saigon; then, the question of North Vietnamese troop withdrawals from the South; etc. We did not see why, if they were serious, they would not settle down and make peace on the basis of hard realities.
"--This led to a very long series of statements on the minds of the men in Hanoi--and in Peking--as seen from Moscow. He began with the Chinese Communists. He said that in their dealings with Moscow, the Chinese Communists often took positions that made absolutely no sense to the Russian mind. For example, in a meeting with Soviet and other Communists, the Chinese Communists said bluntly they did not mind a nuclear war. This would wipe out most of the Soviet population and a high proportion of the Chinese population, but would leave them with two or three hundred million Chinese. (He reported that an Eastern European Communist leader spoke up and asked: 'What about us?') He said that while the men in Hanoi were not casual about nuclear war, they were filled with ideas which were foreign to Moscow and--no doubt--to us. They took enormous pride in their capacity to survive and persist in conducting the war against the world's greatest power. They evoked memories of how they have survived for centuries against the Chinese; struggled successfully against the French; kept in the battle against the big American forces. They are very stubborn about their objectives: he cited their satisfaction and pride in forcing us to stop a part of the bombing. (At this point he came perilously close to suggesting that we should have used more power against them, but veered away quickly.)
"--On the other hand, he said that Hanoi had shared with Moscow some of the negotiating positions they would take after a bombing cessation. He could not reveal these to me. But he personally concluded that they would negotiate seriously.
"--In underlining the curious pride and mentality of the men in Hanoi he gave a long circumstantial account of how the Soviet Union was prepared to make available to them pilots for air defense. He said that the Soviet Union had a number of experienced pilots who were in retirement at an early age. Their pensions were greater than the salary of an Ambassador. Some Soviet military men were extremely anxious to get them into Hanoi so that they could acquire experience in combat with the Americans. The Americans were learning exactly what the capacity of their aircraft and their pilots was. The Soviet Union could only train their men under non-combat conditions. Therefore, the pressure to get Hanoi to accept Soviet pilots was considerable. But they flatly refused. He cited this, again, as an example of the extreme pride of a very small power in dealing with a major power.
"6. I told him that I had no position to report to him on a cessation of bombing other than that with which he was wholly familiar. We hoped that things would move forward in Paris. If they wish to negotiate with President Johnson, they had better get moving. I doubted that they would do any better in negotiations with President Johnson's successor, whoever he might be. Moreover, they had better reckon that the South Vietnamese are as stubborn as the North Vietnamese. They will soon have a million men under arms of increasing competence and confidence.
"7. Dobrynin then suddenly asked: If there were a free election in the South, how do you think it would come out? I said that it was my private judgment that the hard core Communists could not attract as much as 10% of the South Vietnamese vote. On a Popular Front basis they might do better; but, for what it was worth, I did not believe that a Popular Front in South Vietnam would do as well as the French and Italian Communist parties in their elections. He asked: How would President Thieu fare in an election? I took him through the election statistics (which I shall send him), pointing out that between them, Thieu and Huong had gotten 45% of the vote. If you added in former General Don in the Senate, you were up to something like 56% of the vote. Except for Dzu, who was in effect a Popular Front candidate, the balance went to anti-Communist Nationalists. I concluded that the problem of the South Vietnamese in an election, in my judgment, was not with a vast pro-VC majority, but how to avoid running 10 Nationalist candidates, as they did last time. I concluded by saying that I could be wrong; and if the men in Hanoi believed in the popularity of their cause, let them adopt the test of a one-man, one-vote election. We were ready. He asked: Is Thieu ready? I said that it was my impression that he was ready. I cited the statement in the Honolulu Communiqué which he had volunteered despite the fact that he was under considerable political pressure at home at a time when a major attack on Saigon was expected." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File)
The full text of this memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV, Document 295.
On September 13 Dobrynin delivered orally a note from his government to Rostow addressing the convening of the proposed summit. The note reads in part:
"We are ready to exchange opinions on Vietnam with the understanding also of the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be a substitution on this question for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and for the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. We think that such an exchange of opinions can be useful if to proceed from the fact that continuation of the war in Vietnam benefits nobody but those who would like to bring the United States and the Soviet Union into collision, and that the solution of the Vietnam problem can be found not on the battlefield. We did already express to President Johnson our conviction that the current meetings in Paris between representatives of the DRV and the United States give an opportunity to find a way out from the present situation. We continue to believe--and it is not without grounds--that if the United States completely stops bombings and other military actions against the DRV it could create a turning point at the meetings in Paris and would open perspectives for serious negotiations on political questions of a settlement."
The full text of this note is ibid., Document 296.
10. Paper Prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Washington, September 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 092.2 (September-October 1968). Confidential. A notation on the paper reads: "Dep. Sec. has seen." An attached note dated September 11 reads: "Clark--Some days ago you asked me to think over an idea of yours relative to a cessation of bombing north of 17¡. I have done so. The attached paper, which I wrote personally, sets forth the doubts & problems it raises for me. Bus." Another attached note to Clifford from his military aide Robert Pursely dated October 17 reads: "Mr. Clifford: You handed the attached paper to Mr. Warnke some time ago. He now returns it, with the comment that he feels no action is indicated at this time. REP"
CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AND NVN
1. It has been proposed that, in the near future, the President would make a nationally-televised speech in which he would state:
a. Effective one week later, he was directing the cessation of all offensive actions against NVN.
b. He assumed that the DRV would refrain from certain military actions and would, within 2-3 days after the cessation of US operations against NVN, engage in fruitful discussions leading to a just and honorable peace. (See para 2 below for a hard-core listing of these actions.)
c. He assumed also that, during the intervening week, if the DRV found his assumptions unacceptable, they would so state. He would construe silence on their part to indicate consent.
2. The following is a listing of the hard-core items of Phase II of the Phase I-II package which have been mentioned to the North Vietnamese in Paris:
a. Restore the DMZ. No massing of troops or supplies in or near DMZ.
b. No increase in US or DRV force levels in South Vietnam after cessation of bombing.
c. No attacks on major population centers in South Vietnam, such as Saigon, Hue, and Danang.
d. Substantive discussions, on a "our-side your-side" basis to commence as soon as bombing stops, with either side free to raise any topics relevant to a peaceful settlement.
Note: Aerial reconnaissance over NVN is implicit in the foregoing.
3. The principal arguments advanced in favor of this procedure are:
a. It removes the element of reciprocity which the North Vietnamese have declared to be not acceptable to them.
b. The North Vietnamese do not have to say anything; they need only to refrain from doing certain things. (Except sub-paragraph 2d.)
c. Unlike earlier, more simple proposals for unilateral cessation of offensive operations against NVN, the President is protected; i.e., if the North Vietnamese respond that the proposal is not to their liking, the order to cease US operations would not be issued.
d. Acceptance (silence) by NVN would lead promptly to substantive discussions. Rejection would coalesce world opinion against them and in our favor.
4. The foregoing formulation is better in several respects than others put forward earlier. However, there are certain aspects which deserve further and deeper examination. Among these are:
a. The attitude of the North Vietnamese leaders.
Comment: Ambassador Vance stated during his last visit that, at the outset of the negotiating sessions, the North Vietnamese were arrogant, obviously expectant that the US representatives had come prepared to negotiate a face-saving turnover of SVN to NVN. They were surprised and apparently shocked that such was not the case. His views are borne out by frequent statements in NVN propaganda, exhortations to VC/NVA forces, private comments to individuals, etc., regarding the "stubbornness" of the Americans.
It seems reasonably clear that Hanoi rejects reciprocity in order to get something for nothing rather than any obscure considerations of "face."
This leads to a question: Would a further unilateral restriction on our offensive actions lead to any move to peace by NVN leaders, or would it serve to confirm that our "stubbornness" can be broken and further concessions gained if they stand their ground?
b. The reality of the US construing silence on the part of the NVN delegation as acceptance of our assumptions.
Comment: I am informed that there are ample and sound legal precedents for construing silence as consent. However, it is not clear to me that this is necessarily true in international law and, even if it is, there is no court to so construe, find, and take corrective action. Of course, there is world opinion, for what it may be worth, in dealing with NVN. I surmise it would have little force in Hanoi.
In other words, I conjecture that NVN could, and probably would, remain silent, permit us to cease all combat operations against NVN, and count upon world opinion (which has more impact in Washington than Hanoi) to inhibit us from resuming offensive operations north of 17¡.
Furthermore, arguing legalistically, the North Vietnamese could maintain that (1) these were our assumptions, not theirs; they had never agreed to reciprocal actions, and our assumptions were reciprocity in another guise; (2) since they had not agreed to the US assumptions, they were not bound to proceed on any or all of them, e.g., an "our-side your-side" formula; (3) however, now that the US had ceased offensive operations against NVN, which was the central reason for negotiators convening, we should now proceed to the next item on their agenda: which is probably the withdrawal of US forces from SVN.
Question: Could we realistically reverse our course should NVN adopt the above, or a comparable position?
c. Assuming silence from NVN, the soundness of the assumption that prompt and substantive discussions leading to peace would be forthcoming.
Comment: Three points are pertinent. The North Vietnamese have adamantly rejected the "our-side your-side" formula, saying that they will not deal with the "puppets" Thieu and Ky. They have stated repeatedly that restoration of the DMZ would be equivalent to permanent partition of Vietnam. And, like other Communists, they believe in the "talk-fight, fight-talk" tactic.
I think it reasonable to expect that, in the postulated situation, talks might begin promptly. On the other hand, they might well not be substantive and productive. Free of all military pressure against NVN, they could (and, I believe, would) settle down for protracted negotiations (with us--not the GVN), fully expectant that US war-weariness would prevent us from insisting on GVN participation, inevitably produce further concessions, and ultimately give them a Paris-type victory.
I base the foregoing judgments on these considerations: (1) following the "talk-fight" formula, they could control the tempo and resultant costs of combat in SVN; (2) they could expect, over time, a deterioration in the RVNAF due to weariness, losses and knowledge that NVN was not suffering while they and their country were under attack; and (3) they could expect with high confidence that, so long as the talks continued, we would not resume our offensive against the North even under circumstances of serious provocation.
Question: Assuming silence from NVN relative to the proposed assumptions, would the resultant situation be advantageous or disadvantageous to the US?
d. The reality of the implicit assumption that we could and would resume offensive operations against NVN should negotiations prove to be non-productive.
Comment: Our experience with unilateral cessations of operations against NVN has been illuminating, but not happy. Since the facts are well-known, no purpose is served by belaboring the point. Moreover, this aspect has been discussed partially in 4c. above.
However, I am convinced that once we cease our offensive against NVN, the chances of resumption are most remote.
Question: Under what circumstances, assuming that talks following this formulation have been undertaken, would the US resume offensive operations against NVN?
e. The value of our air and naval campaign against NVN.
Comment: As pointed out earlier, our limited air and naval operations against NVN comprise the only pressure which self-imposed constraints permit us to apply against NVN. Within the limits we have established for ourselves, we have the initiative, and we can control the tempo and destructiveness of our attacks regardless of defensive measures taken by NVN.
The contrary is true in SVN. There--at a cost and within limits--NVN can control the level of combat activity and the destruction created.
I believe that both proponents and opponents of air and naval operations against NVN have, to varying degrees and far too often, expressed their differing views in extremes. Certainly, to maintain that the air and naval campaign is the single most important factor of the war is as illogical as to maintain that the campaign is militarily valueless. In essence, war is force applied to achieve an end. The more violently and the faster force is applied, the sooner the end is achieved.
I believe the following factors are pertinent to our air and naval campaign against NVN and, moreover, are undeniably true:
(1) Our limited air and naval campaign is the only means available to us, within self-imposed constraints, to bring pressure on NVN.
(2) Without attempting to quantify physical results, our operations are disrupting the enemy's war effort and hurting him.
(3) Complete cessation of offensive operations north of 17¡ will permit the enemy to move with impunity forces, military matériel and supplies to areas contiguous to the combat zone, thereby increasing the hazard to US and Allied forces and installations. Under these circumstances, should the enemy so choose, US and Allied casualties will increase to a level largely determinable by the enemy.
(4) The morale of US and Allied troops, and that of the SVN populace, would suffer.
(5) Friend and enemy alike, military and civilian, would construe the imposition of further unilateral restraint on our forces as a victory for NVN, supporting the thesis that, if the NVN remain intransigent, they can achieve their full objectives in SVN.
Question: Would a total cessation of military operations against NVN create a situation, political and military, more favorable or less favorable for the achievement of US objectives?
5. Of course, people will answer the foregoing questions in different ways. My own answers can be summed up as follows:
a. I know that it is militarily wrong to make concessions from a position of strength to an enemy showing signs of increasing strain and weakness; and
b. On balance, I believe such a course to be equally unsound politically.
Wheeler
11. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, September 12, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 72-207A, AA-3, FE Division, 1968. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Carver. In an attached note to Deputy Director for Plans Thomas Karamessines, Chief of the Far East Division William E. Nelson, Chief of Vietnam Operations [name not declassified], and Chief of Saigon Station [name not declassified], September 12, Carver wrote: "Attached is the final version of the briefing memorandum on Lien Minh given the Director to brace him for the 12 September Presidential lunch. In going over this with him, I reported [name not declassified] strong conviction (which I share) that although we may have some reservations about the mechanics of the Ambassador's proposal, we feel the Lien Minh concept is sound and merits U.S. financial support. The Director agreed and said he would argue for the basic concept at the lunch."
SUBJECT
The Lien Minh
1. The Lien Minh (Vietnamese short title for the National Alliance for Social Revolution) is a political concept that has no American counterpart. Very roughly, it is something like an alliance of the ADA (under a Democratic administration), the UAW, the Knights of Columbus, and some elements of the League of Women Voters. The basic purpose of the Lien Minh is to stimulate the political coalescence of various groups and factions on the non-Communist side--which, in the aggregate, comprises the majority of politically concerned Vietnamese in South Vietnam but is presently (and historically) too divided and disorganized to compete politically with its tightly disciplined Communist rivals.
2. The long range objective of the Lien Minh exercise is to stimulate the development of a political party or parties. This, however, will not be achieved quickly, easily or soon. The more concrete short run objectives of Lien Minh are (1) the development of a forum for disparate political elements in which they can express common nationalist aspirations and (2) the creation of a popularly based service organization, national in scope, whose social welfare activities will have political overtones and redound to the GVN's political benefit. (Social welfare has traditionally been viewed in Vietnam as a function of government.)
3. The three major components of the Lien Minh are the National Salvation Front (NSF), headed by Senator (and former General) Tran Van Don; the Democratic Freedom Force (DFF), headed by Nguyen Van Huong; and the Farmer-Worker Association, headed by trade union (CVT) leader Tran Quoc Buu. The NSF is a loose political coalition of various political groups that emerged more or less spontaneously in the aftermath of Tet, but was viewed with reservations by Thieu because of the NSF's ties to the Ky camp. The DFF is another political organization and is, in effect, the Thieu camp's answer to the NSF. Though many fairly important groups or factions are left out (e.g., Catholic groups, Dai Viets, the northern VNQDD) the Lien Minh amalgam does include at least some elements of all major religious, regional and political groups and is the broadest thing going in Vietnam today. (See the Annex for a more detailed break-out of the Lien Minh's composition.)/2/
/2/Attached but not printed is an annex outlining the organization of the Lien Minh. It noted that the plans for the expansion of the Lien Minh included the incorporation of religious groups and gaining support from civic associations, the military, and other GVN components.
4. A total of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has been passed to Thieu to support Lien Minh: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on 29 August and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on 5 September.
5. On funding mechanics, Thieu has designated Nguyen Van Huong (DFF leader and the leading member of Thieu's presidential staff) as the point of operational contact with the Lien Minh, Huong's counterpart being CAS officer [name not declassified]. Thieu has asked, however, that all funds be passed directly to him personally and that no other Vietnamese (including Huong) be aware of U.S. financial support. The funds already given have been passed to Thieu by [name not declassified].
6. On accountings, the physical recipient of the U.S. funds is President Thieu, the Chief of State. Thieu of course can (and should) be expected to explain or report the purposes for which these funds are used and disbursed. He can certainly be pressed for as much detailed information on these points as the Ambassador wishes to seek. Since Thieu is the Chief of State, however, diplomatic and protocol considerations will probably mean that we will generally have to take Thieu at his word and that he cannot be compelled to support his statements with detailed accountings backed by written records and receipts.
7. General Recommendations: We believe the Lien Minh concept is sound and that activity along the Lien Minh line is the best politically practical method of encouraging South Vietnamese political cohesion, institutional development and--ultimately--the evolution of real political parties. We thus share the Ambassador's view that the Lien Minh concept merits U.S. encouragement and financial support. We do have reservations about the mechanics of the Ambassador's specific proposal, though we recognize he is the man on the scene with ultimate field responsibility.
(1) We would greatly prefer to see the GVN making a financial input of its own from the start. Without a direct GVN input (and, hence, vested interest) there will always be the risk of the program's being considered, even in Thieu's eyes, an American scheme the Vietnamese are indulging.
(2) On security grounds, we question Thieu's ability to conceal the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] unless there is some known Vietnamese fund raising activity of which these U.S. funds could conceivably be a part.
(3) While we agree with the Ambassador that the Lien Minh should be gotten off the ground now, we believe that Thieu could find some funds of his own if he really supports the program and felt the necessity of giving it personal financial support. Our experience in last summer's electoral campaign supports this belief.
12. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, September 12, 1968, 1:39-2:37 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the White House Mansion. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
CIA Director Helms
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: We expect a call during lunch on the status of the Paris talks today.
The President: Fine, let's go on.
Walt Rostow: Ambassador Bunker has a good report on Vietnam. It shows action in land reform and other areas.
The President: Huong has a good image with our press. Let's get him before them more.
Should we brief the Congress, Dean? Your briefings with the leadership have been good.
Secretary Rusk: The sessions were more relaxed than I have had before.
The President: Clark (Secretary Clifford), who called whom on the call to the Vice President?
Secretary Clifford: He called me about his statement on troop withdrawal. I told him I had not predicted any U.S. troops would come home next year. Thieu has. Also, he asked if it were true a Marine unit was coming home now. I said yes, but it is a rotation.
Secretary Clifford: The Vice President has had three flubs.
1. Withdrawal of troops.
2. Minority plank vs. majority plank.
3. Bringing Marine unit home now./2/
/2/In a speech at Philadelphia on September 9, Humphrey stated that certain military units could be withdrawn from Vietnam by late 1968 or early 1969. In Denver later that day, Humphrey downplayed the differences between the majority and minority planks on Vietnam adopted by the Democratic National Convention and noted that he would have been able to run based upon the minority plank. See The New York Times, September 10, 1968. In a September 10 speech before the American Legion in New Orleans, the President stated: "We yearn for the day when the violence subsides. We yearn for the day when our men can come home. No man can predict when that day will come, because we are there to bring an honorable, stable peace to Southeast Asia, and no less will justify the sacrifices that our men have died for." The full text of this speech is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 936-943.
He needs a man with him every day we trust and respect to give him correct guidance.
Secretary Rusk: Thinking should be done before rather than after. Tom Hughes would be good.
The President: 1. I want the Vice President to win. 2. I want the Democratic Party to win. They are better. No question of Humphrey against anybody. 3. I have told the Cabinet not to let the record of its Departments be distorted. I want the Cabinet to do what is appropriate to help the Vice President.
Where I help depends on where the Vice President wants me to help.
Secretary Rusk: I would like to have a briefing session with Humphrey. Does he want to show a little space between us and his position.
The President: He wants space. In his heart he is with us, but he thinks it is politically wise to keep space.
[Omitted here is discussion of Nixon's potential personnel selections for the Department of Defense and the Supreme Court.]
Walt Rostow: There is procedural progress, but no substantive progress. We will meet privately Mondays and Fridays. Averell and Cy believe other side does not understand Manila Formula./3/
/3/In the Manila Communiqué of October 25, 1966, the United States and Allied nations declared their intention to withdraw from Vietnam within 6 months of North Vietnamese disengagement. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document 281.
[Omitted here is discussion of strategic weapons talks and the Pueblo.]
13. Memorandum From Robert N. Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, September 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68. Secret; Nodis; Harvan/Plus.
I was struck by two aspects of yesterday's meeting between Tho and Harriman:/2/
/2/Harriman and Vance met with Tho and Thuy for a second private meeting on September 12. Their report on the meeting was transmitted in telegram 20779/Delto 724 from Paris, September 12, and telegram 20789/Delto 725 from Paris, September 13. (Both ibid., Harvan Chronological File, Vol. XXI) This meeting had been set during the tea break at the 21st formal session on September 11. (Telegrams 20657/Delto 714 and 20662/Delto 715 from Paris, both September 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, Harvan-(Incoming)-September 1968) Jorden's notes of this formal session are in Johnson Library, William Jorden Papers, William J. Jorden Notes, 21st Meeting.
--Tho's warning about the futility of our intensifying the war. This may have been simply a probe to try to ascertain whether we were giving any thought to the idea. It may well be that the North Vietnamese fear this possibility in view of the lack of progress in Paris. This fear could be the main motive behind their agreement on the expanded schedule of private talks. It remains to be seen whether or not more frequent talks are designed simply to forestall our intensification of the war or whether they are now ready for substantive talks because of their deteriorating position in the South combined with a fear that we might intensify the war.
If they are worried about an intensification of the war, a 7-10 day bombing campaign between 19 and 20 degrees might encourage them to talk faster.
--Tho's emphasis on US troop withdrawal and the unacceptability of the Manila formula. This could result from the fact that phase 1-phase 2 is a dead issue and they need something new to talk about in order to maintain our interest. It may also be that they wish to probe in hopes of weakening the US position on the Manila Declaration/3/ and in the process creating troubles for our relations with the GVN and our other allies. On the other hand, it is at least remotely possible that they are ready to enter into serious discussions about troop withdrawals as one way of proceeding with substantive discussions. From their point of view it would be unwise to proceed very far down the line of step-by-step mutual de-escalation until they had a better idea of the end of the line in terms of a political settlement in SVN and foreign troops in SVN.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 12.
With these thoughts in mind, our position ought to be to:
--Probe NVN intentions by trying to start a serious dialogue on troop withdrawals.
--Emphasize that a serious discussion of troop withdrawals is impossible as long as they maintain that there are no North Vietnamese troops in SVN.
--Reaffirm the flexibility of the Manila Declaration without further weakening of the position.
--Avoid for the time being any hint of token withdrawals.
--Note that an ultimate agreement on troop withdrawal requires agreement--or at least understanding--about the political future of SVN.
G
14. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson at Camp David/1/
Washington, September 15, 1968, 1517Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. Received at 11:35 a.m. The notation "ps" on the telegram indicates that the President saw it. The President was at the Presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, September 14-16. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
CAP 82396. The telephonic flash report of the Paris private meeting this morning is obscure. They found it hard to summarize on the phone. Their written report should arrive about noon and will be forwarded./2/
/2/The written report was transmitted in flash telegram 20872/Delto 732 from Paris, September 15. A full report of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 20873/Delto 733 from Paris, September 15. (Both ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto XIII [2 of 2])
--Meeting took 2 hours and 40 minutes.
--Harriman presented the points he indicated to us he would make,/3/ and there was discussion.
/3/In telegram 20861/Delto 731 from Paris, September 13, Harriman indicated that he would bring up mutual withdrawal, the circumstances necessary to stop the bombing completely, and the "our side-your side" formula for participation. (Ibid.)
--The other side used some "nuanced language" which "interested" our delegation.
--They remain "not discouraged, not encouraged; but interested."
--Firm agreement to meet again on Friday/4/--with probably not much to be expected from Wednesday tea break./6/
/4/September 20; see Document 24.
/6/Nothing substantive was discussed during the tea break at the 22d formal session at the Majestic Hotel on September 18. A report on the session was transmitted in telegram 21015/Delto 745 from Paris, September 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, Harvan-(Incoming)-September 1968)
15. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, September 16, 1968, 8:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2]. No classification marking. Drafted by Elsey. This meeting is the regular 8:30 a.m. staff meeting of Secretary of Defense Clifford, which included, in addition to Clifford, Nitze, Warnke, Elsey, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Phil G. Goulding, and military assistant Colonel Robert Pursley. For additional information on the group, see Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 491.
CMC [Clifford] tells re week-end at Camp David./2/ He had 2 of best talks on V. Nam since becoming Sec Def 1-1/2 hrs Sat nite & 2 hrs on Sunday. When Harvan's 3,000 word cable came to Camp David--it shows for 1st time some movement by NVNams./3/
/2/Clifford spent both September 14 and 15 with the President at Camp David. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of these conversations has been found.
/3/Reference is to telegram 20873/Delto 733 from Paris, September 15. See footnote 2, Document 14.
Sat, pm
CMC went over his plan again: "we've been on dead center for 5 mos. we have to get something in return for stopping the bombing & I have a way--a plan--etc. etc."
LBJ had felt, he said, CMC just wanted to quit the bombing, without concession. He was re-assured.
Then came, Sun, the long message. I said, "It proves the NVNams are there, meaning business."
We agreed, if Czech stays quiet for a week, LBJ will send a message to Kosygin to revive a meeting with K. on Strat[egic] weapons & he'll try for an assurance with K. that we'll stop bombing if the other side will give certain assurances.
Nitze at this pt. explodes! "It's asinine--it's 'pissing' away an advantage we have! It'll undo the N.Atlantic alliance if LBJ gets into bed with Kosygin."
Warnke sides with Nitze, but much more mildly. He too thinks movement is going on without the Russians.
CMC expresses astonishment at Nitze's objections--"You, Paul, wanted to get the Russians into act."
"Yes," says Nitze, "but that was before Czechoslovakia & before NVNams started to move!!!"
Elsey & Warnke argue that this won't work because timetable won't work; it'll take too long. We'll have an election before you can get the Russians in!
CMC grows irritated! "I'm for anything that will get the Pres. to stop the bombing!"
Nitze--"No, I'm not!! Not if it means doing things contrary to our national interest! Wrecking NATO by playing footsie with Kosygin wld do so!"
CMC--"All of you are trying to think logically. You don't realize LBJ's mood. It's: 'I'm God-damned if I'll stop the bombing without something from the other side!'"
The discussion breaks off at 0925 to prepare for 0930 Staff meeting (Averell Harriman calls in to set date--He is just coming in from Paris--Max Taylor calls--CMC refuses to take call.)
CMC--"Do not deprecate the concept of finding the means of persuading the Pres to stop the bombing in the N[orth] & until we get it stopped we can't get anyplace. I'm ready to take risks elsewhere, anywhere!"
Nitze explodes again: "I feel passionately, not to jeopardize U.S. boys, ever, any time, any place & there is no need now to play into Soviet hands & it would terribly . . . to do so!"
16. Memorandum From the Board of National Estimates to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, September 16, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 092.2 (September-October) 1968. Secret. A notation on the memorandum reads: "Sec Def has seen--8 Oct 1968."
SUBJECT
The Coming Political Struggle for South Vietnam
1. The long awaited and much heralded third Communist offensive has fallen well short of its advance billing. In contrast to repeated warnings of a massive country-wide attack, approaching or even exceeding the Tet offensive, the current effort has been a fairly cautious affair. No doubt much of this is due to increasingly effective Allied spoiling operations. In any event, the bulk of the evidence indicates that the Communists are not now attempting a major military offensive; most of the action has been sporadic, with considerable emphasis on attacks by fire, and only occasionally followed by limited ground probes. The present effort is more prolonged but less intense than the Tet or May offensives.
2. The gap between the ominous predictions and the subsequent reality has led to considerable speculation. One view is that the Communists have suffered a near disastrous defeat and have been forced to postpone if not cancel their plans for a major offensive. A contrary opinion is that the climax is yet to come, and that we have only witnessed the preliminaries to a massive assault, ultimately against Saigon.
3. In our view neither of these interpretations is accurate. While there will probably be lulls and new bursts during the next several months, Communist military action is not likely to rise significantly above the level of the past month. It now appears that the Communists have made a strategic decision to conserve their forces, while trying to maintain intermittent pressures sufficient to preoccupy Allied troops in or near the urban areas. Further, this decision, we believe, rests on Hanoi's reappraisal of certain fundamental Communist strengths and weaknesses--a reappraisal which was probably conducted at the highest level during Le Duc Tho's absence from Paris in July.
4. In terms of manpower and matériel, the Communist forces are still capable of a formidable effort. But the political and military leaders must now be acutely aware that such an undertaking involves extremely high costs, cannot be recycled indefinitely, and would almost certainly not win the war. On the other hand, the Communists are quite capable, without the expense and risks of an extraordinary military effort, of enduring the next six months or more without seriously impairing their position in South Vietnam.
5. In these circumstances a massive military move would only be justified if it promised significant psychological and political dividends in terms of Hanoi's basic objectives: breaking the "aggressive will" of the US and destroying the GVN. It would be foolish to rule out such a move; Hanoi could well see a high political return not apparent or convincing to others. In our view, however, the Communists can no longer have very high expectations that their objectives can be advanced by large scale military attacks. The Tet attacks were unique, and in a sense an aberration. They yielded important gains for Hanoi, but it is increasingly unlikely that such a situation can be duplicated.
6. Now, Allied forces and the general populace have been fully prepared for further offensives by the Communists. US opinion to some extent at least has been conditioned to expect an intensification of the fighting. The record of the last few months should raise doubts in Hanoi whether the Paris talks can be directly influenced by battles--or even lulls--in South Vietnam. And one important benchmark has been passed--the political conventions--without a significant turn in US policy.
7. One further consideration must be of growing importance in Hanoi's calculations. Unless the North Vietnamese surprise everyone by making a rapid settlement in the next three months, Hanoi will have to deal with a new American administration. The Communists might be tempted to try a political move or even a dramatic military effort in an attempt to sway the election. But they could have no assurance of the net result; Hanoi is in no better position than anyone else to guess what policies will prevail after the election. In this context, it would be prudent for the North Vietnamese to confront a new administration with its forces not seriously weakened, rather than expend its manpower and resources trying to influence an outgoing administration.
8. In sum, we agree with the remarks, recently attributed to President Thieu, to the effect that the present period is a transitional one: the military aspects of the struggle will gradually be overshadowed by the political aspects./2/ The military effort will be supplementary to the political and diplomatic struggle. We believe that Hanoi intends to reach a negotiated settlement; the optimum period for this settlement opened on 31 March and in Hanoi's view will probably not last much beyond the first six months of a new administration. Thus, we foresee an intensive political-diplomatic struggle coming, one which could produce some dramatic surprises.
/2/Thieu offered his analysis during a September 13 meeting with Bunker, who reported on it in telegram 37824 from Saigon, September 14. Rostow assessed Thieu's analysis in an attached covering note, September 16, transmitting the telegram to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, 9/30-10/22/68, Vol. I [3 of 3]) In a September 15 memorandum to Abrams, Komer supported Thieu's contention that the enemy would "seek to maintain military pressure for essentially political purposes, i.e. to convince the U.S. and Vietnamese audiences that the VC are still strong enough to insist on a political settlement favorable to them." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Komer Files: Lot 69 D 303, Vietnam/Turkey) In another assessment contained in a memorandum of September 17, Carver and Allen of the CIA Vietnamese Affairs Staff wrote: "Though Thieu is probably basically right, his analysis is a shade too comfortable. Our adversaries are waiting for a break and, in keeping up the pressure, are trying to hold down their losses. They are trying to develop a situation they can exploit, however, and should they find a chink in the Allied position (e.g., be able to slip small units into Saigon), they will move swiftly and sharply to take advantage of any such opening." (U.S. Army Center for Military History, Robert Komer Papers, Pacification Files, Nguyen Van Thieu: General File)
9. In Paris we expect the pace to quicken somewhat. Since Hanoi is not certain of the character of the next administration, its immediate aim will be to commit the US more firmly to the continuation of the talks, so that a new administration could not easily abandon them. Some concession, if only a cosmetic one, will probably be made behind the scenes to whet the interest of the US team. Probably Hanoi believes there is still an outside chance that the bombing will be ended before the American elections and it will work for this in Paris. Hanoi's general objective still is to move the negotiations onto highly charged substantive issues--the role of the Front, the withdrawal of American troops, etc.--which unnerve Saigon and create divisions between the US and the GVN. There would also be some advantage in advancing the talks so that a new administration would be able to dispose of the Vietnam problem by making some clear-cut decisions. Major concessions to the American position on reciprocal de-escalation, however, seem unlikely before the elections. If such concessions are intended, they would probably be reserved for a new administration.
10. Within South Vietnam, the Communists intend to go forward with the political preparations for an end to the fighting. They will develop two new instruments: the urban oriented "Vietnam Alliance for Peace . . ." and the administrative apparatus in the rural areas known as revolutionary liberation committees. Thus far these two instruments have been given a public identity separate from the National Liberation Front. Though this calculated ambiguity may be somewhat confusing to the rank and file, it permits the Communists to keep open several options when serious negotiations over a political settlement begin. The general aim of a "coalition" government underlies the creation of these new devices, but how the various pieces fit together is open for bargaining. In any case, the Communists are laying the groundwork for claiming a share of political power when the fighting stops.
11. Some painful choices, however, confront the Communists as they proceed toward a settlement. One is whether to press for a cease fire. With their forces intact and in control of large areas in the countryside, a cease fire might seem an attractive move, especially since the GVN seems to fear it. The Communists would count heavily on the widespread popular fears that a cease fire could only mean that the Communists would be eventually given some political position in Saigon. On the other hand, by agreeing to cease fire, the Communists would lose important leverage on the GVN and the US and would then be in the position of having to deal, sooner rather than later, with the present Saigon authorities. We simply cannot be sure how they would weigh the prospective gains and losses. But such a move could come at any time.
12. There is one further problem which Hanoi may have already begun to mull over. What if, despite serious negotiations, continued military action, and a change in US administrations, Hanoi cannot achieve a settlement which, at a minimum, provides an opportunity for winning power in political competition. In other words, what if US terms are simply too harsh and unacceptable. Then North Vietnam must face the prospect of reducing its own minimum terms, or gearing its military strategy for a much longer war than it now foresees or intends. An awareness of this potentially agonizing decision may give some greater sense of urgency to Le Duc Tho and his comrades in Paris over the next few months.
For the Board of National Estimates:
Abbot Smith
Chairman
17. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, September 16, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive. In an attached covering memorandum transmitting a copy of this report to the President, September 17, Rostow wrote: "Herewith the matter Dick Helms was going to raise at lunch, but held off at Sect. Rusk's suggestion. It reveals what Ky's--and in part, Thieu's--frame of mind really is; and their deep anxiety about the U.S. This is absolutely firm intelligence and suggests our major problem with a bombing cessation. I believe I know how we can deal with it." Notes of this luncheon meeting are printed as Document 22.
SUBJECT
Discussion Between President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao
Ky to discuss coup rumors and the general Vietnamese situation
1. On 10 September 1968, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and President Nguyen Van Thieu had an hour-long private meeting, arranged at Ky's request, to discuss the coup rumors of 8 September. The conversation evolved into a somewhat disjointed and speculative dialogue about possible American interest in promoting a coup to obtain a quick peace in Vietnam. The Vice President also used the occasion to stress the need for unity in the government, to propose again that the President delegate to him some special mission as a way of dramatizing their mutual confidence, and to attack what he called the divisive activities of Prime Minister Tran Van Huong, Interior Minister Tran Thien Khiem, III Corps Commander General Do Cao Tri, and Information Minister Ton That Thien. The President did not respond to these latter gambits of Ky's but the two men appeared frank and forthcoming in discussing the matter of a coup.
2. Ky began the meeting by saying that coup rumors had been brought to his attention on 8 September by a phone call from Ambassador Berger and by the talk of his fellow officers on 9 September; he therefore wished to report these matters to Thieu and to review the situation with him. After protesting his own innocence of even any prior knowledge of coup talk against the President, Ky expressed the view that the Americans might resort to a coup to resolve the Vietnam issue before the election so that Vice President Humphrey might win.
3. Thieu responded that the same thought had occurred to him. He indicated that he had been concerned over two possible American solutions to the war (1) a coup, or (2) a sudden decision to stop the bombing, accept a cease-fire, and press for coalition government. He speculated that the Nixon camp might like to foment a coup to create disorder in Vietnam as a way of attacking the Johnson administration. He also mused that the Communists must help Humphrey in the elections, "even if they have to assassinate Nixon".
4. Ky suggested that the Americans might be "preparing a solution through some third person--possibly Tran Van Huong or Duong Van (Big) Minh". Thieu speculated that the U.S. could even be thinking in terms of Phan Quang Dan or Truong Dinh Dzu.
5. After further similar speculation, Thieu and Ky finally concluded that an American coup against the President would solve nothing since the nation's anti-Communist forces would quickly mount a counter-coup and that to overthrow the entire Vietnamese Government, from top to bottom, would be a very difficult and hazardous undertaking for the Americans. Thieu said that he believed the likeliest dramatic gesture to insure a Humphrey victory would be an American move for a bombing halt and cease-fire. Ky agreed that the Americans had probably not decided on the course of a coup--"they only envisage it to make all their preparations".
6. Twice during the conversation Ky referred to the need for unity within the government. He called Prime Minister Huong a "card of the Southerners" and a creator of factionalism and said he was afraid of the Prime Minister. He criticized the high turnover of civil, police, and military posts involving friends of Huong and Interior Minister Khiem. He expressed reservations about the positions of Khiem and III Corps Commander Tri in the event of a coup, saying "I am afraid of persons like Khiem and Tri, and Tri most of all--he is an avenger". He also criticized the reference of Information Minister Thien, "that slave of the Americans", to Premier Huong as the Magsaysay of Vietnam. Thieu made no comment on these accusations nor did he respond to Ky's suggestions that he be given "some task, a special mission" to prove and dramatize the unity and trust between them. The two men also discussed the return of exiled General Minh. Thieu indicated his unhappiness that so much discussion of Minh's return had been conducted via the press medium, but neither Thieu nor Ky expressed opposition to Minh's return.
18. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, September 16, 1968, 9 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Literally Eyes Only for the President and Secretary Rusk.
Mr. President:
As we consider the possible initiative with the Russians, I believe we should take certain steps and plan others--in the form of a scenario--to make sure all bases are covered.
1. A military assessment for the next several months, say mid-September to mid-November.
This should cover:
--enemy plans and intentions;
--our capacity to deal with them;
--current and prospective rates of infiltration;
--weather and probable supply movements through the Panhandle and Laos.
We know, in general, that the answers are: a stretched out harassing campaign, with an effort to consolidate politically in the countryside; we can cope well; low infiltration now, probably due to weather--possibly due to political plans: infiltration could rise sharply when Laos dries up from mid-October on; weather will deteriorate in Panhandle, improve in Laos. But we need an authoritative wrap-up from Abrams, for which we can ask at any time.
2. Contingency plans for applying more pressure to North Vietnam if you should judge diplomacy has failed.
Major candidates are:
--bombing Cambodian bases;
--bombing up to 20th parallel;
--bombing Hanoi-Haiphong;
--mining Haiphong;
--ground attacks into northern half of DMZ;
--ground attacks north of the DMZ.
Bus could be asked to work on this on a personal basis now, without staff. You may wish formally to engage Pentagon staff only if bombing halt is under way.
3. Rules of engagement during a bombing halt.
We had a good talk about this in Nick Katzenbach's Vietnam group ten days ago. All hands agreed we would wish to strike back in case of DMZ violations promptly, with our response local rather than general, and about three times the weight of the particular provocation; for example, three shells for every one fired across the DMZ. But we may wish to start formal contingency planning on this.
4. Political.
A. If we go ahead with another message via Dobrynin, say, late today/2/ and we get a positive reply, you may wish, just for the record, to check with Thompson and Bohlen before moving--so that Russian experts will have been consulted.
/2/Rostow met with Dobrynin that evening from 6 to 7:30 p.m. He transmitted a message from Johnson to the Soviet leadership that stated that, if the leaders of the Soviet Union were "prepared to advise on the basis of what now is being said" that accompanying action on the part of the DRV would be assured on a "de facto basis," then the President "would take their advice with the utmost seriousness" in a decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. The full text of this message is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Document 299. In a memorandum to the President, September 16, 8:10 p.m., Rostow noted Dobrynin's reaction: "He felt it important that, if the Soviet Union gave a positive reply to the message I had handed to him, that we not take such a reply as committing the Soviet Union to assuring the role we had envisaged for the GVN in negotiations." See ibid., Document 300.
B. With respect to Averell, the question may be more urgent: should he be told in general terms of the possibility of an approach via Moscow as a third party in the next several days?/3/
/3/The issue was discussed with Harriman in several conversations on September 17; see Documents 19-21.
C. Not immediately urgent, but to be kept in mind as a checklist, if we move ahead:
--When do we tell Bunker, Thieu, and Abrams and how do we keep South Vietnamese from panicking?
--When do we tell Asian fighting allies?
--When do we tell NATO allies and how do we keep them from turning off efforts to strengthen NATO?
--How do we reassure Israelis that we are not going to sell them out with the Russians, while keeping the heat on them?
--How do we deal with the issue of Czechoslovakia?
--When do we talk to Congressional leadership?
--When do we inform the major candidates?
(The answer to a good many of these questions--in terms of substance--will come to a head in the drafting of a statement for the President announcing his forthcoming actions. Simultaneous announcement of a NATO meeting in Brussels, post-Geneva,/4/ and a meeting with fighting allies in Asia would help. The Czechoslovak issue will be difficult, although it could be helped by a public troop withdrawal schedule before Geneva.)
/4/Reference is to arms control talks being held in Geneva.
5. A final thought. If the bombing halt comes just before Geneva and we wish to hold Hanoi's feet to the fire on performance in both Paris and on the ground, you may wish to keep the Geneva talks going until they do perform. Much the most interesting thing said in Paris yesterday was that serious discussions could begin "the next day."/6/
/6/See Document 14.
Walt
19. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 17, 1968, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Rusk, Dean--1968-69. Top Secret; Nodis. Harriman's summary version of this conversation is ibid., Confidential File, July-September--General. Harriman had returned to the United States 2 days before to attend a family funeral.
Secretary Rusk
W. Averell Harriman
I had a half-hour's talk with Dean before going over to the White House. Nick Katzenbach came in at the end of it./2/ The atmosphere was completely different from last night./3/ It was relaxed and cordial.
/2/Rusk met with Harriman from 11:30 a.m. to 12:07 p.m. Katzenbach joined the meeting at 11:55 a.m. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Book, 1968-1969)
/3/The previous evening Harriman met over dinner with Rusk, Katzenbach, Bundy, and Read. In his memorandum of the conversation, September 16, Harriman noted: "Rusk made a hard-line argument with Nick, saying: 'If Hanoi is serious it would give us the word,' since, from his experience, Eastern 'face' was a farce. They could get around it if they wanted to. Nick argued well, speaking of North Viet-Nam's ideology rather than face, and U.S. interests." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips & Missions, 1968-69, Paris Peace Talks, Memoranda of Conversations)
Dean said the President had very much in mind that there were three elements that had to be dealt with, and that in talking to him I should understand this. One was military activities in the DMZ area. The second was what Dean called attacks on the cities. I told him it would be better to speak of attacks on Saigon and other principal cities. I explained the difference between hitting Saigon and a provincial capital like Tay Ninh. He listened without comment. The third point was the participation of the GVN. I told him Cy and I thought the DRV had a clear understanding on the DMZ and had told us as much as we would get. We had dealt with shelling of Saigon last June, though there had been some additional shelling recently. I didn't think there would be so much difficulty establishing the world opinion on that question.
Dean argued the need for referring to other attacks in our discussions was not conclusive, except Dean stated the subject was definitely on the President's mind. I maintained reference to Lau/Vance talks had dealt with that and could only be determined at "serious discussions" after end of bombing on basis of reciprocal deescalation, etc.
On the third point I stated that I thought we had not had a satisfactory answer from Le Duc Tho. He had only agreed to talk about it at the serious discussions. We had commented that each has a different point of view but we'll discuss it.
I told Dean that I thought Cy and I ought to have more authority to go back on Friday's meeting/4/ indicating that we felt we'd made real progress and an understanding on the DMZ matter, but that inclusion of GVN was a point which needed to be clarified. I said we wanted to be able to tell Tho that the President (or the Government) was gratified with the progress we had made on the DMZ but the question of GVN was holding up any action. I wanted to be able to go as far as we could in implying that this issue was the one that had to be settled before action could be taken on the cessation of the bombing.
/4/For the meeting at Paris on September 20, see Document 24.
I gave Dean my opinion about the meeting with Kosygin./6/ If the President arranged to see him before ending the bombing, little or nothing would result, whereas if the bombing stopped before he saw him, I felt that the talks could be extremely useful, both as it related to Viet-Nam and the other matters he wished to discuss (Middle East and nuclear). The Secretary encouraged me to make all these points frankly with the President.
/6/See footnote 2, Document 18.
W. Averell Harriman/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
20. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 17, 1968, 12:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Johnson, Lyndon--1968. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting lasted until 12:42 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) In a memorandum to the President, September 17, 10:15 a.m., Rostow transmitted guidance for the meeting in the form of five questions that the President should ask. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Middle East and Vietnam Negotiations, September 1968) Rostow's notes of this meeting are in his undated memorandum for the record. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3])
The President
W. Averell Harriman
Walt W. Rostow
I had a brief talk with Walt Rostow before going in to see the President at quarter past 12. Walt came with me. (The President was most cordial. I thanked him for the telegram and flowers, etc.)
I went over the same ground with the President in some detail as I had with Dean./2/ He did not argue about any aspect of it. He questioned me in some detail about my judgment of Kosygin's attitude after the cessation of bombing, rather than before. I explained that Russia had the same commitment to NVN as we had to SVN. They were committed not only in hardware, but open-ended commitment on military personnel. They could not take any position as long as we were hitting what they called a Sister Socialist State and there would be a new situation if we stopped bombing NVN. We had no concern over the future of NVN; similarly, they would have little concern about SVN; but they would feel committed to support Hanoi in their position on the political settlement. On the other hand, they would be able to use influence. I underlined the desire of Eastern European countries to get a settlement, particularly Tito,/3/ Romania and Poland. He listened attentively and appeared to accept my conclusion. (After lunch, in speaking of this to Dean Rusk, he said, "Averell is more optimistic about our talks with Kosygin if we stop the bombing first." Something to the effect that he thought "we ought to consider what Averell said".)
/2/See Document 19.
/3/Josip Broz Tito, President of the Republic of Yugoslavia.
The President listened to my statement about the understanding with Tho on the DMZ and my request for more leeway in discussions of the position of GVN in talks. The President asked whether I thought their intent was to accept the end of the bombing and then stall as they had for four months until a new President came along, or whether they would want to reach a settlement. I told him that I thought the latter would be the case, although it might take some time. They would accept an independent SVN, etc., according to the NLF program. Our major difficulty would be over who steered the government. We were insisting on Saigon having the lead; they would insist on the NLF. They would fight each item as long as they felt there was a chance of getting what they wanted. How far they would compromise I could not tell, but in any event by January 20 we would be well into the talks. The important question was to get the South Vietnamese talking among themselves in the hope of their working out a solution.
The President did not seem interested in the details but was interested in whether there would be a serious attempt to come to an understanding in the discussions. I pointed out the difference in the manner in which they were talking about mutual withdrawal of troops in last Sunday's discussions with Tho/4/ than before, which encouraged me to believe they were thinking seriously of mutual withdrawal, but I couldn't see now how we could police the withdrawal. I pointed out Tho's question: why shouldn't our troops be out at the same time theirs are out? I told the President time was rather short; I hoped he could make a decision within the next couple of weeks on ending the bombing, and I thought a meeting with Kosygin at the end of October would be too close to November 5th to be feasible and suggested mid-October as latest date.
/4/See Document 14.
(Note: In talking with Dean Rusk later, after the lunch, the President said you have to recognize our schedule is short and we have to have action (I thought he said late in October) or it would be too late. I commented that I thought before the end of September for end of bombing. He said "He meant all action including the Kosygin talk".)
The President asked about Ohio./6/ I said that I normally had some sort of a guess. I had none in this case. I explained the sense of authority that Le Duc Tho gave in talking to him. I couldn't believe that they would want to transfer the talks to some junior person in Oslo. I said I couldn't guess; we would have to wait and see.
/6/On August 6 DRV Ambassador to Norway Ngo Minh Loan suggested to the Norwegian Government that DRV Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nguyen Chan travel to Oslo before August 15 in order to reopen the indirect Norwegian channel of communication code-named Ohio. (Telegram 5963 from Oslo, August 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO) The Department recommended that Davidson be sent to Oslo to act as the U.S. representative in these contacts. (Telegram 216977 to Oslo, Paris, and Saigon, August 7; ibid.) On the eve of the meeting, however, it was postponed by the DRV. (Telegram 221207 to Oslo, Paris, and Saigon, August 14; ibid.) Chan's arrival in Oslo was re-scheduled for September 19, and his first talks with Norwegian Foreign Ministry officials were to begin on September 20. Davidson arrived the previous day for a briefing by Norwegian officials. (Telegrams 6605 from Oslo, September 18, and 6634 from Oslo, September 19; both ibid.) For the September 20 meeting, see Document 25.
I emphasized that bombing could begin at once in DMZ and just north if the DRV didn't carry out its part. The President said that I was as bad as Dean in thinking it easy to start bombing again--he spoke of the 37 day pause/6/ and reaction when he started again, etc. I explained the difference between the present situation and then.
/6/Reference is to the 37-day bombing pause during the period December 1965-January 1966.
W. Averell Harriman/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Addendum:
Dean told me that the President had said he had had an interesting talk with me and had covered a lot of ground. Rusk asked me to meet with him early tomorrow morning and go over the instructions needed. I told Dean I would talk the situation over this afternoon with Bundy./8/ There were certain points I wanted to make and get a decision. On other points we might reach an understanding on what we had in mind.
/8/Notes of Harriman's meeting with Bundy have not been found, but he did meet with Rusk during the morning of September 18. His notes of the conversations read in part: "We discussed problem of inclusion of GVN and I had to admit things would be difficult if we did not have an agreement. We couldn't start bombing on this issue and we might have undignified and frustrative delay in Paris. He has Bunker and Saigon much in mind on this question." Harriman added: "On Hubert and United States political situation, Dean is on another planet." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Humphrey, Hubert H.--1963-1968)
W.A.H./9/
/9/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
21. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 17, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Confidential File, July-December 1968. Top Secret; Nodis.
Walt Rostow, White House
W. Averell Harriman
After speaking with the President, I went back to Walt's office and we had about a half-hour's talk (the President had to go to General Ware's funeral)./2/
/2/Major General Keith Ware, Commander of the 1st Infantry Division, was killed September 13 when his helicopter crashed near the Cambodian border. The funeral was held at Fort Myer in Arlington, Virginia. The President left the White House at 12:50 p.m. and returned at 1:43 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
We talked a lot about "Your side and our side". Walt wondered if that was as important as the details to get them to accept the GVN in the negotiations even though it might be on some other basis. He had been impressed with Bunker's ideas that there might be talks among the Vietnamese in some place other than Paris, or if in Paris without our participation. Rusk, however, feels strongly that we should stick to "your side and our side" formula as we would have impossible problem with the GVN if they don't sit in formal talks in Paris. This would not preclude the alternative of our having private talks elsewhere at our official level. Walt expressed what he called the hopeful view that Hanoi theologians could claim success in having forced the United States out but they might want to have the NLF conclude a deal with the GVN which would not be as satisfactory. They might not want to take the onus of this less than satisfactory deal. I allowed I didn't know, but I said I had no idea what Hanoi had in mind but as far as I was concerned I thought the GVN should deal with the NLF; they were southerners; they were people. It would be better for them to deal with each other. I realized this was political problem for GVN but perhaps this problem could be surmounted at a later stage. Walt Rostow also hopefully suggested that in some of the mass of material he'd been through there were indications that Hanoi was not as anxious to get us out of SEA as they appeared--even a base in SVN. I said, I disagreed. I couldn't see SVN but the Russians might be happy with our continuing to have some base facilities in Thailand. They would certainly like to see us continue to take an interest in SEA just as they had in the South; eventually hoped to come to some sort of understanding or at least parallel action with regard to China.
Rostow agreed and so did the Secretary that it probably would be better off to inspect and enforce the DMZ than to stick back an incompetent ICC. Both said that if we had the right kind of overflights we could decide the facts for ourselves. Walt had some ideas about getting Asia into the ICC or some other supervisory organization.
He did not disagree with my statement we had gone about as far as we could get with military actions in the demilitarized zone. I told him we had spoken of ending all action in the DMZ simultaneously with the cessation of bombing. We didn't discuss in any detail either with the President or with Rostow the President's second point on attack on the cities. I had, however explained what had happened in the middle of June on the shelling of Saigon. World public opinion had, I believe, induced Hanoi to desist. I said that this question should be dealt with in the statement the President might make at the time he announced he was going to end the bombing. We went into no detail on the kind of statement the President should make except that it was implicit that consideration must be given to the manner and content.
W.A.H./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
22. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, September 17, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting began at 1:43 p.m. at the White House. Clifford and Wheeler left at 2:40 p.m.; Rusk, Helms, and Harriman left at 2:55 p.m.; and Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson left at 3:10 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
THE TUESDAY LUNCHEON GROUP
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Ambassador Harriman
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
Walt Rostow
CIA Director Helms
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Clifford: We met with the Senate Committee this morning. They spent one and a-half hours on Vietnam./2/
/2/Reference is to hearings on Defense appropriations by the Senate Armed Services Committee.
CIA Director Helms: I had five and a-half hours with the same Committee yesterday, two hours on Vietnam.
Secretary Clifford: Senator Russell, Senator Jackson, Senator Allott, Senator Mundt, Senator Symington and Senator Kuchel asked questions.
The President: What is Senator Russell asking?
Secretary Clifford: He is asking, "how do we get out of the predicament in Vietnam?" He wants to know which direction we go to bring the war to an end. Senator Stennis wants to bomb and mine Haiphong. The other direction is Paris. "Do we go this way?" There was discouragement in the Committee.
Senator Russell says there is increasing impatience in the country.
Senator Stennis said within three months after the election we will get this problem solved. He says we should have brought military force to bear.
The President: What is the military predicament?
General Wheeler: In South Vietnam we are in "satisfactory" situation. We have the initiative. We have forestalled every major effort. The ARVN have performed well.
I see no reason for concern. We are on a sound military basis for continuation of talks.
In the North, they are rebuilding LOC's and their facilities. They are moving much matériel south.
The President: Have we lost or gained by the action of March 31?
General Wheeler: We lost something psychologically, nothing militarily at this time.
Secretary Rusk: We only gave up 10% of our sorties because of March 31.
General Wheeler: Senators Stennis, Russell and Allott implied we made a mistake on March 31.
Secretary Clifford: I told the Committee we were there to prevent the subjugation of the South Vietnamese.
General Wheeler: You made a good statement, Clark (Secretary Clifford).
[Omitted here is discussion of defense appropriations, aircraft sales to Israel, the Pueblo crisis; the status of U.S. bases in Spain, Cambodia, and Czechoslovakia; and the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.]
Paris Talks
Secretary Rusk: Averell and I have talked. Attacks on cities, willingness to talk with Saigon and the DMZ are three areas we have to get movement on./3/
/3/In spite of this assurance to the contrary, in a telephone conversation with Rusk on September 23, the President expressed doubts about the emphasis which Harriman gave to these three points during his discussions with the North Vietnamese. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, September 23, 1968, 9:37 a.m., Tape F6809.03, PNO 1-2)
Anything we do must be done before October 20. Otherwise we will have made bad gamble and lost.
Secretary Rusk: We are grateful for how Harriman has done his work. Jorden and Kaplan have done a good job.
Secretary Rusk: We are in disastrous situation on aid.
23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, September 18, 1968, 2003Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-September-October 1968. Top Secret; Nodis; Harvan/Plus. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Harriman, Rostow, Katzenbach, Clifford, and Read; and approved by Rusk.
240579/Todel 1107. Supplemental Instructions for Ambassadors Harriman and Vance.
1. These instructions supplement those contained in State 233437,/2/ which have been the basis of your conduct of the three conversations with Le Duc Tho.
/2/In telegram 233437/Todel 1045 to Paris, September 5, the Department noted the key negotiating points as being GVN participation and the cessation of military activity in the DMZ. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel-Paris Delto XII)
2. As your previous instructions have made clear, the two critical points on which we seek the highest possible degree of understanding--as the basis for a decision to stop the bombing--are the inclusion of the GVN in subsequent substantive talks under the "Your side/our side" formula, and military activity in and near the DMZ.
3. With respect to military activity in or near the DMZ, you should indicate that we have noted Tho's apparent understanding of our views on the subject and the importance we attach to it. It is vital that there be no misapprehension. You should, therefore, reiterate the understanding you expressed at that time, without their taking exception, so that it is in effect repeated and made clear what we understand their view to be.
4. You should state, however, that we are not satisfied with the position they have taken on GVN representation. You should make clear that a further degree of understanding on this subject is required, and you may imply that such a further degree of understanding could be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing. This should be the main topic on which you focus in your Friday meeting, so that they are left in no possible doubt as to its importance and our view of it.
5. In expressing our views on the subject of military activity in or near the DMZ, you should find occasion, as you did in your September 15 meeting,/3/ to make clear that, while this is our foremost specific concern in the area of military restraint, we continue to have in mind the other items discussed in the Vance/Lau conversations, in which attacks on major cities were included. We regard attacks on major cities as an action which would have the gravest consequences.
/3/See Document 14.
Rusk
24. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, September 20, 1968, 2033Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-September 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Harvan/Plus. Received at 4:53 p.m.
21178/Delto 751. From Harriman and Vance.
1. We met again with Tho and Thuy for 3-1/2 hours on September 20. The same people were present on both sides./2/
/2/The full report of this meeting was transmitted in telegram 21191/Delto 753 from Paris, September 21. (Ibid.) In telegram CAP 82431 to the President, September 20, Rostow relayed Vance's immediate telephonic report on the meeting. Vance noted that "there was no progress and no statement of 'understanding'" and contended that the North Vietnamese "had no authority from Hanoi to respond in the face of our rather precise statements." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68) The President vacationed at his Texas Ranch September 19-24. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
2. We opened by presenting our position precisely in accordance with instructions./3/ Our main emphasis centered on necessity of GVN representation in "serious discussions following the cessation of bombing."
/3/See Document 23.
3. We cannot report progress from our discussion today. It was clear that they did not have sufficient instructions to enable a positive response to the proposals we were making on GVN representation. At our suggestion, they agreed to communicate with their government and seek instructions. Apparently because of the time required for them to have a turn-around with Hanoi, they did not agree to meeting again on Monday./4/ They suggested we discuss the question of another meeting on Wednesday at the tea break with the proviso that if either side has anything to say as a result of communication with its government, an earlier meeting could be held./6/ Tho indicated that although he was prepared to meet again on our regular schedule, he thought it would be a mistake to meet until further instructions were received from our governments.
/4/September 23.
/6/See Document 32.
4. The gist of the discussion following on our proposal with respect to GVN participation concerned their claim that this was a prior condition which did not meet their demand for an unconditional cessation of bombing. We responded time and again that this was not a condition of cessation of bombing, but it was a question of a definition of serious negotiations. Without this understanding, we questioned the seriousness of their intent.
5. Further argument centered around two questions put by Tho: first, he wanted to know whether this was the only "condition" on which he had to come to an understanding before we would stop all bombing; second, whether we would decide to stop the bombing only when we have come to agreement on this question. We answered the second question first by saying that the bombing would not be stopped unless we could reach an understanding on this question. We answered the first question by saying that we could not say this was the only question, but we could inform him that agreement on this matter could be a major factor in facilitating a decision on the cessation of bombing.
6. Both Tho and Thuy repeatedly remarked that our unwillingness to state that the question of GVN representation was the only condition on which we should come to an understanding before the cessation of bombing, plus use of the words "could, repeat could, be a major factor," was an indication that we would have many more factors to raise. They said this would be an attempt to lead them into endless discussion of other factors before the cessation of bombing--which they had repeatedly made clear they had no intention of doing./6/
/6/In telegram 38599 from Saigon, September 24, Bunker argued: "It seems to me, therefore, that in stating our assumptions, we should not just say that the GVN must take part in serious discussions, but that we will bring them into the negotiations from the start. In effect, if we are unable to get Hanoi's agreement in advance to GVN participation, then we should unilaterally establish the 'our side, your side' procedure for the 'serious negotiations' by means of assumption." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Chron., XXII)
7. We went over the ground with them a number of times but they continued to insist that we were asking for prior agreement on matters which they were not prepared to discuss before the unconditional cessation of bombing. They repeated again their willingness to meet immediately following a cessation of bombing for discussion of any subject the other side wished to raise.
Harriman
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21591.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
25-43
25. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, September 21, 1968, 1423Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President/Walt Rostow, Vol. 95. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only for the President. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 12:36 p.m.
CAP 82446. Following are four cables on the Oslo channel.
Cable 1. The Norwegians debrief the men we sent to Oslo on their first discussions with the North Vietnamese./2/
/2/Telegram 6685 from Oslo, September 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO) In telegram 38466 from Saigon, September 23, Bunker commented on the Ohio contacts, in particular expressing the hope that "the Department has in mind making sure that our Norwegian friends leave the North Vietnamese in no doubt that a bombing halt and serious negotiations depend not only on an understanding with respect to the DMZ but also about GVN participation in the negotiations." (Ibid.)
Cable 2. Our brief instruction, sent during the night, to Davidson in Oslo./3/
/3/These instructions were noted in telegram CAP 82444 from Rostow to the President, September 21. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Chronological, Vol. XXII)
Cable 3. Harriman's comment and, quite helpful, elaboration of our instruction./4/
/4/Telegram 21180/Delto 752 from Paris, September 21. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO)
Cable 4. North Vietnamese plans for today, Saturday./6/
/6/Telegram 6687 from Oslo, September 21. (Ibid.)
WWR Comment:
The heart of the North Vietnamese message (cable 1) is in para. 7 and, perhaps, in para. 10.
Para. 7 states: "Concerning the North Vietnamese forces which were shelling South Vietnam, if the U.S. stops all bombing of North Vietnam and stops shelling across the DMZ, the North Vietnamese will not shoot at U.S. airplanes (because they will not be above NVN) and will not shell U.S. positions in South Vietnam across the DMZ. Warships outside North Vietnamese territorial waters would not be fired upon. Chan summed up by saying that the cessation of U.S. bombing and shelling of NVN would bring an end to all acts of war by North Vietnam against the U.S. However, when the U.S. hits at North Vietnam, North Vietnam must give them several blows back."
Para. 10 states that the North Vietnamese told the Norwegians that "they did not want Nixon."
It sounds a little as if Hanoi had taken rather literally two minimal statements made by Secretary Rusk and the President:
--Secretary Rusk's often repeated statement that "no one has ever been able to tell us what would happen if the bombing stopped."
--The President's press conference statement that "almost anything" from the other side would be helpful in stopping the bombing.
In any case, if the Norwegians are accurate reporters--and they have a reputation for being accurate, professional, and hard-headed--this is the first time that anyone from Hanoi has said that even the shelling across the DMZ would stop if our bombing stopped.
We must, of course, probe further.
It is interesting that the Soviets have contacted the North Vietnamese in Oslo. It is also interesting that the Soviets had to take the initiative.
Text of cables follows.
Cable 1. From Oslo to Washington.
"1. This afternoon Algard and Vraalsen met Davidson and Ridgway in Davidson's hotel room and supplied following information about their conversations with the North Vietnamese through afternoon Sept. 20. (In an attempt to create an informal atmosphere Vraalsen had jotted down points rather than taking full notes and the North Vietnamese did the same. When Vraalsen transcribes his notes a copy will be made available to us.)
2. Algard and Vraalsen met and dined North Vietnamese delegation Thursday evening. Conversation was completely nonsubstantive. Chan, Sung and interpreter Giai, Algard, Boye and Vraalsen met 9:30 a.m. Friday Sept. 20 for first substantive meeting. After exchange of formalities Chan said the situation had changed considerably both militarily and diplomatically since Algard's visit to Hanoi in Feb-Mar and asked if he could give a short statement setting forth the current situation. Speaking generally without notes Chan referred to the great victories won by the South [North] Vietnamese in their three great offensives, Jan-Feb, May and August. He used the highly exaggerated military statistics contained in recent NLF communiqué and mentioned the great damage the war was doing to U.S. dignity and honor. Chan stated that North Vietnam wished to live in peace but that it was entitled to sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity as agreed in the 1954 Geneva Accords. He said the North Vietnamese wanted to see an early end to the war and that every country could contribute to this, based on its special potentialities. To solve the problem its root--U.S. aggression--had to be removed. The war was the result of U.S. miscalculation and the U.S. would meet with defeat. What is needed is the unconditional cessation of bombing and also other acts of war so that the parties could go on to talk on other matters of interest to both sides. The fighting in South Vietnam must be stopped. (WWR Comment: I reported to you some time ago that in the preliminaries leading up to Oslo the North Vietnamese in Peking had said, in February 1968, 'Hanoi presupposed that military operations be stopped while negotiations are conducted.')/6/ Questions concerning South Vietnam must be discussed with the NLF. U.S. forces must be withdrawn so that South Vietnamese people can decide their own destiny. Chan concluded his thirty-minute presentation with the usual remarks about the U.S. responsibility for the impasse in Paris. He then said to Algard 'You've heard all this before.'
/6/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 66.
3. Boye opened discussion by saying that the Norwegian Govt's only interest is to help in bringing the Vietnamese war to an end, that it was disappointed by the lack of progress in Paris and willing to do anything it could to help. However, the GON could itself act as a channel and nothing more.
4. Algard said he was also concerned about Paris becoming a blind alley. The Norwegian Govt. stood behind its public statements favoring a unilateral cessation of bombing but fully understood why the U.S. President needed assurances of the safety of his troops before he could stop the bombing. Algard told Vietnamese he had the impression that the U.S. would be satisfied with an indirect message that North Vietnam would not endanger the safety of U.S. troops and that the U.S. was not requiring assurances in any attempt to trick the North Vietnamese into dropping their principal position. He said that the GON was sure that the U.S. wants to find a peaceful solution and would like to stop the bombing providing it receives assurances about the safety of its troops, particularly those in the area of the demilitarized zone. At this point Chan interrupted to ask whether the U.S. had said so and Algard replied yes.
5. Chan replied that the NLF could not stop defending itself against aggression, that U.S. forces massacring the people would meet natural resistance from the people and that what the U.S. was actually asking for was reciprocity.
6. Algard said he disagreed. The U.S. was not trying to get North Vietnam to change its position but must have assurances that security of its own forces would not be jeopardized if it stopped the bombing.
7. Chan then said the U.S. had to talk to the NLF about NLF military actions. Concerning the North Vietnamese forces which were shelling South Vietnam, if the U.S. stops all bombing of North Vietnam and stops shelling across the DMZ, the North Vietnamese will not shoot at U.S. airplanes (because they will not be above NVN) and will not shell U.S. positions in South Vietnam across the DMZ. Warships outside North Vietnamese territorial waters would not be fired upon. Chan summed up by saying that the cessation of U.S. bombing and shelling of NVN would bring an end to all acts of war by North Vietnam against the U.S. However, when the U.S. hits at North Vietnam, North Vietnam must give them several blows back.
8. Chan then stated North Vietnamese believed it was very important to get the Paris talks going. The U.S. must stop all bombing. The North Vietnamese are seriously fighting and are serious concerning peace. They are honest and serious, concerning other questions, Chan continued, tell the Americans that 'This will also be good.' 'This' was apparently the stopping of bombing. (WWR Comment: I believe the reference is to "honest and serious talks"--not to stopping the bombing.)
9. Algard told the North Vietnamese that neither GON nor U.S. would misuse any statements made to GON.
10. At the conclusion of this morning's talks Algard explained again to the Vietnamese the reasons that the U.S. could not stop the bombing without adequate assurance of the safety of its troops. He pointed to the recent Harris poll which showed 61 percent of the U.S. people were against unconditional cessation, mentioned the political problems that unconditional cessation would cause in the U.S. (noting that both party platforms had rejected it) and remarked that the course of the Paris talks and of the war in Vietnam could not help affecting the U.S. elections. Chan replied that the North Vietnamese had a definite opinion as to which candidate they preferred and indicated that they did not want Nixon.
11. Algard told Davidson that his impression was that the North Vietnamese were trying to convince the Norwegians that they should tell the U.S. that we could stop bombing without risk to our troops. Algard found it very hard to pin this impression down to any direct statements they made but cited the North Vietnamese flat statement that they would cease artillery fire across the DMZ if the U.S. stopped artillery fire across the DMZ and all bombing of North Vietnam and the North Vietnamese who twice repeated that if Americans only stopped the bombing everything after that would be easy. Algard did not indicate to Davidson that he accepted Vietnamese line about lack of risk to U.S. troops.
12. Algard found the North Vietnamese decidedly less aggressive and more informed than any North Vietnamese had previously been with him.
13. Algard will be seeing the North Vietnamese Saturday Sept 21 at 10:30 a.m. He intends to devote most of the session to trying to elicit more satisfactory response to question of what will happen on the ground if U.S. stops the bombing. He will point out serious consequences that would arise if U.S. stopped bombing and events showed that this endangered the security of U.S. troops. He will state that the road ahead after cessation of bombing will not be easy and may indeed be impossible if North Vietnam does not respond favorably.
14. We were unable to completely debrief Algard and Vraalsen. Vraalsen had to return to take the North Vietnamese sightseeing and Algard received call to report back to FonOff.
15. Comment: Most interesting aspect of conversation was definite North Vietnamese statement that they would stop their artillery fire across DMZ if U.S. stopped all bombing of North Vietnam and its artillery fire across DMZ. Hanoi has thus indicated its readiness to pay a specific military price (although not a very high one) for the stopping of bombing.
16. We would appreciate receiving any comments that Washington or USDel wish passed on to Algard."
Cable 2. From State to Oslo.
"Proposed position outlined paragraph 13 for tomorrow's talks is sound and we have no further comments at this stage of Oslo talks."
Cable 3. From Harriman to Oslo.
"1. We agree with Department that proposed position para 13 reftel is sound.
2. As an additional refinement you should point out to Norwegians, that as they seek to explore what will happen on ground, it would be helpful if they would keep in mind U.S. expectation that DRV will cease military activity in, through and across the DMZ and cease massing troops north of DMZ. In other words they should solicit DRV views on all their military intention in DMZ area in event U.S. stops all bombardment of DRV."
Cable 4. From Oslo to Washington.
"1. Algard telephoned Davidson 8 a.m. this morning (Saturday, Sept 21) and asked if he could come up to Davidson's hotel room. When he arrived he informed Davidson that yesterday afternoon the Soviet Embassy had called leading Oslo hotels to ask whether 'the North Vietnamese delegation' was registered there. Soviets finally contacted North Vietnamese and met with them later in the day. Soviet Embassy is giving a dinner for North Vietnamese Monday night. GON hopes that no Norwegians will be invited.
2. Algard mentioned the North Vietnamese had told him they would report his comments to Hanoi. Algard speculated that North Vietnamese might be using Soviet communications facilities.
3. Algard said in a relieved tone that nothing about North Vietnamese visit appeared in this morning's Oslo newspapers."
26. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, September 21, 1968, 1730Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-September 1968. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Harvan/Plus. Received at 3:54 p.m.
21192/Delto 754. Subj: Meeting with Oberemko.
1. This morning Vance met at Soviet Embassy with Minister Counselor Oberemko, who is chargé d'affaires in Zorin's absence. Negroponte was also present.
2. Vance told Oberemko that we had now had four private meetings with Tho and Thuy. The third meeting, on September 15, had been an important one./2/ At the meeting we had defined our position on withdrawal of forces because the DRV seemed to have some misunderstanding on our position in respect to the Manila Declaration. Next we had gone into the question of the cessation of bombing and the circumstances which would make it possible for such cessation. We had referred to the Lau/Vance talks and had then said there were two matters we considered of great importance: one was the question of military activity in the DMZ, the other was the inclusion of GVN representatives in any discussion of the political future of South Vietnam.
/2/See Document 14.
3. Vance said that we had come away from the third meeting with Tho and Thuy with the impression that they understood our position on the DMZ but the question of representation had not been satisfactorily resolved.
4. At our fourth meeting on Sept 20,/3/ we concentrated on the matter of GVN representation which we felt had been left in unsatisfactory condition at our last meeting. The matter was discussed at length, Vance told Oberemko, and the DRV side's attitude was totally unrealistic. They repeatedly spoke in platitudes about "serious intent" and "good will." It is easy to talk about serious intent and good will, but what is important and necessary is that it be demonstrated by acts and not just words.
/3/See Document 24.
5. Vance then gave Oberemko verbatim account of that portion of our Sept 20 statement which dealt with the representation issue (paragraphs 6-11 of Paris 21191 Delto 753./4/ Vance then explained that DRV side had responded by saying we were imposing a condition and our position was tantamount to reciprocity. We had replied that it was inaccurate and improper to characterize our demand as reciprocity. We had made it clear for a long time that we could not have serious discussions without representatives of the GVN on our side because the political future of South Vietnam should not be decided by either Washington or Hanoi, but by people of South Vietnam. We had said that the inclusion of GVN representatives on our side was necessary to permit serious conversations to take place, and that the DRV could include the NLF or any other they wanted on their side. Thus by insisting on this, we were merely defining what we meant by serious discussions. We had indicated to DRV side that their opposition to our totally reasonable request raised grave questions in our mind as to whether they were really serious.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 24.
6. Vance then remarked that Soviet Govt has often expressed its interest in seeing this conflict resolved. We believe that the time has come for Soviet Govt to weigh in heavily to make DRV realize that they are taking a wholly unreasonable and unrealistic position which is blocking the way to peaceful settlement. We believe we are now at a critical juncture, and we feel it is important that the DRV face up to reality. Vance noted that the world thinks we are intransigent on the NLF, whereas in fact we are willing to see them seated on DRV side. The world would think it totally unreasonable if it knew that Hanoi would not have anything to do with the GVN in discussions regarding the political future of Vietnam. The world would then realize that Hanoi simply wants to dictate by force of arms what the political future of South Vietnam will be.
7. Vance reiterated that we were approaching Oberemko today because we are at a critical juncture and it is important that the Soviet Govt use its influence at this time to permit us to get around the road block and move forward.
8. Oberemko replied that he would transmit our views to his govt without delay. He said he had a couple of questions. He noted that our proposal regarding the inclusion of the GVN in future talks could be a major factor in the decision to stop the bombing. Was the inclusion of the GVN the only US condition being put forward at the moment, or does the US have anything in mind regarding the DMZ? In other words, Oberemko said, does the US have one or two conditions for the cessation of bombing?
9. Vance replied that we have stated to the DRV what we would do in the DMZ if the bombing stopped and we have indicated to the DRV side what we expect them to do in and around the DMZ after the cessation of bombing. We have drawn our conclusions and we believe that the DRV would know what to do.
10. Oberemko said that it seemed to him that the question of GVN representation had became the major road block to serious discussions. Vance replied that it was a major road block. Oberemko then noted that Vance had mentioned the Manila formula and the question of withdrawal. Vance then gave Oberemko the precise wording we had used on this subject at our Sept 15 meeting with Tho and Thuy.
11. Oberemko said he did not understand the point concerning the withdrawal of US and free world forces remaining in South Vietnam not later than six months after the complete withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces. He asked if this meant that once all of the DRV troops whom we consider to be in SVN have been withdrawn that there would still be some of US troops in SVN. Vance replied affirmatively, saying that the US had more troops and that they would have a longer way to go. Vance said the important point is that mutual withdrawals should begin and that they begin simultaneously. The modalities and timing of mutual withdrawal should be discussed and agreed upon between the US and the DRV.
12. Oberemko again said that he would communicate our views to his govt. He did not think that it would be appropriate for him to comment at this time. The US, he said, already knows the comments of the DRV side. He said that he personally believed that the major obstacle in our talks is the continuation of the bombing and he felt that an unconditional and definitive bombing cessation could open the way to a political settlement. Vance replied the major obstacle was whether the DRV was really serious about seeking a political settlement and that the DRV position on GVN representation casts real doubt on their seriousness.
13. After the meeting Vance discussed the conversation with Gov Harriman and supplemented it by the following letter which was hand delivered.
"Dear Mr. Minister:
After returning to our Embassy this morning, I discussed our conversation with Governor Harriman.
I wish to add one thought to what I said this morning, to make sure that you have it in mind in reporting to your government.
As we have said many times, we are firmly committed to the principle that we will not discuss matters pertaining to the political future of South Vietnam without the inclusion of representatives of the Republic of Vietnam. It is unthinkable for us to stop the bombing, and then be faced with a continuation of the present situation--months of fruitless debate. This would be the result if representatives of the Republic of Vietnam were not included on our side. Sincerely yours, Cyrus Vance."/6/
/6/A copy of this letter is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips and Missions, Paris Peace Talks, Chronological Files, September-November 1968.
Harriman
27. Letter From W. Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance of the Paris Delegation to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Paris, September 21, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Rusk, Dean, 1968-69. Secret; Personal.
Dear Dean:
You undoubtedly have seen from our reporting cables on yesterday's meeting with the North Vietnamese that, as we all anticipated, the crucial issue is GVN representation./2/ When we told them that "an understanding on this subject could be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing", they immediately asked whether this was the only "condition". We repeated our instructions, and emphasized that this was a strong statement.
/2/See Document 24.
During a lengthy argument, Tho repeatedly pointed to the fact that we had used the words "'could be', only 'could be'" a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing. In addition, he stressed that when we said "a major factor" it meant that there were other factors as well. He maintained that, in light of the foregoing, if they discussed this question, the U.S. would lead them into endless discussion of other factors.
In Vance's conversation with Oberemko this morning, Oberemko asked for clarification on these points./3/
/3/See Document 26.
We have thought over the situation very carefully and have concluded that the instructions which Averell requested were too narrow, and that if we are to have hope of breaking the impasse, it will be necessary to broaden those instructions. We believe they should be changed to state "an understanding on this subject would be the major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing".
We feel that it is essential to have this additional authority before next Wednesday's meeting./4/ Although Tho has asked for instructions, he stated repeatedly that he knew his Government's views on this subject, and we assume that as a result of his report, Hanoi's instructions will support his position. We believe it would be much more effective to hit them with new instructions voluntarily, before they get locked into a position from which it will be difficult to move them.
/4/September 25; see Document 32.
We want to emphasize the importance we place on this issue and the manner in which we think it should be dealt with. We hope you will agree.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Averell
Cy/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Harriman and Vance signed the original.
28. Telegram From the Embassy in Norway to the Department of State/1/
Oslo, September 21, 1968, 1900Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Ohio/Plus. Received at 4:54 p.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
6688. 1. This morning's (Saturday, Sept 21) meeting between Algard, Vraalsen and North Vietnamese began at 10:30 and ended at 1:00 and Norwegians gave following report to Davidson and Ridgway later this afternoon.
2. Algard began Saturday sessions, picking up North Vietnamese statement yesterday that NLF had right to self-defense. Algard asked whether it was correct to understand that if US troops did not take offensive action, they would not be attacked. Chan replied he had not said that yesterday and then said that the us should recognize the NLF and should talk about above issue directly with the NLF now in Paris. There was more emphasis on talking to NLF than on recognition. (Although Algard says he clearly recollects the North Vietnamese saying that we should talk to the NLF now in Paris, Vraalsen, the note taker, does not remember any North Vietnamese reference to Paris in this context and his notes do not contain any such reference.)
3. Chan said us declares it can't let South Vietnamese regime go. He derided South Vietnamese Govt as bad sons of Vietnam, saying the Vietnamese people will know how to educate them. Algard used statement as opportunity to raise question of GVN representation in discussions after the bombing halt. The North Vietnamese said that the question of GVN presence was a matter that could be discussed after the bombing stopped. Chan also said that the North Vietnamese delegation in Oslo did not wish to discuss the question of representation.
4. Most of the discussion centered on US politics and its intentions. The North Vietnamese said that after putting the two party platforms under a "microscope" they had concluded that the Republican plank was general and did not contain any concrete suggestions on ending war but said that the North Vietnamese know "who (Republicans) are and how they are," obviously implying disapproval. The North Vietnamese said the Democratic platform did mention how to solve the Vietnamese problem but was mainly devoted to justifying the President's policy. Two elements in the Democratic platform were particularly dangerous and had to be rejected firmly. The first was the principle of reciprocity which was the equivalent of asking a victim to pay ransom. The second dangerous element was continued US support to the present South Vietnam regime including elaborate plans for strengthening and equipping its forces coupled with ignoring the fight for freedom of the Vietnamese people whose representative is the NLF. The North Vietnamese appeared to be afraid of Nixon and pointed out that according to every evaluation, progress in Paris would work to Humphrey's advantage.
5. Algard told the North Vietnamese that if President Johnson stops the bombing and the North Vietnamese misuse the cessation it will backfire on the President, on the Presidential candidates and most of all upon the North Vietnamese. Chan nodded but made no comment. During their discussion the North Vietnamese claimed that the US election campaign is like a power game between two gamblers and that is why it is dangerous for the North Vietnamese to make any commitment to the US.
6. At another point in the discussion, Chan said concerning the situation around the DMZ that it was the US that had violated the zone by sending troops into it and firing across it. The US believed that North Vietnamese would not be able to shell back. By shelling, the US committed an illegal act and the North Vietnamese have the right to self-defense. In this connection (apparently meaning self-defense) US representatives had to discuss the matter with the North Vietnamese in Paris. The North Vietnamese indicated that US shelling of North Vietnam was one part of a package of attacks on North Vietnam which also included bombing and naval bombardment. Chan said that after the US had stopped bombing and all other acts of war, North Vietnam would not have any target to fight.
7. The North Vietnamese suggested that either during their stay in Oslo or at the time of their departure, the GON issue some public statement about the visit in order to avoid possible impression, if visit later reported, that NVN delegation came to sue for peace. North Vietnamese suggested statement along the lines that because of the concern of the GON with the Vietnamese conflict and to return Algard's visit to Hanoi, the DRV sent Ambassador Chan to Oslo to give the GON an exposé of the situation in Vietnam. Algard told them that he still believed that serious purpose was best served by secrecy but since the North Vietnamese had raised the question of a public statement by the GON, he would give them the GON position after discussing the matter with his Foreign Minister.
8. Algard asked us to give him our thoughts on the desirability of a GON statement by noon on Monday, Sept 23. Preliminary FonOff view is that GON public statement might end GON usefulness as channel since it would both decrease possibility of further secret conversations and create internal difficulties on Foreign Minister Lyng's right.
9. Chan told the Norwegians that because of his position as Ambassador to Moscow he had told the Soviets that he was taking a trip to Oslo and had contacted their Embassy in Oslo. However he emphasized that he was not telling anyone (including the Soviet Union) the contents of his talks.
10. Algard said that it was his impression that the North Vietnamese were marking time today either because they had nothing more to say or because they were waiting for their appointment with Foreign Minister Lyng on Tuesday. He still believes that they are trying to convince GON that if US stopped the bombing the danger to US troops would not be increased. Algard said that North Vietnamese appeared to want the GON to certify North Vietnamese good intentions to US.
11. When Davidson asked Algard whether he believed that US troops would not be further jeopardized if the US stopped the bombing, Algard replied that, realizing full seriousness his words, it is his belief that the North Vietnamese would not act in a way to increase the danger to US troops after bombing cessation and that they are sincere in their intentions. Algard believes that the North Vietnamese are aware of the consequences that would follow their taking advantage of any bombing cessation. Algard recalled that this summer Loan had told him that the North Vietnamese had the advantage of good public opinion and asked Algard whether he thought North Vietnam would destroy it by taking advantage of a bombing cessation. Vraalsen said he agreed with Algard's evaluation of North Vietnamese sincerity.
12. Davidson read operative portions of Paris 21180/2/ and asked if Algard would raise these matters with North Vietnamese. Algard and Vraalsen promised to do so but indicated that it would have to be done more obliquely and said that they anticipated great difficulties in asking North Vietnamese how they intended to deploy troops on their own territory. Davidson also asked GON not to convey any impression that US might be interested in exchanging freedom of US base camps from attack for commitment not to take offensive action or move freely through countryside (see para 2 above). The Norwegians said they would do so.
/2/Dated September 20. (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-September 1968)
13. The North Vietnamese will be taking sightseeing trip on Sunday and fly to Bergen with Vraalsen on Monday, returning Monday night for dinner at Soviet Embassy (composition of guest list unknown). On Tuesday morning North Vietnamese will meet with Algard who will then accompany them for meeting with Foreign Minister. Algard has told North Vietnamese that his Foreign Minister is preoccupied with the question of bringing about a cessation of the bombing and would prefer to devote most of the conversation to discussion of modalities which might achieve this objective. He also asked the North Vietnamese to avoid any long prepared statement.
14. North Vietnamese delegation has asked Vraalsen to make arrangements for North Vietnamese departure Wednesday via Berlin.
15. Algard and Vraalsen have strong impression that while Chan acts as spokesman for delegation, Sung is really its boss.
16. Foregoing account (as well as yesterday's) largely episodic because Vraalsen spends only limited amount of time with us before rushing out to accompany North Vietnamese on sightseeing expeditions. Vraalsen again promised to give us his notes as soon as they are transcribed but indicated they might not be available until "sometime next week." Vraalsen said that to preserve secrecy he is not allowed to use a secretary and this plus his duties as shepherd to North Vietnamese delegation slows process down considerably.
17. We have promised to advise Algard of US views on desirability of press release Monday morning. Would appreciate any guidance on that issue, bearing in mind that FonOff staff will no doubt need our help in persuading FonMin of disadvantages of initiating publicity. Also appreciate any points we might make to GON before Algard next meets North Vietnamese./3/
/3/Telegram 242980 to Oslo, September 22, instructed Davidson to inform Algard that the United States was "strongly against any public statement." The telegram also contained the following instruction: "You should certainly get Algard away from his total preoccupation with 'the danger to U.S. troops,' noting that this is necessarily our way of explaining the problem to the American people, but that what we have in mind relates to specific actions, notably in the DMZ." Davidson was also instructed to stress the importance of including attacks on cities and the participation of the GVN as actions requisite to a full halt. (Ibid.) The additional points that Davidson planned to cover with Algard were transmitted in telegram 6689 from Oslo, September 22. (Ibid.) Davidson conveyed these points in a meeting with Algard on September 23. (Telegram 6713 from Oslo, September 23; ibid.)
Tibbetts
29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Norway/1/
Washington, September 21, 1968, 2029Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Ohio/Plus. Drafted by Bundy; cleared in substance by Rusk, Katzenbach, and Rostow; and approved by Bundy and Read. Repeated to Paris for the delegation.
242960. Oslo for Davidson.
1. We are of course deeply interested in your 6685./2/ You should express our appreciation to the Norwegians for the obvious care and persistence they are displaying.
/2/Text in Document 25.
At the same time, you should emphasize that exact detailed language could be of great importance in a serious exchange of the sort which may be developing here. While not necessarily demurring to the practice of jotting down points rather than taking full notes, we hope the Norwegians can retain and cross-check exact language used on critical points and that you will cross-examine to this end. Moreover, we may well wish to suggest their restating what they have understood DRV reps to say, so that it is nailed down and confirmed.
3. As we have already suggested, we also need full and exact account of what you yourself are telling the Norwegians on key points, and would appreciate exactly what you have already said in your first briefing on September 19./3/ This again is for the sake of exactness.
/3/Davidson met with Norwegian Foreign Ministry officials on September 19 to present the U.S. position on stopping the bombing. (Telegram 6634 from Oslo, September 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO)
4. In conveying to the Norwegians our requirements in relation to the cessation of the bombing, we assume you have made it clear that it is not necessary to get into such words as "conditions," "reciprocity," or other language that might run into consideration of face or prestige on either side. It is a simple fact of life that a cessation of bombing could not continue if the DMZ were not respected, if there were significant attacks on major population centers in South Vietnam or if North Vietnam refused to sit down in further negotiations which would include the Republic of Vietnam as one of the participants.
5. As to the DMZ, we get the impression--which may of course depend on your getting the fuller debriefing referred to in para 14 of your 6685--that the Norwegians may have conveyed the impression that we are concerned solely with the protection of US forces. Obviously, our concern extends equally to GVN and allied forces in the DMZ (and elsewhere).
6. Secondly, we are of course concerned not merely with firing across the DMZ, but with any movement of forces and equipment in and through the DMZ, or any massing of forces north of the DMZ. These are aspects that the Norwegians should already understand, and which we hope they in turn will be making clear. As you have already recognized, the one definite statement that emerges from your 6685 simply does not cover all the points that concern us.
7. This leads to a statement in your 6685 that we find both interesting and puzzling, namely, the next to last sentence of para 7. The reference to our stopping "bombing and shelling" has clear implications with regard to reconnaissance, while the reference to acts of war by NVN "against the US" is a wholly new wrinkle the meaning of which--particularly in relation to the DMZ--we simply cannot assess. This is another illustration of the vital importance of as nearly verbatim reporting as you can obtain and convey to us. Moreover, it is the kind of general expression that might serve as a vehicle for probing and for the Norwegians asking just what acts of war by NVN are meant to be covered by the statement, and what is NVN now doing that it would not be doing if the bombing stopped.
8. Another point that depends on exactly what was said and perhaps on further probing is the reference in para 2 of your 6685 in which the sentence about stopping the fighting in South Vietnam--as it appears in the sequence--could be taken to suggest the possibility of a ceasefire during negotiations. A similar suggestion cropped up in the Ohio channel in February, and the point is certainly worth probing a bit with the Norwegians to see just what was said. (We would not wish to have them pursue it with the North Vietnamese in any way, at least for the moment.)
9. Turning now to what you might be stressing with the Norwegians, our tentative advice--in the absence of your report of Saturday's meeting--is that you must get across to them the importance of inclusion of the GVN in political talks following the cessation of bombing. You should make clear that this is not a condition, but rather a minimum description of what is required for serious negotiations such as the North Vietnamese appear to envisage. As you know, we are pressing this point hard in Paris at the moment, and it is important that the Norwegians include it very clearly in their presentation of our position in order, at a minimum, not to mislead Hanoi about our major effort in Paris to reach an understanding on the "your side/our side" formula. You should convey to the Norwegians the importance we attach to real understanding on this point.
Rusk
30. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, September 22, 1968, 1623Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Chlodnick Files. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only For the President. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 1:40 p.m. The notation "ps" on the telegram indicates that the President saw it.
CAP 82463. I now rate the possibilities of a positive response from Moscow and enough from Hanoi to proceed as one in three or one in four--no higher, but no lower.
On that still highly contingent basis, I thought you might wish to look at a draft statement announcing your decisions and your movements, to see how certain key sensitive matters might be dealt with:
--The GVN, whose stability and sense of confidence must be preserved;
--The Czech question;
--The NATO issue;
--The nature and limits of our understanding on the bombing cessation, so that your hands would not be tied should you have to resume.
At some point the Norwegians would have to step before the world and say Hanoi promised them no violation of the DMZ and prompt, serious, sincere negotiations.
Also, once the bombing stops, we have to push Moscow very hard to press for peace and to take a firm, unambiguous position to clear up Laos.
I have given thought to Bangkok; first or last?
The advantage of seeing the troop contributors immediately is obvious; but we will not know then:
--The immediate post-bombing state of the Paris talks;
--What the Russians are--and are not--prepared to do post-bombing, towards peace in Southeast Asia.
Therefore, I now lean to: Geneva; Brussels; Bangkok.
The advantage of Geneva first is to hold the Soviet feet to the fire on delivering in Paris, on Laos, etc. They have always said they could do more if we stopped bombing. We've got to nail it down in the first flush of the event.
I calculate something like this:
--By the end of this week we shall know whether Moscow and Hanoi will give us enough to proceed;
--Once you make a decision, it will take a few days to work out the scenario here, a few further days to get Bunker, Thieu, and Abrams aboard; get dates set for the Russians; inform Hanoi, if we so decide, so they can get out military and diplomatic instructions;
--I would guess you would want about three days in Geneva, two in Brussels, perhaps a stop in Paris; two days in Bangkok. With flying time, etc. perhaps eleven days. If talks opened in Geneva, for example, on October 7, you could be home for the weekend of October 19-20, I should guess.
Draft contingent text follows, which I have not showed to Sect. Rusk because of its highly tentative status.
Draft Contingency Presidential Statement
In recent weeks there have been intense private contacts, direct and indirect, with the authorities in Hanoi, including private meetings in Paris. There have also been a series of exchanges with the leaders of the Soviet Union. As a result of these exchanges, I have reached two conclusions.
First, I now judge that we have reason to believe the cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam by U.S. forces could take place under conditions which involve no increase in the risk of casualties to the forces of the United States or to our allies.
I also have reason to believe that such a cessation of bombardment could lead to serious discussions which would move the war in Vietnam towards a settlement.
It is extremely important that the President not mislead our own people, our allies, or the world at large about these conclusions. We have made real progress, but I cannot guarantee at this stage the precise military or diplomatic behavior of the authorities in Hanoi after a bombing cessation. We shall have to assess that behavior with respect to military operations and diplomatic performance very carefully in the days ahead. But the other side knows well that our eyes will be focused on three specific matters:
--First, on whether the demilitarized zone is respected by their side as well as by our side.
--Second, whether there are attacks on the cities of South Vietnam. These could have the gravest consequences for the environment of diplomatic talks.
--Third, whether, in the light of the diplomatic positions we have already conveyed to the other side at great length, there are very prompt, serious negotiations looking towards the earliest possible peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. There can be no political settlement in South Vietnam without the full participation of the Government of Vietnam. We appear to agree with the authorities in Hanoi that the political settlement in South Vietnam must be reached by the people of South Vietnam--and that means the elected constitutional government of South Vietnam must play a leading role. There can be no definitive settlement of the demilitarized zone and other matters relating to the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 without the full participation of the Government of Vietnam.
The bombardment of North Vietnam will cease on --------. We expect the new phase of serious, substantive discussion to open in Paris the next day, --------.
Let everyone be clear: the objective of what we are doing--the test--is prompt and serious movement towards peace. The bloodshed in Southeast Asia must end.
[Omitted here is the section of Rostow's proposed statement for the President concerning potential arms control talks, which is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV, Document 305.]
31. Summary of Meeting/1/
Washington, September 24, 1968, 1:15-2 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. No classification marking. A full transcript of the meeting is ibid.
SUMMARY OF MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND
SENATOR DIRKSEN IN CABINET ROOM, SEPTEMBER 24, 1968
Senator Dirksen reported to the President that he had had a call from Richard Nixon and also Bryce Harlow reporting that they had heard that John McCone and General Taylor were going to try to push the Paris Conference with Vietnam or North Vietnam--push along for a conclusion that might be regarded as something of a sellout.
The President reported that neither of them had made such a recommendation, and that he considered General Taylor a "pillar of strength" and he would never make a recommendation that he did not consider reasonably strong. He told Dirksen that he had not talked with McCone since he left.
The President went on to say:
"I have taken the position that we are not going to stop the bombing so long as it would endanger American lives to do so. And another way of putting it, which is very offensive to them, and we don't want to use that word to try to get an agreement. We want to stop the killing the first moment we can without reciprocity."
The President told Dirksen that we have said in effect to that that the bombing will be stopped if we have good reasons to believe and we have satisfied ourselves that the DMZ matters can be cleared up that won't pour men across it, won't use this period to shell the cities, and that they get down to substantive discussions.
The President told Dirksen he had told Nixon and Humphrey these things and they were on their own. He said from Nixon's experience in the Senate and Vice President--and also the same thing to Humphrey--that they ought to know Lyndon Johnson well enough to know that he is going to do what he thinks he ought to do. That's why he made the March decision. He didn't think he could do it as a candidate.
The President said:
"Now after January 20th if you are President you'll be in charge and then if you want to sell out or pull out or go in or do whatever you want to, you can do it. I will work with any President and try to help him and sympathize with him and pray for him because I think they're being very cruel to their country and to their boys out there by all of these talks back and forth."
The President told Senator Dirksen:
"Generally speaking, the Republicans have not been a problem on the war. They did quote every morning folks here. They've been quoting Goldberg here lately every morning. They want to stop the bombing. They do quote every fellow that says something about stopping the bombing--Mansfield every day. They don't quote Dirksen. They don't quote Tower. They don't quote Nixon. They just say Nixon's no good. He's just like Johnson. The columnists I'm talking about."
Dirksen said:
"You see, in Nixon's concern that had he stood in your corner that he hasn't relented either, that if the rug was pulled out from under him he just wouldn't like it."
The President told Dirksen that he had told Nixon he was going to treat him and Humphrey just alike as far as foreign policy was concerned. He said he would work and vote for Humphrey, but he was not going to do anything to cause one Republican to be angry with him on foreign policy. He assured Dirksen he wanted to treat Nixon just exactly like Eisenhower/2/ had treated him, and he wanted to treat Humphrey in the same way.
/2/Dwight D. Eisenhower, President, 1953-1961.
Dirksen told the President that Nixon had told him to assure the President for him that his and the President's relationship will be just like he has announced and it will continue that way and he can bet all the tea in China on that.
President Johnson said:
"I am getting criticism on not hitting Nixon. Now I don't want to be a hypocrite at all. I want Humphrey to win just like you want Nixon to win. On the other hand, I want Communism defeated in Southeast Asia and this country more than I want anybody to win and that's why I took myself out of it March 31st."
The President told Dirksen he disagreed heartily with Nixon on nonproliferation; that that was not for Russia's benefit--that's for our benefit. He felt that when we delay we wind up with Germany and Israel and the rest of them not going along and that in his judgment history will treat them very badly.
The President assured Dirksen that we were trying very hard with the Russians, with the North Vietnamese, with every other neutral power we could in order to bring this war to a stop where we could stop killing boys. He said he was not going to do anything that's political with it and that he was going just as far the other way.
The President said:
"When I go back home I don't want to be active in the Government. What I do want to do is to have the confidence, the respect, and if I can, the affection of whoever is President because this man needs every help he can get and I will say this. I have never said a mean word about Eisenhower. I stood up for him.
"I have been paid back with ten percent interest for my investment and patriotism and non-partisanship by your conduct.
"I got a letter from Agnew on July 28th of this year--one month before the Convention--and he said: 'Within the obligation that I have to my Party, I'm going to cooperate and support you every way I can because you're my President and you need help and that means foreign policy and domestic.' It couldn't have been better if it had been from my Mother. You've never seen me say an ugly word about the man because I think he's sincere and genuine. Now I think if I were both candidates I wouldn't get into the war too much, tactics and strategy. I would just say--well, we want a change. We are not going to spend too much money and we're going to try to give you better Government. Just like you win your Senators up there and Congressmen up there. The new type is to do it on issues. And I think Nixon has been doing that pretty well. Once in a while he says the old man or something like that, but I'm not having anything to do with it."
The President told Dirksen that he was free to tell Nixon and also Ford what had been said in their meeting--that he hoped he would.
32. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, September 25, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, Harvan-(Incoming)-September 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Harvan/Plus. No transmission time is indicated; the telegram was received at 11:29 a.m.
21344/Delto 767. From Harriman and Vance.
1. Tho, Thuy and Lau were present at the tea break./2/ The tea break lasted an hour and 5 minutes and was devoted entirely to substantive talk.
/2/The full report of the tea break discussions is in telegram 21423/Delto 776 from Paris, September 26. (Ibid.) A summary of the formal session was transmitted in telegram 21345/Delto 768 from Paris, September 25. (Ibid.) Jorden's notes of the formal meeting are in the Johnson Library, William Jorden Papers, WJJ Notes.
2. We opened by saying that in our last private talk/3/ we spent a great deal of time discussing the parties who will be included in the serious negotiations which would follow a cessation of bombing. This subject has become a major roadblock to progress.
/3/See Document 24.
3. We said we could state today that an understanding on this subject would be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing. We said that they would note that we had used the word "would" rather than "could." We said that we had taken into consideration their comments at our last meeting on our use of the word "could" as noting uncertainty. We said that we had consulted with Washington and could now tell them that an understanding on the subject would be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing. We said we trusted that what we had said today would clear the roadblock.
4. Tho replied that we had different conceptions of what the word "serious" meant. He said they considered talks to be serious when the United States ceased all bombing and other acts of war against the DRV. Tho said that we had a different definition. He said that we wanted to force agreement on the inclusion of the representatives of the GVN before the cessation of bombing and they believed this position to be a demand for reciprocity. Tho said that after the cessation of bombing discussion of who will participate in subsequent talks could be immediately discussed between us. This, Tho said, was a positive proposal on the part of the DRV.
5. We argued the point at great length. We said that the necessity of reaching an understanding on the inclusion of representatives of the GVN was not reciprocity and it did not become reciprocity just because the DRV said it was. We said we had made it quite clear that we were not willing to stop all the bombing and have another delay such as we have experienced before we got down to serious talks. We said that if the bombing were to stop and we came in with the GVN representatives and the DRV refused to join the talks, it would be simply a farce.
6. Tho said he wasn't trying to force us to accept his definition of reciprocity. He said he would not discuss the matter of GVN participation until after the cessation of bombing and then they would let us know their views.
7. We replied that we were getting a clearer and clearer impression that they were not prepared to let the representatives of the GVN participate in the determination of the political future of SVN. We said that if they were not ready to accept the fact that we would be accompanied by the GVN representatives, then we could only conclude that they were not interested in getting on with serious talks.
8. We said we had consulted with our government and reminded them that we had asked them to consult with theirs. We said that we wanted them to understand that we will have the GVN representatives present with us and if they did not object, then we could make progress. If they objected, then there would be no serious talks.
9. Thuy replied that they had reported to their government and that their government had reiterated that there must first be an unconditional cessation of bombing and then the questions of interest could be discussed.
10. We said that the US had no intention of stopping the bombing and then having another lengthy wrangle. We said we hoped they would consult their government again. Tho replied that they had already consulted their government, and then added, that he had not yet expressed himself on whether or not they agreed on the inclusion of the GVN. He said this would be discussed after the cessation of bombing.
11. We said that we were dissatisfied with their response. We said that it was fundamental with us that neither we nor they are going to impose a political solution on South Vietnam and they must realize that fact. Therefore, GVN must be included. We said we had nothing more to say and that we would be prepared to meet with them on Friday/4/ or any other time during the weekend if they had something to say to us, but there did not seem any point in meeting on Friday as things now stood. Thuy replied that they were ready to meet if we had something to say on Friday, or any later day if either side wished. If not, we would meet next Wednesday./6/
/4/September 27. No meeting occurred on that date.
/6/October 2; see Document 45.
Harriman
33. Telegram From the Embassy in Norway to the Department of State/1/
Oslo, September 25, 1968, 1200Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Ohio/Plus. Received at 9 a.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance from Davidson.
6752. 1. This morning (Wednesday, Sept 25) Ridgway and I were given account by Algard and Vraalsen of their dinner conversation with North Vietnamese last night (Sept 24)./2/
/2/Prior to the meeting with DRV officials, Davidson transmitted to the Norwegian Government a message from Rusk to Lyng requesting that he attempt to get the North Vietnamese to remain in Oslo for several more days. (Telegram 243111 to Oslo, September 23; ibid.) Reports of meetings between Davidson and Norwegian officials on their discussions with the North Vietnamese representatives on September 24 are in telegrams 6725, 6737, and 6745 from Oslo, all September 24. (Ibid.) At these meetings, Chan noted that he was unable to remain in Norway and had to leave on September 25. A full translation of the Norwegian notes on their September 24 conversations with the North Vietnamese is in telegram 6808 from Oslo, September 30. (Ibid.)
2. Algard told us that he had made a "final effort" over brandy to pin the North Vietnamese down by summing up his understanding of the substance of their visit. Algard told the North Vietnamese that the Norwegians had listened to their presentations with great interest and that he was convinced that the North Vietnamese had a serious approach to the question of peace negotiations if bombing stopped and that if the bombing were stopped the North Vietnamese would take no military advantage particularly in the area in and around the DMZ.
3. In reply the North Vietnamese said that their approach was indeed serious. They also observed that North Vietnamese do not use the words "take advantage" in this context. Algard told us that he thinks the North Vietnamese were trying to convey the impression that they do not think in terms of taking advantage. Algard indicated to us that he considered it useless to pursue the matter since it appeared to him that the North Vietnamese were under instructions to go no further.
4. Summing up his conclusion on the North Vietnamese visit, Algard told us he regarded as most important the facts that North Vietnam had sent a delegation, including a man who came all the way from Hanoi to Oslo, under specific conditions as to secrecy and the role of the GON and that "they played the game." The North Vietnamese did not attempt to propagandize the public or to contact the local Vietnam Solidarity Committee. Algard believes that while the North Vietnamese "didn't offer much directly in the way of assurances" the serious manner in which they conducted themselves was, in an "Oriental way" intended to demonstrate that they could play an honest game and that they would be willing to play an honest game if the bombing were stopped. I said I was very disappointed that the North Vietnamese delegation had been either unwilling or unable to give any substantive assurances and Algard admitted that he had hoped for more from them.
5. We now have and are translating the GON notes of their Friday and Saturday meetings with the North Vietnamese./3/
/3/The Norwegian notes of the September 20-21 meetings were transmitted in telegram 6762 from Oslo, September 25. (Ibid.)
Tibbetts
34. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, September 25, 1968, 1750Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, Harvan-(Incoming)-September 1968. Secret; Nodis; Harvan/Plus. No transmission time is indicated; the telegram was received at 2:26 p.m.
21378/Delto 770. From Vance. Subject: Meeting with Oberemko, Sept. 25.
Ref: A. Paris 21192 (Delto 754); B. Paris 21344 (Delto 767)./2/
/2/Documents 26 and 32.
1. Afternoon of September 25 Vance met at Soviet Embassy with Minister-Counselor Oberemko, who is Chargé d'Affaires in Zorin's absence. Negroponte was also present, and Bogomolov attended on their side.
2. Vance told Oberemko that since their last meeting we had spoken again with Tho and Thuy at today's tea break. The meeting had been totally unsatisfactory. We had told the North Vietnamese that the subject of which parties will be included in the serious negotiations that would follow the cessation of bombing had become a major roadblock to progress. We had told the DRV side today that an understanding on this subject would be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing. We emphasized the word "would" rather than "could" since, at our last meeting, the DRV side had commented on our use of the word "could" as indicating uncertainty. We told DRV he had taken their comments into account and had consulted with Washington and could state that an understanding on the subject would be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing. We had said to the DRV that we trusted that what we had said today would clear the roadblock.
3. Vance said that our discussion with Tho and Thuy at today's tea break had lasted more than an hour and that they had been totally intransigent. We had gotten absolutely nowhere. We have tried from the beginning to be constructive and we had hoped that what we said today would clear the roadblock, but the DRV side has not budged one inch. Vagueness of language is not a problem in view of the change that we had made today. We wondered what Oberemko could tell us today. Vance asked whether Oberemko had heard from his government, and how they viewed the problem.
4. Oberemko said that he had reported Vance's remarks of September 21 to Moscow and had not yet received a reply. He said he presumed that the matter was under consideration and expected to hear some word in the next couple of days. Vance suggested that Oberemko might also wish to transmit our change from "could" to "would." Oberemko replied, "Yes, this is a clarification," and that he would transmit it without delay. Oberemko said he would refrain from any further comment since he knew what we wanted was an answer from Moscow. He said that he thought that the position taken by the DRV remains unchanged, and we have known it for a long time, that is, that the US must unconditionally cease the bombing and all acts of war against the DRV, and then the DRV will be prepared to discuss any question either might wish to raise.
5. Vance said that the question of the GVN inclusion is not one of reciprocity, but is a question of the definition of serious talks. There cannot be serious talks if the GVN representatives are not included in talks regarding the political future of South Viet-Nam. For our part, we are willing to have seated on the DRV side the NLF, the Alliance, or any other group they may wish. The DRV's unwillingness to accept GVN representation raises grave questions as to their seriousness and whether they merely want to string us along. It does no good for them to call our proposal a demand for reciprocity.
6. Oberemko replied that it was still a condition. Vance said that it was a question of defining what serious talks are. We think the world would be shocked if they knew that the DRV is refusing to include the GVN in talks regarding the political future of South Viet-Nam. This must mean that Hanoi wants to dictate the political future of South Viet-Nam. Vance said that the time has come for the Soviet Government to weigh in on this subject.
7. Oberemko replied that he would communicate the clarification from "could" to "would" which he said was clear to him and to Bogomolov. He said that, it would be useless for him to predict what the reply from Moscow would be, but he would let us know when he gets a reply.
Harriman
35. Notes of the 591st Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, September 25, 1968, 12:17-1:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. Those attending were the President, Rostow, Rusk, Clifford, Nitze, Ball, Wheeler, Helms, Fowler, Marks, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Joseph Sisco, Christian, Bromley Smith and Nathaniel Davis of the NSC Staff, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of this meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. For Smith's notes of this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, Document 432.
[Omitted here is discussion of issues before the United Nations involving Czechoslovakia, the Middle East, and Biafra.]
Secretary Rusk: Major votes on major questions will not take place before the election.
Ambassador Ball: U Thant meddled too much in affairs with the Vietnam statement./2/ All except the Communists see it that way. I do not expect a vote on this.
/2/On September 24 U Thant stated that if a resolution calling for the end to the bombing of North Vietnam was introduced into the UN General Assembly, it would pass overwhelmingly. See The New York Times, September 24, 1968.
Assistant Secretary of State Sisco: That is the way most all nations see it.
The President: The President does not know of any plans for a withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. I read Clifford and Wheeler's testimony./3/ It doesn't say that.
/3/Reference is to their testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Secretary Clifford: A Marine RLT is coming back, but it is being replaced by other troops. Congressman Lipscomb/4/ asked about the decrease in troops. We have no plan to reduce the troops in Vietnam. I cannot predict the return of any troops.
/4/Representative Glenard Lipscomb.
Secretary Clifford: We are preparing a statement to clarify this. There is no sort of plan to bring the number down.
General Wheeler: The examination of forces in Vietnam by Abrams was of logistic and administrative troops. We won't pull down--we are able to knock this story down flatly.
Secretary Rusk: The prospects for peace in Paris are still dim.
The President: What does "other acts of war" include in the Hanoi demand?
CIA Director Helms: Overflights.
Secretary Rusk: Reconnaissance.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Spanish base agreement.]
Ambassador Ball: General debate in the U.N. starts October 2.
The President: I would like us to review the following areas precisely:
1. Instructions to U.S. negotiators in Paris.
2. Their position on the bombing halt.
3. Their reaction to our instructions.
Secretary Rusk: The United States is in Paris on the basis of the March 31 speech. There is no agreed agenda. Our purpose--peace in Southeast Asia (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia). We want to determine how the bombing can be stopped so it can lead us toward peace?--So we want to know what will happen if we stop the bombing.
1. The Liberation Front can sit at the table. North Vietnam won't let South Vietnam sit at the table.
2. An agreement on Laos is important to us.
3. The territorial neutrality of Cambodia also is important.
Hanoi's delegation comes back with:
--stop bombing.
--get out of South Vietnam.
--U.S. is the aggressor, they are the "victim."
There are three important points if the bombing is halted:
1. We could not keep up the halt if North Vietnam flooded across the DMZ.
2. If there were attacks on cities.
3. If talks proceeded without the South Vietnamese at the table.
North Vietnam still refuses to say what will happen if the bombing halts.
Therefore, what would happen if we stopped the bombing?
The President: If we stopped the bombing, nobody knows whether or not:
A. The DMZ would be respected.
B. South Vietnam could come to the table.
C. The attacks on the cities would
halt./6/
/6/In a telephone conversation with Rusk on September 23, the President expressed concern that Harriman and Vance had backed away from a firm insistence on these three points. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, September 23, 1968, 9:37 a.m., Tape 6800.24, Side B, PNO 10 and Tape 6800.25, Side A, PNO 2)
The President: What effect would this have on the morale of the men? (Referring to a bombing pause)
General Wheeler: It would have an adverse effect on:
--our troops
--South Vietnamese troops
--South Vietnamese people./6/
/6/In a September 25 memorandum to the President, Wheeler noted that while Abrams regarded GVN participation in talks as the most important stipulation, he did not recommend proceeding on the basis of mere assumptions or of dropping the other two preconditions. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI)
The President: What will the United Nations do on Vietnam?
Ambassador Ball: It will be mentioned. U Thant believes the bombing will be halted. He is intoxicated by microphone.
Secretary Clifford: Of the three items mentioned by Dean (Secretary Rusk), the shelling of cities can be a condition. Make it a "serious matter."
The DMZ and GVN--presence of the GVN at the table should be an absolute condition.
The demilitarization at the DMZ--proceed on an assumption of if we stop the bombing, they will not take advantage of it. It goes back to the San Antonio speech./7/ I think the President should assume they will not take advantage of the pause.
/7/In his San Antonio speech on September 29, 1967, President Johnson pledged to halt the bombing of North Vietnam provided the cessation would be followed by prompt and productive discussions and the North Vietnamese would not take military advantage of it. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 340.
(Bombing between 19th and 17th parallels constitutes 5000 men in effort. 95% of our force is preserved.)
I think the President can give up 5% to take whatever risk--to get substantive talks going. We could risk it. I think this is a minimal risk. I think there is a 65% chance this will pay off. The bombing could restart if it had to.
The morale of the troops could go down if nothing results. The troops want peace, I want peace.
We preserve 95% of our forces. We gamble with 5%. I think it will be successful.
Secretary Rusk: The incentives of North Vietnam would be affected--what it takes to move us. They would move on to another point.
The President: They would move on to reconnaissance.
Ambassador Ball: I share Clark's (Secretary Clifford) view emphatically.
We are each "dug in" to doctrinal position, like Arabs and Israelis. There always are risks in war and peace. I do not think the risks are great. You can make assumptions on these points. We have blown the importance of this part of North Vietnam far out of proportion. We were told earlier that this is not very significant. Only 5% of our assets to damage the enemy would be at stake. I quarrel with Dean. There is an element of "face."
Secretary Rusk: What about "face" of other Orientals in the area--Koreans, Thais, and others?
Ambassador Ball: We are doing the most in the war. The Communist theory of war is that they are helping out a revolution in the South. When they are attacked they are outraged. I think the Soviets want to help. They can't until war is reduced to war in the South.
Time pressures are on them to do something. We will kill a lot of American boys rather needlessly.
Secretary Rusk: Would you restart the bombing?
Ambassador Ball: I would ask for demilitarization at DMZ, bombing of cities. I would stop bombing to test their "good faith." I would stop it for a couple of weeks. The position of the United States will be infinitely better.
We are in a box. I believe they want a peace. They are scared to hell of Nixon--afraid of his use of nuclear weapons.
Secretary Fowler: What happens if we threaten to stop talk if they don't move?
Ambassador Ball: That would be terrible. I have spoken very indiscreetly here.
Secretary Rusk: There would be a lot of votes for Nixon if we get nothing for the bombing pause.
Ambassador Ball: He'll get them anyway.
The President: I am not hell-bent on agreement. We have done things before on assumptions. We have been disappointed. When I make an assumption, I want a reason to make it. I doubt if all three things are sufficient to get us to stop it--shelling, DMZ, South Vietnam.
Ambassador Ball: The situation is changed now. These tests haven't cost us that much. They give us strength in the eyes of the world.
The President: It will not be done now unless they indicate something.
General Wheeler: 1. We are in a strong position in Vietnam. There is good hard evidence of that. 2. The offensive operations against the North are far higher than 5%.
Secretary Clifford: I would place it about 5%.
General Wheeler: Naval and air campaigns are the only pressure we put on the North.
Ambassador Ball: The pressure is the men they are losing in the South.
General Wheeler: Giap says they can go on losing men. Our operations are hurting him. The enemy can move forces and supplies right down to the combat area. War is nothing more than pressure. We can't resume bombing easily once we stop it. The morale of our forces would suffer.
Friends and enemies would interpret this as victory for Hanoi.
In summary, I cannot agree. 60% of the people think we should get concessions before. It is wrong militarily to stop pressure on the enemy who is increasingly weak.
I think it unwise politically. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree on what I have said.
Under Secretary Nitze: The alternatives are:
1. Proceed as we do now.
2. Ambassador Ball's alternative, but
--continue reconnaissance
--bring South Vietnamese to table on Day 1.
I don't think they would shoot down reconnaissance planes. I don't think they would appear with the South Vietnamese on Day 1. They would appear later.
USIA Director Marks: What would be military costs for two weeks if Ball's suggestion is adopted?
General Wheeler: It would take two or three weeks to mount up force. They could move artillery in two weeks.
USIA Director Marks: Reinforcements, but not offensive?
General Wheeler: Not a large attack.
Director Marks: How about casualties?
General Wheeler: There might be a large increase in casualties.
Secretary Rusk: Holding South Vietnam together would be the big problem.
USIA Director Marks: You would not have high costs for two weeks.
The President: If I thought they would do something I would jump at it.
USIA Director Marks: I would take the risk if Harriman and Vance thought it would pay off.
Secretary Clifford: This would be a test. We could raise three points. The Soviets think benefits would follow. Bus' points are academic.
1. We stop the bombing.
2. We sit down to negotiate.
If they build up, they don't intend to negotiate. We then have done everything. We restart bombing and you can go as far as you want to.
The President: No, we will debate it as we did before. They will move all the time.
The President: We will not take this course if they don't.
Secretary Clifford: If they agree GVN can come in to the table, I would pursue it.
The President: I want negotiators to pursue all three points.
--cities not attacked.
--DMZ re-established.
--GVN sit at table.
Those present voiced opinions as follows:
|
For |
Against |
| Clifford | Rusk |
| Ball | Wheeler |
| Marks | The President |
| Nitze |
36. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, September 25, 1968, 2:04-2:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the second floor dining room of the White House. It immediately followed an off-the-record meeting between the same men that began at 1:43 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
ATTENDING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson
Clark Clifford: George Ball called me. I saw him this morning.
He said he had "reached a decision."/2/
/2/Ball, who had been appointed as Representative to the United Nations on May 14 and had presented his credentials on June 26, officially resigned on September 25.
I listed the reasons he should continue in the job. Ball also said:
"I cannot permit myself to remain quiet any longer about Nixon. He is a liar, dishonest, and a crook. This is my country. We would get poor leadership." He said he must be free.
--Speak out myself
--Help Humphrey say what he should
--Bring in people to help
He said he couldn't live with himself if he didn't work to defeat Nixon.
Secretary Rusk: He said the same things to me. He is misestimating the political situation. It would be interpreted as "break" with the Administration.
Clark Clifford: He said he does not intend to "break" with Administration.
Secretary Rusk: Ball quits 2 months after he takes office.
Clark Clifford: He has an excellent statement.
The President: The time when he should have decided this was when he agreed to serve.
The President: I talked to Dirksen yesterday./3/
/3/See Document 31.
Secretary Rusk: Bus might pass the word to Abrams to slip out these facts about
--The 3rd offensive being blunted.
--SVN strength improved.
Clark Clifford: Better press tone because of
--General Sidle's approach.
--General Abrams doesn't "sell" it.
--Facts are on our side.
Secretary Rusk: Bunker would try to go along with anything, but he puts priority on GVN presence at table.
Secretary Rusk: To replace Ball, Cy Vance would be ideal.
Walt Rostow: I expect within 2 weeks to know what will happen in Paris. They are getting their military dispositions. Detailed messages on exactly what their strength is in the field.
The President: Ball's going to Humphrey is part of movement to "dove" side--special sale number one. McCarthy is an admirer of Ball's.
Clark Clifford: This may be a desperation move by HHH. They talked on the phone Monday./4/
/4/September 23. No record of this discussion has been found.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Spanish base agreement.]
37. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
No. 2040/68
Washington, September 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R1580R, Executive Registry Subject Files, 266-Vietnam. Confidential. A notation on the memorandum reads: "This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs." An attached covering note from Helms to Rostow transmitting a copy of the memorandum, September 27, reads: "You asked for a memorandum on this subject some time ago. Here it is."
1968 AS THE YEAR OF DECISION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Summary
Extensive evidence that the Vietnamese Communist high command planned to initiate the "decisive" phase of the war in 1968 has been uncovered in documents captured since Tet. This decision was almost certainly taken by the Hanoi politburo in the summer of 1967. It called for the launching of the so-called "general offensive and general uprising" often discussed in Vietnamese Communist theoretical literature over the years as the final stage of the war. The groundwork was laid simultaneously for the start of political negotiations to accompany the military action.
It does not appear that the politburo in Hanoi firmly tied the conclusion of the offensive and the end of the fighting to any particular time frame, i.e., the year 1968. The enormous effort and cost which the Communists put into the Tet offensive, however, strongly suggests that they entertained a serious hope, if not a firm belief, that the military pressure would bring an early and decisive turn in the conflict, hopefully during 1968, even if the fighting was not terminated during the year. Such a development, in their view, would force major allied concessions and open the way to a negotiated settlement of the war. There is considerable evidence that Hanoi was prepared to move ahead quickly into wide-ranging substantive discussions on the conflict once the bombing of North Vietnam had ceased.
In choosing to launch the general offensive during the winter-spring campaign of 1968, it appears that Hanoi was convinced that its military strategy, even though highly costly in Communist combat casualties, had forced the war into an indecisive, stalemated stage more deleterious to the allies than to itself. This was the point, enemy theoreticians had often argued, when massive military pressure should be combined with diplomatic maneuver to break the allied will. At the same time, the Communists were probably also influenced by a full recognition--long in germination--that they could not win a complete military victory over the allies. They would, at least initially, have to settle for a compromise in South Vietnam short of their optimum objectives of earlier years.
Other factors, including the domestic situation in the US and conflicting pressures from the Soviet Union and China, probably also played some role in Hanoi's decision.
[Omitted here is the 11-page body of the memorandum.]
38. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Republican Presidential Nominee Richard Nixon/1/
Washington, September 30, 1968, 6:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Nixon, September 30, 1968, 6:45 p.m., Tape F68.06, PNO 5-6. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Hello?
Nixon: Hello?
President: Hello?
Nixon: Hello, Mr. President?
President: Yes.
Nixon: I'm awfully sorry to bother you. This is Dick Nixon.
President: Yes, Dick.
Nixon: And the only reason that I'm bothering you is that I'm going very shortly to be on a television program, and there just came over the wire this statement by Hubert with regard to--saying that he would have a bombing pause if elected,/2/ and the only purpose in my call is to determine whether there's any change in our own policy at this time with regard to what position the administration is taking.
/2/See Document 40.
President: No, there is not. I have not read his speech. It has not been discussed with me. I say this in strict confidence--I'll ask you not to quote me or repeat me; I'll talk clearly.
Nixon: I won't--that's why I called you.
President: I have not read it. I just had the press secretary call me with the flash that he says he'll stop the bombing pause--he'll stop the bombing--if elected. And then it indicates that he has to have direct or indirect, or deed or act, assurance that they will respect the DMZ. I don't know really what he is saying. Ball said, 2 or 3 days ago when he quickly resigned, that the bombing was not--well, he said that the newspapers were pressing that too much as just a part of a whole big general picture.
Nixon: Right.
President: So I was rather surprised that as his adviser, that Hubert would take this position, because it looks like a little bit inconsistent with what Ball said.
Nixon: Yeah.
President: I haven't reconciled it because I don't have the text. Our position is this. We are very anxious to stop the bombing. We went out before we met with the [Congressional] leadership prior to the Chicago [Democratic National] convention and asked Abrams what effect the bombing operations in Vietnam were having. He came back and said, "We believe we're destroying or damaging 15 percent of the trucks moving into the South. It is our conviction the air interdiction program has been the primary agent which has reduced trucks being detected by 80 percent between mid-July and the present time. The third effect is to prevent the enemy from massing artillery and air defense means in the area to the north of the DMZ from which they can attack our forces."/3/ You see, Mr. Vice President, they have to stop at the 20th [parallel] now, or really up to the 19th, we haven't gone above that. But if we stopped the bombing, they could just come day and night, with lights on and lights off, bumper to bumper, right down to the DMZ where they'd be poised to hit us.
/3/This message was transmitted as telegram MAC 11409 from Abrams to Rostow, August 23; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 337.
Nixon: Right.
President: So, in the light of these three things--the trucks that he's stopping, the 80 percent between mid-July and the present time, and the massing of the artillery at the DMZ, then we said, "Well, what would be the effect of the cessation of that bombing?" He says, "First, military matériel would be able to reach the DMZ or the borders of Laos unimpeded. We believe the current attrition from truck destruction alone, not to mention truck parts, is running several hundred tons per day. The truck flow could be expected to return to the mid-July level--the high--within as little as a week. We're talking about an increase--repeat increase--in southwest movements--southward movement--which could amount to as much as 1,500 tons per day or more. Next, the enemy would mass artillery, air defense means, and ground units north of the DMZ for use against our troops. Finally, freed from interdiction north of the seventeenth degree, the enemy could move reinforcements to the DMZ by truck or rail, thus drastically shortening transit time."
Then we said, "Is there any possibility of your providing even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stop the bombing of North Vietnam?" He said, "We would have to expect a several-fold increase in U.S. and allied casualties in I Corps." Now for that reason, our people took the position in the [Democratic Party's campaign] platform that we would stop the bombing when we were assured that it would not cost us men by doing so.
Nixon: Right.
President: Now we don't have that assurance as of now--at least I do not have it. Then he goes on, I'm quoting Abrams now, "With the bombing authority now in effect, I am able with the forces available to limit the enemy's capability in South Vietnam by interdicting his roads and destroying a substantial amount of his munitions before they reach South Vietnam. In addition, I am able to suppress his artillery and air defense north of Ben Thuy so that our positions south of the DMZ are secured." Now this is the key question. "If the bombing in North Vietnam now authorized were to be suspended, the enemy in 10 days to 2 weeks could develop a capability"--be careful of that word "capability"--"in the DMZ area in terms of scale, intensity, and duration of combat on the order of five times what he now has." In 10 days he'd increase his capability five times.
Nixon: Yeah.
President: "I cannot agree to place our forces at the risk which the enemy's capability would then pose." Now that was reviewed with the joint leadership. They know that. That has not been made public because we don't want to notify our enemy that is our estimate.
Nixon: Sure.
President: Now, our position--which I've been very careful with you and very careful with Humphrey, and I've told both of you the same thing, and you, both of you, have the same information--our position has been this: we are anxious to stop the bombing, we'd be glad to stop the bombing, if we can have any assurance that A--they would respect the DMZ, thereby not endangering these four divisions, the three of ours and one allied, or stop shelling the cities, or, and most important of all, talk to the GVN, talk to the Government of Vietnam. Now, we do not think that we ought to cause that government to fall and immobilize a million men that are going to be under arms this year by meeting in Paris and dividing up their country or deciding what they're going to do without their being present. So our first condition all along has been to say that they have got to be present. They have consistently refused to agree to do that. We have said you can bring the NLF if you want to. But we can't decide the future of South Vietnam--it now has an elected government--in their absence and without their presence. So in effect, we have said we are interested in what you have to say on these three subjects: DMZ, GVN presence, shelling the cities.
Nixon: Yeah. But you don't insist on all three, just the--
President: Well, we'd like to have all three.
Nixon: Yeah, yeah.
President: But we ask them to make their commitment to us--tell us what they would do.
Nixon: On any one of these things.
President: Now, we don't say--we don't say that you've got to sign in blood beforehand. But we do say this. What would happen if we stopped the bombing Sunday and we walked in Monday morning with the GVN? Would you walk out? They have not responded, and we don't know what they would do. Now until we do know, and that is very important to us, we don't want to gamble American lives. And when we do know, then we will have to make that decision.
Nixon: Yeah.
President: But they're making it now, and we don't know what they're going to do about it. They may decide that they'll try to hang on until January. They're taking a terrible--they're paying a terrible price. Now, the message and information I gave you came in before the convention and we met with the joint leadership, Republican and Democrat. I have today a wire that came in yesterday from him--let me find it--from Abrams,/4/ the nut of which he says that he thinks he is destroying between five and ten thousand military per--is it--destroying between five and ten thousand military per month in Vietnam by his bombing alone. We are losing, oh, seven, eight hundred a month, our people, all told, a couple hundred a week, a hundred, two hundred a week, maybe two fifty sometimes. Now we have two hundred million, we're losing seven or eight hundred a month, and he's losing five to ten thousand just from the bombing. Now if we stop that, he says that they have now a hundred odd thousand--[covers phone and speaks to Rostow]--I've got his wire on the bottom, but I've just found it, and I just answered your call out of a meeting./6/
/4/Abrams' message was transmitted in telegram MAC 13145 from Saigon, September 28, which was excerpted and analyzed in a memorandum from Rostow to the President, September 28. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 96) In a memorandum to the President the day before, Rostow reported that he had sent a back-channel message to Abrams requesting his assessment. (Ibid.)
/6/Following a meeting with Special Assistant Joseph Califano and Director of the Bureau of the Budget Charles Zwick from 6:20 p.m. to 6:40 p.m., the President made two brief telephone calls to Rostow and Christian before taking Nixon's call. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Nixon: Yeah.
President: But he says very much that he's very much opposed to the bombing [halt] as of last night--to stopping the bombing--
Nixon: Yeah.
President: Unless we get some of these things. Now our negotiators have been unable to get them up to now. We have a meeting Wednesday./6/ I thought after Wednesday I might have other talks with Cy Vance and Harriman and see what they had to say there. But--
/6/October 2.
Nixon: The way this--the way was just seeing the AP dispatch here, and of course papers always tend to make a bigger difference than real, he says that this was a dramatic--they say a dramatic move away from the Johnson administration foreign policy. But when you read further down, it says that Humphrey said that "in weighing the risk, he would place importance on evidence--direct or indirect, by word or deed--of Communist willingness to restore the demilitarized zone." So that would indicate that he wasn't just going to do it unilaterally, but--
President: I thought the safest position for anyone to take--he takes it part of the way in his position, but he does not--[Johnson speaks to Rostow].
Nixon: I can't quite hear you. Hello? Hello? Hello? Hello? I can't quite hear you.
President: Dick, I want to put Walt Rostow on for just a second. [To Rostow:] Summarize for him Abrams' latest wire just as if you could read it.
Rostow: Mr. Nixon? This is Walt Rostow, sir.
Nixon: Yeah, sure.
Rostow: Uh, we went out again to General Abrams, and put the same questions we put a month ago. His response was that the weather was changing and there--he'd had some successful operations, but essentially, he would make the same answers as a month ago, that unless we got some assurance on the DMZ, we would take a very heavy military consequence from a cessation of the bombing at this time.
Nixon: Well, to an extent, you know, of course, I think Humphrey leaves that possibility where he talks about, that he said, the press always tends to play the biggest part of the story. But in weighing the risk, he said, he would place importance on evidence, direct or indirect, by either word of Communist willingness to restore the demilitarized zone.
Rostow: Yes, I noticed that on the ticker, Mr. Nixon.
Nixon: But, on the other hand, this will be interpreted, as I'm sure you know, as a dramatic move away from the administration. It's my intention not to move in that direction, I think, for this fundamental reason. As long as the administration is still negotiating, I think we've got--I think that my position has to be in good conscience that unless and until there is some evidence of a reciprocal step, we could not stop the bombing.
President: Yes.
Nixon: That's the administration's position?
President: Yes, except reciprocal, Dick, is a bad word with them.
Nixon: Right.
President: I'd say unless they give us some assurance that it wouldn't--unless we had some indication that it would not cost the lives of our men. I found this memo, if you want me to read it to you very quickly. "What is the effect of our current bombing operations in Vietnam?" This is September 28th from Abrams to Johnson. "Deterrence is the first effect. Our air presence is keeping the enemy from moving his air forces, rail system, and logistical bases southward toward the DMZ. After better than 70 days of effort, it is now clear that our concentrated efforts to choke traffic at four prime areas, at six road points, and at six critical water points of North Vietnam have reduced the enemy's detected flow of troops from the mid-July high of 1,000 per day to less than 150 since that time. Southbound truck detections the past few weeks have numbered fewer than a hundred per day. If the bombing in North Vietnam ceases, a return to the level of a thousand per day would have to be expected. These efforts have also prevented the enemy from massing artillery, supplies, and air defense means for sudden attack against the DMZ. Possibly of greater consequence is the combined Navy and 7th Air Force interdiction efforts in North Vietnam which have effectively impeded the transshipment southward of a significant stock of supplies which continue to move into Thanh Hoa and Vinh by rail, road, and boat.
Question number two. What would be the military effect of a cessation of the bombing? Answer: A--The major result of the bombing halt would be the enemy's increased capability to position and maintain large ground forces north of the DMZ in close proximity to our U.S. and ARVN forces deployed to defend the I Corps. He could concentrate his artillery, armor, air forces, and air defense forces in direct support of his ground forces and place them in a position to initiate a large-scale invasion of South Vietnam with minimum warning time. B--We can expect the enemy to develop forward logistic complexes. C--The enemy will devote a maximum initial effort to reconstruct of his lines of communication south of the 19th parallel. D--Airfields south of the 19th will return to service. A bombing pause will permit the North Vietnamese Army to make fuller use of land lines in communication. Country-wide, the North Vietnamese Army presently devotes an estimated 80,000 troops to its air defense mission." And these are two good figures: North Vietnamese Army devotes an estimated 80,000 troops to its air defense mission. "Plus, perhaps 110-200,000 laborers. Complete bombing cessation would allow the North Vietnamese Army several options, any of which would increase the threat to American forces in or near South Vietnam.
Question number three: Since March 31st--that was my speech--what is the average number of trucks destroyed and trucks damaged per week? What is the average number of trucks sighted in the panhandle per week? What is your best estimate of the total number of trucks sighted and unsighted that flow through the panhandle each week and the portion of this total that we are not getting? Answer: The enemy's day movement of trucks has been virtually halted. As a consequence of night attacks against the above areas, the enemy has ceased moving in convoys and has been unwilling to allow his trucks to wait behind crossing points. As a result, most of his trucks have been kept north of Route Package 1, moving out singly under the cover of darkness. Consequently, fewer kills have been possible. In the week of July 14-20, an average of 508 trucks per day were sighted from all sources. After that period, there was a steady decrease in truck traffic as the enemy felt the full weight of our interdiction bombing campaign concentrated at key traffic choke points. In the week prior to Typhoon Bess on September the 4th, the sightings had decreased from 508 trucks per day to 151 per day. Since September the 4th, truck kills and damages have averaged 32 per week as a consequence of nearly complete blockage of his wide choke point.
Question four--What is the estimate of military casualties we inflict on the enemy each week in the bombing of North Vietnam? We believe the military casualties resulting from intensive air strikes since mid-July 1968 have increased significantly. As in our previous submission, casualties on the order of five to ten thousand per month do not seem unreasonable.
Question number five: Is there any possibility of your providing for the President even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties America would take if we stopped the bombing in North Vietnam? Answer: I have reviewed the factors considered in my response to this question. Further examination of the results of the air interdiction campaign convinces me that my estimate at that time remains valid. In summary, a cessation of offensive action north of the DMZ would enable the enemy to amass personnel and equipment along the DMZ. It would facilitate his infiltration and logistic support across and around the DMZ. It would increase the air, artillery, and ground threat to our forces located in northern I Corps. I must emphasize the adverse effect of a cessation without reciprocity on the morale of the officers and men of my command, as well as those of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces, who would be exposed to increased enemy pressure from a newly created sanctuary. Conversely, a complete bombing cessation would raise the enemy's confidence and his aggressiveness. It would validate his doctrine of the insurgency war. It will confirm his unrealistic view of the military, political, and psychological postures of the warring parties. It will portray to him increased strength on his part and growing weakness on ours. It will demonstrate to him that he is winning. Above all, it will convince him that he must continue or increase the current tempo of the war to gain the ultimate victory. Militarily and psychologically, a complete bombing cessation will shift the balance significantly toward the enemy." Unquote. Now that's today.
Nixon: That's just today.
President: That's today. Now, we have not given that to the Vice President--he has not asked for it. We will give it to him if he does ask for it. I didn't call him because I don't want to be coaching him on his campaign. I'm trying to run the war.
Nixon: Yeah.
President: On the other hand, I think what's safe--
Nixon: Yeah, what is it?
President: Is the position that the President, and there's just one President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ambassador Bunker, and General Abrams are responsible for that situation in Vietnam. They're going to be responsible until a new President is elected. Therefore, you're not going to try to look over their shoulders without all the information and tell them what is best. You have to have some confidence in the professional army, and the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, and you believe that every American wants peace, but you're not, in order to win a campaign, not going to be in a position of trying to overrule all these men without any information that would justify you're doing it.
Nixon: That's what I've been trying to say. Of course, I think on this too, I can just say what I have said previously, that as I understand it, it is the position that if there is any evidence that there would be--that a bombing pause could take place without endangering our men, we will go ahead and do it. Isn't that really our position?
President: Well, not necessarily. We have said we favor the stopping of bombing if it doesn't endanger our men. And of course, we--then we want them to close that DMZ. We don't want them to take advantage of it.
Nixon: Right.
President: That's San Antonio./7/ We said we don't want them taking advantage if they'll assure us. We said don't shell the cities. The most important thing though, Dick--
/7/See footnote 7, Document 35.
Nixon: Is the recognition of the government [of South Vietnam].
President: We've got to--well, not necessarily--yes, just letting them hear, just let them sit in.
Nixon: Right.
President: We've got a million men there. Now, if they pull out, we're in one hell of a shape. We've lost everything.
Nixon: We're done. That's right. Well, I hesitate to bother you, but--
President: No, I think that--
Nixon: I just want to be sure that I was up-to-date on everything.
President: I think that--I think that the least you can get into tactics and strategy, the better any candidate is. And I say that to American Party, Republican Party, and Democratic Party. And I put that responsibility on somebody else until I had to assume it myself and was elected. And then I would just say to them that you believe the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense have made our position clear in Paris that you are not going to overrule that position unless you have more information than you have.
Nixon: Right.
President: Okay.
Nixon: That's what I'm going to continue to say.
President: Thank you, Dick.
Nixon: Appreciate your time. Bye./8/
/8/In a telephone call to Dirksen on October 1, the President commented on Nixon's reaction to Humphrey's speech: "As a matter of fact, he didn't want anybody to know it, but he called me last night and asked me my evaluation. I told him we'd just have to see what--that we just didn't know anything about it and we'd just have to see for ourselves what this fellow meant by it. And I think that's a pretty good position for everybody. You don't have to say anything--just say, well, what does he mean? Can you tell me? Does it mean that he's willing to pull out and stop bombing without--if it's a condition, that's okay. If it's not, why then we put those boys in pretty bad shape there." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, October 1, 1968, 11:22 a.m., Tape F6810.01, PNO 12)
39. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey/1/
September 30, 1968, 7:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Humphrey, September 30, 1968, 7:30 p.m., Tape F6810.01, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Humphrey called from Salt Lake City, Utah. Rostow was with the President in the Oval Office during the conversation. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Hello?
Vice President: Mr. President?
President: Hi.
Vice President: How are you this evening?
President: Fine.
Vice President: Say, I'm going to be on your TV in about 5 minutes./2/
/2/See Document 40.
President: All right, I'll turn it on.
Vice President: On NBC, and I thought I should have called you a little earlier, but they had me taping here all day and I've been about half-dead.
President: Is it taped?
Vice President: Yeah, it's taped.
President: Good. Well, I'll turn it on.
Vice President: And it points out the things that we've done here on Vietnam. And it's about the arms control as well as the non-proliferation treaty and it says, for example, that we've given the time for Asian nations to strengthen themselves and work together and so we see a stronger Southeast Asia--a stronger South Vietnam--contrasted with a few months ago when peace negotiations were started. And there are new circumstances which will face the new President, in light of these circumstances, and assuming no marked changes in the present situation, how would I proceed. And let me make clear first what I would not do. I would not undertake a unilateral withdrawal. Peace would not be served by weakness or withdrawal and I make that very clear. Nor would I escalate the level of violence in either the South or the North. We seek to de-escalate. The platform of the Democratic Party says the President should take reasonable risks to find peace. North Vietnam, according to its own statement, has said it will proceed to prompt and good faith negotiations if we stop present limited bombing. But we must always think of the protection of our troops. As President, I would be willing to stop the bombing of the North as an acceptable risk for peace because I believe it could lead to success in the negotiations and a shorter war.
President: Now does that mean without any--
Vice President: No. Wait a minute. This would be the best protection of our troops. [Quoting from his speech:] "But in weighing that risk and before taking action, I would place key importance on evidence--direct or indirect, by deed or word--of the Communists' willingness to restore the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam."
President: Now would you just want evidence on that one point? You know our negotiating position. We have three. The South Vietnamese--Bunker tells us that that government and those million men they have would really go into chaos if we divided up in Paris their future without their having a chance to appear.
Vice President: Yes.
President: We would be willing to have the NLF appear, but about the most important condition we think we've got to have is not that we decide their fate without their presence, as Hitler and Chamberlain did to Czechoslovakia. Now--
Vice President: Yeah, well, we say that they must proceed with good faith negotiations, and if they--
President: Now, would that include--well, you see, there are these three points. This is one of them. I gather from what you're saying that you would require evidence--direct or indirect, deed or word--of their willingness to restore the DMZ. Now that would give us some protection for our men if you would--
Vice President: Yes, sir.
President: If that is a condition.
Vice President: That's right.
President: Now there are two other things that we say they ought to do if we stop the bombing. One is--not shell the cities. And two--to let the GVN come in and we'd let the NLF come in. Now they have not agreed to any of these three up to now. Would this be your only condition?
Vice President: That would be my only specific, except that I'd say that they'd have to have good faith in negotiations. They'd have to show good faith. I said here, "North Vietnam has said it would proceed to prompt and good faith negotiations if we would stop the present limited bombing of the North." And then I say, "If the Government of North Vietnam were to show bad faith we would, of course, reserve the right to resume the bombing. And in weighing that risk and before taking any action, I would place key importance on evidence--direct or indirect, by deed or word--of the Communists' willingness to restore the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam." I don't say that's exclusive, but I say that's one thing above all that they must do.
President: Well, there's two other things that you want to remember. Number one, we've got 500,000 men. They've got a million.
Vice President: Yeah.
President: Now we don't want to divide up North or South Vietnam without both of them being present, so that ought to be understood before we give up our whole card that if we bring them in they wouldn't walk out. Negotiate in good faith with whom? With both of us, you see. The second thing is we couldn't very well keep the bombing stopped very long, I think, from a practical standpoint if they shell the cities.
Vice President: Yeah. Well, that's what we would mean by "good faith negotiations."
President: Okay.
Vice President: I'll tell you what. I want you to look at this and I've got a lot of stuff in there that we've done. I've built up the record so that we have a complete statement about the Constitution and the elections and the improvement of the economy and the fact that's what happened to the other nations of Southeast Asia and their regional development, and then we come down on the non-proliferation treaty at the end and Mr. Nixon's point of view on it. I would just like to hear from you afterwards what you think. I had to stake out some positions, as you know, and I think I've done it carefully here without jeopardizing what you're trying to do.
President: You do require evidence of direct or indirect, or deed or word, on the restoration of the DMZ?
Vice President: Absolutely.
President: Before you stop it?
Vice President: That's absolutely right. I say just exactly, "in weighing that risk and before taking any action, I would place key importance on the evidence--direct or indirect, by deed or word--of the Communists' willingness to restore" it.
President: I'll turn it on. Thank you.
Vice President: God bless you. Thank you.
40. Editorial Note
In a speech at Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 30, 1968, Vice President Humphrey pledged to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. He would undertake such an action, he noted, "as an acceptable risk for peace" since "it could lead to success in the negotiations and thereby shorten the war." However, he added that prior to a cessation, he "would place key importance on evidence--direct or indirect, by word or deed--of Communist willingness to restore the demilitarized zone between South and North Vietnam." He further stated that he would support the resumption of bombing if the North Vietnamese "were to show bad faith." The text of the speech, which was taped and then broadcast nationally that evening, is in The New York Times, October 1, 1968.
In a memorandum to President Johnson at 8 p.m., September 30, Walt Rostow advised the President to make no comment on Humphrey's plan and noted that "our general attitude towards the speech should be, in backgrounding, that we don't see a great deal of difference between the Vice President's position and the President's." Rostow also described comments he had received from Rusk: "His judgment is that it need not give us trouble. He would not have expressed the matter in precisely the Vice President's terms, but we should not go looking for marginal differences." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 1 [2 of 3])
41. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and George Ball/1/
Washington, September 30, 1968, 8:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Ball, September 30, 1968, 8:15 p.m., Tape F6810.01, PNO 6. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: He [Vice President Humphrey] said to me that he would stop the bombing. And I said, "Without any conditions?", as I did to you the other day. And he said, "No, they would have to give me direct or indirect, word or deed or act that they'd restore the DMZ." And I said, "Okay, now what would you do about the shelling of the cities and bringing in the Government of Vietnam?" "Well," he said, "you couldn't have discussions in good faith unless you talked to both the NLF and the Government of Vietnam too." And I said, "Well, that's all right. Is that what you mean by good faith?" And he said, "Yes." And I said, "Well, how long do you think we could go if they were shelling the cities?" And he said, "I made clear that if they didn't negotiate in good faith we would go back." And I told him "all right" [and] that I would get his speech./2/ I haven't got it. They have a copy here but Walt [Rostow] has it and he is analyzing it. I haven't talked to Dean [Rusk]. I have just talked to the Vice President and placed a call./3/ I had a meeting going on. We've got the damn longshoremen out tonight and I had to issue a Taft-Hartley/4/ and we mean mess on that. And I just got in in time to hear him. I thought that--I think we'll--I guess you are keeping up with these cables. We got a three-page cable from Abrams./6/ Abrams thinks he and Bunker--that the one thing we have got to do is not let these folks out there fall out from under us and have another con deal or two and that we've got to keep saying to them that we are not going to make any agreement that they're not involved because we will lose their million men that we're going to rely on if we ever try to phase out.
/2/See Document 40.
/3/See Document 39.
/4/A 1946 Congressional act that authorized the United States to impose a cooling-off period during labor disputes.
/6/See footnote 4, Document 38.
Ball: Let me say that I talked to some of the press today, Mr. President, and I told them that implied in all of this was obviously the fact that both the South Vietnamese and the other side--the Communists--would want to bring the other side, but we couldn't make a decision for anybody.
President: That's exactly right. Well, your television appearances and your press conference have made it very clear, and I wish that we could get them out of talking about Vietnam if they would tell the papers--if Nixon and Humphrey would tell the papers what you said on television. I saw you the other morning. I thought it was superb. I don't know why in the hell a fellow that can handle himself that way can't work for me but I guess he did that long enough. But anyway, I hope they can get away with it. You know now, I guess, that the Foreign Minister of Hanoi is in Moscow. He's there now. We think he's there now trying to decide this thing. We got that from the most sensitive source you can imagine. I don't think the V.P. knows it or anybody else, but there are just three or four here, but he is there. We have made some steps that nobody knows about, not even the highest officials, that we are kind of hoping that Russia would help us and Hanoi would agree. What we'd like to do is show up some morning with the GVN and just the day before stop the bombing and then have some indication that they wouldn't walk out of the room--it'd be bad if they did--and have some indication that they wouldn't take advantage of us there at the DMZ. Now we are trying our best to get them on board on that. They have not said yes and they have not said no. They said, "What are you requiring? What do you insist on?" We said, "We don't insist on any guarantee, any promise, any assurance. We want to know, though, what would happen if we did so and so. Would you walk out?" Well, they said they have to talk to their country. When they get ready to talk to their country we find them in Hanoi--I mean Moscow. Now don't say that around any of those sources, but I will talk to you from time to time. Abrams says that the most important thing of everything we can do is not to let that government feel that we sell them out because he is using them and using them effectively and he is going to use them more effectively every day.
Ball: He is doing a terrific job.
President: Gene Black is back today./6/ Gene Black says he has been there three times and he says that Huong and what they are doing to try to clean up the mess is having a hell of a good effect. He thinks that Tet did a good job on this crowd and scared them and they're doing better than they have ever done. I don't know--I have heard so many reports I can't tell, but we will see. And I just hope we can get away from--the best line that has been said in the campaign was your line that Johnson is not running against Humphrey. Johnson got out of the race. He is just going to be President until January 20. Now the whole question is let's look at Nixon and let's look at Humphrey and let's see which one of these we want and let's don't get down any rabbit trails. You just keep that up.
/6/Black, the President's Special Adviser on Asian Economic and Social Development, had just returned from a trip to seven Asian nations including Vietnam. He reported on his trip in a meeting with the President at 12:47 p.m. on September 28. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting has been found.
Ball: Right, Mr. President. Well, I'd like to keep in touch with you.
President: Well, you can any day. You call me any time you want to, any hour, and I'll give you any information that we have--that I have.
Ball: That's wonderful.
President: Okay.
Ball: Thanks.
42. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Everett Dirksen/1/
Washington, October 1, 1968, 10:31 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, October 1, 1968, 10:31 a.m., Tape F6810.01, PNO 7. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Johnson telephoned McCormack immediately after this conversation at 10:45 a.m. and discussed the same topics. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and McCormack, October 1, 1968, 10:45 a.m., Tape 6810.01, PNO 8-9)
President: Hello?
Dirksen: Are you at liberty to make some comment on Hubert's speech last night?/2/
/2/See Document 40.
President: Except in the greatest confidence, I would just say that it depends a lot on the interpretation of it. He did not discuss it with our people, Rusk or Rostow, or anybody that we're aware of. The first I knew about it was when the press called me and pointed up that it was on the ticker. So, it was prepared without our knowledge and without our advice. It interpreted, I think--a literal interpretation would show there's no great difference in our present policy. I think his intention is to try to do that without and still leave the impression that there is--get what I mean?
Dirksen: Yeah.
President: Well, so here is our present policy--that we're ready, anxious, willing, eager to stop the bombing just as we are eager to stop the war. But we just can't stop one side of it. The other side has got to stop something too. We found that when we stop and they don't stop, it kills more men. So we've said to them, "If we did stop the bombing, what would you do?" They're now considering that. They have not given us a firm answer.
Now one of the things we've said to them, "If we stop the bombing, would you de-militarize, would you reinstitute the DMZ?" Up to now they've said "No." Now, Hubert's speech, the way I read it, and I emphasize I, the way I read it says that before taking any action, he would have to have direct or indirect deed or word that they were reinstituting the DMZ. Now if that is a fact, that's all right, that's what's important.
Now the second thing we feel we ought to have--we think that we can't go to this, can't make a peace for that area like Hitler and Chamberlain did without Czechoslovakia being present--we don't think you could make a peace for that area without the elected government having its voice heard anyway. We don't object to their bringing whoever they want to--NLF, anybody. We've always said their voice could be heard. But they refuse to have anything to do with this government that is elected and has a million-man army that's doing a lot of the fighting. We don't ever report it and don't give them credit for it, but they're losing more everyday than we lose, and they're just 14 million and we're 200.
So that's the second consideration. They must talk to the GVN. Now if they don't, and this group walked out from under us, we'd really be left--we'd stand to lose a lot. The thing that both Bunker and Abrams, the two best men we have, are more concerned about than anything else is something that would make them wobbly and make them distrust us and make them think we'd sell them out. Now, Hubert's speech says that they'd have to negotiate in "good faith." If he means by "good faith" talking to the GVN, which he could, that's what we think ought to be done. He doesn't say that, though, spell it out. He just says they'd have to negotiate in good faith.
The third thing--if I stop the bombing, and they shelled Saigon tomorrow and Danang tomorrow and kill thousands as they did during Tet, everybody in this country and all the soldiers there would certainly demand that I do something about it. So, I would have to reinstitute the bombing. Now if you're going to reinstitute, there's no use stopping it. So we ought to know that they wouldn't shell the cities. Now the only way he would know it is to have some understanding with them that they "act in good faith"--that's the phrase that is used.
Now both Ball and Goldberg think that you ought to stop the bombing, just quit bombing. Clifford thinks you've got to have conditions to it. Bunker and Abrams think you've got to have conditions to it. Now Bunker is a liberal, progressive fellow and a hell of a good diplomat, best in the service. But he's an old Republican businessman before he ever got into the service, although he's progressive, and he just says, "You'll lose everything if you don't have this government present." Rusk feels very strongly about it, and needless to say, I do. Now, up to now, the Vice President has pretty generally agreed with us. I can't interpret his speeches any more than I can interpret Nixon. But if he means by his statement that "direct or indirect" that they give him before he takes action assurances on the DMZ, well, that would be very appealing. But of course Rusk thinks that Hanoi will knock it down today. They've never been able to tell us that. We don't know why they'll tell him that next January. Do you follow me there?
Dirksen: Yes, I follow you.
President: So, I would think that Nixon's position that he would take would be, with these conferences going on, that he add all the information, that he's not in touch with them, that he's not responsible, that he doesn't want to do anything that would appear to divide this country, and therefore it is the Democrats' responsibility, period, and not to get into the war thing any more than he has to. I would think that would be the best thing for Hubert, but apparently he's trying to get the McCarthy vote. Now, the way I see the thing, there are 43 percent of the people for Nixon, 28 percent for Hubert, 21 percent for Wallace. So when you take 43 and 21 on Wallace and Nixon that's 64 percent. Now there's only 8 percent undecided--let's assume all of those are McCarthy people. That doesn't do him any good. If he puts 8 percent with his 28, he's just got 36. So he's got to do something to get at some of the Nixon [supporters] back or some of the Wallace people back. And I wouldn't think that this kind of a speech would get either of them--I may be wrong. I believe he's been losing because they have been doubtful on Vietnam and a lot of the Democrats, particularly in our section of the country, have been going to Wallace. That's my judgment.
Dirksen: Yes, well, that's the way I size it up.
President: So, I have said all along, and Nixon has said all along, that we've just got one government and we've got to stop at the water's edge and we can't play politics with the war and we just cannot ignore Bunker and ignore Abrams, our commander in the field, we cannot ignore all of our Joint Chiefs--there are four of them, we can't ignore our Secretary--we can't ignore our Secretary of State, we can't ignore the President, who have all the information involved. So that's the way we see it.
Dirksen: Well, thanks much.
[Omitted here is general discussion of ambassadorial and judicial nominations.]
43. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 1, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO. Secret; Nodis; Ohio/Plus.
SUBJECT
Hanoi's Purpose in the Oslo Talks
Hanoi's recent decision to send several officials to Oslo for conversations with the Norwegian Government appears intended to persuade us to agree to a bombing halt in exchange for some tacit--and limited-- Hanoi restraint in the DMZ area. It is also designed to gain Norwegian support for the North Vietnamese position. It does not, however, appear designed to open a new channel for negotiations. In fact, it appears intended to reinforce the Hanoi position in Paris, and to move the Paris negotiations forward. It thus underlines the importance Hanoi attaches to the Paris talks.
Chan Indicates Readiness to Stop Cross-DMZ Shelling. The most interesting element in the North Vietnamese position as presented in Oslo by Ambassador Nguyen Tho Chan was a statement to the effect that Hanoi would be prepared to stop shelling across the DMZ if we stop the bombing of North Vietnam and "other acts of war," including our own shelling across the DMZ. This line is not, strictly speaking, new; Hanoi had earlier said that the status of the DMZ could be restored if we would stop our violations of it. The noteworthy aspect of its presentation in Oslo is that it has now been included in an official Hanoi presentation.
Because of the circumstances surrounding the North Vietnamese statement, and because of Norwegian imprecision, it is not completely clear whether the Hanoi officials had intended from the start to make a special point of the DMZ. Nor is it completely clear whether their remarks were nothing more than the standard line that "we will stop firing at you if you stop firing at us." From the unusual nature of the contact, however, it appears reasonable to conclude that the Hanoi officials were given definite instructions to present their line on the DMZ. It is also clear that they were under instructions not to discuss their position further but were merely to state it and depart.
Hanoi knows that the Norwegians would report the Oslo conversations to us. It may have calculated that the Norwegians would use the North Vietnamese statement to urge us to accept Hanoi's proposal on the DMZ as evidence of military restraint and to undertake a complete bombing halt on that basis. It may hope that we will do so.
But Hanoi Still Rejects Responsibility for Southern Matters. Chan's remarks were made in a way which suggests that Hanoi still wishes to reject responsibility for any involvement in the war South of the 17th Parallel. He consistently rejected any implication that Hanoi had troops in the South, and he attempted to convey the impression that Hanoi's role in the war would be completely ended once US "aggression" against the North had ceased and Hanoi had in consequence stopped shelling across the DMZ. He also consistently pushed the NLF forward as the party with which Southern matters had to be discussed, e.g., in dealing with the question of the safety of US forces in the South after the bombing had been stopped. On the role of the GVN, Chan appears to have deliberately misconstrued Foreign Minister Lyng's direct question on this subject by replying with a lengthy statement that Hanoi would not engage in reprisals. The implication was therefore left that Hanoi would not deal with the GVN or accord it any degree of legitimacy. Nevertheless, Chan did not specifically rule out GVN participation in talks, but even said that this could be a matter for discussion after a bombing halt.
Knows That Statement Does Not Meet Full US Demand. Hanoi knows that Chan's statement about the DMZ does not meet the full range of US demands on a bombing halt. However, Hanoi has on several occasions in recent months made statements which it knew did not fully meet our position, in the hope that we would respond affirmatively (e.g., its series of statements justifying but not admitting Northern troop presence in the South, and Colonel Ha Van Lau's circumspect reference to the "lull" in an interview with an American journalist).
Hanoi may not now want to make any specific statement in Paris on its readiness to stop shelling across the DMZ. It knows that such a statement would not fully meet the US desiderata and it may not want to give us the opportunity to respond by pressing it for some move on other elements in that position. It has thus chosen to address the issue through Oslo, where, as already noted, it might expect to gain additional leverage on the US via the Norwegians.
We May Wish to Raise in Paris. However, since Chan indicated at one point that the matter should be discussed in Paris, our delegation could raise it discreetly at some convenient opportunity. We could indicate that we find Chan's remarks promising and that we would like to explore North Vietnamese intentions around the DMZ area further. This would indicate our particular interest in the area, while pointing up that we take indirect messages seriously but prefer ultimately to resolve such complicated questions directly and with at least some measure of precision. We could, of course, also want to indicate that we reserve our stand on other issues.
It is possible that Hanoi may respond to such an overture by withdrawing or at least failing to reiterate its statement as soon as we indicate that we want to pursue it and might ask for more. However, as INR has pointed out before, we believe that one area in which Hanoi may be prepared to exercise some restraint is the DMZ. Hanoi's position with regard to this issue is thus particularly worth exploring. This would be especially true now, since Chan's remarks suggest that Hanoi is thinking seriously about this problem and may thus be prepared to shift its stand further, and since his remarks also point up in general terms that Hanoi wishes to make some progress in the negotiations and sees them as an important element in its strategy./2/
/2/The Norwegians deemed as a positive development the seriousness placed upon the Ohio channel by the DRV. (Telegram 6838 from Oslo, October 1; ibid.) In telegram 22112 from Paris, October 9 (retransmitted as telegram 253256 to Oslo, October 10), Harriman and Vance suggested sending a message to the Government of Norway thanking it for its assistance and noting that "the conversations also assisted the USG in assessing North Vietnamese thinking." (Both ibid.) Lyng later said of the Ohio channel: "It is quite difficult to evaluate what this Norwegian contact has meant. But I can imagine in the first phase when this was going on that perhaps it had some significance." (Telegram 7231 from Oslo, November 4; ibid.)
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21592.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
44-62
October 2-15, 1968: The Breakthrough in Paris
44. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 2, 1968, 1200Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 9:25 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission. This telegram is printed in full in Pike (ed.), The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 588-593.
39276. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my sixty-ninth weekly message.
A. General
1. For some weeks we have been developing our concept of a "counter-offensive," with emphasis on pacification, moving from the improved allied military position and the growing political strength of the GVN to more extensive and more secure control of the countryside./2/ At our October 1 joint meeting with President Thieu and his principal advisors on military and pacification matters, it was most encouraging to have confirmation that they have been working along generally similar lines toward these objectives./3/
/2/Komer outlined the principles of the pacification "counter-offensive" in a September 22 memorandum to Abrams. He noted: "the idea of an all-out counter-offensive is a natural. We are apparently largely pre-empting Hanoi's 'third-phase' offensive, which lays the enemy open for a counter-stroke. Moreover the political need for increased momentum makes it imperative that we seize the opportunity. We may have until a new administration takes over next January to prove that this war is no longer stalemated. If we can, we may have bought the time to achieve a favorable settlement. If we don't, we may be up the creek without a paddle. If we start at the top (the only way to get things started quickly in this country), it will be easy to sell Thieu and Huong on a general counter-offensive. They will surely go so far as to say the right words. But this solves less than half the problem! Unless we also sign them on to a quite systematic plan and program with time-phased goals and deadlines, we will end up like the VC/NVA--long on words but short on performance." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Komer Files: Lot 69 D 303, Vietnam/Turkey)
/3/Bunker transmitted detailed notes of this meeting in telegram 39342 from Saigon, October 3. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
2. Thieu not only has the keenest interest in pacification but the most thorough knowledge of the problems involved of any of the GVN officials. He has demonstrated his personal leadership in the seminars he has held for top officials in each of the corps areas in the past few weeks, the final one to be held in II Corps today. He is determined to launch a broad pacification offensive that should move substantial numbers of hamlets from the "contested" to the "relatively secure" category. The extent of GVN homework on the new planning concepts was evident in our October 1 meeting.
3. The concept targets primarily the some 3800 contested hamlets where approximately 3 million people live rather than the VC held areas with the remaining 3 million of a total population of 17-1/2 million. As Thieu points out, adding these 3800 hamlets to the 5,000-odd already relatively secure would bring over 82 percent of South Viet Nam's population under reasonable GVN control. It would forestall any VC effort to partition the country or justify any claim to coalition government. It would involve a shift of regional forces, and the creation of new local defense forces in the areas to be secured plus a concerted attack of the VC infrastructure as an intensified Chieu Hoi program. The plan would also stress strengthening hamlet and village administration to compete with VC "Liberation Committees." We are all agreed here that the concept is basically sound. Thieu and his advisors have been thinking in terms of a year-long campaign to begin in December. At our suggestion, however, Thieu agreed to a two-phase approach, the first phase with a goal of 1,000 hamlets to start hopefully within one month and to be completed by Tet, in order to take advantage of the opportunities that now exist to expand the GVN's control in the countryside, for the enemy is clearly faltering in his efforts to keep the initiative.
4. Friendly forces continued to forestall the enemy's efforts at mounting offensive operations. In I Corps, the 3rd Marine Division continued to seize large caches of ammunition, weapons, food and supplies which had been prepositioned to sustain multi-regimental size attacks by the enemy against our position south of the DMZ. In III Corps a series of unglamorous operations northwest of Saigon in Hau Nghia Province discovered similar caches, and also uncovered dispensaries which had been set up to care for thousands of wounded, complete with generators, operating tables, and refrigeration equipment. In the same area our forces have destroyed over a thousand bunkers and over 2500 more have been identified. These are all indications of the magnitude of the enemy's preparation for large scale attacks. He was clearly preparing to support sustained offensive action against Saigon.
5. The level of fighting did not change greatly with enemy killed increasing slightly to 3,782 (47 percent by RVNAF, 48 percent by US) and friendly killed down slightly to 501 (67 percent RVNAF and 30 percent US). I have tried in my recent messages to highlight the growing number of examples of fine ARVN performance. I think nothing better illustrates the full ARVN participation in the successful blunting of Communist offensive action than these figures, especially when one recalls that the ARVN fights without the same firepower in their battalions, without the same lavish artillery and air support that our forces have. As General Abrams has put it, "They are in the fight and they are doing well. They are paying the price and they are exacting the toll." There are of course still weaknesses in ARVN to be overcome. But not only are these weaknesses being corrected, the ARVN in its present state has turned in a truly fine performance in recent weeks. As General Abrams has said, in some cases "heroic."
6. Enemy strategy continues unchanged. Although he made battalion-sized attacks only against Special Forces camps and RF/PF posts in I Corps and III Corps during the week, it is clear that he wanted and intended to do much more with the vast stores we have seized from him, but he was unable to bring it off. He was undoubtedly trying, without success, to clear the way to Saigon and other cities.
7. There is one view that sees the enemy bound to continue this same course, largely by his doctrinal approach which to a large degree determines his long-term goals and which tends also to shape his view of the situation. There are some striking parallels between the strategy pronounced in the COSVN 6th resolution, the principal current statement of strategy, and the pronouncements of Truong Chinh prior to the shift to the "general offensive" in 1954. The Communists apparently see us in the same position that the French were just before Geneva. The emphasis on loss of morale of US and GVN forces, on the adverse effects of the war on the US economy, its divisive effect in the United States, and the movement of world opinion against the United States all find parallels in the earlier documents relating to the French war against the Viet Minh.
8. Other doctrinal points which might incline the enemy towards continuing the offensive are the belief that the negotiations will only ratify what he must win on the battlefield; and the belief that the "balance of forces" shifts in his favor continually as the fighting goes on. His determination to bring about the "popular uprising" might lead to increasingly reckless--and costly--attacks spearheaded at the "puppet forces" in the belief that this will lead to the destruction of the GVN.
9. Great claims are made by Hanoi for the progress this strategy has brought about since Tet, while, as I have pointed out previously, his cadre who are doing the fighting on the ground are increasingly questioning whether the effort has been worth the cost. It is claimed that we have been forced to adopt a defensive posture, concerned only with the protection of major urban centers. At the same time fantastically exaggerated claims are made about the defeats which are allegedly being inflicted upon us. I suppose it is possible that someone in Hanoi may be persuaded by these claims.
10. However while support for this view abounds in the enemy's current strategic pronouncements, it may well exaggerate the rigidity of the enemy's strategic thinking. For example, while the COSVN resolution parallels Truong Chinh's language, it seems likely that Truong Chinh, who reportedly adheres more closely than some others to the classic Maoist line, probably feels that the attempt to move to the general offensive was made prematurely, and that it may be necessary to return to the second stage offensive and the concept of "protracted war." Further, there may well be those in the Hanoi hierarchy who believe that gains can be made at the negotiating table without further heavy battlefield sacrifices. In other words, I think it possible that the use of rhetoric traceable to Truong Chinh's 1954 writings and in some cases to Mao Tse-tung's work serves in part to conceal a considerable range of differences among the leaders in Hanoi, and I believe that it is quite possible that the advocates of continuing the present strategy may be under considerable pressure.
11. In my last message I reported on the likely return from exile of General Duong Van Minh. Thieu told me yesterday that he will return on Saturday, October 5. Thieu sent his Interior Minister to Bangkok to discuss "Big" Minh's future role which may be that of advisor to the President. Most knowledgeable Vietnamese consider Minh's return as a positive factor making for greater nationalist unity and I am inclined to agree, although working out a proper role for him will not be easy. The same beneficial results are not likely to be obtained, however, from the return of some of the other exiled Generals and I am planning to make some remarks along these lines to Thieu at the next appropriate occasion. I think he already shares these views./4/
/4/In telegram 37862 from Saigon, September 14, the Embassy noted while Minh could play a constructive role in the South Vietnamese political scene, he also could become a "liability" if he threw his support behind dissident Buddhist groups. The Embassy also noted that Minh's return to Vietnam was imminent: "President Thieu has told us that he is in touch with Big Minh and has asked a friend to explain the 'facts of life' to him. Presumably this means that Thieu is seeking some kind of understanding with Minh before agreeing to his return. While clearly worried by Minh's reputation for naivete, Thieu likes him personally and is well aware of the possible benefits of his return. If Big Minh supports the government in one way or another, he can contribute to popular backing for the Thieu regime in the critical days ahead. This is worth a gamble, and Thieu is clearly thinking about taking it." (Ibid., POL 30 VIET S) In telegram 246778 to Saigon, September 28, the Department assessed the risks associated with Minh's return as minimal: "We are inclined to view that, despite obvious risks, his return is not likely to be particularly disruptive and may actually add to nationalist unity and strength at this time." (Ibid.)
12. In our joint meeting yesterday I referred to the problem of land tenure as it applied to farmers who had been cultivating lands under Viet Cong control. In response to a question I had raised during Thieu's visit to Ba Tri in Kien Hoa Province, he had described a three point GVN policy: A) that landlords would not be permitted to collect back rents from such tenants; B) that farmers given land by the Viet Cong would not be expected to pay taxes for several years; C) that farmers given land by the Viet Cong would be allowed to keep the land they are farming and would be given titles to regularize possession of it. I pointed out that the third point differed from the provisions of the ordinances now in effect but that I thought that if carried out it would have far reaching consequences in gaining the allegiance and support of farmers who had been cultivating lands under Viet Cong control. Thieu reaffirmed his statement and said that the farmers would definitely be allowed to keep these lands and that a government committee was now working out the details. This I believe can prove to be a highly constructive development and a useful weapon in gaining the adherence of the peasant.
[Omitted here is discussion of political, military, and economic matters and the pacification effort.]
Bunker
45. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 2, 1968, 1410Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Plus. Repeated to USUN for Secretary Rusk.
21737/Delto 788. From Harriman and Vance.
1. Thuy and Lau joined us at the tea break which lasted 42 minutes. Tho was absent from today's meeting./2/
/2/The summary account of the 24th formal session was transmitted in telegram 21742/Delto 789 from Paris, October 2. (Ibid.)
2. After non-substantive conversation, we asked Thuy whether he had anything new to add to our conversations. He replied they had nothing new for their part but that they had just heard of statement by Vice President Humphrey./3/ Thuy said as they read the statement it demanded reciprocity.
/3/See Document 40.
3. We asked if they had a copy of the speech and offered to make one available to them. Thuy said they would like a copy. We said we had not talked to Humphrey about the speech and that Thuy could read the speech and judge it for himself.
4. We emphasized that until Jan. 20th, President Johnson is responsible for US foreign policy and what candidates say is not important during this period. What is important from the standpoint of the DRV is what they are prepared to do to make it possible for us to stop the bombing. We said it was a mystery to us why the DRV wanted to go on fighting.
5. Thuy replied President Johnson has all the power in his hands. Why doesn't he stop the bombing to settle the Viet-Nam problem?
6. We replied that the President has said that we would stop the bombing when we have reason to believe that the DRV is seriously interested in joining with us in de-escalating the war and is seriously seeking peace. We emphasized that we had told Thuy and his colleagues what we would do in and around the DMZ if the bombing were stopped and that we had heard what they had said and had concluded they knew what they would have to do on their part in and around the DMZ. We said we had also discussed with them the serious consequences which would happen if attacks were to take place against major cities. We said we had also discussed at length the fact that if there were to be serious talks after the cessation of bombing, represent-atives of the GVN would have to be included in such negotiations and the DRV could have whom they wanted on their side. We said this is a reasonable position.
7. Thuy asked for clarification of what we had said about DMZ. We said we had told them what we would do and we had heard what they had said and that we expected that they will know what to do in and around the DMZ if the bombing were stopped.
8. We said that they had repeatedly stated that they wanted serious talks, but their refusal to agree to the inclusion of representatives of the GVN in future negotiations has had an adverse effect on our belief that the DRV is ready for serious talks. That bothered us very much in our last meeting./4/
/4/See Document 32.
9. Thuy replied that as Tho, Lau and Thuy had said before, they came with a serious attitude and have wanted to have serious discussions, but it was a matter of principle. They could not accept reciprocity. Accordingly, they had said that the United States should stop the bombing and then we can discuss many questions. We could even discuss the question of participation first.
10. We asked whether they had anything new which they wanted to say as Vance was going back to the United States this afternoon. Thuy replied that they thought their position was clear. They are prepared to talk with us after the cessation of bombing and, regarding the problems we have raised, to discuss the question of participation right away. We said as we recalled it, they had said that they would be willing to discuss it the next day, and Thuy replied that was correct. Thuy said he was convinced there were questions on which we will come to immediate agreement and others where through discussion we may come to agreement. We asked if the first question on the agenda was one on which we could reach quick agreement. Thuy replied that it is possible that it will be quick if both sides take into account the views of the other.
11. We said that Vance's trip was routine but, if they had anything new, this was a good time for them to state it. Thuy said he would like Vance to tell the US side that the DRV wants peace, but that it wants a negotiated political settlement. Thuy said it is against the DRV's will to make war, but if it is obliged to make war, it is their duty to do so and they will be resolute in the struggle. Thuy added that they wanted to end the war and the sooner the better, but on the basis that both sides take into account the views of the other. He said that their view is that there should be no reciprocity concerning the cessation of bombing. We then ended the conversation./6/
/6/In a memorandum to the President, which Johnson saw, October 2, 10:15 a.m., Rostow reported: "The classified telephone to Paris was not very good today, but this is what we have on this morning's talk: during the tea break, Averell delivered, without the slightest ambiguity, our three points; the Hanoi delegation said it was interested in rapid progress after a total cessation of the bombing; they said that the question of GVN participation could be 'the first order of business'; no private meeting was set for Friday." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68)
Harriman
46. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 2, 1968, 1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Nixon, Richard--Vietnam. Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the memorandum by the President reads: "Walt--Call me about last paragraph. L."
Mr. President:
As you were talking to Richard Nixon the other evening/2/--and putting our three points on Vietnam to him--there seemed to me to be a certain ambiguity which required clarification. You recall he asked you if any one of the three conditions would satisfy us--or all three. Your answer was purposefully fuzzy. I don't think we've made up our minds exactly what the "fact of life'' formula you gave Harriman means operationally. And it is conceivable that some clarification is required in our conversations with the North Vietnamese in Paris.
/2/See Document 38.
In the argument that follows we would deal with all three conditions, but in different ways.
1. GVN Participation
It is absolutely essential that we have prior agreement that the serious talks that would follow a bombing cessation should include the GVN. I believe you now have unanimous agreement among your advisers that nothing could be more dangerous than for us to have a bombing cessation and then a prolonged wrangle with Hanoi as to whether the GVN could participate. For Hanoi to have a veto, under the circumstances of a bombing cessation, over GVN participation could produce a major political and military crisis in Saigon. Therefore, the participation issue must be nailed down before the event.
2. On the DMZ, in the Vance-Lau talk of July 16,/3/ Lau said the DRV "will know what to do" about shelling across the DMZ in the case of a bombing cessation. The point of Oslo was to go further on shelling and say they would not shell across the DMZ if we stopped bombing. This is obviously insufficient. But it is doubtful that we can negotiate a full detailed DMZ deal before a bombing cessation, at least at the present time. You have formulated your position--for example, to Harriman--in the form not of prior agreement but "facts of life." Specifically, Hanoi must be made to understand that the violation of the DMZ would meet an instant response. And we must mean that. For example, if they shelled across the DMZ, the post-bombing rules of engagement would have to require that we fire back instantly, at, say, three times the level of the incoming. And Abrams should have that right, before the event. If they began to mass major forces at the DMZ, we should be prepared to bomb them with B52's or anything else. If they tried to send across the DMZ--as they have been doing--substantial military units, we would have to return, in my judgment, to full-scale bombing of their supply routes through the panhandle.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 299.
Therefore, on the DMZ, we might live with:
--a "fact of life" statement;
--a very clear definition of the DMZ behavior we would require to maintain a bombing cessation;
--rules of engagement agreed between Saigon and Washington in case of violation.
Personally, I have never ruled out some retaliatory bombing of the North during negotiations if they cheated; and I don't think they would blow serious talks, if they ever started.
3. With respect to attacks on the cities, Hanoi takes the view that this is a matter for the NLF. With 80% of the main forces North Vietnamese, this is clearly nonsense. But again, that is an item in which they should know, as a "fact of life," that substantial attacks on cities, especially Saigon, would meet with prompt response. And we would have to mean it to maintain our credibility in Moscow as well as Hanoi.
4. Therefore, you may wish to consider with Cy, for the next round in Paris, a formula in which we seek an absolutely firm assurance of GVN participation before the bombing stops plus "fact of life" statements by us on the DMZ and the cities, with all preparations made to back our play if they violate.
5. Although I am not enamoured of the device for a one-day bombing cessation, to give them a chance formally to agree to GVN participation on that day, that device might also be considered in your talks with Vance. (A clear paper will be coming to you on the two devices later in the day.)/4/
/4/Paper, by Bob Ginsburgh, attached, at Tab A. [Handwritten footnote in the source text by Rostow. In the attached October 2 memorandum to Rostow, Ginsburgh expressed reservations about the so-called Bundy plan of enacting a stand-down to gain DRV acceptance of GVN participation, including the necessity to resume bombing if the effort failed to bring in the GVN and the need to consult with allies beforehand. Ginsburgh expanded upon his assertions in a memorandum to Rostow of October 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI)]
Walt
47. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Re: Communications to Soviet Union on Vietnam, 10/2-4/68. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only.
Mr. President:
1. Here is the critical passage to the Soviet Union:/2/
/2/Reference is to a memorandum that Rostow handed to Ambassador Dobrynin on September 16; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Document 300.
"The President has noted with interest and respect the judgment of the Soviet leaders that they continue to believe that they have grounds for the view that a complete cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam would create a turning point at the meetings in Paris and open possibilities for serious negotiations on political aspects of a settlement.
"The leaders of the Soviet Union should know that the President is prepared to try to solve the matter on a de facto basis. Setting all political arguments aside, the simple fact is that the President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace. A cessation of bombing which would be followed by abuses of the DMZ, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks on cities or such populated areas as provincial capitals, or a refusal of the authorities in Hanoi to enter promptly into serious political discussions which included the elected government of the Republic of Vietnam, could simply not be sustained.
"If, after appropriate exploration and consideration by the leaders of the Soviet Union, they are prepared to advise the President to proceed on the basis of what is now being said, the President would take their advice with the utmost seriousness.
"The President believes that the leaders of the Soviet Union will understand the elementary requirements which any man in the President's position would face. The President respects the deep interest of the Soviet Union in its fellow socialist country, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He believes that the Soviet leaders, in turn, understand the interests and responsibilities of the United States toward the Republic of Vietnam.
"The President would like to emphasize his readiness to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam just as soon as it can be done with integrity, as a move toward peace and not as a unilateral concession of military advantage to those who wish to continue the battle."
2. Here is the reply from the Soviet Union:/3/
/3/Gromyko gave Rusk the message on October 2; for the full text, see ibid., Document 308.
"There is agreement in Moscow that the achievement of progress towards a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem would be highly desirable.
"Our understanding of what is required to secure such progress has already been communicated to the President and we are forming the impression that our position in this regard has, in general, been correctly understood by the American side. However an exchange of views during the meeting on this topic as well could, we feel, prove useful."/4/
/4/In an October 4 memorandum to the President, Rostow wrote: "In re-reading the communication which Gromyko gave to Sec. Rusk on Wednesday night, it appears that they are suggesting a meeting which would be guaranteed before the event to be modestly fruitful with regard to strategic weapons talks. But they are saying that a Vietnamese formula probably cannot be established before the meeting and, therefore, the Vietnamese question should be discussed at the meeting." This memorandum is printed ibid., Document 309.
3. If you wish to get into it (I recommend against at this time), here is Sec. Rusk's account of Gromyko's two questions:
"He said he had two questions to put to me about Viet-Nam. The first was whether the presence of the South Vietnamese at the conference table was the sole obstacle to stopping the bombing. I told him that this was a most important issue and, in some respects, might be the most difficult for Hanoi to accept. . . . The President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing if there were abuses of the DMZ, if there were rockets and mortars slamming into population centers such as Saigon, Danang and Hue and if North Viet-Nam did not sit down promptly in negotiations at which the GVN would be present. I emphasized that it was not necessary to talk about 'conditions', 'reciprocity' or 'quid pro quos'. It was simply an elementary fact that no President of the United States could maintain a cessation of the bombing under certain circumstances and we had tried to be explicit to the Soviet Union about such circumstances.
"His second question was whether we could eliminate Thieu and Ky as parties to the situation. He said we should not draw any conclusions from the question--he was merely asking a question. He said that the authorities in Hanoi took a very strong view toward these individuals and that the character of the regime in the South was a major obstacle. I replied very firmly that we could not go down this path. President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong together represented 45 percent of the votes cast in the last Presidential election in South Viet-Nam. They, too, had some strong views about the authorities in Hanoi but they were willing to negotiate with them and were willing to let them have the NLF on their side of the table. I made it very clear that there was no possibility that we would bring about a change in government in Saigon to accommodate Hanoi."
4. You may wish to bear in mind this security warning by Sec. Rusk to me: "Under no circumstances must Harriman know of these exchanges, he would resign." I don't know if his assessment is accurate; but if you bring Cy into this, I believe it wise that you swear him to secrecy.
4. Thursday/6/ is tennis morning; but I'll be available close to 9:00 a.m.
/6/October 3.
W.W. Rostow/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
48. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)/1/
Washington, October 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia Country Files, Vietnam 1968. Top Secret. Drafted by Richard K. Stuart of INR/DDC.
SUBJECT
Covert Diversionary Operations in North Vietnam
The Special Operations Group is now conducting a number of diversionary operations against North Vietnam and additional operations are under consideration. Objectives of the operations are to divert North Vietnamese military, security, and intelligence resources and to create opportunities for psychological exploitation by making the North Vietnamese regime and people believe that there is much more agent activity in the North than in fact exists.
National Teams.
Eighteen notional teams have been created by message traffic since September 1967. Four additional teams are planned by January 1969. Directives and family messages are sent to the teams by one way voice link or, on occasion, poorly concealed in black and white radio Sacred Sword Patriotic League broadcasts. Resupply is carried out in the same manner as with actual teams. The addition of new personnel to the teams is suggested by parachuting ice blocks into tree tops. The ice melts, leaving a parachute and harness. Occasionally a "pseudo agent," i.e. a North Vietnamese soldier who wants badly to get back to North Vietnam is recruited from among North Vietnamese army prisoners and trained a few days. He is dropped as a "reinforcement" to a notional team. Traveling in the aircraft with him are Vietnamese he assumes to be reinforcements for other teams. The fact that actual in-place teams have been captured or "doubled" by the North Vietnamese probably gives an aura of credibility to these notional operations.
Use of Ralliers and Prisoners.
While ralliers and prisoners are recruited in the hope that some will be useful intelligence agents, it is recognized that others will reveal their assigned mission as soon as they are returned to Viet Minh controlled area or to North Vietnam. Prisoners who are judged to be suitable are collected from detention facilities as soon as possible after capture and indoctrinated on South Vietnamese prosperity and freedom for two weeks. They are then given one week of agent training and infiltrated into Viet Minh controlled territory in South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, or into North Vietnam./2/ They are charged with collecting intelligence and inducing defection. Those who prove unsuitable during the orientation or training periods are returned to regular detention facilities to spread purposely revealed false project information to other detainees for eventual transmission to North Vietnamese intelligence analysts.
/2/In an undated memorandum to Trueheart, Stuart discussed plans by the Special Operations Group to infiltrate defectors into the North Vietnamese city of Vinh to obtain information on NVA bases, equipment, and personnel operating there. (Ibid.)
Redemption Coupons.
Leaflets containing a coupon redeemable for cash after hostilities are over are distributed in North Vietnam through returned junk captives, pinpoint air drops or Strata teams. The leaflet thanks the bearer for supporting the Sacred Sword Patriotic League, a notional movement which purportedly operates both the black and white radios beamed to North Vietnam.
Incrimination of NVN Officials.
Although not yet begun, an SOG plan exists to divert North Vietnamese security agency efforts to the detection and interrogation of North Vietnamese officials suspected of traffic with the South. Letters with easily detected secret writing and messages which can be deciphered easily will be sent to selected North Vietnamese officials. Uncooperative junk captives will be put ashore far from home with secret messages concealed in their newly provided clothing.
Rube Goldberg Devices.
Another nascent plan involves the air-dropping of obsolete beacons, weather sensors, electronic devices made of unrelated parts soldered together, apparent agent equipment, empty crates with appropriate markings, etc. It is expected that North Vietnamese intelligence agencies will soon conclude that these devices are decoys but will feel that they cannot be ignored.
49. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]. Secret; Harvan. Prepared by Rostow. In an attached covering memorandum transmitting this memorandum to the President, October 21, Rostow wrote: "Herewith memoranda for the record on your talks with Harriman (September 17) and with Vance (October 3). Also attached are the outgoing and incoming cables which confirm Harriman-Vance support for a bombing resumption if 'our understandings' are violated. You will note that I included the very sensitive reference to the Dobrynin communication of September 16. This means, of course, that these memoranda for the record should be handled with the highest security." The notation "ps" on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw the attached memoranda.
Meeting with Ambassador Vance, October 3, 1968, 9:00-10:30 a.m.
Ambassador Vance reported to the President in his bedroom on the course of the negotiations in Paris./2/
/2/The President met with Vance over breakfast in his bedroom from 8:30 a.m. to 10:10 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
The President asked Amb. Vance if he was optimistic. He said he was. The President asked him for his reasons, and also put the same question to Mr. Rostow. They both suggested to the President that it was possible that Hanoi regarded itself in a military position and a political position vis-à-vis the government in Saigon in which its bargaining power was diminishing. Whatever the advantages might be in waiting for a new Administration on January 20, they might assess their problem as one in which the military situation was likely to deteriorate over coming months; the ARVN would expand, improve its equipment, and increase its confidence; and the Thieu government would gain in stability, acceptability, and legitimacy. Therefore, it was possible they might wish to settle the war sooner rather than later. The President expressed some skepticism. He then laid out his position under three headings:
--there must be private understanding of GVN participation in the negotiations after a bombing cessation;
--Hanoi must understand that the DMZ must not be violated;
--Hanoi must understand that the cities must not be attacked.
As with Amb. Harriman, the President said to Amb. Vance that it would be essential that the whole government be very close together and agreed on the resumption of bombing if these understandings were violated. Amb. Vance, without hesitation, indicated his agreement with this position. (See attached cables for confirmation of Harriman-Vance positions on resumption of bombing communicated to the President.)/3/
/3/See Document 45. In an undated letter to Ball, Harriman wrote: "Dear George, I am convinced that we can work out a situation which in my judgement would justify the risk of a San Antonio formula cessation of the bombing before the end of this month. This could have been done in latter part of July or early August but I believe we are somewhat better off militarily & psychologically in Vietnam now than then. The third wave attacks have failed & NVA/VC have suffered heavy losses. This will be our last chance before the election and I feel action now is essential to give Hubert a fighting chance. I hope you will give Cy enough time to fill you in on things here & get agreement on how we can cooperate. I am greatly disappointed to have missed you--send me any message through Cy." He added a postscript: "We here all agree that if NVN 'takes advantage' President would have wide support for bombing again. I would certainly recommend it." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips and Missions, Paris Peace Talks, 1968, Chronological File, Dec. 1968-Jan. 1969)
The President then suggested that Amb. Vance and Mr. Rostow go to Mr. Rostow's office and make sure the position as outlined by the President was perfectly clear between them.
W
50. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
October 3, 1968, 10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 3, 1968, 10:15 a.m., Tape F6810.02, PNO 4-5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Rusk called from New York, where he was attending the UN General Assembly. The President was in Washington. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Dean? Dean--
Rusk: Yes. Good morning, Mr. President.
President: I'm rather distressed at the papers this morning. I don't guess you've seen the Washington papers?
Rusk: No, I haven't.
President: But Kraft/2/ says that this whole thing was worked out--Ball and Harriman--Ball went over and saw Harriman, and really that Ball and Harriman wrote the speech for Humphrey/3/ and then that Nixon fell into a trap by saying that they laid for him--saying it hurt the negotiations. So Averell started commenting on the speech and saying it didn't hurt the negotiations, and now Nixon has been trapped and Humphrey is really--
/2/Joseph Kraft, syndicated columnist.
/3/See Document 40.
Rusk: Did Averell comment publicly on the speech?
President: Yes, yes. He's a damned fool. He's been playing politics, I found out from Cy, he didn't want to tell it, and I was just shocked to death. And I asked him, I said, "Did anybody discuss this speech with you all?" And he choked and hung up. And I said, "Were you consulted about this speech?" And he said, "Yes, sir." And I said, "Who consulted you?" And he said, "George Ball."
Rusk: For heaven's sake.
President: And so that just ruins it for the other side, when that comes out, in my judgment. Then, he's got a new proposal. I'm sending him back up there to get him away from these columnists and out of this town--so you can talk to him if you want to.
Rusk: All right.
President: Don't think it's essential but you'll probably want to give him a ring sometime on the weekend, whenever you can.
Rusk: He's coming to New York?
President: Yes. I don't think it's necessary you come down here until you find out more than you know.
Rusk: All right.
President: But--here's what Kraft said: "The Vietnam speech had a carefully prepared public build-up. A major speech was announced by the Vice President three days in advance. Leading advisers Under Secretary Ball and Postmaster General O'Brien were on hand. The text itself, while not altogether clear, was artfully wrought. The Vice President moved toward a total halt of the bombing of North Vietnam in a way that placed his position far in advance to that laid down in the most recent statements by the President and Secretary of State Rusk. The speech was hardly over before Mr. Ball was pointing out to various press people how the Vice President stands different from the current posture of the administration. At the same time, a halt in the bombing was made conditional in a way that protects the Vice President against the one man whose public disapproval he fears. That man is the chief Paris negotiator, Averell Harriman, whose views had been recently sounded by Mr. Ball. As to organizing a reaction, Senator Kennedy's chief aide David Berg was briefed in advance on the speech by Van Dyke and Ira Kapenstein,/4/ O'Brien's man. Kennedy followed the speech with an immediate telegrammed approval. Senator McCarthy was given an advance by [Thomas] Finney, a Washington lawyer, formerly top hand of McCarthy. So the Senator has not said anything because he is committed to remaining neutral while reporting the World Series, but the way is open to him to express approval of the Vice President's advance position. Lastly, a trap was prepared for Nixon. It was expected the Republican candidate would reply to the Vice President by raising the question as to whether Humphrey's advance toward the total cessation of the bombing would not adversely affect the Paris negotiations. Mr. Nixon did as expected. Arrangements were immediately made for Ambassador Harriman to deny the Nixon insinuation. All this does not mean, of course, that the Vietnam speech was a major triumph. On the contrary, the Vice President is still way behind, but he is beginning to show the qualities that could make the campaign a serious contest. And if he keeps it up, he begins to focus sharply on the issues" and so forth.
/4/Theodore Van Dyke, speechwriter for the Humphrey campaign, and Ira Kapenstein, executive assistant to the Democratic National Chairman.
Now, Evans and Novak/6/ has got the same Ball briefing apparently. "Ball has complained bitterly to close friends about what he regards as a stiffening with Johnson on the question of the bombing. He is convinced that this stiffening has compromised the negotiating team in Paris. Specifically, Ball has said that the President's actions in Honolulu wrecked the careful diplomatic probe by Harriman, the President's chief agent. Although precise details are confidential, there is reason to believe that a break in the Paris talks was imminent before Johnson went to Honolulu. These culminated in an extraordinary hour and a quarter tete-ˆ-tete between the two heads of state. If there was a memorandum of conversation of this long and private talk, it is a closely guarded document./6/ In Washington, the details of the long talk are known only by very few of the President's most intimate advisers. Thus, the agreements made by Johnson in return for concessions by Thieu are still a state secret. But Ball and other members of the President's official family believe the conversations contained certain agreements that convinced the Communists in Hanoi that the United States was not bargaining in good faith. Accordingly, the careful diplomatic initiative nurtured by Harriman and his aides in Paris was pulled up by the roots. Partly as a result of this, Ball has confided to intimates that Humphrey was placed in an intolerable political bind. Further, this bind was closed tighter by Johnson's repeated contradictions of Humphrey whenever the Vice President claimed to see some glimmer of light. That then is the background of Ball's much-criticized decision to desert the United Nations. Only one day after his confirmation by the Senate, Ball's first job for Humphrey was to help write his Vietnam speech so as to minimize charges Humphrey is selling out the Paris negotiations. Ball first talked with Humphrey about this speech two days before he quit the United Nations. He spent much of last weekend conferring with Humphrey on the West Coast. He then returned with Van Dyke and O'Brien. He was in fact indispensable as Humphrey spelled out the difference between his position and Johnson's. And while the President demands specific de-escalation or a quid pro quo from Hanoi as a condition to stopping the bombing, Humphrey is willing to assume good faith without Hanoi spelling out a quid pro quo. Although the difference is a major one in the careful diplomatic language of Paris, the immediate political reaction at home to Humphrey's speech raises doubts whether he went far enough to accomplish its purpose to persuade the McCarthyites to work for Humphrey. As Humphrey's newest adviser, in short, it is possible Ball may soon yearn for the peace and quiet of the United Nations."
/6/Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, syndicated columnists.
/6/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Documents 303 and 304.
Then Murrey Marder's/7/ got another story, "HHH Parried the Price for the Bombing Halt." And he says that they told him over there--Harriman and company--how they feel and they're much softer than we are. Now, then, that's very bad. What's really bad, though, that I just can't justify at all 'cause they're in politics, I wouldn't comment on it, but here's a headline, "Humphrey Didn't Impair Talks, Harriman Says." "Chief negotiator Harriman sees no basis for thinking Humphrey's Vietnam speech could jeopardize the peace talks here, a spokesman said today. Harriman authorized the spokesman to disclose this position and thus appeared to be rebutting indirectly the criticism of Humphrey's speech by Nixon. Today at the 24th session of the deadlocked talks, Harriman's counterpart said," and they quote him, "with regard to Mr. Nixon, the warlike presidential candidate." Wait a minute now. "Harriman's comments surfaced when U.S. delegation spokesman Harold Kaplan was asked at his briefing whether the American negotiators had any feelings along those lines, referring to remarks by Nixon and sharper criticism by Tower. 'No,' Kaplan replied, 'I don't think there is,' but then insisted they should not be taken as a comment on Humphrey's speech. Kaplan said he did not 'discuss the general notion with Governor Harriman and he specifically authorized me to say that he sees no basis for the speech having any adverse effect on our negotiations.' Harriman, himself a one-time Democratic governor, told a newsman earlier, 'We're engaged in negotiations and in that capacity I'm taking no part in the campaign.'" So forth and so forth. I told Cy there's no use saying you're taking part in the campaign and then start interpreting one man's speech and then answering another man. You'd better just say you're taking no part, period. I also gave him a pretty good lecture about the leaks and I find out that Ball has been over there and talking to him and they've been being martyrs to Ball. And Ball, that's when he decided to quit after he'd had conversations over there. So I told Cy that I just didn't think negotiators ought to be taking such wide latitude. They ought to carry out their President's--
/7/Murrey Marder, reporter for the Washington Post.
Rusk: The truth is, Mr. President, that the combination of these stories--I haven't seen them, the ones you've talked about, I'll get them later in the day--but the combinations of these stories will hurt our negotiations.
President: Of course, it hurts it. It'd be hell. You take it from me. I'm not a diplomat, you've been in on Southeast Asia for 25 years, but they're not going to do anything until after the election. That's period. If Humphrey's elected, they're in clover. If he's not elected, then they can look and see what they want to do between me and Nixon. So you can just forget everything until then, in my judgment. Now, and I think it's done that, I think Humphrey's fuzzy speech saying--and having Ball background everybody--that it did change. And don't I think there's any question but what this agreement between our negotiators and Ball and the Pentagon--they've been talking behind our back, that's clear from my discussions here. And now they've all settled on this one Clark Clifford pitch the other day, if you saw it. It's a Ball pitch. Ball knew about it but Ball just said, well, he thought he'd be a little more peaceful than Clifford, you know, he just said he wouldn't require anything--Clifford requires the GVN--and then they kind of laugh off the other. That is the Harriman-Ball-Pentagon approach now that I called about from down in Texas. They're working that end and the rest goes on assumptions. So now Cy has got a proposal this morning--he'll be calling you about it in a moment. His proposal is that you say to your friend--and Rostow made a mistake indicating that your friend had said something to you, and I didn't acknowledge it, I just didn't say a word, I didn't discuss any of your conversations with Cy with Gromyko because I know he's got to talk to Harriman, and Harriman is like a hydrant--but Cy is going to say to you that he thinks you ought to say to Gromyko, and he's doing this with Averell's approval, that the real block to stopping the bombing is the GVN thing, that if they agree, the GVN, that is the one thing we need. I said, "Okay, what do we do about the DMZ and what do we do about the cities?" "Well, we assume that, and we tell them that we have to go back if they did that." I said, "Well, I don't buy that, but you can tell Rusk that and I'd be willing to be guided by his putting those assumptions a little stronger than you put them. I don't want to have any doubt that in effect they're agreeing to the three if they agree to one." I don't think they'll do a damn thing until November, but for the purpose of satisfying Cy's vanity, that's something I think you ought to explore.
Rusk: Yes. Well, I've wondered, Mr. President, I've thought about it, I thought it--the conversation of last night/8/--and maybe it might be well, if you think well enough for me to say to Gromyko, "Now look, you should be clear in your own mind that these three things are of fundamental importance. One of them has to be a matter of a political agreement--that's the GVN. The others are facts of life that will be determined by events on the ground. Now we can understand that you may not yourselves go to Hanoi on these factual points. But if you can get them to move on the GVN, we will take up directly with them the question of the DMZ and the cities and you yourselves don't have to emphasize that particular point. But you should be clear in your own minds so that we don't mislead you about what is our view."
/8/See Document 47.
President: That's right. And then I'd further say to him that you just think that you ought to know, tell him the political system--he's got pretty good intelligence on it--but you think you ought to tell him that no President can survive 48 hours if they're moving in the DMZ--
Rusk: Told him last night, and I also told him--
President: Or shelling the cities.
Rusk: He asked me about the election. I said, "One thing you should be aware of is that there is a strong conservative movement in this country now and that anybody who thinks the ultra-liberals are getting anywhere in this election can think twice about it because when you put together the Nixon and Wallace vote it means that the American people are fed up with some of the fooling around here by some of these demonstrators and things like that, and the demonstrators are not speaking for the American people. Just look at the polls."
President: That's right. Now, the second thing is--Averell's thought is--you've got Cy's clearly, haven't you?
Rusk: Yes, sir.
President: The GVN will do the job. It'll stop the bombing--it is the chief thing. Then we'll assume on the cities and the DMZ, and we'll retaliate if they violate either, promptly. Now I don't think he would, I think he'd be out of town and not answer the phone, but any way, that's what they say. Second thing is Averell--Averell thinks that this might be the way to do it: Tell them Wednesday we're going to stop Sunday. Stop Sunday and meet them Monday. Tell them we want the GVN in here Tuesday. If they don't come Tuesday, then we can act. That's Averell's point. Now, what I think you ought to do with Cy, just as insurance, I think you ought to make clear to him that you think the real key is the GVN and you've got to get locked on tight. Now he agrees with that. Tell him that they ought to quit putting out this stuff, that there's a difference between us, that this is awfully weak for the country and it helps the Communists. That's the first thing. The second thing you say, that Cy, I don't want to mislead you, and you've got to know what the position is, what the government's is. Number one--the President thinks when this speech is made, we're not going to do anything until November. Now if we can, that's good, but that's his judgment. He thinks that you've got to wait until the election now to see. If Humphrey is elected, they can move; if he's not elected, they'll decide whether they want to move on the President's terms or wait for Nixon--probably move on the President's terms, but he thinks that. Now the second thing is, you might as well know here and now, and you and Averell better be signed on, that you're not talking about one thing--you're talking about three. And if you get an agreement on one--he's got to think, and you've got to make him think that he's got to believe that your judgment is sound--that the other two are in effect agreed because if they're not agreed in 24 hours, you're going to get some action.
Rusk: Yes.
President: So you ought to know and carry out and anticipate its consequences.
Rusk: Right.
President: Now, Walt will call you, but you'll be prepared and you don't need to tell him I've talked to you.
Rusk: All right.
President: He's over with Cy now. But if I were you, I'd certainly get the three articles--Murrey Marder, Joe Kraft, Rowland Evans--and I believe that you ought to talk to Ball sometime in the next day or two. Don't tell him what's going on with Gromyko, but just tell him that you're exploring this thing and just say that you're awfully disturbed that we're going to get some criticism of the Republicans about Harriman commenting and about Harriman in effect writing the speech. You know, they're putting it out now that Harriman wrote the second paragraph so that he could defend it.
Rusk: Yes. I think, well, I think that Cy ought to come clean with us in terms of exactly what happened.
President: You'd better. I think you better just be a prosecuting attorney when you sit down with him. Just say, "Now, I'm Secretary of State here, and I've stayed religiously out of politics, and what I've said to one I've said to the other, but I'm very concerned that when Dirksen is coming in demanding to see Johnson this morning, I've got to know--when did Ball come in? What did he say? Who talked to him?" He says he came over, he talked to Averell, he talked to him and he talked to him about his resignation. He asked for their advice. He counseled them. That's the way to put it. Then I said, "Well, did he discuss this speech with you?" He didn't say he did on the trip. "No," I said, "was this speech discussed with you?" And he hesitated and he flushed and he just--he honestly didn't know what to say. He had to make up his mind whether he was going to lie or not. He decided, of course, he wouldn't. So he came back and said, "Yes, yes, we knew about the speech." I said, "Who discussed it with you?" He said, "I--I don't remember now."
Rusk: [Laughter]
President: I said, "Now Cy, an important speech like that, and you're telling me you don't remember?" I just kind of laughed at him [and] said, "You're kidding." And he said, "Well, George Ball."
Rusk: [Laughter]
President: That's pathetic. But I think you'd better go over that with him. Then I think you'd better furthermore say there are two things; we'd better tighten up our operation; that you're in charge of it. One is our relations with the press showing the division between them and us--that's number one. Number two--if they're going to be talking to any of these people, just please refer the ball to the State Department, and just anybody else, Nixon, Humphrey, or Ball, or I don't know, Ellsworth--I'd guess that if Ball can do it for Humphrey, Ellsworth has a right to do it for Nixon, hasn't he?
Rusk: Yes. Well, I'll call you again as soon as I know when my appointment with Gromyko is.
President: Thank you. But you talk to Cy.
Rusk: Yes, sir.
51. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
October 6, 1968, 10:49 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 6, 1968, 10:49 p.m., Tape F6810.02, PNO 6-7. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Rusk called from New York, where he was attending the UN General Assembly. The President was in Washington. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: [Reading a statement by Kaplan] "I discussed the general notion with Governor Harriman and he specifically authorized me to say that he sees no basis"--
Rusk: His man called, Ellsworth called, and asked if Mr. Nixon could see me tomorrow, and I said my only chance was to drop by to see him between a breakfast I have [and the] swearing in of our mission to the General Assembly. So that'll mean probably about 30 minutes or something like that. What I did not know until just a few moments ago was that the message was that if he was not able to see me in New York, he would hope very much to have a chance to see you. So we have it open to transfer this down to you, if you want to.
President: Yes. I think that's what I would do because I think we're in serious trouble. I don't know what we're going to do about it. I'm worried--I want to talk to you. But our whole outfit is deep in this political thing, and I think if we don't recall Averell, we've got to find some explanation to give to him. Ball sent a man/2/ over there to counsel with Averell and Averell was part of this whole ploy. And I don't think we can have people working for us that are writing campaign speeches and getting themselves involved with private citizens and breaking out to the nation speeches that neither the Secretary of State nor the President know anything about.
/2/George Fitzgibbon of Lehman Brothers.
Rusk: Yes. I wonder if that doesn't mean we should get Averell to come back out?
President: I rather think so.
Rusk: Yes.
President: Yes, I rather think so. What I'm going to do is to go to Honolulu. I hope we can get out Wednesday/3/ night or Thursday and spend some time with Abrams and try to figure out with him what his situation is and really what he thinks about all these proposals and what he thinks the next 3 months hold for him, what he can do about it. Then I want to get Bunker's judgment too. Then I thought I'd just ask Bunker to go on over there. And while they're two old men, I think he might be a little bit realistic with Averell by pointing out the problems that they have and what would happen if the GVN were ignored and how the other two matters are just facts of life--if they start bombing the cities or if they use the DMZ--and see what came out of just 2 or 3 days of bringing them up-to-date on South Vietnam. If at the end of that period if we have any more static here, I think we just might ask Averell to come back. I think it's just another MacArthur deal. I think it's terrible that he would do a thing like this. I'm told that he felt he thought he just had such an obligation to the Democratic Party that nominated him for governor. Well, hell, I've been in the Democratic Party longer than he has, and I don't feel an obligation to any party above my country and I don't think he ought to be playing politics as a negotiator.
/3/October 9.
Rusk: And certainly not without our knowledge.
President: And certainly not without reporting it. And I think it's a dirty trick that George Ball is not to tell us what he's done. He was talking to me all the time and was sending his men across the ocean to talk to our people. And it's all going to turn up. Nixon is going to expose it all and I think we're going to look pretty bad if we're not careful--appearing to be neutral and saying that we don't want to get political and the Secretary of State is not going to make any political observations, the President wants him to speak with one voice beyond the water's edge, and all the time we're conniving around here with a speech trying to trap somebody. And the very day it happens, Joe Kraft tells it all. They've leaked it to him. Now I don't know, I thought maybe--I'm surprised that they haven't denied either the Murrey Marder story or the Hedrick Smith/4/ story. I asked about it today and Cy said that he had told State Department yesterday. They said you were denying it very strong and he had told them again to deny it. But I'm told when they got any of them at Camp David to deny it, but I'm told that when I got into Camp David tonight, they just blew it up.
/4/Reporters Joseph Kraft of the Chicago Daily News, Murrey Marder of the Washington Post, and Hedrick Smith of The New York Times.
Rusk: Well, I saw a statement that Cy made--now, I didn't see it on the ticker, have to double-check--but that statement ought to be available to the press.
President: Well, Cy, according to what I'm told, thought it was outrageous. First, he told Walt Rostow that he was in terrible shape because he worked for one man and he was loyal to the President and he just didn't think these things ought to be going on this way. Did he tell you that?
Rusk: He made it very clear. He didn't say that in so many words, but he was very troubled about the whole business.
President: Well I just asked him outright. I said, "Did you know about this speech?" He said, "Yes." I said, "How did you know about it?" "Well," he said, "I got it from one of Ball's associates." And I said, "Were you consulted?" He said, "Yes." I said, "By a fellow who lives there in Paris?" "No," he said. "By a fellow they sent over." Now what do you think we ought to do in a thing like that? I had written this letter and I told them to check it with you because I had a little doubt, but I thought it might bust up things some. But--
Rusk: Yes, I think probably it's a thing that ought to be said direct, personally, rather than in a communication.
President: You see, he was here last week, Averell, and he didn't mention any differences to me or didn't make any new recommendations.
Rusk: Nor did he to me.
President: And Cy has been here and he hasn't done it. So I don't know what the hell they're doing recommending to Hedrick Smith and Murrey Marder without talking to us. I told Cy to talk to you after this meeting tonight--talk to you tomorrow.
Rusk: I'm not sure but that some of this tipping off to people like Murrey Marder might come from the kind of people who might have given Howard K. Smith/6/ certain papers and withheld others. And I know, I think, some of that stuff could have come out of Washington.
/6/Howard K. Smith, reporter and commentator for ABC News television.
President: Well, I don't know, though. Its headed "Paris" and--
Rusk: That's the Smith story, isn't it?
President: Yes, and I don't know what they know. I haven't been seeing any cables along that line. He wrote you a letter.
Rusk: Yeah, yeah.
President: But I don't believe--have they ever recommended that we just stop bombing per se, do nothing without anything else?
Rusk: No, no.
President: Doesn't everybody agree the Government of Vietnam ought to be in?
Rusk: I think everybody, including Clark Clifford, Cy Vance, and Averell Harriman, agree that this is utterly fundamental, and that when Averell left here he also agreed to the other two points as fundamental.
President: Well, you've had more experience than I have with these diplomats. I don't know what to do with them. But I thought a negotiator followed his instructions and the first instruction I gave him was to stay out of politics.
Rusk: Yeah, yeah. Well, let's see now, Mr. President.
President: You think about it and tell me what you think we ought to do.
Rusk: I think I would just get Averell back here after the next Wednesday meeting or toward the end of the week, get him back here when you get back from Honolulu.
President: Well, you might tell Cy that tomorrow. I think Cy ought to come down here before he leaves and maybe see me. And I think he ought to have a press conference. And I think he ought to just flatly say that Harriman has been back here but he hasn't made any new recommendations. Our position is basically what it has been, and that he's back and he hasn't brought any recommendations, and that these two stories are just without any foundation, and that he doesn't want Hanoi to get the conception that they're accurate because if they believed them, it would affect--and nobody can really--I think we ought to say when they say, "Does this affect the peace negotiations?" I think we ought to say, "God only knows what affects Hanoi?" I don't know what affects them. I don't know whether it affects them or not. I know if I were in their place. I think the simple question is this, Dean: if I were Hanoi, I'd say, "Can I get a better deal out of Humphrey than I can Johnson?"
Rusk: Um-hmm.
President: How would you answer that question?
Rusk: Well, if I were listening to the backgrounding some of the people around Humphrey have been giving, I'd think maybe I could.
President: Or just anything. I just think it's pretty evident from everything you see, read, hear, who supports him, folks line up with him. I just think you're bound to. Well now, if they do, that's bound to affect it, isn't it?
Rusk: I think it is.
President: Why would you pay 10 million [dollars] for something you could buy for 5 million 3 weeks from now? And I'm afraid that's what Nixon wants to do. I'm afraid we're going to get him to demagoguing and both of them will be here before it's over with. And I think this is just a part of the Kosygin letter he wrote me--he had "reason to believe"--and then India, then the Mansfield speech, then the Ogden Reid group, then the Javits and Cooper and Curtis./6/ And now, it culminates in my negotiators saying it, everybody but me and you and Rostow, according to him. Now I think we'd better find out from our folks if this is true. I understood that Nick Katzenbach felt very strongly that in this little committee he meets with--
/6/Senator Mike Mansfield, Representative Ogden Reid, and Senators Jacob Javits, John Sherman Cooper, and Carl Curtis.
Rusk: On these three points--he never wavered on these three points.
President: All right. Doesn't Bill Bundy feel the same way?
Rusk: Yes, he does.
President: That's what Walt tells me. Well, then, who in the hell are they talking about?
Rusk: I would be--
President: The Joint Chiefs are certainly with us. Bunker is certainly with us. Abrams is with us. I don't know who they're talking about. Could they be talking about some of the civilians at Defense?
Rusk: It's possible. I don't know. I don't know them. Averell may be trying to make his contribution to the campaign at this point in his own way. I just don't know the facts about that. But I'd be surprised if he went as far as some of these stories because, pretty generally, he's been a pretty loyal fellow.
President: Yes. But I gather from both Jorden and Cy that they've been troubled by these conversations with the press.
Rusk: Maybe, maybe Cy has made a contribution to this?
President: I would expect so. All the time. Does he have any cables in on it from time to time?
Rusk: No. He wrote me a little private note here sometime ago enclosing an editorial from The New York Times. And I wrote him back and said, "Well, just tell me what you think Hanoi ought to do to make peace," and I haven't heard from him again.
President: What was the editorial from The Times?
Rusk: That was the one--
President: Stop bombing?
Rusk: Yes, that was the one. About a month ago. But I haven't heard from him again. Cy tells me he's not taking part in the action of discussions very much.
President: Pardon me?
Rusk: Cy tells me he isn't taking part in the action of the discussions much.
President: He oughtn't to be. I'd tell Cy that he ought to be very cautious about that because we've got the Bill Moyers running back and forth, you know.
Rusk: Well now, on two points on this, Mr. President. Suppose I can get ahold of Mr. Nixon and suggest that he transfer this from me to you--
President: That's right. Just tell him you're going to be--just tell him that you've talked to me and I'll be here and I'll be delighted to see him and talk to him about it, and that if it's necessary, you'll join him anytime later, but to just come on here anytime he wants to in the early part of the week.
Rusk: All right. Now, secondly, I have a heck of a problem if I myself leave the latter part of next week. I've got Stewart and Hasluck and Holyoake,/7/ and two other Foreign Ministers that are all landing on me in Washington the end of next week. How essentially do you think it necessary for me to go to Honolulu with you?
/7/British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, Australian External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck, and New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake.
President: Well, I'd hate not to have you. Can we--I'm getting rid of most of those folks by Wednesday.
Rusk: I know you are, and it's a good idea, but it's another problem for me to do the same.
President: Well, I'll give you my appointments. You just--Holyoake is going to be here, you know, Wednesday, and we're having the dinner and so forth.
Rusk: He and Hasluck had insisted on a so-called meeting the next day, and Michael Stewart is coming down. Debré is going to be in town for 3 days./8/
/8/French Foreign Minister Michel Debré.
President: Well, I wouldn't stay here for 3 days with them. I'd just tell them that you'll see them Wednesday or Thursday, if we want to stay Thursday. I was hoping we'd get out Wednesday. We've got to attempt to. You've got elections on the 5th and I don't think these guys are going to contribute much to it. But I think that what we do is going to be pretty damned important, and I'd hate to, with Clifford in Europe, to go just alone, although I will, but I'd hate to do it on the grounds that you're staying here to see Holyoake, and I'd just arrange those appointments where you can spend an hour with them, four of them for four hours, on Wednesday, if you have to, Wednesday evening or Thursday. I'm going to try to get rid of Holyoake Wednesday and spend all the time talking about meat imports.
Rusk: If you go to Honolulu, when would you announce it?
President: I thought I'd do it in the morning. I thought we'd start preparing early in the morning.
Rusk: Because as soon as it's announced, then I would have a basis on which I could talk to them about rearranging.
President: I think we ought to tomorrow, and I would say to them along sometime Thursday on, "The reason I want to do this, I want to see these things that we have and talk to Abrams and see what he really thinks is happening there and what he can do and how far he can go without any dangers, so if we're confronted with anything, why we can make a decision based on not killing Americans, period. That's about that simple. I would like for Bunker to go over there because if we recall Averell, we might want Bunker to spend some more time there.
Rusk: Well, if you make the announcement.
President: And I'm not going to tolerate Averell one more week of these stories, whether they're coming out of him or they're not, if he doesn't deny them. I'm amazed that he hasn't denied them now, and I think you ought to be sure to tell Vance in the morning that he ought to come on down here and have a press conference and deny it himself. I don't know, they say your public affairs people over there stopped him--he said he wanted to yesterday and he wanted to again today, and they told him no, not to do it.
Rusk: Let me check and see what happened on that.
President: What happened tonight?/9/
/9/Reference is to a discussion between Rusk and Gromyko earlier that evening. The memorandum of this conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Document 310.
Rusk: I urged my man to concentrate on that one point and said that we would concentrate on the other two in direct contacts in Paris. He didn't give me any answer on it. We agreed that this special channel ought to be kept open, but I think he was thinking about it. But I left him under no illusion that in some combination we've got to have a legion of confidence on all three points, and if they were willing to work on the one point, we'd work on the others in our own way.
President: You mean, on the big one, the one that Clifford--
Rusk: That's right.
President: Oh, yeah.
Rusk: He didn't give me a categorical answer, but I had the impression he was at least interested in the problem. On the Middle East, I think we made a little headway on that in terms of supporting Jarring/10/ on a number of points--refugees, opening of the [Suez] Canal--and things like that. He asked me what the reaction was about a meeting. I said that I couldn't give him an answer on that, that we'd be in further touch with him through the same channel, but there are obviously some complications in our situation. And I hit him very directly on Berlin, and he gave me a categorical assurance on Berlin, for whatever that's worth, so that I think we chopped a little wood but we didn't make peace. Well now, if you announce this trip to Honolulu, Mr. President, I think that if you could not announce it at the same time that I'm going with you--that is, on the first announcement--then I'm going to try to touch base with these Foreign Ministers and we'll rearrange things.
/10/UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring.
President: All right. Now, what are your dates with them--Thursday, Friday?
Rusk: Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. In other words, I'd have to do a good deal of juggling around, so I'll get busy on that right away.
President: Well now, of course, I'll have to go out to Bunker. What time is it out there now--10 or 11 in the morning?
Rusk: Yes, sir.
President: I'll get Walt to talk to him and see what suits their pleasure. Okay.
Rusk: All right. Fine.
52. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
October 7, 1968, 10:02 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 7, 1968, 10:02 a.m., Tape F6810.02, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Rusk called from New York, where he was attending the UN General Assembly. The President was in Washington. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Rusk: [Nixon] asked about the Paris talks and in particular these stories, and I knocked him down very hard and told him that Vance and Harriman had not recommended that we stop the bombing, and I went over again what we expect from the other side to stop the bombing and how important it was to get the South Vietnamese to the conference table. He seemed to agree with all of that. He then spoke rather thoroughly about Vietnam. He said that he thought the decision to make a fight for it was the right decision; that he thought we had had a bad deal on the public support for that basic decision, which he thought was right. He thought it was very important that we come out of that situation with something we could live with even if it takes another year or two. He was really quite sober and thoughtful about the discussion of it./2/ I touched on two or three other things. [Omitted here is brief description of Rusk's discussion with Nixon on Czechoslovakia and NATO.] But on the whole he did not get into any matters of real suspicion or things of that sort. He seemed to be kind of relaxed about his relations with you and me on the kind of briefings he's been getting.
/2/Rusk met with Nixon that morning in New York. No other record of the meeting has been found. See also Document 53.
President: That's real comforting. That's comforting. I was real concerned that he might be wobbling like our other friends had.
Rusk: Well, I saw no evidence of it today. Now, I don't know what he is going to say in his speech in the next 2 weeks. But today he could not have been more solid and wanted to be helpful on Vietnam and said he thought after the election the President-elect would want to make himself available to you so that you could do everything that you could to get this thing over with on a tolerable basis. But we had to have a tolerable basis or the whole situation in the Pacific would roll up and then we would have a terrible situation. So I think you'll find him reasonably relaxed on it and just wanted to be informed and wanted to know that there was no trickiness around the corner in connection with these stories he has been hearing about. And we talked a little about The New York Times. I think he will agree with you on The New York Times.
President: You didn't say anything about going to Honolulu?
Rusk: No, I didn't. I thought I better not.
President: Now, have you looked at your schedule--what the worst days are for you?
Rusk: Well, now there--I would have great trouble in getting away before Thursday night. What you might consider, Mr. President, because I don't want to pay too heavy a cost in our relations with these people--
President: Sure, sure.
Rusk: If you go out on Thursday and have your military discussions on Thursday/3/ and let me come out on Friday and let me be there for political discussions, that might be one way to do it.
/3/October 10.
President: All right.
Rusk: That would mean I would have to reschedule Mr. Debré of France in my schedule. But I think that would be possible, and then I could take care of all of these others and you would have a day of military discussions with Abrams and then let me join you for the political side of it./4/
/4/The President did not attend the proposed weekend meeting with Abrams, Bunker, and McCain in Honolulu, traveling instead to his Texas Ranch, where he stayed October 11-13. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
President: You don't think, then, that I'll have any problems with these folks if, say, I leave here Wednesday night or Thursday?
Rusk: I don't think so. I think that as soon as you announce you're going we'll just say this has completely changed your schedule and you'll have to cancel other appointments.
President: We haven't, I don't think, firmed up that.
Rusk: I think I can explain that all right.
President: Well, then, we might conclude that you will come out Friday. You don't know when Clark's coming back, do you?
Rusk: Well, let's see. He might be getting back about that time. We can check that or Walt can check it. I think he might be getting back about that time.
President: Okay.
Rusk: All right. Thank you.
53. Editorial Note
At 5:11 p.m. on October 7, 1968, President Johnson received a telephone call from Republican Presidential candidate Richard Nixon. Nixon reported his positive reaction to a personal briefing that morning by Secretary Rusk. Both Nixon and the President then moved into a wider discussion of the peace negotiations in Paris, including the domestic public reaction to the conditions for a full bombing cessation. The following is a transcript prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian of a portion of this conversation:
President: Now our basis is this, and I will tell you when it is otherwise. Our basis is three-fold. One, they must agree to recognize the GVN. We cannot take a chance on losing this million-man army. They've got to let them come in on any talks that we have on subjects that matter. They've not agreed to that yet. They also have got to recognize the facts of life that we could not, if we stopped the bombing, carry out that stoppage very long if they did either of two things--if they shelled the cities or if they had mass infiltration. And we have said that to them constantly. Now, we don't know what they are going to do. They've given us no indication. We've said that to the Russians. It is right at a stalemate now. My judgment is that it'll stay that way until election unless they're hurting worse than we think they are, and we think they're hurting pretty bad. I rather think that before long I'll be seeing Bunker and Abrams and will be brought up-to-date and I will keep you informed.
Nixon: Well, the one thing I want to say is this, Mr. President. My statements will continue to be, I hope, responsible. The only reason that I--when I was talking to the Secretary this morning--you know, the goddamn New York Times, they had three dopey stories in there. Rusk told me that they were all fabrications. I don't know what to believe anymore, you know.
President: Well, the Vance story was, certainly. I don't know what the others are referring to, but--
Nixon: Well, the others involved the fact that both Harriman and Vance were pushing for a bombing pause. He said that that is not true--that Vance had been rushed back here.
President: Well, Dick, I think this is true. I think this is true. I think everybody is pushing for a bombing pause. I think you are. I think I am. I think everybody is.
Nixon: But for the right deal.
President: That's right. So far as I know, Vance or Harriman or Rusk or Katzenbach or Clifford or Bundy or Johnson or Wheeler or all the Joint Chiefs or Bunker or Abrams. Now, as far as I am aware, I believe every one of those men would recommend to me that we not stop bombing unless they would agree to let us take the GVN into the meetings. Now, they've told us definitely they will not do that. Now, we think that if we did and the GVN quit us, we would just be out of business. Or if we had a coup out there, we just couldn't physically do it. We also think they've got to understand the facts of life about these other things--about the DMZ and about shelling the cities. Now, we might, without getting an agreement from them, without getting reciprocity, if they agreed with the GVN, we would consider that reciprocity. But we might then say to them that we will stop the bombing on Sunday, but if Tuesday or Wednesday or any other day they shelled the cities, we would have to respond.
Nixon: Yes. Well, that makes sense. We wish you well. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Nixon, October 7, 1968, 5:11 p.m., Tape F6810.03, PNO 1) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
54. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 9, 1968, 1400Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Plus. Received at 11:25 a.m. On a covering note transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, October 9, 1:15 p.m., Rostow wrote: "the most forthcoming business yet with Hanoi--but still utterly inconclusive." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I, [3 of 3]) In a memorandum to the President, October 9, 10:15 a.m., Rostow summarized Vance's initial telephonic report on the tea break meeting. (Ibid., Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VII) Jorden's notes of the formal session are ibid., William Jorden Papers, William J. Jorden Notes, 25th Meeting. The delegation summarized the formal session in telegram 22109/Delto 807 from Paris, October 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
22106/Delto 805. From Harriman and Vance.
1. Le Duc Tho, Xuan Thuy and Lau joined us during the tea break, which lasted about 30 minutes.
2. After a few minutes of non substantive conversation, they said they would like to hear about Vance's visit to the United States.
3. We said that Vance had returned directly to Washington where he met with the President and subsequently with Secretary Rusk./2/
/2/See Document 49.
4. We said Vance had reported on the various matters which have been discussed in our private meetings here in Paris.
5. In accordance with understanding between Vance and Secretary Rusk to hammer first on issue of GVN representation, we followed the outline Vance had worked out with Secretary Rusk.
6. We said we could confirm as a result of Vance's conversations in the US that the issue of the inclusion of GVN in the negotiations which would follow a cessation of bombing was utterly indispensable.
7. We said that each of us recognizes that the other has strong views on this matter. But the question is not whether the two sides like each other, but rather whether they are prepared to sit down together and talk about how to make peace.
8. We said we had already opened the door by agreeing to have the NLF or anyone else the DRV wishes on their side. We have made it clear that it is indispensable that the GVN participate on our side.
9. We said it was up to the DRV now to understand the realities of the situation. We added that all the crises that we have known about in recent years have been resolved by contact between the parties. We saw no reason why this situation should be any different from all the others.
10. We said we would like to know whether they had anything new to say on this subject.
11. Thuy said that we did not have enough time to discuss this subject at the tea break and suggested a private meeting. Tho then said, "If you want to discuss this matter further we are prepared to do so." He added that speaking in the Majestic would not be convenient--gesturing toward the walls and ceiling. He suggested we fix a date immediately. Thuy said in this connection the position of the two sides are clear but since we wished to further discuss the matter, the DRV is willing to do so. Tho concluded by saying that what is necessary is goodwill and serious intent and that the DRV has such an attitude.
12. We then fixed the time and place of the meeting for Friday at 9:30 am at our house [1 line of source text not declassified].
13. We then gave Thuy a memorandum septel concerning Christmas packages for the captured pilots./3/ Thuy said they would study it and give us their comments later./4/
/3/The text of this memorandum is in telegram 22111/Delto 808, October 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Delto Chron.)
/4/In telegram 252815/Todel 1247 to Paris, October 9, the Department wrote: "It occurs to us that even if Tho is prepared to talk business on Friday, he may come up with conditions of his own that we have not yet considered, ranging from demanding some form of U.S. 'recognition' of the NLF as the price for including the GVN as part of our side, or proposing that the U.S. and GVN negotiate only with the NLF 'but not Hanoi' on matters pertaining to SVN, down to peculiar seating arrangements. Obviously, some conditions would pose greater difficulties than others, and we would want a chance to study any arrangement other than 'our side/your side' before indicating any U.S. position." (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
Harriman
55. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VII. Secret; Nodis; Harvan/Plus.
Herewith the summary of the current state of play in the negotiations, which you requested, including this morning's teabreak discussion,/2/ our position and Hanoi's stands as follows:
/2/See Document 54.
1. DMZ. In the last six private meetings, starting with the first Harriman/Tho session of September 6 [7]/3/ we have stressed the importance of re-establishment of the DMZ: the stopping of artillery fire from or across the DMZ; no ground attacks from or across the DMZ; and no massing of troops near the DMZ in a way threatening to the other side.
/3/See Document 7.
The DRV has agreed only to the point on artillery fire--which they conceded in the Oslo talks, but not in the Paris exchanges. However, they have questioned us closely and repeatedly (going back to the early Vance/Lau meetings) and while making no commitment, clearly understand our point of view.
Based on their statements and their silences in the crucial moments in their discussions with Tho, Harriman and Vance stated to Tho that, "we have concluded that, if the bombing of North Viet-Nam were stopped, and the US respected the DMZ, then the DRV would respect the DMZ."
Therefore, Hanoi has in effect been told on three successive occasions that we would expect them to respect the DMZ if we stopped the bombing and we respected the DMZ, and they have not demurred.
2. Cities. Our major representations on this point were made in late May and early June when Saigon was being shelled. At that time Harriman stated publicly and privately that a conclusion of such attacks would have "the most serious adverse consequences on progress in Paris." At that time also, you made clear in several public statements your deep concern with these attacks.
Shelling of Saigon stopped on June 20. On July 3, when Harriman asked Thuy if this was significant, Thuy replied "I think this is understandable to you. The rockets have stopped. What is your attitude?" (The DRV announced the release of three pilots at the same time, and Thuy also referred to this action during the same conversation.)/4/
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 291.
In the Vance/Lau conversations, Vance asked for agreement on the absence of attacks against major population centers such as Da Nang, Hue, and Saigon. Lau's answer was to refer Vance to the NLF if he wanted to discuss matters in the South.
In subsequent meetings, Harriman and Vance have referred to attacks on the cities, varying the intensity of their remarks in part in relation to communist behavior on the ground in the South. At today's teabreak, Harriman and Vance repeated our position.
3. GVN Representation. Since the beginning of the Vance/Lau talks, we have been stressing the importance of GVN representation on our side of the table during any substantive talks concerning political settlement in the South. We have put forward the "our side/your side" mechanism as our device to meet our own requirement, while allowing the NLF or the Alliance to sit with Hanoi.
At first, the DRV may not have recognized the primacy of this point in our position. Furthermore, they appeared to have believed that we were demanding DRV recognition of the GVN. In the latter part of August, Vance and Harriman clarified our position. They pointed out that this was a question not of recognition but of representation at the conference table. Then, in the first Harriman/Tho meeting (September 7), Harriman added that GVN participation in plenary sessions would not rule out continuation of private conversations on matters of mutual concern to the US and the DRV.
In reviewing the North Vietnamese delegation's statements on this matter, I find that throughout July and August the North Vietnamese invariably reacted to a statement of our position by a lengthy polemic attacking the GVN as puppets. More recently, however, the North Vietnamese (while still attacking the GVN) have laid greatest stress on an attempt to defer this question to the post-cessation agenda. They have made explicit that they have not yet expressed their position on this issue. Today, they said that they would be willing to discuss the question of GVN participation the day after cessation, and have said that quick agreement could be possible "if both sides take into account the views of the other." I don't know what this means.
B. Summary/6/
/6/There is no section marked "A" in this memorandum.
In summary, I note that the only item the DRV has so far given us explicit assurances on is artillery fire across the DMZ. At the same time, they have clearly avoided an outright rejection of any of the US requirements for cessation. They may have concluded that we are satisfied on the DMZ point; the question of cities has been less emphasized lately (until today) and it is difficult to judge its importance to Hanoi--their capability for massive attacks is undoubtedly diminished as a result of our intensified military pressure on them; and, on the question of GVN representation, I conclude that they have been backing away from this issue, looking for ways around it, and in general softening their rhetoric without yet giving us what we want.
Nicholas deB Katzenbach
56. Memorandum From the President's Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 9, 1968, 12:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 F, Memos on Bombing in Vietnam, 3/67-10/68. No classification marking. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. A separate notation in an unknown hand reads: "To Rostow for comment."
For the President
The CIA summary for the past few days has reported substantial movements of NVN troops out of forward positions in I Corps, II Corps, and III Corps. In some cases the disengagement appears to be total, and the NVN forces have moved back into Laos and Cambodia. I understand current estimates are that between 1/8 and 1/10 of NVN forces formerly in I Corps have left in recent weeks.
It may well be that these units have decamped only in order to re-fit for further action. Or that Abrams and the monsoons have harassed them so successfully that they are simply retiring from a bad situation for a while. Nevertheless our intelligence seems too uncertain for us to make a positive judgment that the North Vietnamese are only preparing for another round of attacks.
In these circumstances, perhaps we should consider scaling down the number of bombing attacks on North Vietnam.
The daily sortie rate has been in the 420 range for a long time now--with the exception of yesterday, when there were 324. By dropping the number of sorties into the 200's or high 100's, we might give some indication that we are prepared to scale down as they do. If they continue to move troops out of contact and out of country, we would further reduce the number of sorties. If they renew heavy activity with troops that have returned to action, we would scale up the number of sorties again.
Harriman could suggest this to them in Paris, reminding them that stopping the bombing altogether will take some assurance on the DMZ and participation by the GVN in the next round./2/
/2/In an October 10 memorandum to Rostow commenting on this memorandum, Ginsburgh wrote: "Harry McPherson suggests that, in view of recent withdrawals of NVN troops, we should consider scaling down the number of bombing attacks on North Vietnam. I can't think of a worse way to fight a war--or to negotiate a peace. If the North Vietnamese were to initiate such a suggestion--either directly or indirectly--it would at least be worth considering. Lacking such an initiative on their part, I can see no basis for thinking that a scaling down of the bombing might open up any new avenues toward peace. Hanoi already knows by our word and deed that we are prepared to scale down as they do." (Ibid.)
Harry
57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 10, 1968, 0025Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by John Burke of the Vietnam Working Group, cleared by John Walsh of S/S, and approved by Bundy.
252908. For Ambassador Bunker from Bundy.
1. As you know, the information media have been making as much as possible from the coup rumors that are apparently circulating in Saigon, and from the red alert which the GVN declared on Oct 8. We have been responding to press queries by taking the line that we are aware of GVN's declaration of a state of alert, but have avoided comment on such speculative stories as that carried by AP reporting wholesale arrest of marine officers and the prediction attributed to "a high government source" that many people will be arrested within the next few days.
2. From certain indicators, notably Minister of Interior Khiem's conversation with Sam Berger (Saigon 39695),/2/ as well as recent CAS reporting, it does appear that President Thieu is somewhat concerned about political activity against the government. We would hope that he and his colleagues are on top of this situation. (We do feel, by the way, that Khiem may have been inclined to accept, without sufficient skepticism, former police chief Doan Cong Lap's version of plotting in I Corps by RDV cadres and others.)
/2/Dated October 9. (Ibid.)
3. Obviously, it would be most helpful if during the course of Oct 10 GVN were in position and disposed to make an authoritative, public statement which would put the events and rumors of the last few days in some sort of perspective and which would indicate to the public at large that the constitutional government remains firmly in control and that there was never any important threat to its stability. This would seem to us to be the best way of dampening down excessive speculation and depriving Hanoi and others of the opportunity of embarrassing GVN and ourselves./3/
/3/In telegram 253254 from Saigon, October 10, the Embassy speculated that "Thieu himself may be over-reacting for our benefit and trying to signal something to us about his position towards peace possibilities or any fresh developments in Paris" and advised: "It seems to us absolutely essential that another major effort be tried at this time to bring the two together. If we were to see some sort of break in Paris within the near future, the GVN's position as well as our own would be seriously weakened if an open and obvious rift existed at the highest levels in Saigon and was apparent to one and all. By the same token, evidence of a closer collaboration between Thieu and Ky would aid our cause markedly." (Ibid.)
4. We understand just how difficult it is to piece together all aspects of a situation such as this. At times such as this the Vietnamese can be at their most Byzantine. We assume that you will let us know if we can be helpful in any way.
Rusk
58. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 11, 1968, 1520Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan/Plus. Received at noon. In a covering note transmitting this telegram to the President, October 11, 1:20 p.m., Rostow noted: "Herewith Harriman and Vance's report of their conversation. The marked para. 12 is, perhaps, the critical statement." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [2 of 3]) An 11-page memorandum of conversation containing literal notes of the meeting drafted by Davidson is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG59, S/AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Sept. 11-Meeting XXI)
22253/Delto 817. Distribution only as directed by the Secretary. From Harriman and Vance.
Subj: Oct 11 private meeting with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy.
1. We met with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy for one hour and three-quarters morning Oct 11 at location provided [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in suburb of Sceaux. Tho and Thuy were accompanied by an interpreter and two notetakers. Lau was not present. Davidson and Negroponte accompanied us. Formal discussion lasted one hour.
2. Thuy opened meeting by asking Vance to repeat again what he had said at Wednesday's tea break on GVN representation./2/ We did so using same language as at tea break. Tho then said he wanted to raise two questions. First, whether we would stop the bombing when we had a clear answer to the question of GVN participation as a party in the negotiations that would follow a cessation. Second, whether after a clear answer to this question has been given we will consider the answer to be a condition or reciprocity for stopping of bombing.
/2/See Document 54.
3. We answered the second question first, saying it was not a demand for reciprocity or a condition but, as we had said many times, was our definition of serious talks. We said that as we had stated, we do not believe there could be serious negotiations without inclusion of representatives of GVN on our side.
4. Turning to the first question, we said that we could not answer the question and that it would have to be answered in Washington. We then made the following statement: "In responding to your question, it is very important that there be no misunderstanding between us. It is important to understand that we are not talking about reciprocity or conditions but the simple fact that after a cessation of all bombardment the President's ability to maintain that situation would be affected by certain elemental considerations.
5. "We do not look on them as a condition for stopping the bombing but as a description of the situation which would permit serious negotiations and thus the cessation to continue. You will understand, therefore, that the circumstances we have discussed in our various private meetings about military activity in and around the DMZ are essential to the maintenance of that situation. And, of course, you know from our various discussions that indiscriminate attacks launched against major cities would create a situation which would not permit serious talks and thus the maintenance of a cessation." We said that we had said this before, and that it was specifically confirmed when Vance was in Washington.
6. Le Duc Tho asked whether we had finished. He then said that they took note of our statement that cessation of bombing and all other acts of war would be unconditional. Tho continued, but suppose that the DRV agrees to participation of GVN at negotiations after the bombing ceases. You cannot yet assert that bombing will be stopped. You have to report to Washington. We confirmed that this decision could only be made by the President and asked him why he could not indicate his own answer now.
7. Tho said suppose the DRV agrees to participation of the Saigon government. The DRV does not know that the US will stop bombing so how could the DRV agree to GVN participation. Tho said he agreed that there would be no reciprocity for cessation of bombing and also agreed that the US wanted to have reason to believe, but what, he asked, is the condition raised by the US? Is it agreement on the representation of the Saigon government? If so, Tho was prepared to discuss the issue, but first they had to know if US would stop the bombing if the DRV responded affirmatively./3/
/3/In telegram 22279/Delto 819 from Paris, October 11, the delegation commented on Tho's response: "We believe it is consistent with Tho's question as to whether we would call agreement on GVN participation a condition [or] reciprocity. In that case we said it was not reciprocity, but our definition of serious discussions." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
8. We asked whether if we gave an affirmative answer they would agree to GVN participation. Tho turned the question around, saying that he wondered whether if they agreed we would stop the bombing. We replied we were not authorized to answer that question. Thuy said he agreed with what Le Duc Tho had said and wanted to add the following thought: If the DRV gives us their answer first and we reported that to Washington, the US might merely note that response, raise other factors and make propaganda of the North Vietnamese acceptance. We said we would not make propaganda if they answered. We asked Tho and Thuy whether we would be mistaken if we reported to our government that on the basis of our discussions we believed the North Vietnamese answer would be favorable. Tho replied that he suggested we report as follows: If North Vietnam accepted the participation of the Saigon government, would the President immediately stop the bombing?
9. We said we would prefer them to tell us now that they would accept participation of the Saigon government if we stopped the bombing. Le Duc Tho replied, "It is the same thing." (As what he had said.) We asked what his statement meant and Tho replied, "The substance is the same."
10. Tho said he would like to repeat once again that regarding a peaceful settlement, North Viet-Nam had a serious intent and that he hoped we also had a serious intent. He said North Viet-Nam knows how to look at the problem realistically and so would we. And only in this way could the matter be settled peacefully. He said, suppose we formally answer what you are now requiring and you don't stop the bombing--then you would have no goodwill and would not have looked realistically at the matter.
11. Tho said he was convinced that if we both had serious intent and goodwill, a peaceful settlement can be reached. We said that nothing would be worse than to have the talks start and then break down and that that was the reason why we have been completely frank with them.
12. Tho said when you give us an answer we will express our view. He said "We should be positive and you should be positive. If we are positive and you are not, or vice-versa, then no progress will be made."/4/
/4/In a memorandum summarizing a secure telephone call from the Paris delegation, October 11, 9:20 a.m., Read noted that Vance had reported this part of the meeting as follows: "Tho then said if the U.S. gave a positive response, the DRV would give a positive response." (Ibid., Top Secret Miscellaneous Documents--1968)
13. We said we would communicate with Washington the substance of today's conversation and would meet with them on Monday if we had an answer. If we had no answer, we would let them know.
14. This concluded our formal talk. Over tea, Le Duc Tho and Thuy both said that they believed that rapid progress could be made if we were really determined to move toward peace./6/
/6/In a separate memorandum discussing the delegation's telephone call, October 11, Read noted the following comments that would not be included in the telegram reporting on the meeting: "Vance: The fewer people who know about this in Washington the better. Secrecy is essential. Vance is satisfied that the DRV knows what to do regarding the DMZ and cities. We should give an early affirmative reply to their first question. Harriman got on the line. He said he endorsed Vance's comments and recommendation fully. There is no doubt that the DRV understands our views. 'There is nothing to do but to give an affirmative response to the first question. The sooner the better.'" (Ibid.)
Harriman
59. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 11, 1968, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [3 of 3]. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
I have been in and out of government for 27 years, in the intelligence-foreign policy business.
I have learned this rule: if something unexpected happens, stop in your tracks and ask this question:
What has been wrong in my picture of the situation which led to the unexpected event?
I told you the chances were 1 in 3 or 1 in 4 that we would get the kind of exchange we did in Paris today. I was wrong.
There was an additional element I did not report: Tho said at the end: "with a positive response we can move rapidly to peace."
We must now face the possibility--even likelihood--that they wish to wind up the war fast. No matter how sugar-coated, the DMZ and city deals and GVN participation mean, they are probably prepared for a quick settlement on, roughly, our terms.
Why is this possible?
First, the military situation. It is very bad for them. After their experience with the August offensive (preceded by 60,000 infiltrators) they may have concluded that even another 100,000 warm North Vietnamese bodies brought in during November-January would not get them anywhere on the ground in the face of Abrams and the expanding, more confident ARVN. (You should know that a good many North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam are now either:
--outside the country;
--at the border;
--or moving towards the border.)
Second, the political situation. They may have concluded that Thieu-Huong could not be unseated by them; would not be unseated by us; and that a Ky coup was not enough to count on.
Third, possibly the desire for a settlement with you rather than Nixon played a part.
In short, it is now more likely rather than less likely (but, of course, not sure) that they have decided:
--to accept an unsatisfactory political settlement in the South;
--to negotiate U.S. troops out rapidly;
--to save face, as an intelligence report I sent you this morning/2/ suggests, by claiming they forced the aggressive U.S. imperialists out of Vietnam;
/2/Not found.
--and then to turn vigorously to trying to win in South Vietnam by political means.
If this is so, we have a monumental job of fast negotiation ahead, in which the most critical job will be to help Thieu keep his country stable as the new situation unfolds.
Two major caveats:
1. Until the next session, when we put the final proposition loud and clear, we shall not know the full meaning of this morning's exchange.
2. We must keep our eyes on Laos where the military-political position is dangerous and a cave-in could take away a high proportion of what we have gained in South Vietnam.
Walt
60. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 12, 1968, 1143Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Plus. Received at 8:35 a.m.
22313/Delto 820. Distribution only as directed by the Secretary. From Vance.
1. This morning Minister Oberemko called on me at his request. The meeting lasted about 30 minutes, including five minutes for a cup of coffee. Oberemko telephoned last night requesting the meeting for 10 am this morning, saying that he wished to discuss a very urgent matter.
2. Oberemko opened the meeting by saying that as he had indicated in his message last night he had come on a very urgent matter. He said that what he was about to say was not to be considered a reply from the Soviet Government. He then said he wished to repeat what I had said to him previously. Oberemko said that I had told him in the last few weeks that the US attaches great importance to the issue of the participation of the representatives of the Government of South Viet-Nam in future negotiations and that it is necessary for the US to be sure that serious talks will start and start promptly. He said that I had said there could not be serious talks without the participation of the representatives of the GVN. Oberemko said that I had further stated that an agreement or understanding between the DRV and the US on the issue of GVN representation could be a major factor in facilitating a decision of the cessation of bombardment of the DRV. Oberemko said I had subsequently told him that the word "could" should be changed to "would."
3. Oberemko said that I had further stated to him that the action of the delegation of the DRV on the issue of GVN participation was sharply negative, and that it had produced suspicion on our part as to the seriousness of the DRV in the Paris talks. Oberemko added that I had said that the issue of GVN participation was not a condition but rather a test of the seriousness of the DRV.
4. Oberemko said that I had further stated to him that we had discussed the matter of military action in and around the DMZ and the matter of attacks on major cities with representative of the DRV and that we had concluded that they would know how to act if the bombing were stopped.
5. Oberemko then asked me if this correctly summarized what I had stated to him. I said that it did. Oberemko said "I would now like to give you a statement and I am sure you will want to take it down verbatim." He then gave me the following statement:
"I have good reason to believe that if the US stops unconditionally and completely the bombardments and other acts of war against the DRV, the delegation of North Viet-Nam will agree to the participation of the representative of the Saigon government in the talks on the problem of political settlement in Viet-Nam. Thus these talks would be held by the representatives of the DRV, of the United States of America, of the NLF, and the Saigon government." I asked Oberemko who the "I" was, and he said, "It is I, Oberemko." Oberemko said "The wording is a little awkward but that is the way I got it from them."
5. Oberemko then said that he hoped that what he had just said would help move the talks off dead center and that this view was shared by the North Vietnamese. He told me that he had met with the North Vietnamese yesterday afternoon after our meeting with them. Oberemko then said "We consider now is the right time to act. The situation is most favorable right now and this opportunity should not be lost." Oberemko then digressed to say that as we undoubtedly knew, there were factions with different views in Hanoi and that if positive action was not taken now it would be a major setback for those who wanted peace and that it would then be a very long time before peace could be reached. Oberemko added that if we advanced any new conditions it might bring many difficulties. Indeed, he said, "it may provoke reversal of the whole DRV position." Oberemko said, "What I have told you is the rock bottom to which the DRV can go." Oberemko said, "I have another statement which I would like to give to you verbatim if you would care to take it down." He then said:
"I can tell you also on good authority that if the question of the unconditional and complete cessation of bombardments and all other acts of war against North Viet-Nam is resolved positively and promptly, the delegation of the DRV is ready to discuss seriously and in good faith other questions relating to the political settlement in Viet-Nam, provided of course that the other side would also act seriously and in good faith."
6. Oberemko said that he understood that we had told the North Vietnamese yesterday that we were communicating with our government and would be back in touch with them./2/ He asked me whether I knew when we would have an answer. I told him that I did not know but doubted that we could answer on Monday./3/
/2/See Document 58.
/3/October 14.
7. Oberemko got up to leave and expressed the hope that what he had said would be constructive and would bring about positive action which would lead to a settlement.
Harriman
61. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 12, 1968, 1145Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Bunker Files: Lot 74 D 417, Vietnam Telegram Chrons--1968, 1969. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Double Plus.
40117. From Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams. Ref: State 254365./2/
/2/In telegram 254365 to Saigon, October 11, the Department transmitted the Paris delegation's report of the October 11 private meeting. (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968) For the report, see Document 58.
1. The stand taken by the Hanoi delegates at the 11th private meeting indicates a clear desire to shift their main effort from the battlefield to the conference table. This has come as no surprise to us. We were drafting a paper which thought this was a likely early move by Hanoi, and much of the following is taken from that paper.
2. There has been a steady deterioration in Hanoi's position in South Vietnam ever since the military defeats which overtook their general offensive at Tet and again in May/June. The August/Sept offensive could not even be got off the ground and was the weakest of all three attacks. After ten months of enormous effort, Hanoi and the NLF have nothing to show for the loss of over 150,000 killed, plus the thousand killed by B-52 and other air attacks, or who died of wounds or disease, or were captured, or defected, or were eliminated by arrest.
3. At the same time Hanoi has seen the emergence in the South of a stronger and more confident government under Thieu and Huong; a stronger and more effective and aggressive South Vietnamese military and para-military force; a growing bitterness and hostility toward Communism among the people; and an arming of the people themselves in the Civilian Self-Defense Corps. There have been no mass defections to the Communists from the nationalist side in the South--civil or military.
4. We have been gradually accumulating evidence since about April/May that Communist supporters and cadres in military and civilian ranks were beginning to doubt victory and to lose faith in their leaders. More and more time of the leaders in recent weeks has been devoted to maintaining faith in victory and to overcoming the argument that the South Vietnamese and their allies are "too strong to be attacked." Moreover, the NLF has been having more and more trouble recruiting in the South as people left controlled or threatened areas for govt-controlled areas, and the government increased its mobilization and deprived the Communists of manpower resources.
5. The loss of Southern-born cadres was particularly worrying, as these cadres were shifted in large numbers from guerrilla, proselytizing and civil work into the regular forces, where they were chewed up in battle. Others deserted, or were killed, captured, arrested or defected. The 75/25 ratio of Southern to Northern troops in the regular forces was reversed within the year, and could not be concealed. As husbands, sons and brothers left their hamlets not to be seen or heard from again and there were no signs of peace, restiveness and resistance began to be reported in some Communist controlled areas.
6. Beginning with Khe Sanh, our B-52 strikes became a devastating tactical weapon. These strikes and other air bombing of the northern panhandle, in new bombing patterns and designs, have significantly constrained the movement of supplies through the DMZ and into Laos. This, and the wholesale uncovering of caches in the last couple of months--a product of improved intelligence, greater cooperation of the people in the countryside, and information supplied by POW's and defectors--have created supply difficulties for the enemy.
7. A record number of enemy battalions were withdrawn into North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the last days of Sept and early October, signifying an end to the "third offensive." We therefore conclude that Hanoi has had to seek a respite on both military and morale grounds.
8. What else may be motivating Hanoi in this latest move at the eleventh private meeting, we can only speculate about. It may be that Hanoi assumes that if it can get the bombing stopped and keep it stopped until Jan 20, the next President will find it very difficult to resume the bombing. Meanwhile it will have time to rest and resupply and prepare for a renewed struggle in the spring. Gen Abrams believes that [after?] a bombing cessation it will take at least two or three months for Hanoi to rebuild for another attack.
9. Another possible explanation for the sudden switch by Hanoi is that it sees itself as in the relatively strongest position it is ever likely to be for purposes of negotiations, and if it waits any longer to negotiate there may be an erosion of its support in the South or a further weakening of its relative position as the Thieu government moves into more offensive operations on the several fronts--military, Chieu Hoi, anti-VC infrastructure, revolutionary development and pacification.
10. A third possibility is Hanoi's fear of a Nixon victory and what that might portend.
11. Finally, it may well be that Hanoi has drawn the conclusion that the US will not disengage in Vietnam no matter who is elected, and that it must now make the best possible bargain while it is still in a comparatively strong position to negotiate.
12. We personally feel that some or all these factors have played a part, but what is significant is that each of these factors put Hanoi in a defensive position. Hanoi did not take the stand they did at the 11th meeting because victory was in their grasp, but because victory has eluded them and they must now seek the best possible terms. For this reason we venture to predict that Hanoi will soon propose a cease-fire.
13. A complete cessation of bombing will cause some apprehension here, but I do not think it need worry us excessively. We shall maintain a military offensive in the South, the stepped up pacification campaign to extend control over more contested hamlets will be announced on Oct 21, and the intensified Chieu Hoi and Phoenix program attacking the VC infrastructure will be pressed simultaneously.
14. We expect that the NVA/VC will try to intensify the fighting as the serious negotiations start, but we do not think they have a capability for sustained action during the next two or three months and will need that time to repair their supply base.
15. We do not want to leave the impression that we think the war is over or that the North Vietnamese or VC forces are about to collapse. Their fanatical faith in the rightness of their cause, the fear of reprisal and retribution in both the South and the North in the event of defeat, the professionalism of men who have made revolution their life and career, the extraordinary investment of lives and hope over so many years, the tradition of discipline, and the Asian, coupled with Communist, indifference to lives, all suggest that Hanoi and the NLF will continue to fight with undiminished fervor.
16. Up to now Hanoi's political effort has been secondary to its military effort as Hanoi sought a military breakthrough. What we now expect is that the major effort will shift to the political front, with the military in a secondary and supporting role. We believe that there will be very heavy fighting up to the time a cease-fire is arranged or other steps are agreed to diminish the conflict.
Bunker
62. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, October 12, 1968, 1410Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. Received at 1438Z at the LBJ Ranch, where Johnson stayed October 11-13.
CAP 82546. Herewith the lucid, firm Bunker-Abrams response./2/
/2/In telegram 254364 to Saigon, October 11, the Department requested comment from Bunker and Abrams on proposed instructions to Harriman and Vance. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968) For the instruction as sent, see Document 65.
1. General Abrams and I interpret the exchange with Hanoi at the eleventh private meeting as a fairly clear indication that Hanoi is ready for a tactical shift from the battlefield to the conference table.
2. We concur in the instruction to Harriman and Vance, and believe Hanoi will give indications that it finds para one "acceptable," and paras two and three "understandable." We would regard such a response as meeting our essential requirements for a cessation of the bombing.
3. We welcome the assurance that Thieu and other key allies will be consulted.
4. I believe that Thieu will find the instructions acceptable, despite the fact that he has been under some pressure from the hardliners to toughen his stand on negotiations. His main concern, I think, will be that he will see this as the precursor to an early cease-fire, which he would prefer to put off as long as possible./3/
/3/See Document 64.
5. We believe that Thieu must be given time to inform VP Ky, PriMin Huong, MinDefense and possibly one or two others, shortly before our action becomes known, so that their full cooperation will be enlisted. If they first hear news from public sources it would arouse suspicion, certainly in Ky and others.
6. Our further comments on significance of Hanoi's position at October 11 private meeting, and why it looks from here as though Hanoi is at last ready to move to the conference table, are in a separate message./4/
/4/See Document 66.
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21594.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
63-74
63. Editorial Note
In a speech in Indiana on October 12, 1968, the President's former Presidential Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy proposed an unconditional halt to the bombing and withdrawal beginning in 1969 of substantial numbers of U.S. forces. For an extract of his remarks, see The New York Times, October 13, 1968. In a memorandum to Clifford and Nitze, November 8, Under Secretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes commented: "The principal conclusions that brought Bundy to this formulation can only be guessed at; the answer may lie in any one of several possibilities: (A) His proposals are a sugar-coated, half-veiled prescription for slow but inevitable defeat, and he understands this. (B) Having been an architect of escalation, he still believes we have a vital interest at stake in Vietnam and thus require, if not victory, then at least clear-cut 'prevention of defeat.' (C) He is fundamentally a 'process man' who, aware of the unforeseeable ways in which events not yet born will impinge upon any later pre-selected courses of action, believes that what is important is to get started in the desired direction and then play it by ear. Someone else can mop up the consequences if the scheme goes awry. I would guess that all of these considerations were present in his mind." (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 092.2 (November) 1968)
In telegram 254930 to Saigon, October 14, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy wrote: "I called Bui Diem this morning to tell him in light-hearted key that my brother's remarks reflected no prior discussion with me whatever, had not been known to me in any way before delivery, and did not reflect in any way the point of view of the Administration, or for what it might be worth my own personal point of view." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
64. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 13, 1968, 1230Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. I. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Double Plus. Received at 9:35 a.m.
40178. Subject: Meeting with Thieu.
1. Thieu concurs in instructions to be given Harriman-Vance.
2. General Abrams, Amb Berger and I had hour and a half meeting with him tonight. We went over developments of last four days starting with October 9 tea break, and gave him orally paraphrased version of instructions and how we intended to proceed on all fronts.
3. Abrams outlined military situation and implications of a bombing cessation on military position, and we exchanged views as to what military or other reasons prompted Hanoi to shift to negotiations. Thieu asked whether we intended to make reference to infiltration, and we said no and Abrams and I persuaded him that we can handle whatever they send down. Thieu thought that if Hanoi is serious in these negotiations they will soon propose cease-fire.
4. We then together sketched out the sequence of next moves:
A. Thieu agrees to instructions.
B. We notify other contributors.
C. Harriman-Vance put proposals to Hanoi at Paris.
D. If Hanoi accepts them, Washington and Saigon work out timing for cessation, and date of meeting which GVN will join.
E. Joint Johnson-Thieu announcement made that attacks on North stopped in effort to find basis for peaceful settlement. Thieu understands fully that we will not use words like reciprocal actions, agreement of Hanoi, etc., and need for secrecy.
5. Thieu will inform a few key colleagues tomorrow of latest developments and his decision.
6. Foregoing are bare-bones. Will send fuller report tomorrow./2/
/2/The full report of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 40220 from Saigon, October 14. (Ibid.)
Bunker
65. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, October 14, 1968, 1711Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan/Double Plus. Drafted by Katzenbach and Bundy, cleared by Rostow and Read, and approved by Rusk.
254715/Todel 1262. Literally eyes only for Ambassadors Harriman and Vance.
1. We would like your views on an urgent basis on the following proposed guidelines for your next private meeting.
2. Following further word from us, we would request you seek private meeting soonest with Thuy to deliver verbatim following oral message:
Begin Message
(1) Repeatedly in these conversations we have stated our view that the unconditional cessation of bombing could take place and be maintained only if serious talks take place and if circumstances are maintained consistent with serious talks.
(2) At the last meeting you asked a question./2/ Our response is: We are prepared, depending on your response to this representation as a whole, to order the cessation of bombing and all other acts involving the use of force against the territory of the DRV if you agree to begin serious talks the next day in which representatives of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam will participate on our side.
/2/See Document 58.
(3) As we said on October 11, it is also absolutely essential that there be no misunderstanding on the following two points, which describe the situation following a cessation of all bombardment in which the President's ability to maintain that situation would be affected by certain facts of life.
(4) The simple fact is that military activities in and certain military activities near the DMZ would not be consistent with serious talks, such as firing of artillery, rockets and mortars from, across and within the DMZ; movements of armed forces from, across and within the DMZ; and the massing or movement of forces near the DMZ in a manner threatening to the other side. These restraints would, of course, be observed by both sides.
(5) The other simple fact is that indiscriminate armed attacks against major cities in South Vietnam would not be consistent with such talks. End Message.
3. We have used the phrase that would permit reconnaissance, which they may question. We believe it important that they have a clear understanding that we will in fact continue a limited program of unarmed reconnaissance after the bombing stops. Our own research into the record here indicates that we have repeatedly used the general terms "bombing" or "bombardment," and that starting with the Vance/Lau conversation of July (Paris 18012, paragraph 4)/3/ we spelled out repeatedly the longer and more exact term "bombing and all other acts involving the use of force". In an earlier conversation, Lau had asked about "other acts of war" and Vance had said that we would have to discuss what this involved at a later point. So far as we can tell, the issue has not come up in any of the private talks since September 7. Thus, as we see it, we could be faced with the possibility of misunderstanding or purported misunderstanding with the North Vietnamese. Thus, if we were to get into a script of a formal session at which the inclusion of the GVN was agreed, while reconnaissance continued then or thereafter, Hanoi might claim a breach of faith. Therefore, we think that you should emphasize the longer formula in the message "and other acts involving the use of force." Beyond this point, there are several alternatives:
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 299.
a. You could volunteer a listing of examples of such "other acts." This would include naval, air, and artillery bombardment and also such acts as commando raids, which have been included in past Hanoi listings. It would omit, but without initially calling attention to it, unarmed reconnaissance. If the North Vietnamese then specifically raise the question of unarmed reconnaissance, you would state that both sides would be expected to take necessary measures to verify the state of affairs, and that in practice we could not possibly be satisfied that we knew the facts unless we conducted limited and discreet unarmed reconnaissance. (FYI. SecDef and JCS will require some low level flights End FYI) Such reconnaissance clearly does not involve the use of force, and in the circumstances it could not possibly be regarded as an act of war. Hence, we would expect that it would continue.
b. Without volunteering a list of examples, you would be prepared to respond to any North Vietnamese probing of the phrase along the same lines as in a. above. In the absence of a probe, we would rely on repetition of the phrase as establishing the point.
c. As a supplement to b., we might go concurrently to the Soviets in order both to list the acts we expected to stop, and expressly to indicate that we would not stop unarmed reconnaissance.
We would appreciate your judgment among these possibilities.
4. We would also appreciate your views on the time schedule that we envisage. The GVN is now on board and we may be going out today to the TCCs whenever we have your comments on these draft instructions. Hopefully they will be on board by early this week. If it turns out that we can nail down our agreements and understandings with the DRV in one private session, the cessation of bombing could follow soon thereafter. We would appreciate your judgment as to the possible need for more than one meeting to wrap up the arrangements. The maintenance of total security, to mention but one factor, argues for moving as rapidly as possible, and we see no need to aim at one day of the week rather than another, since we could always hold a special plenary session the day after the cessation in order to formalize and make public the inclusion of the GVN.
5. Obviously requirements of secrecy would preclude special GVN delegation from Saigon at first plenary meeting following cessation but there could be token representation drawn from Vietnamese observer delegation. This seems to us desirable since it publicly nails down GVN presence./4/
/4/In telegram 22390 from Paris, October 14, the delegation approved the instructions with only semantic modifications. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
Rusk
66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, October 14, 1968, 1735Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Text as received from the White House and approved by Read.
254719/Todel 1263. 1. Your comments are requested urgently on the following exchange with Bunker and Abrams:
A. Literally eyes only for Amb Bunker and Gen Abrams from Walt Rostow./2/
/2/Telegram CAP 82572 from Rostow to Abrams and Bunker via the CIA Saigon Station, October 14, 0248Z.
You should know that one of the major concerns of the President at the moment is that we examine with utmost care the loop-holes and contingencies in the deal we are considering to make sure it is as copper-plated as we can make it.
For example, he wishes you to examine the possibility that Hanoi is simply seeking a respite to prepare for a later offensive, creating ad interim an atmosphere of hopeful expectations and euphoria which would make it difficult for us to resume bombing of the North and otherwise maintain the remarkable momentum on the ground you have achieved and which explains so much of what may now be hopeful in the current situation.
Specifically:
1. Taking into account the enemy's weather and supply situation and prospects and taking into account the complexity of the diplomatic problems that may lie ahead, what would be a reasonable and secure interval in which to assess whether Hanoi is seriously interested in making peace, once "serious" negotiations start?
For example, it took only a month to wind up the 1954 Geneva negotiation once it became serious about June 20. Would thirty days now be a reasonable interval before we seriously considered a bombing resumption? Please give us your joint assessment.
2. Are you confident you can maintain the morale, fighting spirit, and momentum of the ARVN and our own forces once serious negotiations start?
3. You may wish to consider on a contingency basis the standing rules of engagement you would recommend required to protect the security and morale of our forces and those of our allies in the face of minor DMZ violations, to which the field commander would have the authority to respond without recourse to Washington and the level of infraction, involving more substantial violation and retaliation, which would require and justify recourse to Washington.
4. In view of your judgment that the enemy may move promptly after a bombing cessation for a cease-fire, we trust you are designing and preparing to recommend a cease-fire proposal highly advantageous to our side which we would put into negotiation if such a proposition were put to us.
B. Fm: Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams 284./3/
/3/Telegram CAS 284 from Bunker and Abrams to Rostow via the CIA Saigon Station, October 14, 1425Z.
To: The White House, eyes only Walt Rostow.
Ref: CAP 82572.
1. We have, of course, been examining this latest move of Hanoi and the Soviets from every conceivable point of view, including the four question areas posed in your message. Some of our views are in Saigon's 40117,/4/ but we have taken another close look as a result of your telegram.
/4/Document 61.
Hanoi's intentions
2. It is impossible to say in advance whether Hanoi wants seriously to negotiate a compromise, or is using this latest move only as a means of getting the bombing stopped knowing that it will be difficult to resume later, either by the President or his successor. One can argue that Hanoi may have both these objectives in mind, and they will move in whichever direction they think holds out the greatest hope of gain for them.
3. We think Hanoi's decision to agree to the GVN entering the discussions is of the greatest significance. It suggests that Hanoi has abandoned all hope of a military victory or of a unilateral US withdrawal by the next administration. If this is so, Hanoi's alternatives are to try to negotiate a settlement on a basis most favorable to them, or to return to protracted guerrilla warfare. On balance we think that at the outset at least Hanoi will enter these negotiations with serious purpose.
4. We think their negotiating objectives will be:
A. Cease-fire in place;
B. Mutual withdrawal of forces; and
C. Coalition government.
5. We think they will put these forward early in the negotiations. All three are simple conceptions with strong propaganda features from their point of view, and each is designed to give us trouble. Since we are not going to agree on simple conceptions such as these, we must expect extended negotiations while we hammer out solutions which are acceptable to us and the GVN. We will be working up proposals to handle each of these, and assume Washington and Paris are doing likewise.
6. Our relative bargaining positions, assuming the wider talks start in a week or so, will be important. Both our short and long term bargaining positions are strong. The VC/NVA can do little damage with their regular forces during the next two or three months which they need for rest and resupply. As for the long term Hanoi threw everything they could into this year's offensives, and failed. We do not see how they can make a greater effort or even a comparable one again.
7. On the other hand they are strongly entrenched in the VC controlled areas, where they control about 3700 hamlets, and another 3900 hamlets are contested. We will have to pay a price to extend our power into these areas, for the VC are good at guerrilla and irregular force fighting on their home grounds. However it is what we must now do. Fighting defensively, they will try to make any extension of our control as costly as possible for us. This is where they will concentrate their military effort as the wider negotiations start. As we push against them in these areas, which we mean to do, they will resist and there will be heavy fighting of the ambush and guerrilla type. We must also expect sabotage and guerrilla type activity in the cities.
8. Meantime they will be negotiating in all seriousness for as much as possible of the three objectives listed in para 4.
9. We do not think it possible to fix in advance, even in rough terms, the length of the interval that should be allowed before we consider whether Hanoi is serious or whether a bombing resumption is called for. We think we should have a pretty clear picture of Hanoi's intentions in a month or two, particularly if the negotiating meetings are frequent. By the end of the year, we should also have a pretty good idea of the morale of VC/NVA forces as well as our ability to move into and establish ourselves in the contested areas.
10. Our main problems as we see them will be to justify to the Congress and the American people our unwillingness to agree to a cease-fire in place and our opposition to a coalition, or, to put it in another way, justifying to the American public further casualties while we negotiate for a successful outcome of our enormous effort here.
11. We believe here that 1968--however difficult it was for us--has been a disaster for Hanoi. We must convince the American people that the tide has turned in our favor, and we can only do this if we can show progress in moving into contested areas, rising defections from the Communist ranks, heavy Communist casualties, comparatively light casualties on our side, withdrawal of some American units, the takeover of more and more of the war by ARVN, etc. That will also be convincing to Hanoi, and will determine their negotiating tactics.
12. When the GVN joins the talks, we must insist on closed sessions, or closed along with open sessions, otherwise we cannot regard the talks as serious. Given the complexity of the problems and the strong bargaining cards that each side holds, with the best will in the world, we think it is likely to take some months to produce solutions and agreements, and indeed we may be in negotiations for a very long time.
13. Following is our reply to your question 2.
A. Maintaining the morale, fighting spirit and momentum of US and ARVN forces is absolutely essential. Directives have gone out on the US and GVN side to intensify our offensive operations against infrastructure, guerrillas and local forces in order to extend government control, at the same time maintaining unrelenting pressure against his main forces. It is an offensive against the enemy "system."
B. We are planning now the form and shape of a message to the troops if an announcement is made. This message will be critically important to establishing a positive atmosphere. It will be tied to the results of our operations so far and the offensive described above. We will disseminate it in a massive effort.
C. We are completely confident that the morale, fighting spirit and momentum can be sustained.
14. Following is General Abrams' reply to your third question on the contingency of enemy violation of the DMZ. The basic rules of engagement should include the following:
A. Every commander will retain the inherent right and responsibility to conduct operations for the self-defense of his forces.
B. In case of attack by fire or ground attacks by small units (up to a battalion in size) across the demarcation line, COMUSMACV should have the authority to conduct a timely and adequate response against the attacking force, to include destruction of enemy forces penetrating across the line. No US ground forces would cross the line without specific orders from the highest authority. (Comment: It is envisaged that small ground probes would be counteracted by response in kind, but of decisive superiority.)
C. Enemy artillery fire would be responded to with heavy counter-battery fire and air attack until enemy weapons are silenced. In case SAM's are fired at our aircraft we would destroy his SAM installations and immediate supporting facilities.
D. In case of substantial or general attacks across the demarcation line by ground (including artillery) or air action requiring response going beyond local action, authorization of highest authority would be sought immediately for such action, including resumption of the bombardment of NVN.
2. Request also your best estimate, already given us preliminarily by phone, of meaning of the Tho departure for Hanoi?/6/
/6/In telegram 22391/Delto 825 from Paris, October 14, 2115Z, Harriman and Vance wrote: "We are in general agreement with the constructive and thoughtful comments of Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams. We have no information on which to base a meaningful estimate as to the reasons for Tho's departure for Hanoi. Our best present guess is that (A) He had given us the DRV rock bottom position on cessation of the bombing and he could contribute nothing further to this phase of the negotiations; (B) He is needed in Hanoi to participate in formulation of positions to be taken in negotiations which would follow cessation of bombing." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [3 of 3]) In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of telegram 22391 to the President, October 14, 6:30 p.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith Paris: Agree with Bunker and Abrams' message and, therefore, his proposed rules of engagement. Present their best guess as to the reason for Tho's departure."
Rusk
67. Draft Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only for the President. Christian and Tom Johnson joined the meeting at 10 a.m., and it concluded at 12:07 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) These notes, drafted by Rostow on October 16, cover only the part of the meeting prior to 10 a.m. For the rest of the meeting, see Document 68. A complete transcript is in the Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
Meeting with the President, Monday, October 14, 9:40 a.m., in the Cabinet Room.
PRESENT
Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, General Wheeler, Mr. Helms, General Taylor,
Mr. Rostow (later joined by Mr. Christian and Mr. T. Johnson)
Secretary Rusk informed the President that all present had now been briefed on events since Friday./2/ The President might wish to get their reactions and then consider next steps.
/2/October 11.
The President, noting a question raised by Thieu, asked why infiltration was not involved in our formula.
General Wheeler explained that it was difficult to monitor infiltration performance unilaterally and that it was better to keep our bombing of Laos going. Secretary Rusk underlined the critical importance of the apparent acceptance by Hanoi of GVN participation. This was a real turning point and would so be understood in Asia and the world, as well as by the VC in the South.
The President asked: Why is participation of the NLF being accepted? Secretary Rusk responded that this would not be a three-cornered confrontation; that is, with Saigon and the NLF together confronting Hanoi on the one side and Washington on the other. The arrangement would be our side-your side.
But the real importance was that Hanoi, which had vowed never to talk to the "Thieu-Ky clique," was now prepared to acknowledge the reality of the GVN. This means that there can be no settlement in Vietnam without the assent of the GVN. We have always said that there would be no problem in having the views of the NLF heard.
GVN participation could have a major effect on the political and psychological situation inside South Vietnam; the Chieu Hoi rates should go up; there should be more defectors; etc. Vance had told Secretary Rusk that the acceptance of the GVN was the most difficult of all our conditions. Vance, in fact, believed that they would never accept. Acceptance of the GVN will be fully understood by our Asian friends. Critical issues of face and prestige are involved for Hanoi, as well as favorable factors for Saigon.
The President then asked: Suppose they do accept the GVN and nothing happens in a month or for several weeks? What if we have a stalemate in the talks? What do we do then?
Secretary Rusk replied that if there are no attacks across the DMZ or on population centers, we could go a month or so in a stalemate. But if there is a buildup for later large military operations, that would be a different matter. We should give them until about December 1st before we resume bombing, to see if the talks in fact become serious. If they attack across the DMZ or attack the cities, then we could resume at any time according to the conditions we have put to them.
On the other hand, Secretary Rusk pointed out there would be costs in resuming the bombing too soon; for example, in 10 days. Before we resume we must be in a position to demonstrate that we tested their good faith. Then we could publish our record.
Mr. Helms said that the CIA had been brainstorming the situation developing in Paris over recent weeks. They saw the one great danger in the situation--the one hole--the one great vulnerability--in our position was the question of GVN participation. If the GVN did not participate, all his experts believed there was doubt that the GVN could hold steady. It would probably collapse. Hanoi's concession on the GVN is therefore very important. It is the one thing that fills in the big hole in our negotiating position. It is very significant. Helms agreed fully with the evaluation of Secretary Rusk. Secretary Rusk said that it was his impression that the CIA analysts believed that Hanoi would never accept the GVN at the table. Helms confirmed this as correct.
The President then asked about reconnaissance. Does our formula permit us to continue reconnaissance? Secretary Rusk said that our instruction, referring to "acts of force" rather than "acts of war," would permit reconnaissance. Moreover, he had just bluntly made the point to Dobrynin, who did not react negatively.
The President then asked: Do they understand the "facts of life" about the DMZ and the cities?
Secretary Rusk said that if the other side accepted in silence our statement of the "facts of life", we should be prepared to move on that "assumption."
The President asked: What if we stop bombing and they hit the cities?
Secretary Rusk said that we would have to resume bombing. What they do will determine our behavior. If they violate the "facts of life," we would be back with "business as usual."
Secretary Rusk noted that we had just pulled back the New Jersey from around the Vinh area to a point closer to the DMZ.
The President pressed on. He said he did not wish our understanding to be "fuzzy." It was necessary that there be clarity among us. If they take advantage and violate the "facts of life" as we have stated them, what do we do?
Secretary Rusk said we would resume bombing and disclose the full record. Life magazine had referred to the President and the Secretary of State as the "two lonely men." They would still be here./3/
/3/A notation at the end of these notes reads: "At this point, note-taking was picked up by Tom Johnson."
[Omitted here is discussion of European security issues.]
68. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Eyes Only for the President. These notes, taken by Tom Johnson, cover only the portion of the meeting after 10 a.m.; for the earlier part of the meeting, see Document 67. The President temporarily left the meeting at 11:21 a.m. and returned at 11:30 a.m. The meeting concluded at 12:07 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) A complete transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
General Taylor
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
[Omitted here is discussion of European security issues.]
The President: What do you think of Abrams' views?/2/
/2/See Document 66.
General Wheeler: I agree with Abrams' views.
The President: Do you anticipate problems if we stop bombing if they include the Government of South Vietnam at the Conference Table, assuming we believe they will A. stop shelling of cities and B. not take advantage of the DMZ.
General Wheeler: No sir.
The President: Can we restart the bombing easily if they violate the cities or the DMZ?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
The President: What would happen militarily
--if the DMZ is not violated,
--if cities are not shelled, and they go "all out" on the ground?
General Wheeler: They couldn't get off the ground if they try to step up attacks. I agree with Abrams that it would take them two months to get back up to strength.
The President: I hear we are only operating in the cities.
General Wheeler: That's not true. We are out in the countryside.
The ARVN are doing an excellent job. We captured more weapons and killed many enemy last week.
If we get these three conditions it's okay. If they mount an offensive across the DMZ or on cities, we restart.
The President: You've been in this pause before. You're no virgin, Bus. Who will help you get started back?
General Wheeler: You, Sir, and me, and Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford.
The President: How will the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel?
General Wheeler: They will not be opposed to it. At least one will favor it. One will be reluctant. Others won't object to it.
I remember 37-day pause well. It was undertaken on the basis of pious hope. This is undertaken on the basis of three points.
The President: The Soviets said they needed at least 12 days and no more than 20 to get serious talks going.
What about the Soviets?
Secretary Rusk: We should hear soon.
Walt Rostow: The Communists will test us with minor violations. There should be rules of engagement for Abrams. I doubt that they would start with attacks across the DMZ or on the cities. We should tell the Soviets we have given field commanders freedom to respond to violations.
The President: I thought we had told Abrams that.
General Wheeler: We have put that in cable./3/
/3/See Document 66.
Walt Rostow: We must have this.
Secretary Rusk: If we get 15 rounds Abrams should be able to plaster the area from which this attack was launched.
Walt Rostow: If they will accept the GVN and are ready for serious talks, they won't break them up over engagements in the field.
The President: I feel they are hurting as a result of tenacity and endurance of our people. The ARVN has improved, but I doubt they feel they are going to bring about peace very quickly.
We must have solid answers to back up our taking this action. I won't continue fighting if there is reasonable prospect for getting terms. But I am not as optimistic as my colleagues.
If we expect they won't hit cities, violate the DMZ, and they will accept the GVN at the table, we can accept this as "almost anything." This will give us an opportunity for substantive discussions. All we have for taking firepower away is talks.
General Wheeler: The weather is bad in the DMZ area. There is six inches of rain predicted today. If the integrity of the DMZ is maintained, this is a military advantage to us. We can use sorties in Laos along the trail that would be used otherwise along the DMZ.
President: What do we give up?
Wheeler: Some pressure.
The President: But you shift it to Laos.
General Wheeler: That is correct.
Secretary Rusk: Abrams expresses considerable confidence. But if Hanoi demands new government in Saigon it might appeal to the New York Times. We will reject it. We do not want a "give away" schedule.
George Christian: They will cooperate for a period because they have endorsed the Vice President.
The President: It's hard to sell a house at my price of $40,000 if Lady Bird tells the buyer at the door that she would sell it for $35,000--or if a Mac Bundy would sell it for $30,000--or another Administration man wants to sell it for $25,000.
We must sell our case on: 1. We don't give up much. 2. We can get back if it doesn't work.
Secretary Rusk: A speech by Bundy at this time was bad./4/ This might throw Hanoi off the track.
/4/See Document 63.
Walt Rostow: I told him that. He said he must decide on the timing for himself.
Secretary Rusk: Hanoi could have come unhooked because of this.
Secretary Rusk: We must go to troop-contributing countries first to consult them.
The President: I do not know what I want to do yet here. This is not an easy decision for me. Many people will call it a "cheap political trick."
General Taylor: The pitfalls and loopholes are there. We must look at the contingencies and how we deal with them--the marginal infractions and rocket attacks.
Secretary Rusk: We made it clear to the Russians and to Hanoi.
General Taylor: Abrams and Thieu said they may propose a ceasefire. We can't take off pressure in the South. There would be another Panmunjom.
Also, air reconnaissance must be part of the deal. We must also determine how the NLF will fit into that.
The President: Does "acts of war" include reconnaissance?
Secretary Rusk: It has been interpreted that way at times. We must and will have reconnaissance, particularly along the DMZ.
The President: Should we talk to the candidates first?
General Taylor: If elected, I would.
Secretary Rusk: Nixon is aware of all three points. He has great interest in getting this as far down the line as possible. Nixon wants a little more time if we move.
The President: He made that clear to me.
Secretary Rusk: I am concerned about the troop contributors. Thailand and Korea will understand. Gorton is more of a problem./6/
/6/Australian Prime Minister John Gorton.
Secretary Rusk: The sequence:
1. Go to troop contributors today.
2. Go to Vance-Harriman on instructions.
The President: Go to Vance-Harriman first.
Secretary Rusk: Go to:
1. Harriman-Vance.
2. Troop contributors.
3. Go to Hanoi.
4. If okay with Hanoi, go to candidates and key leaders. 1. Mansfield, 2.
Dirksen, 3. Russell, 4. Albert, 5. Ford, 6. Speaker.
The President: How many in State know?
Secretary Rusk: Four.
Secretary Clifford: The major equation is elementary. Taking Hanoi at its word and seeing if it really means what it says.
They said if we stop bombing North of the DMZ they will get down to serious talks.
I think they have dropped their Four Points in Paris.
The President: Do you think stopping the bombing will do it? What about "other acts of war?"
Secretary Clifford: I think "stopping bombing" and "acts of war" does not include that. It includes planes dropping bombs and naval shelling.
The President: I thought other acts of war would include reconnaissance.
Secretary Clifford: I cannot go into it blindfolded. We have--must have--high-level, low-level and drones. We are going to test their good faith.
You keep three conditions: 1. GVN, 2. Cities, 3. DMZ.
There has been a shift by them on 1. The GVN. It is a condition precedent. And we have made 2. DMZ and 3. Cities assumptions. (Conditions subsequent).
We must let them know we will not accept mass infiltration across the DMZ or attacks on the cities.
If they do either, we restart the bombing. You can lay firm predicate for resumption.
The President: Would you favor resumption of bombing if they violate any of these three?
Secretary Clifford: Yes, Sir, I would.
The President: If they know what will happen and we know what will happen then that's good.
The President: They have implied they would have the GVN in talks and understand the other two points. Don't we have more today than ever before?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, we do.
Secretary Clifford: Yes, we do have.
I think there will be a lowering of level of combat when this happens.
Abrams has shown more flexibility and mobility than Westmoreland.
The President: I do not agree. I think Abrams has inherited most of this from Westmoreland.
The President: When Secretary Clifford came in, we made decisions on M16's and other things that have helped.
Secretary Clifford: There will be diminution in level of combat. I would not let up.
The President: What does "respect the DMZ" mean? What does "shelling cities" mean?
Secretary Clifford: The shelling of cities is easy to ascertain.
Secretary Rusk: With the first rocket--we would raise hell with the Hanoi delegation. With 20 rockets--we would do some bombing.
The President: Abrams lists four rules of engagement. Do you agree with them?
Secretary Rusk: Yes.
Secretary Clifford: Yes. The real threat is staging of 20,000 men or so North of the DMZ. We would warn the delegation and slug them.
The President: Why does Abrams feel different today than he did in August about the bombing?
1. The DMZ agreement--will respect the deal.
2. The weather is much worse in October than in August.
General Wheeler: That is right, Sir. We are going to test their faith.
Secretary Clifford: Kosygin's letter said if you stopped the bombing substantial benefits would flow./6/ We now are taking him up. We need to send a letter to Kosygin from the President. It gives them a continuing responsibility.
/6/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 262.
The President: We said to Kosygin a meeting could bring about a start on limitation of offensive and defensive weapons. We said we would give thought to continuing to pursue these things despite Czechoslovakia.
Secretary Rusk talked to Gromyko and leveled with him on three points. He got no contract on it./7/
/7/See Document 47. According to a memorandum of conversation, October 15, Dobrynin, in discussions with Rusk, appeared amenable regarding the problems faced by the United States over the DRV's desire for an extended time lag between cessation and the start of the new round of talks. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Chlodnick File)
Secretary Clifford: In view of that we need to keep this working with Kosygin.
Secretary Clifford: The timing of it is important.
The desire of people to try this road is overwhelming. We will have much support.
The three candidates should not be notified ahead of time. A leak now would be damaging.
Secretary Rusk: My view of all this will be rather simple if true negotiating starts.
1. We have invested 28,000 dead and $75 billion.
2. I will not accept giving North Vietnam one-half of South Vietnam or a part of South Vietnam or a coalition government.
3. I will insist that the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam go home; that the North Vietnamese in Laos go home. And a return to the 1962 Geneva Accords.
Electoral tricks we must watch for. Nixon has been honorable on Vietnam. We must give him a chance to roll with this. We must give him a chance to know about this.
He has actually been more responsible on this than our own candidate.
Secretary Clifford: He must be told a day in advance that this is a decision the President has made.
Secretary Rusk: I would have the President call him and emphasize the need for discretion and gravity of the situation.
Secretary Clifford: As soon as the decision is made don't let the date of the election concern you. The weight of public opinion is for this. It is too unwise to brief candidates on this much ahead.
I expect Nixon would play it fair with you. The security factor is so important.
Secretary Clifford: Troop contributing countries: We do not have to get commitments from them. We have carried the whole load. Australians have lost few. The Thais have lost only a few hundred. We could get a leak too easily. We could notify them about the time of release.
Secretary Rusk: We have had excellent results with Park, New Zealand, and Australia. I do not trust Marcos at all to hold it./8/
/8/South Korean President Park Chung Hee and Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos.
Walt Rostow: The Australian relationship is important.
Secretary Clifford: I recommend the President proceed on this. As soon as possible. There is more benefit than detriment. It will leave not a single stone unturned in your quest for peace.
General Wheeler: 1. Get comments of Harriman and Vance. 2. Based on that, go ahead and make a decision to stop bombing on the basis of three points. We must have Hanoi agreement on GVN.
The President: You do not think the military risks are significant?
General Wheeler: Abrams and his people can handle it.
I prefer these conditions to those at the time of the 37-day pause.
General Taylor: I would make sure the GVN are at the Conference Table--that reconnaissance will continue--that cities and the DMZ are respected.
The President: What will you get today that you won't get three weeks from now?
General Taylor: I do not have the same sense of urgency.
Secretary Clifford: There comes a time in the tide of men's affairs that it is a time to move.
It is away (three weeks) from the election. It will receive commendation of the world and the country. I consider it a very real point to get the job done now.
CIA Director Helms: Bunker and Abrams point to the stake of North Vietnam in this. Negotiations will be miserable. They are not down yet. Still, I would take this step.
Secretary Rusk: I agree you should go ahead as soon as possible.
The President: Why, Dean?
Secretary Rusk: There is a major shift on Hanoi's part on role of GVN. There also is a good chance of performance on cities and the DMZ.
On the negative side if we don't move we will be destroyed by the record now that they have agreed to do this. But, Hanoi is not buttoned up.
The President: I doubt if Hanoi is serious, but we must test if they are.
The President: Le Duc Tho left Paris this morning for Moscow. What is the significance of it?
CIA Director Helms: There may be disagreement with the Soviets in light of Bundy's speech.
Secretary Rusk: Hanoi may have gotten unhorsed and the Soviets are trying to stay on the horse.
The President: What are the facts on the two times Drew Pearson says we blew peace?
Secretary Rusk: I never heard of it.
Secretary Clifford: Neither have I.
The President: Get the Bunker-Abrams wire to Vance-Harriman./9/ I want them on board.
/9/See Document 66.
The President: Let's meet again this afternoon./10/
/10/See Document 69.
69. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Eyes Only for the President. The meeting began at 1:38 in the Cabinet Room. Christian joined the meeting at 2:17 p.m., Russell entered at 2:22 p.m., Rusk at 2:45 p.m., and Westmoreland at 3:15 p.m. The meeting ended at 3:40 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Bromley Smith's notes of the meeting are ibid., Meeting Notes File, 7/68-12/68, and a complete transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
| Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford | Walt Rostow |
| Secretary of State Dean Rusk | George Christian |
| General Earle Wheeler | Tom Johnson |
| Admiral Thomas Moorer | |
| General Leonard Chapman | Joining the Meeting: |
| General John McConnell | Senator Richard Russell |
| General Bruce Palmer | General William Westmoreland |
| Bromley Smith |
Walt Rostow: In the course of discussions with the Soviets on missile talks, the question of the Middle East and Vietnam was raised.
With the Czech crisis, the environment for a Summit with the Soviets diminished. The President raised with the Soviets the question of Vietnam.
The language to Kosygin read:
"Setting all political arguments aside, the simple fact is that the President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace. A cessation of bombing which would be followed by abuses of the DMZ, Viet Cong, and North Vietnamese attacks on cities or such populated areas as provincial capitals, or a refusal of the authorities in Hanoi to enter promptly into serious political discussions which included the elected government of the Republic of Vietnam, could simply not be sustained."/2/
/2/See Document 47.
Points included as conditions for a bombing halt:
(1) Inclusion of the GVN at Paris talks
(2) No attacks on the cities
(3) Respect for the DMZ.
The Soviets would not march in with all three points. Secretary Rusk stressed that the Soviets should push on one essential point--inclusion of South Vietnam at the Paris talks.
Last Friday,/3/ a private meeting was held in Paris./4/
/3/October 11.
/4/See Document 58.
The critical passages from this discussion:
[Omitted here is the text of telegram 22253/Delto 817 from Paris, October 11.]
The President sent a message on cessation of the bombing and rules of engagement. We want your (General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker) response.
The message was received from Abrams and Bunker that they could live with the cessation if the three points are included./6/
/6/See Document 66.
Ambassador Bunker said he thought they were moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.
The number two man in the Soviet Embassy in Paris called Ambassador Vance in on Saturday./6/ He said there could not be a bombing halt without participation of the GVN. Also, Vance stressed DMZ and the attacks on the cities.
/6/See Document 60.
He dictated the following passage:
[Omitted here is the text of Oberemko's message as reported in telegram 22313/Delto 820 from Paris, October 12.]
Walt Rostow: It was similar.
The Soviet representative said there are differing views in Hanoi. He said if bombing were halted serious talks could begin.
Thieu concurred in instructions given Harriman and Vance.
There is a later cable. He is ready to go along to try to see if they are serious about stopping the war./7/
/7/Document 64.
A message was sent to Bunker to examine loop-holes and contingencies--including the possibility of the enemy needing rest to get ready to hit us again./8/
/8/See Document 66.
Asked four questions of Bunker/Abrams:
(1) How long should we wait?
(2) Can morale be maintained?
(3) Rules of engagement?
(4) Is a cease-fire proposal to our advantage--one we can arrange?
They responded:
(1) Impossible to tell what the enemy can do.
(2) Hanoi given up militarily; trying to get best negotiations possible.
(3) Hanoi doesn't believe next administration will pull out.
Hanoi failed in this year's major offensives.
They will seek:
(1) Cease-fire
(2) Removal of foreign forces
(3) Coalition government.
They think we should know something within a month.
Bunker says they are against
(a) coalition government and
(b) a cease-fire in place.
They said 1968 has been a devastating year for Hanoi.
He sent rules of engagement.
(1) Continued strong pressure in South
(2) Message to troops
(3) Morale can be sustained.
Rules:
(A) All commanders can conduct self-defense actions.
(B) Response to attacks across DMZ.
(C) Artillery fire will be responded to by destruction of unit firing.
(D) If came across DMZ or struck cities, resumption of bombing would be
recommended.
A draft message was sent to Paris this morning. (Attachment A)/9/
/9/Printed as Document 74.
It includes:
(1.) Serious talks must take place.
(2.) If GVN included day after cessation, bombing will be halted.
(3.) After halt, conditions must permit President to continue it.
(4.) Respect for the DMZ.
(5.) Armed attacks against major cities not permitted.
(6.) Reconnaissance will continue, unarmed.
This would include cessation of Naval, air and artillery attacks.
Reconnaissance must include both high and low level flights as well as drones.
We asked for their views on draft instructions. GVN are aboard.
Maintenance for total security is required.
The President: (1) On September 17 Harriman came here./10/
/10/See Document 20.
I told him what we were confronted with. We were interested in
(a) GVN at talks.
(b) No attacks on cities.
(c) Respect for DMZ.
(2) On October 3, Vance came home. I talked with him October 6 and October 7./11/ I told him the same thing.
/11/The President spoke by telephone with Vance at 5:25 p.m. on October 6 and at 11:12 a.m. on October 7. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No records of these conversations have been found.
At 2:22, Senator Russell entered the meeting.
The President: I asked them what would happen if bombing stopped.
I told them we could not stop it if:
--GVN were not included.
--They abused the DMZ.
--They attacked the cities.
Soviets were told this. Rusk got impression they would do all they could on GVN--and that we could work on the other two points.
The President: I met with Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler this morning./12/
/12/See Document 67.
(To Senator Russell:) "Here are three statements."
--San Antonio
formula/13/
--August--Detroit/14/
--New Orleans--won't increase U.S.
casualties./15/
/13/See footnote 6, Document 35.
/14/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 332.
/15/See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 936-943.
(1) The weather has changed.
(2) Troops are moving out.
Secretary Clifford: For five months Hanoi has said if bombing is halted they will begin "serious" talks. They refused any conditions. They said they never would sit down with the GVN.
Now the situation has changed.
(1) We say GVN must be at the table.
(2) Hanoi now prepared to accept GVN at table.
(3) Enemy military situation has deteriorated.
(4) We are recommending that there be a shift of emphasis.
If GVN are at table, we can talk but only if DMZ is respected and cities are not attacked.
We are at a point where their good faith must be tested. We are recommending that we stop the bombing to test their good faith. If they violate it, we will know they are not in good faith and resume without any limitations.
The President has an opportunity to take them at their word. I would recommend starting bombing again if they did not show good faith.
We would continue bombing in Laos.
At the moment, Laos is where we want to bomb because of monsoon season in North Vietnam.
They have said we must cease all acts of war. I do not consider reconnaissance an act of war. We cannot deal in the dark.
I always have feared a build-up north of the DMZ. If they did, we would have to destroy the build-up. The time has come now. They have changed their attitude toward GVN.
They recognize the existence of the government in South Vietnam; the partition of South Vietnam and North Vietnam; the effect on the Viet Cong would be damaging. To know North Vietnam has recognized the government of South Vietnam would be quite a psychological blow to the Viet Cong.
I do consider the risk to us as minor. It does not injure us to stop the bombing for awhile. We can go back with bombing if we need to. The timing is important.
There must be another exchange with Kosygin to say we are taking them up on their offer and getting them to use whatever leverage that is possible.
We must move on anything that might bring peace.
General Wheeler: After six months of stonewalling, North Vietnam has made a movement which I consider important.
Abrams' assessment is highly favorable. If we haven't already won the war militarily we are well on the way to it.
Thieu readily agreed to the formula. All believe we must continue reconnaissance in and around North Vietnam.
If the enemy violates this, we will resume our operations without limitations.
I recommend you make this approach to North Vietnam. If they accept the presence of GVN at conference table, we should proceed.
Secretary Rusk: North Vietnam is not clearly on board in this. The acceptance by North Vietnam of South Vietnam at the conference table is a recognition that the Viet Cong are not sole government in the South.
We must press for flat commitments by them after bombing is halted and talks are started on a new basis.
If there is violation of two points we go back to bombing. The Soviets will no longer be in a position where a sister Socialist state is being attacked.
The negotiations will be troublesome.
Bombing will restart if
cities are attacked.
DMZ is not respected.
GVN not permitted at table.
Bunker and Abrams met with Thieu./16/ He is entirely in favor of this step.
/16/See Document 64.
Walt Rostow: Bunker-Abrams said:
(1) Hanoi shifting from battlefield to conference table.
(2) Lost 150,000 killed in action and B52 killed in action and captures and
injured and desertions. [sic]
(3) Strengthening of ARVN.
(4) Inability to mount offensives in recent months.
Beginning with KheSanh, B-52 attacks became devastating. Record withdrawal signaled end of third offensive.
Abrams believes it will take 2-3 months for NVN-VC to rebuild. Hanoi realizes U.S. will not disengage in Vietnam regardless of who is elected.
Victory has eluded Hanoi. Hanoi may feel its position never will be better than it is today.
NVN-VC forces have not collapsed.
Up to now, Hanoi's emphasis has been on military and not negotiations.
Abrams and Bunker concur in instructions on cessation of bombing.
Thieu made a decision on the spot to accept this on October 13.
Thieu said he is ready to go along. The problem is not to stop the bombing, but to stop the war.
At 3:15, General Westmoreland joined the meeting./17/
/17/Westmoreland's arrival was delayed due to medical tests he underwent at Walter Reed Army Hospital, followed by a ceremony for former President Dwight Eisenhower, who was also a patient at the hospital. (Memorandum for the Record by Westmoreland, March 22, 1971; U.S. Army Military History Institute, William C. Westmoreland Papers, History File, #34, TS-0106-80, Jul-31 Dec 1968)
The President: Read the San Antonio formula.
I said we would stop bombing when it would lead to
productive discussions
provided they would not take advantage of the cessation.
Their acceptance of the Government of Vietnam is some modification of their position. It does not represent a breakaway on our part from what we have stated.
Secretary Rusk: Acceptance of GVN is absolute. Other two points are self-policing.
The President: What is the difference between their not signing a contract on two and three?
Secretary Clifford: If they are in good faith, they won't shell cities or not respect the DMZ.
Our risk is limited.
Walt Rostow: Message sent to Harriman-Vance: (Attachment A)
Includes for a bombing halt:
(1) Serious talks take place
(2) GVN participation and
(3) Cities not attacked
(4) DMZ respected.
The President: I want your judgments and your views. I do not know when I will make a decision.
General McConnell: If you agree to unconditional cessation of the bombing, this would pre-empt your resumption of the bombing.
The President: If cities were attacked, If DMZ abused, we would resume.
Secretary Rusk: We have actually--(interrupted)
General McConnell: If you are to stop bombing, NOW is the time to do it. The weather will be bad in the panhandle.
I do not think they can attack the cities.
We would concentrate air operations in Laos this season anyhow.
I am concerned that they could mass troops and supplies without our knowing. Only two days a month would be good for reconnaissance.
We must continue reconnaissance.
I recommend going ahead.
Admiral Moorer: I subscribe to General McConnell's views. We must keep up the reconnaissance.
In III Corps area, Viet Cong might feel as though they are being deserted and initiate an action to break the deal.
General McConnell: I do not think the enemy can attack the cities.
Admiral Moorer: I recommend we proceed along the course as outlined.
General Chapman: The DRV are hurting. Bombing is a strong card. They will want to rebuild their strength. We must go all out in South Vietnam to build South Vietnam army and root out guerrillas.
We must carefully inform the troops and the U.S. public of this.
I support the proposal.
Admiral Moorer: Do we state that bombing will be resumed?
Secretary Rusk: Not at the beginning. It would be provocative.
General McConnell: If we resume, we want to be unrestricted.
Admiral Moorer: I agree to that.
General Palmer: Time has been running against the enemy. Hanoi doesn't have the same support from the Soviets that he used to have.
I would worry about a form of cease-fire.
Once the bombing is suspended it will be difficult to resume it.
The President: If they do not meet these three conditions, we will respond.
General Palmer: Based on what I know, I would go along with it.
Secretary Rusk: A cease-fire in place won't do. We would have to have free access to province capitals controlled by the GVN.
General Westmoreland: It would be chaos not to have GVN at the conference table.
The enemy can't seriously attack the cities. They can shell them some.
We must observe the safety of the troops and the morale of the GVN.
We can do this.
The weather is favorable. Northeast monsoon starts out with fury. The weather will improve in Laos for bombing.
Bombing in Laos is not under jeopardy.
The President: It will be increased.
General Westmoreland: Any massing north of the DMZ will be known. A few hours of each day will be O.K. for reconnaissance.
Communications intelligence will detect it as well.
During January, February and March there is a low fog which hangs over the area. Even helicopters can't fly. In the DMZ, North and South, this will be covered.
The enemy can be seriously affected in a major way.
This gives the GVN a great opportunity to wage a campaign to bring about defections.
I agree with this proposal with the restrictions placed on it.
With the proper psychological campaign we can get defections./18/
/18/In a memorandum for the record, March 22, 1971, Westmoreland wrote: "When I was called upon to comment, I stated that I wanted to be the devil's advocate. I expressed the opinion that we were trading off an important military asset for a questionable political result. I felt that the conditions that the North Vietnamese had presumed to agree to could be gradually eroded to the point that they would be meaningless. They could violate the agreement to an extent, but not to the point that we could publicly renege on our part of the assumed bargain and resume the bombing. They could progressively erode the constraints, and we would find ourselves politically helpless to do anything about it. Also, I pointed out that the enemy could commit violations of omission rather than commission." He noted that the reaction to his argument was "that if they did not adhere to the provisions that we outlined, that the bombing would be resumed." Westmoreland summarized the meeting in the following terms: "No decision was made at the meeting, but it was obvious to me that the political pressures associated with the forthcoming elections were encouraging concessions to the enemy without due consideration to future implications. Also, it seemed to me here that President Johnson was anticipating his role in history and wanted the record to show further that he was a peacemaker." (Ibid.) In a memorandum for the record, June 30, 1970, Palmer noted that he, McConnell, Moorer, Chapman, and Westmoreland all concurred in the plan. (Ibid.)
Senator Russell: I can't deal with this with limited amount of knowledge. The Viet Cong may terrorize the cities.
You all mention "good faith." In our relations with the Soviets, we should indicate how long we will stand by and do nothing.
Secretary Rusk: We should know within four to six weeks.
Secretary Clifford: We should set no limits so long as they do not take advantage of our restraint.
I think we would make a mistake to set a time limit.
Senator Russell: It will be hard to restart the bombing. Soviets need some time in mind as a deadline.
The President: Did we tell the Soviets thirty days?
Walt Rostow: No.
Senator Russell: Do the Soviets and North Vietnam know we expect to continue bombing if this doesn't work?
The President: Yes.
Senator Russell: I hope the suggestion is as our military leaders think it is. It will be hard to resume.
General McConnell: The President assured us we could restart it if we needed to. That's the only reason I went along.
Senator Russell: If that is so, I would hope the program would work.
Secretary Clifford: We are willing to give up bombing for three acts on their part--(1) including the GVN (2) DMZ and (3) no attacks on the cities.
If they stick to all three, we are not being damaged.
Senator Russell: I would perhaps agree with you if I knew something about the enemy morale problems, supply problems, and know we can police this.
The President: I want us to be agreed on this before I go.
Senator Russell: This is a most agonizing war. The most agonizing any President or any Secretary of State or any Secretary of Defense ever faced.
Senator Russell: This is O.K., but the U.S. people won't agree to keep the troops over there when the war is not going on.
The President: On a 37-day bombing pause, the Soviets told us 12 days probably would be sufficient but no more than 20.
General Wheeler said he would not recommend it, but would support it.
I am not brave just because it's at the end of my term. I will not proceed unless both Secretaries and all JCS support it.
Secretary Clifford: This is different from the 37-day pause. The GVN come into the talks. We have the DMZ and cities as a test of their good will.
This makes it easier to start.
Secretary Rusk: Most precious asset has been the morale of our forces. Can this be sustained?
General Westmoreland: The Communists have violated prior ceasefires. They may erode this agreement. If that happens, we will have problems with morale. How far do we go before we resume the bombing? We will have trouble if erosion occurs.
Abrams' approach is very practical. I see no problem.
The President: I want us to know what we are getting into now.
What is the reaction of the country going to be and reaction of the Senate?
Senator Russell: We are in the midst of the political campaign. Reactions will vary. The press will hail this. You will be charged with politics.
What everybody wants is an end of the war. It's been a miserable war--worse than Korea.
Secretary Rusk: No decision has been made in relationship to domestic politics.
Senator Russell: I know that.
Admiral Moorer: I think we should make it clear.
Senator Russell: Senate wants to get out of the war--some by exterminating North Vietnam--others by bringing all troops home on the next convoy.
My committee will give it a chance. There will be some skepticism. Everybody wants to get this to a conclusion.
You've given North Vietnam every chance to show good faith. They haven't.
George Christian: The reaction will be good from the press and media. Political charges of helping Vice President Humphrey will be made.
Secretary Clifford: The public can be educated to two factors:
(1) North Vietnam has not been doing well in the war.
(2) North Vietnam may have chosen to deal with this administration rather
than the next.
The President: I will be charged with doing this to influence the election.
Nixon will be disappointed.
The doves will criticize us for not doing it before now.
If this is not a way of stopping it, I don't think I'll have another opportunity.
I do not have much confidence in the Soviets or North Vietnam.
I don't think they will accept this.
If they accept it, I do not think they will honor it.
General Westmoreland: Militarily, the enemy is BANKRUPT.
We must assume he will accept GVN, honor DMZ, doesn't attack the cities.
Then can you justify resuming the bombing for their foot-dragging on a political act?
The President: We are testing him.
Senator Russell: The U.S. people will take a "wait-and-see" attitude.
Secretary Clifford: The decision to move at this time is not based on our initiative. It is based on Hanoi's initiative. They said they will bring the GVN into the talks.
Secretary Clifford: By stopping the bombing now, we do not give up much?
General McConnell: We do not give up much, no.
The President: What effect does a "no" decision by me have?
Mac Bundy picked the worst time possible to make his speech./98/
/98/See Document 63.
Senator Russell: There is little else that can be done.
The President: We said to the Soviets on September 17 that they could take the heat off Czechoslovakia by talks on Mideast./20/
/20/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Document 300.
Senator Russell: It's worth a try.
70. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Eyes Only for the President. Eyes Only for the President. The meeting lasted from 7:15 until 8 p.m. and was held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
NOTES OF THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH
Secretary of State Rusk
Secretary of Defense Clifford
General Earle Wheeler
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson
The President: Senator Smathers said the word is out that we are making an effort to throw the election to Humphrey. He said Nixon had been told of it. Nixon told Smathers he did not want the President to be pulled into this, that wrong results could flow. Nixon said he is afraid we would be misled.
Senator Smathers said he assured Nixon that the President would move if an opportunity for peace presented itself./2/
/2/The President, along with Jones, met with Smathers from 6:55 to 7:15 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
Secretary Clifford: I doubt it would have any effect on the campaign.
The President: Both sides think it would.
Secretary Rusk: George Ball is coming down tomorrow./3/ I will give him nothing.
/3/Rusk met with Ball from 11:25 to 11:55 a.m. at the State Department. (Ibid., Dean Rusk Appointment Book, 1968-1969) No record of the meeting has been found.
Secretary Clifford: The people have made up their minds on the election already.
Mark Twain said "when in doubt do right."/4/
/4/According to the full transcript, Clifford stated: "I can understand how Mr. Nixon feels. He doesn't want anything that could possibly rock the boat. He likes the shape that it is in now and any little new development might rock the boat, so he would be opposed to it. But what's the matter with rocking the boat? Remember what Mark Twain once said that occasionally is relevant. He said, 'When in doubt, do right.'" (Ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
The President: That is right. But let's not be pulled in.
When does Paris want it announced?
Secretary Rusk: By midnight tomorrow.
There was a discussion of the draft cable outgoing to ambassadors in troop-contributing countries.
The President: Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel we are on solid ground completely? Do all of you think this is the right course?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir. We have unanimous agreement. Abrams is strong for it.
The President: Do you know this is what we ought to do?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, sir.
Secretary Clifford: I have absolutely no doubt that this is right.
The President: All right, go ahead and execute (7:39 p.m. EDT).
The decision was made to send out the draft cable--attachment A./6/
/6/Attachment A was sent as telegram 255243 to Bangkok, Seoul, and Saigon (repeated to Canberra, Manila, Paris, and Wellington), October 15. In it the Department discussed the evolution of the breakthrough in Paris and requested allied concurrence in the understanding to end the bombing and begin substantive negotiations. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. I)
Senator Russell said we need to do this.
In San Antonio, we said
In Detroit, we said
In New Orleans, we said
We are in close touch with our negotiators.
We concluded we should stop bombing to test their faith.
Ordering it at a certain time.
Gorton, Holyoake will take it. The Koreans, Thais will give us trouble.
Secretary Rusk: Let's amend the GVN so that South Vietnam are at the table the next day.
The President: Are we all in agreement that we should stop the bombing if the GVN are there?
If the GVN are not there do we resume the bombing?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, if they don't agree to sit down.
Secretary Clifford: I agree.
The President: Do we resume bombing if they hit cities or attack across DMZ?
Secretary Rusk: Yes.
Secretary Clifford: Yes.
The question is, should we place any limitation on the bombing?
Secretary Rusk: No limitation. It will depend on circumstances and the degree of violation as to what we do.
Secretary Clifford: I am aboard.
Secretary Rusk: I am aboard.
General Wheeler: I agree. So do all of the Chiefs.
The President: I do not want to be the one to have it said about that one man died tomorrow who could have been saved because of this plan.
I do not think it will happen, but there is a chance.
We'll try it. We'll be scared, but let's try it.
71. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 15, 1968, 7:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 9/30- 10/22/68, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [3 of 3]. Secret; Harvan/Double Plus. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
Cy Vance called from Paris to report the following:
Thuy called him personally on the telephone--the first time he has ever done this. He asked: Are you ready for a meeting this morning? (Paris time.) Cy said no. Thuy then asked, could you be ready for a meeting at 3:00 p.m.? (Paris time.) Cy said no. Cy then said he would be willing to set up a meeting, tentatively, for 9:00 p.m. (Paris time; 4:00 p.m. our time). He did so on the assumption that we would then have the TCC replies and an execute order from us in hand on his instructions, which are now pre-positioned in Paris for a go ahead.
Cy does not know what Thuy has in mind. He and Harriman believe that Thuy has the authority to agree on GVN participation and express "understanding" on the DMZ and the cities. He does not know how they will make out on reconnaissance, but is implicitly optimistic.
(Habib, on the other hand, rather doubts that Thuy will have the authority to give a final assent without a check with Hanoi. In fact, Habib's theory is Tho is going back to Hanoi to help explain to and persuade his colleagues if we should come through.)
Vance is very much worried about a leak in the wake of our informing the TCC's.
Vance would like to be able to tell Thuy--if he agrees on the GVN, understands on the DMZ, cities and recce--that we would stop the bombing tomorrow.
Attached is a possible scenario which Bob Ginsburgh and I have worked out this morning, made up before Cy Vance's telephone call, but roughly consistent with it.
This scenario is based on the notion that we would announce tonight that the bombing will cease tomorrow.
You should know that Bus Wheeler wants 24 hours for two reasons:
--To make sure that everyone gets the word and there are no mistakes;
--To try to get out of North Vietnam (south of the 20th parallel) certain agents we have put in there, to whom we owe something.
As between waiting 24 hours and announcing the "bombing has stopped" and saying the "bombing will stop tomorrow," I favor the latter to minimize the possibility of leaks.
All of this is, of course, based on the assumption that Harriman and Vance are right; that is, Thuy has positive pre-positioned instructions on all our points. There are ample opportunities in this scenario for a holdup--or worse.
Walt
P.S. We have no TCC responses yet but expect them very soon./2/
/2/Rostow added the following handwritten note: "Correction: Thanom now aboard. W."
Attachment/3/
/3/This attachment was handwritten by Rostow.
Possible Sequence of Events
| Saigon | Paris | EDT Washington | |
| 1. DRV agrees to GVN participation. | 15 0400 | 15 2100 | 15 1600 |
| 2. Issue orders to stop bombing. (16 EDT 1700) | 16 0500 | 15 2200 | 15 1700 |
| 3. Tell Paris to inform DRV of time. | 16 0500 | 15 2200 | 15 1700 |
| 4. Inform Marcos. | 16 0500 | 15 2200 | 15 1700 |
| 5. Inform TCCs of timing. | 16 0500 | 15 2200 | 15 1700 |
| 6. Brief candidates. | 16 0600 | 15 2300 | 15 1800 |
| 7. Brief leadership. | 16 0700 | 15 2400 | 15 1900 |
| 8. Joint announcement. | 16 0800 | 16 0100 | 15 2000 |
| 9. Presidential statement. | 16 0800+ | 16 0100+ | 15 2000+ |
| 10. Backgrounder. | 16 0900 | 16 0200 | 15 2100 |
| 11. Bombing stops. | 17 0500 | 16 2200 | 16 1700 |
| 12. Paris meetings--GVN included. | 17 1700 | 17 1000 | 17 0500 |
72. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 15, 1968, 1:12-2:24 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Rusk and Clifford left the meeting at 1:50 p.m.; Helms, Wheeler, and Rostow departed at 2:20 p.m.; Christian and Tom Johnson remained until 2:35 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE
TUESDAY LUNCH GROUP
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
| The President | |
| Secretary Clifford | Walt Rostow |
| Secretary Rusk | George Christian |
| General Wheeler | Tom Johnson |
| CIA Director Richard Helms |
The President: Senator Mansfield said the announcement is "expected." I will be surprised if it is not on evening news.
Secretary Rusk: Bunker says he needs 24 hours.
The President: Smathers called on me. He said Nixon people think a "political trick" is planned./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 70.
General Wheeler: 1. We have two teams in North Vietnam of 20 men. It will take 24 hours. 2. I have to get a reconnaissance program. 3. We must position forces in the DMZ. 4. We must get the rules of engagement. 5. We must set guidelines for reprisals.
I need the President's authority to draft programs when you give word.
Secretary Clifford: No leak of any kind has ever come from the Joint Staff.
The President: I think the odds are 50-50 they won't do it.
Secretary Clifford: We need to draft initial orders.
General Wheeler: Ten people will be involved.
The President: Only military?
General Wheeler: Yes.
The President: Okay. Which civilians know?
Secretary Clifford: Only me, no others.
George Christian: I doubt if it will hold thru today. The New York Times story by Rick Smith and Marvin Kalb at 8:00 a.m. today may be put together./3/
/3/This story reported that the United States was putting forth a new proposal to end the bombing. See The New York Times, October 16, 1968.
The President: Tell Bunker to get Thieu moving on telling his people now.
Thieu must tell Ky, Prime Minister, and Defense Minister and draft a statement.
The President: Making the bombing order not effective for 24 hours is okay. We cannot delay announcement.
The President signed "Futherance" papers at 1:37 p.m.
Walt Rostow: The worst thing is for Ky to learn of this from a press leak or from one of troop-contributing countries.
Rostow called the situation room to arrange secure phone call from Rusk to Bunker (1:40 p.m. EDT).
The President read letter to Kosygin on bombing halt. (Attachment A)/4/
/4/See footnote 2, Document 18.
The following are remarks of the President made previously on reciprocity.
News Conference on February 2, 1967/6/
/6/See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 128-134.
"Q. Mr. President, we have said in the past that we would be willing to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam in exchange for some suitable step by the other side. Are you prepared at all to tell us what kind of other steps the other side should take for this suspension of bombing?
The President: Just almost any step. As far as we can see, they have not taken any yet.
And we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action that they or any of their spokesmen would care to suggest.
We have made one proposal after the other. We would like to have a cease-fire. We would be very glad to stop our bombing, as we have on two previous occasions, if we could have any indication of reciprocal action."
News Conference of March 9, 1967/6/
/6/See ibid., pp. 303-312.
"Q. Mr. President, sir, one point that some of your critics on Vietnam have discussed in the past week is the question of whether or not what we would ask in return for stopping the bombing has changed in the past year.
They say that a year ago, apparently we would have settled for simply getting talks if we stopped, whereas, now you are speaking of the need for reciprocal military action. Could you discuss this?
The President: We have talked about reciprocal military action in every pause we have had, Mr. Bailey./7/
/7/Charles W. Bailey, reporter for The Minneapolis Star and Tribune and The Des Moines Register and Tribune.
We have had five pauses now.
On the first pause of 5 days we made it very clear that we were taking this action and we would keep our ear to the receiver and listen intently for any indication from the enemy that he would take reciprocal action.
Later, we had a 37-day pause. We were told before we went into that pause by some of the same people who are recommending a pause now, or urging a pause now, that if we would go into it for 12 days or at the most 20 days, we could get reciprocal action.
We went 37 days. They gave us no indication that they were willing to take any reciprocal action.
We have just finished a pause of six days during the Tet period.
At the beginning of each of these pauses we made it clear that we were going to pause, ask our men to withhold action, and give them an opportunity to agree to come to conditional discussions, unconditional discussions, any kind of discussion. We have just completed that 6-day pause.
So I would respond to your question by saying at the beginning of each pause we made it clear that we would take action, we would listen intently for action on their part. We have. We have heard the same story every time.
"Q. Mr. President, you and Secretary Rusk have both talked of a military quid pro quo and reciprocal action in exchange for a halt in the bombing. I wonder if you could be specific and say what we would require from the other side as part of this quid pro quo?
The President: I think a good, general way to express it is what I said at my last press conference--just almost any reciprocal action on their part. We have said that we would be glad to stop our invasion of North Vietnam, if they would stop their invasion of South Vietnam.
We would be glad to halt our bombing if they would halt their aggression and their infiltration. We are prepared to discuss anything that they are willing to discuss. But they are not willing to discuss anything, as of now."
Tennessee Legislature, March 15, 1967/8/
/8/See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 348-354.
"But reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will not reduce its activities unless and until there is some reduction on the other side."
News Conference of July 18, 1967/9/
/9/See ibid., Book II, pp. 699-705.
"Q. Mr. President, may I follow up Mr. Deakin's question and your answer? Is the United States position that we would only be willing to stop the bombing if there were reciprocal action on their side?
The President: The United States position is that we are ready to meet with them any time to discuss arrangements for bringing the war to an end on an equitable and just basis. We have never been able to get them or any of their friends to bring them to a conference table.
Until we can, we are not able to explore with them what they might be willing to do. We hear from travelers and from self-appointed spokesmen from time to time this and that. On occasions we have attempted to confirm it, and we have negotiated directly with them.
I think the last position stated by Mr. Ho Chi Minh is a safe statement of their viewpoint. I refer you--as I did Mr. Deakin--to their position as enumerated in that letter. Our position is that we would be glad to meet tomorrow, next week, or any time to discuss conditionally or unconditionally, on any basis, to see what they would be willing to do."
San Antonio, September 29, 1967/10/
/10/See footnote 6, Document 35.
"The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."
News Conference, September 30, 1967/11/
/11/See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book II, pp. 882-886.
"Q. Mr. President, in the past you have mentioned a reciprocal move by North Vietnam as a condition for our either halting or decreasing the bombing. Last night in your San Antonio speech, you did not mention this reciprocity. Was this not mentioning it any change in our policy or any softening of our position?
The President: I will let that speech stand for itself. I don't agree, necessarily, with the first part of your statement, that in the past when I only referred to it I referred to it in a certain way. That is your statement and not mine."
Detroit, August 19, 1968/12/
/12/See ibid., 1968-69, Book II, pp. 896-903.
"This administration does not intend to move further until it has good reason to believe that the other side intends seriously to join us in de-escalating the war and moving seriously toward peace."
New Orleans, September 10, 1968/13/
/13/See ibid., pp. 936-943.
". . . The Commander in Chief has insisted that the bombing will not stop until we are confident that it will not lead to an increase in American casualties. That is why we have placed such emphasis on re-establishing the DMZ."
End of remarks of the President made previously on reciprocity.
At 1:52 p.m. Secretary Rusk leaves to talk to Ambassador Bunker on secure phone.
CIA Director Helms: The CIA sent a report today on the situation in Vietnam.
--No enemy military objectives achieved.
--Enemy forces badly mauled.
--There will be a forced "lull" because of it.
--From August 18 to October 1 there were 22,000 enemy killed in action.
--Serious supply deficiencies.
--ARVN improved; suffered most casualties.
The President: Can we stop bombing at midnight Wednesday?/14/
/14/October 16.
General Wheeler: I'll check. If we got orders out tonight we could knock off at midnight, October 16 or 12:00 noon in Saigon on the 17th.
I would like to send message and get teams out.
CIA Director Helms: That is clandestine.
The President: Okay, go ahead.
General Wheeler: Okay, I'll go ahead.
The President: The New Jersey is doing a good job./15/
/15/Since September 29 the battleship U.S.S. New Jersey had been acting in support of U.S. Marine and ARVN operations from its position off the coast of Vietnam.
General Wheeler: I need proposed rules of engagement Abe sent.
Walt Rostow: There is equipment trouble in Saigon. We are standing by for repair.
1. On Briefing Candidates
Have all of them on a conference call.
2. Text of Announcement
Approved by Clifford with one deletion.
3. Leadership
Talk to them by phone.
4. Briefing.
A. Start with Kosygin's letter./16/
/16/See Document 9.
B. Mrs. Gandhi letter./17/
/17/Not found.
C. Views of House & Senate.
D. Wouldn't stop unless it leads to stopping war.
E. Rusk talked to Gromyko. Told him three things./18/
/18/See Document 47.
1. Inclusion of GVN.
2. No attacks on cities.
3. No abuse on DMZ.
F. September 17, told Harriman.19
/98/See Documents 19-21.
G. October 5, 6. 7, Vance told./20/
/20/See Document 49.
H. Hanoi said they might permit GVN to sit in.
I. Met with Joint Chiefs of Staff--all signed on.
J. Talked to all troop-contributors. They agreed.
K. No top military or diplomatic leader disagreed.
L. If they shell cities, or abuse DMZ, we'll restart possibly.
M. Offer each man a chance to come. If they take advantage we are prepared.
5. Backgrounders
Wheeler and Clifford--Military
Diplomatic--Rusk
President's--White House
6. Talk to Eisenhower.
Honolulu Communiqu}./21/
/21/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 299.
7. Letter to Kosygin
Clifford and Rusk draft it.
8. Letter to Wilson--Rusk.
2:24 p.m. CIA Director Richard Helms looked at the President, shook hands and said "good luck."
73. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 15, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Oval Office, where the President and McPherson had been since 7:25 p.m. Rusk, Clifford, and Read arrived at 7:32, Tom Johnson at 7:33, and Bundy at 7:34. The President called Rostow at 7:55 p.m. Rusk, Read, Tom Johnson, and Bundy left at 7:50, and Clifford remained until 8:12. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES ON MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY GROUP
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Walt Rostow
Bill Bundy
Ben Read
Harry McPherson
Ben Read: Hanoi said they could not get the NLF to Paris a day after the bombing stopped if this were done now. Hanoi said it is impossible to get the NLF representatives to town that soon. They said they are not authorized to speak for the NLF. They would not agree to seating the NLF press representatives who are in Paris because "We do not speak for the NLF."
Vance and Harriman say the announcement should state that talks should begin as soon as the NLF and the GVN get to Paris./2/
/2/In telegram 22466 from Paris, October 15. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I)
The President: When did they say the bombing should stop?
Ben Read: Vance and Harriman did not say. I did not ask.
Secretary Rusk: We do not know if the NLF will send a delegation.
The President: Does the NLF have to send a delegation?
Secretary Rusk: Yes.
The President: Why don't we say that we will stop the bombing 24 hours after the GVN and the NLF are at the table?
Secretary Rusk: We do not know if we really have this thing buttoned up.
The President: We will not stop the bombing if I do not know that serious talks will start with the GVN at the table.
Secretary Rusk: Why don't we get a certain date?
Ben Read: Vance and Harriman think we should go ahead. Their exact quote was: "Don't hang up on this."
The President: No.
Secretary Rusk: We must flash the Troop Contributors and tell them that we will not move on this until a day is certain when the talks will begin with the GVN and NLF present.
The President: I think we should do that. Say to them that anytime the NLF can get there and the GVN are seated we are prepared to stop the bombing 24 hours in advance.
Secretary Rusk: That is good. We will say that the United States Government will stop the bombing 24 hours in advance of the time the GVN delegates are there, and when Hanoi can get the NLF delegates there.
Bill Bundy: I agree. It is the only way to keep the Armed Services with us.
Secretary Clifford: We must make it clear that we have no intention of stopping the bombing until we know the date of the meeting at which the GVN will be present.
Walt Rostow: We do not care about the NLF.
Secretary Clifford: We will stop the bombing 24 hours before such a meeting.
For Cy Vance and Averell Harriman, we say that the presence of the GVN there at the first meeting is only symbolic. We just need a warm body.
Secretary Rusk: They said that too.
The President: Let's do everything possible to make sure that this thing is held tightly. I hope all of you will just close up the State Department and lock the doors.
74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, October 15, 1968, 1059Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Double Plus. Drafted by Read; cleared by Rostow, Bundy, Katzenbach, and Read; and approved by Rusk.
255269/Todel 1277. Reference: State 254715, Paris 22390./2/
/2/See Document 65 and footnote 4 thereto.
This message must not be executed and next private meeting must not be requested until you receive go ahead from Washington, but we thought prepositioning cleared text would help you plan next step.
Begin Message: You should now seek private meeting soonest with Thuy to deliver instruction set forth in State 254715, with following modifications based in part on your 22390:
1. In paragraph 2 of the oral message strike the phrase "as a whole" and at the end of the complete five paragraph message add the question "What is your response?"
If the DRV representatives express any objection to our points on the DMZ or the cities you should inform them that this is a matter which would have the most serious consequences and require basic reappraisal by the USG.
Note: We prefer that you retain language indicating that serious talks should begin the next day as set forth in the oral message paragraph 2 rather than the alternative which you have suggested, since we attach importance to visible meeting including GVN the day following cessation.
2. On reconnaissance you should emphasize strongly, by repeating or otherwise calling attention to the phrase "all other acts involving use of force" in paragraph 2 of the message. If the DRV probes the meaning of this phrase you should then proceed as set forth in 3a to list examples of such "other acts". End Message./3/
/3/In a situation report, October 15, 1:30 p.m., Read noted: "In accordance with the instructions from the Secretary, I phoned Cy Vance on the secure line just before he left for the 8:00 p.m. (Paris time) meeting with Thuy. I told him that if Hanoi's response was favorable in all respects tonight he should tell Thuy Washington would act promptly in a day or two and that he would let Thuy know as soon as possible when such actions would be taken." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968) Thuy's negative response was reported in telegram 22466/Delto 827 from Paris, October 16. (Ibid.)
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21593.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
75-96
October 16-25, 1968: Negotiating the Understanding
75. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 16, 1968, 0815Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [2 of 3]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan/Double Plus. Received at 4:57 a.m. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, October 16, 8:30 a.m., Rostow wrote: "Bunker's full account of how the leak occurred in Saigon. As you see, the story converges with Le Duc Tho's movements and the surfacing of the lull." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw it and the attached telegram.
40830. Subject: Security Breach. communiqué
1. I regret to inform you that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, following Thieu's meeting with the National Security Council, called in the Ambassadors of Korea and Thailand, and then the Chargés of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, at 12:00 and 12:30 respectively, to report to them as troop contributing countries that South Viet-Nam and the United States are considering a bombing cessation.
2. When Thieu told me of this I expressed shock that this action had been taken at this juncture. When Thieu realized that this action had been taken prematurely, he said that they were not being told very much, only that there might be some developments along these lines.
3. I sent Berger immediately to talk to the Foreign Minister, who came out of his meeting with the three Chargés. Thanh said that he had already revealed the information and Berger asked him to inform the Chargés and then the Ambassadors, that the information he had imparted was already known, and only known, to their Heads of State. It was very important that they do not cable this information to their Foreign Ministries or other persons in the governments, but hold it for the time being in view of the delicacy of the talks. The Foreign Minister said he would do this. He would also call the two Ambassadors.
I followed up by calls to the Thai and ROK Ambassadors, both of whom gave me their word that they would not send any message. We are seeing the three Chargés urgently to impress on them the need to refrain from sending messages. My main concern is the Filipino, Bartolome./2/ Suggest you consider informing Marcos.
/2/Philippine Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam.
5. I cannot account for Thieu's instruction to the Foreign Minister to call in the TCC representatives. At my seven o'clock meeting this morning he said he would at some stage call in the TCC representatives, but I never dreamed that he would move in this fashion, since I made it clear that we did not have the results of the private meeting, and that the TCCwould be informed as soon as we did have the results and were taking action. I had impressed on him at each meeting that only the Heads of State of the TCC countries had been informed of what was going on (I did not mention our omission of Marcos), and that the whole matter was of the highest sensitivity.
6. Many rumors now circulating here about bomb cessation as a result of lull in the fighting, return from Paris to Hanoi of Le Duc Tho, editor queries to local correspondents during last two days, and now my seven o'clock and then noon meeting with Thieu.
All this together with the possibility of a leak, makes me wonder how long we will be able to keep situation quiet. Our contingency planning for any press questions would be to note that these are only speculative rumors and that we have no comment./3/
/3/In telegram 257010 to Saigon, October 17, the Department transmitted the following instructions from the President to Bunker: "The leaks out of Saigon--which continue--are a cause of the greatest concern to the President. They generate in the United States enormous confusion and pressure. They may very well interfere with the possibility of carrying forward a successful negotiation at a critical stage. You should, therefore, tell Thieu that we may not be able to give him as much notice should the negotiating process bring us to a moment of decision, unless better communications security prevails." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, Miscellaneous Top Secret Cables) Karamessines sent two CIA memoranda to Rostow and Rusk, October 18 and 19, which reported Thieu's concern over having to deal with the NLF on an equal basis and Ky's recommendations that Thieu extract as many concessions as possible at this time. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-207A, DDO Files, Folder 1)
Bunker
76. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 16, 1968, 9:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [2 of 3]. Secret; Harvan/Double Plus. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Harriman and Vance's written report on their meeting with Thuy and Lau was transmitted in telegrams 22486/Delto 830 and 22490/Delto 832 from Paris, both October 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
Mr. President:
Herewith the Vance-Read telephone report of this morning's meeting.
The message was delivered. Thuy said he fully understood the message. He considered that our insistence on the participation of the GVN the next day after a bombing cessation a "new condition." Thuy had never promised to deliver the NLF the next day.
Thuy believes that the Politburo in Hanoi will reject this new condition. Nevertheless, he will pass along, in fullest detail, Harriman and Vance's protestation and argument; namely, that the "serious talks" which are promised for the next day must, in our view, include the GVN and the NLF.
Thuy said there was an "outside chance" that, in the light of the fully detailed arguments of Harriman and Vance, the Politburo might accept our linking of "serious talks" with the GVN-NLF presence.
Harriman and Vance pushed hard for the earliest possible reply. Thuy could make no promise.
Lau made a very pointed warning about our not revealing the exist-ence of the private meetings.
Harriman and Vance commented that they had searched the record very fully and that, strictly speaking, Thuy has a point. We never stated flatly that the GVN must be present the day after the bombing cessation. What we did was to say that "serious talks" must begin the next day and there could be no "serious talks" without the GVN.
Therefore, in strict diplomatic terms, they do not regard Thuy's observation as necessarily being in bad faith.
Walt
77. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield/1/
Washington, October 16, 1968, 9:34 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Mansfield, October 16, 1968, 9:34 a.m., Tape F68.07, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Mike?
Mansfield: Yes sir.
President: This thing I talked to you about yesterday./2/ They do not--they welched on it.
/2/The President met with Mansfield for approximately half an hour beginning at noon the previous day. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Mansfield: Oh.
President: So, I thought I ought to tell you because you had more information than anybody else. And I don't want no other human to know it, so I wouldn't say anything about it, but the facts were these. When we went over the GVN with them, they said, "Yeah, that's fine." And when we went over the other two things, the cities and the DMZ, why, we stopped and paused, and went real slow so they would get the full impact and there'd be no misunderstanding, and they listened to that and nodded, and raised no objection. We went all the way through it, and they said, "This is all fine, but," he said, "you say here that you'll meet the next day with us with the Government of Vietnam. We have to have the NLF, and we don't know how long it will take to get them." Now we said, "Well, that's all right. We'll be glad if you'll go get them." They said, "No, we think you better stop bombing and then we'll go look for them." Now we said, "No, you said in your talks that if we would stop bombing that you'd be willing to start discussions the next day. This is your language, and so we're ready to take this language." Well they said, "We don't know whether Hanoi'd approve this. We have to go back to Hanoi."/3/
/3/See Document 76.
So, that's a lot of wrangle on that, and our interpretation is that we had a couple of unfortunate speeches, and that they're trying to see if we're going to get any weaker here. [McGeorge] Bundy went out and made a fool speech about withdrawing troops and getting them down to a hundred thousand--our pulling out and it costing too much./4/ Just today, and then while they was--just before they went into the meeting, Hubert came out and said that he was going to stop it period, no comma, no semi-colon, just plain outright stop it./6/ So of course, that was big flashes to both of them. We don't know--they said anyway that they've got to go back to Hanoi and talk to them. Our people interpret that as an indication that something's come up--that they've got some new intelligence--because the three things that we have had that we kind of understood. It really doesn't represent much change on our part. It doesn't represent much change on their part, except for the GVN. Now, they're not arguing about that. They're not saying they don't want to. So, we will just have to take the position that every--that we do have these discussions back and forth. But Vance didn't come over here for any new instructions. We didn't give him anything at all. I just told him, "For God sakes, to try to get some kind of peace in my time, that I had given up everything to try to do it, and I wanted it honorable but I wanted it." And I told Averell the same thing. And I told Thieu that, and Thieu did play ball with us. And Huong played ball with us. And the son-of-a-bitch out there, the Senate--Foreign Minister, whatever his name is,/6/ he leaked the story when I told him. He said he's expecting them to sign right away, and of course he looks like an ass today.
/4/See Document 63.
/6/See Document 40.
/6/Tran Chanh Thanh.
But I just thought that in the light of all the background that you ought to know that the ball's in their court. That we are ready and willing and anxious and eager to sit down with them tomorrow, with the NLF. And they said, "Well, we have to go and look up the [Central] Committee, it's somewhere in South Vietnam." We said, "Well, you've got a lot of representatives here. You've got spokesmen. You've got press. And why don't you bring one of them in, and we'll do the same thing. We'll bring in some South Vietnamese. It's just purely symbolic for both of them." And Vance tried to get them to do that but they said no.
So our interpretation is that we had two unfortunate speeches and we'll have to ride them out a few days and see what happens. I can't believe that they'd pay much attention to speeches. But something changed their mind. The Rusk folks--the diplomats--think that they got some, some key here. Nixon has said something. I thought he'd had some effect, but he kept quiet. He did send Smathers down and wanted to know if we'd stop the bombing, and I didn't tell him anything. I just said, "Our position is the same as it's always been. We're anxious to stop it. We want to stop it. And if they'll meet with the GVN, and not bomb the room we're in--not blow us up, why we'll sure do it." But that's been our position all along. I've said it publicly--at San Antonio--a hundred times, and that's all it is. When and if it gets beyond that, before we stop the bombing, I'm going to talk to every candidate. You can tell Nixon that, you can tell Humphrey and everybody else, and I am before I stop it. That doesn't mean, though, before I sign up. But I'm telling you more than I'm telling any human except Rusk and Clifford, and I just want you to help me and advise me, and--how would you interpret their pulling out?
Mansfield: Just about the way you did. But I wouldn't give up hope. I would keep pushing them.
President: We are. I told Rusk this morning to tell them that they said, well, that one day--they couldn't get them there. We said: "Well, we'll take one week."
Mansfield: Sure.
President: "Or if you want, why we'll take one month. You just go on and get them. Lock them and put them in a goddamn trailer and get an oxcart to bring them if you want to. But the moment you deliver them, whenever you're ready, we're ready."
Mansfield: Yeah.
President: And tell--they said, well, that they're liable to interpret this one day--we said we'd meet the next day--as a condition, a new condition of the United States. That's what the North Vietnamese said: "The United States is imposing a new condition when it says they'll meet the next day." And our people said: "No, that's your language. In our talk, you said that if we stop the bombing, serious talks can begin the next day. So that's what we're doing." Well, they said, "That's interesting. But we'll have to go to Hanoi. We don't have the authority." Now this fellow's gone back to Hanoi; after Bundy made his speech, he just lit out for Hanoi right quick. And I don't know whether George Ball--George is a good man, but he's not the brightest fellow all the time, and I think he advised Humphrey to make another statement. And another thing that's real bad is that they were working on Humphrey's speech over in Paris. That's just inexcusable, don't you think?
Mansfield: I do indeed.
President: Well, I just thought you ought to know it because it may blow on us someday, and I couldn't help it--didn't know it until after it was over with. Cy Vance came back and I asked him what the hell they were doing listening to this speech. And he said, "Well, he had his superior, and Averell had been Democratic governor, and he felt very strong." And I said, "Well, now, your first instruction was to have no politics in this." He said, "Well, they talked to him." I said, "Who'd you talk to?" He said he couldn't remember. I just look at him and laughed. I said, "Cy, you Wall Street lawyer, you're telling me a man come from the United States and talked to you about this and you can't remember?" and laughed and said, "Yeah, George Ball's partner."/7/
/7/George Fitzgibbon.
Mansfield: George Ball's partner?
President: Yeah. Um-hm. So it was messy. And then Averell had been meeting with George Ball the week before. And Averell's a little bit old. I really wish I had Clifford in those negotiations because, God, he's smart and able and tough on negotiators.
Mansfield: He can't do it in his position.
President: No. No, he couldn't. He'd be the war-monger, you know. I wouldn't even let him go by there when he went to Germany this time. I could have Goldberg, but Goldberg just talks all the time. And he wants to be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He says you've got to be for him, and Dirksen's got to be for him, and everybody up there's going to be for him if I've just got guts enough to name him.
Mansfield: Well you handled that right. You handled that right.
President: Well, I haven't handled it yet. It's still--
Mansfield: Well, that's what I mean, the way you did.
[The President laughs.]
[Omitted here is discussion of the nomination of Special Assistant Harold Barefoot Sanders to a circuit court judicial appointment in Texas.]
President: Well, you please don't discuss this with anybody. When the newspaper men ask you about it, I think what I'd say is that you believe the man wants to stop the bombing more than anybody else--that Johnson has got more in it himself than anybody who's in it everyday. But he has taken his position and he has offered his proposal, and as near as you can tell, there is not one thing that has been signed on over there. Now that's a true, accurate statement, and all these rumors to the contrary notwithstanding. And then before anything comes, I will call you first.
Mansfield: OK.
President: Bye.
Mansfield: Thanks. Bye.
78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, October 16, 1968, 1126Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan/Double Plus. Drafted by Read and Bundy, cleared by Clifford and Read, and approved by Rusk.
256008/Todel 1284. For Harriman and Vance. Deliver at Opening of Business.
1. At the teabreak tomorrow you should tell Thuy or hand him a note, if you think that preferable for security or other reasons, indicating: (1) We have no intention of stopping the bombing until the DRV is willing to give us a date on which we can begin serious talks with GVN representatives present; (2) The DRV has repeatedly indicated that serious talks could begin the day after cessation and when the DRV advises us of the date on which such talks can start we are prepared to stop the bombing the day before those talks in accordance with our presentation of October 15;/2/ (3) We see no reason for further delay and urge proceeding soonest even though it may mean starting with temporary GVN and NLF representatives who could be made available promptly and then be replaced by other representatives on their arrival. FYI: From our point of view the presence of "warm bodies" at the table the day following cessation is important as a symbol and it does not matter if they are soon thereafter replaced by permanent representatives. End FYI.
/2/See Document 71.
2. As we have emphasized in our separate cable to Saigon,/3/ any delay will of course create a really serious hazard of leak. We know that you will be doing everything possible to handle this at your end, as we shall here.
/3/Document 79.
Rusk
79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 16, 1968, 1121Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Harvan/Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Bundy, and cleared by Read. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Seoul, and Wellington.
256007. Deliver by hand to Ambassador or Chargé.
1. Saigon should promptly inform Thieu that in private session in Paris on Tuesday/2/ night based on telecons only so far:
/2/October 15.
a. Our basic understandings on military restraints concerning DMZ and major cities were again restated without challenge.
b. We used form of words that clearly excluded reconnaissance, twice without challenge.
c. However, while expressing agreement in principle to GVN (and NLF) inclusion, Hanoi representatives said that they could not promise to get authorized NLF representatives to Paris on a date certain, but would do so "as promptly as possible."
2. Accordingly, we have decided that we cannot adhere to any schedule for announcement or action until we get a firm date from DRV as to when NLF representatives will appear. We are telling Hanoi at Wednesday tea break that we cannot set any date for cessation of bombing until we know a firm date at which formal serious talks would get under way with the GVN present. (On Tuesday night, Hanoi represent-atives rejected having the GVN present without the NLF.) We are going on to say that, once we know the firm date for serious talks, we would be prepared to have the bombing stopped 24 hours in advance.
3. You may tell Thieu that we are somewhat at a loss to explain this inability to set a definite date. However, we suppose it is conceivable that Hanoi and NLF have genuine difficulties and perhaps are troubled about transit through Communist China.
4. Saigon should thus report fully what has taken place in Paris. However, to avoid getting in the position of reporting every phase of the play, other addressees should simply pass the word quietly not indicating when or how received that Hanoi was unable to set a precise date for serious talks with the GVN present, so that we are waiting for them to do so. You may indicate that rest of information received did indicate likely arrangement along the lines already presented.
5. Above all, Saigon and all addressees should stress in the strongest possible terms the importance of maintaining security. This is absolutely vital from every standpoint.
6. Wellington should quietly inform Marshall or White, indicating that we were unable to reach Holyoake or Laking, but will do so tomorrow morning through Corner. Canberra should inform Hewitt or Gorton, and again we will tell Waller in the morning. Bangkok should know that we have not yet informed Thanat in any way, aid now propose to wait until the arrangement becomes firm, including the date./3/
/3/Reference is to Prime Minister of New Zealand Keith Holyoake, Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand John Marshall, New Zealand Ambassador to the United States F.A. Corner, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton, Australian Ambassador to the United States Sir John Waller, and Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs Thanat Khoman.
7. We assume Saigon will be letting us know in any event whether proposed joint announcement is satisfactory. We will try if possible to coordinate this with all TCC before the time comes for its use.
Rusk
80. Telephone Conversation Among President Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon, and George Wallace/1/
October 16, 1968, 11:41 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Among Johnson, Nixon, Humphrey, and Wallace, October 16, 1968, 11:41 a.m., Tape F6810.04, PNO 2-3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. An unknown White House telephone operator was on the line to arrange the call. Humphrey was the Democratic Presidential candidate, Nixon the Republican candidate, and Wallace the Independent candidate. From Washington the President reached Humphrey at St. Louis, Missouri; Nixon at Kansas City, Missouri; and Wallace at Los Angeles, California. The conversation lasted 18 minutes. The entry for this meeting in the Daily Diary reads: "Vietnam Situation--White House Release on Reported Peace Negotiations." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Hello?
Operator: Mr. President, I have not told them that this is a conference call. Do you want me to do so?
President: Do what?
Operator: I have not told them that they're all going to be on with you.
President: I'll tell them.
Operator: I'll put them right on.
President: Hello?
Operator: Just a moment. Go ahead please.
President: This is the President. This is a conference call that I have set up. I asked the operator to get the three Presidential candidates so that I might review for you a matter of the highest national importance and one which I know concerns you this morning. I will make notes of this--a transcription of it--and you are at liberty to do likewise, if you are prepared to do it. If not, you can take notes. If not, I will review it with you in more detail at a later date.
Nixon: Sure. Fine.
President: Who was that speaking?
Nixon: Yeah, I'm on.
President: Hubert, are you on?
Humphrey: Yes, sir.
President: George, are you on? George? Hello, George? Hello, George? Tell the operator that Wallace is not on. I think I will go with you. They told me they had all three connected. This is in absolute confidence because any statement or any speeches or any comments at this time referring to the substance of these matters will be injurious to your country. I don't think there's any question about that.
First, I want to say this, that our position, the government position, today is exactly what it was the last time all three of you were briefed. That position, namely, is this. We are anxious to stop the bombing and would be willing to stop the bombing if they would sit down with us with the Government of Vietnam present and have productive discussions. We have told them that we did not think we could have discussions if, while we were talking, they were shelling the cities or if they were abusing the DMZ. From time to time, beginning back late last Spring, they have nibbled back and forth at these various items. Each time they do, there is a great flurry of excitement. We have been hopeful one day that they would understand this. We don't want to call it reciprocity--we don't want to call it conditions--because they object to using those words, and that just knocks us out of an agreement. But we know that you join us in wanting peace the earliest day we can and to save lives as quickly as we can and as many as we can. So, one day we're hopeful, and the next day we're very disillusioned.
Now, as of today, they have not signed on and agreed to the proposition which I have outlined to you, nor have they indicated that this would be a satisfactory situation to them in its entirety. Our negotiators are back and forth talking to them, and they have just finished their meeting in Paris this morning. But, yesterday in Saigon, because there are exchanges constantly going on, there came out a report that there was an agreement that would be announced at a specific hour./2/ This morning in Paris the same thing happened, and Harriman had to knock that down./3/ We posted a notice here at the White House that said the same thing.
/2/See Document 75.
/3/See Document 76.
Now, very frankly, we would hope that we could have a minimum of discussion in the newspapers about these conferences because we are not going to get peace with public speeches and we're not going to get peace through the newspapers. We can get it only when they understand that our position is a firm one, and we're going to stay by it. And what y'all's position would be when you get to be President, I hope you could announce it then. Because we have really this kind of a situation. If I have a house to sell, and I put a rock bottom price of $40,000 on it, and the prospective purchaser says, "Well, that's a little high, but let me see." And he goes--starts to leave to talk to his wife about it, and Lady Bird [Johnson] whispers, "I would let you have it for $35,000." And then he gets downstairs, and Lynda Bird [Johnson] says, "We don't like the old house anyway, you can get it for $30,000." Well, he's not likely to sign up.
Nixon: Yeah.
President: The Bundy speech/4/ didn't do us any good, and there are other speeches that are not helping at all because these people--when they read one of these speeches and hear them, well, then they take off for Hanoi, or they do something else.
/4/See Document 63.
The government's position is going to be this. I--we are willing to stop the bombing when it will not cost us men's lives, when the Government of South Vietnam can be a party to the negotiations, and when they will not abuse the DMZ and not shell the cities. Now, we do not have to get a firm contract on all these three things. But I do have to have good reason to believe that it won't be on-again-off-again Flanagan; that I won't have to stop bombing one day and start it the next. Now, obviously, they can deceive me, and we know that in dealing with the Communists that they frequently do that. We have had a good many experiences in that right in these negotiations.
But what I called you for was to say in substance this: our position has not changed. I do not plan to see a change. I have not issued any such orders. I will talk to each of you before I do, and all of you on an equal basis. I know you don't want to play politics with your country. I'm trying to tell you what my judgment is about how not to play politics with it, and I know all of you want peace at the earliest possible moment, and I would just express the hope that you be awfully sure what you are talking about before you get into the intricacies of these negotiations. Over. Now, I'll be glad to have any comment any of you want to make or answer any questions.
Humphrey: No comment, Mr. President. Thank you very much.
Nixon: Well, as you know, my--this is consistent with what my position has been all along. I made it very clear that I will make no statement that will undercut the negotiations. So we'll just stay right on there and hope that this thing works out.
President: George, are you on?
Wallace: Yes, sir, Mr. President, and of course, that's my position all along, too--is the position you stated, yes, sir, and I agree with you that we shouldn't play any politics in this matter so that it might foul up the negotiations in any manner.
President: Thank you very much. Now, what our policy is going to be I think all of you should know. It's not going to be an impetuous or hasty policy. I've outlined it to you. I do not want you to speak about it. I do not want you to lay down these points, because if you do, that causes them to say that they're conditions and it's reciprocity, and they may be able to take them if they don't think they're going to get something better by just waiting a few weeks or a few days. Now--so I think it is very important that this be confidential. Do you know whether your talking to me is knowledge to any of your people?
Nixon: In my case, the phone was picked up by somebody here--I'm at the Union Station in Kansas City--the phone was picked up by somebody else. It may be known, but I will seal them down. I'll just tell them we got a routine report.
President: Okay. If anybody asks, we will not mention it here, if they ask us, that we stated the facts as we see them. Namely, that there has been no agreement between us, that we will constantly negotiate, and when there is, well, the candidates will be among the first informed. Now, I'm not going to agree to anything unless my advisers--the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and all the Joint Chiefs themselves--consider the matter and give me their best judgment. And I get that from time to time. And it is all of their best judgment now at this moment that the position I have stated to you is the soundest position for this country. Namely, the Government of Vietnam must be included, and we could not expect an American President to have good discussions very long if they were shelling the cities or if they were abusing the DMZ.
Humphrey: Mr. President?
President: Yes?
Humphrey: It's obvious that I am here at a school and I'm all alone. There's nobody with me, and they do not know that I've got a call from you. But I have been held up at a meeting, and the press is very alert. I'm just simply--is it all right to just simply say that we've had our regular report?
Nixon: That's good.
President: Well, what I'm fearful of--I'm afraid if they think that we're doing this, it will put a seriousness on it that wouldn't be justified.
Humphrey: What can we say?
President: I think, if you want to, I will just say that I called the three of you and I read to you the notice that Christian has posted here this morning--
Humphrey: Very good.
President: Which I will read to you now. It, in effect, says that these reports are premature, that there has been no agreement, and that we're not signed on with them at all.
Nixon: Good.
President: Let me read it to you. "The position of the United States with respect to Vietnam remains as set forth by the President and Secretary of State. The position"--you can write this down--"The position of the United States with respect to Vietnam remains as set forth by the President and the Secretary of State. There has been no basic change in the situation; no breakthrough."
Humphrey: All right.
President: "As you have been advised, when there is anything to report, you will, of course, be informed promptly."
Nixon: Right.
Humphrey: Now, I want to make this point to all of you candidates. First, I think you want to know what the situation is so you won't jeopardize it. Second, I don't want any one of the three of you to think that I am going to give a preference to any person. When we know what is happening that is significant to you, I will call each one of you just as quickly as I can before I would issue any orders. I think I have that obligation to you for your responsibility. So, don't think you are going to get tricked or deceived.
Now, we will be negotiating. We might sign up in--5 minutes ago. Our judgment is we won't. But this is our position. They have not accepted it, and I'm going on until January 20 along this line. I don't say there won't be some modification or moderation. But, in principle, this formula must be our government position as long as I'm here. Over.
Nixon: We got it.
President: Is that clear to all of you?
Nixon: We'll maintain your position. And Mr. Vice President, I'll see you tonight.
Humphrey: Yes, sir. Thank you.
Nixon: At the Al Smith Dinner./6/
/6/For the President's remarks at the annual Al Smith Dinner that evening in New York, at which both Nixon and Humphrey were present, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 1041-1043. Nixon noted that the President reassured him that he was still intent on achieving reciprocal action from the North Vietnamese before he would assent to a termination of the bombing effort during the dinner. (Ibid.) In his memoirs, Nixon recalled the conversation: "There was no breakthrough in Paris. The rumors were wrong. He urged us not to say anything. He said that there had in fact been some movement by Hanoi, but that anything might jeopardize it. I asked for some assurance that he was still insisting on reciprocity from the Communists for any concessions on our part, and Johnson replied that he was maintaining that three points had to be met: (1) Prompt and serious talks must follow any bombing halt; (2) Hanoi must not violate the Demilitarized Zone; and (3) the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese would not carry out large-scale rocket attacks against South Vietnam's major cities. If these conditions were fulfilled, of course, I would support whatever arrangements Johnson could work out." See Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 325.
Humphrey: What time are you coming?
Nixon: I'll be there; I'm flying in from Kansas City. I'll be there about 7:30 p.m.
Humphrey: Are you coming in at the beginning of the dinner?
Nixon: Oh, yes. I'll get there. You won't make it that early?
Humphrey: Are you wearing a white tie?
Nixon: Oh, yes.
Humphrey: I gather. Okay.
Nixon: I've got to go home and put the thing on.
Humphrey: Okay.
Nixon: All right. Thank you.
Wallace: Goodbye.
President: Goodbye, George.
Wallace: Mr. President?
President: Yes, George?
Wallace: Now, you asked if anyone knew about this call. Now, the Secret Service did know about the call.
President: That's all right. We won't say anything about it, unless they quiz you. If they quiz you, the reporters, you say the President read you the memorandum which stated that the government position would remain as set forth by him in his public speeches, and there had been no change--the rumors to the contrary--there had been no breakthrough, and that he wanted to inform me of this fact because of the gossip so I wouldn't be up in the dark, and that he would keep me informed if there is any action taken.
Humphrey: Very good.
Wallace: Well, Mr. President, do you think continued talk about the matter of Vietnam is endangering the peace talks in any manner?
President: Well, I think it's what you say--what people say--that does. I think that if they think that either Wallace or Humphrey or Nixon--if they can hold out 3 more weeks and get a little better deal--buy the horse a little cheaper from you than they can from me, they're going to wait. You know that much.
Wallace: Yes, sir. But as long as we're strong. I've taken a strong position, and I don't want to do anything or say anything.
President: I know. What I'd do, I'd just give my views on it, but I'd bear in mind constantly that the enemy is looking at everything that's said in this country. We had a speech made day before yesterday, and a few hours later, they came in and said, "Well, we've got to go back to Hanoi." And they did. Now, I think if I were in their place and I were negotiating, and I read that Ho Chi Minh was in a sick bed, and in 3 weeks he would be out, and a better deal's awaiting me, and the new--and the new President would really do better than he's doing, I just don't think I would dash in. Don't you feel that way?
Wallace: I agree with you.
President: Anybody that ever bought a cat knows that. And let's just all try to stay together. I suggested to Secretary Rusk that he get all three of you to sign a statement that would say our government has taken a position; we cannot change that position until January 20th; therefore, we will stand behind that position until we take office, and then let Harriman read that to them so they would know it. But before we got around and got the thing written, why it kind of blew up, and we decided it wasn't wise to do it.
But whatever you can do in the way of peace offers or things of that kind, I would be awfully careful. As a matter of fact, I never will agree to one sentence until I have gone over it with my Joint Chiefs of Staff and Rusk and Katzenbach and Clark Clifford and Dick Helms. And if I am afraid to make a statement like that with all of these people advising us constantly, you can imagine how a fellow is out at a box supper or a school or at a country picnic--he's shooting from the hip. And I just hope that you'll understand that if you make a statement and it blows these conferences, I think it will hurt you more than you will gain from talking about the details of a peace offer right now. Wait until you get to January 20th, and then you can really get into it deep.
Wallace: Mr. President, I'm not even going to say a thing to the newsmen if they ask me. I'm just going to say that I'm just campaigning. How's that?
President: That's okay. Thank you, gentlemen.
Nixon: Very good.
Wallace: Thank you, Mr. President. Bye-bye.
81. Telephone Conversation Between Senator Everett Dirksen and President Johnson/1/
October 16, 1968, 3:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, October 16, 1968, 3:27 p.m., Tape F6810.04, PNO 5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. From Washington Johnson placed the call to Dirksen, who was in Champaign, Illinois, in order to inquire about a statement the Senator had made during a speech in Chicago. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) This conversation followed a telephone call Johnson had made to Dirksen earlier that day regarding his briefing of the Presidential candidates. Dirksen made the following pledge: "You stand your ground and I stand with you." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, October 16, 1968, 1:40 p.m., Tape F6810.04, PNO 4)
President: Everett?
Dirksen: Yeah?
President: Everett, there's two things I wanted to raise with you. First, we're being asked about some statement which you made in a speech that any peace thing would be politics before the election, or something like that. I--
Dirksen: Let me tell you what that was.
President: I'm gonna dodge out of it. But I got out of this race to get out of politics and get into peace and I'm going to get peace any day I can if it's right up to the night of the election 'cause I got a lot of boys out there and I want to stop killing them when I can.
Dirksen: 25 reporters were in Chicago there at the lawyers' breakfast. The goddamned UPI said, "So, you think it's a gimmick?" I said, "I didn't say anything of the kind, and I'm not going to say anything until I find out what the story is."
President: All right, well, that's--
Dirksen: "So you think that's a gimmick?" I said, "You put words into my mouth, mister, and don't do it." He wrote that down. We just caught it down-state here.
President: Well, all of them are calling us and wanting to know what's our response and I just told them that--
Dirksen: You're going to tie it up and down for me.
President: We're not going to have any--we're not going to get into a fight with you. Now the second thing is we must not mention--we must not mention the DMZ and the shelling of the cities because if they think--if they think that this is reciprocity, their yellow Oriental face--they've got to save it. Now what we're doing there, when and if we ever do get a peace, we're going to say to them, that we will stop the bombing, but we want you to know that if you shell the cities, it starts it immediately. We want you to know if you abuse the DMZ, it starts it automatically. Now they can refuse to do something better than they can agree to it. Do you follow me? So don't spell out those things unless you have to. Now the main position is I think we've got to take is that the President has taken the position that he would not stop the bombing as long as it endangered American men. Therefore, you do not see how any man could want to stop killing the enemy only to start killing our own men. And that's where we're going to stand. And when and if they ever come under, why the first ones to know it will be you and Mansfield and the candidates, and I'll tell them all. But they have not--they have not agreed to anything like this, but we don't want to point out what they've got to agree to because if we do they never will agree to anything. Okay?
Dirksen: All right. Bye.
82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, October 16, 1968, 1514Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Harvan/Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Rusk, and cleared by Bundy and Read.
256063/Todel 1287. For Ambassador Harriman from the Secretary.
We have been proceeding here on the basis that a cessation of the bombing would be followed immediately by talks in which the GVN would participate. This is not only a fundamental point of policy but it is the only immediate and visible sign that Hanoi has moved at any point. This is a fundamental requirement because otherwise we would be in the position of a unilateral cessation of bombing with nothing in exchange. You have insisted that we not make public points of the DMZ and attacks on the cities because that would offend Hanoi's attitude toward "conditions." We have accepted, even though with some misgiving, your view that silence on the part of Hanoi on these two points was an adequate basis on which to proceed, with the clear understanding that we would resume the bombing immediately if we were disappointed.
We must have a day certain for the beginning of the talks in which the GVN is present before we can deliver our part of the arrangement, namely, the cessation of the bombing. A bombing cessation followed by a week or a month's delay in getting off to serious talks would create an utterly impossible situation both internationally and domestically. Bunker and Thieu simply could not manage the situation in Saigon under such circumstances.
The North Vietnamese Delegation has, according to your reports, said the talks could "begin the next day." We do not believe that we can abandon this idea on the grounds that this phrase was used at an earlier stage, before Hanoi indicated they would agree to the presence of the GVN and that the talks on the next day would be about the question of representation.
The visibility of the presence of the GVN, again, is the only thing we could point to in connection with the major move by the United States in stopping the bombing. Since the presence of the GVN is utterly fundamental we cannot take our step with ambiguity or delays on this most fundamental point of all. We simply cannot take any risk of being in the position of having to resume the bombing after a few days because we are wrangling about the question of representation.
You need not adhere rigidly to "the next day" if you can get a date certain within two or three days but we must be able to point to that date at the time of stopping the bombing if we need to.
I went over with Dobrynin last night your talk yesterday and found he completely understood the importance of this point to the President and said he would immediately report it to his government./2/ There may be some Russian help behind the scenes on this one.
/2/The record of this discussion is in a memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Dobrynin, October 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol I [2 of 3])
It seems to me that the simple fact is that we have accepted Hanoi's proposition, we are prepared to stop the bombing today and we want to know when they will deliver what they have promised to deliver. The object of the Paris talks is not to get the United States to stop the bombing but to move toward peace. The date is now up to Hanoi; we are ready. If Hanoi cannot deliver an NLF Delegation, then we go back to the drawing boards. When Hanoi can deliver an NLF Delegation, we can move.
You and Cy have handled these talks with great skill and we are all anxious, as you are, to move the matter forward. I hope you can overcome this remaining obstacle promptly. Perhaps you should let the Hanoi Delegation know that you are ready for another private meeting just as soon as they have heard from their government.
Rusk
83. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 17, 1968, 8:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts (1 of 2). No classification marking. This was a regular daily meeting of the Secretary of Defense's top civilian advisers. The attendees are not indicated but usually included Clifford, Nitze, Warnke, Goulding, Elsey, and Pursley. Also see Clark M. Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 491.
CMC mutters he had to be back at W.Hse. again last nite (but on another matter unspecified).
0845 CMC: "There have been so many leaks, I think I now have the right to get out from under LBJ order to keep quiet. Now that it's all leaked all over the world I want you men to have the background.
I've been hearing radio reports--some of them grossly inaccurate--& you men have to know I was called early Mon/2/ am & told to be at WHse. Rusk, Rostow & Helms were there--we were given docs to read./3/
/2/Monday, October 14.
/3/See Document 67.
Over Sat & Sun, in a private talk between Harriman & Vance, the other side for 1st time had indicated GVN could sit at the table in Paris. This was a sensational breakthru.
At a previous NSC meeting (when Geo Ball was there)/4/ the discussion had been as to what we could take as a minimum consideration (for stopping bombing).
/4/See Document 35.
--Presence of GVN
--Demilitarization of DMZ
--Agreement not to shell Saigon & urban centers
--Geo Ball had said he'd waive all three!
--I (CMC) had said I'd settle for #1--GVN at table.
This to be a condition precedent
the other 2 could be conditions subsequent
If they could agree to that one understanding, we could start talks--but we'd break off if they violated grossly the other 2.
This is about how the talks in recent weeks have developed.
Word has come back that this was going to be acceptable to Hanoi.
All day Monday phone to Rusk/Vance in Paris etc etc--
--discussions of Releases, backgrounders, conferences--
All thought out in detail.
All we needed was final word from Harriman & Vance that it was firm & when these talks could start--how soon after a (theoretical) Mon. p.m. announcement by LBJ of bombing end--we thought it could start in 48 hrs! We shot word out to Saigon--we even worked out who the GVN's man would be.
It all hinged on our testing Hanoi's good faith--if they shelled the cities etc etc--we'd know they didn't mean it, & we'd break off & resume bombing. This was the logic I (CMC) got LBJ to go along with.
But Mon. nite, still no firm "O.K." from NVNam's man in Paris.
We talked on Tues/6/--we worked out Press statements. We checked at lunch Tues about LBJ's 16 pt checklist. Had Bunker talked to Thieu etc etc etc--& system from LBJ to talk to all 3 candidates etc.
/6/See Document 72.
But Tues aft/even a new element was into the act. For the FIRST time in all the Paris talks, Xuan Thuy raised the point that Hanoi wld have to get NLF permission & consent & there would have to be NLF representation!
He said in effect--"Stop the bombing, & we'll try to get NLF representation to Paris" no assurance as to when, how etc etc etc.
We said--use your NLF Paris reps!
Xuan Thuy--"No, they're just newspaper men!"
Vance urged--"Go ahead & stop the bombing!"
CMC/Rusk/Rostow threshed around for hours. CMC says "I took the position we couldn't stop the bombing until we knew when the talks were going to start . . . we couldn't stop with no assurance as to whether we would have to wait for day after day after day or ever--for other side. So, now, we'll agree to:
--no signed agreement
--we'd stop the bombing if productive talks . . . start promptly we
want/insist/GVN man there
we don't care whether NLF man is there or not--it's OK with us--but we won't stop the bombing without knowing for a certainty there'll be a fast start."
From my seat, this reluctance by Hanoi casts a real suspicion . . .
We were prepared to stop the bombing last Monday nite & they knew it--but then they threw the hooker at us that they would have to dicker with NLF & this could take weeks!!!
The deal was to have been:
A)--we stop the bombing in return for:
B)--They agree to talks with GVN sitting in
When we were ready to do A, they suddenly put B into a vague never-never future.
CMC argument to LBJ:
For LBJ to stop, now, he'll be unable to show what he got in return! Because he would have gotten nothing. & he'd be subject to violent political criticism for doing it, all on grounds of LBJ trickery, for dom. pol. reasons.
CMC even angrier at some TV commentators who now say "Thieu vetoed the whole idea"--this will cause endless trouble.
CMC reveals that at one pt, LBJ had all JCS at WHse. (incl. Westmoreland in from the Hospital!) to be sure he had support & wouldn't be shot down from the rear!/6/
/6/See Document 69.
CMC says Harriman & Vance keep the Russians informed & Moscow is up on all this.
What we've done is disintegrate/end the NLF & so they have hardly anything left by way of strength.
CMC refers back to Monday--LBJ most of Monday still wanted all-three conditions & it took a lot of arguing to get him around to accepting anything.
LBJ is absolutely wild at Mac Bundy. He thinks Bundy's speech/7/ screwed it all up! We know from intercepts how Hanoi was elated by Bundy!
/7/See Document 63.
In the meantime, we're to hit VC as hard as we can with everything--the B[attleship] N. Jersey is South--we hit Laos too.
CMC spoke for 1 hr. & 10 mins. last night with Muskie by phone on "Round the World Tour d'horizon" (this was by arrangement worked out by GME[lsey] with Muskie's Admin. Ass't.).
(Dean Rusk calls at 10:00 to scream at us to keep quiet on V Nam!)
84. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 17, 1968, 1640Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Harvan/Double Plus. Received at 1:06 p.m. In a covering note transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, October 17, 2:15 p.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith Harriman's and Vance's report on their meeting to get a date set for the quadripartite talks. It is not until para. 11 that they get our basic propositions stated straight." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [2 of 3]) In a memorandum to the President, October 17, 9:15 a.m., Rostow discussed a telephone report from Vance on this meeting, describing it in the following manner: "Pursuant to authority granted them, Cy met this morning with Thuy. He made the point that the concept of meeting 'the next day' was Thuy's--not ours. What was essential from our point of view was that a date certain be set. If, for example, a date for the meeting was set on Monday, we were prepared to stop the bombing two or three days before. Vance found the subsequent conversation interesting. Thuy virtually admitted there was a split in Hanoi. There were some, he said, who argued that this was 'reciprocity.' Thuy indicated that he was arguing in the other sense. Lau joined the conversation and indicated to Vance how the hardliners make their arguments. It is now Harriman's and Vance's view that the earliest we can get a response is Saturday, and we will probably not get a response until Monday. Their case is based on day's rest for Tho, upon his return to Hanoi, plus some debating in the politburo in Hanoi." (Ibid.)
22579/Delto 840. 1. In accordance with authorization contained in State 256063,/2/ we met with Xuan Thuy and Ha Van Lau for 1-1/4 hours, including tea, morning Oct. 17. National Assembly Deputy Nguyen Minh Vy, two notetakers and an interpreter were also present on their side; Negroponte on ours.
/2/Document 82.
2. We said that since we had last met we had further confirmed that there had been a real misunderstanding as the timing of the next meeting after the cessation of bombing. Our government had assumed that the DRV side's suggestion to meet one day after the cessation of bombing would apply to any meeting, including a meeting at which representatives of the GVN and the NLF would be present. We said that our government had been reassured by the DRV side's expression of willingness to meet the day after a bombing cessation. And we had further assumed that the DRV had already communicated with the NLF and received its agreement to meet at an early date, in fact the day after the cessation of bombing.
3. We said it therefore came as a real surprise to us when Thuy had not been able to say when we would meet. Having explained the misunderstanding, we said that the question of meeting the day after the cessation of bombing was not as rigid as we had originally indicated it would be. But our government must have a fixed date for a meeting after the cessation and, if the DRV side gives us a fixed day for the meeting, we could assure them that the bombing would stop two or three days before that date. We said we were going into this detail so that there won't be a misunderstanding in Hanoi. It would be a tragedy if further misunderstandings should occur in respect to this matter.
4. We said we hoped that Thuy would communicate what we had said to his government in extenso.
5. Thuy said that at the time of our October 15 meeting/3/ the DRV had not known whether the US would stop the bombing if the DRV agreed to GVN participation and they had not arranged with the NLF a definite schedule for a meeting. We said that this fact contributed to the misunderstanding.
/3/See Document 74.
6. Thuy said that previously we had told the DRV side that the bombing would stop 24 hours before a fixed date for a meeting between the four parties. Now we say that it would be two or three days. Therefore, Thuy said, there is not much difference between the two proposals. We disputed this. We said what our government wants to know is that there will be a meeting and that it will be held promptly--two or three days after the bombing is stopped. There does not seem to us to be any reason for delay.
7. Thuy said that on October 16 he had communicated to Hanoi in extenso the memorandum we had handed to him at the tea break./4/ Thuy said that after receiving our memorandum he was afraid that Hanoi's views might change. What would be the nature of this change? As Thuy had said yesterday at the tea break, whenever the NLF steps up its attack against US positions in South Vietnam, the US clamors that the NLF is launching attacks while talks are going on in Paris; and when there is a "relative lull" the US says the NLF is weak and cannot attack. At these conversations, Thuy continued, the United States says that the DRV side has no good will, but when the DRV shows good will, then the United States raises another demand. This, Thuy said, was what he thought might be Hanoi's attitude. That is, the US will raise more and more conditions. However this morning we had given further explanation and Thuy said he would report it.
/4/See Document 76.
8. We asked if we had made ourselves plain. We had always assumed that there would be a prompt meeting, whereas the impression was created that we might have to wait a week for a meeting. This would create an intolerable situation. A prompt meeting is important as a symbol of progress and good faith on all sides.
9. Lau said he had a few questions. At the tea break yesterday, after receiving our memorandum, Xuan Thuy had expressed some views and, Lau said, he felt that those views have great importance because they deal with the substance of the question. The United States request that the DRV fix a date for a meeting before the cessation of bombing is a conditional one which runs counter to the United States affirmation that it accepts the unconditional cessation of bombing. Xuan Thuy had said on October 16 that he would report our views to Hanoi, including our memorandum.
10. Secondly, Lau continued, this morning we had had some additional word about the date of a meeting. We had also confirmed the existence of misunderstanding. Lau said that the DRV side will report this to Hanoi but personally he would like to say that the question of substance is the question of reciprocity. This matter had not been changed much by what we had said today. It is only a difference of a few days, and there is always reciprocity involved in the cessation of bombing. Lau asked to have our views on what Thuy had said yesterday, because, if there is a misunderstanding, it has still not been cleared up.
11. We replied we wanted to make clear that the misunderstanding is in Hanoi's mind and not in Washington's. We had both always accepted the fact that prompt and serious talks would follow the cessation of bombing. Our government had thought the definition of "prompt" to be one day because the DRV side had said that serious talks could take place one day after the cessation of bombing. Then we had had long discussions about the meaning of serious talks, and we had made clear that such talks must include representatives of the GVN. We had come to an agreement on the definition of "serious," but now there was a misunderstanding on the meaning of "prompt." We said it is very important for all to see evidence of good will and progress in these talks. We said we wished to repeat that we do not consider the question of holding a meeting promptly as a condition or reciprocity, but rather an indication of good faith on the part of the parties in moving to serious talks.
12. Thuy said that he would report our additional views to Hanoi immediately. He then said he had some additional questions for clarification. First, if the United States stops the bombing, how will the question of arranging for four-sided talks be dealt with? There are a number of questions in this regard which the US and DRV sides must discuss first. For example, the US had said that after the four-party negotiations had begun, there would still be matters of a purely bilateral interest between United States and the DRV. There is also the question of the rank of representation. At the moment Mr. Harriman and Mr. Vance are the personal appointed representatives of the President. Xuan Thuy is the representative of his government and holds the rank of a Minister. Will the US representation remain the same, or will its representation be at the Ministerial level? As for the NLF and the Saigon government, Thuy said, we don't know what their level of representation will be either. Will they be the same as that of the US and DRV, or will they simply be called representatives?
13. We replied that we were the personal representatives of the President and we would remain as such when serious talks began. There would be no change. We said we were already holding talks with Thuy holding the rank of Minister, and we were acting as personal representatives of the President. We said we didn't think this was an important matter. We added, of course, that if we did not conclude a settlement before January 20, we could not speak for the new President.
14. Thuy said then the DRV can take it that Harriman and Vance will represent the U.S. at the four-party conference. We replied affirmatively. We said we accepted that there will be matters of purely bilateral interest, and we have indicated in the past that we would be willing to continue private discussions with the DRV side on such questions. The plenary sessions, however, would include the four parties. The DRV side should recall that during the Laos conference Harriman had met privately with Pushkin almost every other day and Sullivan used to meet with Lau. Those kinds of meetings should be held as frequently as needed.
15. We then adjourned for a cup of tea during which they showed considerable interest in miracle rice and other Western technical developments.
Harriman
85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 17, 1968, 2007Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Harvan/Double Plus. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Read, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1301.
256998. Ref: Saigon 40515 (being repeated Paris); and Saigon 40516 (on which Paris was addressee)./2/
/2/In these telegrams, both dated October 17, the Embassy in Saigon described the procedural discussions in which it was engaged with the GVN. (Ibid.)
1. Referring to points raised in Saigon 40515, highest levels author-ized--and Paris delegation today conveyed--slight modification of our position to effect that, while we still insisted on fixed date for meeting with GVN present before order to cease bombing, cessation could go into effect 2 or 3 days prior to fixed date for meeting. As indicated in draft Presidential remarks, we expect shortly after time of joint announcement of cessation, to make clear that the meeting would in fact take place on the fixed date and with GVN representatives present.
2. North Vietnamese reaction to modification today in Paris, and tea break conversation yesterday being forwarded to Saigon septels.
3. We leave it entirely to Bunker's discretion whether this modification should be clarified expressly to Thieu at this stage. We believe that the really serious point is to establish publicly from the outset that there will be a prompt and definitely fixed meeting at which the GVN will be present.
4. Related question is of course what we would say in joint announcement. Saigon and Paris comments have been requested and forwarded.
5. Concerning Thanh's worries on procedural arrangements, we would appreciate Paris comments to us and Saigon. Our own tentative thinking is that participants should sit on opposite sides of the present table, with GVN and US equidistant from the center on our side and without name plates or flags (to avoid NLF having them). We would suppose it much better if GVN had a single authorized spokesman at each session. But these are preliminary comments to the major points. We tend to share Saigon's apparent feeling that Thanh is worrying the problem a bit harder than it deserves. But we should try to clarify things in his mind a little, and would therefore welcome Paris comments.
6. The modalities of the meeting should, in the Secretary's judgment be informal in character rather than highly rigid from a point of view of protocol. The meeting should be looked upon as an extension of the present talks rather than as the convening of a formal conference. The more formality the more difficulty the United States would have because we have been there and would be sitting with people whose very existence we do not recognize. It might be worth pointing out to Thieu that the greater the formality the greater the status of the NLF. The United States and the GVN derive their own status from their general international position and not from the way in which we have been sitting with the DRV in Paris. The Secretary believes that Thanh should be relaxed but that Harriman should be careful about these arrangements; the result might [must] be something we could all live with.
Rusk
86. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 17, 1968, 4:47 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 17, 1968, 4:47 p.m., Tape F6810.05, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Dean, well what's your evaluation today?
Rusk: Well. I think there's about one chance in three that we'll hear from them by the end of the week. That's about the way it sounds to me.
President: Why do you make it so low?
Rusk: Well, the way these fellows turn around. If they have got to go to the NLF and the NLF has got to go to their Central Committee, that sort of thing, I just think it may take a little time. I think that Averell and Cy are inclined to think that the answer will be yes, but I am not quite as optimistic as that.
President: You got all of your people to quit talking?
Rusk: I've really buttoned up the fellows here. Vietnam is just a forbidden subject over here. I did try to get NBC [television] today to come off of this business about we're being hung up by a great debate between us and Saigon. I just told them very much on a background basis that the allies are in agreement. The problem is Hanoi. Get them started in that direction instead of our quarreling with Saigon. That's not very good.
President: I don't know why Bunker didn't call them in for a little backgrounder and say this is just a deliberate untruth and there's not anything here that's holding up anything--that we have kicked the ball and the ball is in their court, and they can have peace any time they want it. Now we can't make up their minds. We have already taken action. It is up to them, and quit saying anything here about Saigon. And I just think we oughtn't send Thieu anymore stuff. To hell with him. I don't care. I am just tired of the son-of-a-bitch making that kind of stuff. It is just awful that his Foreign Minister and all that stuff just cause us all this damn trouble./2/ I feel about the same way about these little jerks that have got one battalion over there. I don't think it's necessary for us to stop our bombers because some goddamn fellow is back in the back woods and this son-of-a-bitch Gorton--I don't like that either./3/
/2/See Document 75.
/3/Gorton stated that he soon expected Johnson to make a statement regarding the complete cessation of the bombing. See The New York Times, October 17, 1968.
Rusk: Yeah.
President: You are going to have a great problem with me, Mr. Rusk, in getting my consent to go out there and do a goddamn thing except a simultaneous announcement. I'm getting ready to say something at 4 o'clock--we'll tell them at 3:30--but I am not going to come in here and let them screw up this thing and give us the pain and anguish and misery that they do for nothing. It serves no purpose.
Rusk: Well, that statement of Gorton's is the worst single thing that has happened, I think.
President: He is an erratic, no good fellow--I knew that the first time I saw him. And I think that Thieu is absolutely disgraceful, but he's got more control over his people than I guess that you and I have. And I just hope--I don't know who is reading these reports back from Averell. Does that have pretty general distribution over there?
Rusk: Oh, no. This particular Harvan Double Plus Series is Ben Read, Bill Bundy, and myself, and Habib, who has gone back to join the delegation in Paris--he's a member of the delegation.
President: That's all right, but you make sure they tell me--they come in everyday and tell me that State says so and so. You be sure Bill Bundy is not talking to anybody.
Rusk: Oh, I am sure he's not.
President: All right. What about--do you think that they'll report back before this weekend?
Rusk: I think there's a chance they could come back at almost any time because I would be very much surprised if the Russians were not working on this very hard the way Dobrynin welcomed my telephone call yesterday morning/4/ about the 2 to 3 days thing. I just illustrate--I said if they will meet on Monday we could stop the bombing on Friday or Saturday, and he was very glad to have that, and my guess is that the Russians are working on this very hard.
/4/No record of this conversation was found.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]
87. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 18, 1968, 1250Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [2 of 3]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 9:35 a.m. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of the telegram to the President, October 18, 12:00 p.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith a GVN problem if we appear to accept the NLF as a 'separate entity'--and not part of 'their side.'" The notation "ps" on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw the telegram.
40627. 1. Foreign Minister Thanh called in Political Counselor October 18 to inform him that President Thieu has sent instructions to Ambassadors Diem in Washington and Lam in Paris to "reaffirm" that if the NLF participates in Paris negotiations "as a separate entity" the GVN will not participate. The President, Thanh said, considers that participation of the GVN in negotiations would bring "no advantage" under such circumstances.
2. We asked what the GVN means by "a separate entity." The other side will obviously try to pretend that the NLF is something separate, which is what they have always said, and one cannot control what the other side says in the course of negotiations.
3. Thanh replied that the GVN is not moving away from its accept-ance of the "your side, our side" formula. They understand that the NLF can come as a part of the "other side" but the GVN could not come to the negotiations unless the status of the NLF was settled beforehand.
4. Pol Counselor said this is the kind of issue that cannot be settled either by agreement or beforehand and is best left unsettled, with each side holding to its own position.
5. Thanh thereupon said the GVN understands that the other side will "pretend" that the NLF is a separate entity but they want assurances that the US will not treat them as such. He pointed to the penultimate paragraph of the Honolulu Communiqué which had said that negotiations should "involve directly North Viet Nam and South Viet Nam."
6. Pol Counselor said that as I had pointed out to President Thieu last night (Saigon 40532)/2/ and as Berger had earlier emphasized to Thanh himself, these matters cannot be settled before the talks begin. We have always felt that it is important for the GVN to be present immediately after the bombing cessation and to make its position known./3/
/2/Dated October 17. (Ibid., HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. III)
/3/In telegram 22624/Delto 845 from Paris, October 18, the delegation noted: "We have made a make-or-break issue of almost immediate talks, and we cannot be in the position of being unable to comply on our side if we get definite date for meeting from DRV," and urged immediate resolution of the issue. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
7. The Foreign Minister was cautioned that it was of utmost importance that instructions to Bui Diem and Phan Dang Lam not leak out to the press, for it would make the GVN appear to be interposing new conditions to a bombing halt and appear to be involved in a major difference with US.
8. The Department will obviously be hearing from Bui Diem in the near future.
Bunker
88. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 18, 1968, 1430Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, Harvan-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret: Nodis/Harvan/Double Plus. Received at 10:53 a.m. In a covering memorandum transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, October 18, 11:45 a.m., Rostow described the Vance-Oberemko discussion as a "clarifying conversation." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [2 of 3]) Vance reported on the meeting by telephone that morning. In a memorandum to the President at 8:45 a.m., October 18, Rostow wrote: "Cy Vance just called with the following: Oberemko asked to see him to catch up on the situation. Cy took him very carefully through the whole position. Cy feels it was time well spent. Oberemko promised to use his 'best influence' to get his government to lead Hanoi over the hump. Oberemko himself had nothing new to throw into the discussion." (Ibid.)
22619/Delto 844. From Harriman and Vance.
1. This morning Minister Oberemko called on us at his request. The meeting lasted about an hour and nothing of real substance came out of the meeting. Oberemko was unaccompanied.
2. Oberemko said that he had come to find out what the status of our discussions with the North Vietnamese is. We told him that we believed his government had been informed through Washington, but that we would be happy to bring him up-to-date. We thanked him for the constructive part he had been playing in our discussions here.
3. We outlined briefly the current situation, concluding that the ball was now in Hanoi's court. Oberemko said that he had been in touch with the North Vietnamese and that they felt that we had imposed a new condition at the last moment, i.e., that talks must begin within 24 hours. We said that no new condition had been imposed, that the issue was one of definition of "prompt" and that, assuming good faith on the part of the North Vietnamese, there had been a misunderstanding as to the definition of "prompt."
4. We said further that in any event we had now told the North Vietnamese that when they give us a date certain for the beginning of serious talks, the bombing will be stopped two or three days before that day. As he obviously wanted to be helpful, we explained at length why this is not a new condition but simply a definition of "prompt" talks.
5. Oberemko said that he felt that both the United States and the North Vietnamese were overemphasizing the importance of this final matter and that there should be a way to find the compromise. We said that we saw no way to compromise the matter, that we had already agreed to change 24 hours to two or three days, and that the best thing for both Oberemko and the Soviet Union to do was to use their influence to get the North Vietnamese to give us as soon as possible the date on which serious talks would begin. Oberemko said he would communicate our conversation to his government.
Harriman
89. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Vietnamese Ambassador (Bui Diem) and the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, October 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [2 of 3]. Secret; Harvan Double Plus. The memorandum was sent to Bunker and the Paris delegation in telegram 258305/Todel 1327 to Saigon and Paris, October 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968) Bui Diem repeated the same messages in a conversation he had with Bundy that same day. (Telegram 257720 to Saigon and Paris, October 18; ibid.)
Bui Diem came in today at 4:30, at his request. He said he had two messages from President Thieu.
The first states that disastrous consequences would flow to the morale of the ARVN and South Vietnamese population if the NLF participates in the conference--especially if this participation is in the form of the NLF being a distinct entity from the DRV. Bui Diem went on to explain that such eventuality could have very dangerous repercussions on political stability given the view in the Assembly and in Vietnamese public opinion.
If "the worst" should come and the NLF is included in the North Vietnamese delegation, it will be essential to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of that position and posturing as a distinct entity.
The second message informed Bui Diem that President Thieu is opposing categorically the presence of the NLF at the Paris conference, especially with qualification as a "distinct entity." It is his feeling that it would be very difficult for the GVN to participate in the conference under those circumstances.
I began by saying that I understood the problem posed by Saigon, but it distressed me greatly for a simple reason: the Government in Saigon appeared to be approaching the possibilities of such a conference in a spirit of anxiety rather than a spirit of confidence. I said that, of course, the other side would try to blow up the NLF. We would stick firmly to your side-our side in the spirit of what President Johnson and President Thieu had agreed at Honolulu./2/ This was not a time to express anxiety and concern. It was time to roll up our sleeves and get to work to see how we handle the conference to our advantage.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 303.
It was a time to organize and be prepared to mount against the VC in the South a psychological warfare campaign that would break their morale in the face of the GVN appearance in Paris and the closing of the DMZ.
It was a time to begin to draft a message from President Thieu to the ARVN to tell them what they had already accomplished at the conference table by their performance on the field of battle, and to tell them to stay with it until an honorable peace was won. I said we had been in the foxholes of Vietnam together; that it would be a great stroke of good fortune if we were to be able to work together in the foxholes in Paris, and we should work in diplomacy in the same spirit that we are fighting.
I reminded him that if Hanoi accepts our position, it will be a position that we took from the first day in Paris, and which President Johnson had assured President Thieu he would take. There was every reason in the world for total trust of President Johnson by President Thieu.
I summarized at the end by saying that the problem they posed--of how the NLF was handled by the other side--was a real problem. We should all think about the modalities we would negotiate with the other side before the conference. We should be prepared to handle their inevitable efforts to blow up the NLF. We should be preparing to make the most psychologically and politically out of a break-over in Paris against the VC, and to strengthen the confidence of the people and armed forces of Vietnam. If Hanoi says yes, the whole world will know that Washington and Saigon have won a great victory. The people of Vietnam and their political leaders should act on this assumption in confidence.
When I finished, Bui Diem said, I know and agree with everything you have said. The problem is that President Thieu has not listened to the advice I gave him when I was in Saigon before Honolulu. I begged him then to prepare our political leaders and our people for peace talks. He has made little preparation. And so now they are worried and in some confusion in Saigon with heavy pressures, especially from the Assembly, on Thieu.
He said he would report what I had told him fully as the words of a great and good friend of South Vietnam.
Walt
90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 18, 1968, 2210Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Rostow and Read, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1324 for Harriman and Vance.
258160.
Our Side/Your Side Formula.
1. Saigon 40627/2/ reporting Thanh's remarks on this subject has been followed, predictably, by approaches from Bui Diem here (septel)/3/ and Lam in Paris (Paris 22652)./4/ Needless to say, we share the grave concern expressed by Paris in its 22632 and 22624,/6/ and agree that we cannot open up the fundamentals of the formula at this stage or, above all, be in position of not having the GVN ready to come to the table if we get a definite date for meeting from the DRV.
/2/Document 87.
/3/See footnote 1, Document 89.
/4/In telegram 22652/Delto 850 from Paris, October 18, the delegation reported that Lam had stated that "he did not believe that his Foreign Minister understood the our side-your side formulation" and that Lam apparently was "exercised" about both not being kept informed by and not having received instructions from his government. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-Outgoing)-October 1968)
/6/Both dated October 18. (Ibid.)
2. Equally obviously, we cannot hope to straighten this out by further conversations with GVN representatives in Paris and here. We are unable to figure out whether putting Bui Diem and Lam into orbit has been Thanh's personal private idea (compare his calling in the TCC representatives) or reflects serious concerns held by Thieu himself. In any case, we believe the only way this matter can be straightened out is through direct and frank talk between Ambassador Bunker and Thieu, if necessary with Thanh present.
3. Key points to be made at this talk, with supporting argument as you see fit, should be:
a. The arrangement proposed in Paris and apparently accepted in principle by the North Vietnamese does not in any way provide that the NLF is being recognized as "a separate entity." We believe that, just as the organization of our side is up to us, so we have to leave it to the other side to determine its own composition.
b. To attempt to define the status of the GVN or the NLF--and especially any attempt to get Hanoi to agree to a higher status for the GVN than for the NLF--is plainly doomed to failure.
c. This is why we have all along made clear that we did not expect to define the status but simply to agree on the fact of participation. (Indeed, from a legal standpoint we are not "recognizing" even the DRV by sitting down and talking with it.) As Ky summed up consensus of his colleagues at 6th consultative meeting, "as practical men we must accept" our side/your side formula. The fact of participation, with no recognition implied in either direction, has been made abundantly clear to the Hanoi representatives in the Paris talks.
d. On this record, there can be no question of the GVN failing to appear at substantive talks when and if a date is set. For them to take this position would be most harmful to US/GVN relations and to the standing of the GVN in the US and elsewhere. It would only dramatize the NLF and play right into Hanoi's hands. There can be no doubt whatsoever that GVN participation under "your side/our side" formula is bitter pill for DRV to swallow linked as it is to bombing cessation.
4. This is of course the central point to get across, together with getting the issue back into Thieu's personal hands. At the same time, we would suppose that Thieu's (or Thanh's) concern rests on political reactions that may have been received since they started talking about the possible arrangement both among themselves and with Assembly leaders. To allay these concerns as much as we can without losing the essence of the presently possible arrangement, we believe Bunker could go forward at this session to express our willingness to discuss the actual physical arrangements at any time. In our judgment, this had best be done in Paris where the physical layout is familiar. But Bunker could tell Thieu that we were prepared to pursue this question of detail in either Paris or Saigon, provided of course that it was clearly understood the discussion would have to be tentative and could not affect the fundamental attendance of the GVN.
5. Another possibility is that we might be prepared to consult now about subjects on which we would expect the GVN to take a leading role. We of course continue to reject the idea that there would be any single designated spokesman, but we do envisage that we would consult extremely closely with the GVN on what each of us would say on any given topic, and that as a practical matter there might well be a division of labor with one or the other taking the lead on specified topics.
6. We recognize, at the same time, that for us to get into either physical arrangements or the question of topics may have just the opposite effect to the one we are seeking. Moreover, we could get painted into a corner, particularly on the topics. We leave it to Bunker after checking with Paris whether to open up either one, or both, of these "safety valves." If there were to be a discussion on who would lead on particular topics, we have many thoughts available here and shared in staff paper being cabled separately to Saigon, but we would need to be very careful indeed, and it might be much better to wait until they have a first-class delegation in Paris, and can go over the whole thing there.
Rusk
91. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 19, 1968, 1045Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 8:50 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 600-611.
40697. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my seventy-first weekly message.
A. General
1. In early July, I summarized in my fifty-ninth message the events and trends, the achievements, and shortcomings of the first half of 1968. I think a similar summation of the third quarter may now be useful. Accordingly, this message is a review of the situation as it developed in July, August, and September. As in my summary of the first six months of 1968, this message will begin with an overview, followed by more detailed accounts of the salient political, military, economic and pacification developments. In my next message, I propose to cover the priority areas where we think it most essential to drive ahead and where we intend to concentrate our maximum efforts between now and Tet, i.e., in the next four months.
2. The major events of the past three months were: A) the Honolulu conference; B) the enemy's abortive August/September "third offense"; C) the assumption of the military initiative by friendly forces; D) the rapid build-up of the Vietnamese armed forces and their continued improvement; E) the gradual but steady drive toward pacification; F) the step-up in the attack on VC infrastructure, and plans for future intensification; G) the preparation of a pacification counteroffensive to be carried out November 1-January 31; H) the completion of the recovery program; I) the move toward political organization with the official launching of the Lien Minh and its new action program; J) the decision to allow General Duong Van Minh to return to Viet-Nam; and K) the gradual return of the economy toward pre-Tet levels. The enemy's strategy of "general offensive" continued both costly and unrewarding to him, but as the quarter ended there was as yet no definitive sign of a change in his strategy.
3. I think several important trends emerged from the events of the past three months. I characterized the major trend of the first half of 1968 as the movement toward a stronger, more self-confident, more unified Vietnamese people and government. This trend has continued. The expectation of a renewed enemy drive against the nation's cities served to maintain pressures for unity, cooperation with the government and maximum mobilization of all military and civilian resources. The subsequent failure of the enemy's military effort, plus the improved performance of both the government and the armed forces, further increased Vietnamese confidence in their ability to run their own government, to shoulder a greater part of the war's burden, and to determine their own future. This increased self-confidence was also reflected clearly in a marked decline in fears that the United States might impose a settlement which could lead to a Communist takeover. I should add, however, that these fears could re-emerge if intent underlying apprehensions are stimulated by new events or rumors.
4. Contributing heavily to the growth in Vietnamese unity and self-confidence was the effectiveness of the working alliance between President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong. This has been one of the major pluses for the period. Thieu and Huong have complemented and supported one another in the effort to prepare the people for peace negotiations and a future political contest with the Communists. Despite some obvious difficulties, Thieu backed Huong on his anti-corruption campaign and significant progress was made. He allowed Huong to run the government from day to day with little interference and supported his decisions, while Huong looked to Thieu for policy guidance and threw his considerable personal influence and prestige behind the Thieu regime. The result has been more effective government, significantly increased popular support, and continued, though not yet adequate, movement toward national unity.
5. The Vietnamese confidence in the US also improved. In late June and early July, the Assembly and the press were full of forebodings about American intentions. The lower house called on the US to put a time limit on the Paris talks and one Deputy called the absence of a Vietnamese representative at the talks "a national disgrace." By the end of September, these fears and suspicions had subsided to a considerable extent. The Honolulu conference and our firm stand at Paris were two factors contributing to this change. It also reflected Vietnamese relief at the outcome of our national party conventions. It sprang significantly from awareness of the fact that the military situation was greatly improved.
6. Also contributing to the trend toward more national unity was Thieu's efforts to nurture a broad nationalist political organization. The official launching of the Lien Minh took place on July 4 and some 840 cadre have been since trained for a high impact self-help social welfare program in Saigon.
7. The second basic trend which I observed in the first half continued; there was further movement toward constitutional democracy, government based on institutions rather than personal relationships, and civilian control of the military. Thieu is in fact now close to exercising the full powers vested in him by the Constitution, and the extra-constitutional power of Vice President Ky and the other Generals has continued to decline.
8. Perhaps the most obvious example of this trend was the removal, without repercussion, of General Khang as III Corps commander. Khang was not only the principal Ky supporter still holding a position of great power, but he is an avowed opponent of constitutional democracy. He thoroughly distrusts civilian politicians and the National Assembly, and he has never concealed the fact. His removal symbolizes the further decline of the power of the military group that took over the government in 1965.
9. Less dramatic than Khang's removal, but at least equally as important in moving toward constitutional government and full democracy, was the continued functioning of an independent legislature. While it was by no means all smooth sailing, the Assembly and executive continue an effective working relationship. Besides serving as a vital sounding board of public opinion, thus providing both a safety valve and a meaningful check on the executive, the Assembly hammered out several basic laws. These included the measure establishing the Supreme Court, the law governing the Inspectorate, war risk insurance, and an electoral law for the by-election in Saigon. Well along toward enactment were the laws governing the press, the political parties, and setting up the three councils provided for in the Constitution.
10. During this period the GVN continued to carry out its general mobilization program. By September 30, regular forces alone had a strength of 825,000; including the paramilitary forces, the total was well over a million. Efforts to upgrade and increase the strength of RF and PF continued, and self-defense forces were enlarged to over 650,000 men and women. While many weaknesses and shortcomings remain in the effort to effect total mobilization, when one considers what has been achieved from a manpower pool representing two-thirds of a population of 17 million, the magnitude of the accomplishment is impressive.
11. On the military side, the trend has been one of steady improvement in the position of allied forces and deteriorating capability on the part of the enemy. The enemy continued to suffer very heavy casualties; the total enemy KIA this year is already greater than for 1966 and 1967 combined. Although the August attacks made few headlines because they were smashed before they really got off the ground, enemy losses were almost as great as those suffered in the more spectacular May/June offensive. One result of these heavy losses is the growing proportion of regular North Vietnamese troops, a situation which is causing the enemy increasing difficulties in terms of local support and troop morale.
12. While the May/June enemy drive was markedly less effective than his Tet attacks, the decline in enemy offensive potential was revealed with far greater force by his almost complete failure to get the long threatened "third wave" underway. Except for a brief foray into the outskirts of Tae Ninh, the enemy penetrated no urban areas. He was forced to abandon his intention to attack Ban Me Thuot, and the main target--Saigon--was never seriously threatened. By defeating the enemy away from population centers, the heavy damage and loss of civilian lives that accompanied the Tet and May offensives were averted. This enemy failure, unfortunately, had the paradoxical effect that others elsewhere in the world did not take cognizance of the fact that he had tried, and failed, to launch a third offensive.
13. It is also notable that the withdrawal of friendly forces from the countryside to defend cities and towns did not reoccur, so the proportion of the population under reasonable government control continued to increase slowly but steadily despite the August attacks and is now virtually back to the pre-Tet level. At the end of the quarter, the government was developing plans aimed at increasing further its control of the countryside--the pacification counteroffensive. This took on new importance in light of the heavy emphasis by the enemy on the formation of "liberation committees." While these committees could serve a variety of purposes, it seems likely that they are intended primarily for a cease-fire situation. Given some kind of internationally supervised cease-fire, liberation committees could lead some credibility of control over wide areas of the countryside. It should be noted, however, that much of this is "old wine in new bottles"; that many of these committees are simply existing bodies under a new name and that more than half of them are in VC controlled hamlets and villages. In any case, it is vitally important that this tactic be countered and the government's plans for this, I believe, are sound. We will support them fully.
14. There is, of course, a debit side of the ledger. While I think it is fair to say that the overall situation has improved significantly in the past three months, important weaknesses and shortfalls still plague the GVN and its allies.
15. On the political side, it must be said that the progress toward unity which I have cited above still leaves us far short of the goal. The government needs much more popular support than it has won so far. For it to rally the anti-Communist majority for a successful political effort against the Communists, the Lien Minh must find a way to draw in other political groups, such as the militant Catholics, Hoa Hao, and Buddhists. Though the decline in Ky's power makes his relationship to Thieu less crucial, the continuing distrust between them remains an important political liability.
16. In some areas, the Thieu-Huong government has made important progress toward effective constitutional democracy; it must also be said that they have often proved less than skillful in handling problems affecting youth and the press and a few dissidents such as Truong Dinh Dzu. Corruption has been cut back and the attack continues, but it still remains a deep rooted cancer.
17. On the military side, we must note that despite his failures and defeats, the enemy still has some capability of building up for further costly offensives, in the hope of wearing down our determination to see the war through. His ability to withdraw to sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia, and North Viet Nam gives him a great advantage if this is his purpose. Nobody could tell us as of the end of September to what extent Hanoi believes its own propaganda about our losses and how they assess the likelihood of important American concessions in Paris. While we objectively judge their military situation to be very bad, they may subjectively still judge it to be good enough to hold out for American concessions.
18. Finally, the basic question is are we making progress, are we gaining or losing ground? In Viet-Nam, an assessment is doubly difficult because the very nature of the way makes defining victory or defeat so much more complicated than in most conflicts. I have outlined the progress for the last three months, the trends as I see them, and the remaining problems. After adding all of the factors, the pluses and minuses together, and making allowances for the imponderables, I can only say that I feel optimistic about this situation; that the steady, though not spectacular progress I have previously noted has continued and accelerated. The tide of history now seems to me to be moving with us and not against us; and I believe that if we persevere, this bitter war will serve to prevent future, broader conflicts.
B. Political
19. When I wrote the summary for the first six months of 1968, the Huong government was still so new in office that it was difficult to say much about its performance. Now, with only a little over four months to judge by, it is still early to come to firm conclusions, but I think it may be useful to draw up a tentative balance sheet.
20. Perhaps the first item on the plus side of the ledger is the increase in popular support which Huong brought to the government. He has a substantial personal following in the South. More important, his image as an incorruptible, tough, paternal figure has not suffered after four months in power. If anything, his speeches, his travels, and his public acts have brightened the image.
21. Huong has his detractors and his political opponents, and the Vietnamese public remains perhaps the most skeptical in the world. At the very outset Huong faced stiff opposition from the Revolutionary Dai Viets, some Northern Catholic elements, and some of the cliques around Vice President Ky. Ky himself predicted that the Huong government would not last long.
22. Huong's opponents adopted the tactic to trying to label Huong soft vis-ˆ-vis the NLF and pro-Communist elements. Huong cut the ground from under them, not without some political cost, by firing Doctor Phan Quang Dan and by taking a very tough line with students and the press. The trial of Truong Dinh Dzu and the Alliance leaders was in part this kind of response to the pressures Huong felt from his political enemies.
23. However regrettable some of these moves from our point of view, they at least proved effective in terms of Vietnamese domestic politics. Barring unforeseen events, such as a turn in the Paris talks considered unfavorable to the GVN, there seems no immediate danger that Huong's opponents can generate any significant degree of popular pressure for a change in government. On the contrary, recognizing that their tactics have been unprofitable, the leaders of the Revolutionary Dai Viets have recently decided to moderate their opposition stance.
24. Probably the second most important plus for the Huong government is the anti-corruption drive. This effort pre-dates the Huong government, and it is due at least as much to President Thieu's support as to Huong's determination to clean up the government. With the sometimes free swinging support of the Assembly and the local press, Huong has given the fight against corruption new impetus and new prominence.
25. Among Huong's first moves against corruption was the revitalization of the executive Inspectorate system by placing it under Minister of State Mai Tho Truyen. Truyen's office is charged with investigating charges of corruption and documenting them. Truyen had told us that his staff cannot keep up with the volume of complaints they receive. A more recent administrative anti-corruption measure was the creation in August of anti-corruption committees in every province and municipality. They are specifically charged with inventing and implementing measures that will make corruption more difficult and less profitable. Also in August, the Huong government directed all civil servants to declare their property holdings, including the property of their wives, children, and parents.
26. Huong has continued Thieu's earlier efforts to remove corrupt officials, particularly province chiefs, and replace them with more honest and more able men. Since Tet, 23 of 44 province chiefs have been changed and the government has made known its intention to replace four more; while many of these were not relieved for corruption, the majority of those whom we had reason to consider notoriously corrupt were among the men removed. In the past such offenders were often not prosecuted or otherwise punished even though they were fired for corruption. In September the Huong government not only announced the removal of three province chiefs "in order to push forward vigorously the anti-corruption campaign" but also stated that two of them would be prosecuted for corruption.
27. The replacement of General Loan as Director General of Police by Colonel Tran Van Hai has also been important in reducing corruption. Petty graft and shake-downs by police have long been among the most visible and annoying forms of corruption from the point of view of the average citizen. Hai has removed, punished, and disciplined literally hundreds of police and police officials in an effort to end these practices. We have several reports that indicate he has in fact made significant inroads on this politically important kind of corruption.
28. The Huong government should also get credit for several meas-ures designed to realize Huong's belief that the government must make sure that the Constitution is applied and that all citizens are equal under law; in effect, to reestablish the government's authority. Among the more important of these moves was the effort to liberalize the processing of civil prisoners. Dismayed by the number of persons being held without charge in jails throughout the country, Huong ordered the formation of special committees to screen all such prisoners within a minimum time period. Prisoners were either to be charged and tried or released promptly. Huong himself visited a number of prisons to follow up his orders. The result is that several thousand illegal detainees have been released, and the police system generally brought more into line with the guarantees written into the Constitution.
29. The most notable beneficiary of Huong's move to free or try illegal detainees was Thich Tri Quang and several of his followers. These An Quang leaders had been put under "protective custody" after the Tet attacks. With Thieu's blessing, Huong acted to release them. This move not only dramatized the government's confidence and determination to support legal forms, but in Vietnamese eyes it also placed Tri Quang under a public obligation which makes it more difficult for him to attack the Huong government directly.
30. In line with this policy, Huong has also pressed Thieu to permit General Duong Van Minh to return to Viet Nam. At the end of the quarter Thieu took the decision, in part I believe also at my encouragement, and Big Minh returned to Viet Nam October 5. While Minh has so far avoided all efforts to identify him with the government or any opposition group, his return is widely regarded as a wise and liberal measure. I also hope that in the future Big Minh's considerable popularity can be brought to bear in support of the GVN and against the Communists.
31. The Huong government should also be given credit for pressing the civil defense program forward vigorously. After Vice President Ky dropped this project, Huong and his Ministers picked it up. With our encouragement, Huong designated August self-defense month, and as I noted in the general section, well over 650,000 men and women are now enrolled in self-defense units.
32. There are other areas in which the Huong government has registered achievements. These include his travels and speeches aimed at preparing the population for the coming political contest with the Communists. (He has specifically tied the self-defense organization to this need in a number of his speeches. Along with Thieu, Huong has worked hard to win a public acceptance of a negotiated settlement and the imperative need for political unity against the Communists in the peace that is coming.) While not temperamentally inclined to an easy relationship with the Assembly, Huong has succeeded in working well with Assembly leaders. Huong is also generally credited with increasing the efficiency of the Cabinet and the Ministries. He has focused bureaucratic attention on the priority problems and applied pressure for results.
33. On the negative side, despite real progress, the Huong government still has a long way to go in winning positive popular support, eradicating corruption, reforming the civil service and breathing more vigorous life into the democratic forms which the Constitution outlines. The major shortfalls as well as the major accomplishments are in those areas; it is not that Huong has not done well, but that there is so much to do and that time is so short.
34. The Huong government's dealing with the press and students has been mixed. Although one of the first acts of the Huong government was to lift censorship, it then proceeded to mete out suspensions and fines to some papers for false reporting and failing to take guidance on some issues. Criticism has not been stifled by any means, but the government has made clear that the press is not to print any story which may undercut the GVN position on peace, negotiations, or the prosecution of the war. Similarly, the Huong government has dealt sternly with some left-leaning student leaders which may have alienated some of the politically minded students who constitute the usual minority of the student body.
35. There were also the trials by a military court of the Alliance leaders and Truong Dinh Dzu. While these trials probably strengthened the government internally--certainly they caused virtually no expressions of opposition--especially Dzu's conviction had a most unfortunate effect on the GVN image abroad. I think it is also fair to say in this connection that in general the Huong government has been preoccupied by its internal problems to the point where very little has been done to promote its interests in the international sphere.
36. To sum up, I think the Thieu-Huong alliance has resulted in a government that is more popular, more effective, and more stable than any since the early years of the Diem regime. Nevertheless, the GVN faces monumental tasks; it must redouble its efforts if it is to succeed in forging the national unity and the strong institutions which are likely to be essential for success in the future political war with the Communists.
C. Military
36. When the third quarter began, it appeared that the enemy was prepared to launch a series of attacks against Saigon, Banmethuot, the eastern DMZ area, the Hue-Quang Tri area, and the area southwest of Danang. Allied forces aggressively disrupted this effort, engaging the enemy wherever possible, penetrating his base areas, and breaking up his logistics system.
37. Air strikes and artillery contributed significantly to the effort. B-52 strikes proved particularly effective. One Hoi Chanh who rallied on 22 September near Kontum City stated that air strikes had left only 40 survivors out the 450 assigned personnel in the 4th Battalion of the 24th Regiment. Recent evidence indicates that the B-52 strikes have caused serious damage to the enemy in all four corps tactical zones, and that the psychological impact on his morale has hurt his fighting ability.
38. The enemy was kept off balance, and when he finally launched what he termed his "third offensive" on August 18, he was unable to achieve any of his major objectives. He was defeated in sharp engagements at Tay Ninh, near Danang, and at the Duc Lap CIDG camp. He was forced to abandon his plans for an attack on Banmethuot, and although Saigon was rocketed on the night of August 22, the capital was never threatened by a ground attack.
39. Enemy activity peaked near the end of August and declined steadily in September. Our forces continued to pursue the enemy in September, inflicting further casualties and capturing very large quantities of weapons and supplies. By the end of the quarter, the threat had been met and defeated by allied counter-offensive actions. Enemy activity, for the most part, was reduced to attacks by fire against population centers and military installations, an increasing number of terrorist acts, interdiction of friendly LOC's and attempts to avoid battle with organized friendly forces.
40. The threat has not been eliminated. The enemy's access to sanctuaries across South Viet-Nam's borders is a tremendous advantage should he decide to rest and regroup for a new offensive thrust. But the capability of the enemy to achieve his objectives has been reduced. By moving aggressively in the pacification field to take advantage of this opportunity, we can strike a severe blow at his longer-term capabilities.
41. Enemy losses this quarter were again very heavy. Enemy KIA during what he calls the third phase offensive were over 23,000--nearly as great as that inflicted during the May-June attacks. Enemy forces lost vast quantities of arms and supplies as they were driven back and were hence unable to protect their logistics system. During the period January-September, we have taken from caches almost 8,500 weapons (over 900 crew-served), and over 700 tons of ammunition.
42. RVNAF also continued to expand and improve its combat performance during this quarter. On June 30 RVNAF had approximately 765,000 men under arms. This was an increase of 120,000 over the level of January 1. At the end of this quarter, the RVNAF strength had increased to about 825,000, a jump of nearly 60,000 men in a period of only three months. Total armed forces in this country, as I said above, are now well over the million mark. This would be the equivalent, on our much larger population base, of an American force of 18 million men.
43. The RVNAF is also fighting better. MACV reports that ARVN forces have gained self-confidence through their victories in recent months, and show encouraging signs of aggressiveness in the conduct of their operations. The increase in firepower of GVN units resulting from issuance of the M-16 rifle and M-60 machine gun has caused a substantial change in the soldier's attitude toward closing with the enemy. Now, armed with a weapon better than the enemy's he has frequently sought contact with enemy main force units and shown less reluctance to accept casualties in order to decisively engage and defeat the enemy. Large unit leaders have displayed a new aggressiveness, and junior officer and NCO leadership have shown improvement, although certain units are still plagued by serious problems of leadership and training.
44. While it is difficult to quantify such matters, I call your attention to the conclusions reached by systems analysis of the Department of Defense in a study published in the September issue of Southeast Asia Analysis Report. It showed that since March of this year, ARVN battalions have been 56 percent as effective as US battalions in killing the enemy versus 48 percent during 1967. It concluded that this better performance by ARVN is equivalent to getting the output of an additional 16 US battalions against the enemy. The improved performance plus the increased RVNAF size have added the equivalent of almost 200,000 Americans between 31 December 1967-31 August 1968. This is the more impressive when one remembers the great difference in artillery and air support which the US forces receive. A separate study in the same systems analysis publication showed that per man, the US soldier in a maneuver battalion gets more that ten times the rounds of artillery supporting a Vietnamese in a tactical unit. I don't have a comparable figure for air support, but we know the Vietnamese get much less.
D. Pacification
45. July-August 1968 saw a stepped up trend in pacification recovery from the post-Tet low. According to the hamlet evaluation system, the rate of improvement was the sharpest of any three month period since the HES started in January 1967. September HES figures just available indicate a one percent countrywide increase in relatively secure population, bringing the total recovery to seven percentage points in six months.
46. Almost 67 percent of SVN's 17.5 million population is now regarded as relatively secure, thus practically erasing the Tet setback. If we look at rural population only, the same trend is evident. Relatively secure rural population has now reached 51.3 percent of the countrywide total. Contested rural population declined to 22.8 percent, and VC controlled rural population to 25.9 percent, by the end of September.
47. While the improvement in pacification prospects is attributable partly to enemy losses and emerging weaknesses, much must also be ascribed to favorable developments in several pacification areas--particularly improvement in RF/PF and in the attack on the VC infrastructure.
48. MACV's long-standing efforts to improve the neglected RF/PF are finally beginning to pay off. Their weaponry has been significantly upgraded, and more is in prospect as we begin the issue of M-16s. By the end of the third quarter 1968, RF/PF strength had reached 386,000, the highest ever. This rapid expansion caused a temporary shortage in officer and NCO cadre, but in August-September this gap began to be filled. Operational results for August (September data is not yet available) show that RF unit operations increased by 8,000 over July (16 percent) and contacts with the enemy increased by 300 (22 percent). PF unit operations increased by 7,600 (9 percent) and contacts by 330 (26 percent). The RF/PF killed 77 percent more enemy in August that in July, while their own KIA increased by 47 percent. We see no reason why this trend in RF/PF improvement should not accelerate.
49. The second notable development in July-September 1968 has been the coming of age of the attack on the VC infrastructure. Thieu gave the Phung Hoang program his personal blessing in July and Minister of Interior Khiem has been energetically pushing it. By the end of September the number of key district intelligence and operations centers had risen to over 200. We estimate that in 1968 to date between 9,500 and 10,000 VCI have been neutralized--either killed, captured, or rallied. It has taken a long time to get this program well organized and effectively operating on the GVN side, but the program has finally reached the point where it should make an increasingly vital contribution to pacification.
50. The GVN also continues to put in stronger leadership at the key district and province level. What was once the exception has now become the rule. Most province or district chiefs whom we recommend for relief are removed--if not always quickly, at least when "conditions" are right--a second province and district chiefs training course will graduate on 19 October. Minister Khiem has asked for our up-to-date list of poor province and district chiefs for his use in placing the new graduates. Police Chief Hai, the Chieu Hoi Minister and Refugee Minster Lu-Y have also acted rapidly over the past few months to remove corrupt and/or ineffective chiefs of police and technical serv-ices in the provinces. We count this upgrading as one the of biggest pluses in pacification.
51. Chieu Hoi returnee rates remained steady during the quarter; during July-September some 4,669 ralliers came in. In view of the increased enemy activity during August, including seven attacks on Chieu Hoi centers in the last week of August alone, the rates are considered favorable.
52. Another area of significant improvement is civilian self-defense, which indicates growing popular identification with the national government. According to GVN figures for end-September, the total number of participants in self-defense activities of all types was 658,934. Of these, 239,264 had received training, and 58,318 had been issued weapons. Popular enthusiasm was fostered by designating August as self-defense month. High-level GVN personalities participated in self-defense ceremonies and it was used to gain popular participation. The traditional reluctance of the government to put weapons in the hands of the people is gradually changing. Some local defense groups have performed well against enemy attack and they are an increasingly valuable source of intelligence.
53. As the quarter ends, the most promising development is the across-the-board pacification offensive now laid on for November-January. It calls for upgrading the security status of 1,000 contested hamlets, a major Phung Hoang campaign to eliminate 3,000 VCI a month, a special effort to rally 5,000 Chieu Hoi returnees, a campaign to increase popular self-defense groups to over one million people, and a major psywar campaign. The purpose is to galvanize the GVN pacification effort, and if we achieve even half of these ambitious goals it will be a powerful shot in the arm. Thieu is energetically pushing the offensive, and has accepted the proposals of our pacification advisors. Their initiative is commendable. Despite the many continuing problems in this most difficult of all Vietnam programs, pacification is back in stride and the outlook more favorable than in months if not years./2/
/2/On October 21 Rostow transmitted to the President a report dated October 16 on the pacification counter-offensive. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1C(4), Revolutionary Development Program) The President indicated his approval for a major land reform program in South Vietnam on an October 18 memorandum from Rostow. (U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Files, Land Reform-LBJ)
E. Economic
54. The economic situation in the third quarter began to shift slowly away from the pattern of the first half. The rise of spending, the size of the public deficit, and the monthly increase in money supply all fell off as the impact of mobilization passed its peak. Heavy import licensing ($42.9 million compared to $31.4 million during the previous quarter) showed renewed confidence. The increase in prices (about 30 percent so far this year) has not yet reflected the increase in money supply (up to 50 percent). With confidence slowly but steadily returning, there will almost certainly be further price increases in the last quarter of the year.
55. The rural economy moves toward pre-Tet levels of activity as transportation routes were generally open and a plentiful supply of goods available. At the same time, prices of many items bought by farmers rose while farm income remained below the level of the previous year, largely because of the situation in the rice trade. That situation was characterized by depression paddy prices paid to the farmer, low retail prices in Saigon, large quantities of paddy stored in delta rice mills and unsold on farms, and excessive stocks of imported rice in Saigon. On October 11, the Prime Minster told me that the government had decided to cut the present subsidy on imported rice in half, i.e., that the price of imported rice should be permitted to rise. Since the price of imported rice tends to set the market price, this will assist farmers. The impact on urban living costs should not be significant. The Prime Minister said the Cabinet would make a full report to President Thieu on economic matters in a few days. Announcement of action on the rice subsidy and other economic matters should follow soon thereafter.
56. During the quarter, USAID continued our efforts to promote economic recovery and growth. More than 21,000 hectares of IR-8 and IR-5 rice during the first crop planting from April through August. Sample average yields are five tons compared to two tons for local varieties.
57. A new program involving the training and use of village officials was initiated to accelerate the distribution of government-owned rice land. It appears that the government's goal of distributing 70,000 hectares by December 1968 will not be reached until April 1969; however, the December deadline was generally regarded as overly ambitious. With respect to land tenure in areas where VC "land reform" has been carried out, I have continued to urge President Thieu to develop and announce a national policy which would give present occupants title to such land if possible, and exempt them from back rents and taxation. He spoke favorably of such a policy during a recent trip I made with him to Ba Tri (where the government has received control of a formerly VC held area), and he has told me he will follow up on it. It would have to be coordinated with land tenure policy in GVN-controlled areas, and the problem of compensation for former landlords must be worked out, but these things can be done.
58. Despite a five month work stoppage caused by the Tet and May attacks, the hamlet school program for 1968 is almost on schedule. Eighty-five to ninety percent of the allocated classrooms (2,495) and 100 percent of the teacher training (3,238) will have been completed by year's end.
59. USAID also participated in the reconstruction of some 100 industrial plants damaged by the Tet and mini-Tet attacks. The GVN has provided one billion piasters and USAID $10 million for this purpose. These funds will permit long-term, low interest loans under the administration of the GVN's industrial development center which is technically assisted by the USAID industry division. The GVN grant is already over 70 percent obligated while the US Government grant is approximately 40 percent obligated.
Bunker
92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France and Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 19, 1968, 1933Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Read. In a covering note transmitting a copy of the telegram to the President, October 21, 8:30 a.m., Rostow wrote: "You may wish to see exactly how Sec. Rusk reported his conversation with Dobrynin. He suggested that you have this text available." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]) The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the telegram.
258563/Todel 1336. From the Secretary.
Ambassador Dobrynin called on me today at his request to transmit informally and orally certain views of his Government on Viet-Nam. He said that his Government had attached "due importance and seriousness" to the information which they have had in the last few days from the USG. He stated that the Government of the USSR is "actively assisting" in the present discussions. He said that it was important not to allow "additional obstacles" to intervene at the pres-ent stage. He made reference to a "concrete day" for the convening of a meeting and seemed to accept our view that the specification of a concrete day was related to the day on which we could stop the bombing.
He then turned to the October fifteen discussion in Paris in which he said Ambassador Harriman had seemed to make a special point of the idea of a two-sided discussion rather than a four-sided discussion./2/ He said this assumed importance because of the way in which Ambassador Harriman had emphasized the point. He asked for my views.
/2/See Document 73 and footnote 2 thereto.
I told him that it would be most unfortunate if theoretical questions should be allowed to stand as an obstacle to serious talks for the purpose of making peace. We had said that they can have on their side of the table anyone they wish. We have said that we would expect to have on our side of the table the GVN. It is entirely possible that each of those at the table would have a different view as to their status and the underlying theory. We ourselves have been talking with the DRV since April even though we do not recognize their existence. The DRV looks upon the GVN as "puppets" of the United States. The NLF pretends to be the spokesman of the South Vietnamese. I said that these theoretical questions could serve as a prolonged obstacle to the serious business of talking about peace. Such matters could consume as much time as the Palais Rose talks about an agenda. If the talks are carried out as we have suggested, anyone present could make any statements he wished to make, ask any questions he wished to ask and submit any proposals he might wish to submit. We should not let theoretical problems stand in the way of this process. Each would have his own view on such matters.
I asked Dobrynin whether this point had been raised in Moscow or whether it had been raised by Hanoi. He said he did not know. My own assumption is that Hanoi has raised it and that Hanoi may be having some of the same problems with the NLF as we are having with Saigon.
I see no solution to these theological issues other than to let each participant have his own theory.
The President fully concurs in the line which I took with Dobrynin and is deeply concerned about our apparent inability to conduct delicate business among ourselves and with our allies without the types of leaks, speculation and public statements which get in the way of either fighting the war or making peace.
For Paris: The Dobrynin visit may be the channel through which Hanoi raises this issue at this point. If the Hanoi delegation raises it in Paris, the above should give you your guidance for trying to deal with it.
For Saigon: Obviously, we have as much of a problem with Saigon on theology as we have with Hanoi. It is very important that Saigon not jump the tracks at this late date and move away from the our side-your side formula. Perhaps they gave their earlier consent partly because they did not really expect the eventuality to occur. Nevertheless, the United States cannot let such questions determine our ability to grapple with the serious issues of substance although we know that questions of substance will be difficult to resolve.
We are deeply concerned about the rapid build-up of resistance in Saigon to the course of action we are following in Paris, which we thought we were taking with the agreement of the GVN. The unfortunate delay resulting from Hanoi's refusal to set a date for "serious talks" plus President Thieu's most unfortunate recklessness in consulting political leaders far beyond what has been done in the United States, have permitted the South Vietnamese to stimulate themselves over these theoretical issues without having in front of them the advantages of practical steps of de-escalation. Bunker should do everything possible to slow down or reverse the momentum of this build-up of South Vietnamese attitudes including an effort to postpone the legislative debate now scheduled for Monday. Given the present attitude of Hanoi, there is no point in our having a quarrel among ourselves for nothing. Our experience in recent days in consulting allies has been a most unhappy one and will obviously have to be taken into account in future consultations. Hopefully Bunker can get Thieu to cut back on public statements, press conferences, parliamentary debates, at least until we know whether there is anything from Hanoi which even poses a problem. Bundy will be sending Bunker further suggestions along these lines./3/
/3/Document 93.
Rusk
93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 19, 1968, 1935Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted by Bundy, cleared in substance by Rusk, and approved by Bundy and Read. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1337.
258564. Ref: Saigon 40702 and 40703./2/
/2/In telegram 40702 from Saigon, October 19, the Embassy reported on a conversation between Berger and Ky regarding the Paris talks. In telegram 40703 from Saigon, October 19, Bunker noted concerns about Thieu's public discussion of differences with the United States. (Both ibid.)
This supplements septel from Secretary/3/ and was written before receipt of reftels.
/3/Document 92. A comment at this point in Rostow's handwriting reads: "and was written before recpt. reftels."
1. We assume Bunker expects to see Thieu soonest to explain 2-3-day time interval possibility, and to nail down GVN attendance under "your side/our side" formula as previously agreed. On the latter point, we agree with Paris 22673/4/ that exact procedures and how topics will be discussed will be best handled through consultation in Paris. Nonetheless, Bunker should have discretion on making clear our willingness to go into these matters in timely and appropriate fashion.
/4/In telegram 22673/Delto 851 from Paris, October 19, Harriman and Vance suggested: "We believe it is not desirable to pursue questions of details on procedures in Saigon. Procedures are a subject for negotiation and not to be laid down as conditions for NVN acceptance beforehand, as we fear GVN desires." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. II)
2. On joint announcement, Bunker is authorized in accordance with para 4 of Saigon 40677/6/ to proceed on the basis of the text contained in Deptel 258161 dropping clause in para. 2 relating to Honolulu statement for coverage in backgrounder if this doesn't cause major problems./6/ While we recognize the arguments made by Paris, we agree with Saigon 40677 that remaining differences should hardly present serious difficulty to Hanoi. (We must of course all recognize possibility that at some point Hanoi will insist on knowing exactly what we propose to say, but this is implicit in the whole situation and should not affect our clearing the present text with Thieu.)
/6/Dated October 19. (Ibid.)
/6/In telegram 258161/Todel 1325 to Saigon and Paris, October 18, the Department transmitted the following text of a proposed joint U.S.-GVN statement: "President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam and President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States of America announce that all air, naval, and artillery bombardment on or within the territory of (North Viet-Nam) (the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam) will cease as of (time and place). President Thieu and President Johnson have reached this common decision because they have good reason to believe that North Viet-Nam intends seriously to join them in de-escalating the war and in entering into serious talks on the substance of a peaceful settlement. They therefore have concluded that this step would contribute to progress toward an honorable and secure peace (consistent with the principles expressed in the joint statement of the two Presidents at Honolulu in July 1968). The two Presidents have issued the order to cease bombardment after consultation with the Governments of Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Republic of the Philippines, and Thailand." (Ibid.)
3. All of the above are serious and difficult issues requiring earliest possible clarification with Thieu. In addition, we share Paris's deep concern over the scheduling of a National Assembly debate for Monday in Saigon. Such a debate obviously presents grave dangers, first in respect to what GVN official reps may say as to present situation, and second as to resolutions or expressions from the Assembly that may tie GVN hands or be taken by Hanoi to vitiate positions we have taken in Paris. Our first choice would of course be postponement of debate on the grounds that the situation cannot be properly presented at this stage, and Bunker should make maximum effort to achieve this unless, in his judgment, such action by Thieu would be seriously damaging to over-all position in Saigon.
4. Failing this, Bunker should seek to go over with Thieu, with great precision, exactly what GVN reps will be saying. It appears that GVN representations to TCC, and possibly Thieu's representations to his own Cabinet and to others, have depicted the situation in respect to military restraints as one of "hard" agreement by Hanoi--which of course it is not. This could have grave dangers of Hanoi re-opening the status of the record on these matters. Equally, (and from the GVN's own standpoint) the more they say that there cannot be a cessation without military "guarantees", the more it will look as if GVN has made a major concession if a cessation is announced without any mention of such "guarantees." In short, it is a tremendous problem from any standpoint, and we believe must be played by ear to try to get most restrained GVN posture possible.
5. We agree fully with line Ambassador Bunker proposes to take with Thieu as set forth in reftel which was received after this cable and Secretary's septel were drafted.
Rusk
94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Vietnam and France/1/
Washington, October 20, 1968, 1750Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted by Bundy and approved by Read.
258607/Todel 1346. Paris for Harriman and Vance.
1. Saigon 40710/2/ seems to us a masterful argument, and we await the results of your follow-up meeting on Monday./3/ Neither we nor Paris have heard from Bui Diem or Lam today, which may suggest that Thanh has been cooled off on use of other channels./4/
/2/Telegram 40710 from Saigon, October 20, transmitted Bunker's report of his meeting with Thieu. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. II)
/3/October 21.
/4/In telegram 258566 to Wellington, October 19, repeated to Canberra and Saigon, the Department expressed concern over Thanh's comments to Australian and New Zealand representatives in which he expressed strong GVN objections to the inclusion of the NLF in the expanded meetings. The telegram noted that Bunker would "be making the strongest possible representations against such recourse to third nations on a matter already worked out fully between GVN and USG." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968)
2. If Thieu should remain unwilling to commit himself to GVN attendance in the event of an affirmative reply from Hanoi, we would have to consider other forms of appeal, and would want Saigon recommendations on next steps.
3. We are not quite clear on one point from Saigon reports, and that is whether Thieu has been told of the 2-3 day possibility having been presented to Hanoi. Time interval does seem to be his main problem, and it occurs to us that the interval could be presented as a useful time for him to get his delegation in place and for us to go over the procedural problems with his first team on the ground. (Indeed, we are inclined to view it in this light ourselves.) In any case, Thieu's public remarks about not knowing all that we do seem to require extra care (as well as possible mild rebuke).
4. On the procedural points raised in Saigon 40761,/6/ we would like Paris comments soonest. Our own thoughts on a few points are:
/6/In telegram 40761 from Saigon, October 20, the Embassy transmitted recommendations for dealing with procedural difficulties. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I)
a. Seating arrangements should certainly keep only two sides to the table. Indeed, one thought would be two separate rectangular tables facing each other, or a single table consisting of two parts put together on a lengthwise axis.
b. On positions at the table, the most convenient would surely be each of us equidistant from the center on our side, with staff on either side of each principal. But perhaps it would be better to start with the principals side by side in the center, minimizing any physical appearance of the GVN "opposite" to the NLF.
c. Name: can we not stick to "Paris Talks" through thick and thin?
5. The question of responses to questions on the status of the NLF is indeed a serious one. We would welcome Paris comments for further work here tomorrow.
6. One point we do pick up from Thieu's press conference/6/--that if anyone "on the NVN delegation" purported to speak "as a representative of the NLF", he would be invited to leave. This is, of course, quite unrealistic and would need to be shot down at some point. We leave it to Bunker whether to raise it at this stage in Saigon. Obviously, the NLF man will claim to represent the NLF and will probably say a lot about what a fine, upstanding group they are; the point is that we need not reply or indeed address ourselves to him.
/6/In a televised speech on October 19, Thieu stated that the DRV had made no concessions that would lead to a bombing halt and noted his opposition to the presence of the NLF at the peace table. See The New York Times, October 19, 1968. In telegram 40649 from Saigon, October 19, Bunker noted: "While we were annoyed by our first reports of his press conference, and would have preferred there be no conference at all, our irritation was largely due to the interpretative paragraphs of the wire services rather than to Thieu's own remarks. They were designed mainly for local consumption, and were not due to any fundamental differences of principle between us. Obviously what is irritating is that whole of the subject should be aired at a time when we are trying to keep it very quiet." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]) In notes taken during an October 21 meeting with Carver, Nitze recorded: "Why did Thieu over-react? Running up warning flag showing how quickly he cld. move. Signal to Bunker that he as far forward as tolerable. Thieu lost face. Unfortunate in timing. Caused Ky to dig in his heels. Might generate threat which didn't previously exist." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Defense Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Notes 1968, 6 of 6) A CIA memorandum to Rostow and Rusk forwarded by the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans, Thomas Karamessines, October 21, cited an intelligence source who suggested that despite the "unfortunate propaganda" of Thieu's statement, "both Ky and Thieu are willing to settle for an NLF presence at Paris so long as the GVN does not appear to be placed on an equal footing with the Front." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-207A, Deputy Director of Operations, Folder 1)
Rusk
95. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, October 21, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]. Secret; Nodis; Harvan Double Plus. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of the report to the President, October 21, 10:25 a.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith Read's notes of his secure telephone conversation with Vance." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the memorandum. The full report of this secret meeting between the delegations was transmitted in telegram 22742/Delto 857 from Paris, October 21. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) A summary was transmitted in telegram 22724/Delto 854 from Paris, October 21. (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
Cy Vance called at 9:30 on the secure phone to make the following points:
1. Harriman and Vance met for four hours with Thuy and Lau this morning, Vance summarized by saying "there was no agreement" but they had moved towards our position on several points and indicated flexibility on others.
2. Thuy opened by proposing a joint communiquéé which would have three paragraphs: -1-A statement about stopping all bombing without conditions on a date left blank; -2-Reference to a ''four power conference" to be called after cessation; -3-A statement that the conference would convene "as soon as possible" after cessation.
3. On the first paragraph after discussion the DRV agreed to the adoption of our phrase concerning "acts involving use of force", and Harriman and Vance interpreted this to mean that they have given up on the reconnaissance issue.
4. On the second paragraph Harriman and Vance made clear that any reference to a "four power conference" was completely unacceptable to us. Thuy then proposed referring to the four participants by name, and Harriman and Vance said it would be essential from our point of view to get in the "our side your side" language.
5. On the third paragraph Harriman and Vance said the "as soon as possible" language was totally unacceptable. Thuy at first spoke of it taking a period of weeks for the NLF to appear in Paris but gave ground rapidly on this issue and left them finally with the impression that the NLF could be there one week following cessation. Harriman and Vance indicated one week was too long.
6. Thuy claimed the reason a joint communiqué was necessary was that there be no further misunderstandings and indicated concern at the statements coming out of Saigon.
7. Harriman and Vance spoke of four options: -1-Letting the actions of cessation and subsequent agreed early meeting speak for themselves, which we indicated was our preference; -2-separate US & DRV statements about cessation & subsequent meeting; -3-A joint minute; and -4-The joint communiqué. Summarizing, they repeated our strong preference for the first but did not rule out the other three options. Thuy said that they would report back to Hanoi and asked us to report back to Washington.
8. Harriman and Vance believed Thuy expects us to come back to him at the next stage with our further comments on how to proceed.
Ben Read
96. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 21, 1968, 1133Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 8:38 a.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
40788. 1. FonMin Thanh afternoon Oct 21 presented me with memorandum, of which text below, which he said he had been instructed by President to hand to me and which he subsequently discussed in some detail. An account of the ensuing discussion and comments follow in septel./2/ Thanh also mentioned that he is having trouble with rapid code transmission to Paris, and I offered to have text of his memorandum transmitted to Amb Lam by our delegation. I would appreciate if this could be done immediately. (We have renumbered paragraphs for easy reference. This should be explained to Amb Lam, so that he does not refer to paragraphs by the same numbers in his communications with Saigon.)
/2/Telegram 40794 from Saigon, October 21. (Ibid.)
2. Begin Text. The position of our government rests on the following basic principles:
a. The Government of the RVN is a legal, elected, constitutional government, recognized by more than 90 countries and has diplomatic relations with more than 30 countries. The Government of the RVN participates in numerous international conferences and is full member of most of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. The parliament of the RVN is member of the International Parliamentary Union.
B. The NLF is only but an organization created, directed and supported by Hanoi. It is a tool of Hanoi in its policy of aggression against South Vietnam.
3. Consequently, our government will not participate in any conference in which the NLF is represented as a distinct entity from North Vietnam.
4. In any case, it is to be avoided that even the appearances give credit to the pretension of the NLF to represent anyone in South Vietnam
5. It is necessary to reach a prior agreement with Hanoi on these details of procedure:
6. Point One. The delegation of the RVN will sit behind a table board, bearing the name "Government of the RVN."
A. The "two-sides" formula does not mean that our delegation has not its own existence and that it is part of the US delegation.
B. The truth is that on our side, there are 6 allied governments which entertain diplomatic relations with the RVN and are assisting the RVN repel the North Vietnamese aggression.
C. Of course, we will not object that Hanoi has a board of its own. But, we will not accept a board bearing the name of the NLF on the other side of the conference table.
7. Point Two. Seating arrangement at the conference table: On our side, the seats of the RVN and US delegation are distinct and cannot be subject to any confusion or give the interpretation that the RVN delegation is part of the US delegation.
8. Point Three. Procedure of speech:
A. At the moment, each side speaks first when opening the sessions alternatively.
B. When it will be the turn for our side to open that session, we propose that the RVN delegation speak first on all military and other matters which will be brought at the conference table.
C. We think that the US delegation should discuss military matters such as: cease fire, regrouping of forces, withdrawal of forces, military bases, control and supervision, international guarantees, international police forces etc. . . .
D. The problems concerning the 2 zones should be the object of direct negotiations between Hanoi and Saigon--problems of internal politics of South Vietnam cannot be raised in an international conference.
9. Point Four. The RVN delegation proposes that at the first session of the conference in which it will assist, it will clearly state that its participation in the conference cannot be interpreted as a diplomatic recognition of the Hanoi authorities. We think it useful that the US delegation make a similar statement.
10. Point Five. Every time that a member of the North Vietnamese delegation claims to represent the NLF or any other related organization and speak in their name, the delegation of the RVN will reiterate that they are part and parcel of the North Vietnamese delegation, speak on behalf of North Vietnam, and that we do not consider them as a separate entity from the North Vietnamese delegation. We propose that the US delegation adopt a similar attitude.
11. Point Six. At the conference table, the rule of courtesy should be duly observed by both sides and on a reciprocal basis. The name of each delegation should be properly and correctly used during the conference. Of course, our attitude will depend on that of the other side. End Text./3/
/3/In telegram 22797/Delto 861 from Paris, October 22, Harriman noted emerging discrepancies between the GVN and its diplomats in Paris: "Lam appears to be receiving rigid instructions from Thanh which do not sufficiently take into account the points made by the Embassy to the GVN." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968) In a covering note transmitting this telegram to the President, October 22, 5:30 p.m., Rostow commented: "I presume Ellsworth will work on this in Saigon, but it is clear that we haven't got the theology straightened out with Saigon and translated into agreed procedures yet." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]) A CIA memorandum to Rostow and Rusk forwarded by Karamessines, October 25, cited a source that noted that in response to a complaint about being kept uninformed, Thanh instructed Lam that until the commencement of expanded talks, "substantive discussions between the Americans and the South Vietnamese would take place solely in Saigon and Lam thus bore no responsibilities in this area." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-207A, Folder 1)
Bunker
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21892.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
97-122
97. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 21, 1968, 10:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]. Top Secret; Harvan Double Plus; Literally Eyes Only for the President. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
Herewith a pessimistic analysis of this morning's meeting./2/ I am not sure it is right, but we ought to consider it.
/2/See Document 95.
They ask for three things, any one of which alone could destroy the Saigon government; all three certainly would:
--our acceptance of their theological language about an "unconditional" bombing halt;
--a long delay before the first "serious" negotiating meeting;
--4 powers rather than our-side-your-side.
They may believe that our anxiety for a bombing halt and forward movement for domestic political purposes is so great we would fall into the trap of opening up this kind of gap between Washington and Saigon. Even the Chinese Communists are bringing the election into the bombing halt question.
Communists always think in terms of what they call "inner contradictions" in the camp of their enemies.
It is possible that:
--they have no interest in forward progress unless it broke the GVN or greatly strained the U.S.-GVN relation;
--they are taking our temperature on the pre-election question, in which case Sect. Rusk might quickly disabuse Dobrynin;
--they may be waiting to see if Vice President Humphrey wins, whom they may regard as an easier negotiating partner;
--they may accept our terms, if we hold steady.
Walt
98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968, 0110Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Read. Repeated to Saigon.
259261/Todel 1359. For Harriman and Bunker from the Secretary.
I have just seen Dobrynin to bring him up-to-date on the October 21 meeting in Paris./2/ I reviewed the discussion with regard to a joint written communiqué, the problem as between a "Four Party Conference" and a "your side-our side meeting," the question of timing for an initial meeting and the Hanoi suggestion that preparatory meetings should discuss procedural matters and the agenda.
/2/See Document 95.
To my surprise, I discovered that Dobrynin had reported inaccurately my earlier conversation with him about the possibility of stopping the bombing two or three days before an established date for a meeting. I had said to him that, for example, if a meeting is set for a Monday we might be able to stop the bombing on the preceding Friday or Saturday. He said that he had reported to Moscow that if the bombing were stopped on Monday there could be a meeting on Friday or Saturday. This may be partly responsible for the retreat by Thuy to "a week." Dobrynin said he would immediately straighten out that misunderstanding.
I pointed out to Dobrynin that everyone in this situation has many formal or procedural preoccupations on such questions as status, recognition, for whom individual representatives might speak, etc. I said that, although we ourselves have a good many formal problems, our approach has been to brush all those aside in order to come to grips with the substance of making peace. I pointed out that we could spend weeks or months discussing such questions without touching substance. We have made a good beginning by having actual discussions go on between the USG and the DRV in which technical questions have been subordinated. We meet regularly without place names or flags and alternate the privilege of speaking first. These talks have been serious and we see no reason why enlarged serious talks could not proceed on the same basis. As for an agenda, we hope to avoid months of debate about the adoption of a formal agenda. Each side has said that any question which anyone wishes to raise can be discussed. When it is our time to speak first, we can raise any questions on our minds. When the other side speaks first, they can do the same. There is no need to go through time consuming debates of the types that are all too familiar in diplomatic history. What is important is that those most directly concerned sit down under informal circumstances and talk about peace, even though each representative present might have radically different views about the formal and procedural questions.
I strongly underlined the timing factor and told Dobrynin that Thuy began by saying that the NLF had indicated that "as soon as possible" could mean a few weeks. I repeated Harriman's comment that one week was too long. I repeated the suggestion that the first meetings might be with temporary representatives who could be replaced by more permanent representatives at a later stage.
For Harriman:
If I may say so, you handled the meeting on October 21 very well indeed. My own reaction is that it would be a mistake for us to become embroiled in negotiating such matters as a joint communiqué, the procedures of a "Four Party Conference" and an agreed complete agenda. The opportunities for delay are unlimited. We are in a much stronger position to say that we should brush all such questions aside and get down to "serious talks" on the substance of peace on the basis of forms and procedures already established in the Paris talks.
Further, I don't see how we can very well expect to negotiate what the various parties will say about it. Each has his own problems and points of view and requirements in managing his own situation. Such agreements would, in any event, break down promptly because there would be no control over what is said and we would already have taken the major public step of stopping the bombing. Another cable takes up some of these questions./3/
/3/See Document 107.
We shall be discussing these matters further at the Tuesday lunch-eon/4/ and we expect to have further comments at that time.
/4/See Document 103.
Hopefully, Thuy was merely trying to see whether he could get a few more drops out of the turnip and is in position to go further than he indicated in your Monday meeting. Obviously, his effort to establish a formally acknowledged status for the NLF runs head on into the central question which we have not only with Saigon but with other allies, quite apart from our own similar views on the matter.
Rusk
99. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]. Secret; Nodis; Harvan Double Plus. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of the report to the President, October 22, 9:30 a.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith the Soviet proposition." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the report. Vance's written report on the meeting was sent in telegram 22750 from Paris, October 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
Cy Vance called on the secure phone at 8:00 a.m.
1. Oberemko phoned Vance last night to ask for a late evening or early morning meeting. They met at 9:30 a.m. this morning for 2-1/2 hours.
2. Oberemko said he had met with the DRV delegation after their private meeting yesterday with us./2/ Oberemko had found them "emotional" and "suspicious", and after discussion with them Oberemko had come to the conclusion that some of their problems came from misunderstandings in the translation process. He said that he had had the same difficulty in communicating with the DRV himself.
/2/See Document 95.
3. Oberemko said that both sides were showing stubbornness and it was now up to a third party to try to resolve the situation by putting forward a "common sense solution".
4. Oberemko, "acting under the general instructions given by his government", then put forward the following proposal: "The United States gives the order to stop bombardment on October 24 or October 25. A meeting with representatives of the United States, DRV, the NLF, and the GVN is held in Paris on November 1 or November 2."
5. Vance said that he would report to Washington immediately. Oberemko said that he planned to deliver the identical proposal to the DRV as soon as he left Vance. Oberemko said he hoped we could get back to him today because of the urgency of the matter and Vance said only that he would report back to Oberemko as soon as possible and before we communicated with the DRV on the Oberemko proposal.
6. Oberemko referred to the question of a joint communiqué or joint minute and Vance said we were opposed. Oberemko said it was not the business of his government whether the DRV and U.S. reached an oral or written understanding. The Soviet Union was trying to get an agreement on principle.
7. Oberemko said it was essential that we take the initiative in calling the next meeting after we had heard from Washington regarding the Oberemko proposal. Since the DRV had called the last one it was impossible for them to take the initiative on the next private meeting.
8. It was clear to Vance from the discussion that the language in the first sentence of the proposal is intended to mean that bombing would stop on the 24th or 25th, not merely that orders to stop would be issued on those dates. It was also made clear that if the bombing stopped on the 24th the meeting would occur on the 1st; if the bombing stopped on the 25th, the meeting would occur on the 2nd. The time interval was chosen according to Oberemko to split the difference between our "two or three-day" proposal and the minimum interpretation of the other side's "several weeks" proposal which the Soviets interpreted as meaning two weeks. Oberemko said the language he had put forward in the second sentence of the proposal was intended to avoid our insistence on "our side/your-side" language and to avoid the DRV insistence on "four power" meeting or conference. Oberemko said on the latter point he understood from the Dobrynin/Rusk conversations that Secretary Rusk had agreed that the nomenclature for the meeting was not essential.
9. Question of unconditional cessation was discussed briefly. Vance said that he was sure Oberemko understood that if, for example, there was indiscriminate rocketing of cities following cessation no President could maintain cessation. Oberemko said he understood but we were stating an exaggerated case. We should be content to rest on the statement that the other side would know what to do and the understandings already reached.
Note:
Vance called back at 8:45 to say that Oberemko had phoned him to say that he had seen the DRV representatives following his discussion with Vance this morning and Oberemko made an appointment to come to see Vance at 2:30 p.m. Paris time this afternoon./3/
/3/See Document 101.
BHR
Recommendation:
Harriman and Vance recommend accepting the Soviet proposal in principle. They believe that in our answer we should use the agreed phrase that "the U.S. will stop all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force on or within the territory of the DRV" on the date to be specified. They also suggest that we rearrange the order of the representatives named in the second sentence so that it would refer first to the U.S., second to the GVN, third to the DRV, and fourth to the NLF. Harriman added the view that the fact the Soviets have become so involved in the resolution of this issue means that they will have a big stake in seeing that the subsequent negotiations are successful.
100. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968, 9:50 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 22, 1968, 9:50 a.m., Tape F6810.05, PNO 10. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Hello.
Rusk: Mr. President, I just had a brief word with Cy Vance./2/ Oberemko, the Russian, had just walked into his office for a second meeting and had gotten simply as far as saying that he was having great trouble with the Hanoi delegation. And when I called Vance out to the phone, I told Vance that a week was impossible; that he had already taken that view over there on two occasions; that our real position was one day. In fact, I personally don't see why, if we stop the bombing, they can't meet the next day, but if 2 to 3 days would make any difference, we could do that. I was hoping if we do that we could do it over a weekend so that the psychology would be that Saturday and Sunday aren't working days anyhow, and if we stopped on Friday night and the meeting is on Monday morning, most people would accept that. He said he would hold to the 2 to 3 days business and report back to us on this present talk that is now going on with the Russian. I'm very disappointed and really amazed that Dobrynin got this thing fouled up because he just turned it around--thought if we stopped the bombing on Monday then there would be a meeting on Friday or Saturday, where I had said that if we had a meeting on Monday, we could stop it on the Saturday preceding. So it may be that the Russians sort of got bugged in on the idea that a week was possible and they have been pressing Hanoi for a week, and now a week won't work, so the thing becomes unhooked again.
President: I think there are three things that we have to bear in mind. First, I do not believe the Saigon government, from the cables I have been reading, with Ky with all his problems and their attitude out there, I don't believe they can stop the bombing for a week and just sit there and say nothing, and what happens in that week would be very dangerous. That government has a million men. Second, I know I can't--I just can't sit here and say nothing for a whole damn week after we stop it with a week before the elections. Now, I wouldn't have any hesitancy, if they want to wait--give them a week's time and then stop the bombing and meet the next day or wait 10 days. As a matter of fact, I had rather do that anyway. I am very fearful that while it is unjustified and uncalled for and untrue, I am very fearful that the politicians will say we are doing this just a week before elections. And I rather think the Communists may be having some of that in mind, and I don't want to play their game and allow them to use me as a Charlie McCarthy. Therefore, if they're unwilling to take the position they took, that they could have serious discussions the day after the bombing stopped, then I am very uninterested in their proposal. I would wait, if they want me to give them a week or 10 days to go get the NLF, that's all right. But after we stop the bombing, I expect them to be ready to move and have their tennis shoes on.
/2/Rusk received a call from Vance in Paris at 9:40 a.m. (Ibid., Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969)
Rusk: Right. I agree.
President: Okay.
Rusk: Fine.
101. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of the report to the President, October 22, 11:25 a.m., Rostow wrote: "Here is Cy Vance's latest, plus a note of mine printed for the 12 o'clock meeting. The Russians are obviously trying very hard to pull this off--and in a hurry." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the report and the attached memorandum. Vance's written report on the meeting was sent in telegram 22763 from Paris, October 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968) Rostow's "note" is Document 102.
Cy Vance called on the secure phone at 10:25 a.m.
1. Oberemko (hereafter "O") had just left. O said it seemed to him that things were moving "step by step" but with great difficulty towards an understanding.
2. O had just seen Thuy and Lau and recounted to them the O/CV conversation of this morning/2/ and put to the DRV representatives the proposal he had already given to Vance. O said he would not give CV the whole conversation with the DRV but its essence. The DRV considered necessary two basic considerations: (1) That we accept the principle of complete and unconditional cessation of bombardment (and again O said it was up to us and the DRV to agree on the exact language); (2) if they would agree not to use the "four party" language they would be unwilling to have us use "our side/your side" language or "two side" language. The DRV agrees to the language suggested by the Soviets of referring to a meeting with representatives of the U.S., GVN, DRV, and NLF.
/2/See Document 99.
3. If there is agreement on these two principles, the DRV is prepared to meet with us and try to work out a final agreement on the date of cessation on the 24th or 25th, and the date of the first meeting on the 1st and 2nd.
4. O said he recommended to the DRV against a joint communiqué and they agreed. O said they would insist however on a secret minute. O said they really did mean to keep it secret.
5. The DRV would like to raise with us in private discussion the question of how to agree to announce these actions to the press. Vance said this would raise a lot of problems and they could not hope to control what we say to the press and O did not demur.
6. At the conclusion of O's meeting with the DRV reps, the latter said "a final agreement on this matter is possible now; it is possible today". O said they were taking "very seriously" the developments of the last 24 hours.
7. O said the DRV was ready to meet with us any time today.
8. Vance told O that he had been in touch with the Department and the period between the 24th and 25th and the 1st and 2nd was too long. O said if the U.S. has something that is less than that period we should come back with such a suggestion but he could tell us flatly that if we stuck on the two or three day proposal the DRV answer would "obviously be no". O said if we wish to go back through him with a shorter time period suggestion he would deliver the message to the DRV but would not do so unless we wished him to.
9. Vance asked what O meant when he said the DRV would not use the words "four party" if we did not mention the "our side/your side" or "two side" formula. Vance said it was one thing to assume the possibility of language in a secret minute which avoided either phrase but the DRV could not hope to control what we said or the GVN said publicly thereafter. O said the DRV was not suggesting that. O said he did not think the DRV expected us to abandon the public posture that the meeting was essentially based on the our side your side formula.
BHR
102. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968, 11:05 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]. Secret; Harvan Double Plus. Rostow transmitted the memorandum, which is marked "For noon meeting," to the President; see footnote 1, Document 101.
Mr. President:
For the Vietnamese meeting at 12 o'clock, here are some points on the timing of the first your-side-our-side session:
1. Oberemko's proposition this morning was nothing more or less than the final position taken yesterday by Thuy:
--Thuy fell back from a "four-power conference" to naming the four participants;
--Thuy fell back from a meeting some weeks after the bombing halt to one week.
2. It was the DRV which suggested that "serious talks" could start the next day after a bombing cessation; and they have now accepted the view that "serious talks" involve the participation of the GVN. On Sept. 15 Le Duc Tho told Harriman and Vance "the DRV would be willing to meet the next day after a bombing cessation and discuss the agenda items with 'serious intent and good will.'"/2/
/2/See Document 14.
3. A week's bombing halt without visible GVN participation in Paris would put the greatest possible strain on the GVN. Its participation is the one solid and overt sign of the understanding at which we have arrived.
4. We will, of course, have to background on the DMZ, and we can either point to that or point to Abrams' executing his standing orders on rules of engagement in case of DMZ violations. But we need the change in the character of the meetings in Paris to validate the deal in South Vietnam and keep the politicians quiet.
5. Much the same is talk at home where you have emphasized to all three candidates the critical nature of GVN participation as part of the quid pro quo for a bombing cessation.
6. I have put the question on the military implications to Gen. Wheeler. He will formulate his views. In general, I suspect that the military effects of political uneasiness will rank higher in Abrams' mind than anything the enemy might do to take advantage in one week of the bombing cessation; although we should be conscious that there are some reports of an attack on Saigon scheduled for late October or early November.
7. We told the TCC's, "since whole objective of bombing cessation would be to move on to serious talks, we must have clear understanding that such talks would get under way at once and would include the GVN on our side of the table. . . ."
Walt
103. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library. Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Oval Office, with the President and Rusk entering at 11:59 a.m.; Clifford, Wheeler, and Rostow at 12:01 p.m.; and Christian and Tom Johnson at 12:10. Clifford and Rostow left at 12:50 p.m., Wheeler at 12:55, and Rusk at 12:56, while Christian and Tom Johnson accompanied the President for a walk on the South Lawn. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Walt Rostow: Bill Jorden thinks they will back off for five days./2/
/2/In a memorandum to the President, October 22, 12:00 p.m. Rostow wrote: "Bill Jorden just called and said he wished to lay before me at this critical moment his views. He believes the other side is in a mood to settle: they have backed off on recce; they have backed off on a joint communiqué. The issue now is, first, time. He believes that they would accept five days. He recommends that we be 'adjustable' and not insist on two or three days. He does not believe that it would be easy to explain a hang-up and failure of negotiation on a question of 48 or 72 hours." Rostow also noted that Jorden listed the text of a secret minute as the "second hang-up issue." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]) In a memorandum to the President, October 22, 5:30 p.m., Rostow wrote: "In a casual classified telephone conversation, I asked Jorden: Why are we insisting on a week? Is it merely to make political trouble in Saigon? He said: I think it is to preserve the myth that the NLF had to get from the jungle in Tay Ninh province, to Phnom Penh, Hanoi, Peking, Moscow, and Paris--after the bombing stops. That would take five days if it were the truth." (Ibid.)
General Wheeler: You could stand it. The problem is related to morale, particularly the Vietnamese morale. The sooner there is an actual meeting with the GVN present, the better the performance of the ARVN and the U.S. forces will be.
Secretary Rusk: We need to get this in the announcement--the inclusion of the GVN.
The President: Why do they need more than one day?
Secretary Rusk: To get people there.
The President: I'd rather not stop bombing until we get them there.
Secretary Rusk: I guess they understand that this is to get away from the "condition" set by a halt in the bombing.
The President: What is the weather?
General Wheeler: It is terrible. The monsoon season has hit. The roads are practically impassable. The effects on the ARVN of a long delay could be bad--not in terms of physical damage, but in terms of morale. McConnell said if we were to stop the bombing, now is the time to do it.
The President: If they used the week badly it could hurt us.
General Wheeler: I'm more concerned about the effect on the ARVN. They have been doing well. They will sit on their hands if the effect is bad. I am a one-day man.
Secretary Rusk: A week is too long. Two weeks are impossible.
1. There could be a meeting at 3 p.m.
2. We could stop the bombing at midnight Friday, and announce Friday evening here, which is Saturday morning Saigon time.
The President: We could go Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and Monday. On their Monday meeting, it would be held.
General Wheeler: 12 midnight Saigon time is noon here. 1500 hours Paris time is 10 p.m. Saigon time, 10 a.m. Washington time Monday, the 28th.
Walt Rostow: With the ambiguity in Thieu's statement,/3/ Ambassador Bunker should ask Thieu whether we could live through it.
/3/In response to comments in an October 20 televised interview of Humphrey which were critical of Thieu's stance on the negotiations, Thieu noted on October 22 that he was "willing and ready to take any action which can hasten the establishment of a just and honorable peace" and that he would drop his opposition to the bombing halt when it became clear that the DRV would join the GVN in de-escalating the war and in direct negotiations. See The New York Times, October 21 and 22, 1968, and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 23-30, 1968, p. 23041.
The President: I worry about the morale.
Secretary Clifford: There is a missing factor here. I don't know what happened since last week.
The President: The implications of the negotiators were that they didn't have an agreement they thought they had.
Secretary Clifford: I thought we had an agreement. Why did we consult with the allies?
Secretary Rusk: Hanoi came up with changes in timing.
The President: We thought they said they would have negotiations the next day.
Secretary Rusk: Hanoi didn't have this buttoned up with the NLF.
The President: I don't think we have an agreement now.
Secretary Clifford: Neither do I.
Prime Minister Gorton had a press conference.
Secretary Rusk: What is your reaction?
Secretary Clifford: The agreement must be solid and firm.
The President: I agree.
Secretary Clifford: We may need to get it in writing.
When I left here Monday,/4/ I thought we had a deal. On Tuesday, I learned we didn't have a deal since the Paris delegation had to go back to Hanoi.
/4/October 21.
We must have a kind of agreement whereby:
(a) The bombing is stopped as of a certain time.
(b) The time when the meeting is to be held with the NLF and the GVN present is determined. We must get it in writing.
Secretary Rusk: Take it easy on written requirements.
Secretary Clifford: Nobody told me they had gone back on it.
The President: Mac Bundy said we ought to stop it. Vice President Humphrey said the same thing.
Secretary Clifford: There is no need to go back to the troop contributors.
The President: I must get Abrams on board.
Walt Rostow: We must have them honor the DMZ or Abe [Abrams] will respond instantly. He and Thieu must know they must stand firm.
The President: What is the deal now? Get Cy and Averell to insure we understand each other. Get Bunker and Abe to please tell us what problems this will cause us. Are they together on times?
Secretary Rusk: If each side can talk, time is the key factor.
Secretary Clifford: Mr. President, your approach is the right one. What is the deal? Write it out.
In three days, send a cable to Cy and Averell to see if they're aboard.
See if Bunker and Abe agree.
See if Hanoi is aboard and the Soviets are aboard.
The President: Get the language.
Secretary Clifford: They can name the participants.
General Wheeler: They must name the GVN.
Secretary Clifford: Get this square with Thieu.
The President: He has worse problems at home than I do with Fulbright. He has problems with his Senate and his people, too.
Secretary Rusk: It was Thieu who insisted that there not be a mention of NLF in the joint statement. They want to treat the NLF as non-existent.
The first of the meetings will be for the birds.
We have debacles. That's why we have diplomats. We are the Department of Debacles.
Here are the conditions:
(1) The bombing ceases as of a certain time. Reconnaissance continues.
(2) There is a meeting within three days. A time is announced for the meeting, e.g. midnight Friday Saigon time, 3 p.m. Paris time, noon, Washington time.
(3) The DMZ is not violated. If so, Abrams responds.
(4) The cities are not attacked. If so, there is a response.
(5) The GVN are present at the negotiating sessions.
The meeting is 3 p.m. Monday Paris time.
They proposed the 24th or 25th.
General Wheeler: This is an example.
Secretary Rusk: I would put this as a hard proposal.
Secretary Clifford: If we have trouble over a date, the whole thing will collapse.
Walt Rostow: Cy is convinced they understand the DMZ and cities part. What we say is important. Can we get Thieu aboard?
Secretary Rusk: Yes.
Walt Rostow: We cannot treat the NLF as an entity. The delay cannot be too long.
Secretary Rusk: This weekend is the last chance. We cannot do it directly before or afterwards.
Secretary Clifford: Publicity has extracted the sting of politics.
Secretary Rusk: Nixon seems to be comfortable.
Secretary Clifford: We should say we have an agreement; we will stop the bombing; we will do it within three days.
Walt Rostow: This would be to Bunker-Abrams.
104. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968, 1:20-2:24 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the mansion of the White House. Clifford, Rusk, Wheeler, Helms, and Rostow entered at 1:22 p.m., and lunch began at 1:35 p.m.; Rostow left at 2:22 p.m., Rusk and Helms at 2:24 p.m., and Clifford and Wheeler at 2:33 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES ON PRESIDENT'S TUESDAY LUNCHEON
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: We ought to put a medal on George Christian and Bob McCloskey for the way they have handled the last few days.
The President: (Read proposed cable to Bunker and Abrams). Insert A./2/
/2/The text is the same as that transmitted in Document 105.
I want to know what the military view is of this--the military effects and morale.
I want to know if Abrams thinks we should stop the bombing.
How much can we tell the South Vietnamese?
Secretary Rusk: The first day--A. Bombing. B. Meeting.
Walt Rostow: The orders will have to go out twenty-four hours before.
General Wheeler: 9:00 a.m. Saigon time Saturday./3/
/3/October 26.
Secretary Rusk: Yes.
General Wheeler: Should we refer to reconnaissance?
The President: Yes.
Walt Rostow: Reconnaissance will continue.
The President: When would we announce?
Secretary Rusk: It would be a joint announcement between you and Thieu.
(Statement, Insert B)/4/
/4/This insert, dated October 21, reads: "Representatives of the so-called National Liberation Front--or others--may accompany the Hanoi delegation. I wish to make it crystal clear that neither the United States Government nor the government of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon recognizes the NLF as an independent entity, let alone as a government. We shall deal with the other side as a team constituted as Hanoi authorities wish it to be constituted. Our side--that is, our own representatives and those of the Republic of Vietnam--will operate as a single closely coordinated team, with representatives of one or the other government taking the lead on specific issues, depending on their content and our respective interests and responsibilities." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [2 of 3])
9:00 p. m. Friday, 9:30 Television Statement. Thieu will go on too.
The President: When do we stop?
Secretary Rusk: Noon our time Friday.
George Christian: It will leak Friday afternoon.
Secretary Rusk: Are the fellows out of North Vietnam?
General Wheeler: They are on their way.
Secretary Clifford: The actual date of the meeting should be in the message.
Walt Rostow: Would Thieu approve announcing having the GVN Representative at the meeting?--Bunker should ask him.
The President: Nixon will ask me if this isn't like putting a fox in the chicken coop. [Laughter]/6/
/6/Handwritten bracketed insertion in the source text.
Secretary Clifford: It seems Thieu gains enormously to have the GVN at the Table.
The President: We do, in effect, recognize them by letting them sit down with us.
Secretary Rusk: It's about like letting Stokely Carmichael/6/ sit at Cabinet meeting.
/6/A leader of the Black Panthers, a militant political organization in the United States.
Secretary Clifford: It still seems like greater benefit than detriment.
The President: Factually, that's correct.
Secretary Rusk: Emotionally, that's not correct.
Walt Rostow: The South Vietnamese are afraid of how we play them in Conference--push them toward accepting a slippery slope--jam into coalition government.
[Omitted here is a discussion of issues in relations with Latin American countries.]
The President: Are we agreed on the language of the announcement?
Secretary Rusk: We do not want to negotiate a joint statement.
We should reserve question of timing.
The President: Do you feel the same way?
Secretary Clifford: Yes.
Walt Rostow: The GVN has gone to work soberly. We should make a checkout with Bunker.
Secretary Rusk: This is a little like Warsaw plan. If they see they can get a week out of us they will hold out./7/
/7/Reference is to the Marigold initiative conducted through Polish auspices. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume IV, passim.
The President: You should see Dobrynin as soon as you can. (Secretary Rusk)
[Omitted here is discussion of a wide range of issues, including a decision to delay the withdrawal of military dependents from Vietnam.]
105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968, 1910Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Draft text received from the White House, cleared by Read, and approved by Rusk.
259404. Deliver literally eyes only to Ambassador Bunker when he arises. For Ambassador and General Abrams from Secretary Rusk.
We are now at a point where we must come back to the North Vietnamese in Paris with a hard proposition on the time of a bombing cessation and the related time of a meeting, which would include the GVN.
We propose the following and wish to have your urgent evaluation of its effects on the political viability of the GVN and what effects it will have, if any, on the military situation and on the morale of our own forces and the ARVN. The GVN is not to be consulted at this time.
This is what we would propose to tell the Hanoi delegation in Paris.
"1. Bombing and other acts of force against North Vietnam will cease as of a certain time; for example, midnight Friday, Saigon time, October 25.
2. A meeting, including the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, will take place within three days from the date of the bombing cessation; for example, at 3:00 p.m., Monday, Paris time, October 28.
3. The date of the Paris meeting will be made known at the time of the announcement of the bombing cessation; for example, at 9:00 a.m., Saigon time, Saturday, October 25."
Of course, our other conditions still hold: that is, our understanding that recce will continue; that North Vietnam will not violate the DMZ, and that General Abrams will have standing orders to respond if such violations take place; and that the cities will not be attacked, and that we intend to respond against North Vietnam in the face of such violation of our understanding.
Rusk
106. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968, 5:24 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, October 22, 1968, 5:24 p.m., Tape F6810.05, PNO 12. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Clifford: Steps that the President can take in a dignified and honorable way to lower the level of combat and look toward a resolution of the conflict constitutes the course to follow. Now, it is my belief that the public will understand that the President does not control the timing--that you have been trying all along--
President: Now wait a minute right on that point. Maybe that ought to be one of the leads in the speech we are making. Maybe the little statement they have been working on ought to go a little deeper and maybe you ought to think about that and say: "Now, my fellow citizens, the President does not control these events. If I could have for 5 years I would have, or 5 months ago I would have, or 5 days ago I would have. I'm not the sole master of this fate here. There are a lot of other people involved." Maybe we ought to say that. Now just put that down--"the President does not control." I'm afraid we are not explaining these things well enough to the people and letting them see that he does not. Now go ahead. Pardon me for interrupting your thought, but I want to get what I can out of it as you go along.
Clifford: That's all right. Interrupt me at any time. And I think in that regard you go back to a good starting point of September of 1967 and you tell the people what you said at that time. You have been making efforts for some time before that--all kinds, any opportunity came up that offered any possibility perhaps of bringing the war to a conclusion, you investigated it. You made a public statement in San Antonio in September of 1967./2/ You wanted to find the road to peace then. You said publicly that you would stop the bombing if they would just start talks that were productive--some such language as that.
/2/See footnote 6, Document 35.
Now, I think what you want to do also is tie-in, at some stage, that for the talks to be productive the GVN has to participate, and let that be a thread that runs throughout it. "The talks are going to be productive. Here's the Government in South Vietnam now. Obviously, it has to play an important part in these matters." Then I think you talk about the fact that Hanoi rebuffed your San Antonio offer, both publicly and privately, and then you touch on the fact that you continued your efforts to no avail. Then I think you get up to March 31st/3/ and you tried again, unilaterally cutting back the number of troops to be sent, turning the burden over to the South Vietnamese, and cutting the bombing back, and getting the talks started. And all along during this period--I think you might have some thread in there--that they would not sit down and talk on substantive matters. And we'd have to get Rusk's consent, but I think if we can develop the theme in there that always they said, "No, we'll never consider the Government of Vietnam," or something like that, "We'll never talk to them." Of course, that constituted an absolute roadblock in getting any talks started. But you continued, nevertheless, always searching for peace. During these talks which have gone on week after week after week by every conceivable bid, they have remained adamant.
/3/Reference is to the President's March 31 speech; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 169.
Then, I think we want to emphasize the point it was they who changed their approach. Now, I say again, you have to watch the language; get Rusk's consent in there. But we can bring this down to the fact that it was they who finally informed us at one stage that they would agree to the GVN sitting down, and so then the negotiations, productive talks, substantive talks which could lead toward the end of the war, could begin, and the reason the matter came up at this time is because they decided to change their position.
Now the one wonderful thing about it is, it's the truth, and it shows that here is the President who has worked on this in September 1967--it's now more than a year ago--constant weekly efforts. Finally, they choose now. Why they chose now, I wouldn't say that in a speech, but that's it--we do not know. It isn't up to them to tell us. Now, there'll be any number of writers, I have already seen. I think the public would understand. They have chosen now because perhaps they feel they would like to take a try at this administration to see what kind of a deal they could get. And it-s been a year, and they are running out of time. You don't say it--people will understand it.
So, I have reached the conclusion, Mr. President, that the best serv-ice to this country is to do it the way you have done it. And then when they finally change no matter what time it is, whether it is 2 weeks before the election, or one week before the election or whenever it is, when they change and a deal can be made, a decent and honorable deal, I think it's the President's responsibility to make it, and I believe that the country will applaud him. My own private notion is that from a practical standpoint, the country has been well prepared now for the last 8 days for some kind of an announcement that would indicate that there is going to be a stop of the bombing and there are going to be substantive talks. I think the country is looking forward with the greatest eagerness to that. I think there will be overwhelming support from the media. I do not believe--I disagree with Dick Russell on a point. I believe that the whole climate that exists now will not be construed to be a political stratagem. We worked too hard on it too long, and it would be an obtuse man who would think with all of this going on that he might swing an election by selecting a time such as this. And, my God, they know--
President: I wonder if we shouldn't say that it has nothing to do with it--don't want it to have anything to do with it and nobody should let anything interfere with it in some way.
Clifford: I missed the early part of that.
President: I wonder if we shouldn't say in this statement that it has nothing to do with these events, and it shouldn't have, and nobody else should take it into consideration. This is--everybody wants this.
Clifford: I think we would want to watch that wording with care, but I think something to say could be an affirmative.
President: All the candidates have assured me that they want peace as soon as they can get it.
Clifford: Yes, it seems to me it can be an affirmative statement and not defensive by saying this is something that we have worked toward. It is so transcendent in its importance that whenever the time came, no matter what its relationship might be to any other event this so transcends in importance, that we cannot be affected by other events taking place. We must grab the opportunity whenever it is presented to us. Something like that, which approaches it indirectly, but I think everybody would get it. But I think--I have felt for a long time--I have sung the same song--I have felt that during this last period of your administration, I had hoped and prayed, and I mean really prayed, that the time would come when there could be a cessation of the bombing even if it is unproductive because then your record will show that you have tried everything that there was to try.
President: Maybe we ought to say that. Maybe we ought to say I want this record to show that I have tried everything there was to try.
Clifford: "And that the circumstances are such that"--we have to be careful about that--"that circumstances are such that for the first time I am now free to stop the bombing because I know now that productive talks can take place"--something like that.
President: "And this will not cost additional American lives."
Clifford: "This will not cost"--
President: "Will not result in the loss of additional American lives." Well, now, then, you better not just do anything else besides get Russell Long taken care of and Juanita Roberts./4/ You better just spend your time. I started to ask Buzz today if he'd be willing to revert to one-star--that'll put yourself in her position. That would've been hard after 15 years in the service. Maybe you had better take your yellow pad and talk about and work on this for 5 or 10 minutes since you are going to have 500,000 words. See, there are just three people talking to me about this that have the overall broad picture--you and Walt and Dean and Buzz--four.
/4/The primary issue involving Senator Long was the location of military bases within his state. Juanita Roberts, an administrative assistant to the President and a colonel in the U.S. Army, had encountered difficulties regarding her reassignment upon the President's retirement.
Clifford: Uh-huh.
President: So maybe you better do this tonight and tomorrow while they are messing around so that we can look at how we say this to the American people--more important, I think, how we say it to Eisenhower and how we say it to Nixon and how we say it to Wallace and how we say it to Dirksen and how we say it to Jerry Ford. They are going to be mean, I'll just tell you, you can just see. I looked over these notes I made on Dick Russell, and he never would pin himself down. He finally said, "Well, I would give it a try."/6/
/6/See Document 69.
Clifford: Mm-hmm.
President: But I know this is going to be rough sailing. I know they are going to charge it. I think that most of these papers with all of this big circulation--I notice there's 22 million circulation endorsing Nixon and 4 million endorsing Humphrey. So the 22 million boys are going to be saying, "Oh, the old wheeler-dealer," and we have got to make this as persuasive as we can and work on it hard if we do it. You get your lead pencil out and yellow paper in the other hand and work on it for me today and tomorrow, will you?
Clifford: Yes, sir. Incidentally, Buzz Wheeler and I go out tomorrow--let's see just a minute--at 10:30 and give the briefings to General Eisenhower. You instructed me some months ago and I wrote him and got a lovely note. And then recently his man called and said that now he was feeling fine and wants very much to be brought up-to-date. We are going to take only a half hour and hit the high spots around the world.
President: That's good. Now, what are we going to do on this proposal?
Clifford: On our proposal that we worked the language up today?
President: Yes. What are we going to say about it to him? I had given serious thought of going to see him before I agreed to it.
Clifford: Well, I wouldn't mention that at all. I am not allowed to talk about that.
President: All right.
Clifford: And I am not going to get into it because if I talk to him and he says something--
President: Then he'll talk to the others. What should I do about talking to him? That worries me.
Clifford: I believe that--
President: First, I believe we've got to get signed on and then decide what to do about the other because if we talk to people beforehand--
Clifford: If you get signed on, then the day that--the afternoon or the evening that you go on TV or something of that kind, you might take a helicopter out there and spend a few minutes with him and tell him to keep it under his hat and there it is. That would seem to me to be about the way to do it.
President: All right. Will you work on this thing for me? Just a simple--just what you said there. Also, would you follow through on this for me?
[Omitted here is discussion of a personnel matter, base relocation, and legislative issues.]
President: And I said in there, I said one time I told Secretary Rusk to draft a message that we could send to Harriman which could be signed by all the candidates saying that we were going to stand as one where there was an undivided voice in our relations abroad and they could expect no division from us. I said before we got it drafted, "Why, that didn't seem wise to send it," and I didn't say that Humphrey had already blown it, but we didn't think it wise to send it. But I said these speeches don't help us. The Bundy speech--I don't know how much effect it had./6/ I don't know how much Humphrey's had yesterday./7/ I rather think that's why they went back home. I think that is what held it up. I think they are going to see--
/6/See Document 63.
/7/In a televised interview, Humphrey said that South Vietnam should not have "veto power" over the United States and urged cooperation on the part of Thieu. See The New York Times, October 21, 1968.
Clifford: I think the Bundy speech was more damaging.
President: They said all over the damn country that the Presidential adviser--and I guess you saw the intercept on it where it went back to where he is not even speaking for the country, not even speaking for his brother. Well, the way they go.
[Omitted here is discussion of issues involving Senator Long.]
107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968, 2340Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Read.
259895/Todel 1367. For Harriman from the Secretary.
After the Tuesday luncheon/2/ I saw Ambassador Dobrynin in order to make two or three comments on Vance's meetings today with Oberemko. I said that I appreciated the effort which Oberemko was making and expressed the hope that we could bring matters to a successful conclusion.
/2/See Document 104.
In commenting on Hanoi's insistence that we accept the principle of complete and unconditional cessation of bombardment, I pointed out that we had no intention of talking about conditions in anything we said but that for us to accept their language would seem to cancel all of the earlier discussion of the facts of life with which the Russians are familiar. I pointed out that what I was saying was for Russian ears and not necessarily for Hanoi. I added that this was a good example of the difficulty of agreeing on language, texts, communiqués, because such attempts would put the emphasis on differences which ought to be brushed aside in order to grapple with the real substance. For what it is worth, Dobrynin did not raise any objection to what I said.
I emphasized the importance of the timing problem and said that a week's gap between the cessation of the bombing and a first meeting was simply too long and was unmanageable from our point of view. I reminded him that, for many months, Hanoi has been saying or implying that there could be prompt talks just as soon as we stopped the bombing. On one occasion they used the phrase "the next day." I pointed out that we would have severe problems in managing our own situation both at home and abroad if there were substantial delay between the cessation and the first talks. Our original position was that the talks should be held "the next day;" we then had made a serious move in extending this period to a possible two or three days. We simply could not move to a week. He gave me a strong argument on this point, asserting that the difference in two or three days should not be that important. He said that if this were a discussion between his and our Governments, he did not believe that Moscow would stick on such a matter but that they were dealing with these strange people in Hanoi. My guess is that he was influenced by the error in his reporting recorded in State 259261/3/ and by the probability that the Soviets had pressed Hanoi to agree to a week. However, at the end, he made the personal suggestion that we take the first or the second of November as dates for the meeting proposed by Hanoi and count back to say the twenty-eighth or twenty-ninth, whichever date we could counterpropose. To this I merely stated that the sooner this matter is resolved the better and did not give him a reply. We will be in touch with you shortly about the reply you should make to Oberemko or Hanoi.
/3/Document 98.
I then told Dobrynin that some of our press were apparently being told by officers in his Embassy that the Soviets were playing an active and important role on the Viet-Nam matter at the present time and urged him to take steps to stop this kind of talk. He assured me that he was the only member of his Embassy who was aware of our exchanges but that it was possible someone in his Embassy had speculated because of his own disappearances to see me on short notices and at odd hours.
I concluded by telling him that there was some reason to believe that Hanoi might be preparing a major public statement which might break up or expose our recent talks before they reached a final conclusion. I told him it might be useful if the Soviets could advise Hanoi against such a course. He said he would report that but that, if Hanoi was planning to make such a statement tomorrow, time factors would be such as to prevent the Soviets from having much influence.
Rusk
108. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 23, 1968, 9:20 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 23, 1968, 9:20 a.m., Tape F6810.06, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: They've got to understand that we've got to play it straight, square and fair, for everybody, and lean over backwards to be sure we take no political advantage of it. Therefore, I think that we must say to Averell that what Clark said yesterday about the paragraph,/2/ that they said they'd have serious talks next day. That interests us. If it is in the far away future, that doesn't interest us. We think it ought to be the next day. We want to be flexible. We were ready to go an extra day. We might even go 2 days, such as--and then give them your date. But what I would do there is move it up to Dobrynin's November 2 and then 3 days ahead of that, which would be October 30 or something.
/2/See Document 106.
Rusk: Mm-hmm.
President: Even though it is not the weekend, I think that would help us some, and say, now, if you want November 2, we can understand that and we will give you 3 days--2 days--try to do 1 day. I would never go more than 3 days, 3-1/2 at the most. Let's just be prepared. Now then, we will have to see how we defend ourselves when they leak the 7th. We will have to think what they could do in that event and how dangerous it would be and what it would do to the Saigon government and what it would do to these other things. I'm a little surprised that Saigon gets on the board so easy--always on first flashes--this cable this morning./3/
/3/In telegram 40931 from Saigon, October 23, Bunker reported he saw "no serious" difficulties with the announcement of a bombing cessation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968) The President paraphrased the text of this telegram in a telephone conversation with Russell; see Document 109.
Rusk: Yeah, yeah.
President: Looks like we made a terrible mistake. That may be part of their plan. It looks to me we would look like jackasses if we stopped bombing on November 2 and had to resume it on November 4. It just looks terrible. I could not do that 10 days before the election and have to resume it. So that is why that second date has some significance. So I think we have to say to him the GVN must be there and certainly make it abundantly clear that we are not agreeing to any unconditional stuff.
Rusk: Yeah.
President: That the GVN has got to be there. That they hear loud and clear once again in the language nobody can misunderstand that he has orders and they trigger it themselves--we don't. They need not come to Washington, but the moment they violate the DMZ, he operates--Abrams does. The moment they shell the cities, he operates. Doesn't make any difference how minor it is, we can adjust it. But we ought to tell them that even if it is minor, we are going to do it and that we'll give consideration to the 3 days before the 2d.
Rusk: Yes.
President: We've got to get it by their leak now so that we don't come up and agree on it that day. Then I think we have to go out to Abrams and say now this is what they'll agree to and then give him the exact paragraph that Harriman read to them. And I want a wire from you endorsing this if you do. If you don't, I want you to say so.
Rusk: Uh-huh.
President: Then I think we ought to do the Joint Chiefs the same way. And I think if we're ready to sign on and are going to sign on, I would think we would have to get all of the [Congressional] leadership in here, just like we did on the Missile Crisis, and tell them this and say, "I am deciding this, and I want to go around the table and let Dean Rusk tell you why he recommends it, let Buzz Wheeler tell you why he recommends it, and let every one of these men tell you instead of just having some guy in the Department leaking it." And then I think we have got to do the candidates the same way. Now you can imagine bringing three candidates in here with their hundred press men traveling with them and all that kind of stuff. It's just going to be a hell of a deal, but I'm not going to put this into effect before election unless I have had those candidates here first-hand--
Rusk: Yeah.
President: With us taking notes why Rusk recommended it, why Clifford recommended it, why Wheeler recommended it, why Abrams recommended it, and why Bunker recommended it. And they are going to have to take all of them on and do it openly if they question this thing. Now, they would like to not know much about it and come out and say, "Well, it wasn't done right."
Rusk: Mm-hmm.
President: So, we are going to have to make clear to Vance and Averell and let them know it is going to be a quickie. I think if you have doubts about it, you ought to discuss them a little later in the day. Now, Averell announced, according to UPI, that he's having another meeting tomorrow./4/ It's very unusual for him to announce these meetings the next day, so that meant everything was imminent.
/4/Harriman suggested that the two delegations would meet in secret the next day, an assertion regarded as a slip of the tongue. See The New York Times, October 24, 1968.
Rusk: I was curious about that to know whether or not he had checked that out with the North Vietnamese. But I will check on that. I haven't got any word on that yet.
President: I would imagine that--Walt says UPI says it is nonsense. Paris says--we've checked with Paris--UPI item Thursday morning, it's nonsense. Habib says they will knock it down via McCloskey. Now here is what I have in mind for Abrams: "I wish I could talk to you face to face at this moment of decision." I guess we cannot do that, but I wish I could while he's still in Honolulu. "Since we cannot do this, I wish to put to you bluntly the questions which are on my mind as I would put them if we could be together. First, if the enemy honors our understanding on the DMZ and the cities, will those actions constitute a significant military advantage to our forces and the ARVN? Second, will that advantage compensate for the loss of our bombing in North Vietnam south of the 19th parallel? Third, is it your estimate that the enemy will or will not honor those understandings? Fourth, if he does not honor those understandings, can standing orders for rules of engagement of the kind you and we have in mind to protect our forces and those of our allies for a period sufficient for us to make a basic estimate of enemy intentions and return if necessary to full-scale bombing of North Vietnam [be issued]? Fifth, knowing all you know of the position in Vietnam, if you were President, would you proceed with the proposed understanding?"
Rusk: Mm-hmm. Now, I think the question about does he think the enemy will observe them, I think that needs a phrase like "Do you have any information or reason to comment on whether you think the enemy will" because almost nobody can answer that question.
President: Is it your estimate that the enemy will or will not honor those understandings?
Rusk: What is your estimate?
President: If they are not, I am not going to do it, I'll tell you that. I'm not going to stop the bombing on November 1 and start it on November 2 because I would look like the biggest boob in the world.
Rusk: I think there is a 75-25 percent that they will.
President: Well, that's the kind of answer I would like to have from him. Maybe we ought to look this over again. We don't need to do this until we get with Paris. Tommy Thompson/6/ is going to a military hospital in Wiesbaden.
/6/Llewelyn E. Thompson, Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
Rusk: Yeah, he's there now.
President: What is it?
Rusk: It is a polyp, I don't know where, in his body, but it's a polyp that has to be removed. It looks like he might be out as much as a month.
President: Hmm. It's a hell of a time.
Rusk: Well, on Lou Harris,/6/ I frankly don't think much of that channel.
/6/Pollster Louis Harris had been in informal contact with Soviet diplomats.
President: I don't think much of him either, but--
Rusk: And I think we ought to--one thing Lou Harris might tell that fellow is that the best way to talk about things like this is for Dobrynin to talk to me.
President: Well, but he'll just go out and tell all of the reporters that we knocked him off. I'm for it but I have nothing to do with it. I have no trust in Lou Harris at all, but he calls up here every week.
Rusk: Is he in town now? Should I get in touch with him?
President: I would just tell the White House operators to get Lou Harris and say this message that Jim Jones gave me that you called in for the President, I have it and we have these delicate things going on there and I am not sure that--we are seeing Dobrynin regularly and my guess is that we're getting everything that he gets and that if I were you I would just listen to the fellow and say nothing.
Rusk: All right.
President: And I would tell Lou Harris that too.
Rusk: Right.
President: Now you think about what we ought to say to Averell. I sure do want these instructions to Averell to be tight and hard and when the wire gets going, I want somebody to call them and tell them how we feel about them.
Rusk: All right.
President: I don't want any of this--in other words, I am not in any quickie on this and I want to take my time and I would suggest to--what was the last day they suggested?
Rusk: The 2nd of November.
President: Well, I would--
Rusk: Which is a Saturday.
President: It would be better--be wonderful--if it were Monday and wouldn't show up until Tuesday, wouldn't it? [Laughter] I am just afraid that our friends are going to think we're playing that election.
Rusk: Yeah.
President: Well, I think they are. I think that's why they're doing it. I don't think there is any question but what they are playing with this election. You and I can't have our reputations ruined the rest of our lives trying to get Humphrey elected. I'm going to try to elect him and I'm going to make television and radio [appearances] and drive into Michigan today and I'm going to Maryland tomorrow and I'm going to New York on Sunday with the ethnic groups. My grandson paraded with a flag for him yesterday in uniform. My wife flew all the way to Texas and back. John Connally got out and just stuck his tongue in his cheek and just went all over the state. But be damned if I am going to throw a peace for him. And I want you to protect me on this very, very carefully. Now, our other friends say they've felt for 8 or 10 months that we should do this--over at Defense--that each day is a great delay. But, I don't know whether Buzz, I guess he feels comfortable with this.
Rusk: Buzz is comfortable. I have no doubt about that. As a matter of fact, I think given the understanding on resuming the bombing if they do these two things, I think the other Chiefs are comfortable.
President: Yes. But how do we look if we have to resume it? That's the point. Suppose I stopped it today and had to resume it 2 days from now.
Rusk: Well, I think it wouldn't be 2 days. You couldn't very well do that. You couldn't get the kind of reaction unless there was a big attack on the cities and I think that would be understandable to everybody. But I think the Chiefs themselves are comfortable about this on that basis.
President: Well, we're going to get that paragraph down that you all worked out yesterday awful strong. See that it's read to them again and that they all understand it. And one thing I think that ought to be added is that they realize that he has these orders and they trigger it, not us--that when they--if they don't respect the DMZ and if they don't do these things, then they trigger this response. Somebody has got to tell them that so that they know we're not kidding and they cannot fool with it or play with it because I think we have got to make this awfully clear to Nixon. You're going to have to be thinking of what you say to Nixon or Wallace and the LeMays and the rest of them because I don't want to get their approval, but I damn sure want to get it to where they can't tear it down. So you work on that and we will meet later today.
Rusk: All right, fine.
109. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell/1/
Washington, October 23, 1968, 10:05 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Russell, October 23, 1968, 10:05 a.m., Tape F6810.06, PNO 2-4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Russell: Hello?
President: How are you?
Russell: A bit shaky this morning. My emphysema's acting up on me. Hope you're well.
President: I'm doing fine. I'm so sorry--I thought you'd have some warmer weather down there.
Russell: We have beautiful weather here. I don't know what happened to me. Well, it's just drafts.
President: I won't keep you long. I just wanted to tell you that we are still wrestling with this very difficult subject and it gets worse everyday. Our friend that I have to rely on a good deal--Abrams--tells me that he only needs 2 hours notice; that from a political and military standpoint he would recommend this; that he thinks that it is desirable. The thing would be this in short: not much change since you heard about it, but we would take our action and at the moment we said the next day we would have meetings. They come back and say a week later. We've told them that in no case would we go longer than 2 or 3 days. They still insist on a week in between the time we act and they act on--
Russell: Is there any reason for that?
President: They imply they don't want it to look like a condition and they want to get folks in that area located down in the delta and the NLF crowd. That's their assumption. I said, "Okay, you take the next week to get them in and we will take our action." But we are hung up on that now, and my guess is that they will start leaking on account of the dovishness of the folks we have to deal with--the Soviets in the middle of it and all the papers are in the middle of it--and my judgment is they'll start putting it on me, that I have had 7 days and I would not act on the 7-day one--I have turned it down. I have turned it down as of this moment and said to them that we will do it in a day or 2 days or 3 days, but we're not going to sit there on our fanny and let you tear down the Saigon government by waiting 7 days and letting the people think that we've sold them out. You've got to act pretty soon to show that you are sitting down with the GVN. Now, we are giving our man out there instructions that he has authority to act on his own to respond to violations of the DMZ.
Russell: You mean Abrams?
President: Yes. He doesn't have to clear it. He can just respond. We're telling them--they're not agreeing, they will do anything on the DMZ or the cities--we are just telling them that if they do we will respond and they know what they are getting into.
Russell: Yes, I thought about that.
President: And that worries me because I would look like a boob before the election to call it off 1 day and start it 2 days later. The experienced diplomats don't think so. They think the Soviets are in this thing and they're worried and wouldn't let them do it and all that kind of stuff. But the net of it is--what you really get down to--we take our action and then they agree to sit down with the GVN. Now, our diplomats think that that puts the government in a hell of a good shape out there, that it says to all the NLF and the Communists that they've finally come around to doing something they said they'd never do--they really recognize them--and that it really strengthens that government when they do it. Now, if they wait a week, it may not be in existence.
Russell: It may not be in existence--I thought of that.
President: Now that's my problem. So, we are fighting on that one. Now on the DMZ, he can respond and on the cities he can respond. And our military people think--Wheeler thinks--that they can never do anything in that country unless they do hit the cities. So if they do agree not to hit the cities, it is a great military concession. At least if they don't agree to it, but just don't do it. They know that if they do it that all bets are off and we might even go back to where we were--Hanoi.
Russell: I don't think you have any option but to do that, Mr. President. Otherwise, it would make us look bad.
President: Now, the big damn question is this week. That's what worries me. I honestly don't have anybody that has the feel of this thing like you have it and like even I have it, even as far removed as I am from getting out with the people. I know--I saw LeMay yesterday--and he said it was going to be a wheeler-dealer trick, and I know that a lot of folks say, "Well, you had 5 years. Why did you do it 5 days beforehand?" On the other hand, if I put it off, they'll say, well, I could have done it and I wouldn't do it because I didn't want Humphrey. And I think I've just got to do what I think is right--when I get it in shape, when I think it is right. Now, I've been standing out here holding back and making everybody get aboard and now they've got aboard really on 7 days. I'm not going to take 7. I'm going back today and say, "Well, I'm going to take 1, but I would go up to 3." Now when they say no to that, the question is, do I try to ride it out having been offered 7 and turned it down or what. So--
Russell: God knows, I don't know. Those bastards are making problems. I sympathize with you in this thing because it gets down to where I don't know what to do and don't have any suggestions on what to do. Well, as the fellow that finally has to make the decision, I sure feel sorry as hell that I got that much advantage.
President: Here is what I think I would do. I think that I would stick on not going above 3 or 3-1/2.
Russell: I don't see how you can go much above that, Mr. President. I really don't.
President: Now, I may have to.
Russell: If they have any good faith, that's all they'll really need.
President: I may have to, but that is what I think. Now the next thing I think, if I did that I think then I'd have to go right back over the procedure I did the other day and get every one of those men to urge me to do it if they feel that way, just individually, every man that you sat at the table with the other day from across the river.
Russell: Yes.
President: Then I think I'd have to get a new, strong wire from Abrams. And then I think I'd have to get, when I was ready to sign on and I'd really made the decision, first of all, I'd like for it to be as late as it could. I don't want it to become an election issue, but--
Russell: Well, just don't do that.
President: Not if it's November 2nd or 3rd. That's what I'm talking about. I would like for it to be the 4th rather than today.
Russell: That's advisable.
President: You see, you have to take some time. You have to give your troops orders and you have to do things like that. Then I thought about meeting Abrams and really looking him in the eye and saying, "Now, you're damn sure that if I agree for you to stop--?" The weather is so bad, that's just terrible. Chuck [Robb] said they have had 30 inches of rain just in the last few weeks in Danang and they just can't even--[everything] they've got, it's just as wet as hell, and the airport is 4 inches under water. And they say they haven't got anybody--the enemy has nobody north of Danang--moved them all out. They're getting ready for this DMZ, getting them all on the other side of it or in Laos or in Cambodia. So they are apparently getting ready to respect it. But then I thought I might even see Abrams and just say to him, "Now you've got to be the man I rely on and I've got to have military advice. Are you goddamn sure that if I stop this that you've got enough advantages from doing it that justifies it. Now if you haven't, I'm not going to." I don't believe anybody can answer these folks on the merits of the decision except the military.
Russell: No, I--well, they have at least got to be part of it. Nobody else could do it without them.
President: The other day they were enthusiastic, and he seems to be more enthusiastic every time you talk to him. Let me read you, if I can here, I want to read you, if I've got it, his latest this morning./2/ I sent him a cable./3/ This is from the two of them--Bunker and Abrams: "If we have Thieu aboard and allow time for him to inform his leaders in advance, we see no serious difficulties here in respect to your questions, i.e. political viability with the GVN, effect on the military situation, or adverse effect on the morale of either our forces or those of the ARVN." We see no serious difficulties. "Two, Thieu has not been concerned with the cessation itself, but rather to the NLF participation. If the nature of that participation is clearly understood and properly handled publicly, he is not concerned. I hope to reach agreement on this at this afternoon's meeting. Three, assuming no further delay here with respect to the issues, when I have authority to notify him of the timetable which we would take up with Hanoi and to obtain his concurrence, I would work out with him the times when others here would be notified. Abrams says they will need 12 hours, but that the information can be restricted to the Chief of the JGS and General Lam, the I Corps commander, and General Troung, Commander of the 1st Division, which is in I. Assuming the timetable in your telegram, this would mean that Thieu would set a meeting next date to include the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, the Speakers of the Legislature and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I feel that Ky should be notified somewhat earlier, and I will tell Thieu that he could do this if he wished. I would remark that the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Legislature were strongly pressed to reveal what President Thieu had told them at the October 16 meeting and all three refused. The Legislature complained they were debating this whole issue without any knowledge of the facts. I therefore think we need not be too concerned about leaks at the top. We will discuss with Thieu how and when Ambassador Lam would be notified in advance." That's the Paris plan. Now, that is their last meeting. So what it narrows down to and consulting with you about, I am just trying to get a feel that I am on steady ground and just not jumping at the 7 days. I don't want to look bad in history and say I was offered something and I was just hard-headed and obstinate. But--
/2/See footnote 3, Document 108.
/3/See Document 105.
Russell: I don't know how in the hell they would really prove that you were ever offered that.
President: Oh, Harriman would just leak it all over the lot. He's already practically doing it. You see, those--George Ball and Harriman and them--are working so close together. Harriman has really--feels that he has an obligation to party as well as to country, and I just don't feel that way on this matter at all.
Russell: Well, on these people, I never really was fully confident of them.
President: I just don't want people to say that this man kept on a war when he could have settled it in 7 days. Now, my judgment is that we may not get anything out of them when we start talking except more Paris and I rather think they're doing it--the Soviets are doing it to affect the election. That's what I'm afraid of.
Russell: Well, they're smarter than I am if they can predict exactly what effect it is going to have on the election.
President: Well, I thought then I would get the [Congressional] leaders when I got ready to sign on and just get them to come in. And I thought I would just get the three principal candidates and just get them in, and say, "Now gentlemen, I want Secretary Rusk to tell you why he recommends this from a political standpoint. I want General Wheeler and Clifford to tell you why they recommend it from a military standpoint. I want to have Bunker and Abrams' wire read to you. Now, I can turn this down and walk away. I don't think the American people want to do it." And then just kind of say, kind of in the language you used the other day, "I am going to take a try at it, but Abrams has his orders that they can trigger a response if they move on either these fronts--either the cities or the DMZ. Now they have not agreed--repeat, not agreed--not to move. But they know if they do move we will respond and it may make us look foolish. But I think it's a gamble worth taking." Just say that to Wallace and Nixon and Humphrey right in their presence. I can't believe they could do a damn thing. When I told them that over the phone the other day, Wallace was just as meek as he could be. He said, "Mr. President," he said, "I am going to support the Commander in Chief whatever you decide." Nixon said, "Mr. President, you know I have said we will speak with one voice." Humphrey just said, "Thank you." But both of them supported my statement the other day when I told them over long distance telephone that this was the thing we were working on. And I don't know, they would bring one hundred newspapermen in each plane and it would be a big extravaganza. On the other hand, I'm afraid not to give them all of the details so that they would really know that I could justify it.
Russell: The only thing that disturbs me at all, Mr. President, is that we don't know definitely whether we've got any quid pro quo at all.
President: We do with the GVN.
Russell: What's that?
President: They tell us on the Government of Vietnam. Another thing I didn't propose--I didn't mention--I would propose to call in Dobrynin and say, "Now our relations are very serious between us and the Soviet Union. You recommended this and I want you to go back to your government and be damn sure that they recommend it. And I want you to know that if any of these three things don't work out, that I'm doing them because of my respect for your responsibility, and if they break loose, why you better hold your hat because I'm not going to be bound at all." So that they would have plenty of time to tell Hanoi that they were in effect bound by these three things.
Russell: Well, if they'd do that, then, I think, of course, that would be tremendously helpful. I think they can urge and suggest these things, but I don't think they've ever just told Hanoi that I think this is what you ought to do and do it now.
President: I think that's right.
Russell: Well--
President: What do you think is wrong with the scenario after we sign on, if we ever get an agreement?
Russell: Well, if you get the agreement, I think it's good. You've got everybody tied up then in the same boat.
President: Well, I mean--
Russell: If the thing folds up, everybody just goes, sits back and says that no fellow could have done a damn sight better than that.
President: Would you have the Cabinet in?
Russell: I just don't know about that.
President: It'll be 6 hours difference. Some of them would be in California and some will be in New England.
Russell: You can't afford to unless it is very firm, Mr. President.
President: That's right, that's right, and that's where I am. For instance, if I--
Russell: If it's very firm, I think that I would, because that's just a relief that we're moving completely on the picture.
President: Would you have the leaders with them or would you have two separate groups?
Russell: That's a hard question.
President: I believe two separate groups because I think that you might have a Rivers that might hit you or you might have a Fulbright that will hit you who'd say it could have been done all along. You might have a debate.
Russell: I guess that is right, although I must say that I am not very apprehensive about that. I think if you have the Joint Chiefs all there and they all say they'll sign up, and Rusk says he'll sign up, and Harriman and the other group, I don't think you will get a bad response out of them. I don't know about Rivers.
President: From the standpoint--
Russell: Oh, hell no, Rivers won't think about it if Westmoreland is there.
President: Well, if Westmoreland agrees, well then Rivers will agree. You're going to have to have them seated together. Seems like they ought to know something before they start asking questions.
Russell: Yes, I agree with that. Who do you think--just setting the President aside--who do you think is our strongest card on this--Abrams or Wheeler or Rusk--from the standpoint of the country, and even the Republicans, and Eisenhower, and Nixon, and so forth?
Russell: Frankly, I think it would be Abrams and Bunker. I wouldn't leave them out. Abrams is pretty well-known over the country and so is Bunker. The trouble is all may not know who Bunker is, but those that get out and make hell-raising speeches all know who Bunker is. I'd sure bring him in right along with Abrams. Let them come in together.
President: Would you meet either with Abrams or Bunker beforehand? That gives me a day or two time if I met them in Honolulu. It'd create a lot of talk, but I could do it on a weekend. It gives me--it moves me up a little closer to Tuesday.
Russell: That will, Mr. President, but you have to bear in mind that one of the candidates might break loose in the meantime. Have your boys talk to them. They know what you are doing. I'd have them come on in to Washington.
President: Well, they ought to be back out there when this goes into effect because Ky might start a coup or we got to respond if they violate.
Russell: Yes, sir, that's really what I'd like to do with Abrams.
President: I want to be sure that Abrams is not--
Russell: Oh, Mr. President, he's a solid fellow.
President: I want to just be sure.
Russell: If Abrams tells you anything in the cablegram, he will tell you the same thing when he sees you. That is my opinion. I have known him very light, not intimately, but I have known him for 2 or 3 years. [Other voices are heard on the line.] Who is it on this phone?
President: I don't know--a party conversation, it looks like. I will let you go. Much obliged.
Russell: Not at all. I certainly hope that it works out all right.
President: Thank you, my friend.
110. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 23, 1968, 2:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I [1 of 3]. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting, which was held in the Cabinet Room, lasted from 2:44 p.m. to 3 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of this memorandum to the President, October 23, 7:10 p.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith an account of your conversation this afternoon with General Momyer, for your files or any use you may have of it." The President made the following handwritten notation on the covering note: "Walt--Save this for Congressional briefing & have available.--L." A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
Meeting with the President, October 23, 1968, 2:45 p.m.
PRESENT
The President, General William W. Momyer,/2/
W.W. Rostow
/2/Commander, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Former Commander, Seventh Air Force, Vietnam. [Footnote in the source text.]
The President asked Mr. Rostow if he had reviewed the President's problem with General Momyer.
Mr. Rostow said he had not. He thought the President should present it to General Momyer himself.
The President stated that he confronted a dangerous decision. It could yield good results or bad. He did not wish to put General Momyer in the position of overriding the judgments of his military or political superior officers; but he wanted his personal best judgment on a wholly personal basis.
The President would have to make a decision on his own responsibility. He had consulted Bunker and Abrams and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as key civilians. But he also wanted the personal judgment on his decision from General Momyer before making up his mind.
For a long time, the President said, we had taken the position that we were willing to stop the bombing if the enemy would do "almost anything" by way of reciprocity. We had also said that we expected prompt and productive talks looking towards peace; and that we would assume the enemy would not take advantage of a bombing cessation.
Lately we have spelled out our position with some precision. First, the GVN must participate in the productive talks. This would confer a great benefit on the GVN. Hanoi had repeated over and over again it would never deal with these "lackeys" of the U.S. Second, we have made it clear that they must understand that if they violated the DMZ we would have to respond. General Abrams would have standing orders to respond if the DMZ were violated.
These two points were the essence of Harriman's initial instructions in Paris. Since then, we have added a third point as a result of the enemy's shelling the cities. We have said that they must understand that if they shell the cities, we would have to respond by bombing North Vietnam.
On these conditions we are considering whether we would stop on an agreement that the GVN would enter the substantive talks within a week.
We would shift our air power over to Laos. We have taken the view that with the heavy rains in the North Vietnamese panhandle our risks might not be too great. We would urge the other side to try to match the negotiating record of 1954 and wind up the negotiations in 30 days. During that period we would expect no attacks across the DMZ and no attacks on the cities.
The President then said he was conscious that there were certain dangers and pitfalls; for example, the other side might not show up for the first meeting. They might violate the DMZ or shell the cities, and we would be in the position of having to resume the bombing and having been duped on the basis of an inadequate agreement. We would have agreement that the GVN must take part in the talks; but this they could simply violate. They could claim that they heard what we said about the DMZ and the cities, but they didn't agree. The President is much concerned at the possibility of entering an agreement which is not sufficiently explicit and might lead to the charge that he was duped. Some of his advisers, on the other hand, say that we could present our record as having gone the last mile in good faith. The President does not wish to lose a great opportunity for peace, but he wished to share his concerns with General Momyer and seek his judgment. Gen. Momyer should know that only one civilian in the Pentagon is aware of the decision that now lies before the President, although all the members of the JCS, plus General Palmer, know about it. Very few civilians in the government know of what lies before the President.
The President then asked General Momyer for his judgment. General Momyer said: I presume that when we talk about a cessation of bombing we mean only North Vietnam, and that we would continue bombing in Laos and South Vietnam.
The President affirmed that this was the case and reminded General Momyer that we would only hold our hand in North Vietnam if they did not violate the DMZ. General Momyer said that we are now in the midst of the monsoon transition in Vietnam. The weather will be bad in the panhandle all the way from the 17th parallel to Hanoi. Bombing from the 17th to the 19th parallel for the next three months would have to be done by radar. That means that you cannot bomb trucks but only fixed points. The effectiveness of such bombing is low. We would normally concentrate our effort against trucks coming through Laos. If we can still do this, General Momyer said that, in his judgment, the risk being undertaken by the President was minimal at this period and for the next few months.
General Momyer went on to say that unless the enemy is engaged in a purposeful de-escalation, we must expect an increase in infiltration and truck movements through Laos. But if we can keep the pressure on in Laos the military risk of a bombing cessation against North Vietnam was "acceptable."
The President asked: Would we move all our sorties over to Laos, or would there be more than could be absorbed in Laos?
General Momyer said: Not all. Some would be allocated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. But we could get better results from bombing in Laos and South Vietnam than in North Vietnam during the present monsoon period. He said, again, that we could only bomb by radar against such fixed points as ferries and fords between the 17th and 19th parallels in the kind of weather that is now upon us. He said this was the most favorable period, from a military point of view, for a bombing cessation. In his judgment, it would not endanger our troops in I Corps.
The President said that he had not wished to indicate the views of others before General Momyer rendered his judgment, but he might be interested to know that General McConnell had given him an evaluation precisely like his own. The JCS also agrees.
The President then turned to another question which, he said, he proposes to put to General Abrams. What is your guess--will the enemy violate the DMZ?
General Momyer said that if he intended to violate the DMZ substantially, he would have to redeploy his forces presently in North Vietnam and in Laos. This would take time in the present period of heavy rain. It might take him two months to get himself into position. It did not make much military sense for him to do so at this time.
The President then said that Secretary Rusk had given him an estimate of a 75% probability that the enemy would honor the DMZ.
General Momyer said he agreed because of the difficulty of moving troops and mounting an attack in the weather conditions which would obtain over the next several months.
General Momyer said he thought they might do a certain amount of desultory shelling across the DMZ to remind us they are there, but nothing like the attacks against Con Thien or Gio Linh where hundreds of shells were fired from or across the DMZ at our men.
General Momyer repeated: I believe the threat of violation is wholly "acceptable."
The President then put to General Momyer this question: If you were President, would you do it?
After a pause, General Momyer said, "Yes, sir." He explained that, given the low military risk, he would certainly do it if he had any reason to believe that this gave us the greatest possible opportunity to bring peace to Vietnam.
The President reassured General Momyer as the meeting closed that reconnaissance would continue. General Momyer thought this essential.
WR
111. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 23, 1968, 4-4:31 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
NOTES ON MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
General Wheeler
Secretary Clifford
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson
The Group read over the Text./2/
/2/Reference is to draft instructions to Harriman and Vance, attached to a memorandum to the President from Rostow, October 23, 12:55 p.m. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 2 [2 of 2]) See Document 113.
Secretary Clifford: You have firm military support.
The President: We do not know yet what we have from Hanoi.
General Momyer said you couldn't do much because of weather. If we get what we are asking for, he'll support it./3/
/3/See Document 110.
General Wheeler: The Chiefs said that the other day.
The President: I want maximum civilian and military support.
The people will ask why did I stop bombing if I had no firm agreement.
Secretary Rusk: There is a 5% chance the other side would like to put the President in the spot of stopping the bombing, then restarting.
Secretary Clifford: What we did yesterday was to get principles upon which this was based./4/
/4/See Document 103.
General Wheeler: This language sounds like an ultimatum. I would go back to earlier language: "The President cannot maintain bombing cessation in the face of violations."
Walt Rostow: I would use "facts of life" formulation.
Secretary Rusk: That's good. Soviets know the three facts of life well.
The President: We will stop bombing on October 31. They can make their announcement as they wish.
Secretary Rusk: We could argue all day about an "agreed minute."
Secretary Clifford: Bus and I had a wonderful time with Ike/6/ this morning.
/6/Former President Eisenhower.
General Wheeler: He was alright on Vietnam. He was concerned about the political situation in Saigon. He said if something comes up he should know about, let him know.
112. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Everett Dirksen/1/
Washington, October 23, 1968, 6:02 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, October 23, 1968, 6:02 p.m., Tape F6810.06, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Hello?
Dirksen: Yeah. Thanks for calling back. I had a call from Nixon. He's rather upset. He insisted that there was some hard evidence that something is going to happen; that there was a meeting and that you would probably go to the country on television with an announcement. I said, "Well, Dick, I don't know anything about it, but I will call and ascertain whatever the score is."
President: Well, Everett, I don't want to talk on the phone and in the papers, and the last experience I had the other day on this gimmick business and on my calling you on the phone twice gave us lots of embarrassment back here. Now, I have told Nixon, and I repeat to you, that I am trying as hard as I know how to get peace in Vietnam as quickly as I can. For that reason, I am not running. Now, when I have anything that I believe justifies or warrants consultation, I will initiate it, and until I do, I don't want to be handicapped with these public speeches and comments that would indicate it. For instance, when I answer your call, it's repeated in the paper that I called you twice and that I said so and so and so, and you demanded two or three conditions here that we discussed. Then Ford wonders why he wasn't called. Then McCormack comes down and says why he wasn't called. Then Humphrey says, "I understand you were talking to Nixon and Dirksen." So I am just in the middle. Now, what I am going to do on these things--I am working at it every day and every night. I am going on not television but radio Sunday night,/2/ but it's going to be a campaign speech--just as they go on every day and every night, and I don't call them and worry them about what they say. They denounce me every day, and people that live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones. Now, if there's anything that involves their duties or their official positions that requires consultation, I'll get them on the phone, as I did the other day. Until then, I don't think it's good to be discussing these things.
/2/The President's radio address of October 27 is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 1093-1096.
Dirksen: Let me give you two assurances: number one, this call never took place, and number two, I presume I'll have to call him back and say you will consult with him whenever there is something to consult about.
President: Just tell him that I have said all along what my position is, and he knows it, and I am looking at a transcript that I made when I talked to him the other day before you called me at his request./3/ I don't know--I don't know how I can do more than that.
/3/See Document 80.
Dirksen: I won't say anything about it. So I'll drop it right there.
President: Okay. I will be in touch with you if there is anything to consult about and I will be in touch with him when and if there is. There is not at this time anything that I would need his opinion on or any announcement I could make. Our position is pretty well known and their position is, I hope, going to be a better one. But I don't have any confirmation of this.
Dirksen: Well, be assured that this call never took place.
President: Okay.
Dirksen: All right.
113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, October 23, 1968, 2152Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Rostow and Read, and approved by Rusk. Repeated priority to Saigon.
260480/Todel 1371. For Harriman and Vance.
As background to your meeting with Thuy, you should bear in mind the following points which are fundamental in Washington:
1. We are entering the climax of a Presidential campaign year. If and when you achieve an agreement in principle along the lines of the instruction which follows, the President will have to make sure he has firm civilian and military support for the step we are prepared to take; there will be political leaders to be talked to; there will be candidates who must be informed. The candidates will be scattered about the country. It may take as much time to go through this process as it may take the other side to bring NLF representatives from Tay Ninh province.
2. Before you give the other side even tentative approval to the arrangement we propose, you must make it very clear again what our understanding is with respect to the DMZ and the cities--on a "facts of life" basis.
3. Against this background instructions for your next private meeting follow:
Begin Instructions:
You should start with a clear and firm position presented orally along following lines:
a. We are prepared to stop the bombing, etc., on the basis of the discussions that we have held.
b. Your side has constantly emphasized that after a bombing cessation, talks would be promptly held. You have even mentioned "the next day." We still think that a substantive meeting including the GVN should be held the next day. However, in a maximum effort to reach agreement we have indicated there might be a two-three day interval between the cessation of bombing and a first meeting.
c. You should indicate that we are prepared to accept their suggested date of November 2 for the first meeting after the bombing cessation. We are not, however, prepared to stop the bombing in that case earlier than two or at the most three days before--which would be October 31 or October 30. That itself would require us to issue orders one or two days prior thereto.
d. You should make clear that, when we announce our action, we expect to announce the date of the meeting and the fact that represent-atives of the GVN will be present at it. They can make their announcement as they wish.
e. On representation, we agree on the substance--that the GVN will be alongside us, and that they will have the NLF alongside them. We see no need at all to haggle over "two sides" vs. "four parties." We look at it one way and they another. We all know who will be there, and that the question is participation not recognition.
f. We see no need for an agreed minute if we agree on what will happen and when. In particular, we are not prepared to agree to anything that goes beyond the concrete points agreed, as listed above. "Without condition" or "unconditional" are not acceptable in a joint minute, unless we also spell out what we have stated as facts of life. The same problem exists in characterizing the participation. If they are serious in wanting to get down to business, forms of words should not stop them. As the events take place either side will be free to make announcements or statements as it sees fit. If these should be at variance with what has in fact been agreed, they can be refuted both by words and by the facts as they unfold in compliance with the real understandings. The only assurance we will give is that no US official statement will use the word "conditional."
4. You should make a maximum effort to achieve agreement on these lines, making clear, however, that any agreement you reach must be subject to final review and clearance here and further notice to them or a short additional meeting.
5. If it appears that they insist on an agreed minute, you should ask for a recess long enough for plausible preparation of a handwritten copy of the following text:
A. On the basis of our discussions, all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the territory of the DRV will stop as of (date and time provisionally agreed).
B. It is agreed that meetings on the substance of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam will begin in Paris on (date and time provisionally agreed). The US has indicated that representatives of the RVN will be present, and the DRV has indicated that representatives of the NLF will be present. The foregoing in no way implies recognition of those represented at the meeting.
C. The date and time of the first Paris meeting will be made public at the time of announcement of the bombing cessation.
6. You should hold firm on the rest, reporting any remaining differences here. You will readily see why we have chosen this wording and why it is essential to adhere to it. Paragraph 5B in particular states the case exactly as we have presented it, and they have accepted it. At the same time, it avoids the straight listing--which has clear four-party implications--and any use of "our side" and "your side," which would simply lead to fruitless controversy.
7. Whatever degree of agreement is reached, we repeat that we must review it here--and perhaps with our allies--before it becomes final. This must be understood by all of us.
Rusk
114. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 24, 1968, 0345Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 1:23 a.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
41044. Ref: Saigon 40987./2/ Subject: Meeting with Thieu and Ky October 23; full account.
/2/In telegram 40987 from Saigon, October 23, the Embassy summarized the GVN's position on NLF representation as set forth at the meeting and requested from the Department "affirmation of our understandings and of our support" on the issue. (Ibid.)
1. At the meeting summarized in reftel, I first went over the ground covered in my conversations with Thieu on October 20 (Saigon 40710)/3/ and with Thanh on October 21 (Saigon 40760),/4/ explaining why the "our side/your side" formula is the only one that will enable us to get down to serious talks. Ky, who had also been over most of these points in his talk with Berger October 22 (Saigon 40866),/6/ listened attentively. This was the only occasion I have witnessed so far when Ky and Thieu consulted each other repeatedly and at length before formulating their positions, and when Thieu acted as spokesman the latter repeatedly stated he agreed with the President.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 94.
/4/Dated October 21. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. II)
/6/Dated October 22. (Ibid., HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. III)
2. Thieu said the GVN has a major problem and wishes to work with us in trying to solve it. From their point of view the bombing halt is not a very important matter. What is important is to convince the Vietnamese people that it would lead to an end to the war and that Hanoi will be obliged to talk with Saigon. His principal worry, Thieu said, is that the Vietnamese people would not understand if the GVN sits sown at the same table with the NLF. They would react with a wave of fear and despair which could result in mass desertions from the RF and PF, a precipitous drop in the Chieu Hoi program, and the stalling of the pacification offensive, and in the cities: panic sales, Communist propaganda, demonstrations and counter-demonstrations by Catholics and the Buddhists, and perhaps mutiny (not a coup) among some of the armed forces. At any rate, the morale of the people would suffer a grave blow.
3. I replied that perhaps I had misjudged the present Government of Vietnam. I had thought, and had so reported to Washington, that it has considerable strength and stability. If the President, the Vice President, and Prime Minister exerted leadership and went before the people and explained the Paris talks as something that had been forced upon Hanoi and as a move toward peace which the GVN is making from a position of strength, it seemed to me the people would understand. It should not be too difficult to explain that in effect Hanoi, having failed to win militarily, was now obliged to talk with the GVN after having said for years that the GVN does not represent the people of South Vietnam, etc. Berger added it must be extremely embarrassing for the NLF, which claims to be the sole representative of the South Vietnamese, to be in a position where Hanoi would have to talk to the GVN.
4. Thieu then developed the ideas that the US should obtain from the DRV some undertaking that Hanoi was "sincere" in wishing to talk with Saigon; that there must also be assurances that Hanoi would resort to no tricks or propaganda or jockeying to put the NLF in some special position; and, finally, that we must work out the procedural problems so that the other side would not be able to claim that we were conferring some improved status on the NLF. We replied that while we would work with the GVN on the procedural problems we could not guarantee that Hanoi wouldn't try every trick in the book and pull out all stops in its propaganda. The point was, we said, that we had outfought the enemy in Vietnam, faced him down in Paris, and are in a strong position to beat him also in the negotiations. Remarked that so far we have carried the burden of propaganda alone in Paris and it's high time for the GVN to have their own spokesman there. Since they have the better story they should not be afraid to compete with the Communists in propaganda.
5. Ky thereupon said the GVN was not unwilling to accept the risk of going into negotiations, all they were asking was some help in explaining to their own people that they were not being forced to negotiate with the NLF. I said, "It is your leadership, Mr. Vice President, that can swing your people." Ky said the leadership is there but they were up against a problem of deep public suspicion. I referred to the joint statement on which we had agreed and which would show why we were stopping the bombing and sitting down with the other side. Ky then said it might be sufficient to reach an understanding that if the GVN said "We are going to Paris to talk with Hanoi," the DRV would at least not contradict them and claim that the GVN was being forced to go to Paris to talk with the NLF.
6. Ky finally said the GVN was really asking us to help them "save face." We said it is Hanoi and the NLF whose face needs saving, not the GVN which will be leading from strength. They will be able to say that Hanoi has been forced to come to the conference table. It will not matter if the DRV brings along their southern branch. There followed a long discussion in Vietnamese between Thieu and Ky, and finally the latter said: "We have to accept the risk, but we still need some insurance." I said I could think of no better insurance than the military commitment and political support of the United States. Ky said the timing is bad, people will think we are giving in to the Communists because of the imminence of our elections. I explained that the elections had nothing to do with it, that for five months we had been trying to get the DRV to accept some de-escalation and to talk with the GVN, we had made no concession, it was the other side that was accepting our conditions.
7. Thieu recapitulated the three points (paragraph 4 above, and paragraph 2 reftel), adding "We have to be sure that we get those things before we can go into the conference." I replied along the lines set forth in paragraph 3 reftel. Thieu said they needed agreement with Hanoi on the procedural matters before they could go into talks, but toward the end of the discussion he was less categorical about this than before. We agreed Berger would follow up on the procedural aspects with Thanh. In conclusion I said it now looked as if the DRV had met the conditions for talks put forward by President Johnson and it only remained to agree on dates for a bombing halt and substantive talks. I said we hoped they understood that if the other side gave us satisfaction in the matter of dates, we would have to move to stop the bombing. Thieu said, "We are not afraid of competing with the Communists, but we need help in persuading our people that we have not been forced to negotiate with the NLF"./6/
/6/Karamessines sent a memorandum to Rostow and Rusk, October 24, noting that a source close to the South Vietnamese leadership advised that "it is useless for the Americans to try to persuade Ky and Thieu on the basis for what is best for Vietnam and should argue rather for the need for the GVN to swallow a bad pill now in return for American assurances of firm future backing on the question of clear primacy over the NLF in Paris talks." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79-207A, Folder 1)
Bunker
115. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 24, 1968, 10:08 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 24, 1968, 10:08 a.m., Tape F6810.06, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Rusk: In behind the scenes with Averell, particularly with Averell, but with Averell and Cy--they are entirely loyal in their talks with Hanoi. That's something you can be assured of.
President: Yes, I think that's right. But I think you and I have to be prepared for their lobbying with us à la the Shrivers or Nick or somebody else. I mean, I think--I don't think there's--I could tell that when they were here. Both of them. They want peace at any price and I think we just have to bear that in mind. Now, I think our strongest point is one you came up with. I'm sorry the Russians are shoving us like they are. You say you got a cable last night?/2/
/2/See Document 101.
Rusk: Yes.
President: They are shoving awfully hard because they are the peace-makers. And I am sorry they are, because that gives us some problems. But I wished they would keep quiet and then say "How bright a boy I am." But I think our best point with both the doves and our own administration--Under Secretaries and even Secretaries of other Departments--is that Dobrynin suggested that we take the November 2d date and move as close to it as we felt we could.
Rusk: Right.
President: That we have done. We feel like we ought to do that, and we just don't think that we ought to try to get something there that would destroy us here.
Rusk: Give some thought, Mr. President, to this point. There's only one file of these Harvan Double Plus cables in this building and Ben Read and I are the only ones that have physical possession of that file. Nick and Bill Bundy are the only two others who are familiar with it. Now consider whether--if you had a very clear private understanding with Clark--whether he should not have in his own safe a similar file.
President: Yes, I think that would be good.
Rusk: But emphasize to him that he just must not talk with anybody else over there about it because I think there is a little bit of a problem here.
President: Has he indicated anything?
Rusk: No. He hasn't complained to me at all about it.
President: This is strictly diplomatic, isn't it?
Rusk: Well, it is. But, you see, we have communicated with Harriman and Abrams without his being intimately involved in all of the records, you see, and it does also involve the armed forces and the military situation out there. So I think that it is a point you might want to think about. It would make things a little more comfortable in talking about telegrams--when you want to sit down with him and go over them and so forth you have the full background.
President: Yes, and maybe we ought to talk a little more, you and I, without always having a bigger group.
Rusk: I think that is right.
President: Well, let's try to do that. You take some initiative, put your hat on, and come on over sometime and we will just sit down and you say, "These are the problems."
Rusk: Yeah.
President: Now, I don't want to yield much away from my November 2d or 3d date and I don't want to go much more than the 3 days. I assume you know that.
Rusk: Yes. I made--I possibly made a mistake yesterday. Harriman had called back saying they wanted 7 days. I assumed you knew that and I didn't report that specifically in.
President: No, I didn't know that. I knew they wanted 7.
Rusk: They would like to go up to 7.
President: I knew they wanted 7. After he got our instructions he called?
Rusk: No, no. This was before that. This was the day before yesterday.
President: I see. He said he wanted 7.
Rusk: That is right.
President: And you told him?
Rusk: I told him our real position was the next day and we had gone to 2 or 3 and it was just unmanageable to go to 7.
President: And what did he say?
Rusk: Well, I didn't pursue it. I didn't myself personally talk to him. I sent him a message on that./3/
/3/See Document 113.
President: What did Cy say last night? Do you have a full report on that?
Rusk: Nick says Cy accepted it and will do his best on it. I think that Cy and Averell would both prefer that they have more wiggle room in stretching the days a little bit, you see.
President: What was your reaction? Why didn't they take this up with you?
Rusk: I think it was probably the time of night. Normally they call the Under Secretary when it's after 8:30.
President: Yeah, but Nick ought to have taken it up with you instead of me because you were familiar with it. But I was glad to give him my feel so he knows.
Rusk: I think your talk with Nick last night was useful, Mr. President, so he could understand more clearly what was really involved./4/
/4/In a telephone conversation beginning at 8:45 p.m. on October 23, the President and Katzenbach discussed Harriman's recommendations regarding extending the interval between the cessation of bombing and the convening of the first negotiating session. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Katzenbach, October 23, 1968, 8:45 p.m., Tape F6810.06, PNO 9-10) In an October 24 memorandum to Rusk, Katzenbach noted: "I assume that the President attaches the most importance to the time gap; if this is true, I think we should be willing to give somewhat on the other issues." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 271, Nicholas Katzenbach Papers, NK Chron. 1968)
President: Now, do you think--what was Cy's reaction? What do you think about the idea yourself? Suppose it had just been presented to you. What would have been your reaction?
Rusk: Oh, I think so long as we do not retreat from the 2 or 3 days--
President: But suppose we had--what he had wanted us to do. Suppose I said--
Rusk: You mean the 7 days?
President: Yes. What he was wanting us to do was to take the 2 extra days. I thought he was really trying to slyly scheme for 5 days. That is the way I interpreted it.
Rusk: He was trying to get the announcement made at the time of the issuing of the orders.
President: That's right. That would have been 5 days.
Rusk: That's right.
President: Now that is the way I interpreted it. What is your reaction to it?
Rusk: I really think we have got a major problem here that, if there is a public gap between the announcement of the bombing halt and the first meeting, that we are going to have trouble, and the longer the gap, the more trouble because this is the only thing tangible that we get out of it that can be visible almost immediately when you make the announcement. Now the rest of these things--the facts of life--will come up more or less de facto, but it'll take several days at least to do that, and during that period we will have a terrible time with a lot of people here and I think with our allies. So that this question on a prompt meeting with the GVN is the only tangible thing we've got coming in the other direction after we take the major step of stopping the bombing--the minority plank in Chicago. So I have no problem on that at all, and those who argue that 2 or 3 days don't make any difference should just turn that around and remind themselves that if that's true, it doesn't make any difference to Hanoi. And therefore, we might just as well do something that will help us manage this problem. No, I have no problem on that at all. I am not a 7-day man at all.
President: Well, why do you think, then, that Cy is, as solid as he is, and that Nick would be as strong for this?
Rusk: Well, I think Nick was trying to accommodate Cy last night to see what your view would be on this point. But, you see, the fellows in Paris have only a piece of this action. They've got the problem there. And my guess is that Averell is 50 percent ambassador and 50 percent an experienced Democratic politician and that sometimes he gets those two hats confused. And they don't have the problem you have in dealing with Bunker and Abrams and Thieu and the political leadership here. So they are inclined to brush those things aside and say, "Well, this is what we ought to do," and that kind of thing. But they only have a piece of the action, just as Thieu only has a piece of the action. He's looking at it from his point of view, so he has got the elephant's tail and Averell and Cy have got the elephant's ear, but you have got the whole elephant and that's something. What I mentioned yesterday--we are conducting five negotiations simultaneously here. What I meant was that each of these elements that we are dealing with has only a piece of it and you have got all of it and it makes it complicated to hold all of these people together. I think that so far, touch wood, this thing is shaping up reasonably well, and I think the South Vietnamese are moving along nicely now.
President: Anything we can do to keep the Russians from spilling over all the time?
Rusk: I talked to Dobrynin about that,5/ and I was interested that a couple of the press people have told us that members of the Russian Embassy have canceled appointments and luncheons they had with them. So maybe Dobrynin did take some action back in his Embassy.
/6/See Document 107.
President: What do you think is coming out of Paris this morning? What's your best guess?
Rusk: I don't think we are going to get a deal this morning.
President: Thank you.
Rusk: Bye.
116. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [2 of 2]. Secret; Nodis; Harvan Double Plus. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it and the attached report.
Washington, October 24, 1968, 1:20 p.m.
Mr. President:
Herewith the haggle in Paris this morning, plus the reference telegram with our text marked on pages 4-5 in red (at paperclip)./2/ Here are the debating points.
/2/Full summaries of this meeting between the delegations were transmitted in telegrams 22908/Delto 874 and 22914/Delto 877 from Paris, October 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
1. They want to insert the words "without condition" in paragraph A but are prepared to accept also "on the basis of our discussions."
Comment: We could, perhaps, live with this because we have put our conditions in the form of facts of life which would permit serious negotiations to proceed.
2. They propose, instead of the underlined language at the top of page 5 in the attached: "a meeting including representatives of the DRV, NLF, U.S. and RVN will be held in Paris on November 2, 1968."
Comment: The introduction of "representatives of" is an improvement over their proposal; but we will have to see what Ellsworth thinks.
3. Their text "In order to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem" seems all right to me as a substitute for "meetings on the substance of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam."
4. They agree to the principle that the date and time of the first Paris meeting be made public at the time of the announcement, but they don't want it in the minute. They have not accepted our two or three days but, at this time, are still holding out for a week.
I assume Sec. Rusk will be forwarding suggestions to you for the next round in the haggle.
Walt
Attachment
Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)
Washington, October 24, 1968.
Vance called on the secure phone at noon
1. Harriman and Vance met at our request with Thuy and Lau for four plus hours at 11:30 a.m. (Paris time) today.
2. In summary Vance said it had been tough bargaining all the way but the DRV had moved towards our position on several points, and in particular had for the first time given us directly a firm date of November 2 for a first post cessation meeting including the GVN--even though they still attached some qualifications undesirable from our viewpoint.
3. Harriman and Vance followed exactly the instructions contained in yesterday's instructions (State 260480)./3/ In particular Harriman and Vance stated twice the precise nature of our essential understandings on the DMZ and the cities and the DRV did not enter objections and "did not unravel".
/3/Document 113.
4. Thuy tabled a draft joint communiqué and draft joint minute/4/ which contained a number of objectionable elements from our point of view and Harriman and Vance rejected these documents and stated our reasons for so doing.
/4/The draft communiqué read: "On October --, 1968, the representatives of the Government of the USA informed the representatives of the Government of the DRV that the President would order the cessation without any conditions of all air, naval and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force on the whole territory of the DRV, with effect from ---- hours GMT, October --, 1968. The representative of the Government of the DRV took note of this communication. After the realization of the above-mentioned cessation, without condition, of the bombing, a conference including the DRV, the NLF, the USA and the Republic of South Vietnam will be held in Paris on ------ with a view of finding a peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem." The draft minute consisted of two paragraphs: A, which read "On the basis of our discussions, the United States will stop without conditions all air, naval and artillery bombardment and all other actions involving the use of force on the entire territory of the DRV on ---- date at ---- hours GMT," and B, which read "In order to find a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam problem, a meeting including the DRVN, the NLF, the USA and the RVN wncoming)-October 1968)n ------." (Telegram 22908/Delto 874 from Paris, October 24; (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
5. Harriman and Vance then said that if the U.S. and DRV could reach agreement on the date of a meeting on November 2, the earlier date of cessation, the composition of the first post cessation meeting, and the wording on all three points we would agree to the principle of a joint secret minute.
6. After leaving the room to confer together privately two or three times, Harriman and Vance tabled, section by section, the three part minute contained in paragraph 5 of the instructions.
7. In paragraph A they accepted our language with two exceptions: (1) Because of our repeated insistence on the understandings regarding DMZ and cities, Thuy said they insisted on insertion of the words "without condition" after the words "use of force" in our text; and (2) they did not agree on our October 31 or October 30 suggestions for the date of cessation--see below. Harriman and Vance said they accepted our phrase "on the basis of our discussions" only after much argument.
8. Thuy and Lau rejected the language we tabled in paragraph B and tabled their own draft as follows: "B. In order to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem, a meeting including the DRV, NLF, U.S. and RVN will be held in Paris on (November 2, 1968--see below)". Thuy said if we preferred they would be agreeable to alter this language to read "A meeting including representatives of ------".
9. Thuy and Lau agreed to the principle stated in paragraph C of our minute, i.e. that the date and time of the first Paris meeting be made public at the time of the announcement of the bombing cessation--but they argued that this point should not be included in a joint minute. They place importance on the public announcement at the time of cessation.
10. At the conclusion of the meeting Thuy said that if we agreed on paragraphs A and B of the secret minute in the form they preferred as indicated above, he would accept November 2 as the date of the first meeting following cessation and we could then discuss between us the exact time for the actual cessation of bombing. It is clear to Harriman and Vance that they will bargain hard for a date earlier than October 30 for cessation.
11. At one point Lau suggested cessation on the 26th and first meeting on the 2nd.
12. Harriman and Vance told the DRV representative it would take "one or two days to implement orders to stop bombing" and they did not take issue with that fact. At one stage they asked whether we could announce the coming cessation at the time the stop bombing orders were issued, but Harriman and Vance said this would not be acceptable.
13. Thuy and Lau made it entirely clear that in their view the joint minute would be kept secret between the US and the DRV (and Harriman and Vance believe their acceptance of the words "on the basis of our discussions" in paragraph A makes this pledge of secrecy credible).
14. Finally, Harriman and Vance told the DRV representatives they were not in a position to agree even provisionally on any of the points at issue but that they would report promptly and fully to Washington.
Benjamin H. Read
117. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 24, 1968, 3:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [2 of 2]. Secret; Harvan Double Plus.
Mr. President:
Bob Ginsburgh and I have been trying to figure out what it is that makes Hanoi stick so hard on a period longer than 3 days. For what it is worth, neither of us believes they are entering this with the intent quickly to grossly violate the DMZ or otherwise to undertake some outrageous military action that would force you to re-start the bombing. Our reasons for that view are:
--First, they do not have either a present capability or the weather to do anything very significant in a short period of time;
--Basically their military and political position is deteriorating; they are moving toward the best settlement they can get, cautiously and carefully;
--A full scale reopening of the bombing and an end to negotiations--including the bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong--is not what they now want to see happen.
Then, why a period longer than 3 days?
We believe they are trying in every way they can to save face and dignity as they go into this phase of negotiations. That is why they are trying to balance "unconditional" with our facts of life. They probably also want to be able, after the bombing stops, to have the photographers take pictures of the NLF man getting on board a plane at Phnom Penh--or Hanoi--with a bunch of roses and a propaganda statement. They want it to appear that they sent this fellow to Paris only after the bombing actually stopped, or--as the conversation today suggested--after we had announced the time of a bombing cessation. In short, we think this is a matter of their saving face (given the travel time from Vietnam to Paris) rather than a sinister plot; although their saving face in these circumstances does have some marginal effect on their subsequent negotiating ability.
This analysis--for what it is worth--doesn't bear on some of the issues that have concerned you. But I thought you might wish to know how two of us, after examining the alternatives, came out on this matter.
Walt
118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 24, 1968, 2054Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Bundy and cleared by Read. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1377.
260990. Ref: (A) Saigon 40987,/2/ (B) Paris 22740,/3/ (C) Saigon 40788./4/
/2/Dated October 21. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. III)
/3/Dated October 22. (Ibid.)
/4/Document 96.
1. We are pleased that Berger and Herz were able to reach agreement ad referendum with Thanh on considerable range of procedural problems. Based on previous exchanges (reftels), we assume that following represents substance of points agreed on, and would appreciate your confirmation and comments on specific points raised.
(a) Flags and Nameplates. There will be neither flags nor nameplates on the tables on either side.
(b) Name for the Conference. We note that USDel Paris has proposed "Paris Conference" or "Paris Conference on Viet-Nam" whereas our own preference would be to stick with "Paris Talks". Can we assume that GVN has agreed to term "Paris Talks"?
(c) Order of Entrance. We assume the GVN wishes to precede us at first meeting and that they will indicate their desires on doing so for any other meetings.
(d) Chairmanship of Delegation. We assume GVN has agreed that there will be no designated chairman of delegation but that heads of each delegation on our side are co-equals.
(e) Opening Statement. We assume GVN understands that its opening statement should not be deliberately provocative and that whatever they say about the NLF or the DRV can be matched by equally noxious statements by other side. Has GVN indicated its thoughts on main lines of opening statement?
(f) References to Other Side. We assume GVN is prepared to refer to NLF as "the other side". Is Thanh still thinking in terms of having GVN delegation make statement asserting that NLF representatives are part of DRV delegation, etc., every time "a member of the North Vietnamese delegation" purports to speak on behalf of NLF (point 5 of Thanh's October 21 memorandum--Ref (C))?
2. Although not specifically mentioned in reference A, we assume that, on seating arrangements, Thanh has agreed to arrangement of two separate tables facing each other, with each delegation on our side of table arranging itself beginning at center and going right and left. Can we take it that GVN desires to tail off to right in a position of honor while US goes to left? Under this arrangement principals would sit side by side in center of our side of the table.
3. As to Thanh's request that the US "join the GVN delegation" in statements that they would make about the NLF, we concur with Berger's point that there is no difference between us on substance, although we might not use exactly the same words as the GVN delegation. At same time, we would not want to give GVN the impression that we intend to follow them if they plan to reiterate mechanistically a set formula on NLF status along the lines of paragraph 5 of Thanh's memorandum.
4. On Thanh's point that "question of internal politics of the Republic of Viet-Nam cannot be raised by either side at the conference" (based on paragraph 8D of his October 21 memorandum), we concur with Embassy's explanation that US position has all along been that each side must be free to bring up anything it likes. Clearly we cannot accede to Thanh's request for agreement that neither of us will discuss internal GVN matters, but we see no point in making an issue of this at this juncture and agree that it must be left for later resolution./6/
/6/Thanh later would attempt to reassure Vietnamese political leaders that Thieu was not being pressured by Bunker into accepting a cessation that lacked reciprocity. (Memorandum from Karamessines to Rostow and Rusk, October 31; Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79-207A, DDO and Agency Papers for Role in 1968 Bombing Halt in Vietnam)
5. As to Thanh's request for assurances that any agreement coming out of the negotiations would not be signed by the NLF, we concur with Embassy's observation that this problem seemed highly premature and that we could face it when the time comes. As Embassy has already pointed out to Thanh, what was in the document would be more important than signatures (Saigon 40885)./6/
/6/Dated October 22. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. III)
Rusk
119. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 24, 1968, 2332Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 8:11 p.m.
22913/Delto 876. From Vance.
1. I met briefly with Oberemko evening October 24 at Soviet Embassy. Negroponte was also present. Oberemko had met with North Vietnamese delegation and appeared well informed on the present state of play.
2. I told Oberemko we had met for four hours in a very difficult session and that there was sharp disagreement between us at the end of the meeting centering on: (A) The time of cessation; (B) DRV insistence on inclusion of words "without conditions" in proposed minute; (C) Description of participation. I told Oberemko that we had reported to our government what had transpired at today's meeting and were awaiting further instructions from Washington./2/
/2/See Document 116.
3. Oberemko then said that, although there was disagreement, he believed that we were not so far apart that it was impossible to reach a compromise. Oberemko said he thought that the United States should agree to latest DRV formulation on participation issue, i.e., naming of four participants without reference to two sides or four parties. I responded by repeating what we had proposed and said I felt our position was a reasonable one.
4. Upon the inclusion of the term "without conditions," Oberemko urged that we agree to this in a secret minute. Oberemko said that agreement to "without conditions" should be viewed in overall context of the proposed minute which, as a result of today's meeting, would include "on the basis of our discussions." Oberemko said he had been shown the exact wording which we had supplied the North Vietnamese. He said, "I know your position. You've got it there. Everyone knows what it means."
5. On the issue of date, Oberemko said that previously the DRV position on the interval between the cessation of bombing and the start of conversations was two weeks. Now it was ten days, and he thought it would be possible to find a compromise which would be acceptable. I said that as I had told him previously, this was a matter of the utmost importance to my government and that our position was two or three days.
6. Oberemko said that he thought we were very close to a solution and that he hoped we would be able to find a way to reach it. He said, as I knew, his government was deeply interested in finding a solution and that he was acting under the instructions of his government. I said we appreciated his efforts and that I would be in touch with him when there was something to talk about./3/
/3/A report by Read on a telephone call from Vance at 5:30 p.m. noted: "Oberemko said he had visited the DRV delegation after the private meeting today. Vance started to say that they had had some tough bargaining and Oberemko cut in to say that he knew all about the meeting. Oberemko told Vance that when we got agreement on including the words 'on the basis of our discussions'--'You (Vance and Harriman) have got it there. Everyone knows what that means.' Oberemko urged us to find a middle ground on the remaining language and time differences." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [2 of 2]) In a covering note transmitting Read's report to the President, October 24, 6:05 p.m., Rostow wrote: "This fellow Oberemko really knows what the negotiation is about." (Ibid.)
Harriman
120. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 25, 1968, 1054Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 7:17 a.m. Repeated to Saigon.
22926/Delto 878. Ref: State 260990./2/
/2/Document 118.
1. Following comments are keyed to numbering of State 260990 on procedural problems, and take into account state of play with DRV, as appropriate.
(A) Flags and nameplates. We have been pressing same line with Lam as contained reftel. May we assume on the basis of Saigon 41093/3/ that GVN will change Lam's instructions?
/3/In telegram 41093 from Saigon October 24, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Thanh and Berger and Herz in which they found Thanh generally agreeable on procedural issues. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decisions, Vol. II)
(B) Name for the conference. With both Thuy and Lam, as reported in Paris 22914,/4/ para 17, and Paris 22912,/6/ respectively we have talked of the next phase as "meetings". Moreover, in accordance with instructions, we used the word "meetings" in our draft minute (Paris 22914, para 36). The DRV has agreed to the term "meetings", and we believe it wise to stick to it rather than to use "talks." Thus we believe name would best be "Paris meetings" or "Paris meetings on Viet-Nam". Final agreement, of course, will be part of negotiations on procedure.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 116.
/6/In telegram 22912/Delto 875 from Paris, October 24, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Lam and Habib on procedural matters. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. III)
(C) Order of entrance. We concur in reftel positions.
(D) Chairmanship of delegation. Concur with reftel.
(E) Opening statement. Concur reftel. Please note also the question of the order of speaking, on which we want to remain flexible until later. This will be a question of tactics which we can decide here. Embassy Saigon should not agree on this without reference to Paris.
(F) References to other side. We concur with reftel, with amplification as contained in Paris 22912, para 6E.
2. Seating. Concur. We hope Lam will be receiving new instructions on this point before he starts building an elevated chair for himself. See Paris 22912, para 6F.
3. Wish to make clear that we do not intend to engage in unbusinesslike behavior. There does not appear to be a difference in substance based on what Lam has been saying.
4. Concur with Embassy's explanation that each side must be free to bring up anything it likes.
5. Concur. We already made this point to Lam.
Harriman
121. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 25, 1968, 12:38-1:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
NOTES ON MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY GROUP
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
General Taylor
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson
General Taylor: This looks like a phony to me./2/
/2/Reference is to the joint draft minute; see footnote 4, Document 116.
The President: You fool the world with this. You do it with no conditions attached whatsoever. That old dog won't hunt.
Secretary Rusk: Hanoi would surface this secret message on "without conditions" if we had to resume bombing.
General Taylor: It's tricky.
Secretary Clifford: Is it a condition?
The President: Credibility would be a word of yesteryear if this happened.
Secretary Clifford: We could say we can't go on with talks if they attacked cities or moved across the DMZ.
If they are peaceful, we'll be peaceful. If they aren't we won't be either.
Walt Rostow: Backgrounding would say they held their concept on "unconditional"; we held our language in terms of facts of life. Plus we could say we gave Abrams standing orders.
Secretary Clifford: What did the President get for halting the bombing? The presence of the GVN at the negotiation table.
Secretary Rusk: We could say you will have to wait a few days to see on the other things except the GVN at the table.
The President: I don't believe we can sell it that way.
Secretary Clifford: We proceed on the assumption they won't take advantage of the cessation. We could say this would be our assumption.
I would take out the words "without conditions." This is a fallback position.
General Wheeler: The escape hatch is "on the basis of our discussions." I agree with Clark and Dean. I would not let negotiations fail on that point.
General Abrams' execution order could be printed on the front page of the Washington Post.
--If they come across the DMZ, he destroys them.
--If they use artillery, he attacks sites.
A commander is always responsible for security of his troops. In instructions, reprisals are permitted.
General Taylor: Hanoi will see this as a victory for them, not as a victory for us.
The President: Read UPI Ticker item (UPI 61:12:09) Attachment A./3/
/3/Not attached. The reference is likely to the President's statement in a news conference the previous afternoon that "there has been no basic change, no breakthrough" in the Paris negotiations. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, p. 1064.
The President: We won't stop the bombing unless--GVN is at the table, and they respect the DMZ and they won't shell the cities.
You can't say I don't have conditions. I think they will do it just to make asses of us--accept this--then hit us--and force us to resume the bombing. I think they are trying to use this to affect the election.
We must have a reason to believe the GVN will come in. While that is going on, they will respect the cities and the DMZ.
Secretary Rusk: They said they could be at the meeting on November 2.
We must stay with this if we go with it. Time is putting pressure on them. Let's keep this language out.
Secretary Clifford: If this deal goes through, could you have a cable from Harriman and Vance that:
a. The GVN will be at the table
b. That there is a chance for productive talks.
We have told Hanoi if they shell the cities and take advantage of the DMZ, we must protect ourselves. They could say that on the basis of our discussions we believe this.
I am not sure it is more than a hope.
Secretary Clifford: We misled the President on the 19th parallel. You aren't giving up much with the weather like this.
Take out "without conditions." What about Dean's suggestion of using "without preconditions."
Secretary Rusk: We lay out the three facts of life. They attack, we resume the bombing.
What do we tell the leadership?
The other side knows we won't keep bombing off if they attack.
The President: I have had one of three conditions.
Walt Rostow: We said to the Candidates: The facts of life are:
1. GVN
2. The Cities
3. The DMZ
The President: I am not sure Hanoi knows this.
Walt Rostow: Cy said he had done it eight times.
The President: Take out the condition stuff.
Secretary Rusk: I would say that we do not recognize the NLF by just listing them.
Secretary Clifford: I would not put in the line about recognition of the parties.
Secretary Rusk: South Vietnam is concerned about our recognizing the NLF.
The President: We imply recognition.
We'll have a hard time explaining this between now and the election.
Secretary Clifford: It's a test of good faith.
The President: Reads UPI ticker on LeMay. (Attachment B)/4/
/4/Not attached. General Curtis LeMay, running mate of independent candidate George Wallace, made several statements during the last week of October implying that a bombing halt would be ineffective in bringing about an end to the fighting in Vietnam. See The New York Times, October 23-27, 1968.
122. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 25, 1968, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Chlodnick File. Secret; Harvan Double Plus; Literally Eyes Only for the President and Secretary of State.
Mr. President:
I received Amb. Dobrynin at my house at 5:00 p.m. today, October 25. After brief amenities, I told him that the President wished me to review with him, on the same basis that we had earlier met, his concerns about the present situation with respect to the Vietnam negotiations. I explained that the document I was about to give him was a personal oral communication reflecting what was on the President's mind.
He read the document carefully (Tab A).
With respect to para. 1, he said that only he, Dobrynin, knows fully about the Paris negotiations and communications between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Tcherniakov, his DCM, knows half the story. No one else in the Embassy has the knowledge to speak with any authority on what is happening about Vietnam. When I pointed out to him that we had stories alleged to be from diplomatic sources in London, he said he could not assume responsibility for the Embassy in London. I said that I had no doubt about the correctness of his own behavior in this matter but we were confronted with a fact; namely, that stories were appearing, allegedly from Soviet sources; and we were confronted with a second fact; namely, that almost every newspaper man who came into my office told me that his favorite Soviet contact was telling him hopeful things about the negotiations and how peace was about to break out due to the role of the Soviet Union. He said that he had issued instructions to everyone in his Embassy not to talk about Vietnam. We ended by my underlining what the memorandum said; namely, that this was a problem for the President for the reasons indicated.
Dobrynin then turned to substance. He said that he found the memorandum very "disappointing." He thought we were going back to matters which had long since been settled. As he understood the situation in Paris, there were three questions:
--First, how we refer to the participation of those who would take part in the talks. On this matter we had raised a "new point" by want-ing to get into the secret minute that participation "would not involve recognition." Everyone agreed that "recognition" was not involved.
--Second, there was the question that the bombing cessation would be "unconditional." He said this was not a matter, in his judgment, of great importance. It was not worth sacrificing the whole meeting on this matter. I interrupted to point out that my memorandum to him explained fully why we took the question of "unconditional" so seriously. Dobrynin said he now recognized that we attached great importance to the matter and would so report.
--Third, there was the question of the date of cessation of the bombardment. He attached great importance to the fact that the North Vietnamese had set a date; namely, November 2. He could not understand why a few days one way or the other were so important to us when there were such great issues at stake. We have been arguing, he said, for two weeks over the question of 2 days.
I said to him it was not quite so simple. From our point of view, we had in good faith put in a proposal in mid-October. We had chosen "the next day" because of what they had said about beginning serious talks the day after the bombing cessation. (Dobrynin said this was a new idea to him. He had not known that they had mentioned the next day.) I went on to say that having geared ourselves to a final decision on the basis of what had been exchanged, Hanoi negotiators had then unleashed a great many "rabbits": a four-power conference; a communiqué; a secret minute; several weeks "as a gap between the bombing cessation and the first meeting"; no conditions; etc. It was Hanoi's behavior with respect to these matters which had deeply concerned the President, because they might reflect a lack of understanding of the "facts of life" and a lack of understanding of the seriousness of the problems that we faced in moving forward, especially at so sensitive a political time.
After some elaboration by me of the kinds of pressures represented by recent items on the ticker in our political life, Dobrynin said: "I now understand better. I thought that this message would take us back very far to where we began some months ago; but I should like to clear up one serious point: in communicating this message to my government, should I say that the President will not proceed with the Paris negotiations until he gets a response from the Soviet government on the question raised?" I said that it was my impression that the President had merely asked me to convey to Ambassador Dobrynin and his government his present concerns. The question he was asking, however, was a serious diplomatic question and I would seek an answer.
I then called the President and put the issue to him. The President said, no. I do not wish to be that hard. I do not wish to commit myself to holding up the Paris negotiations. I would wish to know the reaction of the Soviet government to this situation.
After this clarification, Dobrynin returned to the three points at stake in the Paris talks. He said: You and I can talk with brutal frankness and if I understand what you are telling me, it is that on one point you are prepared to compromise. That is, you are prepared to see the participants listed. But on two points you intend to hold firm; that is, on "without conditions" and time. At about this point I received a telephone call from Ben Read who told me that we would be prepared to tell the North Vietnamese in the context of the secret minute that we did not plan to use in formal statements the phrase "conditions." I informed Ambassador Dobrynin of this fact and said that now we were prepared to compromise on one and a half of the three points. It was time for them to clear this underbrush away.
At this point Dobrynin volunteered the following. He had been privileged to get the reports from both our side and from the Hanoi delegation. He could attest from his personal knowledge that we had "many, many times" made clear the "facts of life." I asked: "Are you, Ambassador Dobrynin, prepared to tell me that they understand the 'facts of life'?" He said, "I can only say that from their reports to me as well as your reports to our people in Paris, you have expressed yourselves very clearly."
At almost exactly 6:00 p.m., as Ambassador Dobrynin was about to leave, he received at my home a telephone call from Tcherniakov, his DCM. Tcherniakov reported that a message to the President from Kosygin had just arrived, on Vietnam. We consulted together as to where the message should be delivered. We decided to minimize the chances of a leak about our contact and Tcherniakov would deliver the message to my house. Dobrynin then dispatched his car to pick up Tcherniakov, and we settled down to await him. (Up to this point, contrary to his custom, Dobrynin did not have a Scotch. He accepted, while awaiting Tcherniakov.)
During the interval, Dobrynin raised with me the question of missile talks. Where do we stand? I said that while the matter was still on the President's mind, he was much concentrated on the question of Vietnam. I then asked: "Was it true that the Warsaw Pact forces are moving out of Czechoslovakia?" He hastened to tell me that Bulgarian, Hungarian and Polish as well as some Soviet forces were moving out of Czechoslovakia. He added, gratuitously, that there never had been any German forces in Czechoslovakia--which, I take it, will be the Soviet mythology in the face of protests of the other occupying powers of Germany.
He indicated his view that it would be a good thing if we could get on with the missile talks.
I took the occasion of the break to say that, on a strictly personal basis, if I had any advice to give the leaders in Hanoi, it would be to go very rapidly for a definitive settlement in Southeast Asia once the new phase of talks opened, assuming we could surmount present problems. I recalled that it only took a month's hard work in Geneva in 1954. He asked me why I thought there was urgency. I said there were two reasons:
--First, there would be a wave of expectation and goodwill in the U.S. in the wake of a bombing cessation, quiet at the DMZ, quiet in the cities, and GVN participation in Paris. But he had to remember that this was a country which had a scar on its heart over Panmunjom. If the talks dragged on, there would be grave disappointment.
--Second, as he could see from the polls, this country was undergoing a swing towards conservatism. This has happened before in our history, but it was clear that something like 60% of the people were for Nixon or Wallace. I could not predict what would happen if there was protracted frustration in the movement towards peace. It was my personal judgment, however, that there would be strong pressures to apply more military power in Vietnam rather than less.
I concluded by saying that in my quite objective judgment, it would be wise for the leaders of Hanoi to seize this moment and work with President Johnson towards the position he first outlined in his Johns Hopkins speech;/2/ namely, a position in which an independent North Vietnam associated itself not with China but with the other countries of Southeast Asia in constructive efforts at development. Only in this way was North Vietnam likely to maintain its independence. (Dobrynin showed surprising interest and concentration as I made this point.)
/2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 394-399.
Tcherniakov then came in with the attached letter to the President from Kosygin (Tab B)./3/
/3/Not attached.
Dobrynin then gave me the following informal translation.
"Mr. President:
"Information we are receiving from official representatives of the United States as well as from the representatives of the DRV, shows that there is now beginning a very important movement in the U.S.-Vietnamese negotiations in Paris.
"Judging from this information, the position of the two sides on the cessation of bombardment, etc., is much closer. And the possibility of reaching an agreement on this question is quite real.
"By such an agreement we could lay the basis for a beginning of a breakthrough towards a political settlement of the Vietnam problem.
"If this possibility which now exists is missed--the development of events could go in a different direction.
"We are convinced that it is necessary that both sides show understanding and responsibility at this moment.
"In this connection, we should like to tell you quite frankly, Mr. President, that we are not completely convinced that the American side's actions in Paris have proceeded from this particular understanding of the situation.
"We are concerned that the achievement of an agreement in Paris on the cessation of the bombing of the DRV and the beginning of subsequent political talks with participation of the DRV, NLF, U.S. and the Saigon administration could be torpedoed because of details of third importance which, in reality, do not have any significance.
"We would like to hope that the government of the United States would understand its responsibility in connection with the present negotiations in Paris and would not let these negotiations to break but would use them to open the way to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, based on the respect of the legitimate rights and hopes of the Vietnamese people which correspond with the interest of the people of the United States and the peoples of the whole world."
On a wholly personal basis, I made the following observations to Dobrynin on this letter.
First, I would, of course, promptly communicate it to the President and to Secretary Rusk. Second, I found it good that on both sides there was an impulse to communicate when a matter of concern arose affecting the peace. Third, as my communication to him revealed, the President felt concerns of first importance in the light of the positions taken by North Vietnam, which Chairman Kosygin had described as third importance. The question of conditions and of timing were, from our point of view, major matters.
He said that the communication, which I had given him, and our discussion had made this clear and he would so inform his government.
As we went out to our respective cars, I looked at my watch and said: "Anatoliy, it is now midnight in Paris. You'd better get to work to clear up these issues of third importance." He said he would get busy but he didn't know what he could accomplish before the morning meeting in Paris.
Upon returning to my office, I then reported to the President that we had received the message from Kosygin and briefly summarized its substance.
The President instructed me that, after checking with Sec. Rusk, I should make the following points to Dobrynin.
"I have informed the President of Chairman Kosygin's message and he wished me to convey to you immediately the following points:
1. The President is gratified that both the Chairman and he were thinking of same problem at the same time.
2. The President has tried and is trying to find answers to these problems but has been unable to persuade the other side to meet us on acceptable terms. Perhaps Chairman Kosygin can help. Perhaps he can try to help move us closer.
3. The President wishes you to know that the points I made to you this afternoon are, in effect, his response to Chairman Kosygin. They represent the anxieties on the President's mind.
4. The President agrees with Chairman Kosygin that this is a critical phase. He would welcome any assistance the Chairman can give us in getting these issues solved. The President believes that, with the passage of a few more days, this possibility for progress might move away from us."
After briefing Sec. Rusk and reporting the President's four-point message, he suggested that I add the following additional point.
5. Therefore, the President believes that both sides should push these issues of third importance quickly aside and get on with the real business, which is making peace.
I then telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin and twice repeated these five points for urgent transmission to Moscow.
W.W. Rostow/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Tab A
Washington, October 25, 1968.
The President wished me to review with you personally the situation in which we now find ourselves with respect to the Vietnam negotiation in Paris.
I recall that Sec. Rusk told Foreign Minister Gromyko that we would concentrate on certain aspects of the negotiation and that it would be helpful if you could concentrate on the problem of GVN participation./6/ But on this occasion the President wished me to review all the issues with you and to solicit your reaction and that of your government.
/6/See Document 47.
Here are the things that are most on the President's mind.
The situation is made very difficult by reports to the press apparently or allegedly from Soviet diplomatic sources, stating that we are very close to an agreement. These reports have the effect not only of generating an optimism which may not prove justified. They also create in those groups which are most strongly anti-Communist in our country, a sense that we are being led into some kind of trap. It would be extremely helpful at this delicate moment if Soviet diplomatic sources would not encourage the press in any particular direction and, in fact, if possible, not comment at all on the negotiation and its prospects.
2. Even more serious is this. The President is committed before his own people that a bombing cessation would not result in an increase in danger and casualties to US forces and those of our allies. It is for that reason that he has insisted that it is a fact of life that the bombing cessation could not be maintained if the DMZ were violated or the South Vietnamese cities attacked. We are not sure that Hanoi really understands how fundamental it is to the maintenance of a bombing cessation that these two operational conditions be observed. If we come to agreement in Paris, the President will issue standing instructions to General Abrams which would permit him to respond instantly to violations of the DMZ. The President and his colleagues are mutually committed to respond if the cities are attacked.
You know, Mr. Ambassador, that it has been and remains the President's intent to deal with the Soviet Union on the basis of respect and trust and good faith.
He would like to be able to deal with Hanoi on the same basis; because making a stable peace in Southeast Asia is a most serious matter for all the nations of the area, including North Vietnam. It is, therefore, exceedingly important that the Soviet Government and the Government in Hanoi be quite clear that all three of the points we have made--including the facts of life about the DMZ and the cities--are firmly understood. If there is any doubt in the minds of the Soviet leaders on this point, it would be a matter of the utmost importance to us.
There could be no outcome worse for all our efforts than to have a resumption of the bombing and the break up of what we have tried to achieve since March 31.
3. The Ambassador should be aware of the cost imposed on us by Hanoi's delay over minor matters such as a secret minute; its exact language; the form in which those participating in the conference will be mentioned. We tried to anticipate these problems by the your side-our side formula which, we believe, had advantages for everyone concerned. We tried to arrange it so that we moved very promptly from a bombing cessation into the substance of the search for peace. Now they move from a gap of the next day to a week. We have avoided in our conversations with North Vietnam the use of the word "conditions" by talking about "the facts of life." Now we are losing day after day and coming closer to the election in the United States. If the bombing is stopped this close to a Presidential election, our people will debate for years whether it had an effect or no effect. A great divisive force will be let loose in this country. The President intends to proceed as he has thus far proceeded on Vietnam in a manner wholly free of domestic politics. He is not delaying the negotiation at the present time: Hanoi is delaying it by this haggle over words. The President has not expedited the negotiation nor will he expedite it on the basis of the election. He is taking each step on the merits. But you, Mr. Ambassador, should be aware of the burden imposed on the President by the tactics of the other side at this time.
4. So far as the substance is concerned, the phrase "without conditions" gives us grave difficulty. We take a minute between ourselves and another government seriously. We have not tried to force the word "conditions" on Hanoi. We do not intend to use the word "conditions" in governmental statements. But we do not wish to mislead Hanoi in substance--nor our own people--about the "facts of life."
5. But the most important point the President wishes to leave with you, on which he invites your comment and that of your government, is the significance of all three of the points we have raised:
--the participation of the GVN;
--the maintenance of the DMZ;
--and the absence of attacks on the cities.
There would be great danger to us all if there is any misunderstanding on these three points, if the negotiators in Paris should succeed in the days ahead in finding a formula./6/
/6/In telegram 262321/Todel 1392 to Paris, October 26, the Department transmitted to Harriman and Vance a White House communication regarding the Rostow-Dobrynin meeting. It reads: "On the basis of Dobrynin's reaction, there is a reasonable possibility that the Soviets will regard your present instructions as a fair balance and support that position. We do not know--and even doubt--if Soviet communications will permit Moscow's influence to be brought to bear fully at the time of your morning session, taking into account the Dobrynin discussion. But Moscow may have sent a parallel general communication to Hanoi. In any case, we thought you should go into your morning session with this background and in reasonably good heart." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968)
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21893.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
123-141
October 26-31, 1968: The Bombing Halt
123. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 26, 1968, 11:05 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 26, 1968, 11:05 a.m., Tape F6810.07, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The Daily Diary entry regarding this telephone call reads: "Discussion of things talked about in Paris this morning, recognizing participants in talks, the Russians, timing, and election day." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Rusk: On the Russians on this point, they've agreed on that second paragraph on the basis of prior discussions./2/ And the U.S. has said that the RVN will be present and the DRV has said that the NLF will be present. Accordingly, the meeting will include representatives of the four. But there was no agreement on the "without conditions" paragraph.
/2/For text of the statement, see footnote 4, Document 116.
President: Can we sell that to South Vietnam?
Rusk: Oh, I think so. Yeah.
President: I didn't like that statement.
Rusk: As a secret minute, I think that there's a fair chance that it will remain private for quite a while, but--
President: Does that put us in a little compromising position to recognize them as a representative? From the position that we took all along when Bobby [Kennedy] was trying to bring them to the table--
Rusk: No, I think that--
President: And we said, well, they'll have no chance having their voice heard. And you remember how careful you were, and how you made me be careful not to ever bring them there as a separate entity.
Rusk: Well, the--
President: I'm just looking how we defend ourselves now with Nixon and these folks./3/ What's my answer to that?
/3/The President telephoned Clifford on October 25 to discuss a newspaper story in which Nixon campaign spokesman Herbert Klein charged the President with using the negotiations to try to influence the election in Humphrey's favor. Johnson advised the following course of action to knock down the story: "Now what I think we ought to say is that when this wild [man] as the old Nixon--with the re-emergence of the old Nixon involving your name, the first thing you did was to try to ascertain what he was talking about and what the facts were; that you thought his preceding sentence was pretty good--minding his tongue because it was delicate; that you certainly agreed that he ought to mind his tongue, and it is delicate. Number one. Number two, that you found out that Mr. Califano had never attended any meeting in connection with the negotiations; that his duties are confined to solely--he advises on domestic matters. That number two, and that no top official has discussed--has talked--to Mr. Ball since he resigned from the government in connection with these negotiations. None of the top Washington officials have discussed it with him. Number three, that you have not had any such discussions that related to politics in any manner, shape, or form, nor would you permit them in your presence. And number four, that it is an insult to Mr. Vance who is carrying on a very great service--duty--for his country, and that you can expect things to happen in the waning days of the campaign, but that you do remind Mr. Nixon that the statement he wrote several weeks ago is good advice for himself as well as other candidates." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, October 25, 1968, 5:37 p.m., Tape F6810.07, PNO 7)
Rusk: The fact is that we've been talking since the first of April with people whose existence we don't recognize, and this has nothing to do with recognizing status. Everybody at the table will have a different view as to the status of the other party. We don't--
President: Is this in any way inconsistent with anything that you and I said in 1964 and [196]5?
Rusk: No. I think you said there will be no insuperable obstacles to getting their views. The South Vietnamese will take the view that these fellows are part of the North Vietnamese delegation. We'll be--we won't debate that or contradict it. We don't have to embrace it.
President: We have to have that last sentence, though?
Rusk: I think we have to. Yes.
President: They insist on that?
Rusk: Yeah. That's right.
President: And that's the purpose?
Rusk: Right. Now, the "without conditions" thing is not agreed and the interval is not agreed. They've come back saying that if we stop bombing on the 27th--that's tomorrow--that a meeting could occur on November 2d. Now, I'm trying to run down--I haven't finished the work on it yet--as to whether they, as Dobrynin thought, had actually moved to 4 days. I don't recall that myself.
President: No, I've never heard of it, and I think that he was just thinking that that is what our boy Jorden was trying to peddle--5 days--and that is why they got 10, so it would look like half. I think we ought to counter to move it up now to maybe the 6th or the 7th [of November].
Rusk: Yes. Uh-huh.
President: Because I don't believe we can stand this thing before the election--the 2d or 3d.
Rusk: You mean the meeting or the stopping of the bombing?
President: Yes. We could stop [and have] the meeting maybe the 7th or something--8th. Maybe we could stop the bombing election morning. Or maybe that night so that it doesn't affect the election.
Rusk: Mm-hmm.
President: Maybe--the election is the 5th as I recall it. Is that Tuesday on your calendar? I don't have one.
Rusk: Yeah, that's right.
President: So, we might be able to the night of the 4th--that night at midnight--stop the bombing. And you figure then it wouldn't come out until, I guess, we ought to the 5th. They ought to stop it--
Rusk: Election evening.
President: Election evening, and that would be the 5th, and then we could--
Rusk: You're likely to be charged then with deliberately holding off because of the election.
President: Well, I think that's right, and I think that we oughtn't to try to pull a quickie here the day of the election to affect it. I'd rather be charged with--in other words we are not agreeing on this thing yet; we're not close to it. But I think that we ought to be awfully careful we don't get tied here to November 2d or 3d because I don't believe it is manageable. I think it just looks like we have been pulled in by the Balls, and I mean George Balls, not--
Rusk: Yeah.
President: We could--
Rusk: Well, it would be a little hard--if they were to close the gap here--it would be a little hard for us to pull back on that.
President: That is right, but that is what--it's not any harder for us to pull back before they accept than it is for them. They are delaying us. Now, why don't we put in there, and say, "Okay, if this gives you trouble, and we have problems here," and we've never told them to be anything but tentative. I've just been very careful about this. Maybe we ought to take a little more time and do this thing when we won't be in a partisanship. We could do it on the 6th instead of the 2d, or work into that some way--I don't know.
Rusk: I think the thing to do on that would be to just [tell] Harriman and Vance that we are just not in a great hurry here; that the other fellows have got to meet us and take their time. Don't go rushing around asking for quick meetings; let them ask for the next meeting.
President: That is what I would do. I would just sure do that.
Rusk: And then maybe this will take care of it.
President: Of course, you have to bear in mind Averell will tell [Drew] Pearson that--
Rusk: Well, I wouldn't--that was the reason why I thought that we ought not to say anything to Averell that has anything to do with the election, you see.
President: Yes, that is right.
Rusk: Well, let me do some--are you going to be here today?
President: No. I am going to be speaking in West Virginia and Kentucky and all around./4/ And I think that'll give you some things--you can just say the President is out Saturday and Sunday, and maybe if you need to we'll have meetings here Monday or Tuesday, but we'll--
/4/For the President's remarks in Kentucky and West Virginia that day, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 1072-1087.
Rusk: That will get us a little time.
President: We've got to have a little time. Then I think I would work in that anything we do will have to be cleared with the [Congressional] leaders and everything, and doing it the day or two before election will look awful suspicious.
Rusk: Right.
President: Getting Cy's cooperation anyway. You think about it, and we will talk about it tomorrow when I get back. But it looks like to me we take less danger doing it election day or the day after than we do just before. Now, what is your gut reaction?
Rusk: Well, I frankly feel that we--that if they should--by some miracle they should close the gap on our present basis, we ought to go ahead; that we shouldn't delay it because of the election. I think that we can give the candidates and the leaders and to some extent the public a chronology here that will show that this has had a chronology of its own. I think the charge that we were deliberately delaying it for the election would be a very serious one where fighting is concerned. But I think that the other side is going to take care of your problem. I just don't know. I have no real judgment as to what the effect of this would be on the election itself. I think it's a mixed bag. I doubt that it's going to have much effect on it.
President: Thank you.
124. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 26, 1968, 11:20 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [1 of 2]. Secret; Harvan Double Plus. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
Herewith a lucid report from Cy Vance on a 5-hour hassle./2/
/2/The delegation transmitted its full report of the meeting in telegram 22992 from Paris, October 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
On the three points:
--Agreement on the statement of participation and a good lucid reference to "prior discussions";
--Some movement on "without conditions"; but the interjection of a supplementary sentence (marked) "Representatives of the DRV understand that this move is made without reciprocity";
--They came down from a week to 6 days.
Comment: I do not know whether the Soviet Union will weigh in with them on the basis of my talk. But I doubt they have had a chance to weigh in. Nevertheless, the movements today suggest that they are trying to find agreement rather than merely to stonewall.
Walt
Attachment
Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)
Washington, October 26, 1968.
Cy Vance called on the Secure Phone (10:15-10:30 a.m.)
1. Harriman, Vance met with Thuy and Lau at the latter's place for 5 hours, starting at 0930 (Paris time).
2. Pursuant to instructions and Vance's phone discussion yesterday with Secretary Rusk, Harriman and Vance made a major effort to get the DRV to give up the idea of an agreed written document, but the DRV continued to insist on an agreed secret minute.
3. Agreement was reached on essentially our language for Para B of such a minute as follows.
"B. On the basis of prior discussions, it is agreed that a meeting to find a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem will be held in Paris on (date and time). The US has said that the RVN will be present, and the DRV has said that the NLF will be present. Accordingly, the meeting will include representatives of the DRV, NLF, RVN and US." (Note: new words underscored)/3/
/3/Printed here in italics.
4. On Para A, the DRV maintained its insistence on inclusion of the words "without conditions" which Harriman and Vance rejected. At one point the DRV suggested alternative language to the quoted words to the effect that "US representatives stated that President Johnson in statements concerning cessation of bombing will not use the word "conditional", but they added a second sentence to the alternative proposal that "Reps of the DRV understand that this move is made without reciprocity", and Harriman rejected this proposal.
5. Thuy again asserted that the time interval could be discussed when and if agreement was reached on the minute. However, after much discussion the DRV representative finally stated that they proposed that if we stop bombing anytime on the 27th of October, the meeting would occur on November 2--a six day interval. Harriman and Vance said 3 days was our outside position.
BHR
125. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell/1/
October 26, 1968, 11:47 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Russell, October 26, 1968, 11:47 a.m., Tape F6810.07, PNO 10-11. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The President, in Washington, phoned Russell at Winder, Georgia. The entry for this meeting in the Daily Diary reads: "talk about Lynda's baby, general discussion of current status of peace moves and Paris talks, politics, General Abrams." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
[Omitted here is discussion of family matters.]
President: So, I called you this morning. We're still wrestling on this general subject. We spent a long time with Kosygin [who] came in and leveled with me pretty heavy yesterday--said they got to do it and now's the time and go ahead and quit arguing about details./2/ While his letter was coming, we were talking to his man. I had initiated it ahead of time, and I told him that I wanted to be positive. Not only did these people understand--the North Vietnamese--that the GVN had to be present, which they had never agreed to before, but they had to also understand that we had the rules of engagement that had already been sent to Abrams that required him to act simultaneously with a response if the DMZ were violated or if the cities were shelled; that they had not agreed to that; we understood that; maybe they couldn't. We wanted to be sure there was no language barrier and that all of them understood it. And, most important, we wanted to be sure the Russians understood it and that they felt like we were justified in acting on that assumption.
/2/See Document 122.
So, we laid it down pretty hard to the Ambassador. While we were talking to him, my personal representative--not in the State Department, one of my men--in came the Kosygin blast to really go now, and we're still fighting on three points. One was who would attend the meeting, how we'd announce it. And we had agreed on that, Vance said this morning, and we will have a secret paper which says "on the basis of prior discussions, it is agreed that a meeting to find a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem will be held in Paris on date and time to be filled out. The U.S. has said that the RVN will be present and the DRV has said that the NLF will be present. Accordingly, the meeting will include representatives of the DRV and NLF, RVN and US."/3/ So, that--
/3/See Document 124.
Russell: I thought they'd already agreed to that some time ago.
President: Well, they--they--this is arguing about a secret minute, so it would be in writing, you see. They have implied--no, they've always held against this. But the last week, the breakthrough, if there has been one, has been that they have implied that [if] everything else could be worked out, they would let them come in. And that is what we are getting. Our people think that will give the Government of South Vietnam a hell of a boost in South Vietnam. It is tantamount to saying that they recognize this elected government. They let them come in, and I say, why didn't it have the same effect on the NLF, but the diplomats say it doesn't, and Bunker says it doesn't. So, anyway, they think that we are getting a hell of a lot.
Russell: I understand that, but I guess its all right. I knew, of course, that they were going to bring the Viet Cong in there if they [we] brought in the Vietnamese Government.
President: Now, the next one on paragraph A, the DRV maintained its insistence on inclusion of the words "without conditions." Now, we realize it is without conditions, although in effect by our telling them the DMZ and the cities that it really is a condition. Do you follow me?
Russell: Yes, sir.
President: Now, they want to put in the secret minute "without conditions," and I don't agree to that because I think that would make my other story look inconsistent. Do you follow me there?
Russell: Yes, I do, and I think it would make you look bad too.
President: Yes, but--
Russell: You don't have to spell out what the conditions are. But if you say "without conditions," why that looks like you have surrendered a point that they were insisting on here 6 months ago.
President: At one point the DRV suggested alternative language to the quoted words to the effect that U.S. representatives stated that President Johnson in statements concerning cessation of bombing will not use the word "conditional." But they added a second sentence to the alternative proposal that "representatives of the DRV understand this move is made without reciprocity." We rejected this proposal. Now, we agree that they're not agreeing to conditions, Dick, and we agree that we're not getting reciprocity. But we are telling them what they're going to get, and we are just stopping it for a day or two. And if we don't get that, if they don't try to de-escalate by these two things--the cities and the others--then we'll go back to bombing. It won't make any difference what happens. But I still think that we cannot have any language like that. But I would hate like hell for it to knock off our agreement. But, anyway, that's one point that is holding.
Now, the second one is--Thieu again asserted that the time interval could be discussed when and if the agreement was reached on the minute. However, after much discussion, the DRV representative finally stated that they proposed that if we stop bombing any time on X day the meeting could occur within a 6-day interval. So they have come down from 10 to a week to 6 days, and we're still 3 days. Harriman and Vance said 3 days was our outside position. Now, that's where we are now. Now, the question is, do I want to let this go and have the record show that I could have gotten it and let somebody else come in and agree to it right after election, or do I want to do it myself. That's one question. The second question is how will it look to everybody in the country, and in the world, and in history, and in every other way. I do not want this war to go on one minute more. I want to de-escalate it as quick as I can. On the other hand, it seems I'd have a hell of a lot less problems with the country and with the world and with history if I did it the day after the election instead of the day before, or a couple of days before.
Now, that is what I'd like to get your real reaction on. Buzz Wheeler says that he and Abrams have got to have 2 days notice before so they can re-position their troops, so they can re-position their bombing orders for Laos and South Vietnam, and get extra targets and things of that kind.
Russell: Let's see, it's 11 days until election, isn't it? Yeah, 11 days until the election.
President: Yes. Well, it's presently what they would like to do now. They'd like to have the meeting on November 2d, and that would require halting the bombing on the 27th or 28th. Now I don't think we can do that because I am not going to have this unless I go meet Abrams and look at his rules of engagement and have him look me in the eye and tell me that he urges me to do this. I am just not going to do it unless I'm sure. Now, you heard those other fellows the other day say that, and you have seen his letter. I got in Momyer yesterday,/4/ and he said he definitely recommended it; that he thought it would be much more useful; he didn't want to say this publicly, but that he ran the bombers for a long time and that they need them more in Laos and South Vietnam than they do in North Vietnam. They'll do a hell of a lot more good beginning this week. And he said that will be true for 4 months.
/4/See Document 110.
Russell: Is that Abrams?
President: No, that is Momyer, who was the air commander out there.
Russell: Yes.
President: He has just been moved back to Langley [Air Force Base], and I got him to come up by himself. Did not tell him that the other Chiefs had even been in. Just said, "Now suppose you were President and you had this kind of proposition. What would you do?" And he said, "I would do it." He said, "It is an acceptable risk. Your destruction can be more effective in Laos with the weather such as it is and in South Vietnam than it can in North Vietnam." He said, "We can't get in there over 2 days a month beginning now and lasting at least 90 days and maybe a 120."
Russell: Did he give you that in writing?
President: I am sure he will. We took notes on him. That is in my note statement. Just like we took notes on what they all said the other day. Rostow takes notes on them all, and we got a quote from each General on saying that. And, of course, we would do it. I thought I might do this if it got that close to it. There's nobody I can talk to even in the government hardly without getting it out except Buzz Wheeler and Dean Rusk. So damn many doves in every department. And you--that's about all I can advise with or get it in the paper. But I thought I might have Abrams--Wheeler talked to me about it this morning--just fly into Honolulu a day or two before we had to, talk to him, and even if necessary just bring him on back here, and let him look all these leaders and candidates in the eye. He could probably be the most convincing man. I told Buzz Wheeler the other day that you had said that you thought his judgment would have about as much effect as anybody.
Russell: Well, I do.
President: He is not very eloquent, but he is tough and he tells you what he thinks. And the Commies are all out to get Westmoreland. I saw a report this morning--one of our Ambassadors down there said Westmoreland said the military ought to take over the country--it was Latin America where the Commies were, and they are trying to smear him, destroy him, I think, because he stood up out there. And he's able and loyal, and everybody--and I think a good deal of South Carolina background. I just think the sons-of-bitches are after him. I read this mean report this morning from a fellow named Corey who is a left-winger with the Look Magazine outfit that Kennedy had in Africa, and we moved to Chile. But it was awfully ugly on Westmoreland. I don't believe Westmoreland would ever say anything that ill-advised. I called Buzz Wheeler and he said it's unthinkable--that he wouldn't do anything like that at all. But they are smearing it all over. President Frei told the Ambassador that Westmoreland is saying that the military ought to take over Latin America.
Russell: Latin America?
President: Yeah, the military ought to take over Chile, for instance, if they have any problems like they did in Peru and Argentina and Brazil and all these other places. In other words, he is advocating military government instead of civilian.
Russell: I don't believe it. He may have done it in some one instance, some case where he knew the facts of it, the details of it, but I will be damned if I believe he is advocating any such thing as that.
President: He's got too much sense.
Russell: If he thought it--he has got too much sense to say it.
President: But they really, you know, put it on you. Look what they've done to Agnew. I think Agnew is a good man.
Russell: He's a decent fellow. Yes, sir, I've watched him, and what he says.
President: They're just smearing him.
Russell: He's a decent fellow, but they sure have driven him into the ground. They sure have.
President: So, what I--
Russell: Of course, he hasn't broke out with ability, but he's a decent man. He's an honorable man.
President: The questions he asked us in the briefing and the way he conducts himself, Dick, are very judicious. A judicious man and, I thought, a good man.
Russell: He is a good man. He is a better man than Nixon. I would rather have him for President.
President: Well, my problem then is would it be better? You see, all the Democrats are going to say that we called the damn thing after the election so we can elect Nixon.
Russell: Well--
President: And the Republicans are going to say we called it before the election to elect Humphrey. And we're not trying to elect--we don't give a damn about either one of them as far as--
Russell: It is a fact of political life that they will say that--some of them will, some of them won't. A great many of them won't. But, undoubtedly, there will be a great many that will say that. I don't see how you are going to avoid that, whichever way you turn, whatever you do.
President: Therefore--
Russell: If, well, you can get it tied down, I would not, though, Mr. President, agree to have it written in the minutes that we agreed without conditions, without reciprocity of any kind, on this thing. I'd just leave that up in the air--not mess with it. If they are going to put that in the minutes over there, that'll be published one of these days. I don't know. If that gets out before the election, they will holler politics from here to high heaven. This election will turn around pretty good now, in my opinion. I am in a very isolated spot, but I can smell.
[Omitted here is discussion of domestic political matters and the Presidential election.]
126. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 26, 1968, 12:16 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 26, 1968, 12:16 p.m., Tape F6810.07, PNO 12-13. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The Daily Diary entry regarding this call reads: "current situation in Paris, Abrams and Bunker." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A summary of the conversation is ibid.
President: Dean?
Rusk: Yes, sir?
President: I looked at this report from Read on Vance and Harriman this morning/2/--that the agreement on prior discussions and who's attending the meeting and all. I don't like the sentence, but that's already there. We can't do much about it if it's there.
/2/See Document 124.
Rusk: Well, I think on that, Mr. President, that there is a protocol practice which we'd bring into play. That is, since each side would have its own ribbon copy, and in our copy we would put the order in the way we want them.
President: Yeah.
Rusk: So we can deal with that that way. So, that leaves the condition point and the time point, and I'm prepared to stand pat.
President: Ah, the one thing I just don't think we can give on, and I've talked to other people about this like Russell/3/ and men that have some judgment of the Congress and the Senate throughout the country, we cannot take 5 years and say that we've got to have conditions, we've got to have reciprocity, we've got to know what the other side is doing, and come along and put in secretly that we did it without them. We just can't. He says you never could explain that or justify it. And he said, furthermore, suppose you have to start bombing back the next day, and then the only reason you've got is that they didn't comply with your conditions. That's the only justification. He said, when you let them put this in here, you make it very difficult to ever get back.
/3/See Document 125.
Rusk: Ah, what time are you leaving today, Mr. President?
President: I'm gonna leave about 1 o'clock, 1:30./4/
/4/The President left at 1:51 p.m. for a day-long trip to West Virginia and Kentucky. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
Rusk: I'm--what I'm working on now are two or three formulas that would make Hanoi mad but it might encourage them to drop the whole idea. For example, that Hanoi understands that this is not reciprocity, but understands the basis on which serious talks can be held, or the circumstances in which serious talks can be held. Or balance off that other thing.
President: I understand that it'd break up the conference. You know what I mean. That's what you're saying.
Rusk: In other words, put something back to them that is so obnoxious to them they might forget the whole thing and thereby perhaps reinforce what may be some advice from the Russians on this point.
President: Another thought. Russell says we could if we had to come up a day, provided we could get Bunker and Abrams in here and really talk to them. He said old man Bunker's name has been in the paper and everybody knows him and respects him, and he ought to just say this is why it's essential. And Abrams ought to just say, "Now, I assure this will not cost us lives, that we can let it do more good in Laos and South Vietnam than we can do in North Vietnam in the months ahead." And, he said, make it awfully hard on Nixon to question Bunker and Abrams, both career people, when they take the initiatives. He said that's why it's important that they be here.
Rusk: One of the problems is that at that particular moment it would be extremely important that they be there. Bunker and Abrams both are going to have quite a job of management in terms of not only the political side but--
President: Buzz says Abrams could be here without any trouble because he's got a good man who could do it if given the orders, and so forth. Russell, rather, urges Bunker. You think that Bunker's got to stay there?
Rusk: I think he's got quite a problem on his hands. I think this is just a lull moment. And if he can come--well, I can't imagine a time when it's more important for Bunker to be in Saigon to keep this thing planted down. Abrams would--could help considerably with mollifying Russell, and he could quote Bunker--give Bunker's views.
President: Yes, I guess that's what we better do. And Russell says we've got to have in writing that they recommend this. Otherwise, they'll say it isn't. But he said that if you've got in writing that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and Bunker and Abrams and all the Joint Chiefs urge you to do this, then you're on pretty safe ground and Nixon's on bad ground. But he says, don't give too long-- enough to ruin you in this country, and you must not ever yield an inch on the "without conditions" or stuff like that, because he says if you do, they'll say, "Well, hell, they could have done this all the time."
Rusk: Yeah.
President: And he said another thing, he says if you're going to have to, if you call this thing, we'll say, on November the 2d or the 3d, and the next day they don't mess with the DMZ or the cities, he said they'll be writing that from out there, and the people will in effect say, well, he did get some results. And if they do, you've got instant retaliation. So, you've protected yourself there. And he said he believed he'd just as soon that came before the election as afterward. What do you think about that?
Rusk: I think--I think that's all right. My own thought, Mr. President, was, unless you told me not to, that I would get a fellow like John Hightower in, others from AP and UP, a couple of reliable people, and give them a little backgrounding on this so that before very long in a matter of hours, why they'll be writing that there's something behind the scenes, the details of which are not fully exposed.
President: I think we have to do it and do it out there too.
Rusk: Yeah.
President: Okay. You call me before you leave to get anywhere, and I'll be here maybe til 1:30.
Rusk: All right. Bye.
127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, October 26, 1968, 1951Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and cleared by Read and approved by Rusk.
262377/Todel 1394. Confirming outline and textual points in Secretary Rusk's secure telecon with Ambassador Vance at 2:00 PM EDT October 26.
1. You should not request next meeting, but may inform DRV representative you are ready to meet (no sooner than Sunday morning) when they wish to do so.
2. You are familiar with Soviet approach and we are hopeful that possible similar representations to other side will convince DRV that agreement on cessation and fact of prompt subsequent meeting with agreed participants is the important thing and that haggling over exact words of agreed language concern only "third rate details".
3. When next meeting does occur, you should make every effort to convince them that agreement on cessation and a prompt meeting thereafter with agreed participants is the essential thing, that agreed minute approach should be dropped, and that other points they are insisting on are "third rate details". You should stand firm on timing issue as indicated in State 261543./2/
/2/In telegram 261543/Todel 1382 to Paris, October 25, the Department urged Harriman and Vance to obtain North Vietnamese agreement on the removal from the secret minute of the phrase "without conditions," as well as the list of participants. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. III)
4. If foregoing representations do not get them to drop insistence on agreed minute, you are authorized to propose any of the following changes:
(a) (In Para A) "On the basis of our discussions, the United States, having reason to believe that the other side intends to join seriously with our side in deescalating the war in Vietnam and in moving toward peace, will stop without preconditions all air, naval, etc."; or
(b) (At end of Para A in form acceptable to us, add sentence:) "The USG and the DRV agree that in announcing and acknowledging the cessation neither side will use the words 'conditional' or 'unconditional'."
(c) With respect to Paragraph B our only difficulty is with stated order of representatives. Suggest you propose to DRV that this matter be handled in customary diplomatic fashion with two ribbon copy originals initialed by both sides, our copy containing our preferred order (RVN, US, DRV, NLF) and theirs any order they wish.
5. Finally, you should make clear once again that whatever degree of agreement is achieved is subject to final approval here.
Rusk
128. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 27, 1968, 1830Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 2:13 p.m.
22993/Delto 883. From Harriman and Vance.
1. We met 3:30 p.m. October 27 with Thuy and Lau for about 1 hour 15 minutes. Same people present on both sides./2/
/2/The full report of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 22994/Delto 884 from Paris, October 27. (Ibid.) According to a situation report by Read, October 27, Vance called the Department on the secure phone and stated: "We have now got everything we have asked for. We should accept. The times proposed for cessation fit well with the timing of possible announcements in Washington and Saigon." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II)
2. We opened with a statement urging the dropping of the idea of their proposal for an agreed minute.
3. Thuy replied by insisting on an agreed minute. He then said that in the interest of going forward to a quick settlement he was tabling a draft. He said that we had not been able to agree on the use of the words "without condition" in the minute. We had, however, said that they could make their announcement in any way they wish and that we would have no objection if they said unconditional. Finally he referred to a previous meeting in which we said that statements by the President or the United States Government related to the cessation of bombing would not use the word "conditional."
4. He then tabled his text of an agreed minute as follows:
"1. The United States will stop all air, naval and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the entire territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam as of ---- hours GMT on October ---- , 1968.
"2. A meeting to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem will be held in Paris on November 2, 1968. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has said that South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation will be present, and the United States has said that the Republic of Viet-Nam will be present. Accordingly, the meeting will include the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation, the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States."
5. We asked for a brief recess and, upon return, we noted that they had dropped the phrase "on the basis of our discussions" in both paragraphs. We thought that the decision to put it in was wise and it should stay in both places. Thuy replied that this was not necessary because the contents of the minute were a result of discussions. This was obvious to anyone and it was not a subject worth arguing about for very long. They had suggested points which we had not found necessary and we had suggested points which they had not found necessary.
6. Thuy said that he would prefer that there would be no time specified for the meeting on November 2, as they were not sure what time they could get their delegations here. It was agreed, however, that the meeting would be as early as possible on November 2.
7. We said we understood what they had said and would take their proposal under consideration. We then settled the question of normal diplomatic usage in the order of naming countries. Names could be changed as each wishes in its own copy.
8. We recessed briefly and we then raised the question of the time of the cessation of bombing. After a brief introductory statement, Thuy said that there remained only the question of the interval between the cessation of bombing and the date of the meeting. He has communicated with Hanoi and the Front. The Front would have a long way to come. This was a reality which he suggested that we take into account. He asked whether it was possible that the bombing could stop earlier than October 30. We replied that we could not agree to that. Thuy then noted that we had suggested 1600 hours GMT October 30, and he then suggested that the time should be 0001 hours GMT October 30. He added that if it could be earlier it would be better.
9. We said that we would report his proposal to our government and will inform him of our reply as soon as possible. In response to our question of how late he would be available for a meeting, he replied he would meet at any time, day or night, when we had a reply.
10. We said that the announcement of the cessation of bombing would also include an announcement of the date of the meeting on November 2. Neither side would say anything publicly until the time of the announcement. They asked what the interval between the cessation of the bombing and the announcement would be. We said that the announcement would probably be made at approximately the same time as the announcement of the cessation of bombing. We would inform them in advance of that time. He asked that we inform him as soon as possible.
11. We closed the meeting by saying that we wanted to make it clear that we are not authorized to agree to their proposals. We would meet with them again as soon as we received instructions from our government.
Harriman
129. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 27, 1968, 7:45-10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the dining room of the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES ON PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GROUP OF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1968
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
General Taylor
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson
(Attachment A--Rostow Packet to President--Eyes Only--10/27/68.)/2/
/2/Rostow's memorandum to the President, October 27, 4 p.m., with nine attachments, also contained an agenda for the meeting. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [1 of 2])
Secretary Clifford: The President stops the bombing on Tuesday./3/ He says four-way talks begin Saturday.
/3/October 29.
The President: Isn't that longer than three days?
Secretary Rusk: It is three days plus 9-15 hours.
The President: What do we do?
Secretary Rusk: We go ahead with it.
The President: Why?
Secretary Rusk: I smell Vodka and Caviar in it. We have substantial compliance with this. The Soviets have moved in.
The President: Why do we have to yield?
Secretary Rusk: They have made the major step.
Secretary Clifford: If ten steps separated us, they have taken eight and we have taken 2.
Secretary Rusk: I would say it is nine to one.
The President: What is the reason for the extra day?
Secretary Rusk: Both have proposed the 30th. It is just a different hour.
The Russians have the major effort here. We can't break it up over a matter of hours. I say that although you know I was a next day man.
The President: So was I. What happened?
Secretary Rusk: Does it hurt us?
The President: I think so. Every minute we delay the more dangerous it is for us, for the South Vietnamese. Every moment will be agony for us until we get the GVN in the talks.
Walt Rostow: A report that there are no shells across the DMZ will be more important than the timing of the talks. Thieu is concerned about the NLF being separate entity. This might leak out of Saigon.
Secretary Rusk: It might leak out on basis of the orders issued.
General Wheeler: Yes, it might. They will pick up the fact that the planes are flying in a different direction. I think it will leak from Washington first--either from State or the Pentagon.
The President: I agree.
The President: No other civilian except me.
General Wheeler: Only NMICC message men. It goes out on "red rocket".
Secretary Clifford: Can you do that tomorrow?
Secretary Rusk: I would send Bunker the last cable from Paris./4/
/4/Document 128.
General Wheeler: I need twenty-four hours. Otherwise, some aircraft may be airborne and can't get the word.
Secretary Clifford: From October 30 to November 2 is three days on Greenwich Mean Time.
General Wheeler: What is the next step beyond this? What will North Vietnam lay on as next proposal? I guess it will be a cease-fire in places. This is dangerous. It would give them sanctuaries within South Vietnam. We should negotiate a cease-fire rather than accept one.
This is the most dangerous proposal we could tie on to.
Secretary Rusk: A cease-fire has to be associated with a withdrawal of forces.
General Taylor: I would echo those views. I am for bombing halt under the circumstances mentioned.
Walt Rostow: I wouldn't argue time, but we need to get Harriman back.
Walt Rostow: I agree with the points on a cease-fire. We want a total peace package.
General Wheeler: Harriman-Vance have been intrigued by 5000 man withdrawal on each side. We can't check their withdrawals.
Walt Rostow: They have got to be withdrawals to North Vietnam, not Cambodia.
The President: I smell blitzing. There is a lot in the air. Let's don't do anything that is fatal to us. See what it is we are getting. I still think this is a political move to affect this election.
Secretary Rusk: Even if it were so, it is in our interest to do this.
General Taylor: I have been a hard-nosed man, Mr. President, but I am for this. They are hurting. There also may be these ulterior motives.
The President: What do we have on cities and the DMZ from them. Do the Soviets know what we mean?
Secretary Rusk: The Soviets understand the three facts of life.
The President: We will call Abrams in to be damn sure he is ready to do this.
Secretary Rusk: I outlined these things to Gromyko./6/
/6/See footnote 9, Document 51.
The President: Is there anything we can put our teeth into?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, their willingness to proceed with clear understanding that if we don't get cities and the DMZ, we'll restart.
The President: What is the Soviet attitude? Do they think they'll respect it?
Secretary Rusk They can't sign a contract.
Walt Rostow: We have statement in Oslo./6/
/6/See Document 43.
The President: Do we have time to talk to the Soviets?
Secretary Rusk: I thought we crossed that bridge. It would be serious to reverse our field.
The President: I wanted to look at this again. I want the Soviets to fully understand this.
The President: I think we are being herded into this under pressure.
Do we need to talk to them again?
Secretary Rusk: I told the Foreign Minister that the DMZ and the cities were essential.
General Wheeler: What kind of contract do we have on the DMZ and the cities?
Secretary Rusk: No contract.
The President: I do not have any firm evidence to go on.
1. Do the Soviets really think this will go?
2. Do they understand we'll restart if the DMZ and the cities are not respected?
A. Tell the Soviets we don't see the reasons for the extra day.
B. Get Soviet assurance the GVN will be accepted.
I don't trust these people. I would like the Soviets' assurances on the DMZ and the cities. They might play that trick on us.
November 2 is a bad, dangerous date. Nearly everybody will interpret it as being connected with the campaign.
I don't know who the people are in Hanoi and Paris--their integrity or their trust. What is their reaction to the cities and the DMZ?
Secretary Rusk: They understand if the cities or the DMZ are violated, the deal is off.
Walt Rostow: They have positioned artillery so they could honor this.
Secretary Rusk: We said to Soviets to concentrate on the GVN problem and we'll concentrate on the other two points in Paris.
The President: Should we push them?
Secretary Rusk: I am concerned over the timing. It would be unfortunate to delay because of the elections.
General Taylor: What you say to the country is of utmost importance.
General Taylor: You can say all bets are off if the DMZ is violated.
The President: Close these gates.
1. Add-on on time.
2. Be very sure they understand all--that Abrams responds if they violate the DMZ or the cities.
I want:
A--Vance and Harriman
B--Soviets
C--Abrams
D--JCS
Then:
E--Leadership
F--Candidates
We may be motivated by evils we know not of. I would rather be stubborn and adamant rather than tricky, slick politician. They think everybody is working toward electing Humphrey by doing this. This is not what motivates us. I want to take it slow.
Do all of these people understand it?
A--Harriman and Vance: That Abrams would respond.
B--The Soviets: That Hanoi knows if the DMZ and the cities are not respected
it means a resumption of the bombing immediately.
C--Abrams.
D--The JCS.
Tell Dobrynin we don't want 18 hours.
Be sure it isn't a 37-day pause./7/ I want to invite your comment on the DMZ and the cities.
/7/Reference is to the bombing pause of December 1965-January 1966.
I want to be more positive about what the Soviets said to us--not what we said to them.
I was disturbed when General Wheeler sent out a cable asking Abrams what would happen if we did stop the bombing./8/ That, it seemed, anticipated us.
/8/Not found.
Walt Rostow: Dobrynin said "He understands." He is an Ambassador.
The President: Does his government believe it?
Isn't it your assumption?
General Wheeler: You have Oberemko's statement. Also, Dobrynin. Also, letter from Chairman Kosygin./9/
/9/See Documents 119 and 122.
The most interesting thing is that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam dropped "without conditions." They may be trying to play American politics.
General Wheeler: The Soviets understand it--loud and clear.
The President: I want the Soviets to understand it; I want Harriman-Vance to understand it; and Nixon understands it.
General Wheeler: To go to the other governments would be dangerous.
The President: Thieu?
General Wheeler: No. Bunker should talk to Thieu.
Secretary Rusk: I want to hear back first on these two points.
The President: Do we let them announce it as "unconditional." I won't stand for that.
Let's not leave them under the impression that it is unconditional. We can't sell Nixon's and Russell's on that.
Secretary Rusk: I am not under any hallucinations.
The President: We can't say there are conditions and they say there are not any. I have my own credibility problems already.
Walt Rostow: We are free to say anything to our people. So are they.
The President: Read Harriman-Vance cable. (Incoming). (Attachment B)/10/
/10/Document 128.
I am troubled by two things:
A. Their saying "unconditional" and our saying "conditional."
B. The time being moved forward on the meeting.
Secretary Rusk: I'll see Dobrynin tonight. I'll also call Cy. (Cy Vance)./11/
/11/According to Rusk's appointment book, he did call Vance at 10:30 p.m. and then went home at 10:45 p.m. Although there is no indication of it in Rusk's appointment book, apparently he and Rostow then met with Dobrynin. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969) For Dobrynin's meeting with Rostow that evening, see Document 130.
The President: Tell Cy he may come back.
Secretary Rusk: It would be good for Abrams to come back.
General Wheeler: It would be good to have Abrams back.
Secretary Clifford: I agree.
Secretary Rusk: I agree.
General Taylor: I agree.
The President: Bring him back without publicity./12/
/12/Preparations had been made earlier for a meeting between the President and Abrams at Honolulu. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, October 25, 8:40 a.m.; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [2 of 2]) In a memorandum to the President, October 25, 9:10 a.m., Rostow outlined questions for Johnson to raise with Abrams. (Ibid.)
Secretary Clifford: I am not sure Wheeler can't do everything Abrams can do and do it better. Abrams does not add anything to what General Wheeler can say.
The President: I disagree. He has color of military commander who is in field. He can say here are the conditions--he can assure that this won't risk lives. I want him to talk straight and direct. Russell said Abrams would be most effective.
All of you are playing with this like you have been living in another world--with a bunch of doves.
The Democrats and George Ball have been putting out that we were about to do this.
General Taylor: Abrams will say he can stand the bombing pause if the DMZ is respected and the cities are not attacked.
The President: All of you know how much I want peace, but we don't have anything to show for it.
General Taylor: I think they will respect the cities and the DMZ.
Secretary Clifford: You have a good story to tell. For five months we have told Hanoi we couldn't go ahead without the GVN present. Finally, they changed their position. They chose the time--not us.
The President: They say, so what?
Some say, sure, we get the GVN in--but Hanoi gets the NLF.
Secretary Clifford: What we wanted was to get to substantive discussions. They have capitulated. Since San Antonio, we have said we would stop the bombing and proceed on certain assumptions./13/
/13/See footnote 6, Document 35.
The President: I want to show people more than we have got.
Secretary Clifford: We have a lot to show. We could say we have informed them if they shell the cities and do not respect the DMZ the deal is off. We have told the Soviets that.
The conversation with Gromyko had this as part and parcel of the agreement.
We have Hanoi, Oberemko, Gromyko, Dobrynin understanding that.
The President: I don't think that. I do not see much they can quote that they have said to us.
Secretary Rusk: Let's not make a point with the Russians on these hours. We went to three days with your full knowledge and permission. This is the substantial agreement with our demands.
Secretary Clifford: I agree. We tell people we have agreed to talk on Saturday. I can't see where it is so important to do it Friday.
The President: I think they are whittling away at this.
Secretary Rusk: This isn't a difference we can stand on. It would seem to the Soviets that we are playing games.
Walt Rostow: What is the question.
The President: Tell them it gives us problems.
Walt Rostow: Is it advice we should proceed on understanding that Soviets know we will resume if the DMZ or the cities are violated?
Secretary Rusk: Soviets might go ahead and advise us to stop bombing.
Walt Rostow: If Bus needs 24 hours, we have to issue orders tomorrow at 7:00 p.m.
General Wheeler: I do not want to violate any agreement you all make.
Secretary Clifford: On the Soviet ship--the pilot jettisoned bombs about three miles away.
General Wheeler: One of our aircraft overflew islands.
130. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 27, 1968, midnight.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Chlodnick File. Secret; Harvan Double Plus.
Mr. President:
With the indicated typographical changes, I gave the attached to Dobrynin tonight. I told him they were rough notes and an oral communication, not in any sense formal governmental message. On the other hand, he should understand that they accurately reflected how the President feels at the moment.
I then explained bluntly the President's dilemma in having to take such a major step at such a critical political period in the U.S. with nothing more from Hanoi or Moscow than assent by silence. I indicated the importance that the President attached to some positive indication from the Soviet Union that there was reason to believe that it was Hanoi's intent to honor the understanding on the DMZ and the cities. I said this was not a matter of our forces being able to protect themselves, but it did relate to the full consequences in the U.S., in Vietnam, and on the world scene of our having to resume the bombing.
Dobrynin indicated that he understood the problem; that he did not know what positively the authorities in Moscow might be able to say to the President at this time, but he would solicit an early response, if a response could be given.
Dobrynin then reviewed the time factor involved if we were to hold to a first meeting on November 2.
I underlined the urgency of a response from Moscow, as he left.
W.W. Rostow/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment
Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/3/
Washington, October 27, 1968.
/3/No classification marking. A notation on the attachment reads: "As dictated by the President."
The President has not made any decision on the discussions and does not intend to do so until he has talked to the leadership in Congress and appropriate committees and to the candidates. He also desires to have whatever understanding is reached carefully evaluated by Amb. Bunker and Gen. Abrams and expects to have their comments and recommendation in connection therewith. He is going back to Amb. Harriman and Amb. Vance tonight and urge them to make abundantly clear to the North Vietnamese the three points: that we expect the South Vietnamese to be received at the first meeting on Saturday,/4/ and that we will expect, while these discussions continue, that the DMZ and the cities will be respected. He is very anxious to have this clearly and succinctly repeated to the North Vietnamese so as to avoid any charge of deception and any risk of misunderstanding. Although he does not expect them to agree this is a condition or reciprocal action, he does expect them to understand that Gen. Abrams has been issued rules of engagement and that a failure to respect either the DMZ or the cities, that would trigger retaliation and disrupt the conference. The President feels it is better this understanding take place in advance before the bombing stops rather than have it stop and start again because of alleged misunderstanding.
/4/November 2.
In addition, the President, in spite of the incidents around the 37-day pause, desires that your Government be informed of the assumption on which he is proceeding so as to avoid any deception or misunderstanding with respect to your government. He is proceeding on these assumptions in the belief that Mr. Kosygin understands them and "has reason to believe" that if the bombing stopped productive discussions could promptly follow. Of course productive discussions could not continue if the DMZ and the cities were not respected.
The President is very anxious to have any comments or reaction Mr. Kosygin may have to these three points, in light of Mr. Kosygin's letters of June and the other day (October 25)./6/ The President will carefully weigh Mr. Kosygin's observations before making a decision.
/6/For the June 5 letter, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 262. For the October 25 letter, see Document 122.
131. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 28, 1968, 12:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [1 of 2]. Confidential; Literally Eyes Only. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
I understand well your reaction to George Ball, the New York Democrats, etc.
I understand well your reaction to the likelihood that Moscow and Hanoi are playing politics.
I understand well the certainty that some will accuse the President of playing politics.
But the tragic dilemma is that you will also be accused of playing politics if you let this slide--and politics against the party you lead. Harriman and the Russians will see to that.
I am not even sure the deal will be there to pick up after the election.
The only safety I have known over these difficult eight years has been to consult my judgment and my conscience. And I know that has also been your only solace.
There were four people in that room at dinner tonight, aside from yourself, who have lived Vietnam, with all its pain, since January 1961: Rusk, Taylor, Wheeler, and myself./2/
/2/The President dined with Rusk, Clifford, Taylor, Wheeler, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Notes of their dinner conversation have not been found.
All of us know that, with all its uncertainties, we have the best deal we now can get--vastly better than any we thought we could get since 1961.
If we go ahead we know it may be tough. But with military and political determination we believe we can make it stick--not because we are so smart; but because your courage, the quality of our fighting men, and the resilience and simple gallantry of the South Vietnamese people give us the tools to make it stick.
We know we could be wrong.
But we laid our judgment on the line in much tougher and more ambiguous circumstances than these.
And none of us would know how to justify delay.
You know you can count on me. I delivered the message as hard to Dobrynin tonight as anything I've ever done. But I do wish you to know how I feel.
I would do anything I know how to do to ease the President's dilemma. But I do not believe all the prior consultations with the leadership, candidates, etc., can ease it. Only the President can decide. And whatever he decides, I'll be there.
Walt
132. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 28, 1968, 1025Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 6:17 a.m.
22996/Delto 885. Eyes only for the Secretary from Harriman and Vance.
Pursuant to telcon with Secretary,/2/ there follows the answer to the three questions he raised.
/2/See footnote 11, Document 129.
1. (A) We have raised the issues of the DMZ and indiscriminate attacks against the major cities and what we expect on the part of the DRV in respect to these two matters in 12 secret meetings with the DRV. Often these subjects were raised more than once in those meetings. In most cases both subjects were raised; in a few cases only one was raised. The discussion of these matters began in June and have continued until the present day, so that we have been consistently presenting our position in this regard to the other side.
(B) Our demand with respect to the DMZ has been: there will be no firing of artillery, rockets or mortars from across and within the DMZ; there will be no movement of troops from, across and within the DMZ; and there will be no massing or movement of troops near the DMZ in a manner threatening to the other side. Our demand with respect to the cities has been that there will be no indiscriminate attacks against major cities. These formulations are precisely in accordance with our instructions, as most recently expressed in State 254715./3/ ns for a settlement. (What Lau is saying when he speaks in this way is that while he will never admit to past violations of DMZ, he understands what will be necessary in the future.)llery fire across the DMZ, "you will see what will happen because our government has consistently respected the DMZ. Reality will give you the reply." This, Lau said, would create the favorable conditions for a settlement. (What Lau is saying when he speaks in this way is that while he will never admit to past violations of DMZ, he understands what will be necessary in the future.)
/3/Document 65.
(C) With respect to the indiscriminate attacks against major cities, we have not only raised this issue repeatedly in private sessions, but made it an issue in plenary meetings. In fact, with a few exceptions, there have been none for several months.
(D) Throughout our meetings when these subjects have been discussed, at no point has the other side given us any basis for believing that they did not understand precisely what we are talking about and what is expected of them.
(E) On October 11, pursuant to instructions (State 252815)/4/ and in accordance with Vance's discussions with the Secretary, we said, "In responding to your question, it is very important there be no misunderstanding between us. It is very important to understand that we are not talking about reciprocity or conditions but simply a fact that after cessation of all bombardment the President's ability to maintain that situation would be affected by certain elemental considerations.
/4/See footnote 4, Document 54.
"We do not look on them as a condition for stopping the bombing but as a description of the situation which would permit serious negotiations and thus the cessation to continue. You will understand, therefore, that the circumstances we have discussed in our various private meetings about military activity in and around the DMZ are essential to the maintenance of that situation. And, of course, you know from our various discussions that indiscriminate attacks launched against major cities would create a situation which would not permit serious talks and thus the maintenance of a cessation." We have repeated this in equally clear terms on subsequent occasions.
(F) In addition, in four meetings with the Soviet representative in Paris, we have raised the subject of the DMZ and attacks on the major cities and have told them that the bombing cessation could not be maintained if the DRV acted in bad faith with respect to these matters. He had been in regular and frequent contact with the DRV delegation. He had indicated to us that the DRV understands our position. We further understand that the Secretary has also raised these subjects with the Russians and has made our position clear.
(G) Finally, our continued refusal to include the words "without condition" in an agreed minute makes it crystal clear that although there are no "pre-conditions" there are circumstances or what some people might call "conditions subsequent," the occurrence of which would cause us to resume the bombing.
2. In our judgment, the DRV will carry out what we have demanded of them with respect to the DMZ and indiscriminate attacks against major cities. While we have not received direct affirmation that the DRV will abide by our demand--we are convinced they understand clearly what they are expected to do. As indicated above, this is confirmed by our discussions with Soviets. In addition, the DRV understands the consequences if they fail to live up to their part of the understanding, i.e., the bombing will be resumed. It is always possible that there will be some minor violations such as moving small numbers of men and supplies through the DMZ. These can be judged on the basis of the total circumstances in which they occur.
3. As we have previously stated on several occasions, the bombing should be resumed if our demands with respect to either the DMZ or the cities are violated.
Harriman
133. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 28, 1968, 1115Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 6:49 a.m.
22997/Delto 886. Eyes only--Personal for the Secretary from Harriman and Vance.
1. The debate over "conditions" for the cessation of bombing has been going on with the North Vietnamese since the first secret talks. You will recall that we developed Phase 1-Phase 2 proposal early in these talks as a means of getting around this problem. The idea then was that because the actions on their part would be taken in Phase 2, even though we had an understanding on them, they would not be looked upon as reciprocity.
2. As these discussions evolved away from Phase 1-Phase 2 and toward the concept of prior understandings, this same theological problem kept arising. The North Vietnamese kept insisting on the unconditional cessation and we kept insisting that our proposals were not conditions. At various times we described them as definitions of serious talks, actions which would give us "reason to believe," and as descriptions of a situation which would permit serious negotiations and thus the cessation of bombing to continue.
3. At our October 24 meeting/2/ we said for example, "We will make no reference to conditions. We do not look on these as conditions but as description of the situation which would permit serious negotiations and thus the cessation of bombing to continue. There should be prompt discussion and actions should be taken as we have mentioned when we were discussing Phase 2." In the same meeting we told Thuy: "We have said many times that we do not consider any of the matters we had discussed conditions, but we have discussed in many different ways the circumstances which would be necessary to permit serious talks to continue." Shortly after this statement, we said: "On this matter and others we have indicated that we will say what we believe is appropriate, and the DRV side will say what it considers appropriate."
/2/See Document 116.
4. We have stuck to the position that what we have been demanding in terms of the DMZ, the cities, prompt meetings and GVN participation is not a demand for reciprocity but circumstances which would permit prompt, serious talks and continuation of cessation of bombing. We have not accepted their definition of reciprocity. We believe that this had been done with the understanding and authority of Washington. In addition we believe that it has always been the understanding that each side would define its actions as it wishes and would be free to make its announcements and statements as it sees fit.
5. For example, the Department's 259261/3/ rejecting the idea of a joint communiqué, said: "Further I do not see how we can very well expect to negotiate what the various parties will say about it. Each has its own problems and points of view and requirements in managing his own situation. Such agreements would, in any event, break down promptly because there would be no control over what is said". In State 260480,/4/ the Department said in the context of the question of "conditions": "As the events take place either side will be free to make announcements or statements as it sees fit. If these should be at variance with what has, in fact, been agreed, they can be refuted both by words and by facts as they unfold in compliance with the real understandings. The only assurance we will give is that no United States official statement will use word 'conditional.'"
/3/Document 98.
/4/Document 113.
6. It has been our understanding that we had no intention of talking about conditions. We have believed that was consistent with your conversations with Dobrynin.
7. We and the Department have always recognized that Hanoi would call the cessation "unconditional." In the Department's instruction on press handling (State 259838)/6/ the Department said: "We must recognize that Hanoi will almost certainly announce that the cessation has been unconditional."
/6/Dated October 22. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II)
8. We have always distinguished between what Hanoi calls conditions and what we call conditions. The fact that we have refused to add the words "without conditions" to an agreed minute has made clear to Hanoi that there is a relationship between the actions expected of them and the cessation of bombing, although we were not going to say so. We recognized this in our verbal assurances to them that we would not use the word "conditional" in our official statement.
9. It appears to us that Ambassador Bunker was operating on the same general assumption. For example, in Saigon's 40532,/6/ in a discussion of the joint US-GVN communiqué, he told Thieu: "The draft he (Thieu) had given us has too many things in it that look like demands or conditions. This is not the place to bring up the question of recognition . . . nor the way to tip off Hanoi's hand with respect to the things they will not do. We have indeed good reason to know what they will not do, but if we insist there is reciprocity, it would torpedo the whole exercise before we even get started."
/6/Dated October 17. (Ibid., HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. II)
10. When Thieu said that the public must have some indication of what it can expect if the bombing stops, Bunker replied: "The whole idea is that Hanoi can say anything it likes but the GVN will be there and can reply." In sum, we believe that our concept for getting around the problem of reciprocity has always been to avoid it by defining actions in our own way and letting Hanoi define them in its way.
11. This strategy had been successful. We have managed to get conditions accepted by not calling them conditions but letting the other side call them what it wishes.
Harriman
134. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Washington, October 28, 1968, 10:31 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Wheeler, October 28, 1968, 10:31 a.m., Tape F68.07, PNO 6. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The President called Wheeler at Clifford's office in the Pentagon. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A summary of the conversation is ibid.
President: The conditions have been referred to each time in the twelve meetings, sometimes more than once, that they [Harriman and Vance] do feel that it's understood./2/ And I don't think they say embraced, but that is thoroughly a part of the whole picture with the other side, and they themselves do recommend the resumption if our understanding is not carried out.
/2/See Document 132.
Wheeler: Right.
President: At midnight, Walt saw our other friend/3/ and told him that we didn't want to deceive anybody; that this was the basis; that we were going into this thing; we wanted them to understand it was that basis; and we were ready to have any--if they want to reject it, they could do it now; if they wanted to say they had reason to believe that we could make progress, we'd be glad to have them repeat that. In any event, before we actually took action, that this was the basis upon which we would take it. Namely, other folks would be present and the other two things would be respected.
/3/Reference is to Dobrynin; see Document 130.
Wheeler: Yes, sir.
President: And so he said he understood that; he would get that to his government. Now, our friend/4/ did not get off out there for some time--I imagine they had difficulties trying to keep it low-key. I very much want to see him before I take this fateful step. And I want the country to know that I've seen him--when I do take it I want them to know I've seen him.
/4/Reference is to General Abrams.
Wheeler: Yes, sir.
President: Now, I know that you've got to do some preparation too. And I had thought New York--I told Walt yesterday to tell him to get all packed and be sitting there ready where he could move pretty quickly. But when we got to him at 11, he finally got off at about 4:30, I think.
Wheeler: 3:30 our time.
President: 3:30 our time. His present plan--I thought it was 20 hours--I understand his present plan is 5 tomorrow morning. 5 doesn't bother me in the least in talking to him, but I don't know what you could do after 6./6/
/6/See Document 140.
Wheeler: Well, I'll have to take a look at it, sir.
President: You take a look at the whole picture and call me back. We ought to be hearing from these other people through the day. It may be that you'll want to take some preliminary steps where all you'll have to do is execute. But look at it very carefully. We don't want to have any more meetings than we have to. But we'll have to do a lot of things today if some of these folks come through.
Wheeler: All right, sir.
President: I think that you feel that you and all the men we met with the other day and this fellow will whole-heartedly recommend this step?
Wheeler: They will, sir. I'm positive of it.
President: Now, suppose that--suppose that they get you, we'd have to decide right quickly, but suppose that they did abuse one of the two other situations, either Saigon or the DMZ. Do you think that we--that everybody'd be ready to go right back where we were before?
Wheeler: I think we are. We'd be ready, sir, and I think the others have all expressed the same view. I think so. This was certainly my--
President: How do you think we look--on-again, off-again? Just look like, well, we tried to go the last mile, and they were sons-of-bitches?
Wheeler: It seems to me that you would be left in a strong position, sir. In other words, you've tried your best.
President: Okay, you look at this other thing, and we'll try to talk a little bit later. Walt'll be talking to you.
Wheeler: All right, sir.
President: There's about eight or ten things we have to do--have to go out to other governments; got all this other stuff--but I don't want to make the mistakes we made last time. I guess we have to talk to the [Congressional] leaders and the candidates. Now Walt--when was your last time for the effectiveness to meet our second deadline--our original orders go into effect?
Wheeler: 7 p.m. on the 29th.
President: Does that include the part they wanted included there? Is that it?
Wheeler: That includes the 16 hours extension.
President: Do I have that right, Buzz?
Wheeler: Yes, 7 p.m.
President: And that doesn't bother you any?
Wheeler: No, sir. We can do it if we can get it off by 7, but I don't see how you can under the circumstances. But I'll take a look and see what we can do, sir.
President: All right. Thank you.
Wheeler: Yes, sir.
135. Telephone Conversation Among President Johnson, the President's Special Assistant (Rostow), and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 28, 1968, 10:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Among Johnson, Rostow, and Rusk, October 28, 1968, 10:45 a.m., Tape F6810.08, PNO 7-8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. A summary of the conversation is ibid. The President and Rostow spoke to Rusk through a speaker phone.
President: Can he [Abrams] get here sooner than he can? I was under the impression he was ready to go. It was 20 hours at 11 last night. It looks like now it won't be until tomorrow morning at--
Rostow: 5:30 [a.m.].
President: 5:30.
Rusk: Mm-hmm.
President: If they question them, I want to talk to him before we get signed onto something. I'm hoping maybe that Buzz can prepare them and then execute after we have our conversation--
Rusk: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.
President: At 6 o'clock in the morning. I wanted to ask you two or three things. One, what is your feeling about the time to see the [Congressional] leadership and the candidates? Must it be before the order is sent out or should it be before it goes into effect?
Rusk: I would think that before it goes into effect and before the announcement. I think that the problem is that when you see them, you almost have to go straight into the announcement because they just won't hold it, I'm afraid. And so, I would think, if you were to go into effect, say, tomorrow evening, that you'd probably want to see them sometime late tomorrow afternoon to explain to them. And I think at that point it would be a matter of your explaining to them why you have taken your decision rather than asking them to vote on it because I think this is a matter where the President carries a unique responsibility. But I don't think--the principal reason I would shorten the time between the two is that I just don't think it would hold.
President: Is there any likelihood of adjustment in that time in any way? Is that too complicated?
Rusk: Well, I think the present time, unless the whole thing on the whole schedule is, say, put off 24 hours, I think the present time is pretty fairly locked on, I mean, in terms of relationships and the various factors. I think there may be an operational question about pushing the button tomorrow morning and having an announcement tomorrow evening in terms of contacts with various people that we'd have to--Bunker with Thieu, for example, is the primary one. I'm not so all that concerned about the--some of the allies, but we'd have to give them at least 2 or 3 hours advance notice. I'm sorry that Abrams can't get back sooner. I was hoping that he'd be in here this evening.
President: Yes, I thought he could. But he can't do it, I guess. They told me it was 20 hours.
Rusk: Uh-huh.
President: But when we got down to it, he just says 5:30 tomorrow morning.
Rusk: Uh-huh.
President: We'll have to look into that and see what the delay is. First, he was delayed getting off for 4-1/2 hours longer than we thought.
Rusk: Maybe, I don't know, do you, in view of what you've already got in cables and what the [Joint] Chiefs are prepared to say today, I don't know whether you want to postpone this until you actually have a final talk with Abrams.
President: I don't want to act on it until I do--
Rusk: I see.
President: Because then I might be on-again, off-again.
Rusk: I see. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.
President: What I'd really like to do, I wouldn't object to in effect--well, you see what got it screwed up, you've got to add in 16 hours onto the product--
Rusk: Mm-hmm.
President: [Added to the time] of it, and it's that 16 hours that makes a difference. You don't think that 3 or 4 of those would be manageable? Suppose--
Rusk: Well, I think for probably what we could do, if we had to have extra time, would be to, say, postpone the meeting until Sunday/2/ instead of Saturday, and just put the whole thing forward 24 hours.
/2/November 3.
President: At that point it would be too close to the election, you see.
Rusk: Yeah. I think it's better to shoot for Saturday if we can.
President: I wondered--
Rusk: Although I think the announcement is the key thing, rather than the actual, in my own judgment.
President: Suppose we made the announcement at, say, 9:30 tomorrow night.
Rusk: Right.
President: And that would give us 12 hours before. Did Buzz say 12 hours or Abrams say 12 hours?
Rostow: Abrams did so. Buzz said 24.
President: Buzz said 24. Abrams said 12. That would give us until 9:30 in the morning. That's what I'd really like to do if I could. 9:30 here would be, what, 10:30 [p.m.] out there?
Rusk: Ah, yes.
President: At night? Is that too late for Thieu?
Rusk: No, I think that would be all right as far as Thieu is concerned.
President: If we made the time 9:30 in the morning, that would give you whatever time you needed. It would be 10:30 in the morning [sic].
Rusk: It might be difficult to get some of our troop-contributing countries in that time frame. But we can--we can--let me just check the possibilities on that.
President: Give some thought, I don't know if it would work, but we could say to Buzz: reposition everybody, the military, the top military, and we would try to say to you firm at 9:30 tomorrow morning. And we would shoot for a 9:30 announcement tomorrow evening, and we would ask for a 7 o'clock meeting tomorrow evening with the leadership and the candidates.
Rusk: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Now, you could--you might, if you wanted to, knock an hour or so off of that by seeing Abrams earlier--say, see him around 7:30 [a.m.], that kind of thing, and have your talk with him when he first gets in.
Rostow: You think we ought to be thinking of the 12-hour difference, rounding out the troop contributors a little earlier in the evening.
Rusk: I'm trying to figure out a way to get to some of the people like Park and Thanom, people like that, the Prime Minister of Australia, before the middle of the night because that would create some sensation in some of these places.
President: Well, let's look at, then, Thieu at 8 o'clock, see what that does, and we'll check his schedule and see why he's so long.
Rusk: All right.
President: And, now, it looks to me like we have to go over the draft announcement carefully.
Rusk: Did you see that telegram from Bunker about the joint announcement going in this morning indicating that Thieu had said, "Well, that's--we have about everything we can possibly expect," or words to that effect? He seems to be very--quite pleased with the draft announcement./3/
/3/See Document 136.
President: That part of the Presidential letter to Thieu?
Rusk: Yes. I think that's a good letter, and I would send that along with the instructions to Bunker.
President: As part of the draft?
Rusk: When you push the button.
President: That message to the troop contributors--
Rusk: I'm sorry. I didn't get the last.
President: That message to the troop contributors--have you reviewed that?
Rusk: I've got to--I'll look at that right away. I haven't seen that.
President: The President's statement's got to be worked on by your Department come today.
Rusk: Right. Right.
President: Satisfied with the Presidential letter to Kosygin?/4/
/4/Document 141.
Rusk: I think that's all right for now. I think we ought to get going on more detail just as soon as this action is taken. But I think as a first message, that's all right.
President: What else do you think I would need to do?
Rusk: I--I think on your business of seeing the candidates--did you have in mind seeing them together or separately? I can see problems about seeing them together. I don't know that you would want those fellows, or that they would want, to be in the same room together under present circumstances. And I think that in your talk with Nixon, you might want to say some things very direct to him. For example, remind him that the Republican party is a stockholder in this situation; that they were in power when Vietnam was divided and the North became Communist as a threat to Laos and South Vietnam and Thailand; that they were the ones who made the SEATO treaty; and that they were the ones who recommended to--President Eisenhower was the one who recommended to President Kennedy we put troops in Southeast Asia. And remind him that the record here is such that they're shareholders in this problem so that he doesn't get too gay about it. I think my own suggestion would be that you try, if you can, see these people separately, if you can.
President: Have four briefings then, I guess./6/
/6/For the briefings of the candidates and of the Congressional Leadership, see Document 166 and footnote 7 thereto.
Rusk: Yes. I think that the candidates you might be able to take care of, well, I think in terms of--with Hubert, you could probably spend 15 minutes with him, not more than that. With Nixon, it might be 30 to 45. And not more than 30 minutes with Wallace. Now, if Wallace doesn't want to come in, we maybe just tell him towards the end of the business on the phone. It sort of builds him up to have him come and sit with the three. I think you'll have problems with the three sitting in the same room.
President: What do you think about the Leadership?
Rusk: I think they will be generally acquiescent but skeptical. I think they will have a measure of skepticism, as all of us will have. The Secretary of State cannot base his good faith to the President on what some Communists say, or don't say, or do, even if we had a treaty with red ribbons on it, and the President is not in a position to guarantee to the Leadership exactly what the Communists are going to do. We can say that in our best judgment the chances are sufficiently good to make this step worthwhile, and we don't want to lose any chance that seems promising. And, as a minimum, it would transform the real relationship with the Soviets to this situation in Southeast Asia because if a fellow Socialist country is not under attack, they haven't got a leg to stand on. And our--the possibility of putting major pressures on the Soviet Union are multiplied several times when a step like this is taken. But you and I can't guarantee to the Leadership exactly what would happen. What we can say is it's our judgment the situation is such that it is a wise move to make and there's a fair chance it will be a real step toward peace.
President: What--old Mansfield's going to be out in Arlington; Dirksen's going to be in Illinois; Albert's going to be in Oklahoma; McCormack's not going to want to fly--he's going to be at Boston. What would you think about just having a conference call with them?
Rusk: I think that would be--how many did you have in mind having in--maybe 10 or 12?
President: I might just confine it to those four top leaders.
Rusk: And as well as the Republican side?
President: Yes.
Rusk: Uh-huh.
President: I said Dirksen and Ford.
Rusk: Dirksen--Oh, I see, Dirksen and Ford.
President: Dirksen's going to be in Illinois. Mansfield, and Albert--
Rusk: And the Speaker?
President: And the Speaker. There'd be five.
Rusk: I'd be in favor of a smaller number the better. First place, it holds better. And secondly, you don't create a sense of monumental crisis by getting 30 or 40 people in here from all over the country with special flights and things of that sort. And maybe a conference call will take care of it. If anyone of them then wants to see you, he can come right on in and see you.
President: 'Cause you know after they hang up the phone they'll be talking.
Rusk: Well, you'll have to do your best to emphasize the timing factors and pledge them not to say anything about it until you do. I think that in the conference call, they're likely to be a little better behaved on charges and counter-charges or anything of that sort. And Nixon on Sunday, despite, yesterday on, despite on some of the other things he said, pretty well left the pulpit on this particular subject. I think if he was smart he would roll with it. My guess is he will.
President: See, North Vietnam's official radio tonight said North Vietnam is ready to accept any conditions in return for a U.S. bombing halt.
Rusk: Well, that's right. Well, they're playing that line publicly, and I told Cy and Averell that they'll have to make it clear that if North Vietnam does that, that we will have to--that we will be free to reply.
President: Well, now, what did you say to them about the--about their saying it's unconditional after our talk last night?
Rusk: I told them that we were disturbed about that--that when they added that extra phrase that we would not object if they called it unconditional; that that looked like an assertion of the "without conditions" in our understanding with them in a way that's to our disadvantage. And that we will probably have to ask them to make it clear to the other side when they see them next that if they claim this is unconditional that we will be free to reply. I regret myself that they just didn't say that each side will be free to say what it wants to about it and leave it at that, so that we're not tied in any way.
President: Why? What would we say?
Rusk: Well, he saw the point. He said he agreed it would have been better if they hadn't specified that particular point.
President: I said, how will we reply?
Rusk: Well, I think we'll, in the first place, background some press to go ahead with the speculation that we've already seen in the papers about what the terms are and urge them to give attention to the facts on the ground, and in fact to watch the DMZ and to watch the cities, and that will get them writing that there were understandings about the cities and the DMZ. I think if it's Hanoi Radio or Nhan Dan editorials or something like that that a formal reply by the President or Secretary of State may not be required. I think that it could be the press is going to be writing on the basis of our opening statements that there were understandings involved here that were not being made public fully, and the people will generally rest with that for awhile.
President: When, would you think, if we announced, say, tomorrow night at 9:30, the halt, would you expect to enforce on both use of the DMZ and the cities?
Rusk: I wouldn't do it in the official papers. I would let it be done--I would let it be done by a backgrounding.
President: I'm not talking about the statement. I'm talking about a fact out there--the performance on their part. You would expect them to start performing the same time we'd start?
Rusk: Absolutely. Absolutely. Absolutely.
President: Well, will they observe that in 2 or 3 days?
Rusk: They ought to be able to. They ought to be able to.
Rostow: Every day they shell the South Vietnamese capital.
Rusk: I don't know whether you saw the intelligence this morning about the movement of four additional regiments in the northern part of South Vietnam--an artillery regiment and three other regiments withdrawing from Quang Tri province in the north into the North and one of them into Laos. That kind of thing, I think, is quite significant here and could be used with the Leadership. But that--that's the sort of thing Abrams would be up-to-date on and could get you the material on in which to work on that.
President: I gather you think it would be better to have a conference call with them than to have the five of them brought in.
Rusk: Well, there's got to be only five. I don't think there's too much difference on that.
President: We got Dirksen stirring up a lot of stuff in Chicago before he leaves, you know.
Rusk: I think what you might do is have a conference call. If things get too rough, then tell them to come on in. But I would think that you would not have too much difficulty on a conference call.
President: Would you try to figure out if we make a 9:30 announcement tomorrow night, we could reposition them today, and we could meet with Abrams early in the morning--6 or 7.
Rusk: Right.
President: And we could give Buzz the full 12 hours Abrams needed to reposition today, where he'd have 24 really but he'd have 12 before he executed. And then we see--got to see when Harriman and Vance inform their folks.
Rusk: I think we ought--myself, I think we ought to inform them secretly as soon as we issue the order so that they can get their guys on the road and we don't argue with them about the Saturday meeting.
President: All right. Well, you look at the 9:30 [p.m.], see what trouble it gives you. Or, I guess, 8 o'clock is what you--the last you suggested--look at what 8 o'clock does to you.
Rusk: If we can push a button at 8 o'clock here, we'll try to work out a scenario and see what happens, and then we can adjust it if it goes beyond 8 o'clock.
President: We'll talk back in a little bit.
Rusk: Right.
President: If you'll do that, and then you make a list of everything you need to do.
Rusk: All right, sir. Fine.
136. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, October 28, 1968, 1545Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [2 of 2]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 12:15 p.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, October 28, Rostow wrote: "Herewith Bunker's account of his meeting with Thieu and Ky on the joint statement. The proposed paragraph sidelined in red on page 2 [a reference to paragraph 2(B)] is stronger than, I believe, Sect. Rusk would like to see it. But I do believe that the GVN has a right to protect its position at this delicate moment. I am quite sure that Hanoi will seek to protect its position before its people without excessive concern for sensibilities in Saigon or Washington. But you will wish to get Sect. Rusk's judgment." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the telegram.
41356. Ref: Saigon 41323./2/
/2/Dated October 28. (Ibid.)
Subject: Joint meeting October 28.
1. The meeting with Thieu, Ky and Thanh took place in the late afternoon, and the fact that more than half the time was taken up by exchanges between the Vietnamese (mostly between Ky and Thieu) showed how necessary it had been. I can report that at the end of the meeting (attended on our side also by Berger and Herz) we reached agreement on a somewhat changed joint announcement, but one which I believe we can accept and which the GVN believes will make it easier for them to cope with criticism that they had agreed to meet with the NLF. It was not easy.
2. Changes represented by the redraft of the joint announcement (septel)/3/ are as follows:
/3/Telegram 41355 from Saigon, October 28. (Ibid., Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. IV)
A. Second and third paragraphs are switched. It is not clear to me why the GVN prefers it that way, but since no substantive change whatever is involved, and since we had to oppose more important changes that Thieu and Ky tried to make, I accepted this without argument and recommended that it be confirmed.
B. The last paragraph to be reworded (1) to get away from the idea of "the next meeting," which carried the implication to the GVN that they were being included in something that had been going on for some time, rather than being there at the beginning of the substantive talks with North Viet-Nam; (2) use of the word "delegations" to describe GVN and US attendance, by which they hope to confer more status on the GVN representatives; (3) deletion of the sentence beginning "the other side," which the GVN now considers unnecessary; and (4) amendment of the last sentence to make it read: "The two Presidents wish to make it clear that neither the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam nor the United States Government recognizes the so-called National Liberation Front as an entity independent of North Viet-Nam.
3. Ky, who apparently made the greatest difficulties during the discussions, came up to me after the meeting and said he had worked hard to find a compromise. Perhaps he did so in the end since after numerous attempts to present the future meetings as involving only three delegations, which I rejected, Ky finally said, "I think it is better that we openly recognize that the NLF will be there." It was Ky, apparently, who offered to drop as unnecessary, the phrase about the other side being constituted by Hanoi "as they wish it to be constituted." He said, "The reality is that we accept the Front at the conference." The most important thing from the GVN point of view, as Thieu emphasized, is to make the last sentence of the joint announcement (about non-recognition of the NLF) as strong as possible.
4. Since the GVN in the end gave up their attempts to picture the meetings as consisting of only three participants, I just wish to record that discussion was long and difficult. At one point Thieu asked me if I had received binding instructions from my government that the conference must not be pictured as taking place between three delegations. I answered in the affirmative. Earlier in the discussion I pointed out once more that since Hanoi wished the meetings to be four-power, and Saigon wishes them to be three-power, the only possible basis for talks was to be silent on the point. Ky understood this well, even while trying to squeeze us. He said: "I understand your problem. You can't have a conference if Hanoi won't come--or if Saigon won't come." But he kept trying, nevertheless, to find some formulation that would have made it appear that there was only one delegation on the other side.
5. After agreement was reached on the text (septel), Ky said, "Quite frankly, we are not satisfied, but with such material we can explain, only it will be difficult to convince the people. If the conference lasts many months, our problem will be to prevent a disintegration of morale on our side." I repeated, with some emphasis, that this is entirely the wrong way of looking at the meeting with the North Vietnamese if it eventuates: the GVN should present it as a victory, it will have forced the DRV to negotiate with them, the talks will be a sign that the DRV despairs of obtaining its goals on the battlefield, that it recognizes that it cannot subvert or intimidate the South Vietnamese. Besides, we will be at the side of the GVN both at the talks and in pushing our military advantages in South Viet-Nam, so that the danger of disintegration should be entirely on the other side.
6. There was still much apprehension on the GVN side about being faced with accomplished facts at the first meeting: they wanted to know how we could avoid press photographers at all meetings including the first. They stressed that pictures showing the GVN sitting across from the NLF as if the latter were a co-equal delegation would be extremely troublesome here. Thanh also said he wished to go over the points covered in all our recent discussions to draft agreed understandings, so that we would have a record of what had been decided with respect both to substance and procedure. At the end it was Thanh himself who used the word "agreement" to describe the outcome of today's joint meeting.
7. I urge approval of this agreement which it seems to me meets our requirements while giving the Vietnamese something they can live with. It has not been an easy decision for them.
8. We agreed to meet soon again to discuss substantive issues that may come up early if there are serious talks.
Bunker
137. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 28, 1968, 1:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [1 of 2]. Secret; Harvan Double Plus.
Mr. President:
Brooding on Bus Wheeler's dilemma and assuming that you do not wish to issue final orders until you have a face-to-face talk with Gen. Abrams, I believe there are two fundamental options:
--send out an instruction tonight to Harriman and Vance to get with the North Vietnamese and say that mechanical arrangements are such that we really need back those 16 hours;
--if they kick and scream at this, slide the whole arrangement 24 hours.
The problem with 24 hours is that these highly correct North Vietnamese diplomats, French-trained, may not wish to have a meeting on Sunday, November 3. They may therefore offer us Monday, November 4.
In any case, this is a problem you may wish to discuss with Sect. Rusk perhaps at the late afternoon meeting you mentioned.
Walt
P.S. I think our argument would have greater credibility with the North Vietnamese if we frankly explained to them that you wish to have a last-minute conference with General Abrams in Washington, which cannot take place until tomorrow morning.
P.P.S. Another alternative: If the North Vietnamese do not want to give us back the 16 hours and we do not wish the first meeting to be closer to the election, we can tell them that our time problems are such that, even with a maximum effort, we cannot guarantee that every unit will get the word by the time of the bombing cessation. Therefore, they should not complain if there is some spill over for, say, 7 hours after the time we specify.
FYI: The main problem is not the Air units or the Navy, it is the forward Infantry and Artillery battalions. In short, we would be asking them for a de facto 7-hour extension on the time of the bombing cessation.
Walt
138. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 28, 1968, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Chlodnick File. Secret; Eyes Only; Harvan Double Plus.
Mr. President:
You asked for an analysis of the attached document to the President from Kosygin./2/
/2/Attached is a translation of the Russian text of the note.
1. There are three points of substance:
--A. The Soviet leaders report that the Vietnamese leaders have "told us as well about the seriousness of their intentions."
--B. "The most recent facts . . . convincingly prove . . . ."
I presume this refers to the Hanoi cave-in on "without conditions" and acceptance of three days, at our insistence and, perhaps, Soviet urging.
--C. "It seems to us that doubts . . . are without foundation."
2. Taken by themselves, these statements do not amount to a great deal; although it is significant that, for the first time, Moscow is responsive to our request that they commit themselves about the intent and integrity of Hanoi.
3. However, when the Soviet reply is placed side by side with the attached memorandum,/3/ which I gave last night to Dobrynin and which stimulated the Soviet reply, the two documents taken together represent something more substantial in dealing with the leadership, etc., than the Soviet document taken by itself.
/3/Document 130.
4. My own assessment--which is also General Taylor's, who has gone over this with me--is that this is about all we might expect from the Soviet Union at this juncture.
Walt
Attachment
Note From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/4/
Moscow, October 28, 1968.
/4/No classification marking.
The progress made at the meetings in Paris between representatives of the DRV and the United States on the halt of the bombings of the DRV, on the opening of political negotiations and on the participants of these negotiations, is being noted with satisfaction in Moscow.
The representatives of the United States in Paris have had more than once an opportunity [to get convinced in]/6/ to become sure of the seriousness of intentions of the Vietnamese side in the search for mutually acceptable solutions. The Vietnamese leaders have repeatedly told us as well about the seriousness of their intentions. The most recent facts, in our view, convincingly prove that the Vietnamese side is doing everything possible to put an end to the war in Vietnam and reach a peaceful settlement on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of the Vietnamese people.
/6/Brackets in the source text.
In this connection, it seems to us that doubts with regard to the position of the Vietnamese side are without foundation (groundless).
139. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 28, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting lasted from 6:40 to 7:55 p.m. and was held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A summary and full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
Director Helms
Walt Rostow
General Taylor
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: We must carefully prepare the briefings for the candidates and the T.V. speech.
Secretary Clifford: Hanoi chose Sunday/2/ as the day to relent and accept the GVN at the conference table.
/2/October 27.
Walt Rostow: Mid-month was time.
General Taylor: He should say he hasn't settled the war. It is just another step.
Walt Rostow: Should Bunker inform Thieu alone that you might make a decision tomorrow?
The President: How does this differ from before when he leaked it?
Secretary Rusk: We must have Thieu aboard.
The President: A burnt child dreads fire.
Secretary Rusk: So do I.
The President: I will not make a decision until Tuesday morning.
The suggested cessation time is 0800 hours, October 30. The President has made no decision on this proposal.
When do you want to make the announcement?
Secretary Clifford: An extra 14 or 16 hours does not bother me. If Abrams gets here and is aboard, you notify Wheeler. He'll notify McCain that bombing is to stop, as of 7 p.m. tomorrow evening.
General Wheeler: It will leak in Washington and in Saigon. I would make the announcement as soon thereafter as possible.
Secretary Clifford: Will it be on TV?
The President: That depends on Secretary Clifford's speech. "I want to know what kind of dress I have before I agree to go to the dance."
Walt Rostow: Should Thieu be sent a Presidential letter?
The President: Only if a decision to go is made.
General Wheeler: If I can get the red-rocket message by 6 a.m. they can stand down by 7 p.m.--a total of 13 hours.
I would have to set up the red-rocket system for between 0500 and 0600 tomorrow. Can we do that?
The President: What is Abrams' schedule?
General Wheeler: At 5:15 he was in Alaska. At 0330 a.m. he arrives at Andrews.
Secretary Rusk: The ground forces should pull out of the DMZ. It is a three mile area.
General Wheeler: We move in only on patrols.
The President: Should the battalion be pulled out of the DMZ?
General Wheeler: It is O.K. with me.
Secretary Clifford: If we have boys in there they will shoot at us.
Walt Rostow: Not if they are serious.
The President: I do not want to abandon the DMZ. We need information.
General Wheeler: We can include the DMZ.
The President: Let's take this up with Abrams.
General Wheeler: "You should position your forces south of the southern boundary of the DMZ"; this language could be inserted.
The President: What do we do if he comes across the DMZ?
General Wheeler: He has immediate authority to respond.
The President: Do you assume that North Vietnam will move out of the DMZ?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir. That's the language.
We do not go across PMDL.
Secretary Clifford: Have we ever been across it?
General Wheeler: Only on a covert basis.
General Taylor: What about the attack on reconnaissance planes?
General Wheeler: Two phases below 19¼.
(1) Make shallow, short, high-speed penetrations.
(2) Regular reconnaissance program.
Tab D/3/ has to do with covert operations.
/3/Not attached.
The President: When do we go to the troop-contributors?
Secretary Rusk: After the decision.
The President: Do we have everything we want?
Secretary Rusk: The message said: What is your view. Do they understand the facts of life? Do the Viet Cong and Hanoi think they would abide by the facts of life?
They responded "events will give our answer."
The record is as hard as it can be short of a contract.
I told the Soviets last night you know what the three facts of life are./4/
/4/See Document 130.
They came back and said we should stop the bombing. North Vietnam understands these matters and that our doubts were "groundless."
We didn't want anybody to charge us with deception.
The President: What about the leadership and the candidates?
Secretary Rusk: I would see them separately between 4 and 6.
I would start with Vice President Humphrey.
Secretary Clifford: Only one factor remains--has a deal been made?
General Taylor: Walt's paper is a good one./6/
/6/Document 130.
Secretary Rusk: Don't try to "interpret" the other side. Don't try to read their minds.
The President: Should the candidates come in the same room?
Secretary Clifford: It increases the level of the event.
The President: We haven't gone into this much with the candidates.
Secretary Clifford: Hanoi finally yielded on the question of the GVN.
General Taylor: Are we going to touch base with Hanoi-Vietcong again?
Director Helms: If the candidates called to Washington, they would flash the President has stopped the bombing.
The President: Have you looked at the speech?/6/
/6/Reference is to drafts of the President's October 31 speech; see Document 169.
Secretary Clifford: I think it is a good speech.
The President: We have got to say moments of encouragement were wiped away with time of encouragement.
We must say that the timing was in their hands.
General Taylor: Say this is not the final victory--only a step on the way.
The President: I'll see Abe as soon as he gets here./7/
/7/See Document 140.
140. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968, 2:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Eyes Only. The meeting lasted until 5:05 a.m. and was held in the Cabinet Room. It resumed at 6:20 and continued until 7:35 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
General Abrams
General Taylor
Director Richard Helms
Walt Rostow
Harry McPherson
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: I thought I'd review how this developed./2/
/2/The following statement by the President came from a memorandum and briefing paper prepared by McPherson, both dated October 28. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [1 of 2])
On June 5, I received a letter from Chairman Kosygin telling me that he and his colleagues had grounds to believe that a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam could contribute to a breakthrough in the situation and produce prospects for a peaceful settlement./3/
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 262.
After a further series of exchanges, I communicated the following to the Soviet leaders on September 15:/4/
/4/See Document 18.
"Setting all political arguments aside, the simple fact is that the President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace. A cessation of bombing which would be followed by
--abuses of the DMZ,
--Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks on cities or such populated areas as provincial capitals,
--or a refusal of the authorities in Hanoi to enter promptly into serious political discussions which included the elected government of the Republic of Vietnam, could simply not be sustained."
On October 2 we were informed that a further exchange of views could prove useful. Such an exchange did take place between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York on October 6./6/
/6/See Document 47 and footnote 3 thereto.
Meanwhile, I discussed our three points with Ambassador Harriman, whom I saw on September 17, and with Ambassador Vance, whom I saw on October 3./6/ Both fully understood our position.
/6/See Documents 20 and 49.
At a meeting in Paris on October 11, the Hanoi delegation put to us this question: Would we stop the bombing when we had a clear answer to the question of GVN participation as a party in the negotiations that would follow a cessation of the bombing?/7/
/7/See Document 58.
After underlining our other two positions--on the DMZ and the cities--Harriman said he would have to refer the question to Washington.
At this point we consulted Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams, asking them their frank views on an instruction to Harriman which would demand a prior agreement on GVN participation--and an understanding of what would be required to continue a bombing cessation: namely, that the DMZ be respected and the South Vietnamese cities not be attacked.
They responded as follows: "General Abrams and I interpret the exchange with Hanoi as a fairly clear indication that Hanoi is ready for a tactical shift from the battlefield to the conference table. We concur in the instruction to Harriman and Vance, and believe Hanoi will give indications that it finds paragraph one (GVN participation) 'acceptable,' and paragraphs two and three (DMZ and the cities) 'understandable.' We would regard such a response as meeting our essential requirements for a cessation of the bombing."/8/
/8/See Document 61.
Meanwhile, we received through the Soviet Embassy in Paris a side message from the Hanoi delegation that they would agree to the participation of the GVN after bombing stopped./9/
/9/See Document 60.
On this basis, we went to President Thieu. He said "so long as we are going to press the offensive in the South and in Laos, and so long as we are prepared to resume the bombing if they violate the DMZ or attack the main cities," he is ready to go along. "After all," he said, "the problem is not to stop the bombing, but to stop the war, and we must try this path to see if they are serious."/10/
/10/See Document 62.
On Monday morning, October 14, Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler, just back from Europe, were briefed along with Mr. Helms, and General Maxwell Taylor./11/ It was the strong recommendation of Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, and General Wheeler that we should interpret the shift in Hanoi's position as representing a possibility of serious movement towards peace. They believed that the risks were low and manageable. Mr. Helms and General Taylor concurred.
/11/See Documents 67 and 68.
At 1:30 p.m. on Monday, October 14, I met with all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We went over the same ground./12/ I polled the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually. They concurred unanimously.
/12/See Document 69.
We then consulted the other troop contributing countries. They all supported the course of action that President Thieu and I had agreed was wise.
We then instructed Harriman and Vance to put the proposition to the North Vietnamese, including a meeting with the GVN present "the next day."/13/ They had earlier said substantive discussions could start the day after the bombing cessation.
/13/See Document 65.
At this point Hanoi balked. They said the next day was impossible.
We have just had two weeks of very hard negotiations in which Hanoi sought the following:
--first, a communiqué in which we accepted the concept that a bombing halt was "unconditional,"
--second, a period of--at first--"weeks" then two weeks; then one week between the bombing halt and the first meeting with the GVN present,
--third, a statement about the subsequent talks which would elevate them to being a "four-power conference." This was designed to inflate the status of the NLF and greatly embarrass Saigon.
On our side we insisted that--although we did not plan to have representatives of the government talk about "conditions"--we would not sign a document which said the bombing halt was "unconditional."
We insisted that the gap between bombing cessation and the first talks could not be more than about three days.
In a meeting on Sunday afternoon in Paris, October 27, they fully met our position./14/ We have reached a rather simple understanding, the essence of which is that we will stop all air, naval and artillery bombardment, and all other acts involving the use of force against North Vietnam, as of 7 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, October 29th.
/14/See Document 128.
We have agreed that a meeting dealing with the substantive issues will be held in Paris on Saturday, November 2. The meeting will include representatives of the U.S., South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the NLF.
Let me summarize the understanding.
--Hanoi has agreed in a secret minute and in our discussions to begin serious talks toward peace in Vietnam--talks which would include representatives of the Government of South Vietnam.
--We have made it clear to them that a continuation of the bombing cessation was dependent, first, on respect for the DMZ, and second, upon there being no attacks on the cities.
--The Soviet Union, which has played a part in this negotiation, knows these circumstances intimately. Their understanding has been reaffirmed at the highest level in the last few days.
--Both Hanoi and Moscow are clear that we shall continue reconnaissance of North Vietnam. That is why we agreed to stop only acts of force and not acts of war.
As we have always said, there is no obstacle to the NLF having an opportunity to express its view on a settlement. But no recognition of the NLF is involved.
That is where we stand.
It is the universal judgment of our diplomatic and military authorities that North Vietnam's acceptance of GVN participation is a major event--potentially setting the stage for an honorable settlement of the war. Many experts felt Hanoi would never do this. Until now Hanoi has endlessly repeated they would never talk to the Thieu government. But there can be no settlement without the assent of the constitutional government of Vietnam in Saigon. We have consistently maintained that position, because the whole purpose of our involvement in this conflict required that the people of South Vietnam participate in deciding their own destiny.
As for the DMZ and the cities, we expect that they will act on their understanding that the continuance of the bombing cessation is
you should know that we are thoroughly prepared to respond if they violate those conditions. General Abrams has standing orders which he believes will protect his forces and our allies at the DMZ, should a violation be attempted.al Abrams has standing orders which he believes will protect his forces and our allies at the DMZ, should a violation be attempted.
The agreement at which we have arrived is, then, precisely the one which--as I have told all three Presidential candidates--we have been seeking in recent months. We have given away nothing to reach this agreement. It is wholly consistent with my public statements.
Every single military and diplomatic adviser has urged me to take this step.
Because election is Tuesday,/15/ it is said there is political implication to what is being done.
/15/November 5.
As of Sunday, they agreed to have GVN present.
We went back to the Soviets about the seriousness of NVN. The Soviets say Hanoi has told them about the "seriousness of this"--our doubts are "without foundation."
This is the first time Moscow has been responsive to this matter on seriousness.
We have raised the matter in 12 separate meetings since June in Paris--on matter of cities and DMZ.
Our negotiators believe DRV will abide by our command. Always possible there will be small violations. We believe if it is a major violation we should resume.
Do you think they will violate the DMZ and the cities?
General Abrams: I think they will abide by it on DMZ.
On cities, I am not sure. I am concerned about Saigon.
In 3rd Corps area, they are strong. They are along Cambodian border.
It's the only place left they could cause any trouble.
I moved First Cavalry into that area. They have reduced capability along DMZ.
They have some capability at DaNang.
Everything we see (intelligence officer) indicates they will go at Saigon again. They haven't given up the idea.
Walt Rostow: What is earliest they could hit Saigon?
General Abrams: I am talking about a half dozen rockets or a few (25-50) sappers into Saigon. The threat is of half dozen rockets or 25-50 sappers.
The President: If the enemy honors our agreement, will this be an advantage militarily?
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: Will it compensate for lack of bombing up to the 19¼ parallel?
General Abrams: Yes, Sir, it will.
We think they have shifted tactics from the battlefield to the conference table (on October 12).
Evidence since then is more convincing that this is a sound move.
The President: Do you think they will honor the DMZ?
General Abrams: Yes.
Secretary Rusk: Saigon is easy.
General Abrams: It is easy for him to stop it with orders.
The President: Can we return to full-scale bombing easily if they attack?
General Abrams: Yes, very easily.
The President: In August we said stopping the bombing will increase enemy capability several fold. Why can we stop bombing now?
General Abrams:
1) Interdiction in Panhandle has been successful.
2) They haven't replaced it in the region.
There isn't enough enemy left in I Corps to keep 1st Cavalry Division up there. The enemy has not been found in Quang Tri. The enemy moved out.
He cannot cause mischief he could have caused in August.
I have no problems standing behind what I said in August and behind what I say now.
Secretary Rusk: In August we said nothing about protecting the DMZ.
General Abrams: That's right.
The President: We said we could do this without causing further casualties. Can we do this now?
General Abrams: Yes Sir, we can.
The President: I am going to put more weight on your judgment than anybody else. Can we do this without additional casualties?
General Abrams: Yes, we can.
The President: How would you reapply air power? I understand weather is bad in the DMZ and Panhandle. Can we get more mileage pound-for-pound in Laos and the DMZ rather than in NVN?
General Abrams: Yes Sir. The weather is beginning to change in Laos. The bulk of bombing [would be?] in Laos.
We had 1,000 trucks a day sighted in Laos last year. We are seeking a better balance of power between Laos and Cambodia.
This is kind of same thing we would be doing anyway.
We have new, 90-day sensors. We could be completed in placing these above and in the DMZ to check the pattern of their activity, if they do go back on their word.
The President: What will this do to the morale of our men and the ARVN?
General Abrams: I don't believe it will have measurable effect on the morale.
As we saw it, military campaign for 1968 had proven to be a failure for the enemy from his standpoint.
He still has local forces, guerrillas, and infrastructure. We agreed we had to make intensive drive at guerrillas and infrastructure. We have now come to the stage of war we have always wanted to get. Rolls of NVN is rolled back--we can hit infrastructure.
Focus of commanders was to hit infrastructure.
Everybody is focused on this. It fits the situation to tee.
Attention already has been directed to dirty work that has to be done.
The President: Is there any deterioration in quality of enemy?
General Abrams: Yes, Sir.
We picked up more weapons than number of enemy dead in one action along the DMZ.
In Delta, Chieu Hoi defector rate is 50 per day. Situation has begun to deteriorate there. In Base Area 270, principal staff officers were hurt badly.
Difficult part is infrastructure and guerrillas. We must get them out.
The President: What is the quality of ARVN?
General Abrams: Good. They are giving better account of themselves. They killed 40%-50% of enemy; lost 50%-60% of allied KIA.
We have one problem division--18th. It's no good. They will replace commander.
The President: How many divisions?
General Abrams: 11 with airborne.
The President: How many poor?
General Abrams: One.
The President: How many superior?
General Abrams: 4; 1 unsatisfactory, 6 satisfactory. They keep improving.
The President: Do they all have M-16's?
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: Has that made a difference?
General Abrams: Yes. They have more confidence.
General Abrams: RF and PF have M-16's. It is quite a prestige item. It's membership in club.
The President: How are you going to keep the pressure on?
General Abrams: Keep pressure on main force. Redouble efforts on guerrillas and infrastructure. It's hard work, but it is pressure that is needed now.
The President: Does he think he is in deep trouble?
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: Since when?
General Abrams: Sometime in September he came to this conclusion. Sometime in September instructions went out from Hanoi. They made new assessment that they were in trouble.
Lot of changes in movement in highlands.
The President: Should we mount massive psychological warfare campaign in South against the enemy?
General Abrams: General Goodpaster and I have talked about this. We must revamp and redesign the psychological warfare.
The President: Does General Goodpaster think we should stop it?
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: What about 7th Air successor?
General Abrams: He'll be for it.
The President: General Momyer was for it. Said in effect this is what we would do anyway.
General Abrams: I am blessed with four good men: Goodpaster, Brown, Zumwalt and Cushman./16/ They don't belong to any service. They belong to the U.S. Government.
/16/Lieutenant General Andrew Goodpaster, Deputy Commander, MACV; Lieutenant General George S. Brown, Commander, 7th Air Force; Rear Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Commander of Naval Forces in Vietnam and Chief of the Naval Advisory Group; and Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Commander, III Marine Amphibious Force.
The President: Is there anything we could do here to enable you to increase pressure in remaining months?
General Abrams: We are working hard on equipping and training ARVN. The ARVN is having to readjust tactics. Americans have been flexible.
ARVN is doing what they learned to do two years ago. We have new techniques. First ARVN Division has been quick to change.
The President: What about enemy strength along the Cambodian border? Are you prepared to handle it and the situation in Saigon?
General Abrams: Yes, Sir.
General Wheeler: More and more supplies are now being found in Cambodia. We are going to have to go after Cambodian sanctuaries. It is intolerable. We must do something about it.
Secretary Rusk: Do they get arms through Sihanoukville?
General Abrams: Yes, they do.
They are moving supplies through there, according to agent reports.
We have had Prairie Fire teams in there.
In 3 and 4 Corps, arms and ammunition are coming through Sihanoukville.
General Wheeler: The Australian Ambassador there isn't worth a damn. He told me there wasn't a single NVN in Cambodia.
The President: This is a critical period here. In light of what you know, do you have any reluctance or hesitance to stop the bombing?
General Abrams: No, Sir.
The President: If you were President, would you do it?
General Abrams: I have no reservations about doing it. I know it is stepping into a cesspool of comment.
I do think it is right thing to do. It is the proper thing to do.
The President: Will the men accept it?
General Abrams: Yes, Sir.
Secretary Clifford: For 5-1/2 months we have had negotiations. North Vietnam had been adamant against permitting GVN to sit. Now, they have agreed. Why--what is your estimate of reasons?
General Abrams: What I think is not too profound.
Sometime in 1967 they made the decision to make an all-out military effort to topple the South Vietnamese people--drive wedge between the U.S. Government and the GVN.
They put on massive infiltration. 246,000 infiltrated in 1968.
Brought in new rockets, AK-47, mortars, artillery, recoilless rifles.
In 1968 they sent everything that was practicable.
They made that effort and tried to sustain it. We were in a certain defensive role.
If they look at it, they must see:
1) GVN is stronger.
2) ARVN are stronger.
Faced with that, they must find some other way to achieve what they seek than this particular route.
They now accept the role of sitting down at the table and insulting the GVN.
Secretary Rusk: We have lost 28,000 men. We can't stand another coup. Do they understand this can't happen?
General Abrams: Yes, they understand that.
Secretary Rusk: Will this action precipitate a coup?
General Abrams: No, Sir.
They know it's the end of the U.S. Government in Vietnam if they have a coup. Berger has done good work on this.
Secretary Clifford: In shifting bombing, can you use all air strength--including naval air?
General Abrams: Yes, I think so.
I need to meet Admiral McCain, 7th AF and 7th Fleet to integrate naval air into this effort. It can be done.
Secretary Clifford: You have been there for quite some time. What will be the effect on the VC when they learn Hanoi has permitted GVN to sit at conference table?
General Abrams: The whole structure in South Vietnam will have problems with this thing. This whole thing will cause them problems. It will be tough to keep hard core with them.
Secretary Clifford: Is it your opinion Hanoi will get into talks with sincere effort to find peace--or is this a ploy on their part?
General Abrams: Top people in Hanoi can't abandon their objectives.
(3:58 a.m.--Rostow hands President a cable.)/17/
/17/Not identified.
General Abrams: They will talk a lot about administrative machinery. Terrorism will continue. I would doubt that large unit engagements will continue. They will try to make more of a government out of NLF.
General Taylor: I want views on ceasefire.
The President: You want to comment on that?
General Abrams: First, public image is in favor of ceasefire.
How a ceasefire is arranged is important. We must talk about how to make it work.
We have to see that mechanics of ceasefire won't place GVN in a difficult position. They must be able to exercise authority over their country.
GVN would want good bit to say about it.
It is something that should come on terms acceptable to us.
General Taylor: How would you go about it?
General Abrams: You could experiment with it by increments.
General Wheeler: I don't see how negotiations of ceasefire can precede pace of political settlement in Paris. Cart is Paris; Horse is situation in South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk: I do not expect this to be wound up in a month. This may go on while you men wrap it up in South Vietnam.
General Abrams: I subscribe to that 100%.
The President: Will they make their 1-million-man mark this year?
General Abrams: They may already have passed it. They are at 835,000.
The President: How much trouble is the President having?
General Abrams: He is stronger. The Prime Minister is a great boost to him.
The President: Is Ky a threat, a dangerous threat?
General Abrams: He's not helpful. Thieu can't bring himself to trust him. These fellows have survived a few bad turns of events. There is some justification for their suspicions.
Thieu may enjoy keeping Ky's suspicions aroused.
But the Vice President is smart enough and sensitive enough not to do anything to overturn the apple cart.
General Abrams: A few spirited fellows might be tempted to do something on their own.
General Brown keeps a close eye on the SVN aircraft loading. Some of Ky's old squadron are in Bien Hoa. We watch them.
General Taylor: Will General Minh be a help or hindrance?
General Abrams: So far, he has been neutral.
Walt Rostow: Do you believe offensive is primarily answer to maintaining the morale of our men and ARVN?
Does the maintenance of offensive seem to be main bargaining tool in Paris?
General Abrams: That's right. This is just one step. There is still much to be done. The loudest voice in Paris is what we accomplish in South Vietnam.
Walt Rostow: We agree.
Secretary Rusk: That's right.
General Wheeler: I want to sit down with Abe on execute orders and rules of engagement. Rules of engagement were largely drawn up by Abe. I need to get messages off.
The President: What if they hit cities? What if they hit Saigon?
General Abrams: One of the things to be considered would be resumption.
The President: What are cities most likely to be hit?
General Abrams: Saigon and Danang are most likely to be hit. They have people west of Danang.
Resuming the bombing will be difficult. A most difficult problem is also Cambodia--those sanctuaries.
The President: Let's put high priority on that, Dean.
Walt Rostow: Soviets plan diplomatic mission to Cambodia. Secretary Rusk may talk to Dobrynin on this.
The President: Do I issue order to stop all acts of force against NVN in light of indication they will sit with GVN--get into serious talks promptly--knowing they must not abuse DMZ and cities?
Will we ever know more to test them than now?
The next few days will be difficult.
Secretary Rusk, do you have any hesitancy or reluctance in my taking this action?
Secretary Rusk: No. We should know it does not mean peace. There is a reasonable chance. I will return to where we are if there is no response.
Secretary Clifford: This is a culmination of events begun with San Antonio speech./18/ It has taken a year of setbacks and losses before they will sit down and negotiate.
/18/See footnote 6, Document 35.
Militarily, we are protected by:
1) Reconnaissance against North Vietnam
2) They know they must exercise restraint at DMZ and cities.
We'll resume bombing if they fail to show good faith.
I recommend this without reservations.
General Wheeler: I think this is as much a symbol of defeat as erection of Berlin Wall. They have been clobbered. If they don't act in good faith, I would urge resumption and really let them have it. I would use fire hose rather than eye-dropper.
Dick Helms: I think it would be a mistake not to take this step. Having GVN recognized will be psychological blow to NLF.
General Taylor: I predate this to 1965 when you committed troops. You changed game.
I fear delay, a long drag-out. I fear reaction at home, temper this a good step, progress, but victory is not with us.
The President: You, Clark Clifford, Dean Rusk, and Harry McPherson should work on a speech. All of you go over Kosygin letter (Attachment B)./98/
/98/Not attached but printed as Document 141.
Also, go over Abrams letter (Attachment C)./20/
/20/Not attached.
Get Russ Wiggins down here at once. Get the JCS to talk about this today.
General Wheeler: General McConnell is in Southeast Asia. Talk to General Ryan.
The President: When do we hear from Bunker?
Secretary Rusk: He started a meeting an hour ago. We'll get phone call and flash message.
General Wheeler: We've selected 15 targets in the Than Hoa area in the event of major attack on the cities.
Walt Rostow: If in public statement, you asked Ambassador Harriman to return to Washington for consultation prior to Saturday meeting?
The President: It is difficult to have a visit from them without problems, but I'll consider that.
(Secretary Rusk read message that NLF delegation may be on way through China to Paris.)
[Let's wait until we get word from Bunker on talks with Thieu.]/21/
/21/Brackets in the source text.
Walt Rostow: We must deal with troop contributors.
The President: When do we plan to do this? We want to delay as much as possible. We'll tell our candidates at 5:30 or 6:00.
Secretary Rusk: We do not want to wait too long on troop contributors.
Walt Rostow: Korea and Thailand held.
Clark Clifford: Australia always held before under Holt. Not under this man.
The President: General, will you be missed in Saigon today?
General Abrams: No Sir, I would like to think so. I don't have much dealings with the press.
General Abrams: Foreign Minister called in fellows before, including fellow from Philippines./22/
/22/See Document 75.
Walt Rostow: We must inform Paris.
Secretary Rusk: We must predict they will use word "unconditional." Do we honor Dobrynin's request of advance word?
The President: Do it as late as you can. I must tell candidates before anybody else.
George Christian: Any clue today will tip our hand.
Jim Jones:
Times:
Saigon--13 hours ahead
Australia--15
Korea--14
Thailand--13
The President: Don't give it 2 hours before announcement.
Secretary Rusk: We don't want allies to flare up on us.
At 5:00 a.m.
The President: How long has Bunker been there?
Walt Rostow: 1-1/2 hours.
5:00 Went to Mansion: General Abrams, Harry McPherson, Jim Jones
5:12 Up to "Sitting Room":
The President, Harry, Jim, George and Tom.
The President: It's good to be the last one. It was unanimous.
Tough to be a candidate and peace seeker at the same time.
Where will Nixon be at 5:00 p.m.? Where will Wallace be at 5:00? HHH?
Have a phone they can cram right up their butts.
5:30
President answers phone.
Haven't heard from Bunker yet.
5:43
Phone Call--Harry answers and hands phone to the President.
Bunker had not seen him as late as 4:55. They are fumbling.
5:50
Signed letter to Kosygin.
Gave letter to Jim Jones
President sat around waiting for phone call.
6:04
Phone call to President from Dean Rusk.
The President held the phone in his right hand. He held his glasses in his left hand--the sides of glasses in his mouth. George Christian was on the President's left.
He says Thieu says 3 days is too short and that he can't get delegation there.
Ky must be talked to. Can't do until 9:00 a.m. our time.
We'll meet back.
Wants to send Ky as adviser. Can't do it in 3 days.
Looks like delay. May be something to report that Nixon is trying to handle this like another Fortas matter./23/
/23/Reference is to the partisan fight over the nomination that year of the President's friend Associate Justice Abe Fortas to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
That's the old Nixon. He may be jittery. May have made mistake attacking him on Sunday, but I had to. He told me at Al Smith Dinner we could really do business after his election./24/
/24/See Document 80 and footnote 5 thereto.
6:15
To the Cabinet Room
The President, Jim Jones, George Christian and Walt Rostow.
The President showed the cables.
6:17 Rusk enters.
New Meeting with:
| The President | Walt Rostow |
| Secretary Rusk | George Christian |
| Secretary Clifford | Jim Jones |
| General Taylor | Tom Johnson |
| Richard Helms |
The President: We may give serious thought to say this would rock the world if it were said he was conniving with Republicans. We are going to get what we can out of not bombing.
This is an execute order. There is plane there to take them. Can you imagine what people would say if this were to be known; that we have all these conditions met and then Nixon's conniving with them kept us from getting it.
If we go public--and they object--we have a real problem on our hands.
Thieu is seeing Ky.
He said 3 days are too short.
The President: Didn't he say one day originally?
Secretary Rusk: We should let Thieu know that we know this. Tell him we know this from political circles.
We may have to put this thing off 24 hours. We must make major effort to get this thing lined up.
The President: The only way to line it up is to proceed.
[The President read Eugene Rostow's note of October 29:
"Walt:
I had a further talk with my informant about the luncheon conversation he attended yesterday.
The man who spoke was a member of the banking community, a colleague, a man he has known for many years, and one in whose honesty he has absolute confidence. The speaker is reputed to be very close to Nixon--as close as Gabriel Hauge (it was not Hauge). (He feels he cannot give me his name.)
The conversation was in the context of a professional discussion about the future of the financial markets in the next term.
The speaker said he thought the prospects for a bombing halt or a cease-fire were dim, because Nixon was playing the problem as he did the Fortas affair--to block. He was taking public positions intended to achieve that end. They would incite Saigon to be difficult, and Hanoi to wait.
Part of his strategy was an expectation that an offensive would break out soon, that we would have to spend a great deal more (and incur more casualties)--a fact which would adversely affect the stock market and the bond market. NVN offensive action was a definite element in their thinking about the future.
These difficulties would make it easier for Nixon to settle after January. Like Ike in 1953, he would be able to settle on terms which the President could not accept, blaming the deterioration of the situation between now and January or February on his predecessor.
Gene"]/25/
/25/Brackets in the source text.
The President: It all adds up.
Thieu delayed seeing Bunker.
Tell Thieu we cleared this before. Tell him we are going to try to have peace talks. If we let this country know he blocked us, we wouldn't have much support for SVN in this country.
I don't think you'll get anything out of Ky.
We can't have different positions.
Go ahead and execute orders.
Secretary Clifford: What word do we have from Bunker?
Secretary Rusk: Bunker tried to see him at 12. Wouldn't see him before 4. Said he could not give us an answer until 9:00 a.m.
Walt Rostow: One more point--The President of the United States remains President until January 20, 1969.
The President: I have no doubt there is some substance in this. This is honest, reliable, prominent man who reports this.
Secretary Rusk: Bunker was disturbed that he wasn't able to budge Thieu off this.
Secretary Rusk: Do we move now or take more time and work this out? SVN are ok, but they are capable of being nuts.
General Wheeler: I would like to make one additional point: MACV does not command directly the Vietnamese forces. They do have Air Forces. They could fly across DMZ and drop bombs. They could shoot artillery across DMZ.
Clark Clifford: What reasons does Thieu give?
Secretary Rusk: 3 days is too short.
Clark Clifford: Is this just a ploy--or does it have merit to it? They can get a man to Paris in 24 hours. They could utilize SVN Ambassador to Paris.
Walt Rostow: They could have organized a delegation.
General Wheeler: I have 12 hours to get orders out.
Walt Rostow: We could gain time by telling delegation there might be some lapover in first 12 hours with possibility of incidents.
Clark Clifford: They said 3 days are too short.
Secretary Rusk: The under-the-table stuff is what may be responsible.
Clark Clifford: Did Thieu have to meet with Ky?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, between now and 9 p.m. Saigon time.
Clark Clifford: If they have understood it all along, it does not appear to be a meritorious suggestion. Their objection does not have merit. They can get a man to Paris. It seems to me they are playing extraordinary games.
Their situation could become so grave under President Johnson's term in office that it would be untenable. We need to take hard look at this. It seems reprehensible and utterly without merit.
Secretary Rusk: I'll call Bunker back.
--Got all we wanted in Paris.
--Political circles tell us they have intervened in Saigon.
--Same circles gave assurances to Hanoi.
--If became known it would be disaster.
--President is best friend South Vietnam has.
--President has made decision--expects SVN to cooperate.
--Let's not give orders until we get one bounce-back there.
--Tell Hanoi we would understand if meeting went to late Saturday.
Clark Clifford: There are two courses:
1) Hold up Wheeler--wait and see what Thieu says.
2) Tell Thieu this is plan--
If they refuse to go along, would be extremely serious. Under 2), we would say it is too late to turn back. It is will of President and American people.
Secretary Rusk: Unless we have Thieu aboard, we cannot tell other troop contributors he is aboard. That would hurt us with South Koreans and Thais.
I would tell Thieu we have made decision--not issued orders.
Dick Helms: I feel you should go ahead. I think we should get Thieu aboard. Price they would like to charge is too high. This is a psychological moment. It is undesirable to have these people believe they have highjacked us out of this. Thieu will be harder to deal with at 9 than at 4.
Secretary Rusk: Ky is a guy who is capable of committing suicide.
We've invested 29,000 killed and $70 billion.
The whole thing could blow up.
The allies could come apart.
If we had public blowup it would be a disaster.
141. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Vietnam: July-December 1968. No classification marking. In a meeting with Harriman the previous day, Bogomolov stressed the Soviet Government's interest in receiving an indication of the next American move. In a memorandum of conversation, Harriman noted: "Then Bogomolov said he was most anxious to know as soon as possible in order that they could inform Moscow. I told him that we would tell him some time during the course of the evening whether we had received a message or not, and give him such information as was appropriate." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Trips and Missions, Paris Peace Talks, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Cables--Outgoing #27-53)
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On Sunday I heard from Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance in Paris that an understanding has been reached with the representatives from Hanoi which has permitted me to order this morning a total cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam starting seven p.m. Eastern Standard Time, October 29.
In reaching the decision to go forward with this step, I have constantly borne in mind the communications you and I have had on this subject. It has mattered to me that you reported that you and your colleagues have reason to believe this step could yield good results and that we should have no doubts about the seriousness of North Vietnamese intentions in the pursuit of peace. Our recent indirect exchanges via Ambassador Dobrynin, and Secretary Rusk's talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York played an important part in my decision, as well as certain communications from your representatives in Paris.
Now that the bombing of North Vietnam is stopping, I hope and expect the full weight of the Soviet Union will be thrown into the balance to bring very quickly a firm, stable peace to Southeast Asia.
With so many dangerous problems elsewhere in the world, it would be good for our two nations and for all humanity if this very dangerous conflict were behind us.
I would very much hope to see the Soviet Union exercising its full responsibilities as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference of 1962 to bring an early peace to Laos as well as to Vietnam. Without a full and faithful honoring of the Geneva Accords of 1962, there cannot be peace in Southeast Asia.
You will find us, in the days ahead, seeking to negotiate this settlement in good faith, asking of North Vietnam nothing more than loyalty to international commitments it has already formally undertaken and looking forward to the day when it can develop a good life for its people in collaboration with the other states of Southeast Asia.
We shall shortly be giving you our views on these matters in more detail. But I wanted you to have this prompt message about the major decision we have just made.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21894.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
142-169
142. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968, 1252Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Text received from the White House and cleared by Read.
262983. For Ambassador Bunker Only. The following message from President Johnson to President Thieu should be delivered at earliest appropriate opportunity:
Begin Text
October 29, 1968
Dear President Thieu:
As we come to this critical but hopeful moment in our joint struggle, I wish to tell you directly what is on my mind and heart.
First, that we have come so far is due to the efforts of yourself, Vice President Ky, and your other colleagues in building the constitutional government, expanding the armed forces of Vietnam, and gathering strength after the shock of the Tet attacks. I'm sure you would also agree that the armed forces of your allies, led by General Westmoreland and now by General Abrams have helped.
Second, I have told General Abrams, and I am sure you have instructed your forces, that we must maintain every bit of military pressure we can summon within South Vietnam and in Laos. This is a time for more military pressure on the enemy, not less.
Third, I trust you will mount a major political and psychological effort in the days ahead to bring the VC over to your side. After all, Hanoi has recognized that there can be no peace in South Vietnam without the assent of your government. The DMZ will be closed--if, the bombing cessation is to continue. The enemy forces have suffered one tactical defeat after another. Surely the basis must be there for a drawing of the VC to your side.
Fourth, I know the question of the NLF in the Paris talks is awkward for you. But you can feel sure that we shall make clear that no question of recognition by the U.S. is involved. And you can do so. Your people can also be sure that we have no intention of imposing a coalition government upon them. On the other hand, I count on you to move towards reconciliation and peace in South Vietnam in the spirit of our talks at Honolulu in July and of our communiqué.
Fifth, I trust that we shall now work together in Paris in the same spirit of brotherhood in which we have stood side by side in the battle. You, Vice President Ky, and I have seen some rough times together. You both honored your commitment to me at Guam. Now we must reaffirm that commitment as the possibility of the honorable peace we all want becomes more real. At Paris Hanoi gave us thus far--in the end--all we demanded. I deeply believe that if we continue to stand together we can get all the essentials we both seek.
Finally, I count on you to lead all South Vietnamese nationalists towards that political unity that will be necessary if we are to consolidate the victory our fighting men have brought within our grasp and make worthwhile the suffering of the people of Vietnam and the sacrifices of their allies.
You can count on Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams, and me to be at your side in the days ahead as we have been in the years that are behind us.
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson. End Text
Rusk
143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968, 1328Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Read.
262985. For Bunker from the Secretary. Confirming telephone call with Secretary,/2/ you are informed as follows:
/2/Rusk called Bunker on a secure telephone three times this day: at 6:05 a.m., 7:50 a.m., and 10:12 a.m. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969) No records of these conversations have been found.
(1) The President has decided that he must proceed on the basis of the joint position agreed between himself and President Thieu as outlined in the joint communiqué and orders have been positioned accordingly.
(2) We consider that we have gotten everything we asked or anticipated at this stage in the Paris talks.
(3) Everything we have done has been cleared with President Thieu. The basis of the position, as set forth in Saigon's 40178 and 40220/3/ has also been cleared with the TCC's.
/3/See Document 64 and footnote 2 thereto.
(4) We are astonished that the question of timing is raised as a last minute objection. Thieu had agreed to "next day," and stated that the time interval of twenty-four-forty-eight hours caused no problem, and has agreed to a joint communiqué in which the time sequence is fully set forth.
(5) We have disturbing information from political circles that certain political elements in the United States have attempted to intervene in Saigon; we also have one report that the same political circles have given indications to Hanoi that would be disastrous for South Viet-Nam. If these facts became known, the American people would react furiously and our joint effort with South Viet-Nam would be completely undermined.
(6) President Johnson is President with full responsibility until January 20, 1969. He is the best friend which South Viet-Nam has in the entire world. He has tried at every step to keep in the closest touch with President Thieu and has acted together with him even on courses of action which have caused the President the gravest difficulties both at home and internationally. The President expects President Thieu's understanding and full cooperation in the present situation.
General Abrams concurs in this message.
Please see President Thieu immediately at the request of our President and obtain his concurrence with the program as presently outlined.
Rusk
144. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to Secretary of State Rusk and the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 3. Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Presidential Views Concerning the Bombing Halt and the Paris Talks
1. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
2. Between 23 and 25 October 1968, President Nguyen Van Thieu continued to hold discussions with a number of government officials concerning a bombing halt and the Paris talks. Among others, Thieu spoke with Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, the Prime Minister, Thieu's Special Assistant Nguyen Phu Duc, the Interior and Foreign Ministers, possibly Ambassador Bui Diem, and the Chairmen of the Upper and Lower Houses.
3. While speaking with the Legislative Chairmen, the President said he had told the Americans that he had instructed several people to contact Hanoi to determine if Hanoi felt the time was propitious to engage in talks. If the DRV does not feel the time right, the Americans had been informed that the Paris talks as well as the fighting in Vietnam would continue as is. However, if Hanoi judges the occasion right, Hanoi must then talk directly to Saigon to resolve the issues. It is imperative though, that Hanoi be serious about wanting to engage in talks. Thieu added parenthetically that if Hanoi would not agree to talks with the GVN Ambassador, Thieu would be willing to dispatch a GVN Cabinet Minister to handle the discussions. If the DRV is serious, the two sides could sit down and discuss the future of Vietnam, the question of peace, or any and all issues that either side cared to bring up.
4. The President continued, then if Hanoi "tells me to recognize the NLF, I would be willing to make that sacrifice. However, if Hanoi demands a coalition government, I would say that is unacceptable. If Hanoi asks to return to nationalist activities, I would say OK."
5. Thieu said that he was willing to see the talks drag on for months or even a year, as long as NVN was serious about the talks. They should not be used for bickering or propaganda purposes, Thieu explained, and once the talks commence, the North Vietnamese "will realize that I am serious". Thieu reiterated that it did not matter if the NLF was included in the NVN delegation. However, he would never let NVN tell the GVN to talk with the NLF.
6. Thieu was obviously concerned that NVN was guaranteeing nothing in return for a bombing halt. He stated he had told the Americans that reciprocity was the most important issue. In Thieu's opinion, the best reciprocal act would be for Hanoi to begin talks with the GVN, rather than a military de-escalation or troop withdrawal from the DMZ.
7. He was also concerned that the U.S. Government wished to do something "dramatic" in order to help Humphrey on 5 November. The inclusion of the NLF at Paris would aid Humphrey, said Thieu, but the benefits are short-range. Thieu told Vice President Ky on 25 October that he was afraid the U.S. would force the GVN to deal with the NLF. He observed, however, that the U.S. was caught between the DRV and the GVN positions on the status of the NLF at a conference.
8. Ky said he felt Thieu should propose that a three-way conference be convened including the GVN, U.S. and DRV. Thieu responded that the Americans had told him that Hanoi may refer to a three-way conference between the DRV, the U.S. and the NLF. Thieu felt, however, that if the DRV would not accept the inclusion of the NLF within the DRV delegation, then Hanoi was not yet ready to engage in serious talks.
9. The President also mentioned that he was having difficulty with the Americans in that they were urging him not to speak to the press or make public statements to avoid leaks on the US/GVN talks. Thieu noted that he was trying to convey the impression that he was a man of peace who would die, not for the world, but for the people of SVN.
145. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968, 8:50 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Nixon, Richard--Vietnam. Confidential; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
Mr. President:
I have been considering the explosive possibilities of the information that we now have on how certain Republicans may have inflamed the South Vietnamese to behave as they have been behaving.
There is no hard evidence that Mr. Nixon himself is involved. Exactly what the Republicans have been saying to Bui Diem is not wholly clear as opposed to the conclusions that Bui Diem is drawing from what they have said./2/
/2/On October 23 and October 27 Bui Diem reported to Saigon the advice of the Nixon campaign to abort the understanding reached in Paris by refusing to attend the expanded talks. Copies of these messages are in the Johnson Library, South Vietnam and U.S. Policies (the so-called "X-File"); see also Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 197-200; Bui Diem, et al., In the Jaws of History, pp. 245-245; Clifford, Counsel to the President, pp. 581-584; Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 586-587; and Bundy, A Tangled Web, pp. 41-42.
Beyond that, the materials are so explosive that they could gravely damage the country whether Mr. Nixon is elected or not. If they get out in their present form, they could be the subject of one of the most acrimonious debates we have ever witnessed.
For the larger good of the country, you may wish to consider finding an occasion to talk with Mr. Nixon, making these points:
1. Here is the sort of thing we have been getting.
2. I do not believe that you personally have been involved in this.
3. It is not clear that some of your supporters have, necessarily, done anything out of line.
4. But what is clear is that this kind of talk is inflaming the inexperienced South Vietnamese who do not understand our constitution or our political life.
5. You might then tell him, assuming that we transit today's crisis, how difficult it has been and your feeling that the Vietnamese image of some of these conversations with Republicans may have played some part.
Therefore, in the months ahead he may wish to caution his men to be exceedingly circumspect in dealing with inexperienced and impressionable South Vietnamese.
W.W. Rostow/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
146. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 29, 1968, 10:30 a.m., Tape F68.07, PNO 9. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. According to the Daily Diary, the President called Rusk "re timing--peace talks." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Yes? Yes?
Rusk: Hello, Mr. President. I just heard from Bunker./2/ He made the pitch as we put it, emphasizing that you had to go ahead; that the terms are known about by the South Vietnamese and the TCCs; Thieu and Ky both agree that they had known about these terms. Bunker emphasized the first meeting could be procedural with local representatives, and that the other delegation get there as soon as they could; that you had been the best friend that they had and it was important that they work with you on this. Thieu came back and said that they were in a meeting of the [National] Security Council--their Security Council. He emphasized--insisted--that they had to have more time; that they couldn't have their delegation turn up there as a minor delegation; that they had to have some leeway there. They did go back into the Security Council meeting and talk about it further in the light of Ellsworth's presentation. Ellsworth--when I said to Ellsworth that I thought this might be a stall, he said he wasn't at all sure about it. He said to me that it may well be this time factor is the problem. He himself then raised the question what would happen if we postpone the outside of the action for 24 hours and then postpone the meeting for 24 or even--not from Saturday,/3/ and perhaps not to Sunday but until Monday. I told him I couldn't postpone anything at this point; I'd have to talk to you about it. But it looks like the possibility of a 24-hour shift on both ends. Maybe the thing will have to try here.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 143.
/3/November 2.
President: What did Vance say?
Rusk: Vance is under the gun--he's coming in on the phone now--he's under the gun from the Hanoi delegation for a meeting which has been agreed now for 6 p.m., which is noon our time. Now, I think what is on Hanoi's mind is that they've been told that it will take us 24 hours to issue the orders, and that time has already gone by, and they haven't been notified that we are issuing the orders. They don't know that we've reduced that to 12. And, of course, they don't know about this latest wrinkle that's developed.
President: And then they may be getting a little of this bait, too, from the other side.
Rusk: Well, they may have some intelligence or intercepts, or something like that, to throw some light on it. But, I think we--it might make a difference if we could put the whole operation forward 24 hours and try to do it in a tidy way rather than a great tumult here at the very end.
President: Does he quote either Ky or Thieu at any length that this is the only objection?
Rusk: They insist that this is the only objection. Now, when I challenged the good faith of that, Ellsworth, who's been very tough on this, said that he wasn't at all sure that this may not really be the real problem.
President: Why wasn't it raised on 1 day and 3 days?
Rusk: Well, I don't know. I think what they've been doing--he said that these people--he said, "Our people out here don't move like Anglo-Saxons are expecting them to move, and they let things like this drag, and then all of a sudden they've got a problem on their hands." But if we could get Saigon aboard by another 24 hours, then we could try that on the delegation in Paris.
President: Well, I'd try that on Cy right now and see what Cy says. I'd talk to Clark [Clifford], and tell him what you said./4/ And then I'd--you didn't talk to Cy before you talked to Bunker?
/4/See Document 147.
Rusk: I talked to him, yes.
President: What did he say about [John] Mitchell?
Rusk: He said he just knew who he was; that he wouldn't put it past him at all to do something like this, but he didn't have any real knowledge of him, and didn't know him really. But he's alert to the nature of the problem, and I gave him some of this background. Shall I ask Cy what he himself thinks about a 24 hour--moving the whole thing forward 24 hours?
President: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. I'd talk to Clark; then I'd talk to Cy; then we'll talk back. Maybe we'll talk on the phone. They're watching things awfully carefully. CBS--you better really close up and watch Bundy and Nick [Katzenbach] and them so we don't put many talks to anybody today. CBS announced at 10 o'clock that they thought we were meeting at noon--
Rusk: I said to--
President: To declare the halt. And that's--I don't know whether [Marvin] Kalb's got that or Dan Rather, but Dan Rather quotes it.
Rusk: All right, sir. So, I'll talk to Clark.
President: And then talk to Cy.
Rusk: All right; sure will.
President: And then call me.
Rusk: Bye.
147. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968, 10:37 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, October 29, 1968, 10:37 a.m., Tape F6810.08, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. According to the Daily Diary, Rusk called the President "re timing, peace talks." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Rusk: Hello?
President: Yes? Yes?
Rusk: I talked to Cy. He is proposing a postponement. He'll try to get 2 hours. He thinks he may get--that he may have to hear them, because they seem to be pretty insistent--say, within an hour's time. But if so, he would only listen. Now, I spoke to him about the possibility--I told him that this was only an idea and was not in any sense a point of view or instruction--the possibility that both days might be moved forward 24 hours to give us a little more time here. His first reaction was that that was bad faith. I told him that I did not think so; that they had caused some problems with their 16 hours, and that 24 hours on both ends would be better than telling them no, and he agreed with that. So we've got two delegations we're working on at the present time.
I come back to Clark's position, Mr. President. You may want to call Clark and talk to him directly about it. I feel myself that this thing could blow up into the biggest mess we've ever had if we're not careful here. And if we have to take a little more time to work on it, it's better to do that than to demonstrate to everybody that we insisted on going ahead against our allies. There would be more than one involved, and this would confirm in everybody's view that the only reason we insisted on going ahead under these circumstances were because of domestic politics. I mean, I think I would confirm that fairly well, and we can't use the information we have because of its classification to rebut any of that. But I think you ought to talk directly to Clark, and I'll be available if you want to call me back.
President: Do you have any feeling that there's a need for a meeting?
Rusk: Well, I think there's not much we can go on until we get this answer back from the meeting of the [South Vietnamese National] Security Council in Saigon.
President: We'll decide at the meeting then./2/
/2/See Document 148.
Rusk: All right. Fine.
148. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968, 1-2:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES ON TUESDAY LUNCHEON
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Taylor
General Abrams
CIA Director Helms
General Wheeler
Harry McPherson
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Clifford: I thought final clearance with Thieu was mere formality. I thought we said--now, here's the time. What happened?
The President: We don't know. I challenged Ellsworth. He said they are sitting on their hands.
General Taylor: They were barred from talking with anybody.
Secretary Rusk: I am annoyed to beat hell, but it is not unusual for this to develop.
These things get complicated. Look at the Middle East.
General Abrams: When we talked to Thieu, Bunker went through it and reviewed it. I reviewed the military situation. This was the 13th and 14th.
General Taylor: Did he raise the matter of consultations?
General Abrams: No. He was asked to postpone it. But he gave a decision. It was unequivocal. He took it, understood it; marched right up to the plate and swung.
Walt Rostow: He handled it well then.
Secretary Rusk: We got 2 and 1/2 hour delay.
The President: What is the situation in Saigon?
Secretary Rusk: They are meeting with the NSC./2/ It's 2:00 a.m. in Saigon now.
/2/Reference is to the South Vietnamese NSC.
General Abrams: I am sure it's the first time the NSC has met at this time of night, even during Tet.
Secretary Clifford: I have trouble with the fact that nothing in the last few days has gone irregularly. The President said he would stop the bombing, if he got productive talks. We said the GVN had to be at the table. They have been kept closely advised. We have friends on the NSC--sure we do. I thought Thieu said we were going in the right direction. It looks like Thieu is going bad on the deal. It looks ominous, even sinister. His excuse is lame--that he didn't have the time./3/
/3/Intelligence reports from Karamessines to Rostow and Rusk clearly described Thieu's intransigence. An October 26 memorandum suggested that Thieu would "never negotiate with the NLF as an equal;" another dated October 28 noted Thieu's brother Nguyen Van Kieu's statement that "his brother would never concede to the Americans and was prepared to leave the Presidency if the Americans cut off financial aid to the GVN or to die if there was an attempt against his life" and that Thieu's preference was for "a respected name in history to living shamelessly like a dog obeying its master's every command." Another memorandum, dated October 29, mentioned Thieu's belief that "the U.S. would force the GVN to deal with the NLF" due to the need to help Humphrey in the U.S. Presidential elections. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79-207A, DDO and Agency Papers for Role in 1968 Bombing Halt in Vietnam)
General Abrams: They talked about flags, name-plates, etc. It was overcome by logic. It does represent a long list of things that had to be settled with them.
Secretary Rusk: We have had the same problem with Hanoi at Paris. There is a problem of face. We can't say Hanoi has face--and Saigon does not.
CIA Director Helms showed the President intercepts of conversations.
General Abrams: When you get down to reality, this type of thing is possible.
Secretary Rusk: These things are tough.
Walt Rostow: It is a tough moment to walk into the room with Hanoi.
General Abrams: I don't think anybody could produce anything when Thieu got concerned about a coup. Maybe it reflects the uncertainty he feels.
The President: Summarize it.
Secretary Rusk: Recommend you wait to hear from Bunker. I take the long view. President Kennedy said we would make a battle there to save South Vietnam. That set us on course. After the Tonkin Gulf, you put in troops to keep South Vietnam from being overrun. We have invested 29,000 dead and $75 billion. We must be careful not to flush this down the drain. But we do have the right to expect cooperation from South Vietnam. Thieu and Ky agreed to this. Bunker said they needed more time. South Vietnam does not want a low-level represent-ative to sit at the table for them. I do not know what is really in the minds of the NSC. If they are playing domestic political politics here, it is a different matter.
If they insist this is a matter of timing, I suggest we go ahead and set time convenient to them. But we should not sacrifice everything by creating a confrontation with our Asian allies. The issues are too grave. We should meet with Dobrynin so that the Soviets are not confused about our attitude.
General Wheeler: Should we meet with Bui Diem?
Secretary Rusk: If we did this yesterday or the day before. Maybe we could though./4/
/4/See Document 154.
Harry McPherson: What is the worst result out of NSC?
Secretary Rusk: If they cannot agree to a ceasefire before November 7 or agree to meeting before November 10, we know they are playing politics. If they agree to Monday I would proceed.
The President: Does anybody have anything to say?
Secretary Clifford: I thought South Vietnam wanted to be at the talks. We have now reached an agreement. They have had five months to think about who it would be. We have an enormous investment. They put Bunker off. Then he sees them. Then he must see them again. Then they must have an NSC meeting.
They are trying to decide what is best--a Johnson Administration or a Nixon Administration to go on with. Bunker may not be putting it to them stiffly enough. I consider this a deep issue of good faith.
Secretary Rusk: What if Nixon's people say be tough. They read the polls. They are whip-sawed too. They have a problem.
Secretary Clifford: They have a moral obligation to go along with us. We said there were months of hard bargaining ahead. It is a matter of good faith. They may think they will get a better deal from the next President. I think they have left us in an almost impossible position--Saigon throws a wrench in the wheel just as we are about to go on this. We cannot move in face of public opposition from Vietnam and other Asian allies.
The great weight of opinion is with us.
The President: Isn't it a case of you losing more than you gain.
Secretary Rusk: The GOP may be giving them advice. HHH has also scared them.
The President: They may just be testing HHH. If I were Thieu I wouldn't feel very kindly about it. I think we have to go through with it, making every effort to take them with us. It is not of world-shaking importance whether it's November 2, 4, 6 or 8. Let's see if they're serious.
General Taylor: Is this request for a delay ineptitude or actual need to touch bases--or is it a doublecross?
The political factor has been waved at them. There is a murky relationship. It may be sinister, or it may be ineptitude. We have so much at stake that we can afford some slippage.
The President: Nixon will doublecross them after November 5. All this publicity, Gorton, HHH, Mac Bundy--all had an effect on Nixon. When the GOP could do it with us, they went to work on the Embassy. They made Bui Diem think he could get a better deal from Nixon than us.
I am trying to do what I ought to do if I can do it--if it's right.
Based on Abrams' views, the JCS views, and all of you, I was ready to go. I was 80% ready before General Abrams came here. Now I am ready to go.
We should try to take South Vietnam with us. We must tell him we are ready to go. If you can't take South Vietnam and South Korea with you, you may have to reassess this situation.
Secretary Rusk: If you were doing this for political reasons you would have done this before the conventions.
The President: I got damn good cold out of this.
General Wheeler: This can be ineptitude or skullduggery. We must be guided by what they are up to. If it is serious, 24 hours is in order. If they play politics, I would take a hard line. You still have playing room on the field. The length of the NSC meeting does not disturb me.
The President: I think Ky is getting just as independent as Hubert.
Walt Rostow: We could say we will start meeting on a three-way basis if they can't get a delegation.
Secretary Rusk: What are their capabilities?
General Abrams: They don't do any bombing up there.
The President: Can they bomb?
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: Could we stop them?
General Abrams: Not really.
The President: Who gives them fuel?
General Abrams: We do.
The President: What would they use?
General Abrams: A-1's.
Harry McPherson: Wouldn't we lose them?
General Wheeler: No more than jets.
Secretary Clifford: We are down to one-fourth of the planes we lost before.
General Abrams: I would try to work around the time of the meeting. You can't work over there with them mad--and all of our relationships.
The President: When are you going back?
General Abrams: Whenever you say.
The President: I am ready now.
Secretary Rusk: "I sleep better when I know you are at your post."
The President: Who runs things when you are away?
General Abrams: General Goodpaster. He, Ambassador Berger, Ambassador Bunker and I are lockstep on this all the way.
Secretary Clifford: I do not think you can get by without announcing General Abrams' visit. You can say you intended to see him in Honolulu, but couldn't. You can say you asked him back to review work. I think you are better off to announce it--to meet it head on.
The President: Well, I'm not sure. I would like to get him back to his base first. If they raise it, that's okay.
General Abrams: There are three plane crews, three men on emergency leave, two other enlisted men. All plane crews sworn to secrecy.
General Taylor: We are stretching our luck to think we can.
George Christian: Every movement of military commanders is not public.
General Abrams: I would like to get back. I will go into CamRanh.
The President: The NSC met--it was bad news. They said we couldn't do it for four reasons.
1. Unconstitutional,
2. More time needed,
3. November 2 is too quick,
4. Harriman insulted them, saying they couldn't veto.
This may mean that everything we have done is in vain. There is no basic change--no breakthrough./6/
/6/In a memorandum to the President entitled "The Bombing Halt and U.S. Politics," October 29, 2:50 p.m., Rostow wrote: "Seen as coolly as I can, this is Saigon's view: Hanoi and Moscow have tried to time the bombing halt to help Humphrey. They believe President Johnson either wishes to time the bombing halt to help Humphrey or has been put in the position where Hanoi and Moscow can control the timing. They are afraid of Humphrey and want Nixon elected. They believe it is fair, under these circumstances, to use their bargaining leverage to prevent a bombing halt before November 5. In this position they may have been encouraged, to an extent we cannot specify yet, by some in the Nixon entourage." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [2 of 2])
The President has been wanting to see General Abrams. Been wanting to see him at some place. It looked like travel this week-end. General Abrams came. We reviewed the whole military situation with him. Can't be more specific than that. Don't say when he got here or when he left.
Gave him Distinguished Service Medal today.
General Abrams has returned.
149. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968, 3:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [2 of 2]. Secret; Harvan Double Plus.
Mr. President:
At Tab A is the Bunker report you already know.
At Tab B is Vance's telephonic report of his conversation with Lau.
We do owe it to Hanoi to tell them by 6 p.m. that we are not stopping the bombing tonight because, I would guess, they have already issued orders to their forces to obey at the DMZ and the cities--and, perhaps, not to fire on our recce aircraft.
We shall be considering this as a first item at 4:30 and probably be in touch with you from Sect. Rusk's office.
Walt
P.S. At Tab C/2/ is the passage between Harriman and Lam, which I sent to you some time ago, which, I believe, is the basis for the second of Thanh's four points.
/2/Not attached.
W. W. R./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
Tab A
Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/4/
Washington, October 29, 1968.
/4/Secret; Nodis; Harvan; Double Plus.
Ambassador Bunker called secure from Saigon at 2:00 p.m. EST (3:00 a.m. Saigon time, 10/30)/6/
/6/A full report on this meeting was transmitted in telegram 41450 from Saigon, October 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
1. Bunker had just returned from the Palace where he had been asked to go to see Foreign Minister Thanh after the NSC meeting had concluded.
2. Thanh raised four points with Bunker on behalf of the GVN Leadership:
(1) Under the SVN constitution the President is required to consult with Leaders of the Assembly and the Leaders would have to be convened and possibly a plenary session of the Assembly in order to approve going ahead with negotiations./6/
/6/In telegram 263695 to Saigon, October 30, the Department interpreted this issue in the following manner: "Whatever the constitutional role of the Assembly in relation to peace talks, it should be possible for Thieu to meet this through full consultation and any debate after repeat after the GVN representative has taken his seat." (Ibid.)
(2) President Thieu had been disturbed by a report from Ambassador Lam in Paris in which Lam claimed that Harriman had stated that the US was not opposed to a separate NLF delegation and the US could not force the DRV to negotiate with the GVN directly./7/ Bunker pointed out our whole position was based on the "our side/your side" formula and that we had made it clear to the GVN that we could not tell Hanoi how to organize its side; just as Hanoi could not tell us how to organize our side.
/7/The discussion between Harriman and Lam was reported in telegram 23126 from Paris, October 29. (Ibid.)
(3) Questions of procedure must be settled before the GVN would go to the first meeting because it did not want that first meeting to be disrupted. Bunker made it clear we could not settle procedures in advance but would present a united front with the GVN on procedures at that time.
(4) Thieu and Ky need more time for preparation. The GVN delegation is not ready and cannot get ready by November 2.
3. Thieu had gone to bed but would be sending a personal message to President Johnson later Wednesday morning./8/
/8/Telegram 41543, October 30. (Ibid.)
4. Bunker stated in summary that it is clear the GVN is not ready to proceed. Bunker told Thanh that he would have to report to Washington that the GVN was not willing to go ahead for the four reasons given by the Foreign Minister. Thanh said that President Thieu intends to instruct Lam to return to Saigon. Bunker told Thanh that Bui Diem should come in and discuss these problems with us in Washington./9/
/9/See Document 154.
5. Bunker suggests that we consider giving the GVN 24 more hours before cessation and perhaps two days more (until November 4) for the first meeting, but he does not know whether such a proposal would be accepted.
BHR
Tab B
Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/10/
Washington, October 29, 1968.
/10/Secret; Nodis; Harvan; Double Plus.
Ambassador Vance called at 3:00 p.m. on the secure phone (9:00 p.m. Paris time)
1. Vance opened his meeting with Lau in accordance with instructions from the Secretary with a statement that he had not yet received instructions./11/ Vance stated that there were a number of complexities in the picture on our side because of the allied elements, the need for consultations here and in other capitals and the time zone differences. He said we had worked intensively on the problem and as soon as he received instructions he would let Lau know.
/11/Although still subject to modification up to the point of execution, the Department sent Vance the following instructions: "1. Orders have been issued to stop all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the territory of the DRV as of 0001 GMT Wednesday. We cannot guarantee that all units will receive these orders in time to put them into effect at the designated hour, but if not, they will be doing so as soon as they receive their orders shortly thereafter. 2. Tell the DRV our announcement will be at the time of cessation. 3. Agree with the DRV to announce tomorrow morning Paris time that the regular Wednesday meeting is canceled." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [2 of 2]) In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of these instructions to the President, October 29, 12:30 p.m., Rostow commented: "Quite a cliff-hanger."
2. Lau asked Vance to explain what our problems were. He asked if the shift of time (from 1600 GMT to 0001 GMT) was what had caused us difficulties. If so, Lau said, let him know and the DRV would take it into consideration. If the U.S. could not accept the secret minute we should also let him know that fact. Lau said he understood that we had complexities but again asked us to let him know what our problems were.
3. At the end of the brief meeting Lau said if the U.S. was not going to stop the bombing tonight at the time the DRV had proposed, we should let him know before midnight (Paris time)--"that is only fair".
4. Comment:
Vance thinks that if we do not intend to order cessation tonight we should let Lau know by midnight Paris time. Vance believes that the DRV may be prepared to drop its demand for a secret minute if we insist, particularly if we are able to indicate to them that we are prepared to stop the bombing at 1600 GMT Wednesday, as we originally proposed.
BHR
150. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 29, 1968, 6:28-7:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The ending time is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) A summary and full transcript of this meeting are ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
NOTES ON FOREIGN POLICY MEETING
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: You should see these two telegrams./2/
/2/Presumably a reference to the telegrams from Saigon and Paris cited in footnotes 5 and 7, Document 149.
The President: Read George Christian's briefing on General Abrams' visit.
Secretary Clifford: It is hard for Abrams to get on an aircraft and depart unseen. We can't brief everybody.
The President: Read George Christian's memorandum to the President:
"Our luck just ran out. Abrams was seen by somebody in the Defense Department, prompting press inquiries from CBS. I gave them the guidelines we discussed and have now advised other reporters of his visit in order to diminish the mystery as much as I could. A transcript will be sent in as soon as possible."
Secretary Rusk: Mood of Hanoi delegation.
Three alternatives, possibly four.
1. Forget it--let thing go over.
Add some days to the five and a-half months we have spent working on this.
We need to talk to the Soviets. It will be a setback for our relationship. It's a shame. Today a Soviet diplomat told a Frenchman after Vietnam, we could move to settlement on the basis of 1962 accords.
2. Go back and insist upon the 2nd. Hard to meet that timing.
3. Meet on the 4th--look as though we made concessions to South Vietnam.
4. If we don't get agreement, make a unilateral declaration. We have a major problem on our hands. They may figure they help Nixon by staying put.
We need to get Ellsworth back in touch with Thieu.
It is a very unhappy situation. One possibility is November 4. They will try to hold up until after our elections.
My own preference: try for the 4th, or say arrangements have been made for the GVN to sit at the talks. We can say the GVN can come when he wants to.
The President: Are you together on a recommended course?
Secretary Clifford: At lunch we thought Saigon's approach might be due to ineptitude or other considerations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
It is due to the fact they want to push this over. They do not want to affect Nixon adversely.
1. They tried to dredge up reasons for the delay:
A. Need for legislature to meet.
B. Harriman said something about the NLF.
C. Questions of procedure must be taken up.
D. Saigon cannot be ready for November 2 because Thieu and Ky cannot be ready.
They do not want to participate in what the President is trying to do.
2. The President has been urged to stop the bombing. You took solid position. Now, three days before the election, you decide to stop the bombing.
We did have an understanding on the GVN presence at the talks. This constitutes something of a problem. We have established the principle that the GVN will be at the talks.
We're faced with the fact that the meeting of the GVN leaders will be all over town. The President may have to clear the air with a sharp, clear statement tomorrow.
We might do well to consider the fact that we talked in good faith with the Soviets. You can't get by with nothing.
You might choose alternative one--do nothing and let Wednesday/3/ meetings go on.
/3/October 30.
Two, get Bunker to tell Thieu we will slide along for 24 hours.
Tell them the President will make a public statement, stopping bombing, and there would be a meeting on November 4. Tell Thieu to come along. This is the way it will go. Tell them none of the reasons have any validity. Tell Thieu either Thieu goes along or we go alone.
Although sometimes doing nothing is better, this is not the time.
I feel it is inappropriate for us, after bearing these burdens for so many years, to turn this over to Thieu and his people and a new Administration.
We know this is a decent, honorable deal. All your advisers can live with it.
This seems to be in the other camp's hands. I do not have a strong definitive plan.
The President: We have never gone so far that we have to do something. The fact that we worked with the Soviets doesn't bother me. They pushed and shoved.
Saigon may see this as a political deal. They may think this would help HHH. They know the Vice President would be softer. I do not want to help them put over a man who has this attitude toward us.
That's one reason I wanted to talk to Abrams. The JCS relieved my fears on the pause.
We don't want to tear ourselves to pieces over this, with the Vietnamese and South Korea. Doing it before the election would be interpreted as political. The Nixon forces have been working on South Vietnam.
We must reassess this.
We can't walk out, quit, split. We have got to hold together. We must tell them we won't stand for their vetoing this. Look at the Bundy speech, the Vice President's Salt Lake City speech,/4/ and you see reasons for Saigon's concern.
/4/See Documents 63 and 40, respectively.
It may be better to wait.
The best choice:
Say to Bunker, now we have attained what we worked for. We must not let this get away from us. You must emphasize that the country [omission in the source text]. It may be we can't trust these people. We have got to get the family together. Why don't we stop the bombing right now. Nobody can force us to continue bombing. I do not feel good about a quickie before the election.
Secretary Rusk: If we go alone the only conclusion is that we went ahead only for political reasons.
Walt Rostow: Can we go to the Soviets?
The President: The Soviets didn't answer my letter./6/
/6/See Document 141.
Walt Rostow: Delay it one week. Get the election out of it.
The President: Let's don't go it alone. I know what forces are at work. I would postpone a day or two before I broke up the alliance. They can shove you around. It is almost impossible with the people in our camp making these speeches.
Thieu and the others are voting for a man they see as one who will stick with it--Nixon.
Bunker must take Thieu up on the mountain and really let him know what the facts are.
1. The bombing not as significant because of the weather. We'll compensate with emphasis in Laos.
2. If he blows this deal, God help him. He has no right to act this way. His people may not like this NLF thing.
Secretary Clifford: There is great merit in what you say. Thieu and his associates are not reading the situation clearly here.
The President: I agree with that.
We must get over the situation to him as we see it.
1. If he keeps us from moving, God help South Vietnam--because I can't help him anymore, neither can anyone else who has my job.
2. There will be criticism.
Secretary Clifford: Thieu must know he must deal with the same military and a Democratic Congress and the same leaders.
The President: If we abandon Korea, Thailand and South Vietnam's 1,000,000.
General Wheeler: Let me send a message to Goodpaster. I can get him to see General Vien and give him the same treatment Bunker gave Thieu. I am frankly disgusted. We can't permit our allies to dictate what are policies of the United States.
The President: I think we have a basic weakness. Thieu doesn't realize what he is doing to himself. The American people will know that just as soon as we got sight of the promised land they blew it.
We have to give him time.
Secretary Rusk: Let's go back on 24-hour, 4 November basis.
The President: (Read note on conversation between Cy Vance and Ben Read)./6/
/6/In an October 29 note to Rostow, Bromley Smith relayed the report conveyed telephonically by Vance to Read at 6:30 p.m. on that day's activity in Paris: "Vance saw the No. 3 man in the Soviet Embassy in Paris upon the Russians' insistence. The Russians (sic) said he was under great pressure for a report on status of negotiations. Chairman Kosygin was waiting to hear. Vance gave a skeleton report of his conversation this afternoon with Lau. He told him that we would not be acting at 0001 GMT (7 p.m. tonight). The Russians asked whether we would be staying with our schedule of 1600 GMT (11 a.m. tomorrow). Vance said he had no instructions on this second point. The Russian concluded by stating that the Soviet Government has great interest in seeing the matter satisfactorily resolved." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [2 of 2]) In a second note to Rostow that day, Smith described Vance's second call: "Cy Vance phoned Ben Read again at 6:40 to say: Harriman, Vance and Habib feel very strongly--more strongly than they did earlier--about the importance of sticking to the 1600 GMT (11 a.m. tomorrow) action. They all agree that the Russian question about this matter reinforces their view that it is important to stay with a time which we have earlier conveyed to the Russians. General Ginsburgh points out that the Russian interest in the 1600 GMT action could be used in Saigon in reinforcing the necessity of our sticking to this time. However, only Secretary Rusk and you are in a position to decide the extent to which we've committed ourselves to the Soviets." (Ibid.)
Tell Kosygin the best laid plans of mice and men often come to naught.
151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 30, 1968, 0232Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted from text as received from the White House. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1408.
263699. 1. You should see Thieu at the earliest possible time Wednesday morning to convey the following as an oral message from the President. If Thieu attempts to make himself unavailable, you should insist that the message is of the utmost gravity and that our President could not understand any reluctance on the part of Thieu to see you at once. Message is:
a. The President is convinced that we have obtained from the other side the essential elements in our requirements at this stage of the war and on negotiations. At every step of the way the President has consulted closely with President Thieu and has proceeded on the basis of the agreement between the two.
b. On the basis of commitments made by Thieu and Ky, the constitutional leaders of the GVN, President Johnson has gone forward in making engagements to others all of which are known to Thieu. He cannot now withdraw from those engagements.
c. The American people have joined in a great battle in Southeast Asia, for more than 5 years, in which we have accepted great sacrifices in men and material. The purpose of this effort was to obtain a chance to talk about peace on a reasonable basis. Now that we have reached that point, we must not let it get away from us.
d. The President is deeply concerned that President Thieu does not sufficiently understand the American people and their government. If President Thieu makes himself responsible for preventing the very peace talks which have cost so much to obtain, the people of this country would never forget the man responsible. No American leader could rescue the position of such a person with the American people. If President Thieu keeps us from moving at this moment of opportunity, God help South Vietnam, because no President could maintain the support of the American people.
e. President Thieu should also understand that the Government of the United States includes the United States Congress and that the leaders of the U.S. Congress and most of its membership will be the same in January as in the past few years. The President and the Secretary of State must be, under our Constitution, completely candid with our Congressional leaders as to how this situation developed and who was responsible for frustrating it. The President wants President Thieu to know that the Congress would take charge of this situation and would completely undermine and would withdraw the support of the United States from the effort in Vietnam.
f. The President also wants President Thieu to understand that the attitude of the American military leadership is of crucial importance to his own country. Our top military men are unanimous that the understandings reached in Paris provide a substantial military benefit to U.S. and allied forces in the field. These men, who have been responsible for the conduct of the battle, will respond with disgust to a rejection of this present opportunity for petty and trivial reasons. Obviously, the elections will have no effect upon our military leadership since they are professional and non-political in character under our Constitution.
g. President Thieu should understand that President Johnson is faced with the gravest possible problems. The first is a judgment as to whether there can exist a relationship of confidence between the Presidents of the United States and of South Vietnam. The second is a judgment which the President must make as to his obligations to the United States, to the American people, and the American national interests. This raises the serious possibility of proceeding alone. We cannot force South Vietnam to do something which it does not wish to do; South Vietnam cannot force us to do something which we consider contrary to our interests. No one can levy upon us a necessity to give the lives of our men and our planes for the bombing of North Vietnam or for the defense of South Vietnam unless the U.S. considers it in our national interest to make that sacrifice. Does President Thieu want President Johnson to go alone? If so, can President Thieu himself go alone?
h. Surely President Thieu understands full well that President Johnson will be President of the United States, with all the responsibilities of that office, until January 20, 1969. The President will make the decisions for the United States while he holds that office; the decisions which are required in the next three months could be vital to the future of South Vietnam.
i. The President can understand if there might be individuals in the South Vietnamese government who may be speculating about the internal politics of the United States. He wishes President Thieu to understand that decisions based upon such speculation carry the gravest danger because the American people would react in fury if they should discover that lives were being lost because people of other countries were trying to intrude their own judgments into the judgments of the American people about our future leadership. The President removed himself from the internal politics of the United States on March 31st in order to deal with questions of war and peace on their merits; it would be intolerable if those with whom he is working should fail to adopt the same attitude.
2. The President has considered carefully the points raised by Foreign Minister Thanh with Ambassador Bunker./2/ He observes that the constitutional point has been raised only at this last moment, following weeks of closest consultation and agreement between our two governments. He cannot accept responsibility for Ambassador Lam's reporting supposed conversations with Ambassador Harriman because he knows that the position of the United States Government has been stated clearly by Ambassador Bunker to President Thieu himself on these matters. Questions of procedure are potentially troublesome but the informal precedents which have already been followed in Paris would meet most of South Vietnam's concern; in any event, it would be for the delegations in Paris to work out these tertiary points.
/2/See footnote 5, Document 149.
The President has taken into account the desire of President Thieu and Vice President Ky to have somewhat more time. He observes that their problems are not related to the cessation of the bombing but are related to the timing of a following meeting and the problems of producing an effective South Vietnamese delegation. The President believes, therefore, that it should meet President Thieu's problem if the date of the cessation of bombing were moved forward for 24 hours and the first meeting should be scheduled in Paris on Monday, November 3. We cannot guarantee that other side will accept this, but we will be ready to find out.
3. Finally, the President is completely unable to understand why, after all the consultation which has occurred between the United States, the GVN, and the TCC's, considerations of secondary importance should be raised at the last minute as an obstacle to a previously agreed procedure. The United States has engaged aspects of its own good faith in pressing these matters upon the other side. And we must maintain our traditional reputation of good faith. But the good faith of the Government of South Vietnam is also at stake. For that to be surrendered for reasons such as those which have been thus far advanced would be profligate in the extreme and would leave the Government of South Vietnam with little credence or credit before the world in the conduct of its own affairs and in its attempt to establish its independence and national survival.
4. Please, therefore, underline with every personal resource you can, the utter gravity of this moment in the relations between the Government of the United States and Republic of Vietnam.
5. If you and General Goodpaster think it desirable, you should authorize him to use any elements of this message for a very frank, direct talk with General Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff./3/
/3/The telegram is unsigned.
152. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, October 30, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [2 of 2]. Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of this report to the President, October 30, 7:55 a.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith the situation in Paris, including the tea break conversation. I do believe that, unless there is a break in Saigon within the next hour or so reported to us, we should have Vance tell Lau that: The 'complexities' referred to yesterday prevent our proceeding at 7:00 p.m. our time; we are still at work to resolve those complexities; we shall be in touch with them again within the next, say, 8 hours." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the report.
Phone Call From Vance, 0645, October 30
1. Vance had just consulted with Harriman and Habib after the regular Wednesday meeting./2/ All were agreed that:
/2/The delegation reported on the meeting in telegram 23142/Delto 895 from Paris, October 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
--the cessation and announcement should be 0800 Saigon local on the 31st (7 tonight our time). They believe this is far preferable to 2400 Saigon local.
--the date of the first meeting could be November 4 or later as the President sees fit. They will do all they can to get acceptance (and, from the previous call, are reasonably confident Hanoi would buy).
2. They all also continue to feel that a response in Paris not later than 1100 our time is vital. At the tea break, Thuy repeated what Lau had said to Vance last night about dates and times--implying that the timing of the 30th for cessation and the 2nd for the meeting had great meaning to them. Thuy also made remarks to the effect that we spoke one way and acted another, clearly suggesting doubt of our good faith./3/
/3/In telegram 23141/Delto 894 from Paris, October 30, Harriman and Vance reported the following: "Thuy said that for the DRV's part he would like to remark that the U.S. has been holding talks with an attitude which is not serious and not correct. The United States says things in one way and does them in another. When the DRV promises something, it carries it out." (Ibid.)
3. Bundy told Vance that his recommendation of a response in Paris by 1100 our time made things extremely difficult if Bunker had not been heard from by then. Vance's recommendation should be made in cable form with supporting reasons, so that the President could weigh it with all factors.4 We should also put our minds on whether there was any partial response that would ease things but not commit us till we knew where we stood in Saigon.
4 In a memorandum to the President, October 30, 7:30 a.m., Rostow noted: "Vance would like the cessation and announcement at 7 p.m. tonight. He believes an 11 a.m. tomorrow announcement would cause 'real difficulty', but he does not argue it would be turned down. (If they are serious they would, of course, accept either time.)" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [2 of 2]) In telegram 23140/Delto 893 from Paris, October 30, Harriman and Vance wrote: "Pursuant to telcon with Bundy, we make the following recommendation. That we be authorized to say to Lau before 1600 Paris time this afternoon the following: 'As I told you, we are working on the matter intensively. We hope to be able to resolve the matter in a manner satisfactory to both of us. We need a little more time and will be in touch with you as soon as possible.'" (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
153. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 30, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting began at 10:09 a.m. in the Cabinet Room with the President, Rusk, Clifford, Rostow, Wheeler, and McPherson in attendance. Christian joined the meeting at 10:15. Read was present for an undetermined period, left, and then returned at 11:30. At 10:24, the President left for the Oval Office to receive a telephone call from Russell. Bundy joined the meeting at 10:30. The President returned at 10:50 a.m. but left again for the Oval Office from 11:52 to noon. The meeting ended at 12:27 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A summary and full transcript of this meeting are ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
NOTES ON FOREIGN POLICY MEETING
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Walt Rostow
General Wheeler
Harry McPherson
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: We're waiting for a flash from Saigon.
The President: I'm concerned about not getting the South Vietnamese aboard but they bought one day, three days, and we were hesitant to extend that for their sake. But if they're agreeable, we'll go longer. Some set of circumstances might intervene to hurt them. If we irritate the Koreans and make them think we've sold out, that's bad. We must say we'll talk with the Koreans constantly.
It's important that the GVN will be present.
--that the DMZ will be respected,
--that cities must be protected,
--that psychological campaign be mounted,
--that our elections have nothing to do with it.
We could have made a deal in April but we didn't because we didn't get the above. Our military commanders say we ought to do this. We're losing nothing by bombing halt.
10:15 a.m.
The President: It is a pure question of when you all are agreed on statement.
Thieu plans to talk at 7:00 p.m. Washington time.
What does Bus say?
General Wheeler: We can issue orders at midday--stop bombing by midnight.
The President: Can we agree on how to best communicate with Australia, Thailand?
Walt Rostow: We can even employ a special ambassador to hold their hand.
Secretary Rusk: Harriman must employ more tact and diplomacy with our allies.
The President: I like the 6th as meeting time. What if we announce at 7:00 tonight. 7 Wednesday/2/ to 7 on the 6th is 168 hours.
/2/October 30.
12 o'clock bombing halt. I would like to speak at 9:30 p.m.
Secretary Clifford: In television speech, we must answer to American people the question "Why now?" What can we say about the DMZ and the cities?
Walt Rostow: In consultations with President Thieu. We must surface on background the DMZ and the cities.
Harry McPherson: The President has said all along he would not stop the bombing if it threatened our men. Nixon signed on to this. So did the Platform committee. We must sign on to this.
The President: April-July-August: give time sequence to what happened.
Secretary Clifford: We didn't reach an understanding until Sunday. It is important to state this. Talks will not continue unless cities aren't attacked and the DMZ not violated.
Secretary Rusk: In mid-October they agreed to seat the GVN. In the past weekend these issues came into focus.
Flash message has been on the way for 45 minutes.
The President: We must watch to see how much the Asia lobby is in this. See what tie-ins Nixon's law firm has. I told another man I was very disgusted if people didn't get aboard. Nixon man implied that it would be better. No question but what Dirksen called and I wouldn't give him much/3/ and that they put the old Asian group to work.
/3/See Document 112.
Secretary Rusk: There is a conflict. What do we say about the DMZ and the cities?
The President: Say nothing about it. Get AP and UPI to watch DMZ and the cities.
Secretary Rusk: Averell and Cy would not want to say anything about it.
William Bundy: Let it leak.
The President: You could say "it is obvious." I have felt since September that we are willing and anxious to take any step which would lower the tempo of the war, which would get productive discussions, and that they would not take advantage of our restraint. I talked to General Abrams.
I have reason to believe we can have productive talks. I signed on Monday. General Abrams is for it.
Productive talks on November 6.
Abrams, JCS said a military disadvantage would not result.
Harry McPherson: We need to say DMZ and cities to answer questions about the JCS and Abrams' position.
Secretary Clifford: Backgrounders will have a lot to do with the flavor of the stories. The President refused for five and one-half months to stop the bombing. What have they done different now than before?
We have one clear understanding: GVN present at conference table.
But the President has been placing concern on the DMZ and the cities. What agreement do you have on this?
We must say we have made it clear they can't violate DMZ or attack cities--if so, we will take appropriate action. I would like to say there is a "clear understanding."
General Wheeler: We know they understand if they violate cities and the DMZ we are required to respond.
Secretary Rusk: The message does not give "green light." FM called in Bunker--gave him a very negative answer in a letter to the President.
The President: What do we say in backgrounders:
1. GVN in talks.
2. Can't allow DMZ and cities.
Secretary Rusk: Keep an eye on DMZ and cities.
Secretary Clifford: I want to go as far as you will let me--not violate cities and DMZ.
Secretary Rusk: There is no contract. There is a clear understanding.
Secretary Clifford: Prompt military action would be required if the DMZ and the cities are violated.
The President: We do not have a contract with North Vietnam.
Secretary Clifford: We have an agreement with North Vietnam on the GVN. We must say we have an understanding on GVN and DMZ.
Secretary Clifford: What about a flat statement of understanding.
Harry McPherson: Tom Johnson has suggested "we have said that the DMZ and the cities be respected."
Secretary Rusk: What about orders to troops?
The President: I would be for giving them at 12:00 noon for 12:00 midnight halt.
Walt Rostow: Letter you write to Thieu will be important.
The President: Let's go to Korea and advise them.
11:35 a.m. Ben Read enters.
I asked Bunker about 10:00 p.m. announcement. He said he would like to work on them and get Thieu to reconvene the Council.
Thieu is standing by at the Palace. He is expecting you to announce your decision. I asked Bunker if he knew of Thieu's speech. He said it asked LBJ for more assurances from DRV.
(The President read attachments A and B.)/4/
/4/Not attached.
Secretary Rusk: We are working against no deadline.
11:44 a.m.
Secretary Rusk: Tell Hanoi to withdraw secret minute. Put it to Thieu.
Walt Rostow: Give him what assurances we can.
Secretary Clifford: What can we expect from Saigon?
The President: I want the meeting on the 6th. He has a speech at 7:00 a.m. I don't want to speak after him. He'll make some points on this.
His 7:00 o'clock speech troubles me.
Ben Read: Bunker thought they could telescope it to six days.
Secretary Rusk: We must bring Thieu along. There could be massive demonstrations against the embassy; the South Vietnamese Army could sit on its hands.
We will be asked why the GVN blew its stack.
The President: The closer you get to the elections, the more troubles you have.
Secretary Rusk: Let's drag this fellow along. We must have him aboard.
The President: Will Thieu lobby our Allies?
What are your thoughts, Bus?
General Wheeler: It makes no difference to me. We can do it either time.
The President: We should do it at 7:00 p.m.
General Wheeler: It also would give Abrams a chance to work on Thieu.
The President: Would you favor a delay?
General Wheeler: Yes, under these conditions. I can swallow my disgust for practical reasons.
Bill Bundy: I would give Bunker another day. There will be two dissenters: The Thais and the Koreans.
Walt Rostow: You might propose an early meeting of the troop contributors.
Bill Bundy: That's a good idea.
The President: Say we will stop unilaterally, tomorrow.
Be prepared to stop at 12 or 7.
Secretary Clifford: We have known before how Thieu would react. Now they have been asked would you rather have three months of Johnson or four years of Nixon. Their whole approach is delay. This message is "horseshit." This message is thoroughly insulting.
Secretary Rusk: This is not this surprising. Hanoi has tried to get us to resolve this before we start process of talks. So have the South Vietnamese. Both sides are pushing for key concession.
Harry McPherson: If Thieu speaks tomorrow, if he talks to T.C.C.'s saying it is bum deal in Paris, and we come along and stop it, it is meaningless. If we do it first--say that we have a deal which gives the GVN the right to sit at the table, that's good. If South Vietnam pisses it away, then it's all on their back.
Secretary Rusk: We must have simultaneous statements. Thieu must delay.
Secretary Clifford: I think it is calculated, planned program to delay, to get through November 5.
If he makes the kind of speech I believe he will make, he will try to get you to change your mind.
If you are going to follow the right course, you must do it before Thieu does.
If Thieu broke with us, he could never get it back on the track.
I don't think additional time will benefit Bunker.
The President: Give Bunker and Abrams up to 7 tomorrow night to deal with Thieu--also Ambassadors to deal with T.C.C. (Troop Contributing Countries) and to deal with Paris.
If Thieu won't make complaints through Bunker rather than through other people and the press, I would be inclined to go ahead.
We can't follow Thieu's speech. Our own people will want to know if Bunker and Abrams are aboard.
General Wheeler: Dean will check with Bunker. Every hour that goes by lessens my confidence that we can do anything by 12:00 p.m. tonight.
The President: Talk to Paris.
Ben Read: They agreed to tear up secret minute.
The President: Tell Bunker we are ready to go tonight.
1. We are ready to get rid of secret minute.
2. Get 168 hours till next Wednesday.
3. Try to get Thieu's speech moved back.
154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Vietnam and France/1/
Washington, October 30, 1968, 1836Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Bundy and cleared by Read.
263808/Todel 1411. For Harriman and Vance.
1. Bui Diem, acting on Thieu's instructions, called on Bundy October 30 to review Bunker's October 29 presentation to Thieu, and Thanh's statements to Bunker following Thieu's meeting with NSC and Upper and Lower House presidents./2/ According to Bui Diem, Thanh emphasized four points:
/2/See Document 149. Bui Diem recalled the October 30 meeting in his memoir, In the Jaws of History, pp. 240-242.
A. Lam's cable from Paris reporting what Harriman had allegedly told him (US would not oppose NLF as distinct entity, US could not force DRV to give advance assurances that it would talk directly with GVN, what guarantee could US obtain that Hanoi would keep promises on implementing de-escalation) had thrown into doubt agreement that had been reached on joint announcement as well as assurances given in US October 25 memorandum.
B. GVN proposed that procedures and physical arrangements be settled before first meeting in order to avoid any risk of "shock" and difficulties.
C. Upper and Lower House presidents had raised many constitutional problems, including government's obligation under Article 39 to consult Assembly before engaging in negotiations.
D. GVN needed more time to settle these internal and constitutional problems; moreover, in view of Lam's cable, Thieu had asked Lam to return to Saigon immediately.
2. According to Bui Diem's account, Bunker replied that Lam had misunderstood what had been told him in Paris; North Viet-Nam had refused to talks procedures in advance; the constitutional problem was a new one of which he had not yet been informed; and he would clarify with Harriman what had been said to Lam. Bunker had emphasized the tension between their two governments that would arise if this matter were not satisfactorily resolved and had asked for GVN cooperation. Thanh said GVN considered it indispensable that Hanoi authorities accept without any question the conditions for de-escalation and the holding of direct talks with the GVN. To go into a conference with no promises by Hanoi, Thanh said, would be disastrous and would be considered surrender by our people.
3. Bui Diem said he had been instructed to ask us to bring this message to the President and Secretary and said Thieu intended to send a letter to the President today.
4. In response Bundy made three points:
A. Ambassador Bunker speaks directly with the authority of the President and further GVN messages to other capitals are not helpful. Lam had completely misquoted the conversation with Harriman; the verbatim account of this conversation had in the meantime been conveyed to Thanh. It was vital to deal in one place only and this was very poor professional procedure on Lam's part. The October 25 memorandum and the agreed joint communiqué remained absolutely valid.
B. On the other points mentioned by Bui Diem, Bundy said, Bunker had already been authorized to cover these with Thieu and we did not wish to make any additional comment whatsoever.
C. The GVN had understood for weeks and months the exact nature of the participation formula that had been agreed upon, and we had gone ahead on that basis. In the meantime there had been no changes in the circumstances to warrant a change in the GVN attitude. We had every reason to believe that the other side understood completely what was involved with respect to observing the understanding reached on both participation and military matters.
5. Bundy then gave Bui Diem for his information the essence of the President's oral message to Thieu,/3/ emphasizing the utterly non-partisan nature of the Administration's decision and the extremely grave consequences if the GVN were not to associate itself with this decision.
/3/See Document 151.
6. Bui Diem, who took careful notes, appeared to be sobered by this presentation, and promised he would immediately report to Saigon, emphasizing that Thieu should convey views to Bunker as the President's representative, the GVN should avoid dealing with the same problem in different capitals, and that substantive points raised in Thieu's instructions had in the meantime been fully dealt with by Ambassador Bunker.
7. In conclusion Bundy emphasized the very serious situation we would quickly face if everyone did not hold their tongues. Bui Diem seemed to get this point also./4/
/4/[text not declassified]
Rusk
155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 30, 1968, 1850Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Repeated to Paris for the delegation as Todel 1412. Drafted from a telephone conversation between Rusk and Bunker, cleared by Read, and approved by Rusk.
263813. This cable is to confirm the following points made in Secretary Rusk's secure telephone conversation with Ambassador Bunker at 1300 (Washington time) Wednesday./2/
/2/According to Rusk's appointment book, he spoke briefly with Bunker over secure telephone from Read's office beginning at 12:45 p.m. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969)
1. The President is prepared to give Ambassador Bunker the extra time requested by ordering cessation of bombing to take effect 2400 (Saigon time) on Thursday October 31, if--(a) Ambassador Bunker thinks there is a 50-50 chance of improving the situation with the additional time; and (b) Thieu can be prevented from "blowing the situation" with the speech he is taping on Thursday evening or in some other manner. Otherwise the President is prepared to order cessation of bombing at an earlier time.
2. In discussing the situation with Thieu Amb. Bunker will be able to give him assurances that:
(a) The secret minute requirement has been withdrawn by the DRV in Paris today;/3/
/3/In telegram 41539 from Saigon, October 30, Bunker noted that he had not told Thieu about the secret minute because of suspicions about U.S. motives that would arise among the GVN leadership. He also recommended that the Department instruct the Paris delegation to request that the DRV modify the secret minute, "for unless the last sentence is removed the secret minute could blow up on us in the most dangerous manner." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968)
(b) We are prepared to give him the extra time needed until the first expanded meeting in Paris next Wednesday November 6;
(c) We will make public that our view of the NLF is the same as Saigon's;
(d) We are prepared to give the GVN the leading role in all matters which come up in Paris involving SVN internal affairs; and
(e) We are prepared to work with the DRV on procedural matters for the November 6 meeting in advance of that meeting.
3. At the same time you should make clear to Thieu that "if he breaks with us, we are finished." "The American people will not take this."
4. Having received your views on the foregoing by phone already, we will attempt to convey to you the President's views on these issues in time for your next meeting with Thieu, which we understand will be at "daybreak".
Rusk
156. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 30, 1968, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Although the meeting, held in the Cabinet Room, actually began at 3 p.m. with Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Rostow, McPherson, Christian, and Tom Johnson attending, these notes cover only the period from when the President joined the meeting at 3:56 until it ended at 5:18. The President, McPherson, and Christian met earlier that day from 12:27 to 1:40 p.m. to work on McPherson's draft of the President's speech. Christian and McPherson continued to work on another draft of the speech until the 3 p.m. meeting. The President approved a version of the speech at 4:55 p.m., and he asked Staff Assistant Charles Maguire to review the speech at 5:50. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
| Secretary Rusk | Secretary Clifford |
| General Wheeler | Walt Rostow |
| Harry McPherson | George Christian |
| Tom Johnson |
The President: When are we stopping it?
Secretary Rusk: Stop at 11:00 a.m.--announced.
The President: Let's stop it so I can announce at 7 today or at 7 tomorrow.
General Wheeler: We can stop it at 0800 Saigon time or 7:00 p.m. tomorrow. There is nothing to do.
Clark Clifford: Do we have information about Thieu making speech?
The President: Make it the day after tomorrow if possible.
Secretary Rusk: What about the timing?
The President: Announce it at 7 p.m. tomorrow.
Clark Clifford and Dean Rusk background, perhaps even appear on television.
Orders go out at 12 noon. This means stopping it--cessation--at midnight tomorrow (1 p.m. on November 1, Saigon time).
We would have from 6 to 8 to work on Congress and Candidates.
I talked to Dirksen once before. He wrote an article on how "we could reasonably hope for GVN to be recognized by sitting at talks."
George Christian: I will send the Press home now.
Clark Clifford: If orders go out at 12 noon tomorrow to stop bombing at 12 midnight, what is the possibility of a leak?
General Wheeler: There is a chance of a leak from Saigon.
The President: It would be 2-3 in the morning.
General Wheeler: You would have a better chance of security. If it goes out at 12:00 Washington time, it is 1:00 a.m. in Saigon.
Secretary Rusk: When do we tell the Hanoi delegation?
The President: I would tell them as late as possible.
Secretary Rusk: Say to them: "The President is ordering a complete halt in the bombing at ____ time."
The President: Why not hold off on issuing orders until I made speech?
Secretary Rusk: Orders issued when?
The President: At 8 p.m. I speak Thursday/2/ (EST). Make issue of orders at 8 p.m. Thursday. Make effective 8 a.m. Friday.
/2/October 31.
1300 Zulu
2100 Saigon on 1st
Secretary Rusk: We should notify Hanoi tomorrow morning.
We can guarantee there won't be a leak out of Paris. Tell them we don't expect incidents.
General Wheeler: 12 hours will do it.
The President: I thought Hanoi already agreed to it.
Have Vance call them now. Tell them we have 8 allies, candidates and Congressmen to deal with.
Tell them we are going to proceed at 8-9 o'clock, early evening if we can understand that you are aboard.
I want all of you to go on television.
Secretary Rusk: ("Today")/3/
/3/Reference is to the morning news and variety television show.
Clark Clifford: (Joseph Benti)/4/
/4/Journalist Joseph Benti.
Let's concentrate on our embassies, Saigon and Hanoi between 6-8, or 7-8.
Secretary Rusk: Times will be "ungodly" in Australia, New Zealand.
Walt Rostow: 6 p.m. EST = NZ 11 a.m. Cambodia 9 a.m. Korea 8 a.m.
EST 5 p.m. is 7 a.m. in Korea
Secretary Rusk: We'll have trouble with Park./6/
/6/South Korean President Park Chung-hee.
The President: Nobody is notified 3 hours before announcement.
The President: I want to say reason I did what I did on March 31 was, as Clark Clifford said, to "test the good faith" of North Vietnam.
"I have determined tonight to give a fair test to that good faith."
157. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, October 30, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. IV [1 of 2]. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus.
Phone Call from Vance, 2150, October 30, 1968
1. Vance reported that the mission had been accomplished--complete agreement on all points had been reached./2/
/2/In telegram 23201/Delto 902 from Paris, October 30, Vance reported on a meeting he and Habib had with Lau and Vy that afternoon, and specifically noted the following: "Lau said that whether or not our agreement is recorded in the minute is not very important. The problem is to come to agreement. Lau said that the reason the DRV had raised the question of a minute was to see whether the U.S. words conformed to its actions. Lau said that if we changed the contents of the minute from the way it was worded the other day then his Minister could not agree. Lau added that his Minister's view was that 'we do not need a minute any longer so that you do not use the minute as a pretext for delaying the cessation of bombing.' As Lau had said, we have agreed on the date of a meeting, on the content of the minute, and now the only remaining question is that of signing the minute and the question of time of cessation of bombing." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
2. The North Vietnamese fully understood the necessity for secrecy; they will say nothing until after our announcement.
3. Vance will meet Lau Saturday/3/ to discuss procedures for the first meeting.
/3/November 1.
4. Vance said the Soviets had been pressing to see him anytime between now and morning, and he requested guidance. He was reluctant to go ahead for fear of leaks. We said we saw no advantage or disadvantage and would leave the decision to his discretion. Mr. Rostow, when informed afterward of the conversation, advised against informing the Soviets. His views were then relayed, at 2215, to Vance, who said they had just reached the same conclusion themselves and would not be seeing the Soviets. This word was passed to Mr. Rostow.
B.H.R
158. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 31, 1968, 0452Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 12:23 a.m.
23202/Delto 903. From Harriman and Vance.
1. We met with Xuan Thuy and Lau from 1:30 to 3 a.m. local time October 31 at a new location of theirs in Choisy-le-Roi.
2. We opened by reading the following prepared statement:
"Your Excellency, this afternoon Ambassador Lau said that you were prepared to dispense with an agreed secret minute./2/ Is that correct? (At this point Thuy asked that we complete our statement before his comments. We said that what we were going to say would be based on his answer and contingent upon agreement to dispense with a minute.)
/2/See footnote 2, Document 157.
"In that case, I am authorized to inform you that the President is going to issue orders in the early evening of October 31, namely seven or eight o'clock Washington time which is 2400 GMT October 31 or 0100 GMT November 1 to stop all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the entire territory of the DRV. Those orders will be fully effective twelve hours later. The President will make an announcement of this action at about the time the orders are issued. In this connection, I must of course, emphasize the necessity for absolute secrecy until he makes the announcement.
"The meeting of the type agreed upon will not be held before November 6. We will be in touch with you on the exact time of such a meeting but it will not be before next Wednesday November 6.
"This action is being taken on the basis of all the conversations we have had, taking into account what you have said and what we have said.
"Can I report to my government that you agree to the foregoing?"
3. Thuy asked that we repeat our statement in its entirety for clarity. We repeated the statement.
4. Thuy then asked for a recess to consult with Lau and Vy.
5. After a 30 minute break, Thuy returned and said he would like to express some views. He said that for nearly six months of conversations in Paris, the DRV has been demanding that the United States unconditionally cease the bombing and all other acts of war against the entire territory of the DRV. This evening as on our previous meetings, the United States side said that it was prepared to stop all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the entire territory of the DRV. The DRV side understands the bombing cessation will be unconditional. The US side has also said that in substance this is cessation of bombing without any condition of reciprocity and in the statements of the US Government there will be no mention of the word conditional.
6. In regard to the meeting to find a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam problem, the US has said that the Republic of Viet-Nam will be present and the DRV has said that the NLF will be present and accordingly the meeting will include representatives of the DRV, SVN-NLF, the RVN and the US. This point Thuy said has been agreed between us.
7. Regarding the question of putting this into a minute, Thuy said that he has proposed a number of different views, but the US had objected. As Thuy had said to Harriman at Wednesday's tea break and as Lau had told Vance on October 29,/3/ the reason for raising the question of a minute was to see whether the words and actions of the United States conformed to each other. The DRV side feels that these words and actions are not in harmony and, knowing this, Thuy said, he did not insist on the writing of a minute. He therefore reaffirmed what Lau had said on October 29 and what Thuy had said in Wednesday's tea break--that he was dropping the request for a minute.
/3/See Document 149.
8. Regarding the date of the cessation of bombing and the date of a meeting, Thuy said that previously we had suggested October 30 for the bombing cessation and November 2 for the meeting. Now we were suggesting that the bombing stop on October 31 and the meeting be held not before November 6. Thuy said the important matter was the interval between the cessation and the meeting allowed sufficient time for the NLF representatives to come to Paris. Now, Thuy said, the date of cessation is postponed and the date of a meeting is postponed but the interval is sufficient to allow time for the Front to come and therefore the DRV agrees.
9. Thuy said the US also requests that the DRV keep this matter secret until the order has been announced by the President. He said the DRV is prepared to keep it secret. This means the DRV will not make any broadcasts, will not publish in any newspapers and will not make any official announcements before the announcement by the President. For his part, here in Paris, Thuy would not say anything. If anyone asks he will simply reply "There is nothing new." On this point, we replied that we would do the same.
10. In brief, Thuy said, he agreed with our proposal today, but he wanted to say that previously there had been points agreed upon and thereafter the US had changed. From now on, both sides should carry out their agreements correctly. Thuy remarked that no doubt we had realized throughout our private talks that the DRV has shown goodwill and serious intent. The DRV also wants to put aside all differences so that we can come to an agreement. No doubt, Thuy said, the US realizes that the DRV has come with a real desire to find a settlement but this involves two sides. The US should show goodwill just as the DRV side has, and then our future work will be dealt with smoothly.
11. We said we had no comment on what Thuy had said. He had mentioned some of the things that he had said in the past as well as some of our past remarks. Since he had gone into this detail we thought we should raise some of the things we have said about serious and productive talks. We were sure that they have in mind the things which we have pointed out to them which would affect the maintenance of serious talks. We were sure they knew what they were. So, we accepted their statement that they want serious talks.
12. We added, for the sake of clarity, and in light of what they had said about October 31, order to stop the bombing will be issued at seven or eight p.m. Washington time October 31 which is 2400 GMT October 31 or 0100 GMT November 1. It will take 12 hours before the order becomes fully effective so that means it will be effective November 1. We were sure that Ambassador Lau as a military man knew that some military units could not receive and therefore carry out these orders immediately because they were not in direct contact with higher headquarters. Thus it would be 12 hours before the order would be completely effective. Lau nodded acknowledgment.
13. Thuy asked if we intended to inform the host government, France, before the actual announcement. We said we had no such plan. Therefore, Thuy said, we would inform the French after bombing cessation. We noted, in this connection there was the problem of secrecy and avoiding leaks which we considered very important.
14. Thuy said that if we tell the French in advance, it would leak and added that the house in which we were meeting belonged to the Vietnamese themselves and nothing would leak out of it.
15. Finally, we said that the United States is good for its word and will carry it out. We have made a statement today which the US intends to carry out. We then adjourned for some tea. At that time it was agreed that Vance and Lau would meet on Saturday/4/ to go over the arrangements related to the convening of our first meeting.
/4/November 2.
Harriman
159. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, October 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. IV [1 of 2]. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus.
SitRep as of 0500
Bunker had three meetings on the morning of October 31 (Saigon time):
1. Thieu (forty minutes). Bunker put the case in the most forceful, sympathetic but unrelenting terms. Bunker cannot tell us what Thieu's decision will be: he was obviously rocked, but there was no time for Thieu to give a considered view. Thieu said he would call a meeting that afternoon of the National Security Council and the two heads of Parliament. Thieu asked Bunker to explain to Thanh the US position on a) the GVN taking the lead on matters concerning it, b) our offer to have private meetings with Hanoi before the firm meeting, c) "the question of the other side." (Saigon 41586)/2/
/2/Dated October 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968)
2. Thanh (at 1100). Bunker went over his instructions, answered three questions (on GVN taking the lead, how we would deal with internal SVN matters at a conference in view of GVN position they would refuse to discuss these, whether we would discuss procedures with the DRV before direct talks begin), read the key sentence on the NLF from the President's talk to the nation, and went over the time schedule. Bunker stressed 1) our hope to have the GVN with us, but our determination to go ahead without them if necessary, 2) the imperative need for tight security (Saigon 41618)./3/
/3/Dated October 31. (Ibid.)
3. Ky (at 1145 for almost an hour). Ky recognized that if the GVN agreed to talk with Hanoi the NLF will have to be present, and there will have to be concessions. He would use his influence in the Security Council meeting to persuade the Council of the necessity for moving together with the U.S. On the basis of Ky's statesmanlike presentation, Bunker believes there is a better than 50-50 chance the NSC will go along with us. (Saigon 41589)/3/
As of 0635--Ambassador Bunker telephoned to say that the NSC meeting was still in session; he would see Thieu immediately after it ended and would phone us right away.
B.H.R
160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, October 31, 1968, 1115Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Read from text received from the White House.
264436. 1. The President wishes you to hold, deliver, or modify these communications. You are quite free to use one without the other. The President is simply putting ammunition into your hands if you think it is helpful.
Message from President Johnson to President Thieu:/2/
/2/A similar message was sent to Ky in telegram 264437 to Saigon, October 31. (Ibid.)
"I have read Ambassador Bunker's preliminary report on this conversation with you.
There is little to add to what Ambassador Bunker has told you. But the hour is too late for division among us. The future would be bleak if that were so.
I have thought since early October that we would sit in Paris as one, determined to maintain freedom in South Viet-Nam and to stop the killing.
We must not throw away in Paris what we have won in South Viet-Nam.
Nor must either of our countries go it alone. I am committed to the course outlined to you by Ambassador Bunker. As you know, I went down this road this far only because I felt that you were beside me at every step--as I believe you were.
I so much hope that you are not leaving me in this critical hour.
I need your wisdom, patriotism, and courage in the critical days ahead.
You should know that I should be delighted to meet with you and the other chiefs of the contributing countries in the Pacific shortly after the first Paris session when the GVN is present, be it in Honolulu or at any other point in the Pacific convenient for us all."
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson/3/
/3/The telegram is unsigned.
161. Notes of Meetings/1/
Washington, October 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2]. No classification marking. The notes begin with the regular meeting of the Secretary of Defense's "8:30 Group" and continue throughout the day. Nitze's brief notes on the same series of meetings is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Defense Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968 [6 of 6].
0845--CMC Thurs 31st Oct 68
We've been on a roller-coaster for days. I still can't talk. We went almost all day on VNam except for luncheon with Bill Foster & Wiggins/2/ & then I went back over there. A decision was made that would be it--but I've thought that 2 or 3 times earlier this week that we've reached a firm decision in Paris with Hanoi. We had it at that 2 to 5:45 am meeting but Bunker took it to Thieu in Saigon & the whole thing exploded.
/2/William Foster, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and James Russell Wiggins, Representative to the United Nations.
Thieu would not agree. Thieu objected that the agreement came too quickly--they couldn't get their delegation to Paris for a meeting (CMC said he thought that a very fishy argument). A series of messages & Bunker was ordered to tell Thieu we should go ahead & they could get there. Thieu then had 4 objections--every one a substantial delay--Thieu saying he had to convene Congress--call his amb back from Paris for consultation.
"Some of us" were urging a hard position vis-ˆ-vis SVNam; "some of us" were admitting they had problems. Another stiff message to Bunker. In reply came 5 additional objections! Insistence that NVNam hold separate meetings with GVN--(not just "our side" "your side" talks). This made everybody swing to CMC's position that SVNam was framing us; was stalling deliberately.
So we've had a sharp, strenuous debate & Pres has listened for hours. "I have voiced greatest suspicion from outset of Thieu's posture. I've been saying since Tues/3/ a.m.--we shld pick a day with Hanoi to stop bombing & to start talks--& tell Thieu.
/3/October 29.
A calamity if this chance gets by us. Others argued that to stop bombing on eve of election without Saigon's support would look like a phony deal solely for U.S. election purposes.
I've felt this since 1st objection from Thieu came in--Thieu is playing for time--more time--still more time. LBJ has had a rough time. He hates dissension & he's had it. Abrams yanked back in middle of night & cross-examined for 3 hrs. the other nite & performed admirably./4/
/4/See Document 140.
By last nite, Pres. said he was ready to move--He ordered Bunker to tell Thieu he was going to stop bombing tonight & announce it & meeting in Paris would be on Wed. [November] 6th. A bitter fight on this date. If this goes thru I'll give you more facts on Saigon.
Ben Read is "one of us" & works hard to keep CMC posted.
CMC says Thieu at one pt. would not see [Bunker]--Bunker had to see the For. Min. Bunker saw Thieu Wed. p.m. (Wash. D.C. time)./6/
/6/See Document 159.
(CMC reads excerpts of notes & meetings. CMC gives some anecdotes about how NVNam negotiators know what goes on in Saigon & have expressed "sympathy" with Harriman & Vance over U.S. problems in negotiating!!!)
CMC says this is the 3rd time he's thought it was settled; it may not [be]. Bunker has always urged the SVNam. side--CMC deeply suspicious of Bunker's firmness & hardness now.
Rusk has been exceedingly reasonable. It's tough for those who've been in this for 5 or 6 years--those who have nursed SVNam on a bottle since infancy hate to see it turned down.
CMC's prediction is that today Thieu will ask for more time & that Bunker will plead his case!
It is an enormous decision for Saigon--we've fought their war; now we've had it & they have to live with it!
All the J.C.S. & Abrams do go along with bombing halt.
CMC predicts many pressures on LBJ to change again today from his plan to announce at 8:00 pm tonight & announce bombing halt at 0800 tomorrow.
Bus Wheeler will flash out his orders at exactly when LBJ makes his statement for to stop bombing 12 hrs hence (or 0800 Friday).
The draft speech has been worked on (by H. McPherson) for some days.
CMC is handed at 0930 a copy of 302341 State to Bunker./6/ "The Pres will issue order to stop bombing at 2000 Wash time 31st--(or 0900 1st Saigon time)--the order to take effect 12 hrs. later." LBJ telling NVNam Wed nite D.C. time at Paris thru Harriman. LBJ "earnestly hopes" Thieu will join in announcement (at one pt, Thieu had agreed--then backed off). If Thieu unable to join, LBJ will do it unilaterally! U.S. says we've gone too far down the road to back off. (sep message: Vance reports Hanoi has been told & does agree to a Nov. 6th meeting)
/6/Telegram 302341 to Saigon, October 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968)
(Bunker flashes back Thieu "rocked" by this ultimatum & pleads for time.)/7/
/7/See Document 159.
CMC at 0945 says he bets right now Thieu won't go along! Thieu has been arrogant & difficult all week so that finally even Rusk has had it & even Rusk came around!!
0950
Then CMC leans back, exhausted, but comes up saying "I think LBJ will stick with his decision--if Thieu does ask for delay, I think LBJ will go ahead anyway."
Rusk keeps saying if we don't have Thieu with us, we may lose Thailand & Korea who will be very alarmed at our forcing "a coalition gov't" & it might scare the hell out of them.
If this goes ahead, LBJ wants Rusk, CMC & Wheeler to give backgrounder! LBJ tells CMC to go on T.V.! "Cut a tape"!--
Here is weakness of our position
We have no agreement with Hanoi. The only "understanding" we have after 6 mos in Paris is that GVN can sit at table in Paris. "They" have not agreed on DMZ or on cities. We have been very clear; they say they "understand" our position on the DMZ & the cities--They have not "agreed."
CMC says he goes back to San Antonio formula--He'd stop bombing when "prompt productive" talks would start; we've known all along no talks could be productive until GVN could be present; only now is that agreed to; we could not get anything until that pt. agreed to. It has now been done.
In addition to the GVN situation, we made very clear what our position is on DMZ & shelling; they have made it clear they understand, that if they violate, all bets are off. They say they want talks to continue. So this gives LBJ the basis for stopping, with minimal risks. We have told them if they "abuse" the DMZ or shell the urban centers, these actions would be most serious & would involve retaliation.
10:05
CMC now gets cc. of LBJ draft on phrases & words. All agree it's a good draft. Then talk reverts to how to handle dirty Q. & A. Long talk goes on & on & on how CMC & Wheeler should comport themselves.
10:30 Ben Read phones from State
Thieu & SVNamese "acting very badly."
--He did go ahead & make a speech.
--Thieu's comments are most serious & clearly inimical & increases LBJ's problems substantially.
--Thieu had his Nat. Sec. Council, & then sent his For. Min. to talk to Bunker.
--Bunker has demanded an audience with Thieu.
To add to commotion, sporadic small arms fire in Saigon & 8 [mm] rocket attacks on Saigon.
11:00 a.m.
News ticker clips come in--reporting Thieu's comments to Press in Saigon. He makes it frightfully difficult. "Saigon does not agree with US terms"--"I don't see any response from Hanoi."
Thieu's statements, CMC moans as he reads aloud, says "His Gov't cannot agree"! "Thieu is playing a very dangerous game."
All this will do is lend substantial fuel to charge that LBJ is doing this just for H.H.H. Had it been smooth, it would have been good.
We now consider maybe LBJ shld wait until next Wed & then go ahead without Thieu. This would avoid the U.S. domestic political charge.
11:10
More news ticker clips. Thieu on TV goes on record with a "hard line."
CMC asks for reactions:
Nitze--go ahead as planned or wait until next Wed after election.
CMC then says--Yes, he even has argued this delay too. But LBJ last night decided to go ahead anyway.
CMC now "leaks" at 11:15 the bombshell: Bui Diem has been having conferences with leading U.S. Republicans who have told Saigon: "Don't cooperate with LBJ; he's only Pres. for 3 more months & Nixon will be in for 4 or 8 yrs. Make it hard for LBJ!"
And in N.Y.C., last week a Repub policy group gloated over fact they had "fixed it" so LBJ couldn't stop the bombing before the election!
Thieu knew everything & was agreeable to all & cleared gov't statements to be issued. Thieu in total cooperation until he began to get Bui Diem's reports.
CMC knew this & that's why he felt sure Thieu would stall for time until after election--all Thieu wanted was time to stall until after 5 Nov.
CMC is handed an intercept by Hixon/8/ (just in) reported as Korean intercept--it shows V Pres Ky tells Koreans it's all politics./9/
/8/Robert C. Hixon, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.
/9/An undated intelligence telegram passed by Rostow to the President. (Johnson Library, South Vietnam and U.S. Policies)
Warnke--Alternatives: 1) Go ahead as planned. GME[lsey] strong for this & says so--we can't let SVN run our show; we'd lose all face with USSR et al if we do. 2) Scrub the plan, because of the danger of Thieu & domes. political commt. & resume after 6th. 3) Blow the Republicans out of the water by openly stating it was all worked out with SVNam & was O.K. with them until Republicans got into act & threatened Thieu's gov't "that it would go hard with them for next four years" if they go along with a bombing halt pre-election on Nov. 5. Say a violation of Logan Act (1798)./10/
/10/Reference is to the Logan Act of 1798 on treasonous activities.
CMC at 1635 Thurs Oct 31
It's been moving so fast it's frenetic & hard to keep straight.
Since I talked this am
--I went to [meeting on nuclear] Stockpile for 20 mins.
--we went at 12:25 to LBJ--Walt, Wheeler, CMC &
I./11/
/11/According to the Daily Diary, at 12:36 p.m. in the Oval Office, the President met with Rostow, McPherson, Wheeler, and Clifford. The Diary reads: "The President reviewed all aspects of present probe--how to get Saigon to sign on once again to step we are taking today. Asked whether, in fact, we were not winning the war and enemy being defeated militarily. Was enemy washed up? Secy. Clifford said in his opinion enemy was definitely washed up. Hence we ought to go ahead and seek progress in peace talks." When Rostow left the room for 5 minutes at 1:05 p.m., the President asked Wheeler whether the Joint Chiefs solidly supported the decision. Wheeler affirmed that they were fully supportive of it. The meeting ended at 1:35 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting have not been found. Following a JCS meeting that morning from 9 to 10:30 a.m., Wheeler sent the President memorandum CM-3743-68, October 31, in which he wrote: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after thorough discussion, agreed as follows: a. In the light of the understandings reached in Paris between our negotiators and those of the DRV, the military situation in Vietnam is such that cessation of bombing and other acts of force against the DRV constitute a perfectly acceptable military risk. b. They hope the current problem of reaching agreement with the GVN can be handled in such a way that the effectiveness and prestige of the current government in Vietnam would not be jeopardized. c. They will, of course, support the decision of the President." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [1 of 2]) In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of Wheeler's memorandum to the President, October 31, 11:20 a.m., Rostow summarized the JCS position and added: "They do need the 12 hours."
We looked at everything. LBJ indicated he was inclined to go ahead. CMC: I made argument which was least damaging & he decided to go ahead with it. This does [show] much substantial progress toward substantive talks & a step toward peace. The political connotations would wash out. If he does not take advantage, & Hanoi & USSR break away--he'd never dig himself out of that hole.
We went to WHse theatre & checked film of his speech--(he'd just done it). He is going to do it on film tonight rather than live.
Then Bunker phoned in--Thieu still had some objections but was coming around.
Thieu still has objections--
#1 Thieu wanted LBJ moved up to 8:00 tonight (CMC had thought it was 8:00--anyway) LBJ not now inclined to worry about it.
#2 Thieu wanted Pres to state to him flatly that LBJ would assure Thieu flatly that--as a result of cessation of bombing--NVNam wld not escalate. LBJ says a damn fool request--answer will be that "LBJ has reason to believe NVNam will de-escalate."
#3 Thieu's 3rd point--He can't get delegation there by Nov 6th. State Dept agreed with Thieu--lv it open. CMC exploded--that would be an invitation to disaster to stop bombing with open-ended & no commitment on a date. So LBJ agreed.
LBJ has called CMC/12/--he's dissatisfied with Wheeler's statement--it's too weak. Get a stronger one!
/12/The President called Clifford at 3:53 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.
CMC said it would be disastrous to ask for a letter that's stronger. Arm twisting would get out. LBJ relented.
CMC now reads to our group the Wheeler letter./13/
/13/Not further identified.
We discuss CMC's proposed statement & a briefing paper prepared under Rostow's direction./14/
/14/Not found.
About 5:30 Thurs 31 Oct
GME raised Ike/15/ question. Wheeler was to see him.
/15/Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
CMC: He's had a setback today!
(GME doubts--he thinks Ike is holding out to help Nixon.)
162. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, October 31, 1968, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [1 of 2]. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of this report to the President, October 31, 11:15 a.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith an interim report of what has been going on in Saigon. The wrangle continues unresolved but Bunker is still in there fighting, armed by your letters." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the report.
Ambassador Bunker's Aide Gave me the Following Information on the Secure Phone
1. The SVN National Security Council convened at 4:00 p.m. Saigon time (3:00 a.m. EST).
2. At 8:20 p.m. (7:20 a.m. EST) presumably after the NSC had recessed, Ambassador Bunker was asked to go to the Palace to see Foreign Minister Thanh.
3. Subsequently at about 10:15 Saigon time (9:15 EST) Bunker requested and obtained a meeting with President Thieu which is now going on.
4. Bunker called from the meeting to request delivery to him of President Johnson's letter to Thieu, which was sent over immediately.
5. At the meeting with Thieu which is now going on Ambassador Bunker was also advised by our Embassy of President Thieu's remarks at the ceremony for Unknown Soldiers, which occurred at a village ten miles out of Saigon at about mid-day after Bunker's last meeting with Thieu in the morning. The Embassy officer did not know Bunker's view of Thieu's remarks at the ceremony (see AP 187)./2/
/2/An Associated Press report in which Thieu stated that the termination of the bombing of the DRV was a unilateral act on the part of the United States. See The New York Times, November 1, 1968.
6. The Embassy does not have confirmation of the radio reports that Lam is returning to Saigon from Paris.
7. The Embassy officer confirmed that Saigon had received 8 rocket or mortar rounds in the last hour or two of which three were duds. There were two or three casualties, all Vietnamese.
8. There are also reports which the Embassy has received of a limited amount of arms fire in Saigon at the present but none of the reports have been confirmed as an actual combat situation.
BHR
163. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 31, 1968, 11:50 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [1 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
Suppose Thieu does not go along today./2/ I suggest that you consider the following:
/2/In a memorandum to the President, October 31, 11:50 a.m., Rostow noted the following intelligence report: "President Thieu's older brother told the South Korean Ambassador to South Vietnam that he believed that it would be better to deal with the next President, no matter who is elected, on issues pertaining to the peace conference. The South Korean Ambassador informed his government that, according to rumors, the U.S. did not expect President Thieu to take such a stubborn attitude." (Ibid., Memos to the President/Walt Rostow, October 29-31, 1968)
--first, have in Nixon alone. Give him the evidence--of which we have an important additional item--that the South Vietnamese are thinking that they can turn down this deal and get a better deal after the election. While sharing the information with Nixon, tell him flatly that you are confident that he has had nothing whatsoever to do with this;
--then give him the views of Abrams, the JCS, etc., on the deal;
--then give him the evidence that Hanoi may in fact be thinking of winding up the war very quickly indeed;
--you might remind him of the trouble that President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, and Sect. Dulles had when Syngman Rhee kicked up his heels towards the end of the Korean war;
--finally, tell him that it is your considered judgment that if it becomes known that Thieu is holding up a deal which would lower U.S. casualties and bring peace near, the basis in the United States for support of the enterprise would dissipate:
--in the government, including the military who are "disgusted;"
--in the Congress, even among pro-Vietnam leaders;
--in our public.
We simply cannot let these inexperienced men snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
Therefore, you would ask him to join in a private message to Thieu, with the other candidates, along the following lines:
"We, the three Presidential candidates in the United States, have been kept fully informed on what the U.S. Government has been seeking in the negotiations in Paris.
"We have just been briefed by the President and other responsible officials of the Government, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are convinced that what has been negotiated in Paris is exactly what the President told us he intended to achieve.
"We are also convinced that the consultations with your Government have been full and candid and the President had reason to believe that he could proceed with the support of the responsible leaders of the Government of Vietnam.
"We believe it would be most ill-advised, under these circumstances, for your Government not to participate in the Paris talks promptly. We believe the American people will not understand what will appear as an effort to protract the war at a time when movement towards peace with honor may be possible. The bases for Congressional and public support for Vietnam in the United States might be gravely weakened. /s/Nixon, Humphrey, Wallace."/3/
/3/See Document 166.
Walt
164. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [1 of 3]. No classification marking. Rusk passed the letter to Dobrynin during a meeting at 10 p.m. on October 31. (Ibid., Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969) A memorandum of conversation of this meeting, dated October 31, was drafted by Rusk. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips & Missions, Paris Peace Talks, Nodis for Harriman/Vance, HARVAN Plus: Cables Outgoing, #54-91)
Washington, October 31, 1968.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On Sunday/2/ I heard from Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance in Paris that an understanding has been reached with the representatives from Hanoi which has now, after some complexities among our allies, permitted me to order this evening a total cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam starting early morning of November 1.
/2/October 27.
In reaching the decision to go forward with this step, I have constantly borne in mind the communications you and I have had on this subject. It has mattered to me that you reported that you and your colleagues have reason to believe this step could yield good results and that we should have no doubts about the seriousness of North Vietnamese intentions in the pursuit of peace. Our recent indirect exchanges via Ambassador Dobrynin, and Secretary Rusk's talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, played an important part in my decision, as well as certain communications from your representatives in Paris.
Now that the bombing of North Vietnam is stopping, I hope and expect the full weight of the Soviet Union will be thrown into the balance to bring very quickly a firm, stable peace to Southeast Asia.
With so many dangerous problems elsewhere in the world, it would be good for our two nations and for all humanity if this very dangerous conflict were behind us.
I would very much hope to see the Soviet Union exercising its full responsibilities as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference of 1962 to bring an early peace to Laos as well as to Vietnam. Without a full and faithful honoring of the Geneva Accords of 1962, there cannot be peace in Southeast Asia.
You will find us, in the days ahead, seeking to negotiate this settlement in good faith, asking of North Vietnam nothing more than loyalty to international commitments it has already formally undertaken and looking forward to the day when it can develop a good life for its people in collaboration with the other states of Southeast Asia.
We shall shortly be giving you our views on these matters in more detail. But I wanted you to have this prompt message about the major decision we have just made.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
165. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, October 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. IV (1 of 2). Secret; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus.
Ambassador Bunker called on the secure phone at 2:40 p.m.
1. He had spent seven hours at the Palace with Thieu, Ky, and Thanh.
2. The GVN wants more time because their Security Council is not on board on the present draft joint announcement./2/ The GVN feels rushed and believes we have given the Communists more time than we have given them.
/2/An attached copy of the U.S.-GVN joint announcement reads: "President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States of America and President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam announce that all air, naval, and artillery bombardment on or within the territory of North Vietnam will stop as of 8 a.m. tomorrow morning, Washington time. The two Presidents have issued the order to cease bombardment after earlier consultation with the Governments of Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the Republic of the Philippines, and with the Royal Thai Government. President Thieu and President Johnson have reached this common decision because President Johnson has assured President Thieu that he has good reason to believe that this action will bring about a de-escalation of the war and that NVN will enter into direct and serious talks with the GVN and the USG on the substance of a settlement for an honorable and secure peace. The two Presidents wish to make it clear that neither the Government of the Republic of Vietnam nor the United States Government recognizes the so-called National Liberation Front as an entity independent of North Vietnam."
3. On the joint announcement Thieu feels that if it were put out in the present form he would be questioned why he has "good reason to believe that the DRV intends to de-escalate the war and to enter into serious and direct talks" and that he would have to explain his reasons publicly.
4. However, if the joint announcement is amended in two respects, they would go with us on issuing the joint announcement at 8:00 p.m. EST tonight./3/ The changes are:
/3/In a memorandum to the President, October 31, 4:45 p.m., Rostow wrote: "I have checked on why Thieu wants 8 o'clock. It is simply: to complete the diplomacy; and give him minimum time to get his statement in shape in the light of that diplomacy. Although they should have been better prepared, they weren't, and feel very hard-pressed for time. Bunker concurs in this request for 8:00 p.m." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [1 of 2]) The following handwritten notation also appears on this memorandum: "Cleared & OK'd by phone. WR 4:45 p.m." According to the President's diary, Rostow called Johnson at 4:38 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of this call has been found.
(1) Replace the third paragraph with the following: "President Thieu and President Johnson have reached this common decision because President Johnson has assured President Thieu that North Viet-Nam intends to de-escalate the war and to enter into direct and serious talks with the GVN and the USG on the substance of a settlement for an honorable and secure peace."
(2) Replace the first sentence of the fourth paragraph with the following sentence: "The first meeting of the direct talks will be convened in Paris at an early date after preliminary agreement on the basic ground rules of the talks."
Note: The rest of the joint announcement should remain the same as presently proposed with the time changes as noted on the attachment in paragraph 1.
5. If we could go along with their suggested changes, the GVN would not feel compelled to give public explanations about the DRV's private "understandings".
6. If we cannot accept their amendments, the GVN feels it must go back to consult its Security Council further and would like another 24 hours.
7. After prolonged argument the GVN gave up on its earlier insist-ence that we obtain DRV agreement that their side in the Paris talks would consist of only one delegation.
8. Comments
Ambassador Bunker says he hopes we can give the GVN our decision in the next hour. If we cannot accept their amendments, we should give them an additional 12 hours--not the full 24 hours requested./4/
/4/In a situation report, October 31, 3:15 p.m., Read wrote: "At Secretary Rusk's request, I called Ambassador Bunker and asked him (not for conveyance to the GVN) whether he thought the GVN would agree to the insertion of the underscored words in the GVN's suggested revised third para: '. . . President Johnson has assured President Thieu that President Johnson has good reason to believe that North Vietnam intends, etc.' . . . Bunker said he thinks he can sell that change to the GVN if we can buy their other amendments. He tried something similar earlier, but Thieu had asked him to submit the language in the form they recommended. If we accept their other changes he thinks he can get them to agree to our amendment without public disclosure of the 'reasons.' Bunker thinks the fourth para suggested by the GVN is not an 'indefinite stall'; that they would show good faith in proceeding to join the talks reasonably soon." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. IV)
Ben Read
166. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Among President Johnson, Vice President Humphrey, Richard Nixon, and George Wallace/1/
October 31, 1968, 6:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, October 1968 [2 of 2]. No classification marking. Although the transcript, prepared by the White House staff, is derived from a recording of the telephone conversation, the recording has not been found. Jones was on the line to arrange the call. The President, at Washington, reached Humphrey at New York, Nixon at Newark, New Jersey, and Wallace at Norfolk, Virginia. The conversation lasted 16 minutes. Clifford, Rusk, Rostow, Wheeler, and Helms joined the President at 5:54 p.m. and remained with him until 6:35 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Jones: Mr. Vice President?
Humphrey: Yes?
Jones: If you'll talk up. Can you hear me all right?
Humphrey: I hear you well.
Jones: Mr. Nixon?
Nixon: Yup.
Jones: And Governor Wallace?
Wallace: Yes, sir. I'm here.
Jones: All right. Hold on for the President.
President: Hello?
Humphrey: Mr. President?
Nixon: Yes? Hello?
President: Hubert? Are you and Dick and George on?
Humphrey: Yes, Mr. President.
Nixon: Yes.
Wallace: Yes.
Humphrey: We're all on.
President: Do you hear me all right?
Humphrey: Yes, sir.
Nixon: Yes, sir.
Wallace: Yes, sir.
President: I have with me Secretary Rusk and Clifford and General Wheeler and Mr. Helms of the CIA and Mr. Rostow. I'm reading from--I want to read a brief background to you from my conference call to you of October 16/2/ so you can get a predicate to what I'm about to say. I said then--this is in absolute confidence, any statement or any speeches or any comment at this time referring to the substance of this conversation will be injurious. I don't think there's any question about that and I know you would not want that to happen.
/2/See Document 80.
First, our position--the government's position today--is exactly what it was the last time all three of you were briefed. That position mainly is this. We're anxious to stop the bombing and would be willing to stop the bombing if they--Hanoi--would sit down with us, with the Government of South Vietnam present, and have productive discussions. We have told them that we did not think that we could have productive discussions if, while we were talking, they were shelling the cities, or if they were abusing the DMZ. That was on October 16th, when I talked to you. The next sentence said, "From time to time they have nibbled back and forth at these various items." Each time they do, there is a flurry of excitement, and so on and so forth.
Since that time, they have sent their man back to Hanoi. We have continued to have our regular weekly meetings and other meetings. We have been in touch with a good many Governments in the world, from Eastern Europe to India to the Soviet Union, all these people working every hour to try to (a) get them to accept the Government of South Vietnam--that they're all puppets and that they'd never sit down in a room with, and (b) trying to inform them that we would be glad to stop the bombing, but that the bombing could not continue stopped if they (a) shelled the cities or (b) if they abused the DMZ.
On Sunday/3/ night, I was informed by Paris that there were very good indications that they would let the Government of Vietnam come and be present at the conference and that they fully understood what would happen if we stop the bombing and they shell the cities or abuse the DMZ. When I got back to Washington from New York, I went back to the Soviet Union and pointed out that I did not want to deceive anybody and didn't want them to be deceived, didn't want to stop the bombing and have to start it again, but I wanted to make it abundantly clear that if they would let the Government of Vietnam come to the meetings and if they thoroughly understood what would happen, then I wanted to seriously consider this matter. But I had doubts--repeat doubts--that the North Vietnamese would stop shelling the cities or would stop abusing the DMZ. The Soviet Union came back to me on Tuesday or Wednesday and said that my doubts were not justified./4/ Ambassador Harriman came back to me and said, "We have repeated to you at least 12 times--we've repeated to North Vietnam at least 12 times--in 12 meetings, and some meetings we repeated it several times--that we could not have a productive discussion in an atmosphere of shelling the cities or abusing the DMZ. Therefore, you may be sure we understand it." While this was going on, we'd gone out and talked to all of our allied countries, and at that time they all tentatively agreed that this was a wise move.
/3/October 27.
/4/See Document 138.
Now, since that time with our campaign on, we have had some minor problems develop. First, there have been some speeches that we ought to withdraw troops, or that we'd stop the bombing without any--obtaining anything in return, or some of our folks are--even including some of the old China lobbyists, they are going around and implying to some of the embassies and some of the others that they might get a better deal out of somebody that was not involved in this. Now that's made it difficult and it's held up things a little bit. And I know that none of you candidates are aware of it or responsible for it, because I'm looking in my transcript here, when we talked before, and I asked for your comments. The Vice President said he had no comment, but thanks very much. Vice President Nixon said, "Well, as you know, this is consistent with what my position has been all along and I made it very clear. I'll make no statements that will undercut the negotiations. So we'll just stay right on that and hope that this thing works out." And then Mr. Wallace said, "Yes, sir, Mr. President, that's been my position all along, too, the position you stated, and I agree with you that we shouldn't play any politics in this matter, so it might foul up the negotiations."
Now, I concluded last March that I couldn't as a candidate stop this war. And I concluded that I ought to stop it the first day I can. I'm going to try to stop it as soon as I can. Therefore, I am planning to issue an order--I'm meeting with the [National] Security Council tonight/6/--I'm planning to issue an order that will stop the bombing that will set a date for a meeting where the Government of Vietnam will appear, and I'm making it very clear to the intermediaries. I can't do it in public because they'll say it's a condition and reciprocal and we'll never get an agreement--and you must not make that statement either, but I think you ought to know it. And we're going to have to wait for 24/48/72 hours to see what happens at the DMZ and see what happens at the cities, and we may have to start the bombing just as fast as we stopped it. But I have considered this matter day and night since March 31st at least.
/6/See Document 167.
And last week I decided before I make this decision I wanted to get every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over here, and I did. And I went over this matter with them, and General McConnell, the Air Force Chief, said, "Mr. President, I recommend that you go ahead and do this." General Chapman of the Marines said, "I think, Mr. President, that you should go ahead with this." General Palmer, who was acting for General Westmoreland that day but who has been his deputy in Vietnam and just returned, and who handled the Dominican Republic for us, said, "Considering everything that has been brought up, I would go along with making this proposition." Senator Russell said, "It's worth a try." General Abrams then was called in. He rode all night and he got here at 2:30 [a.m.] and he stayed with us 'til he left about 4 [p.m.] the day before yesterday. He said he couldn't do much bombing in North Vietnam anyway in the next few days; that he could take that power and use it to good advantage in both Laos and South Vietnam; that he thought if we could get the Government of Vietnam at the table that it was advisable; and he thought in the light of what had happened in the last two/three months in the troops that they had moved that such action would not in any way increase the casualties of the American or allied troops and, therefore, he would strongly recommend this move. Ambassador Bunker took the same position. Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, General Wheeler, all the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Ambassador, the Commanding General--General Andy Goodpaster, his deputy, took the same position./6/
/6/See Documents 67-70, 140, and 148.
Now, I'm meeting with the [National] Security Council and am going to review it with them. We've gone out to our allies--I don't know just--they approved it several days ago. But in the light of these overtures that have been surreptitiously made--the gossip that's gone on by some of the lobbies and the campaigners--I don't know just what will come out of that situation. We're in touch with it. We're on top of it. We're watching it. But we think that this is what we ought to do. Now, I would hope, and I'm going to say so in my statement tonight, that this would not be to anyone's advantage, except to the countries, to peace and to the men in Vietnam.
First of all, the conference won't be held until after the election, probably, we would hope, the 6th or 7th of November, or sometime in that period. We would hope that the Government of Vietnam would have time to get their men there and, of course, the other governments have got to get the NLF there. I would hope that all of you could say--like you said here the other day--that you felt that you didn't want to do anything to undercut the negotiations; that you recommended peace at the earliest possible date; this is not peace, this is not a settlement, this is just one step that indicates that if they do not shell the cities, and if they do not abuse the DMZ--both of those would be great military advantages for us at a time when we're giving up bombing that we can't do for the next 90 days anyway on account of the weather in North Vietnam. We can use that very effectively in other places.
I told General Abrams to return, to give them all he's got in South Vietnam and Laos, but be prepared for this order. The order will not go into effect for several hours after it's issued. It's got to go all over the Pacific, put out some 12 hours. I would think that when I get through with the Security Council sometime this evening from 8 [p.m.] on, I'll make a statement to the public. I have confidence enough in y'all that I've called you even before I've called my own legislative leaders./7/ I've told you every bit of the information I have. Every diplomatic and military adviser I have recommends this course.
/7/Following this conversation, from 6:28 to 6:35 p.m., the President held a conference call with the Congressional Leadership. A transcript of the conversation is in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, October 1968 [2 of 2]. No recording of it has been found. Senators Dirksen, Mansfield, and Thomas Kuchel and Representatives McCormack, Boggs, and Leslie Arends took part in the conversation with the President. Special Assistant Harold Barefoot Sanders subsequently informed Congressmen Ford and Albert of the substance of the call. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
I would not want it on my conscience that I had left the Presidential arena and refused to run to try to get peace, and then when they agreed, that I--the thing--the thing that I insisted on most, bringing the GVN into the table--that I said, "No, I've got to put it off because I'm concerned with an election." I'm not concerned with an election. Y'all are concerned with an election. I don't think this concerns an election. I think all of you want the same thing. So I thought if I laid it on the line that way and presented it to you, you would at least have a complete, full understanding of all the facts. I'll be glad to give you any of the written recommendations. All the files are open to you--be glad to show you what happened. Nobody will know whether it'll be a success or not until we really get into these discussions and these talks with the GVN present. If they shell the cities or if they abuse the DMZ, General Abrams already has his orders, and he is directed to respond immediately without even coming to Washington.
So it could be on-again, off-again planning. But all of my people from General Abrams to Goodpaster to all the Joint Chiefs of Staff--I even went down and got General Momyer who had been in charge of all our Air Force there for several years and who had just been brought in from Thailand to Langley Field, and had him in alone, and I didn't tell him what anybody else recommended. And he not only recommended, but he urged it./8/ I hope that y'all can give us the support because I think there's nothing more important to our country than to have an undivided group here at this time and let one man speak with a single voice to the Communist world and to the rest of the world. Over and out. And I'd be glad to have your comments.
/8/See Document 110.
Nixon: Could I ask one question, Mr. President? This is Dick Nixon. The--with regard to the talks, if--
President: A little louder, Dick.
Nixon: With regard to the talks, if they begin, and as I know, you've made it clear that they may not, but you think they may, does that mean at that point we will not be stopping activities in the South, except for--what you're stopping is simply the bombing?
President: Dick, the talks will be held. We have a firm agreement that the North Vietnamese will bring the NLF in and the South Vietnamese will be permitted to attend. We will stop the bombing only in the North where--in the confidence of the family, the American family--we practically have stopped it already anyway. We will take that same bombing that's taking place in the North today and apply it in Laos and in South Vietnam where we need it much more than we do in the North. In other words, I'm running a transportation company, and I run between Atlanta and New York. But the bridge is out between now and spring between here and New York. So, I'm going to put all my trucks going to Atlanta.
Nixon: Right. In other words, you will continue after the talks begin. You will--that doesn't mean that we will discontinue our activities and let them have the advantage that they had in Korea, for example, anything like that.
President: Not at all. We will discontinue our activities of bombing the North--
Nixon: That's all.
President: Unless they shell our cities or unless they abuse the DMZ. Both of those are valuable to us.
Nixon: Right.
President: But we will take the same airplanes that are bombing the North when they can get through with that weather and apply all of that military activity to South Vietnam in the hope that we can wind things up there.
Nixon: I've got it.
President: We don't want to brag about that publicly.
Nixon: No, no, no. I understand that. Just want to--
President: You see, when we stopped bombing Hanoi and Haiphong, we took in every plane that was going up there and we started putting it in the central panhandle. Now, the weather is bad in the panhandle. So we are pulling them out of there, but we are getting, we hope, three concessions for it. One, they agreed to--that the Government [of South Vietnam] can come to the conference table--these puppets that they said they would never sit down with. Second, we told them that if they shelled the cities or abused the DMZ, we would be back bombing tomorrow morning.
Nixon: But you are not going to state that publicly?
President: No. We can't state that publicly because they will consider it "ultimatum" or "threat" or "reciprocity" or "condition".
Nixon: The only thing you are going to state publicly is that the other people will be allowed to come to the conference.
President: You are right. And after November 5th, I will sit down--and I will do it before that, if you have time--with any of the three of you and go into this thing in detail. Now, my position is this. I can't wait. I have got every adviser, military/civilian/CIA/Ambassadors--Bunker, Goodpaster, Abrams--every one of them recommend this course. So, I am going to recommend it to the nation. I am going to issue the order. I would just hope you all would do likewise.
Nixon: Okay. Thank you.
Humphrey: Thank you.
Wallace: Mr. President, I just pray that everything you do works out fine, and I am praying for you.
President: Well, I need it. Any other comments?
Nixon: We'll back you up. Thank you, Mr. President.
Humphrey: We'll back you up, Mr. President.
Wallace: We'll back you, Mr. President.
President: Thank you very much.
167. Summary Notes of the 593rd Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, October 31, 1968, 6:40-6:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab 75. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. Those attending the meeting, which was held in the Cabinet Room, were the President, Rusk, Katzenbach, Clifford, Nitze, Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor, Secretary of the Navy Paul Ignatius, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, Fowler, Helms, Wheeler, Westmoreland, Palmer, Moorer, Chapman, Acting Air Force Chief of Staff General John Ryan, Office of Emergency Preparedness Director Price Daniel, USIA Director Leonard Marks, Rostow, Smith, Deputy Special Counsel Lawrence Levinson, and Staff Assistants Robert Hardesty and Harry Middleton. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) According to the Daily Diary, the meeting ended at 6:48 p.m., at which time photographers entered. A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
Vietnam--Bombing Halt
(Messrs Hardesty, Levinson and Middleton attended this meeting for the purpose of recording the President's presentation. Their full notes are filed with the President. These notes are merely confirmatory.)/2/
/2/The notes of these Presidential aides, which are in the President's Daily Diary for this date, read: "Because of the historical importance of this day and of this meeting, Larry Levinson, Harry Middleton and Bob Hardesty took notes and combined them into the following: The President was attired in a grey suit and grey tie. He spoke in a voice that seemed hoarse. His delivery was rapid and business-like. He stated: 'We are ready to announce that we are going to stop bombing North Vietnam. We have always held that conferences will not be productive unless the Government of Vietnam is represented; unless the other side refrains from shelling the cities; unless there is no violation of the DMZ. Hanoi has said that it is willing for South Vietnam to sit in on the meetings. We have let them know that any violation of the DMZ will trigger an attack from us. We have talked with the Soviet Union and others and they understand this. We will test their faith and see. I am going on the air at 8 p.m. tonight to talk to the Nation. Just before that, I will order the bombing to stop at 8 a.m. tomorrow. Negotiations will resume on November 6. If they are there, fine. If not, we will go on anyway. I've gotten the judgment of my advisers on this.' (At this point, the President read statements from his advisers: 'McConnell: Therefore, I recommend that you go ahead and do this. Rusk: I recommend that we proceed. I recommend that we proceed along the course as outlined. Chapman: I think we should go ahead with it. Palmer: Considering everything that has been brought up here, I would go along with making this proposition. Russell: It's worth a try. Westmoreland: But if the rules of engagement as suggested here are adopted, I see no problem. Abrams: I certainly subscribe to that a hundred percent.') 'They must respect the DMZ and the cities. It's worth the last mile. I'm willing to take that chance. All my advisers support me. If you have any differing opinions, I would like for you to say so. Bunker and Thieu are meeting. We hope to issue a joint statement. But if not, we will go ahead with our own. Do you have any objections?' (The President went around the table. There was prompt and unanimous agreement among those present. Among the comments: 'OK' 'Absolutely' 'Strong' 'The thing to do' 'The right decision.') 'Others who said wait a little while--you'll get a better deal from the other fellow. We're doing this to test their good faith. There will be some hard negotiating ahead.' Secretary Rusk interjected: 'There will be some hard fighting ahead.' The President replied: 'But this is worth a try. There will no doubt be charges of politics aris[ing]. But the next meeting won't be until November 6.'" (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
The President: Reviewed in summary form the Vietnam negotiations since October 9 when the new phase opened in Paris.
a. On October 14 he informed the three Presidential candidates that the DRV was prepared to sit down with representatives of the South Vietnamese government to negotiate.
b. Based on the San Antonio formula, we accepted their agreement to talk with the South Vietnamese. They understand that the talks cannot continue unless the DMZ remains quiet and there are no attacks on urban areas in South Vietnam.
c. We have talked to Soviet leaders.
d. We will go ahead with a bombing suspension and test the good faith of the North Vietnamese.
The President: Said he was going on the air at 8:00 P.M. this evening and would shortly order the bombing of North Vietnam halted at 8:00 A.M. tomorrow.
a. The first meeting with South Vietnam in attendance would be held on November 6, hopefully, or as soon thereafter as the South Vietnamese come to Paris.
b. Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford recommended that he proceed with the bombing suspension as proposed.
c. At an earlier meeting, the Chiefs of Staff had approved the proposed suspension. General McConnell, General Chapman, General Palmer, and later General Westmoreland and Admiral Moorer had all approved./3/
/3/See Document 69.
d. General Abrams had been called back quietly and had subscribed 100% to the proposed suspension.
The President: Said he believed it was worth going the last mile and that he was ready to take the chance involved in finding out whether a bombing suspension under the conditions proposed would get negotiations started to end the war.
a. He wanted to hear now any differing opinions.
b. He must leave the room promptly in order to await a call from Saigon from Ambassador Bunker who would know whether President Thieu would join in an announcement of the bombing suspension./4/
/4/In a note to the President, October 31, 7:15 p.m., Ginsburgh wrote: "Ben Read called. Bunker said Thieu still insists on two changes in the announcement. Sec. Rusk told Amb. Bunker that was unacceptable and the President is going ahead on the basis of the speech at 8:00 p.m. Ben said so we will not have a joint announcement unless Bunker can get him to change; and we don't know that he will even try." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [1 of 2])
The President: Asked each person in turn whether he had any doubts as to the action proposed. Every person agreed with the proposed action.
a. Two weeks ago we had a firm agreement with President Thieu to go along with us. Now, however, Thieu was hesitant and we are still in doubt as to whether South Vietnam would make a joint announcement.
b. Hard fighting is ahead of us.
c. He could not wave a wand to end the war in Vietnam.
Note: Following the conclusion of the NSC meeting,/6/ the President talked with several members as he was leaving the Cabinet Room. He explained to General Westmoreland that he had asked General Abrams to come to Washington to ask him face-to-face what had been reported by cable from Saigon, namely, from a military point of view, General Abrams fully supported the bombing suspension. To Air Force Secretary Brown, the President said he did not know why President Thieu had not gone along with us after first agreeing completely with the conditional bombing suspension. He said that members of the "China Lobby" may have gotten to someone in Saigon to suggest that if Saigon would hold out until after the elections, they might receive a better deal from a new Republican Administration.
/6/The President's Diary notes: "At the conclusion of the meeting, Walt Rostow commented--also in a hoarse voice--'This is the most sustained day and night effort I've had since the Cuban missile crisis.'" (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Bromley Smith
168. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey/1/
Washington, October 31, 1968, 6:52 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Humphrey, October 31, 1968, 6:52 p.m., Tape F6810.09, PNO 4-5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. A summary of this conversation is ibid. The Daily Diary noted: "The VP called Jim Jones for the President's guidance on what to say re Congr. Gerald Ford." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Hubert?
Vice President: Hello, Mr. President.
President: Glad to hear you, my friend.
Vice President: Glad to hear you, sir.
President: Hubert, there are two or three things that I would suggest. First, I will speak shortly after 8./2/ I just got the Joint Chiefs, all the civilian secretaries, the National Security group that normally meets with us. We are waiting on word from Bunker and Thieu. We may have--could have--disastrous consequences if Thieu and the Koreans and so forth don't go with us. They agreed to 2 or 3 weeks ago. But there's been a lot of talk out of the campaign that has influenced them, and they are, just like when you read the paper about what's happening in Minnesota, you get influenced by it. And the last few days the China crowd has been in it some. And they've been telling them Humphrey wouldn't stick with them at all, so they better put off and not let Johnson make any kind of peace because they will do a much better job; they'll be much tougher. The Ambassador has been sending that word back, and they have Thieu and them upset about the speech--if you stop the bombing, semi-colon, comma, period--you know. And they have had--we've been watching it very carefully, and I know about what I speak. I am looking at the whole cards.
/2/See Document 169.
Vice President: I know that.
President: So, I had Thieu on board 2 weeks ago, and he signed up, and we agreed on the text of a joint announcement./3/ And then Bundy's speech came along,/4/ and they decided they would have to go back to Hanoi, and they went back and considered it. And Abrams won a few more victories, so they decided to go along. And when they did, in the meantime, Nixon's folks--I don't know whether he had anything to do with it or not; I don't charge that he does, I can't prove it--but some of the people supporting him told Hanoi that they could--that he had no connection with this war, wasn't involved, that he could be more reasonable, didn't have any commitments, than anybody who had been fighting them for about 5 years. Then on the other side of the track, they told the South Vietnamese that if they don't sell out--let Johnson sell them out here at the conference table and bring into it the NLF--Humphrey is going to get beat, and they will have a bright future. So, they have just been holding for two weeks.
/3/See Document 143.
/4/See Document 63.
So, I finally took the bull by the horns and got Abrams in, got all the Joint Chiefs of Staff in, got every diplomat and every civilian--General Goodpaster, Bunker, Rusk, Katzenbach, Clifford--everybody, and they all agreed that A, we should stop the bombing. I want to issue an order to stop it tomorrow--that is number one. Number two, they've agreed with Vance that they will let the GVN come to the table. The GVN is debating now. They don't know what to do. They want to put it off. But they can come if they want to. If they don't, we'll go on and talk about what we need to. It'll be a very bad thing, though, if a million of their men get out, you know, and if Thailand gets upset, and if Korea thinks we are selling them out--white men.
But anyway, the thing they have done they have never done before is allow a prompt, productive discussion they don't take advantage of. Now, they've agreed that these puppets they said they would never sit down with can come and sit in the room with them and they will talk to them. Now, that is the major thing they've agreed to.
Vice President: Yes.
President: The second thing we agreed to is they will not shell the cities and they will not abuse the DMZ. Now, they have not agreed to, either. But we've told them that if they do, we have given rules of engagement to Abrams and that he can respond automatically, and that we could not have productive discussions if they were doing either.
Vice President: That's right.
President: So, we may stop it tonight and start it tomorrow night. And I have just said I'm going to say to everybody--from you to George Ball to Charles de Gaulle to North Vietnam to Mike Mansfield--that you have said to me: "Test their faith and stop the bombing."
Vice President: That's exactly right.
President: Now, I'm going to stop it, but I'm just going to start it just as quick as I stopped it if they take advantage and go to killing my boys.
Vice President: Well, Mr. President, we have all agreed on that.
President: But I told them that. Now, there are three things then, really. We can't say a word about it in the paper. Now, Rusk is very fearful of your position. He thinks that this is the best thing in the world for America, and what's good for America is you, but he said the temptation is going to be a lot of people to say we did this for you. So, for God's sake, we know--everybody knows--we don't play politics with human lives, but we did what's right and we couldn't wait. If we did, we might not have this offer a week from now after somebody was nominated. We don't know, and there may be at least 500 killed tomorrow anyway.
Now, this is the first time--they only agreed Sunday/6/ night. Monday and Tuesday we checked it out with the Soviets./6/ Wednesday we got Abrams back. And today I have acted. Now, this is the first time they would give us this assurance. So, if I were you, I would let the laurels come to me, and certainly I wouldn't crow about it or say that I've got this done because then it will look like--they are going to charge us anyway--that we are trying to act in collusion. Now, you and I know we're not. You and I know we're going to do what is right if it runs me out of the race and runs you out of the race.
/6/November 27.
/6/See Document 138.
Vice President: That's exactly right. I said last night, Mr. President, I'm not going to say one word about this, except that I'm grateful.
President: Well, now, every man there tonight said, "We back you up, Mr. President." And what I'd say if I were you, I'd say, "We can only have one voice in foreign affairs; our government has taken the position--I'm not going to undercut it; and that if I am President November 6th, the President-elect, the President has assured me and has assured Mr. Nixon and assured Mr. Wallace he wants us to come in and sit down and talk to him about it." Now there's not much you can get done between now and November 6th because that's the first day they are going to meet in Paris. In the meantime, I think it is just as well that we all say a prayer and thank God that we have moved this far.
Vice President: Let me tell you what I have said to George Christian so that--I've been sitting here in my room, I haven't left here because I didn't want to go downstairs and face anybody until I cleared everything. I would say, first of all, that if I come down people know that there's been a lot of talk around the TV and the radio, and there was some announcement that you were going to speak sometime after 8 o'clock.
President: It will be at 8 and you can tell them I told you all I was going to speak at 8--that I called you on a conference call, that I repeated to you what I had said the other day which you have known for many, many months, since the September [1967] San Antonio speech,/7/ that we would stop the bombing as soon as we could have "prompt, productive" discussions. Now we've got "prompt" discussions. They've agreed to meet November 6th. We've got "productive." They've agreed to let the government sit in with them. So that meets our standard of "productive." We said if they don't take advantage of them we'll continue. Now, we don't know whether they'll take advantage or not--you can't tell about the Communists. But we're going to give them a chance and test their good faith. If they take advantage of the DMZ and the cities, the rules of engagement have been given to Abrams and were laid out to him in a 2:30 a.m. meeting here the day before yesterday. He is to automatically respond, and we will have tested them and they will have failed. If they do act in good faith, then God help us, we make something.
/7/See footnote 6, Document 35.
Now, here's what Rusk said: "Special Notes to the Vice President/8/--Ask him to have his men say that the Vice President has been briefed as have all the candidates been given full information. Number one. Number two, suggest that he not attack other candidates on Vietnam unless the other candidates attack him unmercifully. Number three, tell the Vice President not to let his publicity people crow or take credit for his having done this. He should say that the decision was the President's, and has been in the making for many, many months. Even before he withdrew in March, the President said at San Antonio: 'prompt, productive,' and that 'they do not take advantage of'--those three words. But he, the Vice President, is joining with the President. He hopes that every American is hoping that the door is finally open to an early peace, and as far as you are concerned, whether you are President-elect or ex-Vice President, you will be in there working for peace."
/8/Rusk's notes for the President have not been found.
Now, he said that would give us--would kind of free us from the charge that we are operating for political reasons, and at the same time it will show that we treated them all alike. This is the thing, though, I told you last, oh, a month or so ago--March 31st I concluded that I've got to do this if I do anything else in my life, even keeping my family together, I've got to do this because they're out there and I just got to do it. So--
Vice President: I know it.
President: That's it. But you can say we had a conference call,/9/ and say what I talked about. Every man at the table the other day, I told them there are these three things. Now, we cannot tell the press about the DMZ and the cities because if we do they'll say that is reciprocity, and they'll start shelling them and we'll have to go back.
/9/See Document 166.
Vice President: Mr. President, I am not--the reason I wanted to--I've talked to Jim [Jones] and I've talked to George [Christian], and here was the only thing I wanted to ask you; I didn't want to say anything until after you have spoken.
President: That's all right. That's all right. What I would say is: "I don't know what the President is going to say. He told us, though, that he wanted to brief us, and he briefed us, and you'll see it at 8 o'clock and you'll get the same briefing we got."
Vice President: And I thought that after 8 o'clock what I would say is simply this: "That the President's action is an important new initiative towards peace. I fully support that initiative, and I am sure that a vast majority of the American people will support it. Let us hope that the negotiations in Paris will now move quickly and that Hanoi will negotiate in good faith."
President: Well, the only thing wrong with that is it's not our initiative. They have agreed. Clark [Clifford] wants to put this that we are testing their good faith. We made this last September. What I would try to say, if I could, is that it appears that Hanoi has been willing to agree to the prompt and productive discussions that we asked them last September to agree to.
Vice President: Now, let me just see. All right.
President: It appears that Hanoi has agreed to the prompt and productive discussions that we asked them last September to agree to. We said we'd stop the bombing if we could have "prompt and productive" discussions. Well, "prompt"--they said November 6th. That is pretty prompt. "Productive"--they've said the GVN could be there. So that's what we wanted. They said they'd never sit down with these folks. There is not nothing [sic] new about this. This is an old one. This just took them--what has happened, Hubert, they've lost 250,000 men, and so they've agreed to "prompt and productive." Now, the whole question is whether they're going to be successful or not, is whether we take advantage of them or they take advantage of us. Now, we've said that "You'll be taking advantage, you'll bust up the conference, if you shell the cities, if you abuse the DMZ."
Vice President: We are not going to say anything about that.
President: Not at all, not at all. But you can say "prompt and productive." And if they don't take advantage by doing things that oughtn't to be done, and you'll have to see whether they are taking advantage in the next few days, anybody can read the papers and see--nobody knows, I can't predict, the Joint Chiefs don't know. Our judgment is that they have already quit shelling the cities generally. They hit Saigon last night and again tonight to kind of stir us up a little. But they don't have the capability, and our judgment is that they are not abusing the DMZ much more because they are taking them out of the country instead of putting them in. But what we believe that--the correspondents--if I were you, Rusk is going to tell them in his backgrounder--say "prompt," that is the 6th, "productive," that is the GVN, "not to take advantage," well, you will just have to watch the paper and see what happens.
Vice President: On the "productive," can we say that the Government of South Vietnam--
President: Yes, yes.
Vice President: Will be in the--
President: Yes, sir, yes, sir. They agreed to it. That is what we have insisted all along--that they can come. So, it's not new on our part. It's new on their part.
Vice President: I have got you.
President: Okay.
Vice President: It appears that Hanoi has agreed to prompt and productive discussions as outlined in the San Antonio speech of September--that was the month of September. And then I can say that just simply--
President: And then say, "I hope that they do not take advantage of it. That we will have to let time tell." Now, here is what the man said about it. McConnell said--well, I told you about it. I read you what they all said. Every one of the Joint Chiefs. I have got everybody aboard, and as I understood it, every candidate tonight said we will back you. So--
Vice President: That's right.
President: So, all the Congressmen and Senators said the same thing. So, you go on and watch the television if you can at 8 o'clock, and you will get all the details.
Vice President: Now, as I go downstairs here because I have a reception, you must tell me so that I don't make a mistake. I'm going to have a lot of press down there asking me. Are we to inform them--am I to let them know, if they ask me, that there has been a conference call?
President: Yes, I think that is certainly all right. I would be candid. "Yes, the President told us the other day he would keep us informed--we would be the first to know it."
Vice President: Yes, sir.
President: "As a matter of fact, he hasn't issued his orders." Say--"he told us the other day, any developments we'd be the first to know it. He has called all of us and briefed us."
Vice President: Yes, sir.
President: "But I'm not going to make any comment until after the President speaks."
Vice President: That's right. I will say that "he has called all of us"--
President: Yes, yes.
Vice President: "But I withhold any comment until the President has spoken."
President: Yes, yes. Let me see if that is what Jim has told the others. I think that is what--just a second, let me see. Hello?
Vice President: Yes?
President: Jim says that they hadn't intended to do anything until 8 o'clock. But if you need to, what you can say is that "the President on October 15th told--let me see if that is okay--October 16th conference call at 11:41 [a.m.] that he would keep us briefed. He called us and briefed us again today, but he enjoined us to secrecy about the contents until his television speech at 8 o'clock."
Vice President: That is fine.
President: Then at 8 o'clock I'd say that "We all told the President we'd back him and we'd pray for him and that this is not a party matter--this is an American matter--and I'm glad that every candidate is for it." That way, it will keep them from attacking you for having a "fix-it" deal. This is dangerous because if they thought you and I were trying to fix something, it would hurt us. But if you take the position that you have been treated, briefed, like everybody else--
Vice President: That's exactly right.
President: That the President has to do this until the 20th and you and Nixon and Wallace all told him the other day that you hoped it'd come any minute--the first minute the better--to keep from killing boys. Now this is peace. This is just a discussion, but it looks like Hanoi has moved and we'll still have a lot of hard negotiations. You'll see that in my speech tonight.
Vice President: All right.
President: I tried to call Muriel [Humphrey]. I saw her on television yesterday morning. She was a doll. She was just wonderful. I thought your speech was good last night. I heard it. Then I had a long visit with Luci [Johnson] after she came in.
Vice President: That's sweet.
President: I think I have an awfully good one for Sunday night on nationwide TV.
Vice President: We've been talking about our programs, Mr. President. I want you to know one thing: if I can do half as good a job as you've done, if I am elected, I will be happy.
President: Well, you will do good. Have you ever seen my speech last night? You haven't seen the 15 minute TV [spot] that I did./10/
/10/The taped speech was broadcast on November 3. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 1110-1113.
Vice President: No, I didn't see it. But I will.
President: I will get you a film of it.
Vice President: I have been wanting to call you all the time.
President: Don't you do it. Don't you do it. Don't worry about me. You don't have to.
Vice President: I talk to Marvin [Watson]. I keep in touch.
President: Don't mess with me. You get people worried who are not going to vote for you.
Vice President: Well, God bless you.
President: Don't humor me.
Vice President: I think you're doing the right thing, Mr. President. Let's hope and pray it works.
President: I am trying to.
Vice President: God bless you.
169. Editorial Note
In a speech broadcast nationally at 8 p.m. on October 31, 1968, the President announced that the bombing of North Vietnam would cease at 8 a.m. Washington time on November 1. He also noted that four-party discussions could begin at the next plenary session in Paris on November 6, an occasion "at which representatives of the Government of South Vietnam are free to participate." For the full text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 1099-1103. Special Counsel Harry McPherson finished drafting the speech only that afternoon; the President recorded the final parts of it between 1:35 and 1:53 p.m. The President watched the speech with family members in the Oval Office of the White House. His Diary records: "He said it was the most important decision he had ever made. He further said he was not sure it was the right decision but was what he felt had to be done. Said he couldn't guarantee Thieu what Thieu wanted. 'I could only tell him I was taking them on faith--that the times demanded this action. This is a step toward peace.'" (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
In a press conference the following day, Secretary of State Rusk commented on the speech: "President Johnson stated clearly last night that his decision to stop the bombing of North Vietnam was based upon specific expectations that the Government of South Vietnam will participate in the discussion of an honorable peace and that the action will bring about a de-escalation of the fighting. Some governments and leading personalities have, over many months, undertaken to tell us that something good would happen if we would stop the bombing of North Vietnam. It is now incumbent upon all of those who have taken that view to make a maximum effort to insure that their advice has substance to it. We have our own reasons to believe that our action is a constructive step, will open the way to serious talks, and will not endanger our own and allied forces in the field. But we shall also be interested in what others may do to insist upon actions by Hanoi that will move us toward peace." See Department of State Bulletin, November 18, 1968, pages 520-525.
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21895.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
170-192
November 1-12, 1968: South Vietnamese Abstention From the Expanded Peace Conference; the Anna Chennault Affair
170. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 1, 1968, 0440Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 12:20 a.m.
41688. For Secretary from Ambassador Bunker.
1. After talking with you/2/ I immediately went to see President Thieu to report on my final conversation. The Vice President, Foreign Minister, and Presidential Assistant Duc were still with him.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 167.
2. I told Thieu the President would not make the announcement as originally planned for 0900 Saigon time, but would make a nationwide speech. The President had decided that he must go ahead. He had informed the three Presidential candidates who all enthusiastically endorsed the course. "The President asked me to say to you that you should not be disheartened or discouraged. He would say some very fine things about Viet Nam in his speech and he wants me to assure you that we intend to continue our firm support of your country and your government. We intend to continue to work together with you to achieve what we set out to do. We are all sorry that we could not be together on this."
3. Thieu asked me if the TCC countries had been informed of the decision, and I said they were being informed.
4. His further remarks were somewhat disjointed, and I will give them to you as he gave them to me:
A. "I cannot guess whether we will achieve the result we hoped for. Our firm purpose is to have serious talks directly with Hanoi to achieve peace and progress. The most legal right of our government is not to accept serious talks with Hanoi with the NLF as an independent entity.
B. "I never doubted the sincerity of President Johnson and the US Government not to recognize the NLF and its promise to support us in the talks. We have our own problems here. If we had gone into these talks with the NLF it would have meant the disintegration of the nation. The state must have stability, not trouble, not instability; that is our gravest concern.
C. "I am sorry I cannot join the joint announcement. I look forward to the speech of President Johnson before I make any speech to the nation. Please assure President Johnson that I will continue to have the greatest gratitude to him and the US Government. I think we have to await developments now of the situation after we see how we could proceed to find the way to peace with Hanoi."
5. To this I replied I hope we will find a way out of this situation. We are faced with a practical situation with the NLF, and that is why we proposed the our side/your side formula. It is a fact of life. The NLF is not recognized by you or us, and our whole purpose is to find a way around this problem so as to get on with serious peace talks. That is what we will try to do in the period which lies ahead./3/
/3/In telegram 41698 from Saigon, November 1, Bunker reported the verbatim account of an exchange in which Thieu charged that the United States would "not support our position that the other side is one delegation." In response, Bunker denied this statement and Berger replied: "I said that if you make this a condition for your attendance at the talks, we will not support you. But we will support you in the position that in the negotiations the other side will be treated as one delegation." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
6. Thieu asked the Vice President if he had anything to say, and he shook his head.
Bunker
171. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Robert McNamara/1/
Washington, November 1, 1968, 8:31 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and McNamara, November 1, 1968, 8:31 a.m., Tape F6810.09, PNO 6. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. A summary of this conversation is ibid. The Daily Diary described the conversation in the following manner: "congratulating the President on his speech last night, discussion of comments made by candidates." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Bob?
McNamara: Good morning, Mr. President.
President: How're you doing?
McNamara: I knew you'd be the only other person in town working this morning.
President: No, no, but we have been working, you know.
McNamara: I know it. I know it. I just wanted to call--I won't take a second, but I just wanted to call and say--
President: Please do.
McNamara: Congratulations. I think it was terrific, Mr. President./2/
/2/Reference is to the President's announcement of the bombing halt; see Document 169.
President: Well, God knows. I don't know what will come out of it. We might just really have shambles, but we had to try it.
McNamara: Well, I think you're absolutely right, and it wasn't an easy decision, and I just wanted you to know that I've been thinking of you and sending you my best wishes.
President: Old Abrams sure has worked out good, Bob.
McNamara: Oh, he's terrific, Mr. President. He's just solid as a rock.
President: He just came in here like a man, and not only said that it could be done, but urged it be done, and recommended it be done, and took the ball himself.
McNamara: Well, he's just as solid as a rock, Mr. President. I'm sure that he's with you all the way, and you can always depend on him there. In a time like this, that's the kind of a man you need.
President: What we are in trouble about, you see, are these candidates. They have been playing with them. One said he would stop the bombing--no comma, no semi-colon--period.
McNamara: Yeah.
President: So they get that and they think that if they'll wait 10 days he'll stop the bombing everything will be over with--that's what Hanoi thinks. Then Nixon comes along and his people tell them that I'm not stopping the bombing and I'm not selling you out and I'm not for letting them take you over and this crowd will sell you out just like they did China, and you better wait until I get in. Now you've got all the South Vietnamese and maybe the Koreans thinking that. The damned trouble we're going to have. We had this thing wrapped up, signed, sealed, ready to go two weeks ago, and we got this speech of stopping the bombing, period. So [Le Duc] Tho took off for Hanoi, and we couldn't get him back. Then we got this ready, and we found out that they've been playing with the South Vietnamese, and we started watching their messages. It's the damndest mess you ever saw. It's just almost--well, it's just heresy. It's just unbelievable. So we tried to get them aboard. We had a joint announcement that they agreed on with us. But then they all got to fighting and they wouldn't do it. So today, the last thing I heard, I was up late, was that Thieu said that this was entirely unilateral./3/
/3/Thieu's comment was in a communiqué issued by the GVN on November 1. A second communiqué issued by the GVN noted the lack of "any sufficiently strong reason for associating itself with the U.S. Government in this decision." In addition, in a statement that evening to journalists, Thieu noted: "South Vietnam is not a truck to be attached to a locomotive which will pull it wherever it likes." These statements are excerpted in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 6-13, 1969, pp. 23549-23550.
McNamara: Oh, really? I didn't see that.
President: Yeah. So we got a--you talk about guts, it took a lot to leave them, but Korea and--we've been watching what Korea said to South Vietnam. Korea and Thailand and South Vietnam were ready to go if South Vietnam would go. And we cleared it with everybody. But then the damned politicians got in it and started telling them to wait awhile, they'll do a lot better. And so they may stay aboard or not stay aboard, I don't know.
McNamara: Oh. I think they will, Mr. President. They're not strong enough not to stay on board.
President: That's right. But so what. Then we all come out and we've lost everything we've fought for.
McNamara: Well, that's right. I thought Thieu's statement that I read in the Times this morning didn't sound too bad. But that may have been earlier than the one you referred to.
President: Maybe, I don't know. All I--last we heard of him, poor Bunker worked for days and nights.
McNamara: How's he doing?
President: Just fine, he's just a million percent, and Abrams is just right with him. And we sent Abrams back and told him to really just tell them that this was it, and then we waited 2 or 3 days until we could try to get him aboard. Then we gave him a deadline, and then he came back to me and said well, he might go if I would guarantee to him that this would bring the war an end.
McNamara: [Laughter]
President: I told him I couldn't guarantee the Communists and I don't know what they'd do, but I had reason to believe they would. The Russians had told me they would do this. The North Vietnamese said, "Just try us and you'll see." In any event, we can't do a damned bit of good bombing now because the monsoon is on. I told him it's like I'm running a freight line from New York to Atlanta, and have a big flood and wash out all the bridges in Baltimore and Pittsburgh and New Jersey, and I can't get my trucks through, there's no use running them up there and parking them, so I just better put them all between here and Atlanta, get some extra business. And I said that's what we've got to do. We've got a lot of stuff in Laos we need to do and South Vietnam, but no use going to North Vietnam now. And, oh, he was pretty well aboard until the Nixon people got in it and I don't know what will come out of it.
McNamara: Well, you better take care of yourself. You sound like you have a bad cold.
President: I have the worst one I've ever had.
McNamara: Don't waste your time talking to me, Mr. President. I was just thinking of you and I just wanted you to know it.
President: Appreciate it, Bob. Thank you.
McNamara: Bye-bye.
172. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell/1/
November 1, 1968, 11:38 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Russell, November 1, 1968, 11:38 a.m., Tape F68.08, PNO 5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. A summary of this conversation is ibid. Johnson, in Washington, reached Russell at Winder, Georgia. The description of the meeting in the Daily Diary reads: "Asking his reaction to last night's statement. Ran through developments leading to the statement, and discussed possibilities for the future." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Russell: Yes?
President: Lyndon Johnson. How are you, Senator? Dick, how are you?
Russell: Pretty good, Mr. President. How are you?
President: Fine. I just wanted to figure out what you thought over night and what bases you thought were untouched, what your reaction was, to the statement,/2/ and what we should have said, we didn't.
/2/See Document 169.
Russell: Well, I thought you made a fine statement, Mr. President.
President: We talked to the three candidates,/3/ I think I told you.
/3/See Document 166.
Russell: Yes, sir.
President: I didn't see any of them come out in the paper and say this. I'm afraid Humphrey'll brag a little.
Russell: I thought Wallace made a magnificent statement.
President: I didn't see it. I haven't seen it.
Russell: Well, he's just--in the paper here, he said that "I couldn't care less how it affects my campaign. All other matters pale into insignificance and how it affects me or any other candidate." He said he "prays and hopes that the bombing halt ordered--that you ordered--is the beginning of the end of hostilities in Southeast Asia." He said he agreed on your action--about 6 p.m.
President: Well, that's wonderful. He's said--he made the finest statement both times we've talked to him of any of the three. He said last night, "Mr. President, I'll back you. Mr. President, I'll be praying for you every hour, and I just want you to know that."
Russell: Well, he went a little further. I just got that part here before me. He said that you're the commander in chief, none of them could question that now, and had to support you and so forth. I thought that's as far as he could go.
President: Uh--
Russell: I hadn't seen where Nixon said anything specific.
President: Nixon just said, "We'll back you." He's the first one that said it last night. And then Humphrey and Wallace followed. And then Humphrey--uh, I think Nixon is worried that he's floundering; he's fearful that it'll have some effect. And, uh, I don't think that he's quite sure--I don't think he trusts us because he doesn't trust himself. That's my judgment. I think that he's had these people engaged in this stuff. And I told all the candidates that yesterday. I said that there've been folks messing around with both sides. And speaking of Humphrey, I said, "Some folks're saying--making speeches that where Hanoi thought they could benefit by waiting. And then South Vietnam now is beginning to think they can benefit by waiting by what people're doing." So he knows that I know what he's doing. And this morning, they're trying to close it up. Some of his agents are not so active. The other side that-I noticed that one of the Embassy's refused to answer their call.
Russell: Well, do you have any idea what kind of response you're going to get out of the North Vietnamese or when it's coming, I guess?
President: They'll blast us and raise hell and keep fighting. The great danger in this for us is that they will not let up at the DMZ and they will shell the cities, in which event I'll have to go right back. I have given--I have given Creighton [Abrams], though, the rules of engagement, and he doesn't even have to come to us. And he says he's going to give them two tits for one tat. And in the meantime, he's taken every plane we've got, every bomb we've got, every man we've got, and he's putting all the firepower that he can on Laos, where it's dry and where they're coming--coming in. And there's not anything coming through North Vietnam--they're all going out now. They're pulling out. But he's going to take this same firepower and concentrate it in South Vietnam and Laos. And then, if they're not hitting the cities, and he doesn't have to defend those cities, he's going to spread out over the countryside, and try to clean them out pretty good. He was in hopes that he'd have a great psychological advantage, and he'd mount a masterful psychological warfare, saying, "Now's the time to come on in and give up. You see, they've recognized your government, they've recognized your leaders, they've got President Thieu coming to the conference table, so now's the time to give up." And he would have North Vietnam protected--the DMZ protected, he'd have his cities protected, he'd be free to turn all of his power in Laos and South Vietnam with his planes, and then he could release his men--several thousands that are protecting these places like Saigon--and really have a sweep. Now, the damn fools in Saigon, we don't know what they're going to do. Last night, they came back and made three demands on me. One was, we set no date for the conference. Well, I can't do that, because the main thing I'm getting out of this is they let GVN come to the table. That's what I've been demanding all these years, and now they've agreed to it. So I've got to have a date. And we so told--no date for the conference. Well, I can't do that, because the main thing I'm getting out of this is they let GVN come to the table. That's what I've been demanding all these years, and now they've agreed to it. So I've got to have a date. And we so told--
Russell: I thought that they already agreed they're we going to meet and talk on Wednesday./4/
/4/November 6.
President: They all agreed 2 weeks ago. And then they agreed to one day a week ago. But after Nixon's operatives got busy with them, they started playing for January. And the first statement that South Vietnam put out was that this was a unilateral action by the President. And old man Bunker stayed with them all night. They put out another one this morning that said that they hoped it would lead to peace, that you couldn't tell what if it was good, that he really didn't know whether any good would come from it or not, just wouldn't predict. Now, what he did, at the last minute--I spoke at 8 [p.m.], and I guess he came in at 7--maybe 7:15, he said he would go along and issue a joint announcement if I'd cut out the date in my speech where I said they're going to meet regularly next Wednesday, and they'd be free to be there--I didn't say they'd be there, I said they'd be free to be there. He said that if I'd eliminate that--well, I couldn't eliminate it from the tape, and I wouldn't anyway. That was the first thing. The second thing, if I would give him a guarantee that the North Vietnamese would not cross the DMZ and shell the cities. I told him I couldn't give him a Communist guarantee; that I'd tell him I had good reason to believe that they had told us that, "You stop the bombing and we'll show you, and you'll see it soon." The implication is that clearly they will. We told them that about a dozen times. And we told them the talks can't go on if they're doing either. And they won't talk. So we must, when we say, "Do you get it?", they say, "Yes, we get it." That must mean that they really understand us. Then the Russians told us--I told the Russians I really doubt it that they would live by this--by the DMZ and by the cities. And the Russians--Kosygin came back and said, "Mr. President, I can assure you your doubts are not justified."/6/ Now, I don't know. I thought I left myself plenty of running room last night. But I couldn't get--
/6/See Document 138.
Russell: You left yourself--
President: But I couldn't guarantee him--get back to him and say, "Yes, I will agree to this." I tried to play him like [John F.] Kennedy did to Kosygin. I said, "I will assure you that I have no reason to believe that they will not. No one can guarantee a Communist statement. But I have reason to believe." But he wouldn't take that.
Russell: Well, you mean, who wouldn't take it?
President: Thieu.
Russell: Yeah.
President: Thieu asked three things of me. One was I eliminate the date completely. The second thing that I give him a guarantee--
Russell: Yes, I understood those things.
President: And I've forgotten what the other one was. It's something that--
Russell: The last one that--
President: I don't remember myself, even. But--
Russell: Of course, you couldn't agree to either one of those. He'll be there, though. I don't mean he'll be there, but his representative will be there.
President: He's making a big speech tonight--9 o'clock--to all of his [National] Assembly./6/ And I'm worried about Pak [Chung-hee] too because all these people out there get awfully exercised. Every damn one of them cleared this 2 weeks ago, but after they think they can get a better deal--
/6/See footnote 4, Document 178.
Russell: That's right.
President: They all get independence, you know, after you do. But we may have to start back bombing, or we may not get any more. But I think this ought to put the cap on the climax--every son-of-a-bitch that says, "Stop the bombing, it'll be lovely," they got a chance to see now. And I don't believe we're going to lose anything 'cause I asked Abrams this question, "Can he assure me?" In August he told me they would increase their capability five-fold if we stop the bombing and he'd have to move his men out of the I Corps." "Now," I said, "this is October/November. Can you assure that if we stop the bombing that it will not result in increased casualties?" He said, "I most certainly can." He said, "First place, I hadn't got anybody north of Danang. Second place, they can't get anybody down there without violating any rules where I'd be back bombing again. The damn roads are so bad, and 22 inches of rain in 24 hours, all that kind of stuff, and not 2 days a month that we can get through," and so on and so forth. And he said, "He's whipped, and he's been whipped since September, your people just don't know it." But he said he knows it. And Westmoreland says identically the same thing and Palmer says the same thing. Do you feel that--or do you know enough about it?
Russell: I don't know enough about it to evaluate that.
President: I wish you did.
Russell: I didn't seem to think so, and--
President: I wish you'd come up here. You can sit around and let them show you where they've got their divisions, and where they've moved, and what's happened--see what the hell you think about it. Are you going to come back before the first of the year?
Russell: Yes, sir, I'll be there before the first of the year. Yeah.
President: First time you do, you make Palmer and Westmoreland sit down with you, and Buzz Wheeler, and see just what they've done. They claim they've got less than 75,000 North Vietnamese left--that they've moved 40 or 50 [thousand] of them out.
Russell: Well, they said that the other day, though.
President: Yes. That's right.
Russell: I mean, Westmoreland said that.
President: That's right. They're still moving them out. And Westmoreland is just as cocky as you are that you know how to make a point of order--he's just as sure that they've had 'em whipped since September. He said it's over.
Russell: He repeated that a couple times there the other day.
President: Did you think that we were weak in any point on our statement--we left anything that ought to be--
Russell: I think that when you consider what you had to go on, it was a fine statement. You couldn't make them any guarantees, just like you couldn't tell that fellow in South Vietnam that you promised that there'd be no shelling, no activities, in the DMZ.
President: Where do you think I'm weak? What do you think my danger is?
Russell: I don't--the only danger I see at the present is purely from an historical standpoint and has no relation to the present day. That is, a big flare-up, say, on election day, of bombing Saigon, Hue, and all those other places, and shooting torpedoes in there, and they get active in the DMZ, you're going to have to hit them. And then you'll be accused of this being a purely political maneuver. That's all that I can see. But from a standpoint of just day-to-day, I--I think that you have closed all the holes up awfully well.
President: I think that if these three candidates take the position that they do what they could--that we can keep it out of politics altogether--if every damn one of them say, "I support it."
Russell: I think that's true, because there ain't going to be much of any--there ain't gonna be no politics after next Tuesday, except the recriminations and the funeral services and all that.
[Omitted here is discussion of domestic politics.]
173. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and James Rowe/1/
November 1, 1968, 1:58 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rowe, November 1, 1968, 1:58 p.m., Tape F6811.01, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. A summary of this conversation is ibid. Johnson, in Washington, reached Rowe at Peoria, Illinois, where he was campaigning with Humphrey. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Jim?
Rowe: Yes, Mr. President.
President: I don't want anybody to know that I called you if I can avoid it because it just leads to a lot of complications.
Rowe: I think only your Secret Service people know.
President: You just speak on your own now, and not quoting me or implying otherwise. You just keep the candidate from mentioning Vietnam until Tuesday/2/ night.
/2/November 5.
Rowe: Yeah. He isn't talking about it anyway.
President: This is the most explosive thing you have ever touched in your life. And his statement that he would stop the bombing of Vietnam, period, North Vietnam, period, no comma, no semi-colon/3/--it took us 2 weeks to get around that one.
/3/See Document 40.
Rowe: Mm-hmm.
President: Then Mac Bundy's./4/ Then you know he said he would veto Thieu. That got Thieu mad. Now, Nixon picked up that ball right quick and started going right into them through your China Lobby friend.
/4/See Document 63.
Rowe: Mm-hmm.
President: So he is in deep telling Thieu and them and Korea and all of them not to go along with me on anything because Humphrey said here that he wouldn't pay a damn bit of attention to them, and so what they better do is wait for him and he'll never sell them out, that he'll stay with them. Hell, he didn't think we ought to have sold out China.
Rowe: Yes.
President: And they got your little friend, Mrs. Chennault, and the whole outfit is working in it.
Rowe: Working at it?
President: Yes, working at it. So, as a result, we had them signed up when Hubert made his last statement about the veto--not--going to stop bombing, no comma, no semi-colon, just period. That is, without any condition.
Rowe: Yes.
President: Well, we worked on it 2 weeks and we got them back on the ship again. And in the meantime, Nixon got them off. So, I had to proceed unilaterally last night, which I don't want to because it could be shambles if President Thieu said tonight he is pulling his army out. You see, then we would just have to come home and it is all over. And it's just so delicate. Now all the reporters are saying that Humphrey is being very jubilant and very enthusiastic, and all the aides are saying that this is the difference in the election. Now, if you do, and you are going to get a political issue out of it, and you are going to have these folks--they're getting them answering--you got Hickenlooper and Tower and all the Republicans. And what I would say is just please bar him from mentioning Vietnam.
Rowe: I'll get that done.
President: If I had to have one statement, I'd just say like--like Nixon and Wallace and every other American, I pray for peace every night, period. That's all I would say. I'll do the rest of it if they'll just not be enthusiastic and jubilant and so forth, because if we had to order them back to bombing tomorrow--
Rowe: We're in the soup. That's right.
President: So I just wanted you to know the facts. Now, you have to act on your own judgment.
Rowe: Yes, I will get it done. But let me make this one point. Our staff people--
President: Rusk is just scared to death. He wrote me a memo in longhand/6/ which I read to Hubert and said tell him not to open his damn mouth.
/6/Not found but summarized in Document 168.
Rowe: Yes. We've got about 150 press and every one of them are on everybody's back. One thing we did do is we had a staff meeting and said, "Play this thing down--you don't know anything." They are only asking us one question--"What is the political effect?" We just say we don't know. And when they press too hard, I say I haven't heard anybody make a comment about it except Arthur Schlesinger./6/ Did you see him on the "Today" show?
/6/Former Special Assistant to the President, 1961-1964.
President: No, no, no.
Rowe: Well, he was on this morning. And the first question was, "Are there any politics in this?" And, in his usual way, he said, "While I have had many differences with President Johnson, this is obviously not political." And I said that is the only comment I have heard on the politics of this, and we don't know. And the local politicians are in it, but one thing we can't control is the local "pols," is the--say, I think it is helpful, even there they're saying they don't know how much. Our people aren't saying anything except we don't know, and sticking to that pretty damn closely. Maybe some of them are breaking it, but I don't think so, and I'll go around and lecture them again.
President: I just--it is for your good. It is not--I am not going to get any votes Tuesday. But I just know, and Rusk knows, and Clifford knows, and we have two real explosive things. One, if Hanoi invades the DMZ or hits the cities, we are going back in a minute. Just--they trigger the motion. Abrams has got his orders. So, that could leave you pretty dry if you're very jubilant about this move. The second thing is we do not know where our allies are because as a result of the statement 2 weeks ago, we've lost Thieu.
Rowe: Yeah.
President: Because he thinks that we will sell him out, and Nixon has convinced him, and this damn little old woman, Mrs. Chennault, she's been in on it.
Rowe: Yes. I wouldn't doubt it.
President: Well, I know it. Hell, I know it. I'm not doubting it.
Rowe: Do you want me to get Tommy/7/ to pull her out?
/7/Thomas Corcoran, Washington lawyer, prominent Democratic Party insider, and social escort of Anna Chennault.
President: I don't know. I don't care now. I've already done it. I took the action at 8 o'clock last night, and they've pulled the planes out. Now, we have to wait and see what they do. If they--we can tell them 48 hours--if they don't do anything, it will be very evident we had a deal and it worked.
Rowe: Yeah.
President: If they do do it, then we are in trouble. But I have just got a letter here from Clifford./8/ He is relieved. He said, "Mr. President, there have been times without number in the past 5 years when I have admired you for your fortitude and determination and very unique effectiveness. As of this moment, however, I feel it more deeply than ever before. Your performance on the Vietnam cessation has been magnificent. It was handled with courage, with rare distinction, and the most admirable statesmanship. I was aware of the myriad difficulties that confronted you and I drew comfort and inspiration from the masterful manner in which you met and overcame all of them. I have a profound sense of pride in your performance and in your success." Now--
/8/Clifford's letter, dated November 1, is in the Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Correspondence: President [1].
Rowe: Well, you're hearing this, for what it's worth, you're hearing this kind of comment on the street. It ought to please you. They are saying that this guy's been tough. We think he must be getting us a good, tough deal. They are saying, "By God, he's been holding them." That's the man on the street talking.
President: If we get it, we've got three things. They said they'd never sit with these puppets. Now they have said they would. That's number one. Number two, we told them there's no use coming to the room if they either bomb the cities or abuse the DMZ. Now, if they don't do either, we have got these two. If they do do them, we are right back where we started.
Rowe: Mm-hmm.
President: Now, we are gambling on the latter. We don't know. The Russians tell us they'll be all right. We've told them twelve times. But I just have a hell of a problem between two candidates and Averell. Averell cusses the generals everyday. And, of course, everything--they pick it up and their Ambassador wires their President and says, "Harriman said today you are a bunch of puppet generals." So, of course, if you were President and you had a million men out there and you were losing twice as many as the United States, how would you feel about that?
Rowe: Yeah. Mm-hmm.
President: Then, the next day here comes a flash. Humphrey says you'd never veto anything he does. So Nixon just picked that one up and went out the same night and said, "By God, I won't veto you. We'll work closely together." So then this guy quit me and went to Nixon.
Rowe: Yes.
President: Now, Bunker has worked all night for the last two nights trying to clean this thing up. And so I told Hubert last night in the long-hand note that Rusk has written which I will show you someday in my memoirs--let you have a copy of it. Rusk said tell Hubert not to brag, please not to be exuberant. Just say I pray for peace. Period. And what the others--they will know what it does if we don't jump up and down about it.
Rowe: Yes.
President: So you watch that.
Rowe: I will. I think his line has been pretty much, "This is the President, the President is handling this," and so forth. The only time he had any jubilation was a little on the plane, and I am afraid a couple of the pool reporters saw him in the back.
President: They described him as going up and down the plane being jubilant and exuberant. And, of course, that just puts the John Towers--let me show you what they're saying about it. It's a good excuse for them.
Rowe: That was the only mistake. Publicly, he didn't make any. But the pool fellows saw him doing it.
President: Here is LeMay. He's talking about the politics of it. General Walt--he's put his mouth in it. "One of Nixon's key advisers and a military expert called for further explanation from Johnson. Tower said Johnson's announcement unconditional cessation raised several questions. He is a member of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee. Nixon has consistently supported the President's efforts in Paris, but he added that bombing announcement raised questions concerning what the United States received. Very recently Abrams said the unconditional cessation would let the enemy increase his capability. I believe it is incumbent upon the President to assure America immediately the circumstances have changed--that General Abrams' contention is no longer valid. 'I think some explanation should be given to the timing of his announcement,' the Senator said. 'Everyone hopes the bombing halt would lead to peace. Let us be hopeful there will be some reciprocal gesture. It should be adequately understood by the American people that this unilateral action on the part of America to refrain from the bombing has not ended so far.'"
Rowe: Yeah. The only real problem we have got that you can handle is that the reporters come off these planes for the rallies--they don't pay a bit of attention to Humphrey. These just start looking for local politicians they know. They don't trust the staff people. They all tell them the same thing. They realize this is a line now.
President: You know better than I do. All I know are the facts on two things. I want you to know the Asian allies may dump us any minute. If we do, we've got pandemonium. The second thing--that Hanoi might not go through with it. That's the second thing. The third thing--I think that he could very properly say, and you all could say, is all three candidates said the same thing to the President: "We will back you." This is not any politics. All of them said "We will back you." And that is all there is to say.
Rowe: Yeah. He said yesterday, after the call, you know, what you had already said--I mean you hadn't, but you would say later--that we had a conference call. We had one on October 16th./9/ The President informed us. He informed us again.
/9/See Document 80.
President: That was good.
Rowe: And then they started to pursue and he said: "That's all." He said: "That's all we know--is what he told the three candidates."
President: What he ought to do now is--
Rowe: He's doing quite well except that one thing you have got there. You know, he just--he happened to make a good speech and a good crowd. And this thing occurred, and he just thought--he just got a little jubilant about it.
President: You just tell him on your own, just don't mention Vietnam and what he does. Just use two things. Say all of us said they would back the President, as every American ought to, because if you have them all backing, that helps him.
Rowe: That is right.
President: That we all--all candidates told him, each one of them--Wallace, Nixon, Humphrey--we'd back you up on this. Number one. All the Joint Chiefs of Staff backed him up.
Rowe: We ought to say that?
President: Yes. I don't know how public. I don't think in a public speech. But I'd tell everybody that asks me, and then I wouldn't go any further because I would say: "I don't want to comment any further."
Rowe: Yeah.
President: And if I were you and the strategists around him, say: "I don't know what effect it has. I think the effect is when Johnson withdrew in March." I just think that--because they are going to see if history says we threw an election.
Rowe: That's right. Now let me give you this one other thing the press is saying that you can put in your press back there. There's some kind of rumor you are going to Texas on the 3d, and they are saying, "Is he going to do it?" And I say, "I don't know." And they say, "Is he up on the mountain as President or is that old campaign spirit of his coming out?" Well, I said, "I think he can do both, you know."
President: Well, I am going home this afternoon in the next hour,/10/ and I'm going to make a television speech Sunday night that I worked on a week here, and that is going to be my finale.
/10/The President left for his Texas Ranch at 3:36 p.m. that day, remaining until his return to Washington on November 7. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
Rowe: You're not going to do the Houston [campaign rally]?
President: No, no. I told them--
Rowe: I think it might be helpful with all this churning around that that can sort of--that he, you know, the President, is too busy with this problem--he can't get to Houston. He's going to make a television speech--he's not going to turn up at that big rally, or something like that.
President: Yes. I went on the network night before last and on radio the night before that, and I just don't want to be doing it every night as a kind of barn-stormer. I just think it loses a good deal of the effect./11/ Okay.
/11/The President did in fact make a speech at the Democratic Party Rally at the Houston Astrodome on November 3. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 1107-1110.
Rowe: All right, sir. Thank you.
174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France and Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 1, 1968, 1813Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Priority; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Read.
265246/Todel 1445. For Harriman and Vance from the Secretary. For Bunker from the Secretary. The President wants to be sure that all of us understand that we must now give highest priority to close and friendly working relationships with the South Vietnamese. They are our allies, they have been subjected to a brutal invasion, and they and we have shared great sacrifices in men and treasure. If there is to be peace in Southeast Asia, the full rights of South Viet-Nam and Laos must be respected. The South Vietnamese have some problems in maintaining reasonable unity after so much violence, several coups, and religious, regional and other differences. We must help them just as much as we can as staunch allies and not let unnecessary gaps open up between us.
With the cessation of the bombing we are now in a position to insist upon the most simple and fundamental demands we have to make upon the North Vietnamese. They must stop their aggression. We can no longer accept any sensitivities on their side about such words as "reciprocity," "conditions" and other such nonsense. They must liquidate their aggression in South Viet-Nam and Laos. The fact that they have sent men with guns in hand into South Viet-Nam gives them no basis on which to make demands about the internal political structure of South Viet-Nam any more than we would support South Vietnamese demands for changes in the political structure of North Viet-Nam. The time has come for us to be tough with Hanoi and deal with our friends in Saigon with the utmost consideration and understanding.
Rusk
175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 1, 1968, 1951Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Rostow, Katzenbach, and Read; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance as Todel 1447.
265320. Notify Ambassador Bunker not later that 0700 and Ambassador Berger not later that 0600 of receipt of this cable and its importance.
1. While we are not wholly clear here whether Thieu and others have been having second thoughts after their marathon session with you and the last-minute failure to achieve agreement on the joint announcement, we wish to give you every possible ammunition to prevent Thieu from taking unwise positions in his speech tomorrow and to insure that the GVN goes ahead to participate in Paris on reasonable ground rules that simply insure no distortion of the basic understandings we have with the North Vietnamese.
2. Accordingly, we have expressed our thoughts in the form of a letter from the President to Thieu. This letter may be used entirely as you see fit, as an oral message, or with such editing, addition, and amendment as you think would make it most effective, advising us subsequently what you have done.
3. The text is:
November 1, 1968
Dear President Thieu:
I know these days have been difficult for you. A major turn in the road is always complex in the political life of democratic societies. But I do believe that, as we take stock this morning, we have every reason to go forward together with hope and confidence.
I understand Ambassador Bunker has conveyed to you my assurances of continued strong support as well as specific assurances with respect to the way the negotiations in Paris will be handled.
I am sure that when you saw the text of what I said to our people last night, you knew that I had much in mind the interest of your people and the political problems you face.
I trust that you will make every effort now--in public and in the work between our two governments--to narrow and to eliminate whatever gap there may be between us so that we can go forward as brothers in arms in Paris, as we have been so long in Vietnam.
You should know that in these weeks no comment or piece of advice rendered to me was wiser than our observation to Ambassador Bunker when he and General Abrams in October went over with you those proposed instructions to Harriman. As I remember, you said this: "After all, the problem is not to stop the bombing but to stop the war. And we must try this path to see if they are serious." It was in that spirit that I spoke last night. It is in that spirit of hope, tempered by caution, that I trust we shall shortly move forward together in Paris.
I know that in these difficult but also hopeful times I can count on your statesmanship and your courage.
(Signed) LBJ End Text
Rusk
176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 1, 1968, 2314Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Bundy and cleared by Read. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance as Todel 1452.
265600. 1. Bui Diem asked to see Bundy this afternoon our time. He had no instructions, and no information other than the fact he himself was making no comment whatever to newsmen, and was letting the GVN statements in Saigon speak for themselves. (Press evidence is that he was telling the truth.)
2. Bundy took the occasion to run over the story of events during the day and night of Thursday,/2/ and the basic problems that had prevented final agreement on a joint announcement. Bundy said that President Thieu's insistence that the judgment on de-escalation be that of President Johnson alone would not have caused significant difficulty here, provided it had been stated in the form of "good reason to believe." However, we had not been able to agree to language that would have suggested that we did not have a firm date in mind for the Paris meetings, or that might have been taken to indicate that major "procedural" problems remained to be resolved.
/2/October 31.
3. Bui Diem and Bundy agreed that the problem now was not the past, but what position the GVN would take toward the Paris talks. Bundy noted that preliminary talks on procedure might begin at any time in Paris between us and the North Vietnamese. He then said that, in terms of Thieu's speech tomorrow morning in Saigon,/3/ and of other GVN actions, there were three fundamental points with which the speech and actions must be consistent and affirmative:
/3/See footnote 4, Document 178.
a. That the GVN would in fact participate in the Paris meetings as set up.
b. That the meetings should convene on November 6 or at most a day or so after.
c. That, while we could of course work very closely together with the GVN on genuinely procedural problems such as number and type of seats, name plates, etc., we could not expect to delay the first Paris meeting, or dig ourselves in, on any proposition that in effect reopened the whole understanding on participation. This related particularly to any effort to get Hanoi to say expressly that it would talk to the GVN, or that the NLF were simply members of the DRV delegation. It was hopeless to expect acceptance of either of these two points, and the US Government could not delay the meeting on their account.
4. Summing up, Bundy said that Bui Diem was free to report these three points to Saigon as Bundy statements, based on the central judgment that American public sympathy for the GVN would be sharply eroded if the GVN failed to cooperate along these essentially agreed lines. Bundy also suggested that Bui Diem might wish to add his own judgment of the effect on public opinion of GVN failure to act in this way, and Bui Diem pretty clearly implied that he agreed with what Bundy had said.
Rusk
177. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/
Washington, November 1, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips & Missions, Paris Peace Talks, Nodis for Harriman/Vance, HARVAN Plus: Cables Outgoing, #54-91. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Rusk met with Dobrynin from 5:15 p.m. to 5:35 p.m. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969)
Ambassador Dobrynin came in to give me the attached unofficial translation of his own of a letter to the President from Chairman Kosygin. An official translation of the Russian original is now being prepared.
I called his attention to the use of the phrase "bombings and other military actions against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam" in the first paragraph and told him of the significance of the distinction we drew between the phrase "bombing and all other acts of war" and "bombing and other acts involving the use of force." He asked if the Hanoi delegation understood the significance of this in relation to reconnaissance and I said that they did. He merely said that he thought that the wording of Mr. Kosygin's letter was not intended to convey anything specific on that point.
I told him I would want to see him early next week to have a full talk about where we go following the cessation of bombing. I emphasized the great importance of respect of the DMZ and the absence of attack on the cities and he said he thought that everyone was quite clear about those points. He added "you have certainly made that clear in Moscow."
DR
Attachment
Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/2/
Moscow, October 31, 1968.
/2/No classification marking.
Dear Mr. President:
My colleagues and I have received with satisfaction the news that an agreement has been reached at the Paris talks on the cessation of bombing and other military actions by the United States against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and about the commencement during the next few days of political negotiations with the participation of representatives of DRV, NFLSV, US and the Saigon administration in order to seek a peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem.
We are deeply convinced that a great deed has been done (and) an important step taken in the right direction.
We have frequently and frankly expressed our view, and among others to you personally, about the unpromising attempts to solve the Vietnamese problem by force of arms. Presently, when finally a decision has been made by the United States to stop military actions against DRV, it seems to us that there are grounds to hope that other aspects, too, of this problem will find their solution on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and aspirations of the Vietnamese people.
As we see it, it is very important for the success of the forthcoming political negotiations with the participation of the four sides to show the necessary endurance and composure in order that any incidentally occurring moments do not complicate the attainment of the said goal. In this connection we were glad to note the assurances contained in your letter dated October 31, 1968,/3/ that the USA will in good faith strive to conduct negotiations about the political settlement in Vietnam. There is no doubt that the cessation of the still continuing bloodshed in South Vietnam on the basis of mutually acceptable decisions would be received with relief by the people of the world and the role of those whose actions have allowed to reach this positive result would be properly appreciated not only today but also in the future.
/3/Document 164.
We would like to think that this course of events in Vietnam, namely, the complete end of the war there, giving the Vietnamese people the opportunity to solve for themselves their internal problems would have a very positive effect also on the relations between our two countries. We have always believed and do believe that the relations between the Soviet Union and the USA should be determined by long term, fundamental interests in the cause of strengthening peace and cooperation between all peoples. We hope that you, Mr. President, also hold the same point of view.
Respectfully,
A. Kosygin/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
178. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 2, 1968, 0345Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 11:18 p.m. on November 1. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
41746. Ref: State 265320./2/
/2/Document 175.
1. President Thieu refused to see me despite urgent messages and attempts to reach him personally by telephone. I was told that he had closeted himself in his private apartment in Independence Palace and did not wish to be disturbed. A message did come back to talk to the Foreign Minister.
2. Although this was obviously unsatisfactory I immediately called on the Foreign Minister and in the briefest terms told him that I had a message from the President and that it was imperative that I see President Thieu before he made his address to Parliament at 10 o'clock. I summarized a talking paper prepared for my interview with Thieu and finally persuaded Thanh to try to penetrate the barrier around the President. I gave him a copy of my talking notes (see septel)./3/ I followed Thanh's car to the Palace.
/3/In his talking paper, transmitted in telegram 41753 from Saigon, November 2, Bunker again made the point that the North Vietnamese would never admit that the DRV and the NLF were the same. This paper closed with the following points: "Victory is now within our grasp, both in the fighting which lies ahead in the South and at the conference table. I beg you not to throw away victory. I plead with you not to say anything in your speech that will cause American support of the war to be further reduced. I urge you not to say anything which will make this more difficult. If the American people have any feeling that you fear Hanoi and the NLF, it will shake their confidence in the situation here. The American people will never understand your failure to take part." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. V)
3. Thanh took my talking paper and said he would use it to make the principal points himself to the President after which he would try to have me asked in. We (myself, Berger and Herz) waited until 10:15 when Thanh emerged and said he had failed in his attempt to see Thieu but had managed to give the talking paper to Thieu's brother, Nguyen Van Kieu, who had taken it to the President.
4. Thanh assured me at the same time that he knew the President's speech would be moderate and inoffensive, etc. I did manage to impress Thanh before he went into the Palace that the critical point concerned what the President would say about the other side having to be one delegation.
5. I said if Thieu would say that the GVN would treat the other side as one delegation, he could add that the US had given assurances that it would do the same. On the other hand, if he said that Hanoi must acknowledge that its side is only one delegation, this would in effect mean "closing the door" to GVN participation and could have the disastrous consequences against which I had intended personally to warn Thieu.
6. Under the circumstances outlined above it was not possible to deliver the President's letter to Thieu before he made his speech./4/ I had of course expected Thanh to open the way for me to talk with the President personally before he made the speech.
/4/The President's letter was transmitted in Document 175. In Thieu's November 2 speech to the National Assembly, he imposed conditions upon South Vietnamese attendance at the expanded peace talks, insisting especially that his government would not send a representative to a peace conference if the NLF participated as a separate delegation. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 6-13, 1969, p. 23550.
Bunker
179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Thailand, Australia, the Philippines, Korea, and New Zealand/1/
Washington, November 2, 1968, 0658Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Priority; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Bundy and cleared by Director of the Executive Secretariat Staff Jeanne Davis. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1459 and to Saigon.
266087. 1. This is interim guidance for your handling of the Thieu speech in Saigon today./2/ We are anxious at all costs to avoid public or private expressions of support for Thieu's position from TCC countries, and we leave it to your discretion whether initiative is necessary to head off this possibility.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 178.
2. Essentially, Thieu has now surfaced the matters that in the end prevented agreement on a joint announcement Thursday night, our time./3/ He wished us at that time to agree that if Hanoi did not give express assurances that it would deal directly with the GVN, and that the NLF would be present only as part of the Hanoi delegation, the new Paris meetings would not get underway. The first of these two points is now explicit in Thieu's speech, and the second seems to be implied in Thieu's third point.
/3/October 31.
3. We have given the GVN clear assurances, in writing, that the practical situation, including the fact that the GVN plays a leading role, makes it inevitable that Hanoi will be talking to the RVN--Hanoi has over and over again assured us that it will talk seriously, and it cannot do this without talking to the RVN. At the same time, we have pointed out again and again to the GVN that Hanoi will never give an express assurance to this fact, at least without demanding that either we or the GVN, or both, give a parallel assurance that we will talk directly with the NLF. We gain by letting the practical situation speak for itself. We would only lose in an exchange of express assurances. This point has been clear in our discussions with the GVN over weeks and months, and it has been clear (by silence) in our talks with Hanoi. Although we are not unwilling to do so, we think it would be fruitless to raise this question with Hanoi at this stage, and we most certainly are not prepared to make this a condition for going ahead with the talks.
4. Precisely the same considerations apply to any effort to get Hanoi to admit that the NLF is part of its delegation only. The way that we have handled this with our talks with Hanoi is to make absolutely clear that the GVN will be a separate delegation from the US delegation. At the same time, we have deliberately refrained from even raising the question whether the NLF will be a separate delegation from Hanoi. This leaves the way clear for us to join with the GVN in treating the other side as a single side--that of Hanoi--but it is perfectly clear that, if we do ask for assurance, Hanoi will say categorically that the NLF is a separate delegation and we will be stuck with it or forced to make this a condition--which would upset the whole formula on which we and the GVN have been in accord for months.
5. It is not wholly clear whether Thieu's reference to ruses to elevate the NLF goes as far as the point just discussed. Insofar as it refers to devices (such as Hanoi leaving the room) to force us to address the NLF as such, or as an independent entity, we have again given the GVN clear assurance that, in the event of any such ruses or maneuvers, we would at once consult with them with a view to action (including termination of the meeting) which would make clear that such tactics could not continue. In other words, this point is buttoned down so far as it relates to ruses./4/
/4/In telegram 266088 to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Seoul, and Wellington, November 2, the Department noted that "Thieu's speech does not demand explicit assurance from Hanoi that the NLF is present only as a part of the Hanoi delegation." It stressed that the DRV delegation could bring with it to the table NLF representatives as part of its side but that "we do not regard the NLF as anything but a tool of Hanoi and in no sense an entity independent of North Vietnam." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968)
6. The second of Thieu's points--about the direct talks constituting a "completely new phase" is of much lesser difficulty and importance. In our earlier agreements with the GVN on a joint announcement, we had agreed to refer to the next phase as simply "Paris meetings on the substance of a peaceful settlement", or words to that effect. They had in mind, and we accepted, that this was a new designation designed to show a new phase. At the same time, we have strenuously opposed such terms as "four-party-conference" and have been leery even of the term "conference", which tends to elevate those present and especially the NLF. In any event, we have no doubt that the world press will christen the meeting what it chooses and that the sense of that christening will be in the direction of "a completely new phase". Indeed, this has already taken place for practical purposes, in large part, and we will certainly do nothing to discourage it.
7. In short, Thieu's key points are an effort to reopen matters that have long been understood as being left deliberately vague, so that the practical situation could be developed to our common advantage.
8. In any conversations you may have, you should be as discreet as possible to avoid any impression of US pressure. Moreover, you should refrain from any public comment whatever and take your cue from what is said here. Our general posture should be that these matters can and will be ironed out between ourselves and the GVN, so that the meetings will go ahead in the general manner contemplated./6/
/6/In telegram 41752 from Saigon, November 2, the Embassy recommended against GVN participation in the preliminary talks on procedure since, in light of Thieu's speech, "their participation would mean the instant precipitation of 'Three-Power' vs. 'Four-Power' issue, which would only make it more difficult to obtain the initial procedural arrangements that are so important for them." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. V) In telegram 266086 to Paris, November 2, the Department concurred in the recommendation against GVN participation in the procedural talks and instructed Vance to meet again with Lau on November 2. (Ibid.) In telegram 23320 from Paris, November 2, Harriman reported that Vance had postponed the first procedural meeting with Lau until the following day. (Ibid.) See also footnote 2, Document 182.
Rusk
180. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, November 2, 1968, 9 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2]. No classification marking. This meeting was a regular meeting of Clifford's "0830 Group" of senior Defense Department officials. There is no list of participants.
CMC . . . goes to Saigon situation analysis of Thieu--CMC reviews, SVN--He can't understand why Thieu is so double-crossing & walks away from our agreement.
Nitze says it's clear as day! Thieu is scared that Humphrey & Democrats will force a coalition on him & the Republicans won't & he's sure this is an LBJ plot at the dying hours of the Admins.
CMC argues at length (to convince himself) that we are right & that Thieu has no basis for double-crossing LBJ & walking away from the agreed-upon position of S.V.Nam participation at Paris.
Nitze keeps trying--in vain--to get CMC to see that there is a
rational explanation for Thieu's behavior.
Nitze pointed out the fact that their prior agreement probably didn't mean anything, because they never thought Hanoi would agree to their going to Paris anyway & so it was lip service.
(The longer CMC talks the madder he gets at S.V.Nam--he's disgusted & ready to dump SVNam. "Screw You" is all he says he'd tell them.)
CMC now gets blunt--Max Taylor & Rusk & Rostow have an enormous personal stake in seeing a "beautiful democracy" there; they're committed so to SVNam they'd let Saigon run the whole show for us.
At Kay Graham's house last night Reston, Geyelin, Joe Kraft, Joe Alsop/2/ tried to get CMC to describe the ultimate "political settlement". He said that's their (SVN's) job; we're interested only in getting war over with.
/2/Publisher of the Washington Post Katharine Graham, The New York Times columnist James Reston, reporter Philip Geyelin of the Washington Post, syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft, and syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop.
We all agree that S.V.Nam attitude will change after next Wed./3/ election results are in.
/3/November 6.
CMC:
"I do not believe we ought to be in V Nam
"I think our being there is a mistake
"This demonstrates to me why I think it was a calamity"
Nitze--I thought it was a mistake in 65 & I said so, but that's irrelevant history. But we are there & we have had 29,000 men killed & we have a military success & now I don't want to throw it away by angry, ill-chosen reactions!
Long philosophical discourse CMC + PHN re why we're there & what kind of an outcome.
PHN says he thinks we can negotiate North V Nam out of S.V.Nam.
CMC disgusted, he says, with it all.
[Omitted here is discussion of arms sales to Israel.]
181. Editorial Note
At 9:18 p.m. on November 2, 1968, President Johnson telephoned Senator Everett Dirksen. The Daily Diary records that "Secy. Clifford suggested the President call Sen. Dirksen re stories going around that Nixon people spreading rumors to wait on peace negotiations." (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) The President explained to Dirksen that he had called him because "we're skirting on dangerous ground, and I thought I ought to give you the facts and you ought to pass them on if you choose. If you don't, why then I will a little later." He emphasized that several times during mid and late October Thieu had agreed to the bombing halt understanding, but pointed out to Dirksen that actions on the Republican side had impacted upon the negotiations: "Then we got some of our friends involved, some of it your old China crowd, and here's the latest information we got. The [FBI] agent says that she's--they've just talked to the 'boss' in New Mexico, and he says that 'you must hold out'--just hold on until after the election. Now, we know what Thieu is saying to them out there. We're pretty well-informed on both ends. Nixon's man traveling with him today said quote 'that he did not understand that Thieu was not aboard.'"
Johnson stressed that he had requested that both Dirksen and Nixon have Republican supporters cease their overtures to the South Vietnamese Government. "Now, I'm reading their hand, Everett," Johnson noted. "I don't want this to get in the campaign. And they oughtn't to be doing this. This is treason." He criticized Republicans like Bryce Harlow for making the public statement: "We had the impression that all the diplomatic ducks were in a row," a statement that implied a political motive on the administration's part. The conversation continued:
"President: Now I can identify them because I know who's doing this. I don't want to identify it. I think it would shock America if a principal candidate was playing with a source like this on a matter this important. I don't want to do that. But if they're going to put this kind of stuff out, they ought to know that we know what they're doing. I know who they're talking to and I know what they're saying. And my judgment is that Nixon ought to play it just like he has all along, that I want to see peace come the first day we can, that it's not going to affect the election one way or the other. The conference is not even going to be held until after the election. They have stopped shelling the cities. They have stopped going across the DMZ. We've had 24 hours of relative peace. Now, if Nixon keeps the South Vietnamese away from the conference, well, that's going to be his responsibility. Up to this point, that's why they're not there. I had them signed on board until this happened.
"Dirksen: Yeah, OK.
"President: Well, now, what do you think we ought to do about it?
"Dirksen: Well, I better get in touch with him, I think, and tell him about it.
"President: I think you better tell him that his people are saying to these folks that they oughtn't to go through with this meeting. Now if they don't go through with the meeting, it's not going to be me that's hurt. I think it's going to be whoever is elected, and may be--my guess--him. And I think they're making a very serious mistake, and I don't want to say this, and you're the only one I'm going to say it to.
"The conversation concluded:
"President: I know this--that they're contacting a foreign power in the middle of a war.
"Dirksen: That's a mistake.
"President: And it's a damn bad mistake. Now I don't want to say so, and you're the only man I have confidence in to tell them. But you better tell them they better quit playing with it. And the day after the election I'll sit down with all of you and try to work it out and be helpful. But they oughtn't to knock out this conference.
"Dirksen: Whoever they are, I'll try to get ahold of them tonight.
"President: Well, there are two things they ought to do. One is--they ought to stop this business about trying to keep the conference from taking place. It takes place the day after the election. The second thing is--we can all sit down and talk about it after that time. And I'm not a bitter partisan here. You know it.
"Dirksen: I know. Well, I'll try to find them, wherever they are tonight.
"President: Well, you just tell them their people are messing around in this thing, and if they don't want it on the front pages, they better quit it, number one. Number two, they--we better sit down and talk about it as soon as this thing is over with, and we'll try to work it out. And they ought to tell their people that are contacting these embassies to go on with the conference.
"Dirksen: Right.
"President: OK.
"Dirksen: I agree.
"President: OK. Bye."
This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, November 2, 1968, 9:29 p.m., Tape F68.09, PNO 1)
In a note to the President, November 2, 5:55 p.m., Special Assistant Jim Jones noted that Secretary of State Rusk believed that the press should be given a background briefing on the China Lobby's interference as the reason for the uncertainty regarding South Vietnamese participation at the Paris conference. He also recorded the view of Special Assistant Walt Rostow:
"Walt's opinion is that: a) there should be a press backgrounder tonight; b) then if the story is played significantly tomorrow, Mansfield and Dirksen should be brought in and shown all the evidence we have concerning Saigon playing the U.S. political game; and that someone in the Nixon entourage (but not accuse Nixon himself) is playing with South Vietnam. Mansfield and Dirksen should be told this is a most serious national and constitutional problem and both Senators should be asked to go to Nixon and urge him not to press forward saying he was misled by the President. They should tell Nixon that if he does press forward in this, then he will reveal the evidence which will destroy him and any effectiveness he would have if he's elected. His first duty is to tell Saigon to get their delegation to Paris as fast as possible." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [2 of 3])
182. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 2, 1968, 2020Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 4:17 p.m. Repeated to Paris.
41743. Ref: Paris 23320./2/
/2/In telegram 23320/Delto 916 from Paris, November 2, the delegation noted that it had postponed that day's meeting on procedural arrangements between Vance and Lau in order to note and receive guidance on the matters to be discussed at that meeting. Paragraph 7 of the telegram read: "As we have pointed out, physical arrangements for a procedural meeting should be simpler to arrange. If it is to be a plenary meeting we have two choices: (A) to attempt to hammer out the physical arrangements directly with Lau, or (B) to suggest that we work through the French to establish physical arrangements in a manner acceptable to both sides. This was the procedure used at the opening of the Official Conversations." (Ibid.)
1. The GVN has made it a point, especially during the last ("marathon") session October 31/November 1,/3/ that they want to be included in discussions of procedures. However, they also made it clear that the reason they wanted to discuss "ground rules" was that they wished to establish that the NLF is to be considered part of the DRV delegation.
/3/See Documents 159, 162, 165, and 170.
2. They have told us that they will not come to the substantive meetings until there is agreement on procedures. Therefore, it seems to us that it is to our advantage as well as theirs if we can work out the procedural matters with Lau or through the French, and without them, as long as we do so along the lines of the desiderata that we have established in our discussions with the GVN during the last weeks.
3. However, we think we should not hold the first meeting of the "direct and serious talks" without clearly giving the GVN an opportunity to participate. Accordingly, while we have no objection to bilateral talks with the DRV about procedural matters, we urge that the date for the "first meeting" on November 6 be postponed.
4. Our difficulty with having the first meeting appointing a committee to draw up the rules of procedure is that when we tell the GVN what we plan and invite them, they may protest the inclusion of the NLF and not come; or they may come and inject into that meeting their demands that Hanoi admit they are one delegation, and withdraw when Hanoi refuses, only making matters worse. However, we must at all costs invite them to such a procedural meeting, even though this may happen. Otherwise they will charge that in our negotiations here we were opposed to having them come to our preliminary discussion of procedure with Hanoi, yet we were prepared to enter into discussions of procedure with the NLF. We must avoid being put into this position.
5. In view of the negotiating record, which shows a DRV preference for a later plenary meeting, we think it should be possible to persuade them to accept their own erstwhile position with respect to a later date. If they press us, we can simply say that we are not prepared to meet November 6 because the GVN is not yet ready. This has additional merit of being the simple truth.
6. It is of course imperative that there be no flags and name plates on the tables. If in the judgment of our delegation this is better accomplished by working through the French, then we favor the suggestion in paragraph 7(B). The GVN is exceedingly nervous about the press being at the first meeting, and if arrangements can be made to rule this out, it would be helpful here.
Bunker
183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, November 3, 1968, 0710Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Bundy and cleared by Rostow, Katzenbach, and Dirk Gleysteen of S/S. Repeated to Saigon.
266151/Todel 1466.
1. The parallelogram of forces set up by Paris 23327 and Saigon 41765/2/ leaves little doubt of the answer in terms of Sunday/3/ meeting.
/2/In telegram 23327/Delto 922 from Paris, November 3, Harriman and Vance suggested that the tentative November 6 meeting proceed strictly on procedural matters "if the GVN cannot be brought on board by that time." In telegram 41765 from Saigon, November 3, Bunker noted his concurrence "that we should propose to Lau a bilateral meeting on procedures," but recommended that "if this fails I don't think we need to fix a date for a meeting including the NLF." (Both in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. V)
/3/November 3.
2. Paris should propose that a bilateral meeting be held on Wednesday to discuss the procedures applicable to substantive meetings in the new format. Any broader meeting for any purpose should be postponed on the simple and true ground that we are not ready. We should propose that the bilateral meeting be in the smaller format used in May, but you have latitude for whatever size and level you think most effective.
3. In terms of arguments, there seem to us to be many:
a. Hanoi agreed to bilateral talks on procedure.
b. Even these turn out to be complex and require careful review of existing rules.
c. The agreement on a substantive meeting was not earlier than the 6th, as Xuan Thuy has now affirmed.
d. The GVN is not ready (and, as reports from Saigon make clear, the last-minute mortaring of Saigon did contribute to the atmosphere there on going along at once).
4. On the question of including the DMZ, you should make clear, as Saigon suggests, that an additional purpose of bilaterals at this time is to review exactly what is going on in SVN. You should make clear that the DMZ is a subject on which we could nail down what both sides are doing and how to be sure of it, and on a bilateral basis--but without pressing for an agenda item, so to speak, for Wednesday.
5. One purpose in raising this general subject and establishing its legitimacy (or at least our intent to keep it up), and doing so on the basis of the DMZ (in addition to the latter being a clear Hanoi responsibility and least a GVN one), is that we are reluctant here to adopt Saigon's suggestion of hitting them at this meeting on the mortaring of My Tho, Vinh Long, and Quang Tri. The question of whether these are "major cities" within the meaning of our understandings is one on which we need further research and exchanges with Paris in any event; it may be that the record, and what the GVN understands, are both internally inconsistent and at variance with each other, and that we have some hard thinking to do. But even if these cases are within the understandings, the feeling here is that we should be acting and not bellyaching, if we really know our minds.
6. If Lau should fail to accept a bilateral meeting on procedure for Wednesday, you should say that you must urgently seek instructions. But you should give him the toughest possible time, for it seems difficult to see how he can legitimately refuse, even though he may do some taunting at our delay after our earlier insistence on speed and the GVN. As Saigon notes, that is inherent in the hand at this point, and adherence to the letter of what we had in mind in the last stages of the private talks is viewed here as wholly secondary to taking our time to bring Saigon aboard, along the lines of the strategy stated in Saigon 41738./4/
/4/In telegram 41738 from Saigon, November 2, the Embassy recommended various steps that might compel the GVN to attend the expanded peace conference. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968)
Rusk
184. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, November 3, 1968, 2000Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. V. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 3:42 p.m. Repeated to Saigon.
23330/Delto 923. From Vance.
1. I met with Ha Van Lau and Nguyen Minh Vy at our place in Secaux for two hours afternoon November 3. Habib and Negroponte accompanied me. They had an interpreter and notetaker on their side./2/
/2/Rostow transmitted a summary of this meeting in telegram CAP 82664 to the President, November 3, which was received in the LBJ Ranch Communications Center at 12:55 p.m.
2. I said that we were meeting to consider the next steps and we had a practical suggestion which we would like to outline. In order to approach the problem of arrangements and procedures in an orderly fashion, I proposed that Lau and I meet next Wednesday, November 6, at 10:30 at the Majestic Hotel accompanied by any of our advisors that we need. We could then discuss arrangements and rules of procedure which will be applicable to the substantive meetings which will be held in the new format. I said our meeting on Wednesday should be a working session in which we exchange views on various questions of arrangements and procedure in an effort to reach agreement. I asked for Lau's response to my proposal.
3. Lau said that before commenting on our suggestion he was authorized by Minister Xuan Thuy to express the DRV's views about President Johnson's October 31 speech./3/ Lau said that as it had been previously agreed, the President would at such-and-such a time issue the order to stop all air, naval and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the entire territory of the DRV. But, Lau said, the President's speech did not contain such a sentence as had been agreed upon and, therefore, the President's statement was not fully consistent with the agreement which had been reached.
/3/See Document 169.
4. Secondly, Lau said, in regard to the date of a meeting for the four delegations, the DRV side noted that the President's statement was not consistent with our agreement. We no doubt recalled that at our last private meeting the US representative had made the proposal that the first meeting of the four representatives be held not before November 6. Therefore, the date of the meeting had not been agreed upon and, at that same meeting, Vance and Lau had made an appointment for November 2 to fix a date for the first meeting. Thus, the date of November 6 had not yet been fixed and yet, Lau said, the President fixed it unilaterally in his speech. This Lau said, was another element of the President's speech which was not consistent with our agreement. Lau said it was regrettable that the President had announced a date without agreement of the DRV side and it was on this basis that he came to discuss with me today the holding of a meeting on November 6./4/
/4/In a note to the President, November 4, 10:20 a.m., Jones wrote: "Walt Rostow reports on your question--we acted unilaterally with the DRV. He says we did not clear November 6 with the Hanoi delegation in Paris. We went to that date because Bunker said we should give Thieu a little more time than three days. Rusk and others, based on the history of the negotiations, said we could do this because we had been crowding Hanoi to three days. Therefore, we presumed the additional time would be agreeable to Hanoi." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [1 of 3])
5. Lau said that as far as he understood it our meeting today was to discuss how the first meeting with four delegations will be held on November 6. As for the procedures of this conference, that will be decided by the meeting of the four delegations. At this point Lau noted parenthetically that the DRV side understood the forthcoming meetings between the DRV, the NLF, the US and the GVN would be a conference, although whether we use the word "meeting" or "conference," it made no difference to the DRV.
6. Therefore, Lau said, my suggestion of today had surprised him a little because he found it inconsistent with the agreement we had reached the other day. Lau said that the purpose of today's meeting was to discuss at what time the four-delegation meeting would take place on Wednesday, what the formalities would be, how the delegations would take the floor and so forth. As for rules of procedures, that would be discussed and agreed upon by the four delegations.
7. Why, asked Lau, did he have such an understanding? It was because the DRV had agreed that after the cessation of bombing we would shift into a new phase of negotiations in which a conference to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem would take place with the participation of representatives of the DRV, NLF, US and RVN. Therefore, Lau said, the DRV side believes that at the November 6 meeting the representatives of the four above-mentioned participants should be present. Lau said he knew that the NLF representative would be in Paris before November 6. It was possible that full delegations of the NLF and the RVN might not reach Paris in time. Therefore, the representatives would be present to discuss procedures of the conference. Lau said that the representative of the NLF will be Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, a member of the NLF Central Committee.
8. Therefore, Lau continued, the time of the meeting was to be fixed here today between us. As for the date and the participants, President Johnson had already mentioned them in his speech. Lau said he thought the whole world is now looking forward to such a meeting and, as far as the DRV side was concerned, it was prepared to carry out its agreement. As far as Lau knew, the NLF was also prepared to do the same. Lau said he had finished and at my request we recessed briefly.
9. Upon resuming, I said that I would first like to deal with the two points that Lau had made regarding the President's speech. The order issued provided for the cessation of all bombardments and all other acts involving the use of force against the entire territory of the DRV. That order was issued at the time we said it would be and that those actions became fully effective within 12 hours of the order, as we had said they would be. The important fact is that the order was issued and there is no inconsistency between what the President said and that order.
10. As far as a naming of the date for the meeting, I agreed that we still have to come to an agreement on this subject. At the time of the President's announcement, it was assumed that the date was reasonable for all concerned. Now it appears that the representatives of the GVN cannot make that date. In that connection, the indiscriminate rocketing of Saigon on November 1 complicated the problem, making it difficult for the GVN to come along promptly. Therefore, to proceed with the necessary matters, I had made the suggestion outlined above.
11. The suggestion I had made was not inconsistent with our agreement of the other day, because we both recognized at that time that we would have to make the necessary arrangements for that meeting to be held in an orderly manner. These are complex matters requiring full consideration and necessary consultation. We think these matters can be handled efficiently in the same manner as the beginning of our official conversations. This is properly something that the DRV and US sides should do. As I recalled our previous conversation, the DRV side recognized the need for full consideration and discussion of the manner in which the first meeting would be conducted. And by "full discussion" I meant discussion between the US and DRV.
12. I said that a matter which we might also usefully discuss Wednesday would be the state of affairs along the DMZ. It would be helpful to know what each side is doing there so as to avoid any misunderstanding or incidents. Therefore, I suggested again that Lau accept the proposal that I had outlined at the beginning of our meeting this afternoon.
13. In response, Lau said that the DRV side had taken note of Harriman's and my communication on October 31/6/ regarding the order to be issued by the President. The DRV side recognizes that this order has been issued and carried out. But whether it is effective over the entire territory of the DRV has not yet been confirmed. As for the inconsistency, Lau said that he was referring to the wording used by the President in his speech. The President had only mentioned the order to stop all air, naval and artillery bombardment. Therefore the DRV side maintained its remark regarding the inconsistency between the President's announcement and our agreement. Whether the order of the President has been realized in accordance with the agreement, this cannot be affirmed now, Lau said. He would have to await a report from the DRV. The DRV was following the situation closely.
/6/See Document 158.
14. Lau remarked that I agreed with him that the date of the first meeting should be agreed upon between us. Lau said that since the President had named a date, the DRV accepted it. However, according to what I had said, it appeared that the representative of the Saigon government cannot come in time, and I had mentioned the rocket attack against Saigon as the reason. This question Lau said is related to the NLF. Lau said he did not feel this question was the substance of our discussion today and, as for the rocketing of Saigon, he did not feel that this was the reason for the Saigon representatives being unable to come to Paris in time.
15. Lau said that he was prepared to discuss with us the matters regarding the convening of the first meeting, but he would like to say that our proposal is not consistent with our agreement that the four delegations would meet on November 6. Lau then said that he would like us to tell him formally whether we can have a meeting with the four representatives on November 6 and, if not, when could such a meeting be held? He said he would like to repeat that he was prepared to discuss the manner of holding the first meeting, but that procedures for the conference should be discussed by the four delegations.
16. Lau said he agreed with me that the problem has its complexities and it is necessary to have full discussions and considerations, but the full discussions should be by the four delegations. Lau said he thought that if the four representatives and all parties concerned had good will he believed we could come to agreement on procedural questions. If the representatives of the Saigon administration can come here November 6 he saw no problem.
17. Lau then said he had the following concrete procedural proposals that the two of us could discuss. He proposed that we discuss what we shall do at the first meeting of the four representatives, how each side would take the floor regarding procedural matters, and the order in which they would take it. On May 13 when the official conversations began, it was a simple matter because there were only two delegations. But now there were four delegations and the order in which they spoke should be discussed. It was not a very important matter, but there should be agreement in advance so that the meeting would be orderly and disciplined.
18. Next, Lau said, was the question of physical arrangements. How many people would be in each delegation and what would be the seating, so that we can propose to the host government that it make the necessary arrangements. We should also think about the question of press representatives attending the meeting. These Lau said are practical questions we could discuss today and come to an agreement. If the others concerned come and agree, then we can begin. Lau proposed that we begin the discussion and that if we could not finish today, then we could continue tomorrow. In any event, we should reach agreement before November 6.
19. I said I had some preliminary comments. First, I wanted to ask whether Lau had any information that the orders issued by the President had not been complied with. Lau said that he had no word that it had not, but, as he had said, he could not confirm this now because he had not yet had any report from Hanoi.
20. I then said that the representatives of the GVN simply would not be able to get here by November 6. I said that as I had previously said the rocketing of Saigon had complicated the problem and made it difficult for the GVN representatives to come along promptly. I said we still believed the appropriate place and time of discussion of the matters Lau had just listed would be at the meeting on Wednesday between Lau and myself and any advisors we wished to have in the same form as we had followed at the outset of our official conversations.
21. I said that, without abandoning that position, I would listen to any suggestions Lau had regarding the items he had listed and how his side would organize itself.
22. Lau replied that first of all, if we insisted on the proposal we had made at the outset, then the DRV side feels that it is not consistent with our agreement, that is to say, that a meeting of four delegations will be held to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem and the first meeting will deal with items such as procedure and agenda. In the spirit of that agreement, Lau said he would like to await the arrival of all four delegations and then discuss these matters.
23. Lau said he remembered that we had told him at previous meetings that we would like to have prompt meetings and that the DRV representative was already in Paris. As for the full delegation of the Saigon administration, it could come later because it needed time to make the necessary arrangements. In that spirit, the DRV side had accepted that the NLF representative come to Paris first to discuss procedural items pending the arrival of the full NLF delegation. Lau said that he understood that the full-fledged Saigon delegation may be late, but a GVN representative was already in Paris and, therefore, there was no problem if we have to meet immediately. Moreover, Lau said, he would like to recall that at our last private meeting we had said that we were good for our word and that we would do what we promised. Lau said he hoped we would keep our word.
24. As for the first meeting, Lau said that he would propose that we inform him of what date it could be held if that date was not November 6. At that meeting will be present the NLF, the RVN and our two delegations. As for procedures, each side may express its views as a basis for discussion, because each side has the right to make proposals on what the procedures should be.
25. As for the location of the meeting, Lau suggested that for the first meeting we propose to the French Government that it let us use the largest conference room in the Majestic. Lau said he also proposed that we allow the press 10 or 15 minutes at the beginning of the first meeting to take photographs, and have correspondents present, as had been done on May 13. Lau said the DRV side had received many requests from the press to do this. The foregoing, Lau said, were his preliminary views.
26. I said that I wanted to point out first that the important thing was that all bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the entire territory of the DRV have stopped. We said this would happen and it did, and at the time we said it would.
27. Second, we have run into complexities regarding the first meeting. These complexities are matters beyond our control. On matters over which we have control, we have complied with our word. I then suggested that we recess again briefly.
28. Upon resuming, I said I would like to summarize the situation. Before we can hold the first meeting in an orderly manner, both sides recognize the necessity of reaching agreement on arrangements and procedures for that meeting. It is further agreed that these matters should be discussed between us. This is precisely what we proposed to do in an orderly manner in a meeting between us at the Majestic on November 6. These matters can be appropriately discussed in such a meeting under regular circumstances. Regarding Lau's suggestions, I said I had taken note of them and would be in touch with him and I asked that he do the same regarding our suggestions.
29. Lau said that he had provisionally come to the conclusion that we can not yet hold the first meeting as agreed on November 6, that is to say, a meeting including the representatives of the DRV, NLF, the US and the RVN. The reason for this is the complexities beyond the control of the US.
30. Lau said it was necessary to prepare for the first meeting, that discussion between our two delegations be held and for this reason he had come to meet us today. Now we were making a new proposal. Lau said he would report it to Xuan Thuy and he would get in touch with us.
31. I concluded by saying that for the purpose of clarity, as of today I can not say that the representatives of the GVN will be present November 6 because of the complexities to which I had referred.
32. Comment follows septel./6/
/6/Document 185.
Harriman
185. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, November 3, 1968, 2000Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. V. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 4:05 p.m. Repeated to Saigon.
23331/Delto 924. From Harriman and Vance. Following is our comment on today's meeting between Vance and Lau:/2/
/2/See Document 184.
1. As we see it, there are two practical alternatives:
A. Go forward on November 6th as stated in the President's October 31 statement, with the GVN free to attend if they want to come;
B. Ask for a postponement of the November 6th date to a date certain and be prepared to go forward on that day whether or not the GVN is present. We note that it is not certain that the DRV will accept a proposal which does not include the GVN, although we believe they probably will.
2. The DRV made clear that it will continue to reject the proposal we made today, quoting back our own words that we wanted prompt and serious talks, and that they are ready to proceed on November 6th. They will add, as they did today, that they are prepared to discuss with us in informal bilateral meetings the necessary arrangements and procedures for the first meeting and reach agreement, subject to ratification by NLF and GVN. They said today that if we came to such agreement, the other parties could have no objection.
Harriman
186. Editorial Note
In a conversation beginning at 1:25 p.m. on November 3, 1968, Senator George Smathers and President Johnson discussed Republican actions relating to the Paris negotiations. Smathers noted that he had heard from Republican Presidential candidate Richard Nixon on the issue. He told the President that Nixon was concerned that "you were getting ready to charge him with the accusation that he connived with John Tower and Anna Chennault to bring about the action of the Saigon government not participating." Nixon insisted that "this was first not supported by the truth, and secondly, unfair, and thirdly, unfortunate." In fact, Nixon vowed to offer to Johnson "his full cooperation, and he would offer to go to any place that you might want him to go" to bring about a successful resolution of the impasse at Paris. "The problem is not his traveling somewhere," the President countered. "The problem is the people on both sides of this fence getting the impression that they can get a little more for the house if they'll wait a week to sell it." He allowed that the September 30 speech by Vice President Humphrey had seemingly encouraged North Vietnamese intransigence. "But," Johnson noted, "the former Vice President, his folks get into it, and they say that they know how to deal with these Communists, and they're not going to be soft on them, and if they're elected, they'll see it right on through with them, and that they'll get a whole lot better deal with Nixon than they will with Johnson."
The President insisted that he had proof of Republican involvement with the South Vietnamese Government. He had "started personally watching the traffic" and intercepted telegrams revealed that the South Vietnamese were being told "that Nixon is going to win; therefore, they ought to wait on Nixon." Johnson observed: "So what he's doing--my judgment is--he was--on the surface he was playing that he didn't want to undercut me. Under the table, his people--and this I think you can tell him for sure, there's no doubt about it--his people, A--business-wise, and B--political-wise, were saying that you ought to wait on Dick. Now, that's got it pretty well screwed up. . . . And my judgment is we'll have to wait until Wednesday [November 6], and if he, instead of traveling, all he's got to do is just go back through the same sources and tell them, 'You go on, I'm gonna support the President, and you better get on to that damn conference, because these people are not going to support you if you refuse to even go talk when you've got a chance to.' . . . I may be wrong, but I don't believe the people of America will support me or Nixon or anybody else if these generals out there won't talk when we got them recognized."
Johnson also contended that Nixon had used individuals from his campaign staff to insinuate publicly that the administration was playing politics with the bombing cessation. While Nixon always denied these charges, in Johnson's mind the damage had already been done. "And that's dirty pool because I have told him everything and been very frank and honest with him," he noted. The President had secured a firm commitment of support from all three of the leading Presidential candidates on October 31. Consequently, he believed that the actions of the Republicans violated Nixon's assurances.
Smathers offered both an explanation for the situation and a defense for Nixon. "You seem to think--your people think--that Tower and Chennault have made these contacts," he explained. "But he [Nixon] said he doesn't know whether they have or they haven't. He doesn't think that they have. But he said that he didn't think they had more influence than Bunker and that Bunker should be able to keep everything straight, and that as far as he was concerned, that finished it." But the President countered: "They want to wait for him, because he will never be soft on the Communists, and I am. . . . That's the point." The President insisted that he knew "that the South Vietnamese have gotten the word that Nixon feels that it's better to wait on him, and I know their President has taken that and reversed himself. . . . Now, it's that simple." But Smathers assured him that Nixon guaranteed that he "had been playing it straight and he wanted you to know that he was still playing it straight." The President responded: "Well, you tell him that what I wanted done, I want it just the way it's always been, as you discussed with me some time before, and as some of his other friends have. He's got to keep his Finches and his Lairds and his Chennaults and the rest of them from running around and messing up this broth. And it's messed up--there's no question about that." Smathers replied: "Well, I'll pass this word back to him, that, goddamnit, you had it set, and that someone--his people--are screwing it up." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Smathers, November 3, 1968, 1:25 p.m., Tape F68.09, PNO 2-3; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)
187. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Richard Nixon/1/
November 3, 1968, 1:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Nixon, November 3, 1968, 1:54 p.m., Tape F6811.01, PNO 7. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Nixon called from Los Angeles to the President at his Texas Ranch. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Hello?
Nixon: Mr. President?
President: Yes?
Nixon: This is Dick Nixon.
President: Yes, Dick.
Nixon: I just wanted you to know that I got a report from Everett Dirksen with regard to your call,/2/ and I just went on "Meet the Press," and I said that--on "Meet the Press"--that I had given you my personal assurance that I would do everything possible to cooperate both before the election and, if elected, after the election, and that if you felt, and if the Secretary of State felt, that anything would be useful that I could do, that I would do it, that I felt Saigon should come to the conference table, that if you felt it was necessary to go there, or to go to Paris, either one. I just wanted you to know that I feel very, very strongly about this, and any rumblings around about somebody trying to sabotage the Saigon government's attitude certainly--certainly have no--absolutely no credibility, as far as I am concerned.
/2/See Document 181.
President: That's--I'm very happy to hear that, Dick, because that is taking place.
Nixon: No, I--
President: Now here is the history of it. I didn't want to call you, but I wanted you--
Nixon: That China Lobby thing is something that--
President: I wanted you to know what happened. The UPI ran a story, quoting, I guess it was [Robert] Finch, [who] said "a highly placed aide to Nixon today said the South Vietnamese decision to boycott the Paris talks did not jibe with the assurances given the major Presidential candidates by Johnson." Then it says, "Nixon said the advisor felt that Saigon's refusal to attend the expanded negotiations could jeopardize the military and diplomatic situation in Vietnam and domestically reflect the credibility of the administration's action to halt the bombing of North Vietnam."/3/ Now, I went back--I want to give you the dates of these things. This has been going on, as I told you before, since June, on this three-point basis. Number one, that they take the GVN into the conference, and two and three, that they not shell the cities and that they not abuse the DMZ.
/3/For text of Finch's November 3 comment, see The New York Times, November 4, 1968.
Nixon: Right.
President: We knew we could never get them to agree to it. You asked me one time, "Do they have to agree to all three?" And I said, "I don't want to put it that way, but they have to know that if they do it, that we'll resume the bombing." Now, I don't know what led to this, but in the early part of October, they came in and said, "Now, if we would let the GVN come in, would you need anything else? What else would you need?" We, of course, we came back with these other points. They ran off, then, to Hanoi. I thought it was because they had heard some speeches made in this country that indicated that that was to their interest, and that they just wouldn't take it up. I told you that, in effect, in the October 15 [sic] talk--these three points./4/
/4/See Document 80.
Nixon: That's right.
President: Now, the other day, we had talked--we had talked to Thieu on October 13 and stressed that we had to have these points, and he agreed./6/ On October 15 we reviewed it with him again. And he balked at a 36-hour period between stopping the bombing and the conference. On October 23 he agreed to a 3-day delay./6/ On October 28 we agreed to the communiqué--that we would both make a joint announcement--
/6/See Document 64.
/6/See Document 114.
Nixon: Right.
President: When and if we could clear it with them--get them signed on./7/ Then the traffic goes out that Nixon will do better by you. Now, that goes to Thieu. I didn't say, as I said to you the other day, I didn't say that it was with your knowledge. I hope it wasn't.
/7/See Document 136.
Nixon: [Laughter] As a matter of fact, I'm not privy to what you were doing, of course. The whole point is this. I think one thing we have to understand here is this. You know and I know that within the hawk-dove complex out there, as there is here, and that everybody is saying, now after the election, what will happen. And, of course, there is some thought that Hanoi would rather deal now than deal later.
President: Oh, yes.
Nixon: They think Nixon will be tougher, and I understand that. That's one of the reasons you felt you had to go forward with the pause. But the point I'm making is this. My God, I would never do anything to encourage Hanoi--I mean Saigon--not to come to the table, because basically that was what you got out of the bombing pause. Good God, we want them over in Paris. We've got to get them to Paris, or you can't have a peace.
President: Well, I think that if you take that position, you're on very, very sound ground, and--
Nixon: That's what I said.
President: And I think it's very much in the interest of your--
Nixon: I said that the major thing that the President insisted upon and got was the right of Saigon to be at that conference table, and they must be at the conference table, and I believe they should be, and that's why I said, I just felt, I felt I ought to emphasize it. Nobody knows who is going to win this, but if I do, I said, if I'm President-elect, I personally pledge to President Johnson I would do anything. And I want to amplify that by--emphasize it--by saying that I will do, if he and Secretary Rusk indicate that my presence in Paris, or Saigon--and incidentally, I want you to know that I'll do that, I'll go out there and talk to Thieu if it's necessary.
President: Well, I think--
Nixon: Or whatever you want.
President: My judgment is, now, that from what I see and hear, that--let me read you what I said to you the other day,/8/ because apparently, I don't know whether you remember it or not: "While this was going on," talking of these moves on these three points, "we had gone out and talked to all of our allied countries, and they had tentatively agreed. Now, since that time, with our campaign going on here, we have had some minor problems develop. First, there have been some speeches that we ought to withdraw troops, or that we should stop the bombing without obtaining anything in return."
/8/See Document 169.
Nixon: I remember that.
President: "Or, some of our folks, including some of the old China Lobby, are going around and implying to some of the folks that they might get a better deal out of somebody that was not involved in this. Now that's made it difficult on me, and it's slowed things down some. I know that none of you candidates are responsible for it because I'm looking at what you said to me when we talked last October 15." [sic] Now, that's what I said. And I thought the Finch remark was very much out of place, saying that I had left a wrong impression, because, I thought, and I think now, that Thieu will come to the conference. But I had a firm agreement with him two or three times on the joint communiqué and everything else until he got this word. When I talked to you, I still thought that we could get him, and I think we can. But I tell you, we had problems.
Nixon: That was the impression I had when the three of us talked--the impression I had when you talked to the three of us--that you were confident he was going to come, you know, that Thieu was going to come, and of course, that was what the backgrounder in Washington indicated, too. And I just assumed he would come.
President: Well, we knew we had problems, Dick.
Nixon: You still think he's going to come?
President: Well, we don't see what else he can do. If we stay together, we just think that no people are going to support an effort where a man will not talk to anybody.
Nixon: Well, one thing I said, and I thought you would be interested in this. I made the point, which I feel very strongly about--let's suppose I win. Now, all right, then you've got Johnson and Nixon. I pointed out that I have stood fairly close to you, as I said in answers to Larry Spivak./9/ I said I have disagreed with the conduct of the war, but I agree that, and I use those terms, that I think President Johnson has got a bad rap on terms of the commitment; that we're there to try to stop aggression and avoid another war. And I said--then I went on to say--I said the critical period could be the 60 days before the inauguration. And at that point, if we can present a united front, the--it seems to me that we might make the breakthrough that couldn't be made later. And I honestly believe that.
/9/Moderator of the interview program "Meet the Press."
President: Yes, I--
Nixon: These people, I think you will agree, well, I think you've told me earlier, that these people over in Hanoi, to a certain extent, hold on because they think we're divided in this country. Now, once we've had an election, and you have, if it's Nixon, and you have a Republican, and Johnson, a Democrat, it seems to me that's an awful, awful strong case.
President: Yes, Dick--
Nixon: I just want you to know that I'm not trying to interfere with your conduct of it. I'll only do what you and Rusk want me to do. But I'll do anything--
President: Well, that's good, Dick.
Nixon: Because anything--we've got to get this damn war over with. I also want you to know this. I said to our mutual friend George [Smathers] today--I'm going down to Florida after the election, and I really feel this, and I feel this very deeply--that I think you've got the bad rap on this thing. I think the war apparently now is about where it could be brought to an end. And if we get it down now, fine, that's what we ought to do. The quicker the better, and the hell with the political credit. Believe me, that's the way I feel.
President: Well, that's fine, Dick, and we'll talk about it right after. I don't think they're going to do anything now. The important thing is for your people not to tell the South Vietnamese. If they tell them just what you tell me, why it'll be the best for all concerned.
Nixon: I said publicly, on "Meet the Press" today, I said, look, and that's the only thing, I don't talk to anybody else, I said publicly, I said that South Vietnam ought to come to the conference table, and if the President feels that I can be helpful in getting them to come, I'll go there.
President: That's fine. You tell brother Finch that I told all of you the other day that we did have problems with these folks, and just what I said, because I didn't mislead you. I told you that we had--
Nixon: You didn't mislead me. I told the press today that I felt that--I got the impression that they were coming.
President: We want them to come, and hope they'll come, and really believe they'll come. I just don't think they can. But I--
Nixon: It's really a question of when they'll come.
President: That's right. I said, "Now, this has made it difficult and it has slowed things down a bit." I don't--I know that none of you candidates are responsible for it, because I'm looking at the transcript. And then I said--the Vice President said, when I asked for comments, "Thanks much." Mr. Nixon said, "Well, as you know, this is consistent with my position. I made it very clear. I'll make no statements to undercut the negotiations. So we--I will stay right on that and hope that this thing works out." Then Mr. Wallace said, "Mr. President, that's my position all along. You've stated and I agree with you that we shouldn't play politics so it might foul up the negotiations."
Nixon: Incidentally, Wallace has been very good on that.
President: Yes he has. Both of you. I gave you the three quotes.
Nixon: LeMay has popped off, but Wallace has been good.
President: Well, I didn't want--when he said, "Nixon, said the senior advisor, felt that Saigon's refusal to attend would jeopardize the diplomatic situation and reflect the credibility of the Administration's action--"
Nixon: That's his point of view.
President: That his "highly-placed aide said the South Vietnamese decision to boycott did not jibe with the President's assurances."
Nixon: I'd hit that right in the nose today. Herb Kaplow of NBC asked me the question. I wish you could have seen the program, because most of them thought it was pretty good.
President: Good. Good, Dick. Well, you just--
Nixon: Good gosh, you've got people on your own staff over there that don't, you know--George Ball and some of those guys are saying these God-awful things.
President: Well, George Ball is not on my staff. [Laughter]
Nixon: You know what I mean.
President: But what I've got, I've got both sides. Hanoi will look at one statement and the South Vietnamese will look at the other. You just see that your people don't tell the South Vietnamese that they're going to get any better deal out of the U.S. Government than a conference.
Nixon: Yeah, and also, we've got to make sure that Hanoi knows they're not going to get a better deal.
President: That's exactly right, and I'm doing that.
Nixon: And the main thing that we want to have is a good, strong personal understanding. I mean, after all, I trust you on this, and I've told everybody that. And that once this thing is over, there's nothing I would rather do, if I win the election, than to do anything that you think we have to do.
President: Dick, you noticed--you must--you must have noticed that when we proposed the date, the date was not November 2, as suggested, but November 6--
Nixon: Yeah, yeah, I know.
President: Before any meeting occurs.
Nixon: Yeah. Incidentally--
President: Smathers understands that.
Nixon: I visited Austin for the first time, and it's a beautiful city, I must say. We spoke in that new auditorium, the circular thing, and I didn't get over to your [Presidential] Library. That's where your Library is?
President: We haven't got it built yet, but you have to come. We're just starting on it.
Nixon: You talked about it. Oh, you're building it now?
President: We're building it now.
Nixon: But in Austin?
President: Yes.
Nixon: I see, I see.
President: Well, I'll be in touch with you after Tuesday./10/ And you see that your people that are talking to these folks make clear your position.
/10/November 5.
Nixon: You understand, of course, that this business--some of Humphrey's people have been gleeful. They said the bombing pause was going to help them, and so forth, etcetera, and our people say it hurts.
President: I'll tell you what I say. I say it doesn't affect the election one way or the other, because--
Nixon: I don't think it does.
President: I've asked all the candidates to please support me, and the other day all three of them said, and you led it off, but all three of them said, "We'll back you, Mr. President."
Nixon: Right.
President: So, I say it ought not affect the election and I don't think it will change one vote.
Nixon: Well, anyway, we'll have fun.
President: Thank you, Dick.
Nixon: Goodbye.
188. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary Rusk/1/
November 3, 1968, 2:18 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, November 3, 1968, 2:18 p.m., Tape F6811.01, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. A summary of this conversation is ibid. Johnson called Rusk, who was in Washington, from his Texas Ranch. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: [I told Dirksen] generally that Nixon ought to tell his people to quit sending word out; that it'd be better for him; and he ought to just stay with the position he's taken all along. He said Nixon very distressed by what I told Dirksen about this China Lobby. I read him what I had said to Nixon the other day, and also told him that what this fellow Finch--Lieutenant Governor--had quoted Nixon as saying he'd been misled.
Rusk: Right.
President: So Nixon called me--I told Dirksen that last night and Smathers that at noon today--and Nixon just hung up./2/ Said he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he knew nothing about anybody'd been talking to them; and he knew George Ball and some of the others, the Humphrey people, were very gleeful, and said they pulled all this off--well, he knew that wasn't right; and that they were appealing to Hanoi and it was naturally guessed that some of his friends thought that he might be harder on Hanoi than I was; therefore, Hanoi ought to meet now; and some of his friends might think that I would be harder on the South Vietnamese than he would be; but that that did not represent his view; and that he was willing to go to Saigon and see Thieu immediately after the election or to go to Paris or to do anything that I ask him to do or anything that you wanted him to do.
/2/See Documents 181, 186, and 187.
Rusk: Yeah. Did you see him on "Meet the Press"?
President: No, no.
Rusk: He said that on "Meet the Press."
President: That he wanted to be sure that there's just one voice; and that he felt that they were about out of the war; and that he felt that it could be wound up; and so on and so forth. So, I told him that I hope that his position would be, with all of his people, tell them to quit telling any of the sympathizers one way or the other, that there was but one American position, that's the one that we'd taken and he supported. He said all right, that he would do that.
Rusk: Uh-huh.
President: Now, I don't know whether he knows, and I don't want to question his sincerity, whether he knows of what they're doing or not. But it's pretty obvious to me that they've had their effect.
Rusk: Yeah. Did Smathers ever say about what effect it's having down his way?
President: No. He didn't think it had an effect one way or the other. He said a lot of people thought it was political--that we had done it for political reasons.
Rusk: Yeah.
President: And I think that everybody I've talked to here, I thought they would interpret it that way, and a good many of them have. I saw the leading papers here yesterday morning had lead editorials saying they were disappointed in me that I would hold out this long but then I would cave into the NLF the day before election, and things of that kind.
Rusk: Yeah.
President: And I want him to advise--I knew that they would charge that. And the other side would've charged that after the election. And I just thought that we had to take it up while we had it if we could get it. But--
Rusk: I thought myself that any of this wasn't going to change a thing.
President: I don't think it's going to change a hundred votes. But I think a lot of people think that motivates us.
Rusk: Yeah.
President: That's the question. Now, how do you see it, as of now?
Rusk: Well, I, um, I don't know how to estimate the effect here. My guess is, as I said in the press conference the other day, I don't think it's going to have much effect. But I don't really think there's much we can do to change the situation between now and Tuesday./3/ In any event, I don't think there's much chance really of getting Saigon to announce publicly during today or tomorrow that they're going to Paris, that kind of thing.
/3/November 5.
President: I told Nixon today, and I think I'm right, I said we thought that Thieu would come to this conference. He had signed on two or three times, even agreed to a joint communiqué.
Rusk: Yeah.
President: But we knew we had problems, and I stated to you that we had problems. And I read him the paragraph where I said even the old China Lobby's operating again and causing us some problems out there. And he said--
Rusk: On "Meet the Press," he absolved you personally of any motives of this sort. He managed to get in some of what some of his advisors had said, and he said he dissociated himself from them. And then he said he would go--he thought that Saigon ought to go to the table in Paris; that he was willing to go to Paris or to Saigon, or to do anything else that you wanted him to after the elections; that he thought you were doing the right thing, and he was supporting you on it. So, he managed to get in these other wrinkles.
President: Yes. I don't think they say these things without his knowledge.
Rusk: Yeah.
President: Of course--
Rusk: Well, certainly not without active knowledge of something that's put out there out somewhere.
President: Ah--was Agnew doing the telephoning from New Mexico?/4/
/4/On November 2 Agnew stopped in Albuquerque, New Mexico, during a campaign trip. Following a telephone conversation between Agnew and Rusk, a call from Agnew's plane was placed to the Nixon-Agnew campaign headquarters in Washington. See Document 212.
Rusk: Walt--Walt said he was the only top man in New Mexico that he could find--that Agnew was in New Mexico. And if he did do this, just after my telephone call with him, then he and I have got a problem.
President: Did he call you from New Mexico?
Rusk: I don't know where he called me from, because I didn't have to check that with him. At the time, I thought nothing of it. I had so little information.
President: See if your operator hadn't got that tomorrow.
Rusk: All right, I'll see if I can.
President: Ah, well, what do we do now--just say nothing?
Rusk: I would think we--we ought to hunker down and say nothing at this point.
President: What about Cy's talk today?/6/ What'd you think about that?
/6/See Document 184.
Rusk: Well, Cy and Averell are very embarrassed by this situation. But--and it's obvious, I think, that Hanoi's gloating a little bit over this situation. But I think Hanoi--that Harriman and Cy ought to relax a bit until we get it straightened out and not feel defensive. And we've done everything that we said we were going to do, and if we don't collect on the side of it quite as soon as we hoped to, Hanoi can--doesn't have to--we don't have to trigger anything from Hanoi on that.
President: Didn't we have an agreement with Hanoi on the 6th?
Rusk: Yes. They were ready to meet on the 6th.
President: That cable indicated today that they--I thought that they didn't understand. They were angry because I mentioned the 6th. You know--
Rusk: Oh, well, I wouldn't pay attention to that. But no, we indicated not before the 6th.
President: Yes, that's what I thought.
Rusk: That's right. Yeah.
President: Is that what I said in the speech?
Rusk: Ah, that's right--that they'd be--that the GVN would be free to be there on the 6th. And they had agreed on a sooner date than that. So they had no right to depend on them then. Because we said, "Fine, if you don't like that, what do you want us to do? Start the bombing again?" It's a deal-breaker on something like that.
President: Are Cy and Averell irritated at us?
Rusk: No, I think they're--in the first place, they've had as strenuous a week as we have. They've been on the phone 24 hours a day, and I think both of them are a little tired at this time. But they are as disappointed as we are. And since they are the ones that have to face these fellows across the table, I think they feel a little embarrassed, which professional negotiators should not have to feel--but I think they do. It's inevitable, I think.
President: Just their giving South Vietnam a little hell.
Rusk: Well, I expect that they have some strong thoughts on that--South Vietnam--yeah.
President: Mm-hmm. What do you think Thieu's going to do? Do you think that he's--
Rusk: That he's coming to the table? Yes. Regardless of which one of these fellows is nominated--is elected, I think that he'll come to the table when Nixon says "I'm with the President, and I want you to do what he wants to do," or if Humphrey's elected, he'll come to the table because he has no other alternative. I think he'll come.
President: I think you ought to see that that transcript of "Meet the Press" goes out to Bunker.
Rusk: Right.
President: Nixon's "Meet the Press."
Rusk: Right.
President: What do you think I say? Just I got--just we're just watching things, and I'm not going to say anything until I get back to Washington.
Rusk: I don't think I'd make any statements down there on the--
President: I'm not gonna make any, but I'll be running into hundreds of reporters. I'm speaking at 4 o'clock./6/
/6/See footnote 11, Document 173.
Rusk: Well, I think you just tell them, in the last hour that the matter became unhooked. We had a good, solid agreement with the South Vietnamese. But then they had some internal problems of their own, all these secondary questions. And then at the very closing hours, the arrangements came unhooked. But we had been working with them and had been in full agreement with them for about--for several weeks before this.
President: Okay. Thank you. All right.
189. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, November 3, 1968, 11:16 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [1 of 3]. Secret; Sensitive. Received at the LBJ Ranch in Texas on November 4 at 0411Z. Repeated to Christian. The three messages excerpted in this telegram were transmitted on November 3.
Cap 82666. Herewith an account of what is about to be leaked out of Saigon.
A. Bunker's recommendation
B. Secretary Rusk's recommendation
Saigon 41837
1. Keyes Beech of Chicago Daily News asked see Berger last night saying he had story of last week's developments from Viet-Nam sources and would like to check it out. Berger and Beech are old friends and Berger said we are unable to say anything. Beech said he knew that but he had detailed and intimate account of what transpired during meetings here of last three weeks and in fairness to us, we ought to have chance to comment if we wished.
2. He came to Berger's house and Berger listened with horror as he went through pages of notes giving details of meetings going back to October 13 and fragments from joint communiqué, from one of President's letters to Thieu, Lam's cable misrepresenting Harriman's remarks, the aborted cessation announcement of Oct 14/16, exchanges during marathon session including Thieu-Berger exchange, issues raised, etc. Much of info was accurate, although given in distorted frame. Much was slanted or erroneous.
3. Beech said he talked with a number of persons including Ky, but from contents it is clear that main source was Ky.
4. Berger called me to join them, and Beech went over his material again with me. It was impossible to let him publish in this distorted form and it was useless asking to suppress, since Vietnamese are leaking to others as well. I corrected flagrant errors and worst distortions and misrepresentations under arrangement that there will be no attributions of any kind to US sources here. But story, with all its gory details, will be damaging in the extreme, especially to them, and complicate our problems.
5. Story will show that by their own account only saving grace is that there was agreement on joint announcement and GVN concurrence in bombing cessation, and they balked at the last minute on grounds they wanted clarification of NLF status and procedures. Beech said he plans to interpret this backing out in terms of their expectation of a Nixon victory and hopes they will find Nixon a hawk. (Comment: Prepared, presumably, to take any measure to press war to victory.)
6. We obviously will never again be able to repose any confidence in Ky, and indeed it is difficult to know how we can deal in future with this govt, given this kind of irresponsibility at top.
7. Story will be filed about 1100 hours local today. When you have story I suggest Bui Diem be called in and protest made in the strongest possible terms. If protest is in written form, suggest copy be sent me which we would leave at the Foreign Office without comment. It is probably advisable not to identify Ky by name since others were talking as well. I do not know whether Thieu himself has been leaking, but it is obvious stories are coming from someone intimately associated with the actual negotiations, and protest can be cast in these terms. We propose not to comment here. If Dept chooses different course, please inform us of what you will say or want us to say.
Saigon 41838
Ref: Saigon 41837
At reception given by Newsweek last night, we learned major part of substance reftel known to US and foreign press. One US bureau chief told us Ky henchman made sudden "courtesy call" on NY Times bureau chief Roberts and used this as means of giving him rundown on events of days and nights prior to President Johnson's speech. Roberts said he understood similar visits made to other US newsmen by Ky follower. In view this I feel I should give a backgrounder to selected correspondents, unless you feel to the contrary. Please reply flash.
Todel
Ref: Saigon 41837, 41838
You are authorized to proceed with backgrounder or in any other appropriate way as you see fit./2/
/2/In a November 4 memorandum to Rostow, Lou Schwartz of the NSC Staff reported that Bunker had briefed 18 correspondents in Saigon that morning. (Ibid., 6 I, 11/68 Bombing Halt (Reactions, Memos, etc.)) In telegram 26713 to Saigon, repeated to Paris, November 5, the Department reported on Beech's story as it was printed in the Chicago Daily News and as it was broadcast on television in a report by anchorman Walter Cronkite. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968) In telegram 42169 from Saigon, November 7, Bunker reported on a telephone call that Berger had received from Beech: "He charged that Berger and I had somehow interfered with transmission on first day. Berger told him he was absurd, and then said after reading his account, we wondered what his purpose was in coming to us since he had swallowed the GVN's story hook, line and sinker, and had ignored virtually every fact we had supplied him so that he could write an objective story." (Ibid.) In telegram 42409 from Saigon, November 11, Bunker noted that Beech later apologized "for his unfortunate accusations." Bunker added: "We have closed the book on this episode." (Ibid.)
190. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 4, 1968, 0800Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. V. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 6:40 a.m. Repeated to Paris.
41853. Ref: A. Paris 23330; B. Paris 23331./2/
/2/Documents 184 and 185.
1. I think there is a third alternative, and that is to stall with respect to fixing the date for the first meeting.
2. It seems to me that the same argument that has been used to explain why we cannot meet on Nov 6, namely complexities beyond our control, can be used to explain why we require more time before we can fix a different date. We could also say that the US and DRV have arranged this conference on the basis of certain understandings and we must translate our understandings into procedural practice. I note that they are already in our conversations referring to the talks as a "four-sided" conference. I was under the impression that we would not allow such statements to go unchallenged./3/
/3/In telegram 23348/Delto 928 from Paris, November 4, Harriman and Vance wrote: "We do not think this is a good alternative as it may end up with the worst of both worlds. The GVN has already dug in its heels and is divulging the differences between our governments in a distorted and vicious manner. We believe that the time has come for us to set a deadline for the meeting and force the GVN to face up to living up to their prior agreements with us." They proposed the date of November 13 for the first meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. V)
3. While it will be unpleasant to stall, it is necessary for a while if we are to bring the GVN along in orderly fashion. Setting a date now, and telling them that we will go ahead without them, carries the risk that they will dig in their heels. Cooler heads are beginning to be heard here, and given a little time and perhaps a sop to their pride, I think they will decide to come.
4. I would add that I do not have in mind postponing the first meeting indefinitely, or for a long time. That would give the GVN the veto that we have all along said we cannot concede to them.
5. I am concerned by Lau's observation in para 14 Ref A that the rocket attack against Saigon is related to the NLF. I had always thought Hanoi might seek to exonerate itself from responsibility for attacks on cities on the grounds that the NLF is separate entity, and we now have the first evidence of this.
Bunker
191. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, November 4, 1968, 8:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2]. No classification marking. This meeting was a regular meeting of Clifford's "0830 Group" of senior Defense Department officials. The complete list of participants is not indicated.
62.5% critical wires to W Hse, LBJ upset. That's why last Sat's calls to leading Congressmen was so impt.
CMC tries to figure our meaning of Wash. Post editorial today.
CMC reads aloud a proposed message from LBJ to Gen. Abrams that Rostow sent to his house Sunday./2/ LBJ urging Abrams to get out & "sell" U.S. commanders on what was done last week--saying LBJ not going to sell SVNam down the river.
/2/The draft message to Bunker and Abrams from the President, as transmitted to the President by Rostow in telegram CAP 82658, November 3, and received at the LBJ Ranch at 11:40 a.m., reads: "From here it looks as if it might be useful for Abe to call in the senior U.S. and ARVN military commanders to make the following points: I've personally talked with the President and want to pass directly to you how he views the situation. He is not going to sell out what we--the U.S., ARVN and other Allies--have won on the battlefield. He will have no part of imposing a coalition government on the South Vietnamese. He will live by the Honolulu Communiqué which promises a leading role in the negotiations to the GVN. You and I know that militarily we've got a good deal: (A) During the bad weather over the NVN panhandle the bombing halt doesn't hurt us; we're going to put a maximum effort over Laos; (B) Enemy observance of the DMZ is a net military advantage to us; (C) Our job is easier if cities like Saigon and Danang are free from attack. So, as soldiers, let us go on about our job while the diplomats try to do theirs--in confidence that our strong military position won't be thrown away at the conference table--with the knowledge that early diplomatic success depends on our keeping maximum military pressure on the battlefields. You, in Saigon, of course, must be the judge of whether such an approach would be helpful." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [2 of 3])
GME speaks out--so do Pursley & Goulding--too late, too little "me thinks the lady doth protest too much".
CMC, it turns out, agrees with us. He's against it--he's worried--this proposed message is one more manifestation of Rusk & Rostow's desire to fight on & on & on so long as Saigon wants us to.
The mess we're in now is wholly of Saigon's making--& is solely due to Republican pressure on Viet Nam thru Bui Diem (SVNamese ambassador to U.S.).
(Republican channel is Mrs. Claire Chennault. Chinese-born widow of Gen. [Clair Chennault], whose code name for this action "Little Flower"!!)
CMC thinks he's got it stopped.
0900--CMC turned to Nitze: who opens with an oral report on reconnaissance over N. VNam since the bombing halt.
0901--Walt Rostow phones to argue for the message. CMC arguments:
1) The action LBJ took on 31 Oct was one he had been trying to take for 6 months & was no surprise--no departure from what LBJ has been saying, in effect, since San Antonio in Sept '67./3/
/3/See footnote 6, Document 35.
2) LBJ shldn't be defensive about his decision. Thieu had agreed to this--worked out a joint communiqué.
3) Message is apologetic--Nothing to be apologetic about!
4) LBJ has not suggested he was changing his position on any fundamental point--it looks as though he has by this defensive message?
(Rostow whams back for 6 mins. while CMC listens in silence)
Then CMC opens up again: It's all wrong for LBJ to try to get to Thieu by a message via Abrams to SVNamese generals. It's a screwy way to get out & do business.
Finally, LBJ & Nixon have talked. If Nixon is elected, then a jt. message from those 2 could go. That's the way to press Saigon--not an apologetic, defensive message from LBJ to SVNamese via Abrams.
CMC notes that only reason Nixon went along with the deal of LBJ's because LBJ tricked him into it by telling him--lying--that Thieu had agreed; Thieu had never agreed.
That's what Nixon's staff is now telling all reporters!!!!
Nitze opens up discussion:
--We're fuzzy on what constitutes a strike on a city--& how we retaliate.
--As of now, the talks on [November] 6th in Paris are off because we can't agree.
LBJ told Dirksen we knew the score & Dirksen told Nixon & so Nixon called LBJ at Ranch. Nixon promised LBJ support & did so publicly./4/
/4/See Document 187.
192. Telephone Conversation Among President Johnson, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Secretary of State Rusk, and the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
November 4, 1968, 12:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation of Johnson With Clifford, Rusk, and Rostow, November 4, 1968, 12:27 p.m., Tape F68.09, PNO 5-6. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The conference call, placed by the President from his Texas Ranch, ended at 12:53 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) The Diary records a telephone conversation at 11:37 a.m. between Johnson and Rostow and summarized it as follows: "Walt wanted the President to know that Saville Davis of the Christian Science Monitor had a story from their Saigon correspondent that says that Nixon got to Thieu to change his attitude. Saville Davis wants to know if we can confirm this. The President told Walt that he couldn't confirm anything. He had his suspicions, but just didn't know. Told Walt not to talk to him, but to have him referred to the State Department." (Ibid.)
President: Hello, Dean? I think you and Clark and Walt ought to meet on this Saville Davis thing./2/
/2/For concerns about a similar problem, see Document 189.
Rusk: Yes sir.
President: It concerns me a great deal. I don't want to be in the position of me being a McCarthy. I don't know much more than I told the candidates themselves the other day, which my notes will reflect there. Namely, these folks had tentatively agreed out there to go along and then they started having doubts because we had reports of some folks--the old China Lobby--contacting embassies, et cetera. Now, I can't get much more specific than that, A, because of the sensitivity of the source--
Rusk: Right.
President: --and B, because of the limited nature of the information. I told Smathers that, Senator Smathers, who called saying that he understood from what I told Dirksen that I was likely to make public this information if it were confirmed and if they kept interfering with it./3/ I also told Dirksen that I believed that the friends of one of the candidates was reporting to the folks out there that they ought to wait./4/
/3/See Document 186.
/4/See Document 181.
Rusk: Right.
President: I did that on the basis of two things--one, the intercept from the Ambassador--
Rusk: Right.
President: --saying that he had had a call and the boss said wait and so forth, and second, this China Lobby operation, the Madame involved.
Rusk: Yeah, that's--
President: Now, I don't want to have information that ought to be public and not make it so. At the--on the other hand, we have a lot of--I don't know how much we can do there and I know we'll be charged with trying to interfere with the election. And I think this is something that's going to require the best judgments that we have. I'm rather concerned by this Saville Davis conversation with the Embassy this morning.
Rusk: Now, which conversation?
President: The Christian Science Monitor man called the Embassy this morning and wanted to see the Ambassador and he was unavailable. He told the party answering that he wanted to check out a story received from his correspondent in Saigon; that he planned to come to the Embassy and wait until he could see him; that the dispatch from Saigon contained the elements of a major scandal which involves the Vietnamese Ambassador and which will affect Presidential candidate Nixon if the Monitor publishes it. Time is of the essence inasmuch as Davis has a deadline to meet if he publishes it.
Rusk: Right.
President: He speculated that should the story be published it will create a great deal of excitement.
Rusk: Right.
President: Now, what he gets from Saigon is well and good and fine. But if he gets it from us, I want to be sure that A, we try to do it in such a way that our motives are not questioned and that if the public interest requires it, and two--and that's the only thing I want to operate under, I'm not interested in the politics of it--the second thing is I want to be sure that what we say can be confirmed.
Rusk: Well, Mr. President, I have a very definite view on this, for what it's worth. I do not believe that any President can make any use of interceptions or telephone taps in any way that would involve politics. The moment we cross over that divide we are in a different kind of society.
President: Yeah.
Rusk: Now, if this story is coming out of Saigon, I don't myself see how it could have come from American sources in Saigon because we've been extremely careful not to pass along details of this sort of thing out there. It could have come from South Vietnamese sources--I don't know. Did Saville Davis say from what kind of sources it came?
President: No. He just says that he informed the Ambassador he wanted to check out a story he received from a correspondent in Saigon, and he planned to come to the Embassy and wait for the Ambassador to see him. Now, he has also tried to see the White House.
Rusk: Well, I would think that we are--that since we are not involved in any contacts that the Republicans might have had with the South Vietnamese Ambassador, that this a matter on which only the Republicans could comment, and that we stay out of it completely. I really think that it would be very unwise. I mean, we get a lot of information through these special channels that we don't make public. I mean, for example, some of the malfeasances of Senators and Congressmen and other people, that we don't make public. And I think that we must continue to respect the classification of that kind of material. And I think that all of what--all we can say is that we are not going to comment on such matters; that's for others to comment on if they have anything to say on it. But be very sure that we ourselves are not ourselves putting out this story.
President: Clark, do you have any reaction?
Clifford: I couldn't--I could not hear what Dean said.
Rusk: I can't hear whoever that is.
Clifford: I can hear the President very clearly, but all I can hear is Dean's voice, and I can't get his words.
President: Well, Dean just says he doesn't think that we can confirm or say anything or have any comment in connection with it on the basis of the sensitivity of the information.
Clifford: Well, I would think that there would be a good deal of merit to that. I'd go on to another reason also. And that is, I think that some elements of the story are so shocking in their nature that I'm wondering whether it would be good for the country to disclose the story, and then possibly to have a certain individual elected. It could cast his whole administration under such doubts that I would think it would be inimical to our country's interests.
President: Well, I have no doubt about that. But what about the story being published and our knowing of it, and our being charged with hushing it up or something?
Clifford: Oh, on that, Mr. President, I don't believe that would bother me. I think that the amount of information that we have--that we don't think we should publicize--it has to do with the sensitivity of the sources, it has to do with the absences of absolute proof. So, I don't believe we have the kind of story that we'd be justified in putting out.
President: All right. I think both of you should have a paragraph from this report so you can look at it, and also a question from Nixon in the light of what his people are doing again today. They are going back over this thing, and he's having Senator Tower to say it's politics and stuff like that. But in this conversation the other day at which you were present, I said to him that this thing--we've had these three propositions up to them for some time, since certainly the early part of October they were nibbling--that because of some of some speeches--I had in mind the Bundy and Humphrey speeches, and Humphrey was on the other end of the line, and certainly McCarthy's type of stuff--because of certain speeches that were made at that time, I don't know what effect they had--but anyway they went off and kind of let up for a week or so to Hanoi. Since that time, we had gone out to our allies and got them to tentatively agree--emphasize tentatively agree--that this would be a wise move. Then the old China Lobby starts operating, contacting some Embassies and others, and that interferes with the situation. That I knew from what they had said to me previously--the three candidates--that they were not being responsible for this, but that I thought they ought to know that it created some minor problems and we were trying to work them out. A little later, Nixon asked a question whether we would stop bombing the South, and then said, "Of course, Mr. President, I know you don't know whether the conference will come off or not," implying that I had made my point that they had these problems. But--"Would you stop bombing the South?," and I told him, "No, I wouldn't," and so forth./6/
/6/See Document 166.
Now, he takes the position that he was under the impression that South Vietnam was going to be at the conference, and I told him yesterday, "We are all hoping it would be at the conference, and we had believed, up until this China thing got into it, that we had reason to believe that on two or three separate occasions that the President [Thieu] shared our view, but after this got into it, it created some doubt," and I told him of that doubt. He would keep running away from it. I reminded him of that a time or two. I noticed that a little bit later he said in California, something that kind of confirmed what he said on "Meet the Press," that all of us thought South Vietnamese'd be there and so forth. But he didn't say that he had been warned./6/ Now he has been warned. That may be a little too strong a word for it, but we told him we did have a problem with it, and he knew that, and I confirmed that with Humphrey yesterday too./7/ So I think, Walt, you ought to get--I'll get Jim Jones to put on the wire to you, Walt, the two paragraphs I have in mind. You see that they get two--one for you and one to Rusk and one to Clifford.
/6/See Document 187.
/7/On November 3 the President met Humphrey at a campaign rally in Houston. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
Rostow: I have them. I can send them very quickly, sir./8/
/8/See Document 194.
President: Well, you get the Nixon question and you also get--there's a good part there. I'll try to get it to you because I specifically want to show you what I want them to see.
Rostow: Yes, sir.
Rusk: All right. I'll wait for it.
President: What did you say, Dean?
Rusk: That's right, that's fine. I just think our strongest position here is--if such a story is going to run, and my guess is they'll publish it anyhow--is for us to say that we're in no position to get into that kind of thing; not confirm it. But even no comment from us would tend to leave open the possibility there might be something in it. But I just think it's not for the President or the Secretary of State to appear to get into that story at all.
President: Is that your opinion, Clark?
Clifford: See, I still can't hear Dean, Mr. President.
President: Dean says that it's his opinion that we should just say we cannot get into that at all, period.
Clifford: Well, I better have a talk with Dean about it. I think that would indicate that maybe we had information and chose not to get into it. Maybe we would want to say that we're looking into the story if they publish the story, that we're looking into it, or something of that kind. Why don't--after we hang up, why don't I talk to Dean directly. Then I can hear him.
President: You do that, and--
Rusk: I can't hear Clark from here, sir.
President: Okay, you do that, and I'll get this information to you. You three get together right away. And I will proceed on the assumption that we just do nothing and say nothing and stay out of it, and you all do the same thing. And I don't think Walt should see Saville Davis. He wants to see Walt now.
Rostow: I told him I would not see him, sir.
President: That's good.
Rostow: My secretary told him that I would not.
President: Okay.
Rostow: Okay.
Clifford: Are you still on, Walt?
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21896.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
193-212
193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France and Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 4, 1968, 2119Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Rostow, Clifford, and Read; and approved by Rusk.
266372/Todel 1473. Paris for Harriman and Vance. Saigon: Ambassador Bunker's comments on this cable will be needed by 11:00 a.m. Tuesday Saigon time. This message has not yet been cleared by highest USG authorities.
1. We have weighed carefully the recommendations in Paris 23331, Saigon 41853, and Paris 23348./2/ Our basic conclusions are that:
/2/Documents 185 and 190 and footnote 3, Document 190.
a. There must be no wider meeting in Paris on Nov. 6 nor should we now set a firm date of Nov. 13.
b. We should make every effort to go forward with bilateral talks in Paris on procedures for a wider meeting, during the week. This would be designed to open the way for a wider meeting on Nov. 13.
c. We should prepare for the possibility of agreeing to a wider meeting on Nov. 13 or shortly thereafter, on the assumption that the GVN may still not be ready to attend, but that we may wish to go ahead nonetheless and show them that there are certain subjects we can discuss without them, for example, mutual withdrawal and de-escalation in the DMZ.
d. Meanwhile, Saigon should be taking every possible measure to bring the GVN around.
These central conclusions are reflected in the instructions below. They reflect our considered views, but are of course subject to Paris and Saigon comment.
2. Paris has scheduled (at Lau's request) the next Vance/Lau meeting at 1000 Paris time on Tuesday. We plan now that at this meeting Vance would make the following points:
a. We are not ready for a wider meeting on Wednesday, Nov. 6.
b. We continue to believe that bilateral discussions on procedures are essential, and note that we have never agreed with the DRV that procedures should be worked out in the wider meeting itself, or should be the first item discussed. Indeed, the procedural agreement reached last May expressly provides that those ground rules will continue until we and the DRV agree to change them. (This leaves open the possibility--depending on how the GVN comes around--of ratification or confirmation of the procedures in a wider meeting.)
c. Bilateral discussions on the procedures for a wider meeting should aim to work out agreed procedures so that the first wider meeting could take place in the week of Nov. 11-16. At the same time, we cannot commit ourselves to a date for such a wider meeting until there has been a discussion and at least provisional agreement on the essential procedures.
d. Accordingly, we renew our strong view that there should be a bilateral meeting on Nov. 6 and further bilateral discussions as necessary. We also continue to believe that it is appropriate for such bilateral meetings to take up the question of de-escalation on either side in the DMZ area and what can be done to assure this.
In short, we plan that a meeting on Tuesday/3/ should definitively knock down any meeting on Wednesday other than a bilateral on procedures./4/
/3/November 5.
/4/In telegram 41932 from Saigon, November 4, the Embassy concurred with the strategy and tactics outlined in these first two paragraphs. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968)
3. On the task of preparing for a possible wider meeting without the GVN, we would like Paris recommendations on how this should be done including how we should handle the presence of an NLF representative and the topics we would plan to raise. We would also like your judgment on whether Hanoi would accept such a meeting without the presence of the GVN, or what tactics you think Hanoi might employ if we were to appear at such a meeting without the GVN. This is a matter requiring less urgent comment than the instructions above, however.
4. Meanwhile, Saigon should be acting along the following lines:
a. As you deem most effective, the word should be going out to all influential quarters that the American public will not support a situation in which talks are delayed for any significant time by GVN insistence on the kind of assurances Thieu has mentioned, that Hanoi will formally and explicitly agree: -1- to talk directly with GVN and -2- that the NLF will participate only as part of the DRV delegation. We here are already assembling editorial comment that can be used as ammunition in support of this argument.
b. Also as you deem most effective, you should start to get across the idea that, if the GVN refuses to attend on its present grounds, the US Administration will have to proceed with the wider meetings at which it will discuss appropriate issues without the presence of the GVN.
c. On both scores, you should be getting across the idea that this is a matter of American public opinion as a whole, and has little or nothing to do with who is elected President tomorrow. You should also be getting it across that the present Administration, under our system, has decisive responsibility until January 20. (We infer that some South Vietnamese do not understand this rather basic point.)
5. In short, you should be moving to shorten as much as possible whatever face-saving period the more constructive elements in the GVN regard as necessary. (We have noted Thieu's assistant, Huong, commenting that two weeks would do it. We want to make this less.)
6. In laying out this course of action, we have in mind Saigon's suggestion (Saigon 41738)/6/ that word from the President-elect may become an important element in bringing the GVN around, after the election. We share Bunker's judgment that this could be of crucial importance. Obviously, it cannot be done in the next 48 hours, at least.
/6/See footnote 4, Document 183.
7. Finally we would like Saigon and Paris comment--on a less urgent basis but hopefully in the next 24 hours--on the following possible variations:
a. An offer to cement the GVN's "leading role" by explicitly making the GVN the "chairman" of our side. Would this invite Hanoi to make the NLF "chairman" on the other side? Or would Hanoi emphasize NLF independence by retaining "two delegates"? Does it unduly tie our hands into the future? Would it help?
b. If the GVN is unwilling to come to a wider meeting, our attending with private SVN representation--from the Lien Minh perhaps--as a way of showing how we regard the NLF being present on Hanoi's side.
We emphasize that these are both ideas to probe the possibilities and we would welcome any ideas from Paris and Saigon.
Rusk
194. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, November 4, 1968, 2214Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [1 of 3]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Deliver Direct to the President. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 5:10 p.m. The notation "ps" on the telegram indicates that the President saw it.
CAP 82683. I have just returned from a meeting of over an hour with Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford on the China matter.
1. With respect to the passage of the transcript which I had them read, they agreed that Nixon appeared clear in mind that the talks might not begin and you had made clear that they might not begin. We noted, however, that the immediately following statement could have induced some further ambiguity which Nixon did not follow up at the time: "Dick, the talks will be held. We have a firm agreement that the North Vietnamese will bring the NLF in and the South Vietnamese will be permitted to attend."/2/
/2/See Document 166.
2. With respect to McCloskey,/3/ pursuant to your instructions Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford agreed to instruct him to say to Saville Davis: "Obviously I'm not going to get into this kind of thing in any way, shape or form." He was so instructed in the presence of the two Secretaries and myself. Having returned to my office, I have just received a report from McCloskey on his interview with Saville Davis. Saville Davis began by saying: "I assume you will not be able to comment on this." He then showed McCloskey the story which was along the lines familiar to you. The story was headed by Beverly Deepe: "This must be checked with the Nixon people before publication."/4/
/3/Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
/4/Telegram 268107/Todel 1500 to Saigon and repeated to Paris, November 7, transmitted the Department's analysis of an article entitled "Recalcitrant Saigon Hopes for Better Deal" by Beverly Deepe, Saigon correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, Todel Chron., November 1968)
Saville Davis volunteered that his newspaper would certainly not print the story in the form in which it was filed; but they might print a story which said Thieu, on his own, decided to hold out until after the election.
Incidentally, the story as filed is stated to be based on Vietnamese sources, and not U.S., in Saigon.
3. With respect to the body of information that we now have available, all three of us agreed to the following propositions:
--The information sources must be protected and not introduced into domestic politics.
--Even with these sources, the case is not open and shut. On the question of the "public's right to know," Sec. Rusk was very strong on the following position: we get information like this every day, some of it very damaging to American political figures. We have always taken the view that with respect to such sources there is no public "right to know." Such information is collected simply for the purposes of national security.
--So far as the information based on such sources is concerned, all three of us agreed: (A) Even if the story breaks, it was judged too late to have a significant impact on the election. (B) The viability of the man elected as President was involved as well as subsequent relations between him and President Johnson. (C) Therefore, the common recommendation was that we should not encourage such stories and hold tight the data we have.
Immediately following is a further item which just came in. (I assume that Bui Diem brought her in to tell her about Saville Davis' visit.)
"On the morning of November 4, 1968, Mrs. Anna Chennault traveled in her Lincoln Continental from her residence to the Vietnamese Embassy where she remained for approximately thirty minutes and thereafter went to room two zero five, seventeen zero one, Pennsylvania Avenue, arriving shortly after eleven am.
Room two zero five, seventeen zero one Pennsylvania Avenue is unmarked; however, pretext inquiry of a nearby office elicited response that room two zero five is a Nixon office.
A source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that at eleven thirty five am, a representative of the Vietnamese Embassy talked with Mrs. Chennault and said that the Ambassador would like to see Mrs. Chennault in ten or fifteen minutes. Mrs. Chennault stated she could be reached at telephone number two nine eight nine zero one six.
Shortly after noon, Mrs. Chennault departed seventeen zero one Pennsylvania Avenue and proceeded via cab to the Vietnamese Embassy where she remained for approximately ten minutes. Upon leaving the Vietnamese Embassy, she walked to the Chinese Embassy, twenty three eleven Massachusetts Avenue, arriving twelve twenty pm.
A second source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that at twelve twenty one pm a representative of the Chinese Embassy summoned a cab. The same source advised that several minutes later, Mrs. Chennault contacted her own office stating that she would come to her office in a few minutes.
A cab picked up Mrs. Chennault shortly after twelve thirty pm and took her to the Investment Building, fifteen eleven K Street, Northwest.
A third source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that telephone number two nine eight nine zero one six is listed to the Women's Advisory Committee, Suite ten forty two, Investment Building, fifteen eleven K Street, Northwest, and is an auxiliary line from a private branch exchange (switchboard) at seventeen zero one Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest. It is an unlisted number.
Ten forty two Investment Building is the office of the Claire L. Chennault foundation."
195. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, November 5, 1968, 8:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2]. No classification marking. This was a regular meeting of Clifford's "0830 Group" of senior Defense Department officials. The complete list of participants is not indicated.
Gossip on election--the surprising tightness/closeness. CMC's disgust with Nixon's TV shows.
Comments on SVNam--Thieu's "treachery"--his desire to keep on fighting to keep us there. CMC repeats his frequent comment that Thieu wants the war to go on forever. His gov't is getting richer & richer. CMC mad & wants us to get out.
His hope, however, being reasonable, that cessation of bombing will lead to a very much lower level of combat.
We should get on with the negotiations & start pulling out. Thieu will just "pee away" our substantial military victory.
Warnke points out 2 utterly opposing schools of thought in U.S. Gov't
--one saying we shld root out the infrastructure (Rostow, Max Taylor, Rusk, JCS).
--other, be satisfied with stopping hostilities (CMC, Warnke, etc).
CMC + Warnke: We're for "Ceasefire in place"--we see no reason "to try to make the whole country safe for Thieu."
CMC wants to get out now; [Thieu's] not ready to fight until we've secured the country for G.V.N.
The problem is--as we all admit--this is not U.S. Gov't policy! The hard-liners--Walt Rostow is the major apologist for the S.V.Nam gov't. LBJ has had a confused conglomeration of motives--he's seen it as a war--"Nail the coonskin to the wa[ll]"--he doesn't want be to be the 1st Pres. to "loose [sic] a war." The concept [is] wholly wrong. He still thinks in terms of wars--like WWI & WWII. (He's never understood the complexities of the situation.)
CMC then talks again of the Republican Party efforts to sabotage any progress--the FBI telephone taps, the intercepts of messages from Bui Diem to Saigon, the surveillance & taps on Mrs. Claire Chennault, etc.
Warnke, points out the real issue is--Does U.S. remain in Asia?
--Whether or not we win in S.V.Nam, this is the long-term future.
CMC: "Excruciatingly unbearable awful advice" to LBJ for 5 years, for us to have gotten in so deeply, without realizing what our national interest is.
Let these countries learn to work together. Let's us draw down, as we did in Korea, to the "limited partner" role.
(CMC thinks aloud at length--15/20 minutes--on future of U.S. in Asia.)
[Omitted here is discussion of Israel.]
196. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, November 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. V [1 of 2]. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. In telegram CAP 82696 to the President, November 5, transmitting a copy of this report to the LBJ Ranch in Texas, Rostow described Vance's meeting that morning as "frustrating." (Ibid., Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [1 of 3]) Vance's full report of this meeting was transmitted in telegram 23419/Delto 934 from Paris, November 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968)
Cy Vance called on the secure phone at 8:40 a.m.
1. Vance had a two hour meeting with Lau on procedures this morning in Paris.
2. Lau said that Thuy and Mrs. Binh were prepared to go forward with the new wider discussions tomorrow, whether or not the GVN was represented.
3. Vance replied that the GVN would not be represented in Paris tomorrow and that we would let the DRV know when our side was prepared for the first meeting with wider participation. We could not agree to meet in the new format until there were agreed procedures for going forward. Vance proposed a bilateral meeting with the DRV tomorrow for further procedural discussions, and he further proposed that the fact of today's meeting and subsequent meetings be made known publicly without disclosure of content.
4. Lau rejected a proposal for a US/DRV meeting tomorrow and repeated his view that there should be a three delegation meeting on the 6th. There was a prolonged argument about the different views of the US and the DRV on the "our side/your side" approach and the DRV "four delegation" approach. Lau said no matter what we called it there would be representatives of four different parties present in the new phase of the talks and their side would be organized as two separate delegations. On specific points of procedure the following points emerged.
(a) There was agreement that the first meeting with wider participation would discuss rules of procedure.
(b) On the order of speaking the two sides will alternate and neither side placed importance on who speaks first.
(c) The present language translation procedures will continue in the next stage.
(d) On physical arrangements the US proposed continuation of the talks in the same room with the same number (9 or 10) on each side and the actual arrangements to be worked out through the French. The DRV agreed to work through the French but preferred a larger room and 12 on their side "because there would be two delegations".
(e) There was sharp disagreement on press coverage at the first broader meeting.
5. At the conclusion of the meeting Vance again suggested meeting tomorrow on a bilateral basis to discuss procedures for the first wider meeting. Lau would not agree but took note of Vance's proposal and it was left that if either side had something new to discuss it would get in touch with the other.
6. Comment
Vance and Harriman intend to make public the fact of today's meeting. They do not expect the DRV to agree to a bilateral meeting tomorrow, but Harriman and Vance are thinking of proposing procedural points to the DRV, such as agreeing ad referendum on 12 to a side, which might permit the holding of a bilateral meeting on November 6.
Benjamin H. Read/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
197. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Saigon, November 5, 1968.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Papers, Pacification Program (Planning): 1968. Confidential. Copies were sent to Bunker, Abrams, and Colby.
In my farewell call on President Thieu/2/ I made much of my firm conviction that we were steadily winning the war. I recalled to Thieu that he had some months ago told Ambassador Bunker how the enemy was headed for military defeat and would have to switch soon to a political phase.
/2/Komer was appointed Ambassador to Turkey October 28.
However I didn't waste much time on generalities. I told the President that the greatest weakness in his arsenal and ours in this critical juncture lay in the propaganda field. When the enemy was losing, he claimed he was winning. When we were winning, we acted as if we would lose. I severely criticized the psyops and information agencies of both our governments here in Vietnam. I said that I had recommended to General Abrams that the psychological aspect of our new accelerated offensive should receive command rather than staff supervision; I would make the same recommendation to the President. He listened intently and took several notes. Encouraged, I pressed the need for themes which would convey "the smell of success", which I attributed to General Abrams.
Secondly I told the President that our one mistake was to undershoot the mark on the special pacification offensive. Practically every province had indicated it could upgrade security in many more contested hamlets than its quota. I urged that if by 1 December the offensive seemed to be moving nicely, double the ante to at least 2,000 hamlets by Tet./3/
/3/Beginning with a declaration on November 1, Thieu implemented an accelerated pacification campaign, which he called the Le Loi campaign in honor of a Vietnamese patriot. The ostensible goal of this broad effort was to increase rapidly the percentage of the South Vietnam's population under the control of the GVN. Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 154-207, provides additional information.
Third I strenuously urged an order of the day, or speech by the President (or PM), or TV broadcast to officially launch the special offensive, and to describe all of its facets--including Phung Hoang, self-defense, Chieu Hoi, etc. I said I felt that many province and district officials were confused by the bombing halt, etc. What was needed was a strong, clear call by the top leadership of the GVN to consolidate the victory we were well on the way to winning.
The President took notes on all of the above points. He seemed particularly interested in my propaganda proposals and an order of the day or speech on the special offensive. He ended by expressing warm appreciation of my help to the GVN and presented me with a fabulous piece of lacquer and an inscribed picture of himself.
R.W. Komer/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
198. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, November 5, 1968, 1925Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 2:59 p.m. Repeated to Saigon.
23468/Delto 937.
1. DRV delegation delivered following note verbale to USDel for Ambassador Vance at 1900 Paris time November 5:
"At this morning (November 5, 1968) private meeting, there are two points on which we have not yet reached agreement:
1) The conference room.
2) The press representatives.
Now, we would like to inform you that we temporarily agree to your proposal:
1) The first meeting of four delegations will be held in the room which we have so far used as our meeting place.
2) The press representatives will not be admitted in the first meeting of four delegations.
Thus, there is no disagreed question left with regard to the procedure and arrangement for the first meeting.
Therefore, with the consent of the representatives of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, we propose to hold the first meeting of four delegations tomorrow November 6, 1968, at 10:30 hrs, at the Centre des Conferences Internationales, Paris.
In case the representatives of the RVN are not available, we propose to hold meetings of three delegations: DRVN, FNL, and USA. When the representatives of the RVN come, they will participate in the meeting."
2. We have replied as follows:
"In reply to your note verbale, we wish to inform you as follows:
1. The United States representatives do not believe that we have yet reached agreement on all questions of procedures and arrangements for the first meeting in a wider format. For example, even if the meeting is held in the small conference room as we proposed, agreement has not been reached on all the physical arrangements involved.
2. Moreover, as Ambassador Vance said earlier today, the representatives of the Republic of Viet-Nam will not be present and we cannot have a meeting in the wider format on November 6. We said we would inform Ambassador Lau as soon as our side would be prepared to meet with your side in the wider meeting."
Harriman
199. Editorial Note
On November 5, 1968, Republican candidate Richard Nixon was elected President of the United States. He received 43.4 percent of the total vote, which represented a margin of victory over the Democratic candidate, Hubert Humphrey, of a scant seven-tenths of one percent of all votes cast, or a difference of a little more than one-half million ballots. While independent candidate George Wallace finished well behind the major candidates, his tally of 13.5 percent of the total vote was considerable. The next day, President Johnson sent a congratulatory telegram to Nixon and one of encouragement to Humphrey. The texts of these messages are in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 1114-1115.
Also on November 6, the United States announced the indefinite postponement of the first meeting of the expanded four-party talks on Vietnam. The text of the statement as released in Paris is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, November 25, 1968, page 538.
200. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 6, 1968, 0915Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. VI [2 of 2]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 5:10 a.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance. On this copy of the telegram, which was sent to the President, Rostow wrote: "For the President From Walt Rostow--Herewith Bunker's cool and thoughtful analysis of factors that made Thieu draw back at last minute."
42066. For Secretary from Ambassador Bunker. Subj: Thieu's Decision.
1. I thought it would be useful to set down my thoughts on what transpired here that led Thieu to make his decision not to go with us into the Paris talks. These thoughts are substantially based on evidence and solid impressions, except for Ky's motivations, where what we say is somewhat speculative. We shall continue to collect and analyze the evidence. However, it is important to start evaluating this performance, which came so unexpectedly, so that we will know better how to deal with its consequences, as well as with Thieu and his government in the future.
2. The key issue on which everything turned was the NLF status in the talks. During the last days nothing we could say, no assurance we could give, was able to shake Thieu from the position that Hanoi had to be made to agree that the NLF was part of its delegation, else he would not come into the talks. This came as a surprise since at several points until the very last day we thought we had the fullest understanding of, and his agreement to, the our side/your side formula and how it would be applied. A second but less persistent theme, but one which has been subsequently emphasized, was that Hanoi had to say it agrees to talk directly to the GVN.
3. If at any point prior to the last crucial days Thieu had given us any inkling that he would break agreements reached, or that he would reopen the formula, or wanted stronger guarantees than those we had given him, we might have had time to overcome his opposition by working further on the joint announcement, adding perhaps even stronger assurances that the GVN will deal with all domestic political matters, a reassurance that we will not press them into coalition, etc., but he did not become utterly intransigent until toward the end.
4. The sudden turn of the final 48 hours of our negotiations with Thieu prompts the initial questions: did Thieu deliberately mislead us earlier? Did he hold back his real (and extreme) position until the very end to extract concessions on the central NLF point? Such a tactic would have been based on the twin assumptions of our anxiety to move into talks immediately and of our not daring to move without the GVN. Thieu was, of course, correct with respect to our anxiety to move, but wrong about our unwillingness to move without him despite repeated warnings. In any case, we believe it unlikely that Thieu was deliberately misleading us; he was, however, misreading us.
5. Our own elections and a possible Nixon victory played an important part in Thieu's approach to the problem and reflects another miscalculation. He assumed, and we could not persuade him otherwise, that our haste reflects a political motive, namely, to assist Humphrey. He reasoned that a Nixon victory was probable and would be, on balance, more in the GVN's interest. Thus, if he could prevent our decision to cease the bombing until after the election, pressure from the United States Government might ease. He would then have a new "ball game." Thieu may even expect that Nixon would follow a "hawkish" policy, possibly even threaten to resume full bombing of the North to force Hanoi to capitulate or, at least come to the conference in a weaker bargaining position. We do not say that this factor was decisive, yet we do not doubt that it was a major factor in his intransigence.
6. But we must give strong weight to additional and more substantive explanations for Thieu's final turning away from the bombing halt and serious talks. There are two mutually reinforcing elements here: one reflects a sense of gathering success in the war, and the other reflects fear and suspicion of us:
A. Thieu felt strongly that the timing of the bombing halt and serious negotiations was not propitious. We were proposing to do this--and inviting the probability of an immediate subsequent proposal from the enemy for a cease-fire--just at the moment when we were girding to follow up recent military successes with a concerted aggressive drive against the Viet Cong's control of the countryside. Why rush to a solution at the conference table, which inevitably means compromise, when more and more reports were coming in that the enemy was weakened and discouraged, when the smell of victory was in the air?
B. Thieu's suspicion of, or at least lack of confidence in, our motives and intentions regarding the talks, was also at work. We have already noted his belief that the timing of cessation was a ploy related to our elections. Much more serious is the fact that conscious as he is of the American people's determination to wind up the fighting and withdraw, he almost certainly fears that once we have him at the conference table we would lead him step by step into a cease-fire, and then press on him a coalition, if that is the price we have to pay for a settlement. We know now that an intelligence report was in his hands that the NLF intended to press quickly for a cease-fire and coalition and this reinforced his anxiety and fears. The Laos settlement, and Harriman's association with it, was also in his mind. Certain as he was of a Nixon victory, he saw in that victory the replacement of Harriman in the negotiations. The Lam telegram misrepresenting Harriman/2/ could not have come at a worse time.
/2/See Document 149, and footnote 7 thereto.
C. I would rate suspicion of us and fear of what negotiations will lead to as the second major factor in causing him to back away at the fateful hour of decision. It is an attitude we shall have to keep in the forefront of our thinking in the months ahead.
7. I think all the elements of paras 4-6 were present in Thieu's thinking, but it is an open question to what extent each one entered his calculations. There were times during the last 48 hours when he seemed clearly to move with no sense of urgency, repeating the same argument in a score of different guises, instead of seeking a way out. His argument that the army and the country would "disintegrate" because the other side claimed to have two delegations, however illogical this may seem to us, because it made no allowance for his and our ability to combat Hanoi's propaganda with our own, was a real concern of his as well as the members of the Security Council. The Prime Minister repeated this same concern yesterday. I pointed out that this concern seems to us to be greatly exaggerated but, in the atmosphere of emotion and suspicion, it was difficult to deal with this argument by an objective weighing of its validity. The argument also betrays a deep sense of insecurity and fear of coming to a quick decision that involved some elements of a domestic political criticism.
8. This brings us to the contributing factors of Thieu's style and the matter of "face." Thieu does not generally make quick decisions. He tends to delay the big decisions, especially when he feels insecure. The overreaction to the coup scare of October 8 provides evidence of that persisting sense of insecurity. In this context we confronted Thieu with the biggest decision of his administration. We put him under tremendous time pressure and under bonds of secrecy preventing adequate consultation with his senior colleagues. He was unable to prepare and educate them for the plunge. Although he was on clear notice that we would move quickly once we had Hanoi's agreement, Thieu himself was mentally unprepared for the fact that on the day after we had obtained agreement on a joint declaration, we would come to him with the news that the bombing would stop the following day and negotiations begin three days later. Moreover, Vietnamese, we should remember, are not as efficient as we in lining up their political forces, making contingency plans and waiting with "execute" messages. They require some time to thrash things out and line people up and talk matters over. They are perhaps not alone in this. If we had been less concerned with avoiding discussion with his senior colleagues, perhaps Thieu might have brought his Parliamentary and other opinion leaders along. As it turned out, the pressure also ultimately involved the ever present question of face, so important in this part of the world. I do not wish to exaggerate this point but merely add it to the list of factors. Standing up to the Americans, resisting their imposed deadlines, demonstrating Vietnamese sovereignty became, if not an end in itself, at least a welcome by-product of the affair. I deal with this phenomenon in more detail in paragraph 14 below.
9. I have not thus far mentioned Ky's role. It is a difficult one to assess and one is tempted to raise provocative questions. We must assume that some of the same considerations which passed through Thieu's mind also passed through Ky's. Ky is far more suspicious of us than Thieu. He is far more reckless, and he sets great store by a Nixon victory. He asked us several times, "What's the great hurry?" yet told us he would do what he could to persuade Thieu and the Security Council to go with us. But did he?
10. Our early reports of the first NSC meeting show him taking a hard line, which later became equivocal. One, and probably two factors were at work:
A. We think Ky was pretty certain we would not dare to move unilaterally, although he had no reason to make this miscalculation. And if we did not move, then President-elect Nixon could come into the picture on the side of toughness. He therefore acted in such a way as to reinforce Thieu's hesitations and the serious doubts of those on the National Security Council, instead of counteracting them.
B. But there may have been a second factor. The suspicion inevitably arises that he saw in Thieu's stand an opportunity to destroy Thieu as a result of Thieu's break with the US. If this was indeed his plan, then he certainly miscalculated, for in the short run Thieu's defiance of us has vastly increased Thieu's stature in the country. From the start Ky took the position with us that in principle they are opposed to the NLF presence, but that one must be realistic and face the fact that they will be present. He has consistently said he can handle Hanoi and the NLF; he has no fear of talking with the enemy; he can bargain with them and make concessions, for he is known as a hawk and is trusted. He was ready and anxious to go to Paris, yet in our meetings with him and Thieu his interventions were neither helpful nor constructive.
C. Was it because he wanted Thieu to box himself in on this issue? Was it because he sensed that while the initial emotional reaction may support Thieu, there will be many who will later come to think that Thieu has made a colossal mistake in failing to go with us in pursuit of a settlement, and that Thieu will be discredited and forced to resign in favor of Ky? We do not know, and we tend not to believe that Ky's ambition would carry him to such lengths. Still, we will be on the alert for rumors emanating from Ky and his entourage condemning Thieu for his refusal to join the talks and his break with the US at a time when Ky was quite willing to go to the talks and deal with the NLF or anyone else.
11. Does Thieu realize the full magnitude of the complications he has created for himself and for us, and the way he has isolated himself from foreign support? We think the answer is a qualified yes. Thieu thinks clearly, and said at one point he knows he will be vilified and castigated in US and in world opinion if he does not join the talks. Does he realize that if he persists in his absence he may drive the US to negotiate unilaterally? This I made clear to him, although I did not press it.
12. He must certainly have thought about it, and he received from us ample indications of how American opinion could react and what might happen. But he may see us trapped here, or still see in Nixon's possible election hope of eventual relief from these pressures. Or he may be gambling that Hanoi will come to his rescue by attacks on the cities and across the DMZ. Alternatively, he must realize that he cannot hold out indefinitely, and is buying domestic political support for a future move to the conference table at the cost of a short-run alienation of the US and his foreign friends. A risky and shortsighted course, but one he may have thought necessary.
13. What will Thieu do next? He has made his speeches to the legislature and to the nation. And while he went far out in his conditions, he stopped just short of using the precise words on which he bargained with us, "Hanoi must admit that the NLF is part of its delegation and must admit that it will talk to us." He is also keeping a lid on anti-US demonstrations.
14. Many Vietnamese have observed after his Assembly speech of November 1, Thieu "has really become our President." Some have said, "He is greater that Diem."/3/ It was profound emotional experience for the Assembly and for the country at large. Thieu shed the image of the American-appointed, American-supported chief executive and became a leader in his own right. By catering to a relatively low denominator of nationalism, he has acquired the aura of a courageous patriot who is standing up to the foreigner. By the same token, if he moves wisely and firmly Thieu has perhaps now acquired a freedom of action and an image of independence in the matter of GVN participation that he did not have before. He is now better able to accept a face-saving formula that would permit him to claim that his conditions had been met. And he may now be better able to handle the man in Viet-Nam against whom he harbors the deepest suspicions--Ky.
/3/Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam, 1955-1963.
15. Can Thieu be persuaded to change course--and hopefully soon? We think this may be possible. The essential element is that the President-elect, especially if it is Nixon, will have to make clear to him that GVN attendance at the conference is essential to a continuation of American public support of our Viet-Nam policy. A TCC summit conference thereafter with a carefully worked out and agreed joint communiqué beforehand could be the vehicle for bringing him to Paris with a minimum loss of face. There are already signs of leaders here having second thoughts, and there are reports that Ky is picking his delegation.
16. As a footnote to the above, the three rocket attacks on Saigon during the night of October 31/November 1, while we were in session with him, while not a major factor in his inflexibility during these crucial hours, certainly made him more stubborn. He said, "You say they are ready for serious discussion. But look what they are doing tonight."/4/
/4/In a November 5 memorandum for the President, Rostow conveyed the language of telegram CAP 82707, which was sent to Bunker in accordance with the President's instructions: "You should know that the President does not easily enter into relations of confidence nor does he easily withdraw confidence once given. The President believes he established with Thieu and Ky a basis for confidence over these difficult years. You should also know--and they should know--that the President's confidence in them is deeply shaken--very deeply shaken. Specifically, the President is in no mood for reassurances to them. If a viable relation is to be re-established, it is their task--and they should set about it promptly--very promptly. You will know best how to convey this message without any ambiguity." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [1 of 3]) Bunker planned to see Thieu on November 6 but the meeting was postponed when Thieu claimed to be "too busy" to see Bunker. He did agree to meet with him on November 8. (Telegram 42029 from Saigon, November 6; telegram 42172 from Saigon, November 7; telegram 42270 from Saigon, November 8; and telegram 42329 from Saigon, November 8; all ibid., Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. VI [2 of 2])
Bunker
201. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Stations in Saigon and [place not declassified]/1/
Washington, November 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VII. Secret; Sensitive. Carver passed the text of this telegram to Bundy on November 7. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy to Rostow, November 8, Helms wrote: "You will find this report topical and timely."
CAS 48668. For [2 names not declassified]/2/ only from Mr. Carver.
/2/[name not declassified], Chief of Station in Saigon, and [name and less than 1 line of text not declassified].
1. At Assistant Secretary Bundy's request, I used occasion of 6 November lunch with GVN Ambassador Bui Diem to probe his views on South Vietnamese intentions and, simultaneously, to convey bluntly some home truths about American politics that Mr. Bundy felt might be better transmitted via a personal friend than in an official meeting.
2. Our conversation inevitably commenced with a discussion of election results which provided a natural opening to stress that Mr. Nixon was most unlikely to adopt or follow a Vietnam policy materially different from that of President Johnson who, in any event, remained President until 20 January. Bui Diem concurred emphatically with this view. He acknowledged that some Vietnamese political figures (unspecified) labored under the delusion that Mr. Nixon would take a harder, more hawkish line, but said he had sent a series of long messages home trying to explain why this was simply not the case. He also acknowledged that the President and President-elect were certainly going to work in harmony on pursuing an American policy that transcended domestic political partisanship and, again, insisted he had so informed his own President in Saigon.
3. We then turned to the reciprocal interaction of domestic political factors in both Vietnam and the US. (Throughout our conversation I refused to discuss or comment on recent events that had led to current differences between Saigon and Washington.) Thieu had real political problems at home and limited room for maneuver. His recent actions had unquestionably produced at least short run political benefits for him in Vietnam. These, however, could swiftly sour if Thieu did not now act in a manner that furthered our common aims and not the aims of our common enemy./3/ On the US side, the paramount political task of this administration and its successor was the achievement of national unity. The Vietnam war was one of our primary sources of political divisiveness. Should the American public come to believe that the GVN was blocking the road to honorable settlement of that war, neither the executive nor the legislative branch of our government could turn a deaf ear to the American people's discontent. Somewhat reluctantly, Bui Diem agreed that this was the case.
/3/In CIA telegram 47828 to Saigon, November 4, Helms wrote: "It seems to us that in their own interests (and ours), there are at least three facts of real world life the South Vietnamese simply must hoist aboard: A. President Johnson's publicly enunciated commitment of the U.S. to a bombing halt and quadripartite negotiations in Paris is not going to be reversed (unless Hanoi's military violations are persistent and flagrant). B. The next President (whoever he may be) and, particularly, the next Congress will give the GVN and the Vietnam struggle short shrift if Saigon's leaders refuse to cooperate with Washington. C. Given the real world as it is now, Saigon's leaders will scuttle themselves if they do not put aside their suicidal fixation on the NLF's role in the Paris conversations and, instead, concentrate on the considerable mileage to be made out of the fact that Hanoi has been forced to accept an arrangement in which it is compelled to acknowledge the GVN's existence and puissance, something Hanoi heretofore has adamantly refused to do. We believe it essential that our Vietnamese colleagues face up to the facts of life outlined above. We also believe they might be receptive to the plausibly arguable (even if not irrefutably demonstrable) thesis that the Communist cause is floundering under increasing military and political pressure and that the only hole cards left in Hanoi's hand involve exacerbating Saigon-U.S. relations and setting non-Communist Vietnamese at each other's throats. If the South Vietnamese let themselves be suckered into playing Hanoi's game, the Communists may yet win the pot. If our Vietnamese refuse to play this game, however, Hanoi's remaining cards become worthless. Somehow, we must get South Vietnam's leaders to start thinking and acting along these lines." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/ISS Files, Job 78-32, [name not declassified] Chrono. File, Vol. 3)
4. We then took up Hanoi's strategy and current objectives. I argued that the Vietnamese Communists had fallen on very evil days. They and their cause were suffering severe defeats as a result of allied military pressure, South Vietnamese political progress, and the GVN's increasingly effective attack on the Communists' political apparatus in South Vietnam. Hanoi's only hope of victory now lay in dividing Saigon from Washington and in setting non-Communist Vietnamese at each other's throats. With all we had achieved together at such great cost, it would be suicidal folly to let ourselves be euchred into playing Hanoi's game. Again Bui Diem agreed, but he said we (the Americans) had to appreciate Thieu's problems and internally limited room for maneuver.
5. Thieu had taken the public position (on 2 November) that conditions did not now permit the GVN to take part in the Paris talks. Vietnamese political realities, therefore, required that there had to be some development(s) Thieu could point to as changes creating a new situation. Why could the US not pressure the DRV delegation in Paris to downplay the NLF's role? Emphasizing my lack of official authority to speak on this topic, I answered that while we certainly might lean on the DRV negotiators, I saw no chance whatsoever of their giving ground on this point. Instead, the best riposte to their attack was counterattack. Rather than fretting about Hanoi's propaganda line, Thieu should take a leaf from De Gaulle's book and treat Hanoi's claims for its NLF puppets with indifferent disdain, making it clear through his confident actions that what counted was not Hanoi's persiflage but the fact that Hanoi had been compelled to acknowledge (if not admit) his government's control over South Vietnam.
6. Bui Diem noted that Thieu was a cautious man beset by conflicting advice: some realistic, some not. (Bui Diem here digressed to praise Ky for his current realism and constructive posture.) Thieu was also under great emotional stress. Those around him with cooler heads had to work out a "mise en scene" that would permit Thieu to cooperate in Paris without losing face. Most reluctantly, Bui Diem agreed that the time available for doing this was short. For a few days the American people would be preoccupied with sorting out the election results. After that, trouble could soon develop if there was no sign of movement in the negotiation arena. In realistic terms, something had to break within the next week to ten days.
7. Bui Diem raised the idea of a TCC summit conference but recognized that any such affair, hastily convened, could create more problems than it solved. He did think it would be useful, however, if after Thieu had decided what to do, he touched base with all his TCC allies so he could say publicly he was acting in consultation with his fellow heads of state. Bui Diem also asked about the possibility of public statements, or a joint statement, by President Johnson and President-elect Nixon reaffirming American opposition to the concept of enforced coalition government. (One of Thieu's main problems, Bui Diem observed, was his concern that a GVN delegation's participation in Paris in a status equivalent to that of the NLF's delegation inevitably started Vietnam down the slippery slide to coalition government, which meant Communist victory and rule.) Again emphasizing my lack of official authority, I said I was sure my government would give careful consideration to any such suggestions Thieu wanted to make through Ambassador Bunker.
8. Toward the end of our conversation, Bui Diem began to wonder if it would not be a good idea for him to return to Saigon to brief President Thieu on American political realities and offer some suggestions impossible to relay by cable. I encouraged these thoughts. Bui Diem was afraid if he returned to Saigon now it might be misread as a sign of a chill in US-GVN relations. I opined that this would not be the case if his Saigon visit was short and he returned promptly to Washington. Under the circumstances, it would be perfectly natural for him to go home to give his masters a post-election briefing on the American scene. Time, however, was short and the clock was ticking. Bui Diem said he would ask Saigon for permission to return this weekend.
9. As our lunch closed, we discovered we had a mutual fondness for sailing. We agreed that Thieu had recently taken a tack that gave him domestic political advantage of potential overall utility in competition with our common opponents. The GVN was now headed straight for a reef, however, and it was time to come about. On that note we parted.
10. Mr. Bundy requests that the above report on our 6 November lunch be passed to Ambassador Bunker and Governor Harriman.
202. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, November 7, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting, which was held in the Family Dining Room of the White House, lasted from 1:05 to 2:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Read's agenda for this meeting is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Presidential Luncheon Memoranda. Notes of the Secretary of Defense's "0830 Group" meeting on the morning of November 7 by George Elsey read: "CMC--Luncheon agenda 1:00 W.Hse. today all revolve around how to get Saigon into line? The problem: Thieu followed instructions from Republicans not to agree but he has taken such a strong stand. The problem--How to get talks started--Really, only Nixon & Kosygin can help. The Pres. needs to get a good stiff message to Thieu & be able to say it has Pres. Elect Nixon's blessing. 'I don't know what Nixon's game is going to be. He's scored his points by screwing up LBJ's deal. Maybe LBJ can get Nixon to stop here on his way back up from Florida.' Also Kosygin might help by taming Hanoi's propaganda machine down. Also, get all the Troop Contributing Countries to put pressure on Saigon--except it's doubtful they all will." (Ibid., George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2])
NOTES ON FOREIGN POLICY MEETING
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
General Taylor
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: What do we have from Saigon?
Secretary Rusk: A new peace plan. Thieu won't see Bunker until tomorrow./2/ We should see how Nixon can get out of this as soon as possible. Bill Bundy or I could go down to Key Biscayne.
/2/See Document 203.
I would be opposed to Nixon going to Saigon. He may want to send an emissary like William Scranton./3/
/3/Former Governor of Pennsylvania.
He may want to send a message to Thieu. I can't imagine Nixon wanting to stand in the way./4/
/4/Rostow sent the President a draft letter by Nixon in telegram CAP 82724, November 6. The letter read: "Dear President Thieu: President Johnson and Secretary Rusk have now briefed me in the greatest detail on the evolution of the negotiations in Paris over recent months and on the consultations and the negotiations with the Government of Vietnam and its constitutional leaders. This review included especially the discussions and agreements with your government from October 15 through the negotiation of the draft joint communiqué on October 28 and the subsequent withdrawal of your government from that agreement. In the light of this knowledge, I wish to urge you, with all the emphasis I can, quickly to resolve whatever problems may remain in getting your delegation to Paris and finding ways, in collaboration with the Government of the United States, to come to grips promptly with substantive issues on which a peace settlement depends. You should know that I fully share President Johnson's concern that any further delay on this matter could endanger public support for the Government of Vietnam in the United States and thus endanger the struggle for the independence and freedom of South Vietnam and for a stable and honorable peace in Southeast Asia. As you know, I share President Johnson's view that in the Paris talks there will be, from our side, no recognition of the NLF as an independent entity; and that the U.S. Government will not attempt to impose on South Vietnam a coalition government with the NLF. I have also reviewed with President Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the military situation in Vietnam, including reports from General Abrams in the field. It is my impression that, if we proceed with present military plans, there is no reason that we cannot move forward in Paris from a position of negotiating strength. But, I would emphasize again, this requires an appearance in Paris of a GVN delegation within the next few days, ready to go to work seriously in the search for an early and honorable peace. In short, I can see no gain and potentially much loss from any efforts by your government to postpone decisions with respect to the Paris talks until January 20, 1969." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. V)
The President: Are things quiet along the DMZ, Bus?
General Wheeler: Absolutely quiet on the DMZ. Only 2 incidents on the first day--mortar fire. Nothing since that time.
There were a couple of small attacks against small population centers in the last 24 hours.
The President: I figured they would do this to save a little face.
General Wheeler: The North Vietnamese understand about Saigon, Hue, and Danang.
The propaganda from Hanoi stresses attacks against "military facilities." No action against any reconnaissance planes--drones or manned reconnaissance planes. Apparently they have passed the word.
General Taylor: I agree we should play it loose. We are trying to protect urban population centers.
CIA Director Helms: We have had 24 attacks since November 1.
Secretary Rusk: I would draw a distinction between isolated attacks and major attacks.
General Taylor: We have trouble defining what attacks are.
General Wheeler: Bunker blames attack on Saigon for Thieu backing off.
The President: I think Hanoi has done unexpectedly well. I don't trust them, though. If it's not calculated, substantial attack I would do nothing more than talk a hard game. I think it has been a good trade.
I was amazed with the disapproval it got throughout the country. The polls show 65% against it. The telegrams against it--mail is running 50-50.
Chuck Robb said every man approved of it.
General Wheeler: The message Abrams sent showed the men in I Corps applauded it.
Secretary Clifford: I have a memo on the increase in bombing in Laos. Our men are going about their work with great will.
Walt Rostow: Don Hornig/6/ has a memo on new interdiction devices for use in Laos--including laser bombs.
/6/Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology.
The President: I was proud of all of you on backgrounding--particularly Dean Rusk, Clark Clifford and General Wheeler.
Secretary Clifford: The bombing in Laos up from 181 sorties to 405-456 between November 1 and November 5.
November 1--181
November 2--393
November 3--407
November 4--456
November 5--405
Walt Rostow: They will feel it in Laos.
The President: Let's point out how quiet it has been in the DMZ and the cities.
It justifies our action on the bombing.
Secretary Clifford: Our casualties are up.
The President: The Marines are out there chasing them.
Secretary Rusk: They are from our own initiative.
George Christian: A lot of casualties were a result of one booby-trap.
General Wheeler: Marine engineers were caught in a trap.
The President: We had a party last night for the military people from Randolph and Bergstrom [Air Force Bases]. I am proud of their dedication to duty.
Told story about one fireman whose father worked in a coal mine. Said his father did it: Saw the ocean, rode in airplane, met a President.
Secretary Rusk: I would like all of us to go out to Andrews [Air Force Base] and thank them.
Secretary Clifford: We are under pressure to get the New Jersey back to [Subic] Bay.
The President: I have been thinking about how to handle Nixon. I think he wants both Rusk and Humphrey in his Administration. (laughter)
I think Rusk should talk with him. You may want to go down or talk with him on the phone.
I will see Dirksen this afternoon./6/
/6/The President met privately with Dirksen in the Oval Office from 6:05 to 6:26 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting has been found.
Secretary Rusk: It is a question of how Nixon communicates with Thieu.
A. Send Cable.
B. Call Bui Diem--telling him he will send a messenger to Saigon.
Secretary Clifford: At some stage the President and Nixon should talk. We should by then have a set course of action for President Thieu to take.
Now we are getting a lot of stalling.
The President: The message is the first thing we should get through.
How are we with troop-contributors?
Secretary Rusk: We have marginal problem with Thailand and South Korea--because of Thieu. We need to get this thing ironed out before all of them are called together.
The President: I agree. The Press would have a field day otherwise.
What is our situation in Paris?
Secretary Rusk: There is not much they can say until Thieu is aboard.
I am inclined to let Paris mark time while we are getting Thieu aboard. The NLF are getting all of the news.
Secretary Clifford: During the next 70 days--if the GVN still won't go--can we go into bilateral meetings?
Secretary Rusk: Hanoi might object to public meetings.
Secretary Clifford: We might have leverage to meet bilaterally with Hanoi--not suck up to Saigon.
Kosygin might help.
General Taylor: We can't sit 70 days and let Saigon hold us up. We should start moving after a reasonable period of time.
Secretary Clifford: Fundamentally, we are faced with the fact that we and South Vietnam have different goals.
We--want to finish fighting, get peace and get out.
I believe they prefer fighting go on:
a. Winning militarily.
b. Keeps the government going.
c. Keeps them from facing tough negotiating problems.
d. Psychologically important.
Secretary Rusk: During the GOP administration, the North Vietnamese began to roll in Laos. During the GOP administration, Vietnam was divided.
In 1960 Eisenhower said we would never let a Communist regime be established in this hemisphere. At that time we had on Ike's desk an intelligence report that Cuba was Communist.
Secretary Clifford: I reported on my last trip to Vietnam that the GVN did not want the war to stop.
1. They are content to have the U.S. present.
2. No danger.
3. The flow of money goes on. Thieu and Hong are honest, but there are a lot of them with their hands in the till.
4. We are equipping, arming and training the South Vietnamese army.
We do have separate goals.
We have prevented subjugation of South Vietnam by force; we have strengthened the government.
The President: What do you think of briefing all leaders?
Secretary Clifford: It's profitable to keep them informed.
[Omitted here is discussion of a meeting of NATO Ministers, relief for Biafra, and efforts to secure Senate approval of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.]
203. Situation Report By the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, November 8, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of the report to the President, November 8, 1:15 p.m., Rostow wrote: "As background, you may wish to have the fact stated by Berger in a phone call plus Harriman-Vance views on Thieu's latest." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the report.
Secure Phone Calls, 9:30-10:30 a.m.
Sam Berger
1. Berger informed me that Bunker had been unable to see Thieu at any time on November 8 before or after Thieu's public statement. An appointment had been requested for tomorrow but no definite time had been set.
Ambassador Vance
1. Vance gave me Harriman, Habib and his preliminary views about the Thieu public proposal for two "unique" delegations with the GVN heading our side and the DRV heading the other side. Our delegation believes that Thieu's proposal is "unacceptable and unworkable" from the point of view of both sides in Paris.
(a) The Thieu proposal is untenable from the USG viewpoint because if the GVN were Chairman of our side the GVN representative could take a variety of steps and actions which could prejudice our interests and over which we would not have control, e.g., "breaking up" a meeting, giving fast reactions to DRV/NLF views on matters of basic concern to us without adequate "consultation", etc.
(b) The reference by Thieu to inclusion of TCC representatives on our side "if necessary" would raise a number of complications if our allies chose to take advantage of it in the early stages of expanded talks.
(c) The proposal is almost certain to be rejected by Hanoi because it purports to dictate how Hanoi will organize its side of the expanded discussions. The DRV is apt to note that the GVN proposal is inconsistent with the views expressed by Saigon just a few days ago which insisted on two delegations on our side and one on the other.
2. For consideration at Secretary Rusk's 11:30 meeting today/2/ at the Under Secretary's request I asked Vance for his and Harriman's views on the question of whether the DRV would be willing without the NLF being present to negotiate substantive bilateral questions with us (e.g., mutual withdrawals, prisoner exchanges, Laos), if it became evident that the GVN would not come to Paris on an acceptable basis.
/2/See Document 204.
Harriman and Vance believe that if they put this proposition to the DRV representatives as hard and persuasively as possible Hanoi's initial response would be that circumstances had changed and they would not be prepared to go ahead bilaterally with us, although they were prepared to sit down with us on such issues with the NLF representatives present. Harriman and Vance think that the DRV would cling to this pattern for "a considerable period".
Benjamin H. Read/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
204. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 8, 1968, 1:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. V. Secret; Harvan Double Plus. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "Put on desk."
Mr. President:
We have just completed a meeting at Sect. Rusk's office, which included Sect. Clifford, Nick Katzenbach, and Bill Bundy, as well as myself./2/
/2/The meeting, which began at 11:25 a.m. and lasted until 12:25 a.m., also included Read. (Ibid., Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969) No other record of the meeting has been found.
It was agreed that we would draft for your consideration a message to Thieu, via Bunker, which would not, at this stage, be a direct Presidential letter but rather an oral message from the highest levels of the U.S. Government.
The message would, essentially, make these points:
--Thieu's proposal of today that South Vietnam chair the delegation in Paris is not acceptable;
--On the other hand, we can offer an agreed statement underlining a leading role for the GVN and the leading role in matters affecting the future of South Vietnam itself. Such an agreed statement could also include reference, once again, to the fact that we shall not recognize the NLF as an independent entity, etc.
--We would underline strongly the necessity for Saigon to get its delegation to Paris next week;
--We would tell them that if they cannot get to Paris next week, we are prepared to open talks with the other side on our own, on the issues of direct concern to the U.S.
The line-up of opinion was:
--Clark Clifford: Tell them we're going to open up with the other side in Paris next week, and let them sweat;
--Sect. Rusk: Give them one last face-saving way out, but tell them that we shall go it alone if they can't quickly find an acceptable formula;
--Nick Katzenbach: Same view as Sect. Rusk;
--Bill Bundy: More cautious about telling them bluntly that we shall go it alone. Bundy thought that the President should first get Nixon aboard on that proposition.
I shall be giving you the draft text as soon as I receive it./3/
/3/For the message to Thieu, see Document 206.
Walt
205. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Everett Dirksen/1/
Washington, November 8, 1968, 2:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, November 8, 1968, 2:54 p.m., Tape F6811.02, PNO 11. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. According to an entry in the President's Daily Diary, Dirksen called Johnson "re the Senator's talk w/Nixon this morning, South Vietnamese reactions, China lobby, and Saigon delegation to Paris." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Dirksen: Hello?
President: Yes?
Dirksen: I talked to Dick this morning.
President: Yes, Everett.
Dirksen: Now he's coming to see you at 1:30 p.m. Monday,/2/ as I understand.
/2/November 11.
President: Yes.
Dirksen: And he asked for your backgrounder. Now, I gave him the works. I said, "It seems that they send some of the boys out to stiffen Thieu's spine and tell him to wait and not send anything," so you'll know that he knows the story.
President: Well, what was his reaction?
Dirksen: Well, he said he didn't send anybody. Well, maybe not, but maybe somebody else sent somebody.
President: Well, what was his reaction to the request that he tell somebody to tell them to go on and get to that Paris meeting?
Dirksen: He didn't give me very much reaction. He just thinned it a little by saying "We didn't do anything." Well, that may well be, but there are a lot of people in camp, as you might know. So you'll know the kind of background you'll have to talk into.
President: Well, now, the point is, though, that this is not going to wait until Monday.
Dirksen: Won't wait until Monday?
President: No, no, no. Hell no. This ought to go right now because if they don't go in there this week, we're just going to have all kinds of problems, you see.
Dirksen: I thought that from the arrangements that were made that coming up here on Monday would be satisfactory.
President: No. I thought I told you last night--I ought to--I thought I'd hear early this morning because we want Thieu to get a message so he can get a delegation from Saigon to Paris next week. We think we're held up just everyday. We're killing men. We're killing men.
Dirksen: Yes, he called. Said that this arrangement for Monday was made through Jim [Jones].
President: Yes, he called. His man talked to Jim Jones and said they were coming this way and they'd be here Monday. So we told them to come in and have lunch. They're coming for lunch. But what I'm hoping that he will do--I think it would be better if he didn't have it direct from me--but I think what he ought to do is just this simple thing: Say "I have said I'm supporting our President. Now, he thinks that the South Vietnamese should be at that Paris conference, and I'm supporting that, that's my position." And he ought to tell the Chennaults and the rest of them that, by God, to get the word out.
Dirksen: He said he would go to Paris, if you wanted him to, or Saigon.
President: No, I don't want any travels. All I want him to do is just tell them to get to Paris, to get the delegation there. That's the way I'd--it doesn't do any good for me to go there or for him to go there. We just need the Saigon delegation because you can imagine what you and Mansfield are going to have if we've got a peace conference and this fellow won't even attend it. Now, what he does at that conference is another matter. We have told him that we will not be for a coalition government. We've told him that we will not be for recognizing the NLF. But he must go to the conference because we can't get him one vote in the Senate if he refuses to even talk.
Dirksen: Well, I sensed that he said that after he made the arrangements through Jim that you would have been informed about it.
President: No, no, he didn't mention this at all. I just told Jim to tell them, when he wanted to see me, that I would be delighted to see them, but that I had given you a message last night that was urgent, that we're killing men everyday while they're sitting there and doing nothing. Now if Saigon doesn't come to that meeting, I don't know what we'll have to do. Rusk is ready to brief Dick if he wants a briefing. But Saigon now thinks that they will play this out and keep this thing going on until January 20th and we think that's a mistake.
Dirksen: I had to shop over all of hell's creation to find him, and only got him, here, I guess it was 12 o'clock.
President: Well, you can call him and you tell him that I think this is urgent enough that he should send word to the South Vietnamese, either through me or through them. If he wants to give me a message, I'll carry it, if he wants to go through the Embassy, he can do it--
Dirksen: I told him I was going to call you.
President: And say to them that he supports the President and they should send a delegation there and do it quick.
Dirksen: I'll do my best.
President: All right. Thank you.
206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 8, 1968, 2144Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. V. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Rostow, Katzenbach, and Read; approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1509 for Harriman and Vance. On a memorandum from Rostow, November 8, 4:50 p.m., the President indicated his approval of "a draft statement which Bunker could use with Thieu, along with our threat to proceed on our own in Paris, summarizing our positive understandings as a basis for Thieu's getting off the hook." (Ibid.)
269234. For Ambassador from Secretary.
1. You should continue to seek appointment with Thieu. We leave it to you how hard to press, or whether a touch of aloofness might be more effective. Obviously, we need to get forward as rapidly as we can.
2. For the meeting, you should convey the following points as an oral message from the President:
(a) We note with surprise that President Thieu announced a position on the negotiations involving the United States without any consultation with us. Even though we were not able to reach agreement at the last moment on all matters involved in the cessation of the bombing, there can be no question but that we consulted intimately and at length with President Thieu before our action was taken and public statement made. Please ascertain from President Thieu his answer as to whether this procedure of his is to be followed in the future. If so, we will have to adjust our own attitudes accordingly.
(b) As far as President Thieu's proposals are concerned, they should be followed up by a GVN delegation in Paris. It is for the GVN to try to reach agreement with the DRV on the modalities of talks. We cannot undertake to represent Thieu in seeking agreement from Hanoi along the lines of his public announcement. This does not mean that we ourselves reject them as far as the United States is concerned. But we have just come from a recent experience in which we have engaged the good faith of the United States on the basis of what we had every right to believe was a common position of the United States and the GVN, only to have President Thieu repudiate our understanding at the last moment. We cannot again undertake to involve our good faith and make it subject to the whims of Saigon. The emphasis in President Thieu's proposal is GVN primary responsibility. They should therefore exercise it and get a delegation to Paris at once to probe the possibilities in whatever way is open to them.
(c) On the substance of President Thieu's proposal, he should understand that, whatever the form that is eventually agreed, the United States will speak for itself and will not delegate this responsibility to someone else. No other attitude is possible under our Constitution.
(d) President Thieu wishes a negotiating format in which the United States and the NLF are in the same relative position. Even if we could live with it, we wonder if President Thieu could in the light of what it would do to dignify the NLF.
(e) Finally, it should be emphasized very strongly that the problems President Thieu has in mind are problems with which his delegation should wrestle in Paris in the procedural phase of the new meeting. Unless a GVN delegation is in Paris in the course of next week, the United States will feel free to discuss its own interests with any delegation available to it. The American people, under whatever President, will simply not support the war effort if the GVN attempts to sabotage serious talks about peace, or if there is significant delay on issues they regard as secondary. We have never asked the GVN to be a satellite of the United States; we are not prepared to permit the United States to be a satellite of the GVN.
(f) The President bases his judgment of American public opinion not only on unanimous expressions in all media that seating arrangement is only practical solution, but on views expressed by leading Senators and Congressmen of both parties that GVN must take its place, or US should go ahead without them.
3. Having delivered this stiff message, you might perhaps await Thieu's reaction. In the light of it, you should be prepared to go ahead and state that we are perfectly willing to issue a statement covering the exact agreement reached in Paris, the role of the GVN, how we propose to treat the NLF, our continued rejection of any "coalition," and similar matters. Some of the points, such as the exact agreement reached in Paris, must necessarily come from the USG, but we could try to work out some form of joint statement, or agreed separate statements, if these would help Thieu's domestic political problem. The gist of your whole presentation should be that we are not unsympathetic, but that action is imperative.
Rusk
207. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and President-elect Nixon/1/
November 8, 1968, 9:23 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Nixon, November 8, 1968, 9:23 p.m., Tape F6811.02, PNO 12-13. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Nixon called the President at Washington from Key Biscayne, Florida. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Hello?
Nixon: Mr. President?
President: Yes, Dick?
Nixon: How are you? Did I interrupt your dinner?
President: That's all right. I was eating with some folks, but I came in another room./2/ That's why I didn't want to talk.
/2/The President had been at dinner with Lady Bird Johnson and guests. (Ibid.)
Nixon: That's too bad. I am just sitting here with your old friend [Bebe] Rebozo.
President: Oh, give him my love. I think he is one of the finest persons I ever knew.
Nixon: I want you to say hello to him.
President: I would love to.
Nixon: He is a great admirer of yours.
President: He has been awfully sweet to me.
Nixon: Let me say this that--
President: I am glad that you have got Rebozo because he gave me a lot of comfort when I needed it lots.
Nixon: Right. I had a nice visit with the Vice President today.
President: Good.
Nixon: And, uh, and Muskie, and they went on down to the Virgin Islands. And I want you to know how much we appreciated your wire and also Lady Bird's call to Pat [Nixon]. It was awful nice.
President: Good.
Nixon: And then, as I understand it, we worked it out so that it won't inconvenience you. We'll see you Monday at 1:30 at the White House./3/
/3/See Document 211.
President: That's good. That's right.
Nixon: Good. Now, getting to the key point, if there is anything I can do before that on this business of South Vietnam. If you want me to do something, you know I'll do anything because we are not going to let these people stop these peace things, if you think I could do something.
President: Dick, I told Dirksen last night I thought it would be better to do it that way than to be calling on the trips./4/ I think this: These people are proceeding on the assumption that folks close to you tell them to do nothing until January 20th. Now, we think--
/4/See footnote 6, Document 202.
Nixon: I know who they are talking about too. Is it John Tower?
President: Well, he is one of several. Mrs. Chennault is very much in there.
Nixon: Well, she is very close to John.
President: And the Embassy is telling the President [Thieu] and the President is acting on this advice. He started doing it back about the 18th following our talk on the conversation on the 16th./6/ I had two breaks in the month of October. The first one came from the other side. Hanoi felt that because of what Bundy had said--Mac Bundy--that to withdraw troops, and what Humphrey had said that he wouldn't--/6/
/6/See Document 80.
/6/See Documents 63 and 40.
Nixon: They can wait.
President: Well, he just said, "I will stop the bombing, period, I don't mean comma or semi-colon." So, Hanoi picked up the next day and went home for 2 weeks. We had it all wrapped up there and then for the meeting. Now, I don't know what'll come out of the conference. But that was the way it was. They went off. In the meantime, these messages started coming out from here that Johnson was going to have a bombing pause to try to elect Humphrey and that they ought to hold out because Nixon will not sell you out like the Democrats sold out China. And we have talked to different ones. I think they've been talking to Agnew--I think they think they've been quoting you indirectly--that the thing they ought to do is just not show up at any conference and wait until you come into office.
Nixon: Right.
President: Now, they started that, and that's bad. They're killing Americans everyday. I have that documented. There's not any question but what that's happening. Now, I said to you in that last talk that I don't believe you know it or you're responsible for it. I said--you know when I talked to all three of you that time--but I said we have problems. I looked over that transcript the other night. We have problems. I think we can work them out. I believe Thieu will ultimately come, but there are problems. Now, there are problems because these people are telling them that. Now, I think the wise thing to do from the standpoint of your country and from the standpoint of your Presidency--and I hope you believe me. I want to help you. I want to help you. I don't want to trick or deceive you.
Nixon: I do. Oh, I know that.
President: I want peace. And I don't want to get some Democrat in a favorable position over you. But I think they ought to go to that conference. Now--
Nixon: Let me ask you this--is there anything we can do right now?
President: Yes. I think you ought to have whoever you trust the most in Washington, whoever you're--
Nixon: Go to the Ambassador [Bui Diem]?
President: Yes, sir. Go to the Ambassador and say to him, "I told the President when he proposed these three points: number one, he assured me that he would not be for a coalition government. The President assured me that."
Nixon: That's right.
President: "The President assured me he would never recognize the NLF. So I have those assurances from him."
Nixon: Right, right.
President: "The President is going to be as strong on this as I am, but the President thinks that if we are to support South Vietnam on through the years ahead that we must be willing to meet at a conference table. Now, that's all we are asking. Now, you cleared that on the 7th and on the 16th and on the 28th." At least that's what the South Vietnamese did--they all cleared it.
Nixon: Right.
President: "Therefore, Mr. Ambassador, I think you ought to tell the President that I support our President on going to the conference, and I think you ought to go. And if they try to sell you out, you don't have to agree. But you ought to go because the Fulbrights and the Mansfields and even the Dirksens will not go along with anybody that won't go to a conference table." Now, that is where they are tonight.
Nixon: Let me ask you this--about the Ambassador, is--I met him about 5 or 6 months ago--does he have any influence with that government?
President: Yes. He is giving them these signals and he is telling them that he has just talked to New Mexico, and he has just talked to the Nixon people, and they say, "Hold out--don't do anything--we are going to win--we'll do better by you." Now, that is the story, Dick. And it is a sordid story. I told you that Sunday when I talked to you./7/ You remember when I talked to Smathers and Dirksen?/8/
/7/For this November 3 conversation, see Document 187.
/8/See Documents 186 and 181.
Nixon: Right.
President: Now, I don't want to say that to the country because that's not good.
Nixon: Right.
President: But they are playing that game. I don't think you're playing it, and I'd get off that hook. I'd just say to them, "You go to that conference and you protect your country, and I'm going to support our President as long as he doesn't recognize the NLF, as long as he stands on the conditions he does, and we're united, and don't depend on me to give you a better deal."
Nixon: We'll do that. Now, let me ask you this. Who would be the best one--who do you think the Ambassador--who should I have talk to him? Have you got anybody in mind?
President: No, I don't.
Nixon: Could Dirksen do it?
President: Yeah. I don't know whether Dirksen has any contacts or not. I-I-I trust Dirksen. I think Dirksen--he is not for any Communist take-over, and at the same time he is intelligent.
Nixon: Well, also, he is considered to be a--why don't we--let me try this out. Why don't I get--see if I can get Everett to go over to the Ambassador and lay it on the line with him?
President: That is what I would--
Nixon: And say that this is--say that he speaks for Nixon and Johnson. So let me do this, Mr. President. There's nothing I want more than to get these people to that table. As a matter of fact, as I told you on the phone tonight, I will even go out there if it's necessary to get them there. I think that would be a grandstand stunt. It would not be the best way. However, if you think the Ambassador has influence, I will have Dirksen talk to the Ambassador, or I could do it myself, if you think that will help.
President: I think it would help. I would just call him on the phone. Say, "I want you to know this. I don't want your people to get off-key. I'm talking to the President every day."
Nixon: Right.
President: "And the President has assured me that he is not going to do anything that we don't understand."
Nixon: Oh, I know that.
President: "And you tell your President that he better get his people to that conference and get them there quick. And what he does there is a matter for his judgment, but he oughtn't to refuse to go to a room and meet."
Nixon: Okay, we'll work on it.
President: Okay, Dick.
Nixon: Now, let me ask you this. One other thing. Tell me about Helms. What do you think about Helms?
President: I think he is a career, former UPI, man I never heard of. I appointed an Admiral [Raborn] when John McCone left because I wanted to be sure I didn't get a patsy or a soft guy in there, and we had too many of them here. The Admiral took it over and this Helms was the Deputy. I consider him--
Nixon: Let me ask your candid opinion. Would you continue him?
President: Yes, I would. Yes, I would. If I were you, I'd continue him, and if I were taking over from you, I'd continue him. He's objective. He's a reporter. He was an old UPI man. He's fair. He's not an advocate. He's anti-Communist.
Nixon: Oh, I know. When I met him out at the Ranch,/9/ I was very impressed by him, and I remember--you feel that way, do you?
/9/Nixon met Helms during a visit to the LBJ Ranch on July 26.
President: Yes. I never heard of him until I appointed him. He was a deputy to this Admiral that I had and he's extremely competent. He's succinct. He tells you as it is, and he's loyal.
Nixon: Let me ask you to do this as a personal favor. Would you mind--I think it would be a nice way to work out our positions--could you tell him sometime before we meet Monday that we have talked. Well, I don't want to say now that we plan to continue him. Will you do that?
President: Yes, yes. I will be glad to.
Nixon: Because I think it is good that we have a, you know, a good transition. Now, on this fellow, the Ambassador, he speaks English pretty well?
President: Yes, yes.
Nixon: Yeah. Well, we could talk to him. I don't think we ought to on the phone. Maybe I--and I don't want him to come down--maybe I can see him when I come up to Washington. That might be a better thing. No, I might get to him before that, though. Maybe Dirksen is the best one.
President: I would write out whatever I said, and what I would say is what Rusk said yesterday, and Rusk is the best adviser you can have until you get a man you have that much confidence in. He will play fair with you--I'll bet my life on it--as he will with me. He's a good man. Rusk said if I were Nixon I would write out one sentence, and I would say: "I support the President of the United States in going to the conference as soon as you can, and thereby there discussing the problems at issue, and we are united on that. Now, the President has given me assurances that he's not for recognizing the NLF as an independent entity and he's not for a coalition government, and that's what you said you want too. So you go on and talk it over, and if you can settle it, I'll be the happiest man in the world. If you can't, when I come in, I'll assure you that the President will work with me in trying to settle it."
Nixon: Actually, if we can get them to talking before that, that'll be much better.
President: It certainly will, because you want--
Nixon: This 60 days is the best time to get the damn thing going.
President: It certainly will, because you won't have 10 men in the Senate supporting South Vietnam when you come in if these folks refuse to go to the conference.
Nixon: Absolutely. Well, I'll get on it. As a matter of fact, uh, we'll try to get--I'll try to get Dirksen on the phone now, and see if we can arrange to have this fellow--well, I'll work it out. You don't need to worry about that. We'll try to get to him, and, uh, and I can just put it quite directly that we want him to go to the conference, period, and that you and I agree completely on what ought to be done.
President: I would do it, and I would say we will be in touch each day, and--
Nixon: Yeah.
President: And that he can be sure--he can tell his President that this government is going to operate as one before and after.
Nixon: Right.
President: And I am not going to make any decision there that will adversely affect those people without talking to you and without talking to them.
Nixon: Well, of course.
President: I haven't stayed in this thing 5 years to throw it away the last 5 weeks.
Nixon: The point is, too, that your position has always been, basically, as I told you, uh, you have taken the position which was extremely unpopular and which was right, and therefore I want to support you on it, and I am going to do it. No question about that. I want you to know that.
President: Thank you, Dick. Thank you.
Nixon: Great. Now, the only difficulty is, there is Rusk. Does Rusk think this fellow, the Ambassador--I don't know the fellow, I met him in New York about, oh, in April or May,/10/ and he is--
/10/Bui Diem dated his meeting with Nixon as July 12. (Bui Diem with David Chanoff, In the Jaws of History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), pp. 236-237)
President: Rusk told me last night that Nixon ought to do one or two things, that "I'll go see Nixon if you want me to." I said, "I think that will highlight a problem and there will be a lot of press around and it will embarrass Nixon and embarrass you." And he said that you ought to do one or two things. You ought to pick out whoever you are going to have for Secretary of State, or whoever your closest friend is, to go tell him, or you ought to say in writing just two sentences that "I want you to know"--pick up the phone and tell him--"I want you to know that I believe your country ought to go to this conference. It's going to make it hard for all of us if you don't. The President talked to me about it before we had the conference and he's going to talk to me about what happens at the conference and you don't need to feel insecure. We're going to stay with you and be fair. I can give you that assurance." And you ought to tell them that they are going to hurt themselves if Fulbright and Mansfield--
Nixon: Yes. The country will not support--
President: Mansfield's coming in to me tomorrow to say to them to go straight to hell and go on and negotiate--or get out--with Hanoi. That's why he is coming. He's the Leader of the Senate.
Nixon: You can't do that because we--because that way you would leave all those boys out there alone.
President: No, sure can't. Or pull them out and leave them there all alone.
Nixon: That is what I mean. Yes.
President: But if this damn fool just sits back and says--today he says he wants to go and head the United States delegation and tell us what to do, and under our Constitution, I couldn't do that.
Nixon: No, that's right.
President: So, what he's doing, Dick--these people--they thought that we were going to trick you and try to pull a bombing halt to defeat you. So, their judgment was that they ought to take out insurance and get them to screw the thing up where no good would come. Now, we're not trying to do that, and I'm not. And I think that American boys are being killed every day. We ought to tell these folks to go to the conference and we're going to support South Vietnam after the election just like we did before.
Nixon: And if they go, then there's a better chance for them than if they don't go.
President: Oh, of course. [Break in the recording] That Abrams--they trigger Abrams' reaction, so it is just on again, off again, just a matter of hours the bombing will be resumed. So then we went back to the Soviets and said we don't want to deceive anybody. This is close to the election. It is a very delicate period. I have told Nixon and Wallace and Humphrey all the same thing that I'm telling you now. Nixon said, "Do you have to have all three of them?" and I said, "No, I really don't have to have any if I thought that--I have said--if they do nearly any little thing, I would stop the bombing. But I would like to have all three, and I'm going to try to get all three." Well, in effect, that is what we are likely to get. So I went back to the Russians and said, "Now, we don't want to be deceitful, and if we should stop the bombing--" [Break in the recording]
Nixon: Because otherwise they would be deserted. Okay, I'll get on it.
President: Okay. You let me know what you do and what you do so I will know.
Nixon: What time is it now?
President: If I were you, I would call him right now and I would just say, "I have just talked to the President, period. I want you to know that I think your President should send a delegation there next week, period. I can assure you that I have assurances that this government, before and after January 20th, is going to play it straight and fair with you, but you will lose if you don't get a delegation there and soon, period, because Hanoi and the NLF are having a propaganda field day." Rusk told me that the great social charm in Paris is the NLF woman [Nguyen Thi Binh].
Nixon: Oh, God, yes. She's horrible.
President: And that they're just sitting back and saying that the U.S. can't even deliver.
Nixon: Right. Okay.
President: What I would say, there is nothing dangerous about it--you have said it publicly--that you support the President. "I support the government"--and I would just say--"Mr. Ambassador, some people have raised the question and I just think you ought to tell your President that I have an agreement with our President that we're going to act in unison--just two partners."
Nixon: Right. Will do it./11/
/11/See Document 209.
President: Okay.
Nixon: Goodbye.
208. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 9, 1968, 1100Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. V. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 8:05 a.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
42368. 1. I saw Pres Thieu at 1100 am Nov 9 and gave him the President's message contained in State 269234./2/ Thieu was in a rather subdued frame of mind and in answer to my direct question whether he wished to work with us on a proper and confidential basis in the future, gave an unqualified yes. He was very interested in exploring the idea of a joint statement, and in response to my strong urgings that he send a delegation to Paris, he asked how he could get into a dialogue with Hanoi "discreetly." Further exploration of this question resulted in his remark that he would like to consider a way in which to have "discreet preliminary talks" on the modalities with the US, the GVN, Hanoi "and possibly the NLF." This represents at least a modicum of progress.
/2/Document 206.
2. I began the conversation by saying I had hoped to see Thieu two days ago because I had wanted to have an opportunity to talk with him about finding a way out of his dilemma. I had had in mind that he might issue some statement to which we could agree, or alternatively that we might work out a joint statement which would make clear our position on the various matters that we had discussed earlier such as the our side/your side formula, how they and we would treat the NLF together and separately, our attitude toward coalition, making clear once more that we strongly reject the idea of imposing any form of government on South Vietnam. I said I and everyone in Washington had been very surprised that he had made a public statement on the negotiations without any previous consultation with us. I had a personal message from Pres Johnson for him on the subject.
3. Thereupon I spoke explicitly and at great length along the precise lines of State 269234. Thieu took notes and heard me through without interruption.
4. He then said he had never expected us to agree with his proposal. In fact, he had thought we would reject it and that we could then get together and find "a middle way." He fully realized it would be very difficult for us to accept the position he had publicly expressed yesterday./3/ I replied that it seemed to me that a public disagreement between us would only result in eroding support for him when he had to recede from his position, and it especially had the effect of eroding support for the war and for the GVN in the US. I said it was very unfortunate that we had to try to have negotiations in public, which is never a satisfactory way of conducting diplomatic business. Thieu asked, rather contritely, whether we couldn't discuss matters, and I replied of course, this was one reason why I was here. I wanted to find out whether he was prepared from now on to discuss these matters with us on a confidential basis. I said we needed a specific answer to that question. I said Pres Johnson wanted to know on what basis you propose to deal with US in the future.
/3/On November 8 Thieu proposed that his government's boycott of the Paris talks would end if the parties agreed that the GVN would head a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese delegation and the DRV would take the lead over the NLF. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 6-13, 1969.
5. Thieu said he wanted to make clear, in response to the remark about the US and the NLF being put in the same position (para 2D reftel), that he obviously never intended that we should have a position comparable to that of the NLF. I said this was what his formula seemed to imply and that it would only serve to dignify the NLF, as Pres Johnson had pointed out. Thieu said this had been furthest from his thoughts. I stated again that the US would speak for itself and would not delegate this responsibility to anyone else.
6. Thieu then said it seemed to him that the basic problem was whether Hanoi would continue to insist that the meetings in Paris would be on a "four delegation" basis. I said this was no problem at all since we had made it clear that Hanoi's position would be countered by us in the strongest terms, jointly and separately. We had already rejected Hanoi's claim that negotiations are on the basis of "four delegations." I reminded Thieu that we had been prepared to make a joint statement about non-recognition of the NLF, signed by him and Pres Johnson in the text on which we had agreed on Oct 28,/4/ and I added that we were prepared to repeat our position whenever we thought necessary.
/4/See Document 128.
7. Thieu said he would like to work this problem out with us. The question that kept arising in his mind was whether substantive talks could be serious as long as Hanoi insisted on a separate position for the NLF and persists in propaganda to this effect. I replied that I saw no reason to fear Hanoi's propaganda if the SVN was as strong as he professed it to be when he said SVN would fight on alone if they could not have the assistance of their allies; and that we certainly ought to be able to counter any Hanoi propaganda. I said the thing to do is to put them to the test by sending a delegation to Paris. Ever since Honolulu we had urged them to get in touch with the DRV. Hanoi had said they wanted to talk seriously. Pres Johnson had said that we expect productive, serious and intensive negotiations. The only way to find out whether the other side was willing to engage in such negotiations was to start talking with them. As Pres Johnson had said in the message that I had just delivered--Thieu had made his proposals, now it was for him to follow them up by sending a delegation to Paris.
8. I then gave Thieu an aide-mémoire containing the text of the memorandum given by Habib to Col An (Paris 23606),/6/ showing where we stood in the matter of procedures. I said this showed what we had been doing in Paris and made clear that, as we had told him here, if we don't agree to certain procedures they cannot be put into effect. I added that we visualized that the first meeting on the our side/your side basis would be a preliminary one to deal with matters of procedure.
/6/Dated November 8. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. VI)
9. It was at this point that Thieu asked how he could get into such discussions "discreetly," and wanted to know whether the GVN could get into the private talks between Vance and Lau. I said Thieu should understand that if the GVN attended these talks, Lau would bring along someone from the NLF. Thieu tried to say that if Hanoi continued to insist that there were two delegations on their side, this would show they weren't serious. I reminded him that we had always assumed that the other side would make all kinds of propaganda. The GVN could reject such claims, and so would we, and the world would know that we had rejected them. Thieu then again said he would like to explore the possibility of participating "discreetly" in the preliminary talks. As he put it, there were two possibilities. One was for them to talk with us and agree on procedures and for us to talk with the DRV; the other to talk with the US, GVN, Hanoi, "and possibly the NLF."
10. I said I wanted to come back to the fundamental question of how we were going to do business in the future, since I needed to give a clear reply to Pres Johnson. Did Thieu intend to work with us on a confidential basis as before? Thieu said, "Yes, I want to continue on that basis." I thereupon turned to the idea of a statement that we might work out together, and said we would be willing to cover all the points that were giving the GVN trouble, including a statement about the agreement reached in Paris and how we would propose to treat the NLF, our rejection of coalition, etc. Thieu remarked that nobody was concerned about the coalition idea anymore. I said we had heard statements by his people, and the very fact that he had referred to it in his Nov 2 declaration/6/ seemed to show that this fear was still in his mind. Thieu protested that he trusted us completely. I said some of his people apparently didn't, and that I found this incomprehensible in view of the statements we had made time and again.
/6/See footnote 4, Document 178.
11. I said we would consult Washington about a statement and expected to come up with some suggestions soon. Thieu seized on this with apparent relief and encouraged me to go ahead and try to have a text and said he would like to meet as soon as we were ready. He said he also wanted to have our ideas on how he might participate in the preliminary talks.
12. I then discussed with Thieu briefly the outcome of our elections, putting heavy emphasis on Nixon's complete endorsement (Nov 3) of Pres Johnson's policy with respect to negotiations./7/ Finally, I reminded Thieu again of what I had told him in all frankness before the bombing halt announcement, that we would make every effort to go forward together with the GVN, but that if we couldn't move with reasonable promptness we would have to go ahead alone. I said I wanted to be entirely frank with him, not in an unfriendly way, but I would not be performing my function for either side properly if out of politeness I obscured this point: the temper of the American people is such, I said, that we cannot wait very much longer for a GVN delegation to appear in Paris. I said that I thought this was perhaps the most important point in Pres Johnson's message, and he should be absolutely clear about it.
/7/On November 3 Nixon pledged his support for Johnson's peace effort and suggested that he would travel to either Saigon or Paris to get the talks moving forward. See The New York Times, November 4, 1968.
13. Comment: It seems clear to me that Thieu wants to find a way out of the situation in which he finds himself, and that he views the statement he made yesterday as an initial move. He has obviously talked too much and he has taken positions which have threatened to paint him into a corner. In the process, he has gained wider support and more popularity than he has ever enjoyed. He may also feel that when he gets into negotiations he will have gained some advantage vis-à-vis the DRV's persistent claim that his regime is a puppet of the US. But if now he can find some formula, and if we can help him to find it, that will enable him to move to Paris and at the same time save face, I feel sure he would welcome it. I think it can be done, but that it will take a little time and that we shall have to move with "deliberate speed."/8/
/8/Bunker reported in telegram 42376 from Saigon, November 10, that, in an effort to present such a face-saving solution, he had submitted to Thieu two different proposed statements: one to be issued by the United States and one by the GVN, which were designed to resolve any outstanding differences. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968) The statements included the text of one transmitted by the Department in telegram 269936 to Saigon, repeated to Paris, November 10. (Ibid.)
Bunker
209. Telegram From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith)/1/
Washington, November 10, 1968, 7:12 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. V. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissemination. Received at 1225Z. In an attached memorandum transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, November 10, 10:55 a.m., Rostow noted: "It looks as though with no coalition and no recognition of the NLF as a separate entity--points Thieu had all along--he is ready to go." Rostow added: "Bui Diem has called the State Department's Vietnam Desk officer (John Burke). He reported that he had spoken to Thieu about his conversation with Dirksen. He reported also, with the points about coalition and no separate entity assured, he believes Thieu will be ready to move to Paris after suitable statements are drafted. Bui Diem will be coming in to see Bundy this afternoon. Bui Diem plans to return to Saigon shortly." As a postscript, Rostow added: "The Bui Diem-Thieu conversation, over an open line, we can probably assume was meant to be heard." For the subsequent discussion between Bundy and Bui Diem, see Document 210.
Embassy of Vietnam.
On November ten instant a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past learned that Ambassador Bui Diem was in touch with President Thieu and advised him that Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois had come to see him today on behalf of both President Johnson and President elect Richard M. Nixon/2/ and that Dirksen had assured Ambassador Diem that the U.S. could give positive assurances that: one, there would be no coalition, and two, there would be no recognition of the NLF as a separate entity.
/2/The President discussed the Dirksen-Diem conversation of 8:30 a.m. on November 9 in two telephone conversations with Rusk that same day. In a 10:35 a.m. call, Johnson told Rusk what had happened immediately before the Dirksen-Diem meeting: "Well, Bui Diem called your desk officer, and said that Dirksen was coming in to see him today, and what advice did the State Department have. Bill Bundy told the desk officer to tell him he didn't have any. Walt just told me." He later added: "So, Bui Diem called y'all and said, 'What advice do you have for me?' I'd let Bui Diem not know what Dirsken's going to talk about except that he can say confidentially that Mansfield's coming in to see the President today and the President thinks that Mansfield's going to tell him that nobody in Congress is going to support this war one more step if they won't go." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, November 9, 1968, 10:35 a.m., Tape F6812.02, PNO 15) The earlier discussion between Johnson and Rusk on the same subject occurred at 8:31 a.m. (Ibid., November 9, 1968, 8:31 a.m., Tape F6812.02, PNO 16) Johnson met with Mansfield in an off-the-record session at the White House from 1:55 to 2:35 p.m., followed by an off-the-record lunch among the President, Mansfield, Rusk, Clifford, and Rostow. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Notes of these meetings have not been found. For further discussion of the Dirksen-Diem meeting at the South Vietnamese Embassy, see Bui Diem with David Chanoff, In the Jaws of History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), pp. 244-245, and William P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Administration (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), pp. 48-49.
Ambassador reported that Dirksen emphasized several times that he was speaking on behalf of both President Johnson and Nixon.
The Ambassador said he had told Dirksen that the Government of Viet Nam's reasons for not attending the Paris conference were based on its own interests and had nothing to do with the internal political situation in the U.S., vis-à-vis a Nixon victory at the polls or anything of that nature.
President Thieu confirmed that this is true.
Ambassador said that Dirksen assured him that U.S. policy will remain the same under Nixon; that Dirksen feared there might be some misunderstanding, but that there should be no misunderstanding about that.
Ambassador said he told Dirksen it was not a matter of (at this point informant was unable to furnish exact words of Thieu), but that it is the basic point of his government and is a reaction to the statement made here: that they did not think of it in terms of U.S. policy.
Ambassador reported that Dirksen said that the Vietnam President could consider this an unequivocal assurance on these two points: no coalition, and no recognition of the NLF as a separate entity. Ambassador continued that Dirksen said that Thieu could base his actions on this absolute assurance on these two points in considering the matter of Paris.
President Thieu asked, Can they make these assurances in some explicit way?
Ambassador said, Probably yes, I've talked to Bundy about this and Bundy said if it is necessary it could probably be done./3/
/3/See Document 176.
Thieu said, As far as the problem is concerned, on the part of the Vietnamese population there has been a distrust of the U.S., some distrust which comes from having the Front represented at Paris. Thieu said that the U.S. should not do anything to encourage the Communists, and that the more the U.S. can say, the better, because the NLF follows closely what the U.S. says.
Ambassador said, I told Bundy that and Bundy said that they will do whatever is necessary.
Thieu said, The Communists are claiming it is a four delegation conference. Why doesn't the U.S. deny that?
Thieu continued that if the U.S. would give assurances on the two conditions mentioned and on a third point (at this point informant was unable to furnish exact words of Thieu).
Thieu said that the lack of agreement has been based on principle and was not meant to sabotage the talks. Thieu said that the attitude of the U.S. has created mistrust in Vietnam on the part of the Vietnamese people.
Thieu continued that the assurances on the part of the Americans must have two aspects: one, there should be positive assurances such as the Ambassador has mentioned and two (at this point informant was unable to furnish exact words of Thieu).
Thieu continued that those are two aspects which should reassure public opinion here, in Vietnam, that the Americans will not pull out.
Ambassador asked if he could return to Vietnam to consult Thieu.
Thieu replied (at this point informant was unable to furnish exact words of Thieu) or in a few days?
Ambassador indicated he understands.
210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 10, 1968, 1823Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted by John Burke of the Vietnam Working Group, cleared by Dirk Gleysteen of S/S-S, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1523 for Harriman and Vance. In a covering note transmitting a copy of the telegram to the President, November 11, 10:10 a.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith the account of Bill Bundy's talk with Bui Diem after the latter had talked with Dirksen and Thieu." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI [2 of 2]) The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the telegram.
269960. 1. Ambassador Bui Diem called on Bundy at 10:00 a.m. November 10 to inform him that he had spoken by phone with President Thieu at approximately 2:00 p.m. Saigon time (1:00 a.m. Washington time). According to Diem purpose of call was to convey to his President substance of message which he (Diem) had received during course of November 9 from high-ranking spokesman for President-elect Nixon: that there was bipartisan agreement that no coalition government would be imposed on Viet-Nam and NLF would be not given status as a separate entity in Paris. At same time, Bui Diem had been cautioned that Congressional and public opinion in US did not understand Saigon's refusal to go to Paris and as consequence negative reaction was building which could create difficulties if Paris talks were delayed indefinitely due to continuing GVN refusal to participate.
2. President Thieu, according to Diem, was pleased to receive this information because he is principally concerned about obtaining specific assurances that there will be no coalition government and that NLF would not be treated as a separate entity in Paris.
3. Bundy informed Diem that Ambassador Bunker was in possession of a draft statement/2/ and would be presenting it to GVN which would appear to meet President Thieu's two points.
/2/See footnote 8, Document 208.
4. Bui Diem expressed gratification that there now seemed to be way of moving out of present impasse. He said that he came away from his conversation with President Thieu convinced that latter was most eager to move off present dead center. He said that President Thieu had emphasized that this was a matter of principle and there was no intention on the part of Saigon to sabotage Paris talks./3/
/3/The telegram bears no signature.
211. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, November 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting lasted from 2:58 to 4:15 p.m. Nixon, along with his wife, had arrived at the White House at 1:20 and remained until 5:02 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Rostow took notes for the first part of the meeting and Tom Johnson for the last part; their notes were combined to produce the final document. Rostow's notes are marked Secret. (Ibid., Walt Rostow Files, Nixon and Transition)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT-ELECT RICHARD NIXON
PRESENT AT THE MEETING WERE
The President
President-elect Richard M. Nixon
Secretary Dean Rusk
Secretary Clark Clifford
General Earle G. Wheeler
Director Richard Helms
W.W. Rostow
The President and President-elect came in at 3:00 p.m.
The President began by telling Mr. Nixon that the Secretaries of State and Defense would brief him on Vietnam. Secretary Rusk would also touch on problems in other areas. General Wheeler was available to deal with the military situation; and Mr. Helms would contribute intelligence data and make arrangements for keeping Mr. Nixon informed from day to day.
Secretary Rusk immediately suggested that it would be wise if Mr. Nixon would appoint a man in whom he had absolute confidence and adequate background to be stationed in a room next to Secretary Rusk's office for immediate liaison purposes.
Mr. Nixon said that, despite observations in the press, he had made no decisions on his Cabinet. He hopes to have his Cabinet appointed by December 5. He would naturally like to have someone keep in touch on Vietnam. To this end he had contacted Cabot Lodge. He found Lodge's views close to his own and those of President Johnson. In general, he found no significant difference between his views on Vietnam and those of the present Administration. Cabot said he did not wish to be considered for any permanent position in the new Administration.
Nixon said he accepted that view but would use him for special chores. He said that if it were acceptable to the present Administration, he would like Cabot Lodge to be his observer on Vietnam. He had great confidence in him. The only question he would raise is whether it would disturb the Germans if he were pulled out of Bonn for this special immediate task.
Secretary Rusk said immediately that Cabot Lodge would be wholly acceptable to him.
Mr. Nixon said that he needed someone for this task who had a deep knowledge of the Vietnam situation. He could not begin an education on Vietnam now. [Omitted here is brief discussion of personnel matters.]
Mr. Nixon said he would say and do nothing about this until he had a chance to hear from Secretary Rusk. He would discuss it further with Cabot in whom he had great confidence. He hoped the matter could be settled soon.
The President then asked Secretary Rusk if he would review the diplomatic situation. Working from the attached chronological paper,/2/ Secretary Rusk said that for the first two months there was no progress in Paris. The U.S. held to the President's position of March 31. Hanoi held to its position of April 3; namely, that the only purpose of the meeting in Paris was for us to stop the bombing unconditionally.
/2/Not printed.
During June, the your-side, our-side formula was talked over with Thieu. By the end of June Thieu and Ky had agreed that this was the best practical way to proceed. In July, Vance spelled out the your-side, our-side formula to Lau./3/ Nothing came of it, however, at that time.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 285.
In mid-September the President, through a special channel, put his basic three points to the Soviet leadership. On the 9th of October the delegation from Hanoi in Paris indicated an interest in the question of GVN participation and its relation to a bombing cessation./4/ On 11 October they asked bluntly, would the bombing stop if the GVN were to participate in the Paris talks. Harriman said he would have to refer it to Washington, but reaffirmed the facts of life about the DMZ and the cities./6/
/4/See Document 54.
/6/See Document 58.
We then checked with Bunker and Abrams, who agreed to Harriman's instructions based on the President's three points.
A Soviet diplomat in Paris affirmed to us that Hanoi would accept GVN participation.
On 13 October Thieu fully agreed to the proposed instructions to Harriman./6/
/6/See Document 64.
There were then meetings at which the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State expressed to the President their agreement. The JCS were polled individually and agreed. We then went out to the troop contributing countries who accepted the proposition.
On October 16 the President briefed the three candidates and received their support./7/
/7/See Document 80.
When the proposition was put to the Hanoi delegation in Paris, however, they raised other issues.
First, they proposed that the new, enlarged meetings be called a "four-power conference." This we refused. They also proposed that we state the bombing cessation was "without conditions." This we also refused because the President's "facts of life" represented, in effect, "conditions subsequent." Finally, there was the question of the time that would elapse between a bombing cessation and the first meeting. Hanoi offered "several weeks." We pressed them back towards a period of about three days, because the South Vietnamese government had steadily insisted that the time interval should be minimal. They thought that a gap might be politically awkward for them; and it might be awkward here as well, because the opening of the wider talks was the one concrete action in the wake of bombing cessation we could talk about frankly.
On October 27 there was a breakthrough. Hanoi dropped all the unacceptable points it had been pressing upon us and accepted a gap of three days and sixteen hours between the bombing cessation and the first meeting./8/
/8/See Document 128.
The President then requested General Abrams to return.
Secretary Rusk: We insisted on three points:
(1) That Hanoi recognize the GVN and let them participate in the talks.
(2) Restore the DMZ to its demilitarized state.
(3) No shelling of the cities of South Vietnam.
We checked with Dobrynin. On October 13 President Thieu agreed. All of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred. On October 15 all the troop contributing countries agreed.
We got locked up on some points with Hanoi. They dropped the "unconditional" clause. There was a breakthrough on October 27 when they dropped the word "unconditional."
Then General Abrams was ordered home for consultations.
We agreed with President Thieu on a joint announcement. It was short and simple. Thieu raised the points about having a session with his legislature; said more time was needed to get the delegation present.
The your-side, our-side formula was to give different views about the status of the four delegations. It has taken several months to sweep these things under the rug.
Issues have cropped up in Thieu's mind. Still it was thought possible that Thieu would join the talks after the President's announcement. On the basis of an agreement with Thieu earlier we had locked on to an agreement. We couldn't go back.
We think we can meet most of Thieu's demands.
It does not concede that South Vietnam heads the delegation. We can't have them speaking for us. We will give them anything short of speaking for us.
We met in Paris this morning.
Artillery and rockets came out of the DMZ. We met with the DRV and protested strongly. This is in direct violation of the agreement on no abuse of the DMZ.
General Wheeler: This is the second incident since the President's statement of October 31./9/
/9/See Document 169.
Secretary Rusk: On October 27th we went to the Russians and reminded them of our three points./10/ The Russians said our doubts on this were unfounded.
/10/See Document 130.
They more or less underwrote this agreement.
Mr. Nixon: As far as Bunker is concerned, he has good rapport?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, he does. Their nerves have gotten frazzled.
Mr. Nixon: It is best to leave matters with him then. Any talk about being of help should be through him.
Secretary Rusk: Dirksen's talk with Ambassador Bui Diem was helpful./11/
/11/See Document 209.
Mr. Nixon: My position has been to do nothing unless the President and Secretary of State thought it would be helpful. I will do nothing unless it is seen to be helpful by you. You would want me to stay where I am?
The President: Yes. I thought that travel wouldn't come into it. It would be better if this talk in Paris is private. The basic decision comes out of this room.
What you did here in Washington could be very helpful.
My judgment is that in the month of October the election campaign came at a bad time--delayed us from getting substantive talks.
The first two weeks we were charged by the Democrats. The last two weeks we were charged by the Republicans.
You should pick the man closest to you to participate or be informed on the decisions and instructions.
Mr. Nixon: We must be a united front. There must be a conviction there will be a continuation of policy after January 20 in both Saigon and Hanoi.
Do you feel an observer in Paris would not be helpful--have him where the decisions are being made and instructions issued?
Secretary Rusk: Washington is the site of highly discreet contacts with the Soviets.
Mr. Nixon: What are Lodge's credentials with South Vietnam?
The President: Excellent. He left of his own choosing.
Mr. Nixon: I don't want anybody messing it up.
The President: I would want it--if he has access to you and will be your man.
Mr. Nixon: He would be. I can see you ought to have a man here.
Secretary Clifford: I think it is a practical necessity to have a man here. You can be very helpful in next 65 days--I know you want to wind this up as soon as we.
Mr. Nixon: The quicker the better.
The President: I think in this period you should keep him informed. Lodge will have my confidence.
Secretary Rusk: Bring Lodge back on temporary duty.
General Wheeler: All the principal military men--General Abrams, General Brown, General Goodpaster, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff--say we are in a strong military position in Vietnam today. We can cope with anything they try.
There has been a withdrawal of twelve regiments in I and II Corps. There is a threat in III Corps from Cambodia.
Mr. Nixon: I Corps is up along the DMZ.
General Wheeler: None of us have any worry about it.
Mr. Nixon: Are we keeping the pressure on?
General Wheeler: Yes, if anything, the pressure is up. They're going after the enemy hammer and tong.
There has been no effect on the South Vietnam military by this current political imbroglio.
There is no sign of any breech between the United States and South Vietnam military.
Secretary Clifford: In order to understand present military situation, you must know:
(1) For three years North Vietnam had guerrilla strategy.
(2) In 1967 they found this was not succeeding. The Military in South Vietnam was more effective.
(3) In 1967 they met and decided to change strategy. They decided to mount an offensive to destroy the South Vietnam government.
(4) By January 1968 they mounted the Tet offensive. 50 to 60 cities were attacked including Saigon. They penetrated the U.S. Embassy compound.
(5) It was a military disaster. They lost a great many elite men. They withdrew--refitted--re-equipped.
(6) They launched the May offensive. It was less successful than the January offensive--they had huge losses.
(7) They attempted another in the last of August--the so-called third offensive. We had much better intelligence--we hit them with
B-52's. This was even worse.
(8) They withdrew again. They may have taken 40,000 men out of South Vietnam further distances. This shows where they are today. They have tried that from January through November.
I think this accounts for their presence in Paris. They don't know where else to go militarily.
Since November 1, part of the understanding was not to violate the DMZ. We have not entered but one violation--Saturday/12/ evening they launched 16 artillery rounds. They also launched rocket rounds: 8 122 millimeter rocket rounds; 4 U.S. Marines killed in action, 41 injured. This is a violation of the DMZ.
/12/November 9.
I do not take it too seriously. We thought they might test us out--to see if we really would respond. Abrams fired back immediately. It may not happen again.
We went from November 1 to November 9 without violation. There have been no other violations since Saturday night.
Secretary Rusk notified Ambassador Harriman and Mr. Vance. They took it up with North Vietnam. They said they would look into it.
Our understanding with North Vietnam is an excellent understanding from our standpoint. We do not have to worry about men coming across the DMZ or hitting the cities.
We are giving them fits in Laos. The weather is good in Laos. The weather is bad in North Vietnam. We are not going up much.
From the military standpoint it would be good for South Vietnam to appear in Paris. We need to resolve this uncertainty. We need to do everything we can do to get South Vietnam to the table.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Czechoslovakia, NATO's 20th anniversary, the Middle East, and the Presidential transition.]
212. Editorial Note
In a telephone conversation on November 12, 1968, President Johnson discussed the Anna Chennault affair with FBI Deputy Director Cartha Dekle "Deke" DeLoach. Johnson told DeLoach that he had "some pretty good information" and "hard" evidence that the most significant directive from the Republican campaign to the South Vietnamese Government occurred by way of a November 2 communication between Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew and Anna Chennault. The President therefore requested that DeLoach check all of the telephone calls originating from the telephone connection in Agnew's chartered campaign plane at the Albuquerque airport. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and DeLoach, November 12, 1968, 8:30 p.m., Tape F6811.03, PNO 1)
The next day, DeLoach called the President with a report on these calls. One of the phones on the plane had been used five times. The first call was made at 11:59 a.m., a personal call from Agnew to Rusk that lasted 3 minutes. The next call was made to Texas and another two calls were made by Agnew staffer Kent Crane to New York City. A fifth call was made to the Nixon/Agnew campaign headquarters at the Willard Hotel in Washington at 1:02 p.m.
The President verified that Rusk had talked with Agnew. He added: "We think somebody on the plane talked to the woman. We think pretty well that they talked to her and talked to Rusk, and talked on the same thing. And we think that they told Rusk--that they wanted to know what was happening in these relations. And Rusk made notes of it, he didn't exactly know what time, but he estimated that it was about 2 o'clock. And hers, it was immediately followed by a call to her, we think. And what we want to know is what time that was and when it was."
Johnson asserted that Agnew had passed to Chennault the word from Nixon "to hold off--do nothing." He related his assessment of the affair as follows: "I know this, and I don't think there's anything startling about it, because I'll just proceed on the assumption, I believe I'm right, that she--that he called Rusk, and he said what is going on in South Vietnam, the very question that he and she were talking about. Rusk told him--he didn't think anything of it, but he made notes on the conversation, and he made notes of the time, just the approximate time; he reported this to us. Then she comes along and she says to the South Vietnamese Embassy--she was a carrier, that's what she was--she said, 'I have just heard from my boss in Albuquerque who says his boss says we're going to win. And you tell your boss to hold on a while longer.' And that's the nut of it." Johnson concluded: "So I know that she told the Ambassador that. I know that the Ambassador told Saigon that. I know that Agnew--Rusk told Agnew what the facts were. Now I believe that Agnew told her that, because she says 'I have just talked,' and there must be an incoming call to her."
The President further noted that if the United States had not had physical surveillance on Chennault and a wiretap on the South Vietnamese Embassy, it would not have been able to secure a statement from Nixon encouraging the South Vietnamese to attend the Paris peace conference.
DeLoach then requested the following clarification: "Now did you say, and just to confirm what you've just said, we did intercept that phone call that she made to Ambassador Bui Diem, and she said specifically that, that 'my boss says to hold off, that we're going to win, hold it off.' The President replied: "Well, Ambassador told his President that. And the President told a bunch of people that. We were watching him pretty close, as you can imagine, in Saigon, and he repeated--this went all the way through the chain of command. The only thing I've got to do is see who her boss is, which we think is Agnew, because Albuquerque's the place. We ought to look at it carefully, because she talked to Agnew." DeLoach speculated that the 1:02 p.m. call to campaign headquarters actually was to Chennault from Agnew. Johnson agreed. "She got the message from Albuquerque," he noted. "That's logical that he was the one [who] gave it, because when he called Rusk, that's what we thought, because that's the only way he could get information to give her, was from Rusk." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and DeLoach, November 13, 1968, 5:15 p.m., Tape F68.09, PNO 8) These transcripts were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
For additional information on the electronic and physical surveillance measures relating to this episode, see U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Vol. VI (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976); ibid., Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans: A Final Report, Book 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976); and Cartha D. DeLoach, Hoover's FBI: The Inside Story By Hoover's Trusted Lieutenant (New York: Regnery Publishing, 1995).
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21897.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
213-226
November 12-30, 1968: South Vietnamese Participation in the Paris Peace Talks
213. Editorial Note
On November 12, 1968, Secretary of Defense Clifford held a news conference at the Pentagon. In response to charges that the administration enacted the bombing halt without prior agreement with the Government of South Vietnam, Clifford related the step-by-step process of negotiating the October understanding. He specifically referred to Vietnamese assent to each move, and he characterized the understanding as being "as clear as two partners can have, over a substantial period of time." He then made the following statement:
"Now, here is the position the President was in on Thursday [October 31]--and I might say I feel it strongly, because I see what he had to go through. He worked through 5-1/2 months to reach an agreement that he thought could be a major step toward peace, and then in the last out of the ninth inning, why, suddenly they say, 'No, we can't go along.' I think the President felt he had to proceed with his plan. He was committed. He had made the commitment to Hanoi. Vance and Harriman had put their word on the line, and I think he felt he had to go ahead. In addition to that, after all we have done in the country, after the enormous contribution that's been made, with the knowledge that we had gotten to the point where we had the sort of agreement that we had been working toward, I believe the President was absolutely right in not giving Saigon a veto on the plan. I do not believe that you can work along with your partner up to the very last minute, with the understanding full and complete as to what the arrangement is, and then suddenly have Saigon change its mind and decide not to go ahead. I think the President owed it--under his constitutional duty, I think he owed it to the American people to proceed with the talks. Now, I say that I believe we should make every reasonable effort to demonstrate to Saigon why it should come in and join the talks. At the same time, if they chose not to, I believe the President has the constitutional responsibility of proceeding with the talks."
The news conference is excerpted in the Department of State Bulletin, December 2, 1968, pages 568-573.
In a November 13 memorandum to the President, Rostow critically assessed Clifford's press conference: "I would suspect that Thieu would feel that Secretary Clifford overstated the case that Thieu was kept 'fully informed' and 'fully posted'. It is true that Thieu was told what he needed to know when he needed to know it, but he was not informed of the details of the private conversations. Nor was he informed of each conversation." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI [2 of 2]) Rostow later wrote the following reflections in a November 23 memorandum for the record:
"This memorandum for the record is set down at the instruction of the President. Sec. Clifford's remarks on November 12, 1968, indicating that we might proceed with talks in Paris without the GVN, were made without prior discussion or clearance with the President. At that time the President was not prepared to act along the lines that the Secretary suggested; nor was he prepared to clear a public statement indicating that this would be a possibility. On the other hand, the President had encouraged Sec. Clifford and Sec. Rusk to have press conferences. He knew that Sec. Clifford would have a press conference on November 12, 1968. They did not discuss the content of his position before the event. This does not mean that the President might not, at some stage, have taken action to open talks without the GVN. But he did not feel at the time that the situation justified such action. The President spoke to me to the same effect as the above the day of Sec. Clifford's press conference, when word of its content came in over the press wires." (Ibid., Vol. VII)
In his memoirs, however, Clifford maintains that he acted at the behest of President Johnson; see Counsel to the President, pages 600-601.
In a memorandum of conversation, December 6, Ambassador Harriman discussed Clifford's remarks about the conference that Clifford made to him during a private conversation:
"He explained to me in some detail the way in which his press conference of November 12 came about. He said the President the day before had said, 'Clark, you haven't had a press conference recently. Why don't you have one?' He went home and thought it over, tried to think what the President had in mind for him to say. Clifford thought the press would ask him whether the stopping of the bombing was political, and he made up his mind that it was his job to tell the truth. He had been incensed by the increasing volume of leaks coming out of the Saigon Government to the effect that President Johnson had taken unilateral action without consultation, and had done it for political purposes. (He subsequently told me he would give me the gory details that there were supporters of Nixon who encouraged the Saigon Government to do all they could to prevent a bombing halt before Election Day. He said he didn't have evidence that it was directed by Nixon, but it was certainly done by his supporters. (This explains what I had thought--that the Saigon Government was motivated in withholding approval of a bombing halt to attempt to avoid the election of Humphrey.)) Clifford thought out the night before what to do, and he made up his mind that he would tell the facts. Of course with the detailed precision with which he did it, no one can dispute the accuracy of his statement. I was particularly impressed with his telling the press that, having been up all night, they had gone to rest with the expectation that the President would go on the air that night, October 29. This was our belief in Paris. He referred to Bunker's several telegrams of Thieu's unwillingness to go along and requesting delay, and Clifford underlined the fact in his press conference that Vance and I had taken a commitment to North Viet-Nam that the bombing would stop and the U.S. Government had to live up to that commitment." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips & Missions, 1968-69, Paris Peace Talks, Memoranda of Conversations)
214. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 12, 1968, 0410Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Repeated to Paris.
42463. Subject: An interpretation of Hanoi's future strategy.
1. It is important that Washington, Paris, and Saigon to try to arrive at a consensus of why Hanoi accepted our terms for the wider negotiations, since our strategy in the initial phases of the new talks will be affected by the assumptions we make on this score. This is the case whether the GVN joins us soon, as we hope, or whether we are forced in the end to begin the talks on our own. I therefore wish to initiate an exchange on this subject and advance the following thesis.
2. Hanoi was aware that the war had become very unpopular in the United States and that support has been eroding at a rapid rate. Hanoi perceived that neither the American people nor the Congress will support an indefinite continuation of the war without hope of a foreseeable end, and that 1969 would be the critical year for an American decision on the war. Hanoi was mindful that concern with domestic problems and disillusionment with foreign intervention are mounting rapidly in the United States. Hanoi saw certain parallels between the growing American frustration and disillusionment with the war and those which led the French Government to disengage in 1954.
3. Therefore the following questions require an answer:
A. Why then did Hanoi not persist in its policies in the expectation that the erosion of our commitment would continue to the point that we would throw in the towel?
B. Why did Hanoi accede to our terms and make its concessions precisely at the time it did?
4. I venture the following answers to these two related questions:
A. Hanoi assumed that if they could get the bombing stopped before our elections it would be difficult, while talks were still in progress, for the President to resume bombing before January 20, and it would be even more difficult for the next President to resume the bombing after a 2-1/2 month pause. If there is merit in this thought, then we can conclude from this that Hanoi will act with enough restraint during the next 2-1/2 months with respect to the DMZ and the cities to deny the President justification for resuming the bombing before January 20.
B. Hanoi also believed that the election of Mr. Nixon would on balance be less favorable to them than Vice President Humphrey's election. They must have had a certain fear that Mr. Nixon, in an effort to end the war quickly, would authorize resumption of bombing, including possibly Hanoi and Haiphong, the closing of Haiphong, and even attacks on Lao and Cambodian sanctuaries. These fears--probably fanned by the Soviets--were a possible second reason which prompted them to meet our terms before the election. If, in fact, their plan was to try to defeat Mr. Nixon, then the plan miscarried by their waiting too long to accede to our terms.
C. But there were more basic and compelling considerations at work. Hanoi had to face the fact that the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong forces had taken enormous casualties in the three offensives of 1968. These defeats dashed hopes of a quick victory in 1968 based on a "general offensive" and a "general uprising," that would produce the disintegration of the armed forces and the collapse of the Thieu government.
D. Another basic consideration which Hanoi had to confront was that the South Vietnamese Government, armed forces, and people emerged from the ordeal of 1968 clearly strengthened, more unified, and more self-confident than ever before. With each passing month Hanoi had to assess the telling impact of American military power, General Abrams' new tactics, including the devastating tactical use of the B-52's and air power to close traffic choke points into Laos, the growing strength of the South Vietnamese Government, increasing aggressiveness of the ARVN military and para-military units, and the formation of the popular civil defense forces. This was a formidable combination too strong for them to hope to overwhelm militarily. The heavy losses of VC cadre during 1968 added to Hanoi's difficulties.
E. In the face of all this the NVA and VC leaders were encountering more and more discouragement and even signs of defeatism in their own ranks. There was evident danger of further deterioration on their side if they insisted on clinging to military (and quasi-conventional) strategy.
5. All this led to the conclusions, probably taken in September, that their only practical options were either to resort to the policy of protracted warfare or to shift their emphasis to the conference table or a combination of both in order to bargain for terms while VC strength in the countryside remained formidable and their structure of control is still virtually intact.
6. This brings me to their strategy in the coming talks. While it will call for a certain amount of fighting in the South, their main thrust will be to get substantive talks going quickly so that they can, very early in the game:
A. Put in a demand for an immediate cease-fire while at the same time exerting substantial, but shrewdly selective, military pressure;
B. Make such concessions as they have to make on their own withdrawal of forces so as to produce the earliest possible withdrawal of United States troops;
C. Offer tempting proposals for a coalition government, probably not with Thieu, Ky and Huong, but with almost anyone else they think we might accept.
7. The wide appeal and seeming logic of an immediate cease-fire coupled with an offer to withdraw their forces (already partially "out of country" in border and sanctuary areas) could be the two first main points of pressure on us. They know that these two offers (demands) will play upon the American public's desire to end the casualties and get out. If Hanoi can extract our agreement for an early cease-fire under conditions somewhat favorable to the Viet Cong and tied to this agreement on a troop withdrawal, then this will obviously strengthen their hand in the bargaining over coalition.
8. I therefore foresee no long haggling by Hanoi in the negotiations over procedures, for their purpose will be to get to the substance of business as quickly as possible. The alacrity with which Lau dropped his demands for a joint secret minute, for the presence of the press and TV at the first meeting, and for transferring the meeting to the larger conference hall, all reinforce my hunch that they want to move with speed to the substantive talks. I predict that they will not haggle long on such questions as flags, name plates, the position of chairs around the table, etc.
9. The GVN's refusal to enter the talks has given Hanoi a propaganda advantage which they will try to exploit as long as possible. They will make the most of this chance to sow suspicion and create division between us and the GVN. Hanoi will quickly sense that nothing suits their purpose better than to have the GVN boycott the talks indefinitely, forcing us to talk alone with them and the NLF. We may be sure that they are very conscious of the pressures on us to go ahead which will be coming soon from Congress and American opinion.
10. To negotiate without the GVN would be extremely difficult for us. Apart from the obvious complications in the negotiations themselves, it could touch off such confusion and demoralization in South Viet Nam as to endanger the stability of the government and the morale of the ARVN forces. Because of this Thieu simply cannot stand aside from the talks for very long. Moreover, if he should be so foolish as to delay unduly, he would find that, despite his November 2 address,/2/ so widely applauded at the time, pressures would build up to force him into the talks.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 178.
11. All this suggests to me that Thieu will have to move soon, but it may require that we take the few extra days or possibly a week or more, to bring him around. We have too much at stake and to lose by going it alone, and so has he. As for Hanoi, it can do little in these next few days except chafe and complain, protest and propagandize. If we assume as we do that Hanoi wants and needs this conference badly to save what it can from the wreckage of its 1968 strategies, then Hanoi has no choice except to wait.
12. The thesis of this telegram also suggests the relative unlikelihood that Hanoi will renege on its agreement with us or decisively provoke us into a resumption of bombing by seriously violating the DMZ or attacking the larger cities. Finally, it also suggests that once we and the Government of South Viet Nam move in concert into negotiations we will be in a strong position.
13. To fight while negotiating creates obvious and considerable problems and these cannot be minimized. During this period the sensitivities and vulnerabilities of American public opinion will be operative, and properly so. The enemy will probably attempt to maintain a level of "fighting" which will have optimum political impact (terrorism, assassination, continuing American casualties well publicized, etc.). At the same time they will offer, as noted elsewhere, superficially reasonable and tempting proposals during the negotiations. The "mix" will be designed to increase all pressures on us to settle at the table for a package favorable to the Communists. Although our emphasis in this message has been on the Communist desire to get into substantive talks, we believe that extensive preparations now underway in the enemy camp (as described in interrogations and captured documents) suggest the strong probability of considerable armed conflict in the days ahead.
14. Our own assessment, however, suggests, to repeat, that we could be in a relatively strong position at the table. Exactly how strong will depend on our ability to maintain our (and ARVN) troop morale, on our success against the Viet Cong local forces, guerrilla units and infrastructure during the coming months, and on our ability to exploit the pressures on the enemy for a rapid settlement while resisting (or at least containing) those working against us. We simply must not permit the enemy to believe through his reading of our public statements and overt or even diplomatic actions that our side is desperate for a settlement (or any part thereof, including the all important cease fire).
15. If the morale of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army has actually deteriorated to the extent we think, we should resist a cease fire until we have settled several crucial issues to our satisfaction: the future of the DMZ, the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces, not only from South Viet Nam but from Laos and Cambodia as well; and perhaps most important, the precise interplay between the exercise of government and Viet Cong jurisdiction in the countryside during the period of cease fire and prior to a final political settlement. Unless we obtain some satisfaction on these issues, any agreement will be a temporary truce to be upset by a pragmatic and ruthless enemy not long after our forces have departed these shores.
16. My final thought, already referred to above, is that while speed in getting the talks started is essential, we should give Thieu and his colleagues a reasonable time to let the message from the President-elect sink in, to consider our last proposal for a statement, and to reflect on Ambassador Diem's reports of the strength of the US press, public and Congressional reaction and criticism from other countries. It seems to me that we can live a little while longer with American public frustrations over the GVN's hesitations, now that talks are in prospect and there is a foreseeable end to the war. If necessary, we still have a few more cards we can play to bring them into the talks, for example a TCC meeting or a special envoy, before we lower the boom and go it alone, with all the complications that this implies.
Bunker
215. Editorial Note
During the fall of 1968, U.S. and South Vietnamese officials discussed the fate of a nuclear reactor located at Dalat. In a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Clifford, his Assistant for Atomic Energy, Carl Walske, warned of the possibility that this reactor could become a target for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. He specifically noted:
"It is certainly possible that the enemy could (a) destroy the reactor and its irradiated fuel with conventional explosives, thus spreading radioactive contamination around the blast area, or (b) in the extreme, steal the fuel with its enriched uranium. The true significance in this case would be minor, but the claim of a 'nuclear incident' might be quite important from a public relations point of view. In real terms, however, the contaminated area in the case of a destruction with conventional explosives would be limited and could be dealt with by standard remedial procedures. Again, the amount of enriched uranium lost if there was a theft would not be militarily significant, i.e. enough for an atomic bomb." (Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Memoranda--Miscellaneous)
Subsequently, it was agreed to shut down the reactor. In telegram 243817 to Saigon, the Department requested Embassy comment as to whether it would be more advisable to move the fuel elements to a safe storage site outside of Vietnam rather than retain them in-country, even though the rods were leased to the Vietnamese Government. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 38881 from Saigon, September 27, Ambassador Bunker insisted that the South Vietnamese had always been assured that the reactor rods would remain in Vietnam. Noting that General Abrams shared his views, Bunker advised:
"In suggesting deactivation of the Dalat reactor, it was most important that we avoid any implication that we entertained doubts concerning either the short or long-term security situation in South Vietnam as a whole. Aside from the reflection on our own ability to hold off the enemy, it was important to avoid to the maximum extent possible the lowering of GVN prestige among its own people and internationally as a result of any eventual public knowledge that deactivation of the reactor had been considered necessary. Since we have already led the GVN to believe we were not proposing removal of the rods from Vietnam, and since we have already engaged in considerable planning of our joint effort to effect removal from Dalat to a secure location in Saigon, I believe that for us now to suggest that it might be preferable to move them outside Vietnam would most certainly be interpreted as a vote of no confidence in the GVN and the future of SVN. It would raise among Vietnamese, both in the government and among the public when word of the removal gets out, serious doubts regarding our determination to continue to support SVN." (Ibid.)
In a November 12 memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze, Warnke reported on new recommendations from the Embassy. Rather than proceeding with in-country storage, the Embassy and MACV now contended that deactivation was no longer necessary on the grounds of security. They proposed to inform the GVN of this assessment but to offer to deactivate the reactor if the GVN deemed it necessary. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72 A 1498, OASD-ISA, Vietnam 381--May 1968) According to a notation on this memorandum, Nitze approved the termination of the deactivation program.
216. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 13, 1968, 0327Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI. Secret; Flash; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 11:18 p.m. on November 12. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
42560. 1. Following is text of memorandum handed us by FonMin Thanh this morning (underlinings are those in the original)./2/ Account of the interview and comments on the memorandum, including suggestions for reply, follow in septels./3/
/2/See footnote 6 below.
/3/See Document 217.
2. "This memorandum is designed to provide explanations on the RVN proposal of Nov 8,/4/ which, in the view of the GVN, deserves serious attention from the USG.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 208.
3. The basic formula envisaged by the USG and the RVN is a 'two-side meeting.' What remains is how to define the two-side formula.
4. The US Embassy note of Nov 11, 1968/6/ indicated that, as far as the other side is concerned, the US made clear to Hanoi that it might bring on its side of the table any persons it wished, but that the US would regard and treat all the representatives on the other side of the table as members of 'single side, that of Hanoi, and for practical purposes as a single delegation.'
/6/See footnote 8, Document 208.
5. This principle is very close to the RVN concept of the two-side formula, in which each side should consist of only one delegation, and Hanoi is the head of the delegation of the other side. The GVN, however, believes that this principle should be unequivocal in its applications to avoid the tendentious interpretations of the Communists who pretend that the so-called NLF is a separate entity and constitutes a separate delegation.
6. The Communists have stated publicly that the meeting is to be a four party conference, and that the US has accepted that formula.
7. The GVN believes that a public rectification by the US Government of these statements is necessary and will be helpful.
8. On our side, the GVN deems that the positions and the public images of both the US and the RVN will be greatly enhanced if, parallel with the other side, our side is also to consist of one delegation and the RVN is to head the delegation.
9. In the two-side formula, it is difficult to conceive that each side is not headed by someone.
10. In the delegation on our side, if the criteria of power and experience in world affairs are to apply, the US indisputably is the most qualified to head the delegation. But the GVN has serious misgivings on the political implications of such an arrangement, which the Communists will not fail to exploit to our great disadvantage, vis-à-vis Vietnamese public opinion as well as international public opinion.
11. As is well known, the Communist aggressors pretend to be the standard bearers of Vietnamese national independence, and their propaganda theme is that the GVN is not an independent government.
12. Besides, on the ground of principles, the RVN is the principal party in this war. The allies who have nobly responded to the appeal of the RVN in the defense of freedom in Vietnam play a role which in principle is only a supporting role, even though it is an instrumental and determining role.
13. The strength or weakness of 'our political position' depends on how effectively we safeguard even the appearances of these principles. In the view of the GVN, the political and psychological considerations of this nature cannot be underestimated in the present ideological war.
14. In fact, the Communists are very keenly aware of these considerations, and are most careful in respecting them. We have an example and a precedent in the arrangements of the peace talks at Kaesong and at Panmunjom during the Korean war.
15. These talks were also based on the two-side formula. On the free world side, the problem was simplified by the existence of the UN Command. On the other side, the Communists pointedly had the North Korean representative as the head of their delegation, while the Red Chinese representative was outwardly assigned only a supporting role.
16. This arrangement did not create any illusions of the respective power positions of these two Communist countries, but it did help them to keep certain appearances in conformity with the respective roles they claimed to play in the conflict.
17. We deem that the arrangements for one delegation for each side is more in harmony with the two-side formula, than the arrangements for three or four delegations with various interpretations.
18. The agreement reached in Paris between the North Vietnamese and US negotiators can be regarded as tentative until the concurrence of the other parties concerned, and until then still subject to negotiations.
19. To that end, in the view of the GVN, representatives of the RVN should participate, along with representatives of the US in Paris, in the unofficial and secret contacts with the representatives of NVN for discussions on the arrangements and procedures of a two-side meeting.
Saigon, Nov 13, 1968"
Of note: Quotations used in lieu of underlining./6/
/6/Set here in single quotes.
Bunker
217. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 13, 1968, 1100Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 7:45 a.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
42582. Ref: A. Saigon 42560; B. Saigon 42563./2/
/2/Telegram 42560 is Document 216. In telegram 42563 from Saigon, November 13, the Embassy reported on a discussion between Herz and Thanh regarding the GVN memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI)
1. In view of the uncertainty on the GVN side whether they had received a formal reply to their proposal of November 8, and since the President's message (State 269234)/3/ had to be communicated orally to Thieu who does not always pass our oral positions on in detail to his colleagues, I think it very desirable that we give a written reply to the GVN memorandum of November 13,/4/ setting forth our position in some detail. Following are some suggestions for such a reply, keyed to the paragraphs of reftel A.
/3/Document 206.
/4/See Document 216.
2. Re para 4, we might say that we are pleased that the GVN considers that we have come "very close" to their concept of the two-side formula and believe that in line with what President Thieu has said about finding a "middle ground," the GVN should now find it possible to move to negotiations in Paris. We continue to believe that the GVN proposals should be followed up in Paris and that it is now for the GVN to try to reach agreement with the DRV on the modalities of the talks. Accordingly, we urge the GVN to send a delegation to Paris as soon as possible.
3. As far as our conception of the our side/your side formula is concerned we feel that our side cannot dictate to the other side how they will constitute themselves for the talks. We can and will however say to them how we view and consider their side, and notably that we do not accept that the NLF is an independent entity. The other side may say whatever they please, but this will be propaganda and should be treated as such. It will be for our side to refute it at the negotiations and to set forth our position with dignity and emphasis to enlighten world opinion on the realities of the situation in Viet Nam.
4. Re paras 6 and 7, we might say that whatever the other side may claim for themselves, the US has never accepted that the forthcoming talks in Paris are to be called a four party or four-sided conference. What we have said, in line with our long-standing public position, is that the DRV may bring along to the talks any persons they desire. If any of those persons call themselves representatives of the NLF, we will point out at the talks that they are members of a single side, that of Hanoi, and for practical purposes part of Hanoi's delegation. (Note: We still feel, in line with para 2 Saigon 41764/6/ and para 2A Saigon 42288,/6/ that a US statement refuting the contention that there has been agreement on a "four-sided" conference would be desirable. The remarks by McCloskey at State Department briefing Nov 8, of which the core was on background, do not fully meet the requirements.)
/6/This paragraph of telegram 41764 from Saigon, November 2, contained the text of a proposed U.S. statement refuting the idea of a four-power conference. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II)
/6/This paragraph of telegram 42288 from Saigon, November 8, reiterated the need for issuing such a disavowal, not only in Paris and Saigon but in Washington as well. (Ibid., Vol. VI)
5. Re para 8, we might say that even if the US were able to accept that the GVN should be the head of a single delegation, we do not see how this would prevent the other side from making propaganda claims to the effect that the NLF was a "delegation" and that they were therefore two delegations. We have said to the GVN from the beginning of our consultations that we fully expect such propaganda claims to be made and that we must be prepared to refute them at the talks. We are, in fact, prepared to refute them at the beginning of the talks and as often as necessary thereafter, so that Vietnamese and world opinion will be in no doubt whatever about our position.
6. Re para 9, even if we could accept the position that each side must be headed by someone, we do not see how we can oblige the other side to accept that view. As far as the position of the GVN on our side is concerned, we are prepared to consider them as "primus inter pares", i.e. as the principal spokesman on all matters which are of immediate and direct concern to South Vietnam. Our draft statement of November 11/7/ which represents a formulation very favorable to the GVN, should give it full satisfaction on this point. We are also prepared to defer to the GVN representatives in such matters as seating, entry into and departure from the meeting chamber, etc.
/7/See footnote 8, Document 208.
7. Re para 10, we have never been concerned that placing us under GVN leadership in the negotiations would detract from our prestige. Our inability to accede to the wishes of the GVN in this respect comes not from considerations of prestige, but from constitutional considerations. Moreover, as indicated above we do not believe that even if our side were constituted as a single delegation, this would force the other side to constitute the DRV as the head of their side; they might very well constitute the NLF as the head of their side. That is why, in line with our discussions during recent months, we take the position that the our side/your side formula, which leaves it to each side to constitute itself as it wishes, is the only way in which we can move to the serious and direct talks on whose desirability the GVN and US are in agreement.
8. Re paras 14 and 15, we trust the Department will come up with appropriate comment.
9. Re para 18, while the GVN's participation on the basis of the our side/your side formula is a matter for sovereign decisions by the GVN in accordance with its national interests, we find it necessary to recall that the US acted in complete good faith in reaching agreement on this matter with the DRV, believing it to be fully consistent with our mutual consultations over a period of several months.
10. Finally, re para 19, we might say that we urge the GVN to participate in the procedural talks in Paris as soon as possible, whether such talks be in secret or in public. The US, however, cannot guarantee that the other side will be constituted as the GVN wishes it to be constituted./8/
/8/The President indicated his approval of a statement addressing five issues raised by Thanh: "(A) Reconnaissance flights, (B) the shelling of the cities, (C) the claim of the NLF to have been 'invited,' (D) the DRV claim that we have agreed to a four-sided conference, (E) violations of the DMZ." (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, November 13, 11:30 a.m.; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI) For text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, December 2, 1968, pp. 563-564.
Bunker
218. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 13, 1968, 5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted by Adolph Dubs, Acting Country Director for the Soviet Union in the Bureau of European Affairs. The Department transmitted a synopsis of the conversation to Rusk, who was attending the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels November 12-16, in telegram 271357 to Brussels, November 14. (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968)
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam--Attacks from Demilitarized Zone and Firing on Reconnaissance Planes
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Dobrynin, Embassy of the USSR
The Acting Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Dubs
Attacks from Demilitarized Zone by North Vietnamese--Ambassador Dobrynin was called in at the Acting Secretary's initiative to discuss matters of serious concern to the United States regarding developments in Viet-Nam. Mr. Katzenbach said that the first item he wanted to mention was that a series--but not large--of attacks, primarily artillery, had taken place from the DMZ./2/ Mr. Katzenbach said he could not overemphasize the importance the US attaches to the demilitarization of the DMZ. When such attacks take place it becomes serious, both in terms of maintaining the present situation and moving forward in the Paris talks. There should be no misunderstanding on this score on the part of the North Vietnamese. Mr. Vance has made this perfectly clear in Paris.
/2/Numerous incidents of shelling from NVA positions in the DMZ into South Vietnam occurred during November 9-13. On November 13 the Department released a statement characterizing the attacks as evidence that the DRV was not living up to the terms of the October understanding. See The New York Times, November 14, 1968.
Mr. Katzenbach handed Ambassador Dobrynin a paper (Tab A)/3/ detailing incidents initiated from within the DMZ. Mr. Katzenbach said that the paper and attached map pinpoint locations from which attacks have originated. These attacks have often come from the southern half of the DMZ. Surely the Soviet Union and the North Vietnamese must recognize the seriousness with which the US views these attacks.
/3/Attached but not printed.
Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether this subject had been discussed with the North Vietnamese. Mr. Katzenbach noted that the incidents were discussed yesterday (November 12) afternoon or evening./4/ The North Vietnamese, however, were not given a map detailing the coordinates from which the attacks had been launched. The map was now being handed to Ambassador Dobrynin in order to underline precisely where they had originated.
/4/In telegram 23712 from Paris, November 12, the delegation summarized that day's meeting with their North Vietnamese counterparts. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968) In telegram 23790 from Paris, November 13, the delegation reported on a discussion between Harriman and Oberemko regarding the shelling incidents and reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam. (Ibid.)
North Vietnamese Attacks on US Reconnaissance Planes--The Acting Secretary pointed out that US reconnaissance flights below the 19th Parallel have been shot at by the North Vietnamese. This has happened despite the fact that it had been made quite clear that we intended to continue these flights until such time as progress in the talks could suggest another solution. The North Vietnamese knew of our intentions, since we had made it clear that we would only cease the bombing and all armed attacks. Fortunately, so far, nobody has been hit. We cannot, however, rely upon such continuing good fortune in the future. If the situation continues, it will create a problem for the President in maintaining the present situation and the hope for serious talks. If reconnaissance flights continue to be fired upon, it is inevitable that the fire will be returned. Eventually, we would be back where we started from. This point has also been made with the North Vietnamese. The Acting Secretary then handed Ambassador Dobrynin a statement and map showing from where unarmed aircraft were fired upon (Tab B)./6/
/6/Attached but not printed.
Ambassador Dobrynin said that it was his personal impression that firing on reconnaissance aircraft was not explicitly discussed from the North Vietnamese.
The Acting Secretary pointed out that the aircraft involved were not making armed attacks. If firing continues, the Acting Secretary added, moving forward with the talks will be seriously jeopardized. If the North Vietnamese do not recognize this, they had better be told.
Ambassador Dobrynin said that it was his personal impression that the US was now placing a new demand, ex post facto, on the North Vietnamese. It was his impression, too, that this point had not been raised before in Paris. He recognized, however, that this could be a matter of interpretation.
The Acting Secretary said that if somebody shoots at you there is a good possibility that the fire will be returned. He did not want to see this happen. Certain points had been made by the US in discussions with the North Vietnamese. While these points did not constitute agreements, they were surely understood by the North Vietnamese. We simply don't know what their difficulty is in being photographed. All that we know is that if attacks against reconnaissance flights continue this is likely to lead to retaliatory action. US unarmed reconnaissance flights are not attacking anyone in Viet-Nam, and if a plane is shot down it will be difficult to maintain the present cessation of bombing. The US is the only side which has done anything, i.e., we have stopped the bombing. The North Vietnamese for their part are now violating the DMZ and firing upon US reconnaissance planes. The seriousness with which the US would view the loss of an unarmed plane cannot be overemphasized. We assume that the Soviet Union wants serious talks to take place.
Ambassador Dobrynin said that it was not quite clear to the USSR what was going on at the present time. After all the difficult arrangements, the US side does not appear able to come to the conference table. He noticed on the ticker that certain arguments surrounding the situation were now being made public and he did not believe this could be helpful.
The Acting Secretary said that interpretative statements by Hanoi as to what was agreed upon are causing the problems. Statements coming from Hanoi have made it more difficult for everybody. US statements regarding the situation have been scrupulously accurate; Hanoi's have not been.
Mr. Katzenbach said he hoped Ambassador Dobrynin's views regarding the unwisdom of public statements would also be expressed to Hanoi. He reminded Ambassador Dobrynin that we have stopped the bombing and that we would like to get on with the talks. He urged the Ambassador to tell Hanoi that their statements have not been helpful./6/
/6/Rostow met with Dobrynin the next day and summarized the meeting in a memorandum to the President, November 14, 3:30 p.m.: "With respect to Vietnam, he was primarily interested in knowing how we were getting on in Saigon. I explained some of Saigon's difficulties, emphasizing the role of Hanoi, VC, and Paris propaganda. I hit him hard on the DMZ and firing upon our reconnaissance planes. I told him I was temporarily optimistic about getting the GVN to Paris, but could give him no time. He said he hoped it could be soon. We were losing momentum. He expressed the hope that when they got to Paris they would be able to organize private talks in various pairings. With respect to Saigon and the NLF, he said that they would not come hat in hand to Thieu begging for forgiveness but would negotiate hard on the basis of the population and territory they held, plus their program for the future of the country. I said the critical matter, in my view, for Saigon and the NLF was to get off together up a back street in Paris and talk about the substance of the matter rather than jockeying publicly for face and position. He agreed. His final remark of the lunch was as follows: 'Off the record, I wish to tell you that we have had as much trouble with Hanoi as you are having with Saigon. The only difference is that your troubles take place in public.'" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Chlodnick File)
219. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 14, 1968, 1200Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 8:05 a.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
42653. 1. Ambassador Bui Diem came to see me this afternoon Nov 14. He stayed for over an hour. My general impression from the account of his conversations here is that the logjam is breaking and we are beginning to see some movement in the right direction.
2. Bui Diem said he had come back because he thought it highly important for the President and Vice President to know what the atmosphere was in the US and, more specifically, because he wanted to convey personally to the President the message from the President-elect that he had received through Senator Dirksen./2/
/2/See Document 209.
3. He felt his decision to come had been shown to be correct because he had found there was no true appreciation here of the atmosphere in the US, of the impatience of our people to get on with the talks, and he had tried to convey to all those he had seen here the sense of urgency in coming to an agreement with the US because there was no other way out for the South Vietnamese.
4. He had had a very long talk with President Thieu yesterday, Diem said, followed by another long talk with the Vice President. He had explained to Thieu very fully and frankly the situation in Washington and remarked that although he had not personally seen President Johnson, he felt that our President took a very serious view of developments here. He had given Thieu a full account of his talks with Senator Dirksen and with Bundy./3/
/3/See Document 210.
5. He had also told Thieu, Diem continued, that he thought he had received bad advice in sending a personal message to the President-elect suggesting that he come here, because this had been subject to misinterpretation and it made a bad impression in Washington. He emphasized that the President-elect stands four-square with President Johnson with respect to Viet-Nam and that the GVN is in fact confronted with a solid US bi-partisan front. He said he had also suggested to Thieu that he send a personal message to President Johnson.
6. He had stressed, Diem went on, in his talks with the President and the Vice President, that no time must be lost in working out a formula that would allow the GVN to participate in the Paris talks. He commented to me however: you know how the President is. It will take a little time for him to adjust to this. On the other hand, he is very quick to grasp the situation and will make the decision eventually. The trouble is that Thieu thinks too much in terms of Vietnamese society and not enough in terms of Viet-Nam's position internationally. It will take a little time for him to view the situation in the proper perspective.
7. Diem said that the President had asked him to talk with members of the National Security Council this morning; he had been reluctant at first but when the Vice President also urged him he decided to do it. He felt this had been very useful. He also talked with some members of the Senate and found them receptive to the need to find a way out of the present impasse.
8. Thieu had been very upset by the Clifford statement,/4/ Diem said, but he had also told Thieu that the "reply" by Minister of Information Thien had been very unwise, to which the President agreed. Thien's statement had been made without any consultation. Diem urged that there be no further public recriminations, and I said I couldn't agree more.
/4/See Document 213.
9. Bui Diem said he would stay here until a solution was worked out. This might force a few more days to prepare people psychologically, and perhaps the Clifford statement meant that a little more time would be desired so that people will not think that the GVN is caving in under threats. He thought there had been misunderstandings on both sides but that these could be repaired and that he thought there was good will on the GVN side.
10. With respect to the statement that we had proposed on Nov 11, Diem said he thought it satisfactory in general but probably the GVN would have some suggestions which would not so much concern substance as phraseology, and he said (as Foreign Minister Thanh had informed us) that the study of our draft had not yet been completed. Diem was planning to see Thieu tomorrow morning and would urge him to see me as soon as possible. In any case, Diem said, the President would send for me soon. Also, the Vice President had said he would like to talk with me.
11. I asked Diem's opinion whether he thought I should wait for Thieu to make the next move and whether he thought it was up to me to respond to what he had told me about the Vice President. Diem thought I should wait until I hear from Thieu but he thought this would be soon, and that I might inquire from Ky's office when he wished to see me. Diem asked whether I would accept a dinner invitation from the Vice President, and I said of course I would do so.
12. We had earlier information from Dan Duc Khoi which was generally confirmed by what Bui Diem subsequently told me. Minister of Interior Khiem was also reported as saying that matters seemed to be clearing up and that he thought obstacles had been removed to an understanding between the USG and the GVN on the Paris talks.
13. Comment: I believe that this talk with Bui Diem and the earlier conversation with Foreign Minister Thanh (reported septel)/6/ show that it is the desire of GVN leaders to find a way out of the impasse and to send a delegation to Paris. In order for this effort to succeed, however, it is essential that we be able to work out the method for achieving this quietly with them and that we allow them a reasonable period of time to come around.
/6/See Document 216.
14. It is evident that Secretary Clifford's press conference and the angry reply by the Minister of Information make it difficult for the GVN to move immediately since it would appear to be done under US pressure. It is therefore essential that there be no more public statements which would make the situation more difficult, so that the excellent Department statement and Bui Diem's activities here can have their maximum effect.
15. I anticipate that through conversations with the Foreign Minister, President, and Vice President in the next two or three days, we can work out the exact form of the statements which will be used as a basis for resolution of the problem. I have assumed that the Department's statement was in fact the answer to the Foreign Minister's November 13 memorandum and Thieu's November 8 proposal,/6/ and it is now unlikely that a full written reply will be needed.
/6/For Thanh's memorandum, see Document 216. Regarding the November 8 proposal, see footnote 3, Document 208. In telegram 271923 to Saigon, November 14, the Department noted: "There is of course no question that any effort (honest or otherwise) to get the DRV to accept Thieu's November 8 proposal would be going beyond what had been discussed in the private talks with Hanoi and would change the understanding that each side would be free to organize itself as it saw fit. Nonetheless, the question whether this 'goes back' on anything reached in private talks seems to us entirely secondary to the practical judgment that Hanoi would never agree and that the effort would simply paint both the GVN and ourselves into a worse corner. We honestly do not think 'bad faith' has much to do with it, but practical results do." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968)
16. If the Department has any further comments on Saigon 42582,/7/ however, I would appreciate having them promptly, but I would urge that I be given flexibility as to the use that might be made of them. At this moment it seems most likely that the combination of the Department's November 13 statement/8/ and the draft statements furnished to the GVN November 11, perhaps modified slightly to meet GVN points, should be the basis for an agreed solution.
/7/Document 217.
/8/See footnote 2, Document 218.
17. I have just now been informed that the President wishes to see me tomorrow morning./9/
/9/See Document 222.
Bunker
220. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 50-68
Washington, November 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, Job 79-R01012A, NIE Files. Secret; Sensitive; Limdis; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the National Intelligence Board and signed by Helms. For an INR assessment of this NIE, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVII, Document 96.
SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER VIETNAM
The Problem
In this estimate we consider two possible outcomes of the war: first, a political settlement which, for one reason or another, would permit the communists to take control of the government in South Vietnam, not immediately but within a year or two; the second, acceptance by Hanoi of a solution that falls well short of its objectives while preserving important elements of its political-military apparatus in the South.
The Estimate
I. Southeast Asian Strengths and Weaknesses
1. Whatever the outcome in Vietnam, there are several constant factors in Southeast Asia which will serve to condition developments there. Stability in the region is jeopardized by the internal weakness of states still seeking the right mixture of traditional practices and modern institutions after a long period of colonial rule. In most states, the central government has little capacity to mobilize national resources; and in several countries, border provinces are remote and neglected, and there is widespread alienation among ethnic and religious minorities. Other broad social problems and poorly functioning economies add further to the burdens of the frequently inefficient civilian and military leadership. While these conditions offer opportunities for communist subversion they are partially offset by a growing sense of nationalism, traditional fear of China and distrust of communism as an anti nationalist and pro-Chinese movement.
2. Obviously, there are significant differences in the inherent stability of the nations of the region and in the strength of internal factors resistant to communism. The military regimes of Burma and Indonesia, for example, have still not developed a firm popular consensus in support of their policies and programs, nor is it clear that the existing political institutions are viable. In both countries, however, the sense of nationalism is strong enough to hold the basic political framework together. In Malaysia and Singapore, on the other hand, the ethnic loyalties of the Malay and Chinese communities conflict with their national feelings, but representative government and the electoral process have taken hold, and there is positive support for the national leadership based on its commitment to economic betterment.
3. Thailand and Cambodia occupy a middle position. The Thai regime still searches for mechanisms to ensure and legitimate its predominance; while in Cambodia, Sihanouk's highly personalized rule has forestalled any real test of political institutions. But both regimes are reasonably acceptable to the majority of the people and neither appears to have domestic political opposition with sufficient strength or cohesion to threaten its position. In both countries, too, political stability is reinforced by widespread respect for the royal family. Though Laos is also a Buddhist monarchy, it lacks the homogeneity of population and the sense of history which provide a firm basis for Thai and Cambodian nationhood. In any event, Laos is a special case: Fundamentally, the Souvanna regime depends for its survival on the external forces which created and sustain it.
4. Economic weaknesses--inadequate utilization of resources, capital shortages, low export earnings--are also conspicuous among the problems of Southeast Asia, but the impact of such deficiencies on political stability should not be overstated. In general, the region's predominantly agricultural economy provides sufficient food to adequately feed the population despite continuing high birth rates. In this situation, sophisticated economic analyses often have little application to the life of the mass of the citizens, much less to their political attitudes. It is apparent, however, that the reasonably well-managed and rapidly growing economies of Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore have enhanced the political stability of their governments, while economic stagnation contributes to the uncertainty of prospects for the regimes in Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia. In a category apart is the Philippines where a fairly good growth rate tends to mask ever-widening disparities between rich and poor.
5. The leaders of Southeast Asia are further distracted by the rivalries and frictions which frequently characterize their relations with one another. Prince Sihanouk views Cambodian history as essentially a struggle to forestall national extinction at the hands of more aggressive Thai and Vietnamese. As a result, Cambodia's energies--and those of Thailand and South Vietnam as well--are often diverted by border incidents, propaganda wars, and diplomatic recriminations. The burgeoning dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over the ownership of Sabah threatens to disrupt efforts to achieve greater regional cooperation. Thailand's longstanding doubts about the loyalty of its ethnic Malay peoples causes Bangkok to deny full cooperation to Kuala Lumpur in joint efforts to deal with security problems along their common border. For their part, the Malaysians remain suspicious of Indonesian ambitions in Borneo despite Sukarno's departure from the scene. And Singapore is persistently fearful of absorption by its Malay and Indonesian neighbors.
6. Communist Subversion. More than any other part of the world, the countries of Southeast Asia have been hampered in their quest for stability by communist subversion. Each of them, except Singapore, has had to contend with a communist insurrection on some scale, and communist bands are still active in most countries. So far, however, the communists have gained complete control of only the northern half of Vietnam and adjacent positions of Laos. Moreover, although Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have, at one time or another, required the assistance of foreign combat troops to meet the communist threat, the others--Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines--needed only the input of matériel, technical aid and, in some cases, advisory personnel.
7. Communist parties in Southeast Asia have fared poorly, not because Marxism and Socialism are unpopular, but because the communists acted in such a manner as to alienate nationalist sentiment in the various countries. In 1948-1949, just as newly independent, nationalist and socialist oriented regimes were appearing in the region, Moscow and Peking proclaimed a general line of armed liberation for Southeast Asia. This gave the communist parties an anti-nationalist image which alienated most students, intellectuals, and workers. (A major exception, or course, was in Vietnam where the communists managed to gain a predominant position in the nationalist movement after World War II.) After the failure of these premature insurrections, communists in some countries tried to operate at the legal and parliamentary level under the slogan of peaceful coexistence. But popular support, except in Indonesia, could not be developed, and most of the parties had no alternative but to continue with the effort to develop peasant-based insurrection. In several cases, this has meant operating in remote areas populated by relatively primitive minority peoples.
8. Communist prospects in Southeast Asia reflect these inadequacies. Communist insurgency is much less of a threat today in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines than 20 years ago. The once formidable Malayan Communist Party force is down to less than 1,000 men and is holed up just north of the Thai-Malaysian border. Another 500 or so guerrillas from Sarawak roam the highland jungles south of the Sarawak frontier. Both groups are comprised mainly of ethnic Chinese residents of Malaysia, but neither maintains any substantial foothold on Malaysian soil. The Huk movement in the Philippines consists of an armed nucleus of about 150 men and appears to have degenerated from a communist guerrilla movement into more of a Filipino "mafia," engaged in murder and extortion for a livelihood. In central and eastern Java, a few hundred Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) activists have taken to the hills in hopes of developing the sort of guerrilla force the party so obviously lacked during the crucial weeks of October 1965. The PKI effort has been severely set back by recent government operations against its bases; many top communist leaders have been killed. Despite this setback and the party debacle of 1965-1966, the communist movement in Indonesia remains the most potentially significant subversive force in Southeast Asia aside from the Vietnamese communists.
9. While communist insurgency has declined in the insular and peninsular states of Southeast Asia, activity further north--in Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia--had been stepped up in recent years, partly because of the war in Vietnam and partly because of the stimulus of Peking and Hanoi. Fundamentally, the present significance of the communist parties in these countries lies in their role as instruments of external forces rather than in their own internal appeal or strength.
10. In Burma, the long-simmering insurgency of the 4,000 or so Peking-oriented White Flags (Communist Party of Burma/White Flag) was given a new orientation about two years ago when they adopted a full-blown Maoist line. This was followed shortly by a crisis in Sino-Burmese relations generated by Peking's Cultural Revolution. Although the Chinese have since moderated their overt hostility toward the Ne Win/2/ regime, they persist in an effort to weaken it; they supply guns and training in adjacent Yunnan Province to the relatively few members of dissident ethnic groups willing to cooperate with White Flag elements in attacks against government units in northeastern Burma. Whatever the communist strategy in Burma, Peking and the White Flags probably have little hope of implementing it without substantial cooperation from the Kachin, Shan, Karen, and other ethnic insurgent forces. In the past, the lack of common objectives and cohesion among these rebel groups has been their principal weakness vis-à-vis the Rangoon government, and there are few signs that this defect will soon be remedied. Moreover, most ethnic insurgent leaders appear to be anti-Chinese and to oppose communism as a threat to their ancient modes of living.
/2/General Ne Win, Chairman, Union Revolutionary Council, Burma.
11. The decision to commence active insurgency in Thailand in early 1965 was probably made by Peking in concert with Hanoi; the former has always dominated the Thai communist movement. While preparation for guerrilla war in Thailand began at least as early as 1962, plans were accelerated in 1965 probably to assist Hanoi by generating concern in US official circles over a possible communist "second front" in Southeast Asia and by stimulating fear in Thailand over further extending its military commitments to the US. So far the communist insurgents have made little headway, but their actions have alerted the regime to its vulnerabilities in remote sectors of the country and led it to institute various remedies in the fields of security, administration, and economic development. In the Northeast, across the Mekong from Laos, 1,500 or so insurgents are on the defensive, despite occasional forays. In the dense highland jungles of the North, several hundred tribesmen, with grievances against the government, have been armed and trained by communists and are harassing government forces and outposts near the Lao border. On the other hand, the communists are not likely to exert any significant influence away from remote tribal districts so long as their appeal is geared mainly to hill-tribe grievances. Efforts to penetrate the ethnic Thai in the North have not progressed far but do pose some threat for the future. Communist terrorism on a much smaller scale is a continuing problem in other regions of the country.
12. Over the past year or two, guerrilla activity has revived in Cambodia and become a serious internal problem for the Sihanouk/3/ regime. Its origins and nature are vague, but activity is centered in two areas. In the remote northeastern part of the country, where the Vietnamese communists operate in support of the war effort in Vietnam, some dissident tribesmen have apparently accepted arms from Hanoi to oppose the increasing government presence in the region. Of greater potential significance are the disruptive activities of the ethnic Cambodian insurgents, styled "Khmer Rouge" by Sihanouk, who operate sporadically in small armed bands throughout western Cambodia. There have been incidents elsewhere, however, and the Khmer Rouge appear to have links to subversive elements in Phnom Penh itself.
/3/Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodian Chief of State.
13. In Laos, of course, the communists pose a major threat. They control about half the country and a third of its people, and the indigenous communists--the Pathet Lao--have an internationally recognized claim to a share in the national government. The backbone of the insurgency is, however, provided by regular North Vietnamese forces.
14. In sum, the nations of Southeast Asia exhibit serious social, political, and economic weaknesses. But they are generally buttressed by a sense of nationalism and a determination to preserve their independence. They have had considerable experience in dealing with communist subversion, and they have learned over the centuries to survive in the shadow of a powerful China. None of the countries in the region, with the possible exception of Laos, is so weak that communist movements are likely to increase their strength greatly over the next several years without major and direct foreign assistance.
15. The US Role. How the US views its role and commitment in the region, and how this is perceived by both communist and noncommunist elements, will continue to be crucial factors in the Southeast Asian political equation. There is no realistic prospect that over the next several years another power or a regional system will appear to relieve the US of the security function it has been undertaking in the area. In fact, the expected withdrawal of UK forces from Malaysia and Singapore will inevitably pose new problems for the US in this regard.
II. A Settlement Favorable to the Communists/4/
/4/Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and Maj. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dissent from the argument in this section. For their views, see their footnote to paragraph 38, page. 12. [Footnote in the source text.]
16. In discussing an outcome favorable to the communists, we rule out such unlikely assumptions as the military collapse of Allied forces in South Vietnam and precipitate and unilateral withdrawal of these forces, or a negotiation involving political concessions so sweeping as to be tantamount to granting Hanoi outright achievement of its aims in the South. The contingency here discussed is a political settlement of the war which, for one reason or another, would permit the communists to take control of the government in South Vietnam. Insofar as the rest of Southeast Asia is concerned, an important variable would be the time required for the communist takeover. If it took 5 or 10 years, the repercussions elsewhere would tend to be muted or even lost among other developments during the period. For purposes of this estimate, therefore, we assume a much shorter period, say no more than a year or two, during the course of which the Southeast Asians would come to the conclusion that the settlement accepted by the US made a communist success virtually inevitable.
17. Communist Reactions. A settlement in Vietnam favorable to the communists would give a psychological lift to leftist elements everywhere in Southeast Asia, but it would not necessarily lead them to rely more heavily on armed violence than at present. Some local parties are already doing all they can in the field of "peoples' war;" others would require considerable time and outside assistance before a large-scale campaign of violence could be initiated. And the decision to attempt this course would depend not only on the local party and its view of the opportunities but also on the policies of its patron--China, North Vietnam, or the USSR as the case might be. Only in Laos, and perhaps in Cambodia, is there a capability in being to increase the level of armed pressure and violence quickly and significantly.
18. Hanoi's first reaction to its success in South Vietnam might be an early move to unleash the armed forces it controls in Laos and to provide large-scale assistance to a Cambodian resistance movement. There is, after all, no doubt that Hanoi's objectives are to establish its control over Laos and attain predominant influence in Cambodia. But we believe the Vietnamese communists would be somewhat more cautious. They might fear that there was some risk of a new US military response and, more important at this stage, this level of military actions would probably seem unnecessary to the North Vietnamese; they would expect the regimes in both countries to be amenable to Hanoi's influence without further resort to war. Moreover, Hanoi would be preoccupied, for a time at least, with the formidable task of consolidating communist rule in South Vietnam.
19. Initially, therefore, Hanoi would probably apply pressures in Laos, hoping in this way to produce a new coalition government dominated by the Pathet Lao. (Hanoi might indeed have embarked on this course in advance of the Vietnamese settlement if it were convinced during the negotiations that the US was in the process of a major reduction in its commitments in Southeast Asia.) If pressure tactics failed in Laos, the North Vietnamese might undertake new military action to strengthen the communist bargaining position or to effect an outright military takeover of the country. In Cambodia, Hanoi would probably move more gradually, settling initially for a government reasonably responsive to its influence. If Sihanouk proved uncooperative, Hanoi would apply additional pressures, including assistance to procommunist elements in Cambodia.
20. Hanoi sees both Laos and Cambodia as falling primarily within its sphere of influence and, in the aftermath of a successful settlement, would resist efforts by Peking--or by Moscow--to have a controlling voice in either country. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Hanoi is not likely to seek a predominant role in the communist effort. Activities in Laos and Cambodia would have first call on its capabilities. In Thailand, the North Vietnamese are currently providing support to the guerrilla forces though they recognize that the Chinese have a major interest and may be in a better position, over the longer term, to influence the communist movement there. Hanoi will probably be reluctant to leave the field entirely to the Chinese, however, and will do what it can to maintain an influential role in the communist insurgency in Thailand. With regard to Burma, Indonesia, and Singapore, on the other hand, the North Vietnamese will probably be more intent on cultivating friendly relations in the postwar years.
21. As for Peking, it is difficult to estimate the extent and nature of its activities in Southeast Asia after Vietnam, especially because of the uncertainties engendered by China's domestic situation. Recurrent internal crises, for example, could limit China's ability to sustain a consistent policy line toward the region. On the other hand, if internal order is maintained, China's aspirations for great-power dominance in the region would lead to increased efforts to limit or displace US influence, particularly in those states close to China's borders. But this will be true no matter what the outcome in Vietnam. In any event, China would almost certainly claim some credit for any communist success in Vietnam and exploit it at the diplomatic and political level throughout Southeast Asia as part of the continuing effort to advance its national interests. A communist success in Vietnam would encourage Peking to support subversive movements, but the scale of its efforts would be influenced by the degree to which local conditions provided promising opportunities. Current Chinese strategy does not appear to call for overt aggression and we do not foresee a change in this strategy.
22. The impact of communist success in Vietnam on relations between Peking and Hanoi could have substantial implications for Southeast Asia, particularly over the longer term. It is possible, for example, that the two countries would draw closer together and undertake joint political, propaganda, and subversive efforts in the area. It seems more likely, however, that Hanoi would wish to take the opportunity to establish quite clearly its independence of the Chinese, relying on continued Soviet and available Free World sources for the material and technical assistance essential to its postwar reconstruction. Following such a course would require that Hanoi soft-pedal support of subversive activities outside Indochina at least. It would also increase the chances that the age-old Vietnamese distrust of China would combine with current conflicts of interests to produce serious strains in Hanoi-Peking relations.
23. The Soviet Union is not likely to become a major supporter of communist subversion in Southeast Asia after Vietnam. The Soviets will be disposed to defer to Hanoi's wishes on Laos and Cambodia and will probably attempt to increase their own influence in the outlawed Indonesian communist movement. In general, however, the end of the war and its self-imposed obligation to support Hanoi would lead the USSR to seek a more important political position in the area--particularly in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines--by developing further its diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties. The Soviets would oppose increased Chinese influence everywhere in the region.
24. Reactions of the Southeast Asian Countries. Most of Southeast Asia would welcome an end to the war in Vietnam, but a settlement favorable to the communists would produce a crisis in Laos and severe anxiety in Cambodia and Thailand. Throughout the area, the settlement would have an adverse psychological impact that would damage US prestige and credibility. In view of the extent of US commitments to South Vietnam and the depth of US involvement in the war, serious doubts would be felt about the validity of US power and commitments, and there would be renewed concern over communist intentions and the longer run prospects of surviving in the shadow of Chinese power.
25. The greatest danger in this situation would not be that subversive elements in Southeast Asia would immediately take heart and make rapid progress in undermining the stability of noncommunist governments. As indicated above, local communist organizations generally lack the capability and the appeal for any such rapid growth. Rather, the certain danger would be the development of an atmosphere of defeatism and resignation in noncommunist countries in the area, with individual governments losing their hope of withstanding the political and psychological pressures of Hanoi and Peking. There could be a general move to placate the communist powers by cutting military and political ties with the US. This process could begin before the communist takeover had been completed, particularly if Hanoi moved quickly and successfully to upset the balance in Laos.
26. We cannot say that it would not work out this way in the end, for much would depend on continuing US actions. While some Southeast Asian leaders would probably entertain increased doubts about the will of the US to play a security role in the area, we do not believe that they would be panicked into precipitate changes in policy or posture. They would probably suspend any definitive policy decision at least until there had been time and opportunity to study indications of future communist conduct and intent and, more critically, those of the US.
27. Concern over the communist threat in the aftermath of Hanoi's success would also be conditioned by the circumstances of the time. Some countries may be psychologically prepared for a settlement which appears to be favorable to the communists. Moreover, if the settlement came in the next year or so, the atmosphere in Southeast Asia would be quite different from that which existed in 1964-1965. At that time, there was the spectacle of unbroken Viet Cong successes against South Vietnamese forces, rapid Chinese advances in the field of modern weapons, and an increasingly powerful Sukarno/PKI coalition taking charge in Indonesia and bullying the newly-organized and fragile Malaysian federation. In the intervening years, however, Southeast Asians have seen China bogged down in confusion and disorder, Sukarno ousted and the PKI suffer bloody suppression, and the Vietnamese communists pay a fearful price during long years of war.
28. A communist success in South Vietnam would have its sharpest and most immediate impact in Laos. The realization that North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao could quickly overrun government-held territory if they chose to do so, would generate sentiment among civilian politicians in Vientiane for reaching an accommodation with Hanoi. Souvanna and other Lao politicians would be willing to see a return to the 1962 Geneva Accords, a coalition government with communist participation, and a more truly neutral foreign policy. They would be reluctant, however, to agree to concessions that appeared to threaten a complete communist takeover. The top Lao military figures would oppose any major concessions to the communists. Much would depend on how far and how quickly Hanoi pressed its advantage. Without increased US involvement, Laos could not long withstand the military and psychological pressures which Hanoi would in due course almost certainly apply.
29. Cambodia would also feel directly exposed as a result of a communist success in South Vietnam, especially if North Vietnamese Army units remained in Cambodia. Khmer Rouge and other insurgent elements might be emboldened to intensify their efforts, but they are not likely to develop quickly into a major threat to Sihanouk's regime without considerable support from Hanoi. Sihanouk would probably try to suppress the insurgents, meanwhile taking steps to accommodate Cambodia to the new situation in the Indochina area. Internally, for example, he would probably decide to bring procommunists into the government, though he would oppose a predominant role for them. Internationally, he would seek the good offices of Moscow and Peking to help secure Cambodian independence, and might even propose convening a new Geneva Conference to this end. Sihanouk would do these things in hope of avoiding the complete communist takeover that he has long feared. If all such measures fail, Sihanouk would probably bow out rather than subject his country to a Vietnam-type conflict or accept a figurehead status for himself in a communist-controlled regime. A new leadership that could carry on effective resistance to Hanoi would be unlikely to emerge.
30. In Thailand, the will of the present ruling group to maintain itself in power, to assert national independence, and to resist internal subversion would probably remain strong despite communist success in Vietnam. The present Thai leaders would have limited options because of their longstanding and unequivocal commitment to military alliance with the US, an alliance which they have regarded as indispensable in the face of a continuing armed threat from China. We do not believe that these leaders would view alignment with Hanoi or Peking as acceptable alternatives to continued reliance on the US.
31. In these circumstances, Thai counterinsurgency forces would persist in their efforts against the communist guerrillas, and communist prospects for recruiting large numbers of local Thai for their forces would remain poor. But Thai capabilities could be severely taxed if Hanoi were to emerge from the Vietnamese struggle prepared to adopt a more aggressive and direct role in support of the Thai insurgents; for example, by sending trained Vietnamese guerrilla cadres and more sophisticated hand weapons into northeastern Thailand, a prospect which is already a source of great concern in Bangkok. The Thai leaders would be particularly sensitive to signs that Hanoi was moving toward a complete takeover in Laos, in view of the strategic importance they attach to it as a buffer against direct communist pressure. Indeed, we could expect that the Thai would press the US to take measures to prevent communist control of the Mekong Valley.
32. Even if Hanoi does not adopt this more aggressive posture toward Thailand, neutralist and leftist elements on the Bangkok political scene would become more vocal. But their influence would probably not grow sufficiently to sway the government unless US support and US responses to Thai requests had made it appear that the US was withdrawing from its commitments to Thailand. The Thai would, in any case, consider whether their relationship with the US ought to be changed in some way. Any reevaluation would proceed carefully and would closely reflect Thai judgments of US statements and actions following a settlement in Vietnam. Under the changing circumstances, the Thai might decide that the evolution of US policy left them no choice but to adopt a posture of strict neutrality./6/
/6/Capt. Frank M. Murphy, for the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believes that the probable political impact upon Thailand of the assumed settlement would be more severe than stated. He would have the last sentence read: "Under the changing circumstances, the US-Thailand relationship probably would change, with the Thais beginning to move toward pragmatic adjustment to the new political realities after the Communists take over." [Footnote in the source text.]
33. Peking is the chief concern of Burma which is currently being harassed by the Chinese-supported White Flags. Ne Win will be sensitive to the possibility of any increase in such support in the wake of the Vietnamese War, but it is doubtful that communist success in Vietnam would lead him to alter significantly Burma's domestic or foreign policies. Malaysia and Singapore are apprehensive of any substantial increase of interest by Peking in their ethnic Chinese leftists and guerrilla remnants. These groups have usually been responsive to Peking's direction and, in the event of communist success in Vietnam, might receive additional covert support from legal leftist fronts which continually agitate in these countries for accommodation with the communist powers. Such activity could serve to heighten existing tensions between the Chinese and Malay communities in both countries.
34. Indonesia would feel less vulnerable than the others because of its remoteness from China and the small proportion of ethnic Chinese in the country. It is most unlikely that the present leadership in Djakarta would falter in its determination to cope with Indonesia's internal communist problems; indeed, the regime would attach considerable importance to the continuation of US economic aid to sustain this determination. The psychological impact on the Philippines would be somewhat greater than in Indonesia, if only because the Filipinos have been for so long wholly dependent on the US for their defense. While Filipino leftists and anti-US factions would derive new confidence and vigor from the US failure in Vietnam, the problem of communist subversion in the Philippines would probably not increase to any important extent. In any case, it would remain far less of a threat to Philippine stability than the chronic political corruption and economic malaise of the country.
35. The US Posture. Over the longer run, a great deal would depend on the role the US decided to play in the region, and on its success in convincing leaders there of its will and capacity to continue backing them. Initially, the Southeast Asian states would fear a tendency for the US to withdraw generally from involvement with the security of the entire region, particularly if a settlement was reached in such a precipitate manner as to suggest a sudden and basic change in US policy. This initial concern would probably be least in Burma which chooses not to rely on external support for its security and is unlikely to change in this regard. The self-reliant Indonesians would be somewhat less concerned than the Filipinos and a good deal less concerned than Malaysia and Singapore. The two latter have been accustomed to British protection and are disturbed by the prospect of its complete withdrawal.
36. These initial reappraisals of US capabilities and intentions would be subject to continuing review. We believe that governments with any sort of security arrangements with the US--i.e., Laos, Thailand, and the Philippines--would wish to retain them, at least until further evidence was available on the course of US policy in the region. All would urgently seek concrete reassurance of one sort or another and, if these were forthcoming, they would over time tend to dilute the impact of the loss of South Vietnam. For the Thai, one of the lessons of Vietnam could be that US support is not likely to be effective without greater efforts of their own. They would, therefore, move to bolster their forces, including acquisition of all possible material aid from the US.
37. For the other nations of Southeast Asia, US actions in support of Thailand would be an important measure of its intentions throughout the region; few would expect any major US military effort in behalf of the more exposed Lao. No matter how the US performed in Thailand, however, there would inevitably be an increased search for alternatives to heavy reliance on US military power. There would, for example, be increasing interest in a strong counterinsurgency role for regional associations, though all member nations would realize that defense against external aggression could not be the province of such groupings. And there might be some interest in having the Russians play a greater role in Southeast Asia as an additional counterweight to Peking. Even the Thai, concurrent with their efforts to obtain new US security guarantees, would doubtless explore such foreign policy alternatives. Neutralist sentiment in Burma would tend to become even firmer, and neutralist voices would become louder, though hardly decisive, in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.
38. One factor of great importance would be the appraisal made by US leaders and public opinion of the meaning of the Vietnam experience for the future course of US policy. A traumatic popular reaction in the US, revealed perhaps by recriminations over Vietnam and bitter debate over future use of US power in Southeast Asia would greatly intensify the impact of the loss of South Vietnam. Conversely, if American opinion seemed in the main to take a steady and sober line, echoes in Southeast Asia would be similarly moderated. In effect, US domestic interpretations of a setback in Vietnam and the impressions others consequently formed as to the likely course of US policy in the region might ultimately prove as important as the event itself./6/
/6/Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and Maj. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dissent from Section II. They believe that this section seriously underestimates the impact of a communist success in South Vietnam, and gives inadequate consideration to the attendant circumstances. The postulated settlement favorable to the communists would seriously damage US prestige and credibility. And, in view of the expenditure of vast resources to prevent a communist takeover in South Vietnam, the noncommunist governments might be highly skeptical of any US commitment to their defense. Communist elements throughout Southeast Asia would be encouraged and would press harder to emulate the demonstrated success of "peoples' war." Both Laos and Cambodia would come under some form of communist denomination fairly soon; even the Thai probably would change their relationship with the US.
Whatever the reaction of the noncommunist governments of Mainland Southeast Asia over the short term, for the longer term, regardless of US assurances, they would probably seek some means of accommodation to communist pressures. Some leaders in the area almost certainly would view accommodation as an acceptable alternative to the prospect of prolonged military action in conjunction with the US--ending only in a solution favorable to the communists.
The Army and Air Force members also believe that elsewhere in Southeast Asia, leaders would be greatly influenced by the outcome and would, at the time of the settlement, view US support in the area as uncertain. In the US acceptance of an unfavorable settlement in Vietnam, they would see US withdrawal from a longstanding and deep commitment. On that basis, Southeast Asian leaders would make those policy decisions then considered necessary to national survival. [Footnote in the source text.]
III. A Settlement Unfavorable to the Communists
39. In discussing an outcome unfavorable to the communists, we are not including in our consideration any outright surrender on their part or the complete abandonment of their campaign to take over South Vietnam. We are assuming the acceptance by Hanoi of an outcome that falls well short of its objectives but which preserves some important elements of its political-military apparatus in the South. This situation might come about as a result of negotiations or it might become gradually apparent as the communists scaled down their attacks, disengaged their forces, and otherwise indicated a willingness to terminate the shooting war. In either case, an increasingly confident regime, allied with the US, would retain power in Saigon.
40. The principal initial reaction of the Southeast Asians to such an outcome in Vietnam would be a sense of relief and a belief that additional time had been won to bolster further their own political and economic stability. Few would conclude, however, that the future of the Saigon government had been assured, that the Vietnamese communists had been permanently stopped, or that Hanoi had abandoned its ambitions in Laos and Cambodia. Nor would an outcome unfavorable to the communists remove Southeast Asian doubts concerning the willingness of the American Government and people to engage on a substantial scale in any new military conflict in the region.
41. US prestige would increase, however, and its allies in Southeast Asia would reaffirm their links to the US. Everywhere in the region, the morale of communist forces would sag while that of the noncommunists would improve. But the impact on the actual power relationships in each country would not be significant, except in Laos where the political position of the Souvanna government would be greatly strengthened, and in Cambodia where the will of the regime to oppose domestic communists would be reinforced.
42. Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence would be felt inside the communist countries and within the various communist movements. The successes of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions have no doubt been highly influential in the continued commitment of other communists in Southeast Asia to the concept of "peoples' war." Defeat in Vietnam, even if rationalized as a temporary setback, would bring the doctrines of Mao and Ho Chi Minh into question. "Revisionism" might begin to gain some adherents, and there would probably be some splits and degeneration in the various insurgencies. There might ensue a period in which communist forces would place greater emphasis on working within the system through popular fronts and association with other leftwing movements. In such a case, Peking and perhaps Hanoi would lose some influence.
43. Because of the importance of Southeast Asia to China, it is conceivable that Hanoi's acceptance of an unfavorable outcome in Vietnam might provoke recriminations in Peking and result in a leadership crisis. We think, however, that such a reaction is unlikely. For Peking at least, there already exists a rationale for the defeat of the Viet Cong, namely that because of improper tactics they were unable to persist in a protracted war. Chinese policy might become more threatening, but it is more likely that the failure of the communist campaign in Vietnam would not have a major effect on Chinese policy elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
44. As for Hanoi, we believe that it would remain unreconciled to the division of Vietnam and to the presence of US power in Indochina. The Vietnamese communists would try to preserve what assets they could in the form of cadres and organization in South Vietnam. They might well, however, refrain from instituting further violence while they rebuilt their potential and waited for the diminution of US power and interest in Vietnam.
45. A communist failure in South Vietnam might further strain Hanoi's relations with Peking. There might be mutual recriminations and Hanoi, in its weakened position, might be more than ever concerned to retain Soviet support and avoid overdependence on China. Nonetheless, normal prudence, if nothing else, would suggest that Hanoi would attempt to maintain good relations with Peking. Both Hanoi and Peking, of course, would want to prevent any further strengthening of the noncommunist positions in Laos, and Hanoi would try to hold the areas of Laos bordering on North Vietnam.
221. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 14, 1968, 4:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI [1 of 2]. Secret; Harvan Double Plus. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
The attached memorandum of conversation between Cy Vance and Lau should be read in the light of this further report on what Dobrynin had to say about reconnaissance./2/ When I raised reconnaissance, he asked: Did they understand fully your position on reconnaissance? I said that I had no doubt that they did understand it. It was clear that their initial instructions after the bombing halt forbade firing on reconnaissance aircraft.
/2/See Document 218.
He then asked: What was Lau's reaction when Vance raised this matter with him in Paris ? I said that he took notes and agreed to inform his government.
He then asked: Why do you think they are now shooting at your aircraft when they did not shoot in the first days after the bombing halt?
I said that I did not know, but that he might take the trouble to find out.
Against this background, the Vance/Lau conversation attached suggests that they are going to test us pretty hard on reconnaissance.
You will also note that they say that no North Vietnamese troops are involved at the DMZ--an acknowledgment of that condition--but they do not take responsibility for the NLF. They are pressing us here to some purpose, and I am not sure which of the following it is:
--to establish how determined we are about reconnaissance;
--to force us to talk to the NLF;
--to make us reduce the intensity of reconnaissance;
--to put pressure on us to get Saigon to Paris.
In any case, they are pushing us./3/
/3/ In a memorandum to the President, November 15, 4 p.m., Rostow listed the President's options to respond to the DRV's "test" on reconnaissance and the DMZ, but noted that in the end the decision would be a political one: "Do we wish to react to the rather unpleasant talk in Paris about reconnaissance and the DMZ violations by this show of determination--or not?" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI [1 of 2])
Walt
Attachment
Situation Report by the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh)/4/
Washington, November 14, 1968.
/4/Secret; Nodis; Harvan Double Plus.
Cy Vance called at 1:05 p.m. to report on his conversation with Lau
Lau opened the discussions with a reference to Vance's statement to him on November 11 about the violations of the DMZ on the previous day. (Cy had given him specific details and a map of the positions of the US forces and the firing units.) Lau said that he was authorized to state that artillery had not been fired from the North of the DMZ to any position South of the DMZ; therefore there was no shelling on the 10th. In regard to any shelling or mortaring by NLF that is their responsibility.
He said that our remarks yesterday in Washington/6/ were merely a pretext for further delays and a justification of our aggression.
/6/See footnote 2, Document 218.
He then raised the subject of the reconnaissance flights. He said that there were daily flights including alerts in Hanoi. This is a violation of the security of the DRV and acts of force. He urged that there be immediate stops in these flights in accordance with the spirit of the agreement.
Vance responded along the following lines. In respect to the November 10 situation, the evidence indicated the presence of the 27th DRV Regiment in the DMZ. Even assuming the DRV forces were not in the DMZ we would not accept Lau's assertion that the NLF had a free hand. He called to Lau's attention the latter's statements in the course of October that if the bombing were stopped the DMZ would be respected.
In respect to the question of reconnaissance we had chosen our words very carefully. This was not an act of force. We believed that they had fully understood what our words meant. We would continue our reconnaissance flights and if they were fired upon we would take the necessary defensive actions. This could create a dangerous situation which we assume neither side would want.
In the last meeting Lau had mentioned an alleged violation by a US naval vessel of DRV waters. We had carefully checked his accusation and could state that no US vessel had penetrated the territorial waters of the DRV on that date.
Vance rejected Lau's charge that the US was an aggressor and forcefully stated that the true aggressor was the DRV and the NLF.
Lau then responded: He said you think you have a right to infringe on the sovereignty of the DRV; this is serious and dangerous. We will strike back at the reconnaissance flights. The US must bear responsibility. There is no international law that would tolerate the dangers to the DRV brought about by such actions. These acts would not improve the chances of peace. If the US continues, the DRV will use all necessary means of defense. He then rejected Vance's statement about the alleged US penetration of DRV waters.
In respect to the DMZ he again stated that there was a clear difference between the actions of the DRV and the NLF. The U.S. would have to speak to the NLF about this matter.
Vance then stated that reconnaissance does not endanger the security of the DRV. The only problem in this matter is the firing by DRV. Until we approach closer to peace, reconnaissance will be necessary and will continue. We had stopped all bombing and all acts of force against the territories of the DRV and there was no danger to the security of the DRV involved.
In respect to the alleged naval incident our statement was fully accurate. He would, however, be willing to receive any further information on this matter that Lau might wish to provide.
With respect to the DMZ, Vance said we recognize no distinction between actions of the DRV forces and actions of the NLF. He then asked Lau if the DRV had withdrawn all its forces from the DMZ. Lau responded affirmatively.
Vance reported that the conversation throughout was orderly and was not heated. He considered Lau's remark that no DRV forces were in the DMZ as indicative that they recognized an obligation in respect to the Zone. However, there is a considerable problem involved in the suggestion that the forces in the DMZ are NLF. Vance further noted that there clearly is a most serious problem in the offing in respect to reconnaissance flights.
He will file as soon as possible a detailed cable./6/
/6/Telegram 23918/Delto 955 from Paris, November 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968) In telegram 23983/Delto 964 from Paris, November 15, the delegation wrote: "Reflecting upon Vance's talk of last night with Lau, we have some tentative reactions on DMZ as follows: A. The DRV has confirmed the existence of an agreement with respect to the DMZ but is probing to see the limits of our understanding of the agreement. B. The DRV has made its opening move to try to draw distinction between the NVA forces and the NLF forces in the South. They will continue to try to press the alleged separation of responsibility in an attempt to push us toward talks with the NLF soon. C. With respect to Lau's statement that there are no longer DRV troops in the DMZ, we should have all available information as soon as possible to be able to refute or confirm Lau's statement." (Ibid.)
John P. Walsh
222. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 15, 1968, 1100Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
42751. Ref: A Saigon 42653; B State 271405./2/
/2/Telegram 42653 is Document 219. Telegram 271405/Todel 1555 to Paris and Saigon, November 14, contains the text of the Department's reply to Thanh's November 13 memorandum and the November 8 proposal. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968)
1. I called on President Thieu at 10:30 this morning at his request. He was notably more relaxed than he had been during any of our recent interviews, and clearly in a constructive frame of mind. With respect to our draft statement of November 11, he asked if this was to be regarded as a "counter-proposal" to the GVN proposal of November 8./3/ I said yes, and he seemed pleased. (Under the circumstances I did not use the helpful material in reply to the November 8 proposal which the Department had furnished in Ref B.) He asked if the fact could be brought out that this was in response to their proposal, and I said this should cause no difficulty.
/3/See footnotes 3 and 8, Document 208.
2. Thieu then said that he thought we could come to an agreement on the basis of our draft statement. Foreign Minister Thanh would have some suggested improvements which he would discuss with Calhoun and Herz, after which we could have a full-dress meeting with the President, the Vice President, I and the Foreign Minister. I agreed and said we ourselves had been thinking of ways in which the statement might be made more presentable. I stressed the importance of proceeding quickly to an agreement.
3. I remarked that I thought the Department's statement of November 13 should be very helpful to the GVN. Thieu agreed and said, "This is what we had been waiting for."
4. Thieu himself raised only two points with respect to our draft attachment. First, he wished to know whether some way might be found to associate the TCC's with the statement. I said I was sure they would give their public support. (It was clear that Thieu considered that he would gain "face" if some public stamp of approval could be given by the TCC's to whatever we work out.) Second, he asked if we could now work quietly without any public statements. He said if it had not been for the Clifford statement/4/ which again roiled the public emotions here, it might have been possible to move a little more quickly. Under the circumstances he needed a few more days for tempers to cool down and he thought this would happen if there were no more public exchanges. I said that Ton That Thien's emotional outburst in reply had not been helpful either and Thieu agreed, saying this had been made without his prior approval. I said that I hoped we could both work quietly now without public statements from either side in order to make as rapid progress as possible.
/4/See Document 213.
5. We understand Thanh and Bui Diem have been closeted this morning going over our draft statement. Calhoun and Herz have a tentative appointment, subject to confirmation later this afternoon, to meet with Thanh at 6 pm. (This has just been changed to an equally tentative appointment after 9 pm.)/6/
/6/In telegram 42771 from Saigon, November 15, the Embassy reported that Thanh gave Calhoun and Herz a "working redraft" of the proposed statement on the Paris talks. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 84, S/AB Files: Lot 74 D 417, Files of Ellsworth Bunker, Vietnam Telegram Chronos) The text of the redraft is in telegram 42772 from Saigon, November 15. (Ibid.) Calhoun and Herz presented the U.S. changes to Thanh on November 16 and a revised redraft on November 17. (Telegram 42838 from Saigon, November 16, and telegram 42840 from Saigon, November 17; both ibid.) The text of the redraft is in telegram 42842 from Saigon, November 17. (Ibid.)
Bunker
223. Notes of Meeting/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts (1 of 2). No classification marking.
Washington, November 17, 1968.
Elsey-Warnke-Goulding-Pursley
CMC 11:05 a.m.
LBJ call Sun. am./very friendly to LBJ./2/
/2/At 9:30 a.m. that day, Clifford called the President at his Texas Ranch. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of this conversation has been found.
Symington called too.
I. 1st accomplishment of CMC press conference./3/ No doubt in minds of Americans any more since his press conference.
/3/See Document 213.
S.V.Namese attack on LBJ started at time of bomb halt & continued for 12 days.
a)--cables show it. They deliberately started a campaign of vilification.
b)--Am. newspaper articles such as Keyes Beech prompted by Saigon./4/
/4/See Document 189.
c)--intercepts & intelligence showing statements by Thieu, Ky et. al. against LBJ, (e.g. S.Vietnamese amb. to Seoul/6/ quoting Thieu & Ky saying LBJ was engaging in political trickery.
/6/The South Vietnamese Ambassador to the Republic of Korea was Nguyen Van Kieu, Thieu's brother.
"I happen to know LBJ didn't end the bombing on 31 Oct. just to elect Humphrey because I've never believed he wanted Humphrey to win!" CMC Sunday 17 Nov. '68.
Bunker on [November] 11th reported no sense of urgency at all--January is plenty of time to do anything./6/
/6/See Document 214.
Then came CMC press conference & overnight Saigon suddenly became urgent & caught the point.
CMC's point: Do you wait & let Saigon tear us to pieces--lie, lie, lie--
LBJ can't do it. So CMC decided somebody had to tell the truth--
--about LBJ
--to the Am. people
--to the world
--to Saigon--i.e. letting Thieu & Ky know U.S. Gov't is up to their tricks.
The S.V.Namese attacks were unwarranted & dishonest; someone had to answer them & CMC did.
All CMC did was stick to facts--no conclusions, no personal vilification--I ascribed no motives--just the facts.
Now there is no doubt in minds of Am. people or the press as to the truth in what happened.
This is corroborated by press stories, cartoons & editorials.
GME makes point that only CMC could have done this. LBJ couldn't. State wouldn't. CMC was only one who could & would, & would have credibility. (CMC jumps at this.)
Second accomplishment of CMC press conference.
II. We got Saigon moving. On 29 Oct., at time we first were ready to stop, they balked. They continued to balk, right up to CMC press conference.
Despite State, Bunker, etc. etc., nothing was happening.
Proof positive: Bunker's cable of 12th 0730 a.m./7/ that Saigon is not moving at all & wants to wait until January.
/7/Document 214.
& Thieu's brother told Embassy on some day we need lots of time. Not only weren't they moving--they had no intention of moving & were counting to dig up more & more objections. Movement in Saigon started on 14th reported by Bunker "logjam has broken--"
Saigon galvanized into activity after "righteous indignation."/8/
/8/Telegram 42651 from Saigon, November 14. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI)
CMC question--does this sound too self-serving?
(GME answer--No--you're just citing facts.)
Now, however, movement has slowed. State is slowing down & softening.
S.V.Namese is trying to test us by quibbling over words in a joint statement.
Bui Diem dashed home & tells everybody to move!!!
But they aren't moving for last 2-3 days.
III. Maybe the S.Vamese. don't want to move!!!
a) political--the longer they put off, the better SVNam will be.
b) economic--
c) military--they're in No danger at all.
Various reasons to support this:
It makes no diff. to SVNam how many Amers are killed.
The longer it goes on, the better armed the ARVN will be.
549,500 troops pour gold in!!!
The ruling clique is incredibly corrupt & shipping gold by the ton to Swiss banks.
The U.S. shld. not go on fighting & dying just for these guys.
All this leads to conclusion we'll never come to an agreement with Thieu & Ky because they don't want agreement!
IV. Re the criticism that CMC broke new ground & made new policy by stating "we'll go it alone if needed:"
--CMC was merely re-stating a State Dept cable of 8 Nov; & it was re-stated by State 14 Nov in cable & publicly by State same day.
V. What should our policy be from now on?
(CMC refers to a memo from Mort Halperin GME has not seen.)/9/
/9/Not found.
Course A--
Just continue our present course but numerous problems
--continual erosion on DMZ & on attacks on cities.
--growing disaffection in U.S.
Course B--
Postpone talks but hold private talks with Hanoi.
Course C--
Start expanded talks--holding open a seat for Saigon.
He'll end up Strongly on Course "C".
Recommended course
--Send written message to Thieu setting date for talk in Paris
--will go with him or without him
--we must not permit talks to stall
--we must reduce level of combat & start troop withdrawal
--LBJ has borne the brunt--& must not be cheated out of any credit for:
--for lowering the level of casualties
--no reason why he can't bring [home] 5-10,000 troops.
224. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 18, 1968, 8:55 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI [1 of 2]. Secret; Harvan Double Plus. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
The more I see, at this stage, the more I judge Hanoi's strategy in Paris to be an effort to press the NLF openly into contact with Saigon and the U.S., moving toward de facto recognition of the NLF and a coalition government.
Aside from the attached UPI report (Tab A),/2/ the Vance-Lau talk on the DMZ said, essentially (Tab B):/3/
/2/Attached but not printed is a report from United Press International in which Lau labeled a cease-fire as "unrealistic" until after a political settlement and the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
/3/See Document 221.
--Hanoi will respect the DMZ;
--shelling and penetration of the DMZ by the NLF will continue;
--the U.S. should get in touch with the NLF about this matter.
Saigon, on the other hand, is willing to talk to the NLF either secretly in Paris or deal with the NLF in Saigon as a dissident element in the South Vietnamese population. But Saigon will resist all efforts to have the NLF role in the South dealt with as an international diplomatic matter--at the table in Paris.
The central issue--and test of will--should come, if this view is correct, over how and when Saigon talks to the NLF.
That, in turn, will depend on how steady our side is in Paris and on:
--how fast pacification moves forward on the ground;
--how the VC fare in military operations, which are picking up. (Today's battle west of Danang, with 305 enemy killed versus 4 ARVN, was helpful.)
Once we engage in Paris we may wish to press the Russians to use their influence to encourage secret Saigon-NLF talks and, perhaps, Thieu to open a secret contact--outside of Paris--when the time is ripe.
Walt
225. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, November 19, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VII. Secret; Sensitive. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to the President, November 11, 7:15 p.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith Thieu's rationale for his position and frame of mind as of 19 November. He apparently envisaged at that time to confer with Bunker on November 20 and get out the joint statement within '2 or 3 days.'" The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the memorandum. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
President Thieu's Remarks on U.S./South Vietnamese Relations and His Justification for His Initial Negative Reaction to President Johnson's Announcement
1. On 19 November 1968 President Nguyen Van Thieu said that the Government of Vietnam (GVN) is now prepared to participate in the Paris talks. Referring to the impasse between the GVN and the United States on the Paris talks issue, he noted that while there was an understanding between the two governments that talks with the Communists would take place, the people of Vietnam were not psychologically prepared to accept talks on 6 November 1968. They were also unprepared for the presence of the National Liberation Front (NLF) at the conference table.
2. Thieu stated that this popular unreadiness did not apply to a bombing halt. Recalling the ready acceptance by the GVN and the Vietnamese people of the partial bombing halt, he said the Vietnamese were prepared to accept a total halt in the bombing, and if President Johnson's announcement had been confined to this issue there would have been immediate full support for his action by all Vietnamese. Thieu said that he had prepared the people and the GVN for a bombing halt and even for talks with Hanoi but he would have been faced with a complete breakdown of the government which, in turn, would have resulted in countrywide anarchy, if he had gone to the Paris talks without additional preparations. He admitted that communication between the government and the rural population is poor and observed that the Vietnamese would have been unable to comprehend a quick acceptance of the original formula.
3. Expanding on this latter point, Thieu said the Vietnamese military, divided into doves and hawks, were totally unprepared for talks with the NLF, as were the masses. An immediate acceptance of the 1 November (Saigon date) proposals would have inspired the hawks within the military to renew coup plotting and attempt an overthrow of the administration. The doves in the military would have concluded that the war was lost and would have deserted in droves. He reviewed the disintegration of the Army after the 1954 agreements and said he must prevent a repetition of this at all costs.
4. Turning to popular civilian reaction Thieu said militant Catholic groups also were totally unprepared and would have demonstrated violently against the GVN. The Buddhists, who are softer on the peace issue than the Catholics, would have demonstrated against the Catholics and the GVN. In Thieu's view this would have produced serious political unrest throughout the country's population centers, with clashes in the streets and a breakdown of law and order. The people in the countryside, reacting to the political instability in the cities and towns, would have concluded that a Communist victory was certain and would have tried to reach an accommodation with the Viet Cong. Thieu observed that the only people in Vietnam prepared for talks as suggested by President Johnson were those involved in the discussions with the Americans.
5. Thieu admitted to reaching various agreements with the Americans during the pre-bombing halt discussions. He attributed the differences between the U.S. and the GVN to poor timing by the U.S. and to poor diplomatic mechanics. With respect to the timing he asked, "Why 1 November?", noting that 1 November is Vietnamese National Day. He asked if any reaction other than rejection could have been expected from an unprepared population being told on its National Day that its government would talk with an enemy whose political legitimacy is in question. Thieu also complained about ''the offhand manner" in which President Johnson referred to GVN participation in the Paris talks and said that the President could have stated his views more diplomatically leaving the GVN some room to maneuver. He added that Johnson might have "invited" the Vietnamese to attend the talks rather than suggesting that their attendance was a matter of little concern. He said he appreciated Mr. Katzenbach's remarks discounting Madame Binh's claim of four-sided talks at Paris/2/ but in the same breath registered his anger at Secretary Clifford's press conference./3/
/2/See footnote 5, Document 217.
/3/See Document 213.
6. Referring to Secretary Clifford's press conference, Thieu said he found it difficult to believe that Mr. Clifford did not reflect President Johnson's views. He observed that the GVN Minister of Defense does not comment on matters of national policy without checking with the President. He stated he himself had not been aware in advance of the rebuttal to the Secretary's remarks made by Minister of Information Ton That Thien, adding that he censured the Minister for this. He continued by saying that although he was angry he has concluded that there is nothing to be gained by more recriminations and has suggested to all that both sides get down to trying to resolve their difference through quiet talks.
7. Thieu now believes that as a result of his delays, speeches and comments the Vietnamese people are prepared to accept the "our side-your side" formula for talks with the enemy. He said he is fully aware that at the conference table the GVN delegation will be talking to the NLF but he said this is not a matter that needs to be admitted in public. He also observed that the NLF still insists that the talks will be four-sided and that he realizes that the U.S./GVN side does not have to agree to this position, despite enemy claims.
8. Thieu said that he had talked to the Foreign Minister earlier on the morning of 19 November and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be delivering the GVN's draft of a new communiqué to the American Embassy within a few hours./4/ He said that he hopes to be able to confer on the Vietnamese draft with the principal involved on 20 November/6/ and in "two or three days" a joint statement might be agreed upon. Thieu did not go into the details on the differences between the GVN and the U.S. on the "our side-your side" formula, noting that these are already a matter of record.
/4/The text of this draft was transmitted in telegram 43016 from Saigon, November 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 84, S/AB Files: Lot 74 D 417, Files of Ellsworth Bunker, Vietnam Telegram Chronos) The Embassy's analysis of it was transmitted in telegram 43017 from Saigon, November 19. (Ibid.)
/6/See Document 228.
9. Thieu's manner during the interview was moderate, considerate, reflective and polite. He gave every indication of sincerely desiring a solution to the impasse, providing Vietnamese face and sensitivities are taken into account.
226. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, November 19, 1968, 2211Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Drafted by Habib and Bundy, cleared by Rostow and Read, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance as Todel 1601. In a covering note transmitting a copy of the telegram to the President, November 19, 3:05 p.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith for your clearance is the proposed outgoing to Bunker to guide him in, hopefully, the showdown discussion with Thieu at 8:30 tonight our time." The President cleared the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VI [1 of 2])
274093. Saigon Deliver to Ambassador at Opening of Business.
The following is a redraft of the text of the U.S. statement which you should use in your discussions with Thieu. It takes into account the previous discussion with Thanh./2/ Where differences have arisen we have commented parenthetically at the end of each paragraph to indicate the reasons for the position taken.
/2/See footnote 5, Document 222. The full texts of both draft statements were also transmitted in telegram 277033/Todel 1646 to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Seoul, and Wellington, November 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968)
Text Begins.
1. This statement is designed to answer the questions which have been raised by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam about a new meeting in Paris. (Comment: We agree to deletion of the phrase "the arrangements for.")
2. Prior to the President's announcement of October 31 of the stopping of bombing against North Viet-Nam, agreement had been reached in Paris between North Vietnamese and United States negotiators that a meeting on the substance of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam should be convened in Paris. (Comment: You will note that we have dropped the word "promptly." If GVN objection rests on the reference to the promptness of the meeting, this change should be sufficient. In terms of the format of the statement alone, the paragraph is essential as a foundation for later references. Moreover, for our part, it is important to retain that we agreed to a meeting on the substance of a peaceful settlement. Anything less would derogate from the purposes of these meetings and could possibly lead us to fall prey to what we suspect would be the GVN's preference that these meetings be considered preliminary or as dealing with arrangements prior to negotiation of a subsequent settlement. This is a matter of substance on which we should not concede. You may recall to Thieu that the Honolulu Communiqué,/3/ referring to the Paris talks, spoke of "discussions concerning the substance of a final settlement." The Honolulu Communiqué also expressed the agreement of the two Presidents that "The basic objective in the Paris talks is to open the way to a stable and honorable peace.")
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 303.
3. During the earlier discussions with the North Vietnamese representatives, United States spokesmen made clear that the stopping of bombing and the holding of such a meeting would not be possible without agreed provision for the participation of the Republic of Viet-Nam as a separate delegation forming with the United States delegation one side of the meeting. United States negotiators made clear to Hanoi that it might bring on its side of the table any persons it wished. It was understood that both sides would organize themselves as they chose. (Comment: We agree to the addition of the word "earlier" in the first sentence but prefer retaining the words "such a" rather than substitute the word "future" as applied to the meeting. If it will simplify GVN acceptance, we would be willing to have the phrase in the first sentence read "and the holding of such a future meeting." We wish to make clear the relationship between the meeting being spoken of in this paragraph and that described in the previous paragraph. You will note that we have re-inserted the last sentence of the paragraph. This is a fact not only which was spoken of in the Department's November 13 statement/4/ but repeated a number of times in the negotiations with the North Vietnamese. It is at the heart of the Our-Side Your-Side formula and should have been apparent to the GVN from the beginning. Thus, we believe we should have one last clear try at getting it into the statement. However, if it becomes the sole obstacle to final agreement, we could accept its omission. The point is that Thieu must be in no doubt that this remains the case, whether we say it in this statement or not.)
/4/See footnote 8, Document 217.
4. The North Vietnamese representatives in Paris accepted this proposal and indicated that they would bring to the meeting members of the so-called National Liberation Front.
5. This was and is the sole agreement concerning representation in the new Paris meetings.
6. In the light of these facts the arrangements agreed in Paris provide in essence for a two-sided meeting. Hanoi clearly understands that our side will be constituted as separate delegations of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States.
7. Whatever others may claim, the United States has not agreed and will not agree that the meeting is a four-sided or four-party conference, or properly so described. (Comment: We think this is more comprehensive than the GVN draft and accurate.)
8. Consistent with our view of the nature of the so-called National Liberation Front, we will regard and treat all the persons on the other side of the table--whatever they might claim for themselves--as members of a single side, that of Hanoi, and for practical purposes as a single delegation. (Comment: We believe we must retain the last phrase despite the points raised by Paris. However, the whole point of the reference "whatever they might claim" is to recognize that the other side will try to set themselves up as a separate delegation, and that such action by them cannot be grounds for our walking out.)
9. In the discussions between the United States and North Vietnamese negotiators it was made clear throughout that, whomever Hanoi chose to bring on its side, the arrangement involved no element of recognition whatever. The United States Government has repeatedly made clear publicly and privately that it does not recognize either the National Liberation Front or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). Concerning the so-called National Liberation Front in particular the United States Government has at all times regarded it as an agent of Hanoi's aggression against the Republic of Vietnam. The National Liberation Front is not in any sense a separate entity, much less a government. (Comment: While we would be willing to accept the phrase "an emanation of North Vietnam and a tool of Hanoi's aggression against the Republic of Vietnam" in the penultimate sentence, we believe that the sentence as redrafted above is simpler and includes "aggression" which the Government of Vietnam apparently wishes to introduce. Our draft is also much more in keeping with the style to be expected in an official United States statement.)
10. Following the stopping of the bombing of North Vietnam, if Hanoi fulfills its repeated undertaking to enter into serious talks--undertakings repeated throughout the contacts between North Vietnamese and American representatives in Paris--the North Vietnamese delegation must talk directly and seriously with the Republic of Vietnam's delegation.
11. In the Paris meetings the Republic of Vietnam delegation will play a leading role, as was explicitly affirmed in the Honolulu Communiqué of July. The Republic of Vietnam will take the lead and be the principal spokesman on all matters which are of immediate and direct concern to South Vietnam. (Comment: Simply omitting "immediate and direct" is too broad to accept, for reasons you have already expounded. If the GVN still objects, acceptable alternatives for us would be:
a. to omit the second sentence and expand the first to read "a leading role in discussions concerned with the substance of a final settlement in Vietnam, as was . . . ."
b. "paramount concern" or "of concern primarily"
c. "principal spokesman on all matters relating to the substance of a political settlement in Vietnam."
We cannot accept the inclusion of the GVN's paragraph "In the respect of national sovereignty of RVN, problems of internal politics will not be considered as proper subjects of discussion in the framework of these meetings." For reasons summarized in Deptel 273732,/6/ the United States is not prepared to agree to such a broad restriction. It is not correct to state that no sovereign government can permit its internal affairs to be discussed in an international conference. In fact, a sovereign government can discuss anything it wishes. Moreover, Thanh's comparison of the 1962 Geneva Conference is erroneous. At that conference, by agreement, negotiations of internal arrangements were conducted separately by the leaders of the three factions. As we have pointed out previously we cannot allow the GVN to believe that it can walk out if the DRV side raises internal matters. If Hanoi raises the issue of a political solution in the South, our joint position--primarily articulated by the GVN--could be a political solution based, for example, on the principles of the Constitution, election, and reconciliation policy. The GVN should be prepared to set forth its political views as a sovereign government. Only in this way will its position be understandable in the United States and internationally. Moreover, it is only in this way that it can avoid leaving the field open to the other side without any logical reply.)
/6/Dated November 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968)
12. The new Paris meetings will be expected to explore all avenues to end Communist aggression against the Republic of Vietnam and to reach a subsequent peaceful settlement. They will start with a clean slate. The sole agreements that have been reached in the earlier Paris talks between North Vietnamese and US representatives have concerned the stopping of bombing and the convening of a new meeting. As the President stated in his October 31 speech,/6/ "We cannot have productive talks in an atmosphere where the cities are being shelled and the DMZ is being abused." (Comment: Although we would have preferred to omit the word "subsequent" in the first sentence, we believe we cannot argue forcefully against it in the light of our own belief--and commitments to the TCC--that a still wider format would be required to participate in the final total "settlement." Even more seriously, we believe it is essential to change the third sentence in this fashion, since any claim that there were "agreements" concerning even the "circumstances" would be met by sharp rebuttal and is just not true. This was our mistake, and we now believe that we must have a formulation such as this to clarify the matter. Since Thanh and Duc previously suggested using the President's words, we would hope that the GVN could buy this change.)
/6/See Document 169.
13. In the new meetings the United States Government will operate in the closest cooperation with the Republic of Vietnam, and in continuing consultation with the nations that have contributed military forces to the defense of South Vietnam.
14. The substantive position of the American Government will continue to be based on the Manila Communiqué, the Honolulu Communiqué, and on other publicly stated positions. In particular, there has been no change whatever, and will be no change, in the position of the United States Government toward a so-called coalition in South Vietnam. The United States does not believe aggression should be rewarded and will not recognize any form of government that is not freely chosen through democratic and legal process by the people of South Vietnam. The imposition of any coalition government would be in conflict with this principle.
Katzenbach
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21898.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
227-242
227. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, November 20, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting lasted from 1:15 to 2:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Nitze and the President met the previous evening to discuss Vietnam and other issues with Rusk, Clifford, Rostow, McPherson, and Christian. (Ibid.) No record of that meeting has been found, although an agenda in a November 19 memorandum from Read to Rusk indicates that the topics were the same as those discussed the next day. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-EX Files: Lot 74 D 164, Secretary-President Luncheons (2))
NOTES ON PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE
TUESDAY LUNCHEON GROUP
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General McConnell
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
[Omitted here is discussion of the European monetary crisis.]
Secretary Clifford: Danang: The shelling was directed at the military base--not cities.
On the DMZ there is some sporadic activity.
There is substantial movement of supplies to Laos--not through the DMZ. Helms says 100,000 North Vietnamese troops are still in South Vietnam.
We are doing a good interdiction job in Laos. I think we should clear out the southern half of the DMZ when the talks start.
General McConnell: AA and SAM's are being shipped into Laos. They are concentrating north of the DMZ. Harriman wants to see if there are North Vietnamese in the southern half of the DMZ. We propose sending patrols in there to capture a few to positively identify them as North Vietnamese rather than Viet Cong as North Vietnam is charging in Paris.
Secretary Rusk: I would be for that.
We should be tough about the DMZ. We should be in a position to make demands.
Secretary Clifford: We could have a battle in the southern half of the DMZ.
Secretary Rusk: These fellows are looking for the margin of tolerance. We must tell them that we expected this when we stopped the bombing.
Walt Rostow: They are occupying all of the Northern half of the DMZ. They have some men in the southern half./2/ We must do what is right on this.
/2/In a memorandum to the President, November 16, 12:30 p.m., Rostow cited the NSC's estimate of NVA troops in South Vietnam as 90,000-110,000 and the CIA's estimate as 100,000-130,000. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 106)
CIA Director Helms: I agree with the Secretary.
Secretary Clifford: We have twelve reconnaissance flights per day. Now they have bad weather. They want to do it on a weekly basis.
The President: I'm for it.
General McConnell: Abrams wants to send some small units in to capture North Vietnamese in the southern half.
78 violations of the DMZ.
7 fired at us.
72 people observed.
The President: Do the Joint Chiefs think we should do it?
General McConnell: Yes.
The President: Rusk, Helms, and the Joint Chiefs are for it. So is Rostow.
Secretary Clifford: I would go along since Abrams recommends it.
The President: Let's do it.
Secretary Clifford: We'll send out an order today.
Diplomatic Situation
Secretary Rusk: Congress would murder us with Thieu acting like he's acting now. We are short of measures.
CIA Director Helms: We may need more patience.
Secretary Clifford: We are getting a run-around in Saigon. Before, Bunker could always see Thieu.
The points they stick on are fundamental to agreement. We cannot agree to what they're insisting on. We have a perfect right to go on with plans for the talks.
You've stopped bombing and want to get talks started. 20 days have gone by. I think time is running out. We have exactly 2 months left today.
I would meet on Friday of next week./3/ If the GVN come, a wide range of talks can take place. If they don't, we can talk on purely military matters.
/3/November 29.
We cannot go indefinitely without talks starting.
--the DMZ will erode.
--military support will be lost.
--cities agreement will erode.
I think the talks will get us somewhere.
I would like to withdraw a contingent of troops. We have right to proceed with this.
It would be a great day to pull out 5000.
Secretary Rusk: I would go ahead and talk to North Vietnam in a private session.
The President: It should be a shove to Thieu.
Secretary Rusk: I would shove him hard.
The President: Would you go along?
Secretary Rusk: I'd go pretty far. There will be fast erosion of support here otherwise.
I do not really know what is holding up Thieu.
Secretary Clifford: We are encountering a sharp difference in goals--a policy difference.
The South Vietnamese are
--not for talks
--not for pause
--they'd be for us to just go along as we are now.
We want to terminate the present type of involvement. They do not./4/
/4/Warnke outlined this conflict of interest between the United States and the GVN to Clifford in a November 20 memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files, VIET 092.2)
Vice President Humphrey: The public will be very disenchanted unless something happens. The attitude in Saigon is hurting the Administration. Nixon will move and move fast. He'll sell them down the river.
You ought to proceed with Hanoi without being abrasive with Thieu.
This isn't your problem--it's a problem. I think you should proceed.
The President: Have we suffered any militarily?
General McConnell: No, sir. We haven't except for the supplies in Laos and above the DMZ. There is eleven times as much POL in the DMZ in November as there was in all the preceding months.
I agree with everything Secretary Clifford said, except the military will stay with you a lot longer than the public.
I heard not one--not one--complaint about stopping the bombing when you stopped it. I was in Vietnam at the time and talked with, I guess 100,000 men.
The President: I have been shaken by Thieu. I thought we would have known about Thieu's problems prior to October 31.
Let's be sure this is a desirable thing.
Nixon may be tougher than we are toward the GVN.
Secretary Rusk: You come to a different conclusion when you see what happened in Eisenhower's years. We don't have a credible justification for what GVN is doing. Let's try to get Thieu aboard.
Secretary Clifford: I would like to see both Hanoi or [and?] the NLF present.
Secretary Rusk: I would like to see it worked out with North Vietnam only.
The President: Walt, Clark and Secretary Rusk go back and put it on paper./6/
/6/See Document 229.
228. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 21, 1968, 1050Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 84, S/AB Files: Lot 74 D 417, Files of Ellsworth Bunker, Vietnam Telegram Chronos. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Received at 7:41 a.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance. On November 21 Clifford wrote to the President: "I note with concern in Ambassador Bunker's report on his talk with President Thieu that Saigon continues to urge the two main points that have been the basis of the disagreement between our two countries. These involve the desire of Saigon to take the lead in the Paris talks, and their refusal to permit problems of internal politics to be considered." He recommended that a telegram be sent to Bunker containing a strong message from the President in order to expedite the decision by the GVN to come to Paris. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country Files, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VII)
43182. Ref: A. Saigon 43099;/2/ B. State 274093;/3/ C. Saigon 43016./4/
/2/Telegram 43099 from Saigon, November 20, reported that Bui Diem told Bunker that he "would try to impress on the President [Thieu] the importance of proceeding rapidly now toward a conclusion." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 84, S/AB Files: Lot 74 D 417, Files of Ellsworth Bunker, Vietnam Telegram Chronos)
/3/Document 226.
/4/Telegram 43016 from Saigon, November 19, reported on the GVN suggested modifications. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 84, S/AB Files: Lot 74 D 417, Files of Ellsworth Bunker, Vietnam Telegram Chronos)
1. I saw Pres Thieu this morning at 10 o'clock. (Bui Diem had just preceded me.) In handing Thieu our latest draft statement, I said we had now had several long sessions with the FonMin and Mr. Duc and this was the sixth of a succession of drafts and counter-drafts. The time had now come to move ahead, to get away from legalism and to make a decision. I reminded Thieu that he had told me several times that he wanted to help Pres Johnson to help him. I said this was the time to do it. Only a few points remained to clear up, and we should try to do so at this session.
2. I then went through our draft (ref B) point by point, comparing it with the last draft they had given us (ref C), dwelling at length on the two principal outstanding points, our paragraph 11 ("immediate and direct concern" and their erstwhile para 11 ("problems of internal politics will not be considered"), putting forward our arguments in accordance with instructions.
A. With respect to our para 11, I told Thieu that we do not insist on the precise words "immediate and direct" but could not accept the statement, without any qualification, that the GVN would be the principal spokesman "on all matters of concern to South Vietnam." I said we were pretty much agreed on how subjects would be divided between us according to who was primarily concerned, that it was most reasonable to be flexible and to leave it to our delegations to work out on the spot, and I offered as alternatives "all matters of concern primarily to South Vietnam" or "all matters of paramount concern to South Vietnam" or "all matters relating to the substance of political settlement in Vietnam." Thieu did not argue in favor of the GVN draft and just noted down our suggestions.
B. With respect to para 11 of their draft, I explained in great detail why it would be both tactically unwise for both of us and also inconsistent for the US to say that internal political matters couldn't be discussed. I mentioned the many times when we had publicly stated that we would be ready to discuss any subject, quoting the President's 1966 State of the Union message and other pronouncements which had been made without objection from the GVN. I said we simply could not make a statement that would be in contradiction to what we had said publicly so many times. I noted that the GVN could make such a declaration, but stressed that by doing so they would be incurring serious political liabilities and would, in fact, deprive themselves of important political advantages. I said the GVN should welcome the opportunity to contrast its free and increasingly prosperous society with the controlled Communist system in North Vietnam. They would be very unwise to foreclose themselves from carrying the propaganda battle to the enemy in the Paris discussions. Again, Thieu did not take issue.
3. The President was in fact remarkably relaxed throughout our discussion. I believe that he had already made up his mind to take part in the talks but that he still needs one more go around at the statement before he can move to agreement and public announcement. He listened to the rest of my presentation, which also stressed that we regarded the final sentence of para 3 as important (because it really is introductory to the next six paragraphs describing how we will treat the other side), and then began to talk about tactics in Paris.
4. He asked me what we (collectively) would do if Hanoi claims that the NLF is a separate delegation. I said of course they would claim this, but this was no reason to walk out of the meeting. In para 8 of our statement we were giving the GVN the key on how to handle this. We would be in a very strong position to work together to counter such propaganda, to make our case before Vietnamese opinion and international opinion. I said if we go ahead on the basis of our statement, with the full endorsement of our fighting allies as Thieu himself had proposed, we need not be afraid that the other side will put anything over on us. We would have a united front, and especially if the GVN is not reluctant to speak as a sovereign government in nailing enemy propaganda claims about the internal situation, we would have the strongest possible position. I added that at the same time we understood the GVN position that substantive talks on internal matters are better handled in side talks, and I remarked that if the GVN refuses to discuss a subject of this kind, obviously we could not do so on our own.
5. I might add here parenthetically that I did not use the argumentation provided by the Dept in para 11 ref B to rebut the claim about the 1962 Geneva Conference because it is possible that we had misunderstood Thanh on this point. Perhaps the GVN position in this matter was really that they dreaded the precedent of that conference precisely because internal matters had been discussed, because this had resulted in establishment of a coalition government in Laos. I thought it best to lay stress on the positive elements of that paragraph of the instructions.
6. Thieu remarked that he thought Hanoi was planning another offensive, not because they expected to achieve anything militarily but because they might be able to make fanciful claims about a "victory" and about the losses they were inflicting on us, to put pressure especially on American public opinion. I said this was entirely possible, but the facts would speak louder than Hanoi's words. Thieu agreed and remarked "We are more practical." I enumerated the factors of strength in the present position of the GVN as they had been reviewed with us the same morning by the PriMin (septel)./6/ Thieu also said he thought the other side was making a special effort with respect to attacks on the cities to convey the impression that the US had really obtained nothing in connection with the bombing halt; to prove that the US was giving a false impression to the people of SVN; and that it was too weak to protest. But he volunteered that our statement of Nov 13/6/ had provided welcome, if belated, ammunition in countering such allegations.
/6/Not found.
/6/See footnote 8, Document 217.
7. I then said we had now in successive drafts. [sic] It was very important when we could have his decision. Thieu said he would have another meeting of the NSC today and then we would talk again. He said, "We are very close now. We need only one more draft." I asked if he thought seven would be the lucky number. He smiled and repeated, "We are very close" and said we would be hearing from FonMin Thanh. Since Thieu would be taking our new draft to the NSC meeting, I left with him a sanitized version of my talking paper, so that he would have the full array of our arguments in connection with the points that were still unagreed.
8. In the course of our discussion Thieu also made some remarks which show, I believe, how he intends to proceed. I noted he had been to Vung Tau twice in the last few days and asked if this was in connection with the pacification counter-offensive. He said he had really been meeting with his psychological warfare people and with administrators from the provinces, and that he had called those meetings to make especially two points: (A) that it was absolutely untrue that the GVN was boycotting the Paris talks; and (B) that any expressions of anti-American feeling must be immediately countered, that we were working closely together and that that cooperation must and would continue. It was apparent from this remark that he is methodically laying the groundwork for public support when he announces that the GVN will participate in the Paris talks.
9. The other remark that he made is especially important. He said that a number of people (he mentioned the Italian and New Zealand Ambassadors) were going around asking questions about the composition of the GVN delegation. They were for instance asking whether Sen Tran Van Lam would head the delegation, as if everything else were already arranged./7/ He said this was bad because it created the impression of foreign pressure and intervention. I said I had had no knowledge of this activity. (Incidentally, just as I was leaving, the Italian Amb arrived to call on Thieu.)
/7/In telegram 43018 from Saigon, November 19, Bunker reported that although Lam had not yet been appointed, private contacts had been developing in Saigon between Lam and NLF representatives. Bunker noted: "Lam, as a reputable older Southern politician who is persona grata in most quarters, also seems a fairly logical candidate for such an approach if NLF leaders feared that they might be left out of any US/DRV arrangements. (These soundings could have been a disciplined gambit by the DRV/NLF for their own tactical purposes.) There is presumably little more that Lam can do at the present time to further this matter, but it would seem a useful reason to include him in a future GVN delegation. He has already been tentatively mentioned to us as a logical choice by a number of would-be delegation makers." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 84, S/AB Files: Lot 74 D 417, Files of Ellsworth Bunker, Vietnam Telegram Chronos)
10. I think this is a time when we should be especially careful to avoid any leaks or speculations that would give the impression that everything is in the bag and that it is a foregone conclusion that the GVN will be sending a delegation to Paris. There have been some unfortunate stories of that kind recently, not only from here but especially with Paris and Washington datelines. Thieu mentioned that he had refused to talk to reporters at Vung Tau yesterday. If, as is apparent, Thieu is carefully laying the groundwork for his announcement hopefully sometime during the next few days, we should refrain from anything that would deprive him of the psychological effect that he needs to carry his country with him. That effect, after all, is the purpose of our draft statement. We should not dissipate it by anything said to the press at this time./8/
/8/The South Vietnamese NSC accepted the U.S. draft on November 23. (Telegram 43342 from Saigon, November 23; ibid.) In telegram 43417 from Saigon, November 25, the Embassy transmitted the text of a letter on tactics for the upcoming expanded conference, which Bunker sent to Thieu that day. (Ibid.)
Bunker
229. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 21, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-EX Files: Lot 72 D 192, Dean Rusk's Files, White House Correspondence. Secret.
It seems to me that we should try to avoid, within the next few days, additional public controversy with South Viet-Nam while proceeding quietly to assert and take care of our own interest in further contacts with the North Vietnamese Delegation in Paris.
I would make no public announcement about what we are doing because we would (1) create even more severe problems of face for President Thieu, and (2) expose ourselves to a rebuff from Hanoi which could make us look ridiculous.
As a first step I would ask for the comments of Bunker, Harriman and Vance on the attached telegram./2/ This telegram is based upon the idea that we would proceed to take up certain questions with Hanoi in Paris unless there were a public agreement by Saigon to participate in the Paris talks. These contacts with Hanoi should be private and not public and we should attempt to have them as a continuation of the bilateral contacts we have long been having with Hanoi rather than on the framework of "expanded talks" which would include the NLF. This means we would not, at least at the beginning, talk with both Hanoi and the NLF; if this proves impossible because of Hanoi's refusal, we would then have to reconsider that point. The central idea is that we follow up specifically with Hanoi on formal and firm arrangements about the DMZ and the principal cities. These subjects we have already discussed with Hanoi at great length on a bilateral basis. They were crucially involved in the decision to stop the bombing. They are just as crucially involved in our ability to maintain a cessation of the bombing.
/2/Attached but not printed.
If we succeed in engaging Hanoi in discussion of these matters, we should let President Thieu know that we are engaged in such discussions. In a formal sense this would be a continuation of our policy of informing him about our private contacts in Paris; in a political sense, it would serve as pressure on him to get his delegation to Paris because he would know that we are proceeding to discuss important matters with Hanoi whether he is there or not.
I would prefer to let Ambassador Bunker have a little more time to try to work out an agreement with Thieu before we make the situation even more difficult by further public announcements or threats.
My suggestion would be that, as the next step, we send out the attached telegram to get a quick reaction from Saigon and Paris. Over the weekend, we can then decide whether Harriman should proceed to contact Hanoi and could make this decision in the light of the current estimate as to the prospect of Thieu's agreeing to join the talks./3/
/3/In notes of a meeting of Secretary of Defense Clifford with his staff, November 22, Elsey noted the following statement by Clifford: "We've conceded every point in controversy to S. VNam in order to get them to Paris." (Johnson Library, George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts) In notes of a meeting of the same group the next day, Elsey recorded Clifford as remarking: "Dean Rusk was good on Wednesday--but as soon as he got back into hands of Bundy et. al., he yielded & gave up. State was unwilling to pressure Saigon at all. So nothing really is going on other than Saigon continuing to kid & bamboozle Bunker into thinking 'just a few more days.'" (Ibid.)
Dean Rusk/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
230. Telegram From the CIA Station in Saigon to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Saigon, November 23, 1968, 0710Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/ISS Files, Job 78-32, [name not declassified] Chrono File, Vol. III. Secret; Rybat.
CAS 702/IN 40384. Please pass following message from Ambassador to Assistant Secretary William Bundy:
1. Although momentarily overshadowed by our collective preoccupation with the bombing halt and negotiations issue, the need to proceed with priority programs in the political development field is obvious and urgent. Our Lien Minh effort is one such program. I should now like to resume our exchange on this subject, looking toward an early confirmation of our intention to support the Lien Minh over the coming months.
2. First, I want to express the opinion that Lien Minh is making adequate progress given the manifold difficulties which attend any venture of this kind in this particular country. Its governing bodies are meeting, its cadre are beginning to develop projects, "peoples' committees" have been elected in all Saigon precincts, an information program is being developed, the process of forming Lien Minh provincial committees is underway, a new top level political council has been formed and, in general, we discern steady if slow movement forward. Still, problems of internal stress, leadership and lack of participation by major religious groups persist. During the past several weeks, partly as result of the negotiations crisis noted at the outset, we have seen an internal financial emergency develop.
3. It appears the Lien Minh ran out of funds around mid-October. Nguyen Van Huong failed in his efforts to discuss this with the President and solve the problem. Thieu was obviously not able to divert his attention from the boiling pot on the front burner. The financial problem for the Lien Minh did not go away, however. Finally, Huong was able to obtain a stop-gap remedy from Thieu of one million piasters, a sum not sufficient to cover what we understand to be the backlog of obligations.
4. You understand that, at my direction, there were no CAS contacts with Thieu during the period from 16 October until this week. The President was not about to raise with me the Lien Minh and our subsidy thereof while in the midst of our diplomatic tug-of-war. In fact, we had a CAS report indicating that he found the idea of accepting our Lien Minh funds during this period embarrassing and awkward. He apparently feared that it could be used as another pressure point on him to conform to our wishes. In any case, it was necessary and, perhaps in retrospect, politic to delay direct discussion with Thieu on Lien Minh until the air had cleared somewhat on our critical negotiations issue.
5. Accordingly, I authorized CAS to contact President Thieu only on 19 November and to include prominently on the agenda a discussion of the Lien Minh in an effort to determine Thieu's present intentions concerning it. Following is a summary of what transpired:
A. Thieu was asked if he planned to continue to provide his full support to the Lien Minh. He was reminded of my earlier assurances that the USG stood behind him in this effort with both funds and political endorsement. Thieu was informed that I remain persuaded of the important potential of the Lien Minh, especially as a bridge between government and people in the provinces. He was told that the new administration would soon be briefed on the Lien Minh in order to obtain its views on this enterprise. Our presentation to the new team in Washington would require an up-to-date expression of Thieu's support for the organization. If Thieu had changed his mind, we were prepared to adjust accordingly.
B. Thieu stated that he remains fully committed to the Lien Minh and professed his intention to attend to its problems shortly. He then described some of these problems as he saw them, to wit: Tran Van Don's lack of organizing talent and cadre, faults in the system of cadre salaries, etc. These have been reported in FVS-17,978./2/
/2/Not found.
C. When reminded that the Lien Minh was in financial difficulties, he reiterated his desire for USG help in this area. While he expressed the view that Lien Minh officials had not used funds for personal gain, he asked our assistance in evaluating the "wisdom" of the financial expenditures made thus far.
D. Thieu then requested a change in procedure with respect to the passage of funds. In order to improve the security of the support arrangements, he asked that the funds be given to his private secretary, Hoang Duc Nha, who in turn would give them to the President. The latter would, of course, dispense as needed to the Lien Minh organization. (Comment: Whether this request was based on Thieu's assessment of the need to improve security or reflects a residual embarrassment at personally receiving these funds is an open question. In my view, the change is essentially mechanical and does in some ways improve security. In any event, this is how Thieu wants to handle the affair and we will comply. We have no derogatory information on Nha and assume that Thieu, a most prudent man in these matters, has placed his confidence in Nha with reason. Embassy has had continuing contact with Nha and has found him cooperative and well inclined towards U.S.)
6. We have approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] remaining from existing authorization and plan to pass that to Nha as soon as possible. Additional sums will be required almost immediately. I would hope that in the natural order of briefings for the new administration, this important project would receive early attention. There will soon come a point where the Lien Minh will expand (we hope rapidly) as committees are formed and cadre recruited in the provinces. It would be unfortunate if momentum were lost by uncertainty of the financial side.
7. My desire to have a clear statement of willingness to support and to have funds clearly earmarked does not mean that I have altered previously stated intentions to avoid a blanket or open-ended commitment to the Lien Minh. The process of careful evaluation of its progress and potential will go on. If at any point we believe that forward motion is irrevocably arrested, I will so inform the President and can, if desired, arrange to terminate the subsidy. Moreover, intend to remind Thieu at the earliest expedient moment of the need to develop indigenous sources of funds. You will recall his strong feeling that this could be done but not until Lien Minh had become a going and successful concern. With hard work and some luck, the latter condition could apply before the end of the current fiscal year.
8. I can appreciate the possible difficulties in arranging a full dress review of the Lien Minh with the new administration during this hectic period. If this cannot be done, I must ask you to authorize a second [number not declassified] allotment to be passed by CAS at my direction pending the final decision on the entire package previously put before the 303 Committee./3/
/3/The reply to Bunker from Bundy in CIA telegram 54540 to the Saigon Station, November 27, reads: "Your review of present state of play with respect to Lien Minh has been understood and appreciated at the appropriate levels here. Your comments on 'possible difficulties of arranging a full dress review of the Lien Minh' are quite apt, and I have, therefore obtained approval for the more limited allotment of [number not declassified] dollars requested in your para. 8 to be passed to Thieu by CAS at your direction. We naturally will need continuing reporting on developments affecting Lien Minh and the use to which the funds passed have been put. This reporting will be essential for the eventual revival of the effort to obtain appropriate clearances for the entire package previously put before the 303 Committee." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/ISS Files, Job 78-32, [name not declassified] Chrono. File, Vol. III) In telegram 44649 from Saigon, December 12, Bunker noted that he told Thieu in a December 11 meeting that "while we respect the President's judgment that he should avoid over-identification with the Lien Minh, we believe it is clear that an enterprise of this kind is not going to gather momentum, let alone become a powerful non-Communist popular movement challenging the NLF/VC apparatus, unless there is a greater expression of Presidential interest." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Subject File, Vietnam)
231. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
Washington, November 23, 1968, 11:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, November 23, 1968, 11:45 a.m., Tape F68.09, PNO 9. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Clifford: Hello, Mr. President.
President: I was kind of under the impression these folks were going to accept our reconnaissance. Apparently, these negotiators don't know what they're doing over there. Now they shot down this plane this morning--I think that's pretty serious./2/
/2/A single reconnaissance aircraft had been shot down over North Vietnam on November 23.
Clifford: Yes. I had my boys in as soon as we got the flash, and we talked it out. Here is my understanding of the agreement over there. Maybe somebody ought to check with Cy, because we'll have it, we'll get questions on it, and I go on this program tomorrow, and I want to be sure I have it right. But you'll remember we went through the stage when Hanoi was insisting on a written minute of agreement--
President: Yeah.
Clifford: And they had language in there that said that we "shall not engage in any act of war." After a couple of weeks of argument, when we talked about reconnaissance and all, that was changed to we "shall not engage in any act of force." And that specifically meant that we were going to fly reconnaissance.
President: That did to us. Now what it meant to them, I don't know. I thought they--I thought it meant that to them. But apparently they never have taken that position.
Clifford: No. I was just going to say that I think all that did was to permit us to fly reconnaissance. But I have never seen a word that indicated that they were not going to try to knock our planes down. We could have agreed ahead of time not to fly any reconnaissance. We said, "We've got to fly reconnaissance." They finally say, "Well, okay, we'll change the words--you fellows fly reconnaissance." But at no time did I remember that they have said they would permit us to do that without trying to knock our planes down. And I think that's the understanding.
President: Well, do we have an understanding we won't knock hell out of their anti-aircraft?
Clifford: No, we do not.
President: Well, then, why in the hell don't we do it? Just go right in there--that son-of-a-bitch that hit him, and let everything we have on him, so that maybe we could temper their shooting down a little bit.
Clifford: Yes.
President: I don't think we can ask our boys to go over there and get hell shot out of them and then throw kisses at them.
Clifford: We cannot. Now this particular plane that went down was an unarmed reconnaissance plane but it was escorted. Now we don't--we know that--we know it was escorted by an armed escort. Now we don't have the details yet to know whether or not the armed escort went and attacked the ground fire. But my understanding is that the orders are, I'll check with Bus, but I'm practically certain that our orders are that any plane that's fired on we are to fire back at once and attempt to stop the firing on our planes. That's the instruction.
President: I sure hope so. I don't know any other reason why we'd have an armed escort with him.
Clifford: Well, the only other reason is--
President: Unless he's just keeping him company. [Laughter]
Clifford: Well, no, no. There're a couple other reasons. One other reason is to protect him against Migs at night.
President: Well, that's what I'm talking about, though. I mean, if he has no authority to fire, there's no point of having an escort.
Clifford: Right. He has authority to fire. And then the other purpose is that if a reconnaissance plane goes down, then this armed plane hopefully can stay in the vicinity and try to spot the fellow and then try to direct helicopters in to rescue the man. That's all set up, and we've gotten a little hint yet in the reports that they were staging rescue operations here, but that they weren't able to get the man.
President: That's right. They heard a beeper, and heard his voice, but pretty soon they picked him up, I guess, got his beeper and everything.
Clifford: That's right. Now, there is a flash out of Hanoi, just 5 minutes ago. You've seen it?
President: Yeah, yeah, they've announced it. I think this is going to give us great problems with our hawks here--that if our reconnaissance planes are being shot down and we're not doing anything about it, and everybody thinks that our agreement at least implied that we could have reconnaissance, they wouldn't be knocking them out of the air all the time.
Clifford: Well, I thought I'd straighten that out tomorrow. I'm sure I'll get a question on it. I thought I'd be ready, and I thought I'd straighten by saying that we said that under no circumstances were we going to stop flying reconnaissance, that the President has to know what's going on north of the DMZ. We can't live in a vacuum.
President: What is going on there? Does that disturb you at all?
Clifford: As to what's going on?
President: Yes, yes. What was the information you're getting from there?
Clifford: Oh, there's a lot. There's a lot of movement in North Vietnam. There's a good deal of truck movement. Interestingly enough, quite a lot of it moving from south to north, and there's substantial movement of north to south. I've just been going over some figures here that are damned interesting. As far as men are concerned, in July and August, they were coming down at a rate of between 20 and 30,000. In September, it fell off to around 12,000. In October, it fell off to around 3,500. And so far this month, it's run--it's been--there've been about 600. So the last 3 months, there's been a very substantial fall off in personnel moving from north to south. Now, there are more trucks moving over in Laos now than were moving before. Probably the main reason being--that that's the road that's passable. So that we're moving--we don't say this publicly, but as you know--we're moving our air power over, attacking them in Laos, and doing quite a good job.
President: I wonder what results are coming out of that. Are we getting much more since we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam in Laos than we were getting before?
Clifford: I'll have--I'll get those figures.
President: Get what we were doing October 31st and what we're doing now.
Clifford: Now, also, one of the main points is, of course, why we were interested in the DMZ is that we wanted to be sure that there wasn't going to be any infiltration through the DMZ. That's another reason we've been watching North Vietnam very carefully. As far as we can ascertain, that's been okay. There's not been any infiltration through the DMZ. Now, the boys here have been putting me through a skull session. One of them asked a very good question. One of them said, "Now, Clifford, you say that over in Paris that there was a general understanding that involved the DMZ and involved the cities. Was that all that there was in consideration of our stopping the bombing?" I said, "Well, no. Of course, the GVN was to come to the table." And then they said, "Was that all?" Then I said, "No. And my answer to that, unless somebody persuades me to the contrary, is the President has said all along, and it's just as clear as it can be, that if they take any steps during the bombing halt that places our men, particularly up in the I Corps, in greater jeopardy, then that means that there is the kind of violation of the understanding that we cannot permit. And up until now, during the 22 days since the bomb halt, we do not believe that our men are placed in greater jeopardy in I Corps, and neither does General Abrams." That's the way I thought I'd handle that, because I don't believe we can just confine our--the kind of general understanding we have with Hanoi to just the cities and the DMZ. I think we've got to include this other. If we saw, for instance, two divisions massing north of the DMZ, and saw them establishing a great military base just north of the DMZ, we couldn't go on, you see. So, that's the--
President: I'll see you at 1 o'clock, I guess, won't I?
Clifford: Yes, I'm coming over at 1 o'clock./3/ But that seems to me to be the best way to handle that. That would protect us.
/3/From 1:25 to 3:10 p.m. that day, the President met with Clifford, Rusk, Rostow, Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Frederick Deming, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System William McChesney Martin, Murphy, Edward Fried of the NSC Staff, and Christian. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the meeting was "a rundown on what happened at the Bonn meeting of the Financial Ministers." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A record of the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VIII, Document 221.
President: I'm worried about this plane. I think that our people will start coming, saying, "Okay, now, what are we going to do?" And they'll think that we kind of left them under the impression--matter of fact, I was under the impression--that they were not going to knock our planes down.
Clifford: Well, I intend to step up to that one tomorrow, and tell them that our planes are being accompanied by armed escorts, and we will continue to accompany them by armed escort. But we might lose one of them once in a while. Of course, we're not losing near the planes that we were before. But we're--they're flying with armed escorts who are authorized to destroy or to attempt to destroy anyone firing on our planes./4/
/4/For comments made by Clifford during his televised interview the next day, see The New York Times, November 25, 1968.
[Omitted here is discussion of an agreement for the sale of aircraft to Israel.]
232. Editorial Note
President Johnson remained concerned over what he perceived as a connection between the South Vietnamese Government and Republican Party operatives. In a telephone conversation with Senator George Smathers on November 23, 1968, President Johnson stated: "This bunch of fools that moved in and got South Vietnam not to go to the conference because of Nixon, they just screwed up everything, and it's taken us 3 or 4 weeks. And I didn't expose it because I just couldn't use those sources and I didn't want to make it impossible for him to govern. I think if I had've said to the country and exposed this, brought it out, I think it would've shocked the country so that he would've been seriously hurt. So I just told you, and he told Dirksen, and got it kind of back on the track again. But that damned woman is still messing around, causing trouble, that Mrs. Chennault." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Smathers, November 23, 1968, 1:08 p.m., Tape F6811.05, PNO 9-10)
In a telephone conversation with Senator Everett Dirksen the following day, Johnson noted: "We're making some progress on the South Vietnamese thing. We haven't got it quite back where we had it in October. But we're hoping in the next day or two to do it. Your performance was A-plus. We read you loud and clear. Your speaking for both Presidents prompted action and as a matter of fact, they not only got their dispatches out rather quickly and rather alarmingly, but you cleaned up a big mess for your party that would've been a national scandal. And I think it put Dick [Nixon] in a lot better position than some of his other people put him in. I don't think he knew too much about it, but they had been playing with it some. Bui Diem was impressed enough that he went on out there himself--the Ambassador--and he has been there personally pulling it through every day and just working like a dog and I think largely because you impressed him. And I think--I just thank God that Congress is not in session now, because if Fulbright and Mansfield and them started working on him for not going to the table, we'd be in a hell of a shape." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, November 24, 1968, 9:36 a.m., Tape F6811.05, PNO 17) Both transcripts prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
233. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, November 24, 1968, 2105Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Repeated to Saigon.
24385/Delto 987. From Vance. Subject: Report of meeting, November 24.
1. In accordance with instructions in State 276999,/2/ I met with Lau at our place in Sceaux afternoon November 24. Vy, an interpreter and a notetaker were present on their side. Engel/3/ and Holbrooke were present on our side.
/2/In telegram 276999/Todel 1639 to Paris, November 23, the Department transmitted the following instructions: "Vance should see Lau as soon as possible and make the strongest possible case that the shooting down of U.S. reconnaissance planes in the southern part of North Viet-Nam is wholly unacceptable to the United States. Vance should call upon all the background of the previous talks about reconnaissance and use any additional arguments he thinks will be effective, such as North Viet-Nam has its own forces in South Viet-Nam and, therefore, has its own means for informing itself about movements of our own and allied forces in the South and that we cannot, therefore, be blind to what is going on in those parts of North Viet-Nam which could directly threaten our forces in the South. Make clear that it will be necessary for us to insist upon reconnaissance and to protect our reconnaissance planes by whatever means are required. Our preference, in the interest of talks leading to a peaceful solution, would be for the North Vietnamese to comply with their clear understanding of our point of view and leave our unarmed reconnaissance planes alone." (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968)
/3/Foreign Service officer David Engel.
2. I began the meeting with the following statement: Begin statement. "At our last two meetings we discussed at length the conducting of reconnaissance flights by US aircraft over the DRV. At those meetings I told you that we continue those flights as required.
3. I further said that the conducting of reconnaissance flights was totally consistent with our understanding at the time of the cessation of all bombardments and was necessary for the safety of allied forces. I pointed out that it in no way constituted a threat to the security of the DRV.
4. I protested the firing by the DRV on our reconnaissance aircraft, and asked that it be stopped. I warned that if the attacks on our reconnaissance aircraft continued, we would take all steps necessary to defend our aircraft and to protect our pilots, and this could lead to a serious and dangerous situation.
5. What I spoke of has now happened. Yesterday, as you well know, one of our reconnaissance aircraft was shot down in the vicinity of Dong Hoi. That action on the part of your government is wholly unacceptable to the United States.
6. I previously said to you that I assumed that both of us did not wish to see anything happen which would seriously endanger movement towards a peaceful solution of the Viet Nam problem. As I understood your remarks at our last meeting, you agreed with that assumption. Yet your gunners have continued to attack our reconnaissance aircraft which are in no way endangering the security of the DRV.
7. As I told you before, until we move closer toward peace, it will be necessary for us to continue reconnaissance as required for the protection of our forces. You have your own forces in South Viet Nam, therefore, your own means of informing yourself about movements of our own and allied forces in the South. We do not have any forces in the North. We have stopped all bombardments and all other acts involving the use of force against the territory of the DRV. We are therefore, except for aerial reconnaissance, blind as to what is going on in those parts of North Viet Nam which could threaten our forces in the South.
8. Our preference in the interest of talks leading to a peaceful solution would be for North Viet Nam to comply with your clear understanding of our point of view and to leave our reconnaissance aircraft alone.
9. I wish to make it crystal clear that we will continue reconnaissance and, if fired upon, will defend our aircraft and protect our pilots by whatever means are required.
10. I ask that you convey this message to your government promptly. End statement.
11. Lau said that he would like to comment on what had just been said. In connection with the activities of US reconnaissance flights over the territory of the DRV, and in connection with the military activity of the US in and around the DMZ, Lau said that, at the last private meeting on November 14,/4/ he had emphasized the serious situation created by continued US reconnaissance flights over the territory of the DRV. He said that he had also emphasized the absurdity of the US point of view that it has the right to violate the sovereignty and security of the DRV, and, at the same time, deny the DRV's legitimate right of self defense against these illegal US acts.
/4/See footnote 6, Document 221.
12. Lau said that he also rejected the slanderous US accusations against the DRV, such as saying that the Peoples Army of Viet Nam (NVA) had opened artillery and rocket fire against US positions south of the DMZ.
13. At this point I interrupted and asked Lau to repeat his statement. He did so. Comment: We note that Lau pulled back from DRV public charge that US had positions in southern half of DMZ.
14. Lau said they felt that since the last meeting the US has not paid attention to the serious situation it has created, but rather had committed further illegal acts not only in the DMZ but also on the rest of the territory of the DRV.
15. Lau then handed me a piece of paper containing excerpts of the November 21 DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting, he said, the repeated US artillery shellings from south of the DMZ and shellings by US Navy ships in the vicinity of south of the Cua Viet River against the northern part of the DMZ on November 16, 17, 20 and 21./6/
/6/For text of this statement, see The New York Times, November 22, 1968.
16. Lau said that the US was also continuing to send manned and unmanned reconnaissance flights over the territory of the DRV in increasing numbers. Lau said he wanted to convey the statistics on US violations of the air space of the northern part of the DMZ. He then handed me a paper in French, the informal translation of which is as follows: Repeated violations by American airplanes against the air space of the DRV: November 14, 1968--15 times of which two times north and 13 times south of the 19th parallel. November 18, 1968--18 times, twice north and 11 times south of the 19th parallel. November 20, 1968--12 times, including on L-19 above the northern half of the DMZ. November 21, 1968--15 times, including four times north of the 19th parallel and on L-19 above the northern half of the DMZ. November 22, 1968--14 times, including 3 times north and 11 times south of the 19th parallel, and on L-19 above the northern half of the DMZ. End translation. Lau asked us to note that they were making a distinction between violations north of the 19th parallel and south of the 19th parallel./6/
/6/Harriman and Vance later commented in telegram 24479/Delto 988 from Paris, November 26: "It would appear from the foregoing that the DRV is especially sensitive to flights north of the 19th parallel and particularly in the Hanoi-Haiphong area." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968) In telegram 278383/Todel 1672 to Paris, November 27, the Department replied that "Lau's distinction between reconnaissance north of the 19th parallel as opposed to the south of the 19th parallel aroused our curiosity too" and requested that Harriman "probe" Lau on this point. (Ibid., HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968) In a meeting with Lau that day, Harriman brought up the subject, and reported in telegram 24610/Delto 990 from Paris, November 27: "As for my question regarding the distinction between reconnaissance flights above and below the 19th parallel, Lau said the distinction he had made had no particular significance. It was just to make a geographical demarcation." (Ibid., HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968)
17. Lau then said that it was not mere coincidence, immediately after the cessation of bombing of North Viet Nam, that, according to UPI November 4, Harold Brown the Secretary of the Air Force had warned that actions might be taken and that according to The New York Times on November 1, President Johnson gave General Abrams the right to resume bombing in the DMZ and even just north of the DMZ.
18. In answer to my question as to what exactly Harold Brown had allegedly said, Lau said that Brown had said that we would continue to order reconnaissance flights, and that if North Vietnamese forces returned to the DMZ, then the US would take action. He said that Brown had made these remarks in Washington on November 4.
19. Lau continued: In the November 14 private meeting, the DRV had demanded that the US stop reconnaissance flights immediately. After conveying this warning about the violations committed by the US against the status of the DMZ, Lau said that he was now instructed to reject completely the position of the USG in regard to reconnaissance flights over the territory of the DRV. He said he was also instructed to ask me to convey to my government the energetic protest of the government of the DRV against these actions against the sovereignty of the DRV and the infringements upon the status of the DRV.
20. Lau said that he was also authorized to state that if the US side did not put an end to these violations it would have to bear full responsibility for the consequences which might arise from this situation. The allegations of the US side concerning the DMZ are aimed only at justifying its ambitions and schemes in South Viet-Nam, and in covering up its increasingly serious violation of the status of the DMZ and its encroachments of territory of the DRV by reconnaissance flights. Lau said that the US was also making these allegations in order to evade the responsibility for hindering the holding of the four-party conference to find a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam problem as had been agreed upon. Comment: Lau was obviously prepared for a discussion of reconnaissance flights and the DMZ, and spoke from prepared notes.
21. I said I would express my views on his comments. First, I said that the information which has been provided to me concerning the DMZ indicated that there have been numerous sightings of military personnel in uniform in both the northern and the southern halves of the DMZ since the cessation of bombing. During all this time there have been no US or allied forces in the DMZ; therefore, the persons in uniform in both the northern and the southern halves of the DMZ are members of either the North Vietnamese Army or of the Viet Cong. I reminded Lau that he had told me previously that there are and have been no military personnel in the DMZ and I asked Lau again if that was correct.
22. In response to attacks by rockets and mortar against allied forces south of the DMZ, I said that I had spoken of this matter before and I would not go into it again tonight.
23. I then said that between November 10 and 23, on nine days there had been firing upon air observers, all of whom have been flying in observer aircraft over the southern half of the DMZ. These air observers have been fired upon 35 times; nine times with 30 or 50 caliber machine guns, and 26 times with small arms. Twenty-one times the firing has come from the southern half of the DMZ, and 14 times US air observers have been fired at from the northern half of the DMZ. The artillery fire from south of the DMZ has been primarily for the protection of the forces which have been fired upon, including the air observers. With respect to firing into the northern half of the DMZ, this has taken place only on two occasions: first, on November 21 when a 50 caliber machine gun opened fire on an air observer flying over the southern half of the DMZ. In this case artillery fire was directed against the guns in order to protect the pilot of the aircraft. The second occasion in which fire was directed into the northern half of the DMZ was on November 22. As in the previous case, a 50 caliber machine gun fired approximately 75 rounds at an air observer. In order to protect the observer, artillery fire was directed from south of the DMZ against the machine gun which had opened fire on the US air observer, who was flying over the southern half of the DMZ.
24. With respect to troops in uniform seen in the DMZ, I said that they have been seen in varying numbers up to two sightings of platoon-sized groups. I told Lau that I rejected the allegations that the US had violated the DMZ. The US had kept its troops and other allied troops out of the DMZ. No firings or attacks were made into the DMZ until rocket and mortar attacks were directed against allied positions south of the DMZ on November 10.
25. I said, further, since that time there have been continuing violations of the DMZ on their side both by the presence of troops and the firing of weapons out of both halves of the DMZ against US and other allied forces. I said that it is the policy of the US to respect the DMZ and we expect that that will be the policy of the Government of the DRV.
26. I said the information available to me did not accord with the allegations made in the Foreign Ministry spokesman's declaration which he had handed me earlier. I said that I would review the material he had given me on reconnaissance flights and I reserved the right to comment further at a later date. I wished to repeat again, however, what I had said at the opening of the meeting, namely, that we would continue reconnaissance flights and if fired upon would defend our aircraft and protect our pilots by whatever means necessary. I said I hoped he would reconsider the untenable position he had expressed concerning the flying of reconnaissance aircraft over North Viet-Nam.
27. Concerning the alleged statement of Harold Brown, it was not clear what he was alleged to have said, and I reserved the right to comment further at a later date.
28. Finally, concerning the baseless charge that the US has taken certain alleged actions to cover up the fact that a wider meeting has not yet taken place, I said that I rejected those allegations.
29. Concerning matters under the control of the US, as Lau well knew and as I had previously pointed out, the US has taken the actions which it said it would take. Concerning other matters not under US control, as he well knew and as I had previously pointed out many times, complexities had arisen. So far as a wider meeting was concerned, I might have further information to give him on this subject--namely, a wider meeting in which there would be present on our side representatives of the RVN, and on the DRV side representatives of the NLF--in the not too distant future.
30. Lau said he would like to speak about the aerial observers over the DMZ. The US had said that aerial observation was carried out in the southern part of the DMZ, but his information was that violations had been made over the northern part of the DMZ not the southern part. (I interjected that our information was different.) Since the violations were made on the territory of the DRV, Lau continued, the DRV had the right to defend itself. He wanted to reiterate that the US position, denying the DRV the right to defend itself, was unacceptable. As he had said previously today, if the denial by the US Government of the DRV's legitimate right to self-defense leads to a more serious situation, the US Government must bear full responsibility for this situation. He had stated this at our last private meeting on November 14, and he wanted to reaffirm it now. He wanted to express his point of view strongly and firmly. The DRV feels that if the US side deliberately creates this serious situation, that is, by continuing reconnaissance flights over the territory of the DRV and threatening to use the necessary means to protect its aircraft and pilots, that was evidence of the US scheme not to abandon its scheme of aggression, and it proves once again that US words of good will and peace were not sincere.
31. Secondly, Lau continued, concerning the DMZ, not long after the US cessation of bombing against North Viet-Nam, the US again violated the DMZ by firing artillery from south of the DMZ against the DMZ and by naval bombardment against the DMZ. Therefore, the DRV demands that the US Government stop these violations of the status of the DMZ. He wanted to repeat again that allegations of the presence of North Vietnamese Army personnel in the DMZ were only aimed at justifying the violations of the DMZ by the US. The DRV had said many times and said again today that DRV policy has consistently been to respect the Geneva Agreements, and as part of the Geneva Agreements, the DMZ.
32. As far as a four-party conference was concerned, Lau said the DRV felt that the fact that the US Government had raised the matter of complexities or difficulties does not allow the US to be free of its responsibilities in carrying out the agreement we had reached, no matter what the situation was. If this conference could not be held, and he wanted to point out that almost three weeks had elapsed since November 6, the responsibility will be that of the US Government. He reiterated that if we could not meet with four delegations, we should hold a conference with three. The NLF representatives are already here, having come to Paris on November 4.
33. I said I wished to comment. First, on Lau's statement that the US must bear responsibility if the continuation of reconnaissance flights led to a more serious situation, I rejected it and wished to state that it is the DRV which must bear full responsibility.
34. Secondly, on his charges of aggression and the matter of who is the aggressor, we had spoken of that many times in the last six months, we know each other's positions, and nothing further need be said tonight on this subject.
35. Concerning the DMZ, I said that it was important that I clearly understand what the factual situation is. Had I correctly understood him to say that there are and have been no North Vietnamese Army forces in the DMZ since the cessation of bombing, and by that I meant both the northern and southern halves of the DMZ? I also wanted to ask him whether he was denying the fact that there are at this time persons in military uniform in both the northern and southern halves of the DMZ. I reiterated that, as I had said many times, it has been US policy to respect the DMZ.
36. Finally, on the issue of a wider conference, as I have said many times, the US does not consider it a four-party conference, but a conference of two sides, including representatives of the DRV and the NLF on one side and the US and the Republic of Viet-Nam on the other side. With respect to such a wider conference, I had said I might have further information to give him on this matter in the not too distant future.
37. Lau said he wanted to make a few comments before closing this session. He requested that I convey to the US Government the DRV protest against the continuing US reconnaissance over the territory of the DRV and that I convey clearly to the US Government the DRV position that the US Government must bear full responsibility for the serious situation which might arise due to these reconnaissance flights. Those actions were actions which violate the sovereignty and security of the DRV, and the DRV has the right to act against these violations.
38. Secondly, as far as the DMZ is concerned, as he had said previously and had repeated many times today, the information according to which there were DRV troops in the DMZ was only a fabrication to justify violations of the DMZ by the US. He said he again demanded that the US stop firing artillery from south of the DMZ into the DMZ, both northern and southern halves, and stop its naval bombardment in the DMZ. I had said the US policy was to respect the DMZ. In fact, the US has repeatedly violated the DMZ. In the documents which he had given us today, these violations were clearly mentioned: the date, place, and means of violation, whether by guns, warships, etc.
39. Finally, on the matter of a four-party conference, Lau said he took note of our statements that we might have information to convey to them in the not distant future but he wanted to maintain his position that if the four-party conference could not be held, it was the responsibility of the US. It was their position that it was four party, not two sides. He had never agreed it would be a two-sided conference.
40. I said I wanted to make three brief comments. First, I would report fully to my government on this meeting, including their protest, and I asked and assumed that he would report fully to his government on the meeting, including our protests on the DRV actions. Secondly, since the cessation of bombing, the US has taken no actions concerning the DMZ except in retaliation to violations by others. Third, I still had not gotten an answer to my question as to whether he was denying the fact that there were soldiers in uniform in both halves of the DMZ.
41. Lau replied that he had already answered. He said that allegations about the presence of the DRV troops in the DMZ were mere fabrications.
42. I asked him whether he was denying that there were NLF forces in the southern and northern halves of the DMZ.
43. Lau said that for that matter there was a representative of the NLF here, and we should talk to Madame Binh about this. He could reply for the North Vietnamese Army only. But Mrs. Binh was prepared to come and talk to us. She had been here since November 4.
44. We then adjourned.
Harriman
234. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, November 25, 1968, 12:06-12:41 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. This was the 594th meeting of the NSC and was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. These notes were taken by Tom Johnson; additional notes taken by Bromley Smith are ibid., National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. V, Tab 76. A summary and a full transcript of the meeting are ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
NOTES ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
THOSE PRESENT
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Ambassador Wiggins
Secretary Fowler
Walt Rostow
Ed Fried
Joe Sisco
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Clifford: We lost three planes in 48 hours in North Vietnam./2/ It is getting serious.
/2/In addition to the unarmed reconnaissance aircraft shot down over North Vietnam on November 23, on November 25 an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft and an armed escort plane were shot down in separate incidents. Vance and Lau discussed these events in a private meeting on November 27. (Telegram 24610/Delto 997 from Paris, November 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968)
[Omitted here is discussion of the European monetary crisis.]
The President: We have three messages:
--Economic
--State of the Union
--Budget Message
Don't tie me to a situation. I don't know what I might do. I notice Rusk and Clifford are in disagreement.
Secretary Rusk: What are we in disagreement about?
The President: About the basic Vietnam policy, so the press says. It's imaginary, but we must watch it./3/
/3/Smith's account of the President's discussion at this point in the meeting reads: "A newspaper story alleges there is disagreement between Secretary Rusk and Clifford. (Secretary Rusk interjected to ask what are we disagreeing about now?) There is no reason for having stories about differing views in the Administration, particularly when such did not in fact exist. We do not want stories during the remainder of this Administration which report disagreements on Vietnam or any other subject." (Ibid.)
I do not want to submit a reform message.
Mills seems reconciled at our not doing it.
Military:
General Wheeler: Situation is good. 230 violations of the DMZ since November 1. (Indications of enemy presence.) We fired 66 times into DMZ.
There have been 60 attacks on population centers. Nine in the last 24 hours. Three major attacks.
There have been 80 hostile reactions to reconnaissance planes. Two reconnaissance planes and one escort plane have been shot down. These were south of the 19th. No manned aircraft north of the 19th except at very high levels.
In route package one, there is much activity. Tactical reconnaissance in Laos.
General Abrams says pacification has stepped up. 3% population gain in the last month.
69.8 percent under GVN control.
14 contested.
15.3 under Viet Cong control.
Chieu Hoi Program is up. The best month in attacking Viet Cong infrastructure.
General Abrams has a good assessment.
1. The enemy shifted from military to political.
2. The enemy recognizes our strategy. 69% of attacks on hamlets this month
by the Viet Cong.
The tone is optimistic and driving.
The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese lost 2900 last week.
The President: Are there any second thoughts on the bombing halt?
General Wheeler: No second thoughts, but he said reconnaissance up to the 19th was essential.
The President: Anything to cause you to reassess the decision to halt bombing?
General Wheeler: No.
The President: Any second thoughts by General Abrams?
General Wheeler: None as of this time.
Secretary Clifford: Late Friday/4/ we lost a reconnaissance plane with an armed escort.
/4/November 22.
You authorized armed escort to shoot back at facilities shooting at our aircraft. We decided to stand down reconnaissance until we had time to tell Hanoi. Cy told the North Vietnamese. At 7:00 p.m. Bus reissued reconnaissance. Three and one-half hours later we lost it.
We lost a Navy reconnaissance plane and AF-F4D escort craft.
The problem is ahead. There may be a buildup. We could bomb a village accidentally. We may be able to get out information with less provocation./6/
/6/According to Smith's notes, Clifford said: "The problem is as follows: we go into North Vietnam on escorted reconnaissance missions. They shoot at our planes. We reply with attacks on the ground, possibly including villages. What should we do in the brief period until the talks in Paris get going? Once these talks begin we can take up the subject of the North Vietnamese firing on our reconnaissance planes. Meanwhile, can we get the information we must have without provocation? We are using drones and low-level flights now and we shall be looking to see if there may be ways in which we can obtain comparable information in a different way. It would be a tragedy if this problem of reconnaissance derailed the Paris talks." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. V, Tab 76)
[Omitted here is discussion of a possible summit with the Soviets, European security, and events in the Middle East.]
The President: There are two basic problems:
1. Position of allies.
2. Nixon doesn't want it done too close to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Secretary Clifford: The Germans and the British want to go ahead with talks with the Soviets.
The President: Tell Murphy that.
Secretary Clifford: The others feel if they go ahead with his okay. Don't ask a girl if you should kiss her--go ahead and it's all right.
The President: A meeting might help: 1. Vietnam. 2. Mideast. 3. Missile talks.
235. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, November 26, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 092.2, (November) 1968. Secret; Sensitive. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to Clifford, November 26, Helms wrote: "Attached is a report on the 25 November South Vietnamese National Security Council meeting obtained from a reliable Vietnamese source who has been reporting accurately on Vietnamese political affairs since 1962. This report has been passed to Ambassadors Bunker and Harriman. In Washington it is being disseminated only to you, and the Messrs. Rostow, Rusk and Bundy." A stamped notation, dated December 6, on the CIA memorandum reads: "SecDef has seen."
SUBJECT
Government of Vietnam (GVN) Decision to Announce on 27 November Its Decision
to Attend Paris Peace Talks; President Thieu's Plan to Send a Delegation
of "Representatives of the People" to Paris; Possibility that Vice President
Ky Will Not Go to Paris
1. The South Vietnamese National Security Council (NSC) agreed at a meeting on 25 November 1968 that Government of Vietnam (GVN) participation in the Paris peace talks should be announced to the public on 27 November./2/ On the morning of 27 November, at about the same time as the U.S. Government makes its announcement, Foreign Minister Tran Chanh Thanh will make a simple statement about the GVN decision. That afternoon, at about 1600 hours, Thieu will make a follow-up announcement, probably on television. During the NSC meeting, Vice President Ky advocated that Thieu make the announcement at a press conference, with a bit of fanfare, rather than on television.
/2/A November 23 CIA report reads in part: "The National Security Council met from 1030 to 1400 hours on 23 November, was briefed on the detailed text of the newly drafted Vietnamese/American 'statement of understanding,' agreed that the understanding satisfied the governments' requirements for attendance at the Paris talks, and approved the dispatch of a South Vietnamese delegation to Paris." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, Executive Registry Subject Files, 280--Paris Talks)
2. Much of the 25 November NSC meeting was taken up in discussions of the GVN posture at the negotiations on matters of both substance and procedure. For example, Thieu, who chaired the meeting, asked what the GVN delegation should do if the National Liberation Front (NFLSV) representative insisted on describing himself as the only true representative of the Vietnamese people. Senate President Nguyen Van Huyen declared that in such a case the GVN delegation should walk out. Ky demurred, saying the GVN representatives should ignore the comments and simply address their reply to the "representatives of the other side." When one of the NSC members asked what the GVN delegates should do if the NFLSV or North Vietnamese (DRV) representatives addressed them in profane or unacceptable language, Ky said the GVN delegates should make it clear at the beginning that they would look at the ceiling the first two times this happened but would walk out the third time. The GVN, Ky went on, should make it clear it was present for serious talks and was wasting its time if the other side did not want them. Ky added he did not think this was a serious problem since he believed the NFLSV/DRV does not want to torpedo the talks.
3. The meeting also discussed the position the GVN should take if the DRV/NFLSV should move for a quick ceasefire. All those present agreed that the GVN is not yet prepared to face the Communists politically and therefore must oppose an immediate ceasefire. The consensus seemed to be that the GVN should agree to a ceasefire only if the Communists were willing to make serious and important concessions which would lead to a just peace. Most NSC members doubted Communist willingness to make such concessions and therefore thought that the GVN, at least for the present, must be prepared to expose hollow concessions for what they are. The GVN, they agreed, must not appear opposed to a ceasefire per se but only to one that did not appear as a true and significant step toward peace.
4. After the meeting, Thieu told Ky he had put together a delegation of "representatives of the people" that would go to Paris and observe the work of the peace talks. This delegation will consist of 20 to 30 National Assembly members and other politicians who would remain in Paris for some time. Ky was not pleased by Thieu's announcement since he thinks the members of the group will be running around giving interviews to the press and reinforcing the belief that the GVN is disorganized.
5. Thieu also told Ky following the meeting that, having postponed their scheduled lunch meeting on 25 November, he would get together with Ky on 26 November to discuss the make-up of the GVN delegation. However, at about 1400 hours on 26 November, the President's office informed Ky's office that Thieu was too busy to see Ky that day. Ky was disheartened by Thieu's seeming lack of interest, which suggested a possible change in Thieu's thinking, and said he would not go to Paris if Thieu just threw in his name as an afterthought after selecting the delegates himself. Ky later remarked that he and his entourage may soon be back on vacation in Nha Trang.
236. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, November 26, 1968, 1135Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 108. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Double Plus. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of the telegram to the President, November 26, 12:55 p.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith Bunker's latest talk with Thieu. As you will see (para. 3), Thieu is still a little foggy about getting into substantive talks until towards the end of next week. This cable underlines the urgency of our working out our own negotiating strategy and talking it over with the GVN--an item on today's lunch agenda." The notation "L" on the telegram indicates that the President saw it.
43517. 1. I called on President Thieu this afternoon. We noted that at that time, about 5 pm here, concurrences for our statements had arrived from all troop-contributing countries except the ROK (which arrived after I returned to the Embassy)./2/ Thieu was relaxed and fully expected President Park's concurrence in time for announcement as contemplated morning November 27./3/ I asked if he intended to address the nation in connection with these statements. He said he would probably make a TV and radio broadcast tomorrow evening. He remarked that the South Vietnamese people are now psychologically prepared for the talks. This had been very important. Of course there would be some who would criticize, but they would be few.
/2/In telegram 43314 from Saigon, November 24, Thanh agreed in principle with a draft to be sent to the Ambassadors in the TCCs in order to gain their endorsement. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Chronological, Vol. XXIV) In telegram 43513 from Saigon, November 26, the Embassy reported that it had received concurrences from all five TCCs. (Ibid.)
/3/For the full text of both the U.S. and GVN statements, see Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1968, pp. 621-622.
2. I inquired about composition of the GVN delegation. Thieu said he had asked the Vice President to work on this and expected to discuss the matter with him tomorrow. He added that I might talk with him, too. I said I presumed it would be better not to do so until Thieu himself had talked with Ky, but he said I might talk with Ky before. (I am asking for appointment with Ky tomorrow morning.)/4/ Thieu remarked that it is difficult to find the right people. It was possible that Ambassador Pham Dang Lam, who had headed the observer delegation, might also head the full delegation. Ky would probably have overall supervision, shuttling between Saigon and Paris.
/4/In telegram 43606 from Saigon, November 27, in which he reported on his meeting with Ky, Bunker noted that Ky would arrive in Paris on either December 7 or December 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968)
3. We next discussed timing. Thieu said the problem is not so much getting a delegation to Paris as getting prepared to discuss substantive matters. I said we were very anxious to get the meetings going. Thieu said he might be able to get the delegation off soon, but he did not see how they could go into serious talks this week or even early next week. I said we hoped it would be before then, and in any case the first meeting would be procedural and need not have full delegation in attendance. I also said in any case we could go ahead with the DRV bilaterally to lay the groundwork for the first meeting on the wider basis, which itself would also deal with procedure. Thieu agreed that this would be useful.
4. Thieu was very anxious to resume our consultative meetings on broad strategy and key issues. I agreed and said while we expected to be in daily consultation in Paris, we would need frequent meetings here, too. Thieu asked how often I thought there would be meetings in Paris. I said it seemed to me they did not have to be in weekly intervals but could be somewhat more frequent. Thieu speculated that the Communists probably would want longer intervals since their delegation would be bound by strict instructions; but it might be possible to work on a basis where the day after a meeting one would study the record, the next day outline our response, then spend a day in preparing the presentation, and meet on the fourth day if the Communists were then ready.
5. I took the occasion to bring Thieu also up-to-date on the latest Vance-Lau discussion of November 24./6/
/6/See Document 233.
Bunker
237. Editorial Note
From 10:21 to 11:11 a.m. on November 26, 1968, President Johnson met with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Walt Rostow, Assistant Press Secretary Johnson, and Senator Fulbright. The issues discussed included European security, the Middle East, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the proposed summit with Soviet Premier Kosygin, and Vietnam. Rusk made the following comments on the opening of the expanded peace talks: "The logjam is broken. We expect Saigon to send a delegation to Paris. In Paris, we worked out an arrangement with Hanoi where we had agreed language with Thieu to announce this, but when the horse came to the hurdle he would not jump." Relating the Vietnam peace negotiations to the overall arms control process, Rusk noted: "In Southeast Asia, we are in a position to demand a lot from the Soviets. We did what they asked us to do--stop the bombing of a fellow Socialist Republic." He added that, as a consequence, "We think it would be good for the President and Kosygin to meet."
Later in the discussion, Clifford cautioned: "We wish to maintain close working arrangements with South Vietnam. We must keep up reconnaissance to protect our men. We must know if they are moving substantial number(s) of troops and supplies north of the DMZ. Some black Monday they might pour over the DMZ and kill many of our men. We have stopped bombing for 26 days--now it is time for them to produce." He also advised: "We have a momentum going now. It started with the decision to stop the bombing. Now we will have the Paris talks. If we could get talks with Soviets, there is a momentum toward peace." The complete meeting notes are printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV, Document 323.
238. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, November 26, 1968, 1:45-2:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Family Dining Room of the White House. Afterwards, the President met privately with Clifford, Rusk, and Helms for an additional quarter hour. The President left for the LBJ Ranch in Texas that evening and returned to Washington on December 2. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
FOREIGN POLICY MEETING NOTES
THOSE ATTENDING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Robert Murphy (Nixon Staff)
General Wheeler
Walt Rostow
CIA Director Helms
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: I talked about the possibility of meeting with the Soviets with Senator Fulbright and Bob Murphy, liaison with Nixon.
Secretary Clifford: I said we had meeting after meeting after Glassboro/2/ on missile talks. I think it was the best prepared effort I had seen. At the eleventh hour, they (Soviets) went into Czechoslovakia.
/2/Reference is to the Glassboro Summit held June 23-25, 1967. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Documents 217 ff.
The Soviets can't see how they can face the costs of the missile race.
They are ready for talks. We are ready. There is support for this at Defense. When Nixon comes in, it could be a year before you get back to the point where we are now.
We now have substantial nuclear superiority over the Soviets. If a freeze goes into effect, we would be ahead. They are gaining in ICBM and submarine field.
Robert Murphy: I don't know if we have superiority or not, based on intelligence briefings and reports I have had. We need to cut down on expenses. We have something going. The bombing was stopped. South Vietnam will come to Paris./3/
/3/Two memoranda prepared on November 26 discussed future U.S. strategy in the expanded Paris talks. In a memorandum to Clifford, Warnke suggested continuing holding private U.S.-DRV bilateral talks on mutual withdrawal simultaneously with the expanded talks. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 092.2 (November) 1968) In a memorandum to Rusk, Bundy also called for continuing the private talks with the DRV on the DMZ and withdrawal, with other issues such as Laos, a cease-fire, and a holiday truce likely to emerge as well in these exchanges. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Secretary-President Luncheons (2))
Secretary Rusk: An announcement will be made tonight./4/
/4/See Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1968, pp. 621-622.
Secretary Clifford: I think it would be in President-Elect Nixon's interest to get these talks started. During his term, I expect an agreement could be reached.
A number of forces are in position now to let talks begin. Then technicians can take over.
Items to be discussed:
Missiles
Vietnam
Korea
Mideast
Walt Rostow: The Soviets said they have done full staff work. They have a paper to hand us--a bargaining paper.
They are prepared to have agreed statement before we go.
We would go back and study papers each handed us.
Robert Murphy: That Communiqué would be a great achievement.
They use "equality of security."
Secretary Rusk: We have used this.
Walt Rostow: This is Dobrynin talking to Rusk and me.
The President has long history of correspondence on Vietnam. We could lay out this. They seem to want to work the Mideast out.
Secretary Rusk: We were far down this track before Czechoslovakia.
Neither one of us has decisive influence on countries of the Mideast. But we both do have legitimate claims on Southeast Asia.
Robert Murphy: I have a reservation about summit meetings. The thought of another Glassboro would be unappealing.
The President: The question of preparation is not a relevant one. We have been prepared.
Secretary Rusk: We are under pressure from non-nuclear countries to get going on these talks.
The level of talks is related to Vietnam and the Mideast. Every week that goes by without progress increases the danger.
Robert Murphy: On the balance, this should appeal to Mr. Nixon./6/
/6/In a memorandum to the President, November 29, 9:43 a.m., Rostow noted Murphy's comment on Nixon and his possible attendance at the proposed summit along with Johnson: "Frankly, he is blowing hot and cold." (Johnson Library, Walt Rostow Files, Nixon & Transition) In a memorandum to the President, November 19, 2:35 p.m., Rostow cited a note transmitted to him by Murphy: "Nixon asks whether Cy could be asked tactfully and confidentially whether he would be willing to continue in Paris after January 20, depending, of course, on state of negotiations." (Ibid.)
The President: [While] We don't want to commit Mr. Nixon, we do want him to know of it.
Bus, any comment?
General Wheeler: No, Sir.
The President: Dick?
CIA Director Helms: No, Sir.
Secretary Rusk: North Vietnamese representatives told Cy Vance there is difference between what happens north of the 19th parallel and what happens south of the 19th parallel.
General Wheeler: We could probably live with it.
CIA Director Helms: We must keep our eyes south of the 19th. Not much north of the 19th.
Secretary Clifford: We are only firing drones north of the 19th.
General Wheeler: If there is a known AAA site or SAM site, the idea is for armed reconnaissance.
Robert Murphy: What is the infiltration?
CIA Director Helms: 7000 month. Still good deal of traffic.
Walt Rostow: That is a good figure.
CIA Director Helms: 410,000 since '65.
General Wheeler: Walters/6/ knows lots of North Vietnamese people. He saw Le Duc Tho and his people. He saw a very bleak situation in North Vietnam.
/6/Major General Vernon A. Walters, Defense Attaché at the Embassy in Paris.
Walt Rostow: They have great respect for General Abrams, U.S. Forces. They have manpower problems.
Secretary Clifford: The Soviets have been limited in what they can do while we were bombing a sister Socialist State.
Robert Murphy: It's interesting that issue was never raised of bombing during the talks there except hitting the bridges over the Yalu River.
Walt Rostow: The report says they want peace, but they won't come on their knees to Thieu.
Secretary Rusk: Let statements speak for themselves.
The President: When is Dobrynin going back?
Secretary Rusk: Tomorrow.
I'll be on "Face-the-Nation" next Sunday./7/ Next steps in Paris.
/7/For full text of this December 1 interview, see Department of State Bulletin, December 23, 1968, pp. 645-650.
There will be a donnybrook over procedural questions.
One of the first questions of substantive matter will be a more formal agreement on the DMZ, cities and reconnaissance.
They will press for a political settlement. We cannot agree to type of political settlement they can agree to.
I would lean toward mutual withdrawal of forces./8/
/8/In notes of a November 27 meeting between Clifford and his staff, Elsey recorded the following passage: "At Tuesday luncheon, CMC talked about withdrawal of troops; Rusk got into the matter 'one of the early subjects to be taken up is withdrawal of troops.' Rostow looked like he was kicked in the stomach. Major fallacy of Rostow position is that we'd have to keep troops there forever. (We then note that Bundy in last nite 'backgrounder' talked about withdrawal of troops so it looks more & more that Rostow is isolated from DoD & State." (Johnson Library, George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts (1 of 2))
We would have to believe South Vietnam could look after the rag tag elements of the Viet Cong that would be left.
Robert Murphy: A ceasefire--wouldn't you shoot for that first?
Secretary Rusk: We could ceasefire if troops were moving north.
The Viet Cong claim now they control 75% of the area.
Our figures show 69% of the South Vietnamese under GVN control--15% contested.
We need to get Laos back to independent basis and territorial accords on Cambodia.
I do not see how they could accept the terms we would find acceptable, or vice versa.
We have not had flags at the table so far. No name plates.
CIA Director Helms: On November 19, the North Vietnamese director and the Indonesian Foreign Minister/9/ said Hanoi would ask for a declaration of withdrawal of troops--after that they would talk.
/9/Adam Malik.
239. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, November 27, 1968, 1924Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Paris Todel-Paris Delto, Vol. XVI(a). Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Plus. Repeated to Saigon.
24609/Delto 996. 1. In the meetings between Vance and Lau since November 1st, and in particular in the meetings preceding November 6th, we discussed a number of matters concerning the procedural and physical arrangements for the first wider meeting which will deal with the rules of procedure for the next phase. The following reflects the status of these discussions and the exchange of notes verbale of November 5th./2/ It should be emphasized that these discussions concerned only the arrangements for what both sides have agreed would be meetings on the rules of procedure for the plenary sessions (i.e., analogous to the Vance/Lau meetings of May 10 and 11, 1968)./3/ Prior to and after our resuming discussion on this subject with the DRV, we intend to have detailed consultation with GVN delegation on which we will report fully.
/2/See Document 198.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 230.
2. Based upon the discussions which we have held with the DRV since November 1, the following is a summary of US-DRV positions regarding procedure and other matters for the wider talks:
A. Both sides agree that the first wider meeting (with GVN and NLF present) will discuss the rules of procedures, and that the subsequent meetings will also be devoted to procedural questions. It is not clear whether both sides agree that substantive, plenary sessions will not begin until after the rules of procedure have been agreed upon.
B. Press. Our position is that there should be no press at the first meeting in the wider format and the press should not be permitted "until such time as the rules of procedure have been agreed upon" (similar to last May). The DRV originally wanted press at the first wider meeting. In their November 5 note verbale, the DRV conceded the point "temporarily" in an effort to have a meeting the following day. We may assume that they will similarly yield on barring the press from the meetings on procedure, while insisting on a press session at the opening of the first plenary.
C. Language and Translation. During the November 5 Vance-Lau meeting, we agreed to continue the system we have used so far. This will, however, have to be determined in final form during the procedural meetings; as our discussion now stands, the procedural meetings will be concluded using the double translation system.
D. Name of Conference. Prior to the cessation of bombing, we had told the DRV that we wanted to refer to the next phase as "meetings" and they had indicated acceptance. However, on November 5, during a discussion which focused primarily on the question of participants, we stated that "we cannot agree on what the wider format will be called and that will be decided in the rules of procedure as it had been done with our official conversations."
E. Number of People. We told Lau that we thought that each side should have about nine to ten people in the room during the procedural meetings. Lau said that he thought each delegation could send somewhere between five and seven persons. Comment: Discrepancy here is not serious, as Lau himself said.
F. Room. Originally, the DRV wanted to hold the first wider meeting in the large conference room. In its note verbale of November 5, the DRV conceded this point and agreed to our suggestion to hold the procedural meetings in the smaller room. Their agreement was, as on the question of press, "temporary" in an effort to get a meeting on November 6. However, we can expect the DRV will agree to remain in the smaller conference room in the procedural meetings.
G. Seating. This appears to be the major unresolved question. The DRV has informed the French that since there will be a four-sided conference, they should prepare new seating arrangements to reflect this fact; i.e., a four-side table. We have told the French so far only that we do not agree with the DRV suggestion and that we will let them know our views later. We have agreed with the DRV that it would be preferable to work through the French for the final arrangements subject to the agreement of each side on this matter.
H. Order of Speaking. Lau has said that he does not consider this matter important. Presumably, we can therefore take the initiative and propose that we speak first at the first procedural meeting.
I. Designated Spokesmen. This matter has not been adequately aired. It is possible that the DRV may raise a problem on this point, although it is more likely that they will propose that each delegation designate its spokesman or spokesmen in advance. We will presumably want to counter by proposing that each side designate its spokesmen. We would intend to designate both US and GVN representatives.
Harriman
240. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, November 28, 1968, 1405Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Priority; Nodis/Harvan Plus. Repeated to Saigon. The Department terminated the Harvan Double Plus series on November 27 and reserved Nodis/Harvan for the most sensitive subject matter on the Paris talks. (Telegram 279033 to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Seoul, and Wellington (repeated to Saigon and Paris), November 27; ibid., HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968)
24611/Delto 998. Subj: Consultation with GVN delegation.
1. An called on Habib morning November 28. He informed us that Ambassador Lam would not be arriving in Paris on Friday, November 29 as planned, and that he had no idea when Lam would get here, although he thought there would only be a short delay. Habib said that this was an unfortunate delay and that it is vital that the GVN be properly represented in Paris immediately so that we may consult with them closely on procedural and substantive issues.
2. Habib then gave An a ten point paper covering procedure and physical arrangements for the first wider meetings of the two sides. He explained carefully to An that these were the points that the US would resolve in private talks with the DRV prior to the first wider meeting at the Hotel Majestic. Habib emphasized that arrangements and procedures agreed upon in this manner govern only the limited meetings that will in turn determine the rules of procedure that will govern the plenary sessions. Habib told An that we wanted to begin discussing these points with the DRV on Saturday. Therefore, if the GVN had further comments or suggestions on these points they should bring them to our attention as soon as possible. Our desire to move expeditiously made the delay in Lam's return most unfortunate.
3. The paper we gave An follows:
Begin Text:
(1) At the first wider meetings of both sides we propose that we discuss the rules of procedure which will apply to the Paris meetings on Viet-Nam, to determine with the other side acceptable rules of procedure governing the conduct of the meetings. Nothing that is decided in the rules of procedure and arrangements for the limited will prejudge the rules of procedure for the plenary session.
(2) These meetings should be limited in size. We propose to suggest to the DRV that each side bring about ten to twelve people to the procedural meetings. This number would be split evenly between the US and the GVN on our side. The other side may divide itself as it wishes.
(3) The US delegation at these opening sessions will be headed by Ambassador Vance. He will be accompanied by an advisor, a secretary, an interpreter and a stenographer.
(4) We propose that the press not be present at the opening sessions of the wider meetings. (They were barred from the Vance-Lau meetings at the Hotel Majestic May 10-11, also. The press will undoubtedly cover the arrival and departure of the delegations from the Hotel Majestic area, as they always do.)
(5) We will propose continuing the language and translation system used during the May-October meetings. Under that system, everything is translated from its original language into French by the interpreter of the speaker's side, and then from French into either English or Vietnamese, as the case may be, by an interpreter of the listener's side. (This means that the GVN delegation should include qualified conference interpreters capable of Vietnamese-French and French-Vietnamese consecutive translation.)
(6) We will propose that these opening meetings be held in the smaller conference room in which the US-DRV conversations were held. (This will not necessarily be binding on the location of the meetings following the determination of the rules of procedure.)
(7) We intend that there should be two long tables, facing each other. There will be no tables on the sides, or, if there are sides to the tables, they will be empty. We propose that there be no flags or nameplates on the tables.
(8) Determination of the order of speaking will be worked out. We propose that we seek to have our side speak first at the first wider meeting.
(9) While we of course propose to have tape recordings of the latter sessions, we do not have any strong preference for tape recordings of these first abbreviated sessions.
(10) The French Government will be expected to provide proper working sites for each side at the Hotel Majestic. The French will be responsible for physical arrangements, but these should be as agreed by the two sides.
4. We went through the paper point-by-point. Second sentence in point (1) was added at An's request. On point 9, An said that the GVN would like tape recordings of all meetings, and Habib said that we could change our position. Accordingly, when we talk to North Vietnamese we will request that each side be permitted to tape record first abbreviated sessions.
5. Comment: We are concerned that the GVN will not get representatives here without delay. Our present plan is to proceed into private talks with Lau on Saturday, or at latest Monday, and tie down the procedural matters covered in the paper contained para 3. Once this is done, the first wider meeting at the Hotel Majestic can be held. We propose that this meeting be held as soon as possible and not await Vice President Ky's arrival in Paris. We are not sure who the GVN intends to send to this meeting; will Ambassador Lam attend or will the GVN send Minister An? In any event, we believe that the GVN must be aware of timing we are thinking of, and we have asked An to report fully./2/
/2/Simultaneous discussions on the procedural issues were occurring in Saigon among Bunker, Lam, and Thanh. (Telegram 43667 from Saigon, November 29; ibid., HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968) As a result of both channels of discussion, the delegation in Paris believed that it could move ahead with a discussion of procedural matters with the DRV immediately following the arrival of the GVN delegation. (Telegram 24677/Delto 1000 from Paris, November 29; ibid.) News that Lam and Bui Diem would not arrive as scheduled, however, troubled the Paris delegation: "If the GVN drags its feet and we do not even get into procedural discussions in the near future, we not only lose time in resuming the momentum of negotiations, but also we run the risk that things may begin to become rapidly unstuck." (Telegram 24691/Delto 1002 from Paris, November 30; ibid.)
Harriman
241. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, November 30, 1968, 1515Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Harvan Plus. Repeated to Saigon. Bromley Smith sent the text of this telegram to the President at his Texas Ranch in telegram CAP 82851, November 30, and informed the President: "Herewith Ambassadors Harriman and Vance report on their conversation with Soviet Ambassador Zorin about the Paris talks. Zorin was selling full withdrawal of U.S. troops and acceptance of a coalition government. Zorin asked if Harriman and Vance would be leaving after January 20 and they replied affirmatively. Thereupon Zorin said all should push forward as rapidly as possible before that date." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Double Plus, Vol. III) Prior to the meeting with Zorin, the Department sent Harriman and Vance as background an account of the subjects discussed during a November 25 meeting between Rusk and Dobrynin. (Telegram 278474/Todel 1681 to Paris, November 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968) For a detailed memorandum of the Rusk-Dobrynin conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Document 325.
24703/Delto 1005. From Harriman and Vance.
1. Zorin gave lunch at Soviet Embassy on November 29 for us, Habib and Perry. Also present on the Soviet side were Bogomolov, Counselor Utkin and Second Secretary Goritsky, specialist on Viet-Nam. Zorin said the latter two dealt with Viet-Nam matters.
2. Zorin opened the conversation by asking about the status of the negotiations. We replied that we did not yet have a specific date on which the South Vietnamese delegation would arrive but had been informed that it would be some time within the next week or so. We said in the meantime, however, we had proposed a meeting with Ambassador Lau to discuss the procedures for the first wider procedural meeting. We said we hoped the meeting with Ambassador Lau would take place on Monday, December 2. We also said that we hoped that the procedures for the wider conference would be worked out expeditiously as had been the case at the opening of the official conversations.
3. Zorin plunged into the question of "two sides" versus "four delegations," asserting that we had gone back on our commitment. He said that we had agreed that there would be a four-delegation meeting and referred to a document which he had seen describing it as four delegations. The document to which he referred turned out to be the draft of agreed minute. We said that his recollection of the draft was incorrect and gave him the exact wording of that paragraph of the draft.
4. We then said that our position had been consistently that the meeting would be one of two sides--our side/your side--with each side organizing itself as it chose. We reminded Zorin of the history of the development of the "our side/your side" formula and pointed out that we had said to him and to the North Vietnamese many months ago that our side would consist of ourselves and the GVN, and that the North Vietnamese could have on their side anyone whom they chose. We said they had informed us that they chose to have representatives of the NLF on their side. Accordingly, there would be a two-sided meeting which would include representatives of the US, the RVN, the DRV and the NLF.
5. We said that the "our side/your side" formula was purposely ambiguous so as to permit the principal belligerents to sit down together and discuss the means of reaching a peaceful settlement without becoming enmeshed in the problems of status, recognition, etc.
6. We said the really important problems at the moment were, first, the shooting at our reconnaissance planes and, second, violations of the DMZ. With respect to the former, we pointed out to Zorin that we had refused to accept the DRV language "other acts of war"--which the DRV had defined to include reconnaissance--and had substituted our own language, "acts involving the use of force." We said the reason we made this substitution was that we intended to continue reconnaissance and that reconnaissance was not an act involving the use of force. We said we had good reason to believe that the North Vietnamese knew exactly what we were doing when they accepted our substitute words for their words, and that they accordingly knew that we were going to continue reconnaissance.
7. Zorin replied by saying that we had conceded that reconnaissance flights were acts of war. We said that was not the case; that, as he well knew, under international law only acts involving the use of force or the threat of the use of force are "acts of war." Zorin receded from his prior position and took the tack that our reconnaissance constituted a violation of DRV sovereignty. We acknowledged the fact that it did violate DRV sovereignty but pointed out that, although we had stopped all the bombardments and all other acts involving the use of force against North Viet-Nam, a war was still going on in the South. Accordingly, it is necessary to continue reconnaissance over the north for the protection of US and other allied forces. We said that the conducting of reconnaissance which initially had been unarmed, did not in any way constitute a threat to the security of the DRV. All the DRV had to do was to stop firing on our planes.
8. We said we hoped that Zorin and the Soviet Union would use their influence to get the North Vietnamese to stop all firing on our reconnaissance aircraft. Zorin replied that they could not do this and would not become involved in this situation.
9. Zorin then raised the issue of the DMZ and charged us with repeated violations of the status of the DMZ. We responded by saying we were happy to have the opportunity to set the record straight and give him the true facts on the DMZ. We reviewed at length the facts relating to the DMZ and DRV violations thereof since the cessation of all bombardments as we had done with Lau. We emphasized the point that we had fully respected the DMZ after the cessation of bombardments and it was the DRV who violated it by the presence of their soldiers and the firing of rockets, etc., against allied installations south of the DMZ.
10. We gave Zorin details on our patrols into the DMZ during the last few days and the evidence we had accumulated, including the capturing of NVA prisoners. We concluded by saying that it was the United States' policy to respect the DMZ; that we were prepared to do so; and that we expected the DRV to do the same.
11. Zorin replied that he and his associates had talked to both Ha Van Lau and Le Duc Tho, who both denied any DRV activities within the DMZ since the cessation of bombardments. We replied that they were either misinformed or uninformed, and that we would be happy to give Zorin any further proof that he wanted, including the delivery at his Embassy of one of the North Vietnamese prisoners recently captured in the DMZ. Zorin recoiled at this suggestion and said this was a matter for the US and the North Vietnamese, and that he didn't want to get involved in it.
12. We reminded Zorin that the US had stopped all acts involving the use of force against North Viet-Nam and were abiding by our agreement, while the DRV was shooting at our reconnaissance planes and was violating the status of the DMZ.
13. After an interlude in which Zorin questioned us about the warming of Franco/American relations, Zorin gave his advice about the forthcoming negotiations. He urged that the US push forward as rapidly as possible toward agreement that would allow full withdrawal of US troops from Viet-Nam and the acceptance of a coalition government. We replied that the word "coalition" did not exist in the US diplomatic vocabulary, and that we expected to leave internal matters in South Viet-Nam to the South Vietnamese. We said we were, of course, prepared to discuss withdrawal, but it must be a mutual withdrawal of North Vietnamese and allied forces. We urged that Zorin and the Soviet Union use their influence in advising the North Vietnamese in the forthcoming negotiations to act realistically and flexibly so that it might be possible to achieve a peaceful settlement.
14. Over coffee there was some discussion of the future makeup of the negotiating delegations, including the function of General Ky. We said we understood Ky would be here in a supervisory capacity and would probably not take part in the negotiating sessions. Zorin said this was similar to Le Duc Tho's position. We replied that in some ways it is similar but that we hoped very much that Le Duc Tho would continue to take part in our negotiating sessions--particularly the informal discussions. We said that we felt that his presence had been helpful to date. Zorin asked if we would be leaving after January 20, and we replied affirmatively. He said all should push forward as rapidly as possible before that date.
15. We concluded by saying that we wished to emphasize the three points that were of urgent importance: First, the cessation of all attacks against US reconnaissance aircraft; second, respect for the DMZ; and, third, the reaching of agreement on the mutual withdrawal of US and DRV forces. We said we too hoped there would be rapid progress in the talks and that the Soviets would play a helpful role and would explain our position clearly to the North Vietnamese.
Harriman
242. Editorial Note
In telegram 43777 from Saigon, November 30, 1968, Ambassador Bunker reported on how the Paris negotiations affected the South Vietnamese Government and impacted upon the situation inside South Vietnam:
"12. The major events of recent weeks have revolved about the reluctance of the GVN to send a delegation to Paris unless it received certain assurances from us. Working out these essentially face-saving assurances has taken up much of our energies and those of theirs, but spelling them out in precise and clear terms as we have, will, I believe, have certain advantages for the future. I am pleased that this difficult period is now over.
"13. Unfortunate as the government position toward the talks in Paris has been during this last month, it has had some side effects which in the long run may be constructive. The government today has wider support than it has ever enjoyed. Thieu's position as a national leader and Vietnamese confidence in his ability to defend Vietnamese interests has been strengthened. In the eyes of the people the image of the GVN as a sovereign government has been enhanced and Hanoi's propaganda that it is a puppet of the US countered.
"14. The crisis atmosphere of the early days of November in US-South Vietnamese relations had largely subsided by mid-month. The rather truculent and emotional statement of Minister of Information Thien on November 12 really marked the final spasm. When I saw Thieu on the morning of November 15, he agreed with me that it was time that we put an end to public utterances and later in the day put out a carefully drafted statement designed to calm tempers and restore perspective. He said, 'I think this is a moment to avoid pouring more oil on the fire. Differences can arise between any allies, but we do not allow them to be exploited by our common enemies, the Communists . . . Everything can be solved with calmness and patience, frankness and understanding.'
"15. Vietnamese leaders in general had been deeply concerned by the public split with the US and anxious to find a way to repair their relationship with us, although some still have reservations and concerns about our course of action, the public assurances that we have worked out during the past three weeks have been generally welcomed. As a result of these patient negotiations and assurances, the GVN delegation now goes to Paris to face the Hanoi delegation with more national unity, which in turn should make it easier for them to win acceptance of whatever agreements eventually come out of the Paris talks. As another result of Thieu's strengthened position, I think the GVN can be expected to exhibit somewhat more flexibility in negotiating. Another good effect of our recent difficulties is that the Thieu/Ky relationship has been improved, at least temporarily. They seem to be working together effectively, and Thieu has just announced that Ky will exercise overall supervision of the negotiation effort.
"16. I believe the period between Thieu's November 2 speech and the November 27 announcement of the GVN intention to go to Paris was also useful in preparing Vietnamese opinion for negotiations. While both Thieu and Huong have made consistent efforts for many months to prepare public opinion, events have shown that these traumatic last weeks were necessary to persuade the people that their interest would be vigorously protected. This particularly true as regards top government cadre and legislative leaders.
"17. On the other hand, our public differences with the GVN had some important negative effects here, as I know they had in the United States. Few Vietnamese believed our version of what happened, and most still believe that the bombing halt was an election maneuver. They also believe that, for all practical purposes, we got little from North Vietnam in return for stopping the bombing. The result is that apprehensions about our ultimate intentions deepened, and Vietnamese hopes for peace in honor and independence temporarily clouded.
"18. I think, therefore, that our decision against opening talks November 6 without the GVN was critically important in terms of Vietnamese morale. I believe that going ahead without the GVN would have set in motion a very serious decline in governmental and military effectiveness. Once such a decline became evident, the process would have been likely to snowball.
"19. The dangers that would flow from unilateral US negotiations with Hanoi and the NLF were and are apparent to thoughtful Vietnamese both in and out of the government. They also understood that from the point of view of world opinion--and to a lesser extent, Vietnamese opinion as well--the GVN could not long be in the position of seeming to reject peace talks.
"20. At the same time, I should add that the majority of the Vietnamese are profoundly skeptical about Hanoi's willingness to negotiate seriously. There is widespread feeling that Hanoi will try to use the talks to further decrease our military pressures on the Communist forces, to discourage American public opinion, to create further division among the allies, and to gain time in which to prepare for new military attacks. Fear of a coalition still remains strong in the minds of most Vietnamese.
"21. Nevertheless at the seminar in Vung Tau, Thieu took a moderate and realistic approach to these problems. He said that the GVN is, and always has been, ready to sit down with Hanoi provided that reasonable conditions are met, that it must be recognized that Hanoi is in fact the 'Government of North Vietnam' and that, therefore, 'we must negotiate with them.' He said that 'the present situation forces us to strive for a limited objective. Our limited objectives are that the North Vietnamese cease their aggression. We want a peace to last, with effective international control against re-aggression . . . We must remember that our enemy includes our own brothers so we must aim at eliminating hatred within our own family.' In this context he mentioned the national reconciliation program as one of the most important weapons in the arsenal of the nationalists.
"22. I think the main thing now is to let bygones be bygones, to let the late unpleasantness sink into the past, to get the GVN to Paris, and to start talking substance. If we consciously try to create confidence between us, I believe we can work together effectively. We shall need to do this for I have a feeling that the negotiations will prove to be arduous, complex, difficult and long. As you have said, we must expect hard bargaining and hard fighting in the days ahead." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
The full text of the telegram is printed in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Volume II, pages 622-628.
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21902.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
243-260
December 1, 1968-January 20, 1969: Resolution of the Procedural Delays and the Opening of the Expanded Peace Talks
243. Statement Prepared in the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Saigon, undated.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 US-VIET S. Secret. Drafted by Roger Kirk of the Embassy Political Section, cleared by Herz and Berger, and approved by Bunker. Transmitted as an attachment to airgram A-1077, December 1, which was received in the Department on December 9, 8:29 a.m. The airgram reads in part: "The enclosed statement of Fundamental US Objectives in Viet Nam, Intermediate Goals, and Courses of Action represents an effort to draw up a brief classified statement on the subject which can serve as a general guideline for our activities here. Pending receipt of Washington comments the statement should be regarded as a draft working document."
OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES
IN SOUTH VIET-NAM
1. Fundamental Objectives
a. Contain communist power when it seeks to expand through aggression across national boundaries in the general area of Southeast Asia.
b. Demonstrate to our friends and foes that we will honor our commitments under regional and bilateral security arrangements.
c. Demonstrate that we will prevent the success of "wars of national liberation" as practiced by the Communists--i.e., Communist insurrection supported by outside military force.
d. At the same time, avoid war with the major Communist powers.
e. Reduce the number of US personnel fighting in Viet-Nam as much and as fast as possible and withdraw as many as possible from Viet-Nam without frustrating achievement of the other fundamental objectives.
f. Provide the opportunity for all South Vietnamese to choose their form of government free from external force.
g. Assist in development of a free, independent and viable nation of South Viet-Nam that is not hostile to the United States, functioning in a secure environment both internally and regionally.
2. Intermediate Goals
a. Reduce the Communist military and political pressure in South Viet-Nam and
b. Increase the ability of the non-Communist South Vietnamese to counter this pressure to the point where:
(1) direct US participation in the fighting is no longer necessary to withstand the Communist military pressure, and
(2) the non-Communist South Vietnamese can establish their military control over substantially all of South Viet Nam and maintain a non-Communist national government.
c. Maximize, within the limits determined by the basic objectives above, the military, political, and economic pressure on the North Vietnamese to stop their attempt to achieve domination over South Viet Nam by force and to accept a peace settlement consistent with our Fundamental Objectives outlined above.
d. Minimize the pressures on the US Government to abandon the struggle in Viet Nam before it has achieved the Fundamental Objectives outlined above.
e. Increase non-Communist South Vietnamese economic strength so as gradually to reduce the amount of US economic support required and eventually to make South Viet Nam economically self-sustaining.
3. Courses of Action
Military
a. Assist the GVN to destroy VC and NVA forces in or entering South Viet Nam and to drive VC and NVA forces into remote areas away from populated areas by ground, naval, and air operations against VC and NVA main forces, LOCs, and into and within enemy base areas in South Viet Nam.
b. Assist the GVN in expanding the areas of secure environment by accelerating vigorous offensive operations against VC provincial forces and guerrillas, with priority to eliminating or neutralizing the enemy political and military infrastructure.
c. Prevent the enemy from additional recruiting.
d. Foster and promote the GVN national reconciliation program.
e. Develop and maintain a suitably balanced RVNAF that are progressively better trained, equipped, and motivated and
f. Turn over to RVNAF, as its capabilities increase, a growing share of the combat responsibility.
Political
g. Assist in the progressive extension and consolidation of an effective non-Communist administration, responsive to the desires of the South Vietnamese people, over the territory of the RVN.
h. Encourage the Government and people of South Viet Nam to develop and make full use of the existing framework of democratic institutions and to strengthen the non-Communist political and organizational structure at all levels.
i. Promote national reconciliation that will enable the currently disaffected elements of the population to find an acceptable place in the political life of the country.
j. Assist the South Vietnamese to develop a politically cohesive society, with freedom for individual development under a rule of law.
k. Promote the national development effort, including pacification and nation-building, through an integrated program within a militarily secure environment.
Economic
l. Assist the Government of Viet Nam to maintain a level of economic activity and stability which will contribute to political growth and to the conduct of the fighting.
m. Help the GVN adopt policies and strengthen or create institutions that will have the effect of increasing savings, investment, and exports and will insure a reasonable degree of price stability.
n. Help the GVN to expand and to exploit fully its agricultural, mineral, and other resources.
o. Minimize the undesirable effects of the massive US presence on Vietnamese society and economy.
p. Assist the GVN to develop a vigorous information effort at home and abroad to portray its efforts and progress in the military, political, economic, and social fields.
q. Help the GVN convince their people of the desirability of a peaceful settlement to the war, involving some form of non-military competition with the Communists, and help them to prepare for it.
r. Attempt, through our actions and the presentation of them, to get maximum sympathy for our motives and purposes throughout the world.
s. Similarly, make clear to the enemy, and to the USSR and China, our self-restraint and the limited nature of our objectives in Viet Nam.
t. Make efforts to increase the pressure from world public opinion, non-Communist governments, and Communist states (particularly the USSR) on Hanoi to stop its attempt to achieve dominance over South Viet Nam by force and to agree to a peace settlement consistent with our basic objectives.
Diplomatic
u. Devise a mutually acceptable settlement consistent with our Fundamental Objectives, and obtain its acceptance through negotiations with enemy representatives.
v. Consult with the GVN and the Troop Contributing Countries to obtain their agreement and cooperation in such an effort.
244. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, December 3, 1968, 1:29-2:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the White House Mansion. Clifford remained with the President until 3 p.m. and Tom Johnson until 3:01 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES ON THE TUESDAY LUNCHEON MEETING
THOSE ATTENDING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Director Helms
General Wheeler
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: Nixon asked to see Harriman. He will see him Thursday morning./2/
/2/December 5. Harriman apparently met with Nixon and Kissinger on December 2. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Kissinger, Henry) No record of a meeting between Harriman and Nixon on December 5 has been found.
The President: Communications, Transportation, Medics and the Secret Service have never failed me. I like the new Military Aide, Colonel [Donald] Hughes. Doctor Burkley has done a wonderful job. All of them are underpaid.
Secretary Rusk: I would echo that. The wing at Andrews is excellent. They have flown me 850,000 miles. I would authorize larger forces than a squad to go into the DMZ to protect the forces.
Secretary Clifford: My concern is the tactics of the South Vietnamese Government. Last word is that Ky won't get there until the 9th.
You stopped bombing 32 days ago. I fear we will have this package fall apart and get back to heavy fighting.
Saigon appears to be stalling until after January 20. We see ahead delay and delay and delay.
We are not getting progress. We have Saigon delaying and stalling. I think we should agree on a date for the talks to start. I would suggest Wednesday, December 11. That is 8 days off.
Secretary Rusk: We are now in talks with Hanoi. We should go ahead tomorrow and push hard on the DMZ.
I regret that Saigon hasn't turned up, but I regret more what Hanoi has been doing--they were clear on the DMZ and reconnaissance.
Averell feels the President should get credit for withdrawal of U.S. forces in South Vietnam.
I think that is the wrong way to get peace in South Vietnam. We must be careful about a token withdrawal of forces. We agreed to pour it on in South Vietnam after the bombing was halted.
I would not have a token withdrawal. I would work toward clearing out the DMZ.
Secretary Clifford: If an agreement could be reached, it would be good to start a mutual withdrawal of troops.
A withdrawal of 5000 troops by each side would mark a significant change in the conduct of the war.
If this step could be taken it would show the turn had been taken. This would be valuable framework for future talks./3/
/3/In a December 3 memorandum to Clifford, Warnke wrote: "Bill Bundy called with respect to an item that may come up at today's lunch. Cy Vance has received word that Ha Van Lau wants to meet tomorrow to give his answer on the procedural matters. Cy would like to propose to Ha Van Lau that both sides agree on a date certain on which they will both withdraw from the DMZ. He would point out that we admittedly have some forces in there and we know that they do. He would suggest that this dangerous situation should promptly be rectified. Bill thinks this is a good idea and plans to draft up appropriate authorization. I would recommend that you support this if it is raised at lunch." (Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Cabinet--Cabinet Meetings)
Secretary Rusk: Provided this is real and not phony.
Two infiltration groups a day are scheduled into South Vietnam. If we are going to bring back troops, it must be that.
Secretary Clifford: They must have a net reduction in troops.
General Wheeler: A piecemeal approach to military de-escalation is the worst thing you could have.
CIA Director Helms: I agree.
Secretary Rusk: I am for a total mutual reduction.
CIA Director Helms: North Vietnam and the Soviets aren't playing--they said if we stopped the bombing they would help. They haven't. I think we should turn the heat on.
The President: 1. Dean, get all the heat on South Vietnam you can to get there./4/
/4/That evening, the President approved a letter to Thieu encouraging him to expedite the departure to Paris of the GVN delegation. Johnson rescinded the letter after Thieu announced that the delegation would be in Paris by the end of the week. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VII)
2. Go strong on reconnaissance and the DMZ tomorrow morning.
We have stood about all the delay from South Vietnam we can. See if they can be there by December 11.
I think we are justified in resuming the bombing.
We have tested them and they have been proved wanting.
I would like to leave office de-escalating--not escalating--but I do not want to make a phony gesture. I do not want to run. We have listened to dovish advisers. We have tested them. We don't want a sellout.
General Wheeler: General Abrams' authority expires at 11:00 o'clock today to put squad size patrols in the DMZ.
The President: You can extend that now.
General Wheeler: He wants same authority.
The President: I am for that.
Secretary Rusk: Unless we get quick answers from North Vietnam tomorrow, we should go all out in the DMZ.
Walt Rostow: They have taken the northern part of the DMZ as their own.
They won't talk sense unless we go up to Binh Hoi River. This is much more satisfactory./6/
/6/In brief notes on this meeting, December 3, Rostow wrote: "Negotiating strategy. Very detailed talk on question Harriman raised of limited de-escalation. President came out very hard and said would love, of course, to get the war over and make real progress. But will not bug out. What was agreed: Sec. of State will draft two cables--one to Cy giving him instructions to go in hard; second to Sam Berger, diplomatically to keep himself under control. Lot of talk about the DMZ. Abrams' authority will be renewed. On Thursday we will have a meeting to consider the whole DMZ." (Ibid., Walt Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, July-December 1968 [1])
Secretary Rusk: Today is Tuesday. Tomorrow we should look at this.
Let's meet at 5:00 tomorrow./6/ Do it at 1:30 p.m. Lunch tomorrow.
/6/See Document 248.
[Omitted here is discussion of Biafra.]
Goodpaster
General Wheeler: Goodpaster told [Bryce] Harlow he preferred to stay in the field, but would do what he was told to do. Nixon wants him 6-7 weeks starting in mid-December.
The President: I would do just what Nixon proposes.
General Wheeler: General Abrams can do it.
Secretary Clifford: I would hope you could put a limitation on it.
Secretary Rusk: Goodpaster's future is with the next President.
The President: Say we passed on the request. Talked to Goodpaster.
[Omitted here is discussion of arms control matters.]
The President: What is your impression of Kissinger?
Secretary Rusk: Theoretical more than practical.
The President: Does McConnell go out in July?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
Secretary Rusk: If Abrams must choose "do less" or "do more" he'll do less.
Kissinger handled himself in an honest fashion on the Paris talks.
Walt Rostow: [Omitted here are comments on European security.]
Henry is a man of integrity and decency. Henry doesn't understand emergency [in] Asia.
245. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, December 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VII. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Plus. An attached covering note by Rostow transmitting a copy of the report to the President, December 4, 10:30 a.m., reads: "Cy Vance reports from Paris by secure phone that the North Vietnamese representative's first reaction to the proposal on the DMZ was to reject it. However, he will report the matter fully to Hanoi. Attached is the telephone summary of other problems discussed by Ambassador Vance." Vance transmitted the full report of the meeting in telegram 24876/Delto 1020 from Paris, December 4. (Ibid., HARVAN Paris Todel-Paris Delto, Vol. XVI(a))
Vance called on the secure phone at 8:30 a.m.
1. He and Habib had spent three hours with Lau starting at 10:30 Paris time this morning. The discussion involved two subjects: procedures for the first enlarged meetings and the DMZ.
2. On procedure, agreement was reached on all points except the following:
(a) Who speaks first: The DRV suggested that there be a specific order of speaker: the U.S., NLF, DRV, and GVN. Vance rejected this proposal.
(b) Physical arrangements: The DRV suggested four tables or a four-sided table and Vance rejected this proposal. The DRV also proposed flags at each of the four delegation's tables which we rejected.
3. Military: Vance led off with a strong statement of protest about DRV military actions in violation of the understandings reached prior to cessation and Lau countered with alleged violations by the U.S. Vance then put forward the proposal authorized in State 281468/2/ that both sides fix an immediate date such as December 6 after which there would be no forces of either side in the DMZ and a cessation of gun fire and air and naval attacks on the DMZ.
/2/Dated December 3. (Ibid., Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VII) In a note dated December 3, 4:45 p.m., which detailed a conversation he had with Rusk, Harriman wrote: "The Secretary told me that he wanted instructions given to Vance to undertake to start negotiating bilaterally with the DRV for the reestablishment of the DMZ. In other words, we would stop all activity in the DMZ if they withdraw all their forces. Then the Secretary suggested we ask how we are going to find out this is being lived up to, and thought that subject should be raised as to who would go in there to satisfy both sides that our mutual agreement was being carried out. He wants Paris to be authorized to attempt to negotiate on above, beginning tomorrow morning at Vance's meeting with Lau." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological File, Scheduling File, Oct.-Dec., 1968)
Lau asked a number of questions and then expressed his own preliminary views that his side would reject our proposal, and that the matter could be resolved if the U.S. simply stopped what it was doing in the DMZ and everything returned to "normal".
Comment
Vance thought our DMZ proposal caught Lau off-guard and gave us a worthwhile initiative in this situation. He urged Lau to report the matter fully to Hanoi and Lau undertook to do so.
BHR
246. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, December 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. No classification marking. The meeting, which lasted from 12:04 to 1:30 p.m., was a formal meeting of the Cabinet. Harriman joined the meeting at 12:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in the Middle East.]
President Johnson asked Secretary Rusk to report on Paris and then introduce Ambassador Harriman.
Secretary Rusk reported that we were pleased that President Thieu announced that his delegation would arrive in Paris by the end of this week. He said we anticipate some rather complicated negotiations ahead of us, but he was pleased that we are able to call upon the services of Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance. Secretary Rusk, in introducing Harriman, said that this Nation is once again very fortunate to have available to it the dedicated public service of Harriman, whose performance in this field is already legendary. Secretary Rusk said we have some hard bargaining, some hard negotiating, and some hard fighting still ahead of us.
Ambassador Harriman then said that he was pleased to have Cy Vance as a partner. He said the present situation was not as they had hoped, they had expected the serious new session to start on November 6th and that North Vietnam understood that none of those serious sessions could continue and for the bombing cessation to be maintained they had to do certain things. He outlined the same things that the President had been setting out, one with respect to the DMZ, two, not shelling the cities, etc.
Ambassador Harriman then reported on the talks thus far. He said there were two basic subjects to discuss. One is a political settlement which he hoped the Vietnamese will get together and work out a political settlement. [sic] He said they were very far apart. He said that we were supporting the position of the Government which is a constitutional--a democratic constitution; that the VC are rebels against the Government and that if they lay down their arms, they can join in the political life of the country.
He reported that the other side maintains that there must be an agreement and that there should be a coalition government, in which they would expect Vietnam to control so the talks had been stalled. He said there had been a lot of propaganda on both sides. He wanted to make it plain to them that the U.S. is supporting the South Vietnamese in their contention and that the other side is the aggressor and must come to terms.
Ambassador Harriman said:
"On the other side, there are some questions which relate to the Manila communiqué and mutual withdrawal of armed forces. We take the position that the United States Government will withdraw its forces as the other side withdraws its armed forces, the North Vietnamese. Then I would hope that we could do two things.
"First, we must affix the restoring of DMZ. Nothing can be done until that is settled. We would then, I would hope, have some thoughts about the mutual withdrawal between now and the 20th, insofar as we'll really discuss it. Whether any agreement can be reached before that time, I wouldn't want to predict. There is one subject which is of interest, and that is that Hanoi seems to want to continue bilateral talks. They even went so far as to say that they were impressed with your (the President's) Johns Hopkins speech, although they take the regular communist line on American aid--they even went so far as to say that the Marshall Plan was a scheme of the United States to invade Europe. Now that's the words that Stalin used--that's the words he used in 1948. And they still maintain it. But they do show an interest in being independent of Peking and not too dependent on Moscow."
Harriman went on to say that they are quite proud of the fact that they are trying to be French and they are enormously interested in Western technology. They are fascinated by the idea of American rights, and he feels that is an asset that we have in the discussions.
Ambassador Harriman said that the Soviet Union at the moment had great influence on Hanoi--greater than Peking--and the Soviet Union was helpful in the September and October efforts in getting the North Vietnamese to drop some of their outrageous demands and also to glean some of the proposals that we had made./2/
/2/Harriman met with the President after the meeting from 1:47 to 2:01 p.m. (Ibid.) Notes of the meeting have not been found. Harriman later compiled the full text of his remarks at this meeting in an undated paper. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject Files, Johnson, Lyndon, 1968-69) In a memorandum attached to his remarks dated January 4, 1969, Harriman wrote: "After my statement at the Cabinet meeting (attached), several people came up--I particularly remember John Macy, who said it was the clearest statement he had ever heard about Viet-Nam. As the President was leaving the State Department, and was sitting in his car (after his speech at the Human Rights meeting), his last remark to me was, 'That was a fine statement you made at the Cabinet meeting.' It occurred to me that several people must have mentioned it to him or else he wouldn't have thought of it." The President was at the State Department that evening to deliver remarks in honor of the Presidential Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year 1968, of which Harriman was the Chairman. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
The President called on Secretary Clifford to give a brief statement on the military situation as he saw it, which he did and brought the group up to date on what was happening on the military front. He said the great majority of the contacts that we were having in South Vietnam are the result of the searching efforts of General Abrams and his troops to find the enemy and, if possible, to destroy them. He reported that they thought this had been exceedingly successful.
Secretary Clifford went on to say that while he says we are having success with our military efforts in South Vietnam, he does not wish to suggest that the enemy is being affected in such a manner that he cannot carry on his military efforts. He can do so. If he chooses to mount some important offensive, he can bring the men down and can supply them and can arm them to do so.
Secretary Clifford then gave a report on the number of casualties on each side. He said that while there had been some withdrawals of enemy troops from South Vietnam, he estimated there were still a force in the neighborhood of 300,000 of the enemy still there. That consists of Viet Cong regulars, North Vietnamese regular soldiers, guerrillas that are spread throughout all four corps, and administrative service personnel, of which there are a great many.
The President then asked Charles Murphy to report on some of his problems with the transition. He reported it was his feeling that the transition was going relatively smoothly and there had been no major problems. He said he believed it was apparent that the initiative which the President took to provide an early start for planning for the transition is proving its merit.
He reported there had been one problem that occurred from time to time where there have been unauthorized requests for information or other help that have been addressed directly to the agencies by persons purporting to be for Mr. Nixon. He told them that all of their requests should be channeled through their contact who was Mr. Lincoln./3/
/3/Frank Lincoln, a Nixon transition team representative.
[Omitted here is discussion of the budget and the Presidential transition.]
247. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, December 5, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-I Files: Lot 74 D 271, Nicholas Katzenbach Files, NK Chron, 1968. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Plus.
As the first wider meetings in Paris approach, the following elements are at play:
I. The GVN
It is now clear that the GVN may move slowly and reluctantly in the Paris negotiations. This is the tactic they have followed in the last few weeks. It is hard for the GVN to move as rapidly as we want them to, even if President Thieu wants to. He has his own problems, which are quite legitimate from his point of view. Applying pressure through Bunker-Thieu confrontations cannot in itself produce speed.
--The GVN delegation still has to get to Paris, to set up shop, and establish working relations with the U.S. delegation and with its own backup (still non-existent) in Saigon.
--The GVN will probably want to bicker over procedural matters and open with firm public statements describing its attitude towards the enemy. We will have to accept some of this, although it will slow down visible progress, in order to prevent a fight with the GVN.
--We will have to begin serious and frank discussions with the GVN over substantive negotiating positions. It will take time for the GVN to digest our views, although we do not necessarily have to have their agreement on substance before we embark on exploratory or bilateral negotiations with the DRV on certain specified subjects (see below).
II. The DRV
Hanoi is by now fully aware of the potential for US/GVN friction which Paris has provided. We should expect that they will seek to exploit this opportunity, as they did December 4 when they made an unacceptable proposal on the order of speaking./2/ I agree with Ellsworth Bunker that they have made a decision to move their primary efforts from the military arena to the political/negotiations arena.
/2/See Document 245.
Some of Hanoi's strategy in these talks has already become evident. They will use every opportunity to put forward the NLF as the party to whom we should talk if the subject under discussion concerns South Viet-Nam. This is why every time Vance complains to Lau about violations of the DMZ, Lau replies that there are no NVN troops in the DMZ, and that any attacks from the DMZ have been made by the NLF; and, Lau adds, Madame Binh is in Paris now ready to talk to the US about this matter. We are going to see more of this tactic as the negotiations progress. Hanoi's opening objective will be to force us to talk to the NLF. Its fall-back objective probably will be to get the US and GVN to talk to the NLF. They may eventually settle for a GVN/NLF discussion. We should resist DRV efforts to get us to deal directly with the NLF without the GVN being present.
III. The US
The GVN is getting what it wants out of a slow public pace in Paris. The US has a legitimate and reasonable objective of its own, to which the GVN cannot object: bilateral talks, in secret but with GVN awareness on certain specified topics.
The GVN will not object strongly to this. Since they have always assumed that US/DRV bilaterals would take place, we lose nothing (and actually gain something by our candor) by telling them that we have resumed bilateral talks with Hanoi, and that we will keep the GVN informed on their status.
There are at least three issues which are a legitimate subject for bilaterals--the DMZ, mutual troop withdrawal, and Laos. We should tell the GVN that these bilateral discussions will not deal with matters pertaining to the political future of South Viet-Nam.
We should keep the GVN generally informed on the course of the bilaterals, recognizing that the bilaterals will have a direct influence upon both the public and private behavior of the GVN.
IV. On the Substantive Issues for Bilaterals:
A. DMZ: Vance has already proposed that we fix a date after which there would be no military activity in or across the DMZ. The DRV has not yet made a serious counter-offer. We may, however, already be in the first step of a genuine exchange of views on the subject. We should pursue the subject in the bilateral format.
While these talks are going on we should not take military action in the DMZ which would increase the fighting, unless Hanoi makes major military actions from the DMZ. Abrams at present has authority sufficient to deal with the problem.
In any case, we should be prepared for a series of meetings on the DMZ; we should not hesitate to press the issue with the other side, but not concentrating on it to the exclusion of other subjects.
B. Mutual Withdrawal: The most obvious other subject that can be discussed bilaterally is mutual troop withdrawal. We have already raised the subject with the NVN prior to the cessation of bombing, on September 15, 1968 (see attached)./3/ At the appropriate time, we should repeat our proposal and offer to discuss it in more detail. The discussion of this subject does not need to await a satisfactory conclusion to the DMZ discussions.
/3/See Document 14.
C. Laos: In putting forward mutual withdrawal, we should specify that NVA troops must leave not only South Viet-Nam but return to North Viet-Nam. Further, when we talk of mutual withdrawal, we should include under our definition of troops to be withdrawn all NVA in Laos and Cambodia. We also insist on respect and compliance for the 1962 Laos Accords.
Far more than procedures can be discussed in the coming weeks. We can lay the groundwork for key elements in a settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict. The above proposals would accomplish this.
248. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, December 5, 1968, 5:31-6:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES ON PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY MEETING
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Harriman
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
General Wheeler: Things are quiet in Vietnam today. It may be a repositioning in the War Zone D near Saigon.
The President: Anything to report something big may be planned?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir. There could be something big. We're looking for them.
Secretary Rusk: I personally would not change directives in the DMZ now. We should get Cy to press the DMZ issue.
General Wheeler: General Abrams and I talked Tuesday./2/ He said he needs to continue patrols in the DMZ. He wants to keep the enemy north of PMBL [demarcation line].
/2/December 3.
This would give friendly forces better security.
The President: Does he ask for more than he has now?
General Wheeler: He wants more authority. He wants to use up to a battalion (900 to 1200 men).
(General Wheeler showed maps showing the DMZ area. He said enemy platoon and company-size units had been seen.)
General Abrams wants to drive the enemy forces back north of the PMBL [demarcation line].
This does not have to be decided tonight.
North Vietnam has encroached on the southern half of the DMZ.
The President: Is this dangerous?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
The President: Should we say to the North Vietnamese that they should get people out of the DMZ--give them warning?
General Wheeler: You have done that already. If this goes on for three weeks to a month I don't know what will happen.
The President: Clark?
Secretary Clifford: We had one solid agreement--to get the GVN to the Conference table.
The President: What did we say at Paris?
Ambassador Harriman: We said "major cities".
Secretary Clifford: Averell and Cy sought advance agreement on the DMZ and the cities.
We said talks couldn't go on if the cities were attacked and the DMZ abused.
Talks haven't started. They have not violated any agreement. It has been 35 days. Talks haven't started. I do not attach as much importance to violations in the DMZ as the JCS.
Only on three separate occasions did they actually fire on us. To build up in the DMZ wouldn't be good at this time.
We first went in to find prisoners. To increase the level of the forces sent in would heighten the level. They'll move them in.
This is a bad time to increase the level.
First element in the talks is to take up a firm agreement in the DMZ.
Technically, we do not have any agreement on the DMZ until talks start./3/
/3/In a December 5 memorandum to Clifford, Warnke noted: "Activity in the DMZ or against the population centers can hardly be said to be inconsistent with productive talks when the absence of such talks is our responsibility, rather than Hanoi's. It is thus imperative that we engage Hanoi in substantive talks in the immediate future so that we can nail down firm agreements on observance of the DMZ and seek to find some solution to the highly dangerous reconnaissance issue." (Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Cabinet-Cabinet Meetings)
General Wheeler: If we have no agreement on the DMZ, there is no reason we can't move in and clean these people out. This is South Vietnam territory.
Secretary Rusk: We want the enemy to perform on the understanding we had at the time the bombing halted.
The President: Let's assume talks started and they still abuse the DMZ. What would you do?
Secretary Clifford: I would like to see what they had in mind. We were general--"abuse" the DMZ.
Walt Rostow: It was much more specific.
Secretary Rusk: We had four points.
Secretary Clifford: I think we are moving in the direction of peace./4/
/4/In an addendum to a memorandum of conversation, December 10, Harriman noted his observations about the December 5 meeting: "The sharp conflict between Rusk and Clifford was completely obvious. Clifford was for deescalation, disengagement of American forces, as rapidly as possible. Rusk was for a policy of all-out pressure on the enemy which he contends is the manner in which we can establish best results in the negotiations. I disputed this position, and although I did not have the time to explain in sufficient detail, my belief that if we continued to hit the enemy hard they would bring down more men and the fighting would be resumed at its old level." Harriman further noted that the President had "reversed himself" and authorized that, in dealings with the North Vietnamese, the Paris delegation could "go ahead and talk to them about anything you want." Harriman also summarized remarks Clifford made to him after the meeting: "Clifford emphasized to me that when we next talked to the North Vietnamese, we should tell them clearly of the fact that there was a strong element in Washington that wanted to start bombing again, and that we should make real progress as rapidly as possible in mutual steps to deescalate the war, such as reestablishment of the DMZ and agreement on mutual withdrawal. He underlined that we should make clear to the North Vietnamese if they continue to violate the DMZ and shoot at our planes, it might have very serious consequences. I didn't ask him where the pressure came from, but I gather it was among the Chiefs of Staff, and I don't think he excluded Rusk and Rostow as jumping on this bandwagon if adequate reasons could be built up. Clark feels very much that he has been isolated in the inner circle, [and] recognizes that Cy Vance and I feel as he does." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips and Mission, Paris Peace Talks, 1968-69, Memoranda of Conversations)
Ambassador Harriman: We were specific that shelling from across the DMZ--massing of troops in the DMZ--infiltration of the DMZ would not be permitted.
I agree with Secretary Clifford. If they violate the understanding when the talks start that is a different matter. There was plenty of talk.
We need a method of verification.
The President: Let's proceed on Clark's theory that we can't do anything until the talks start.
Ambassador Harriman: We must stress this even before the talks start.
The President: We must let them know we consider this an abuse.
Secretary Rusk: If we put in squad, then put in platoon--I don't see why we put limitations on Abrams' ability to rescue his own men.
I agree we shouldn't occupy the DMZ.
Secretary Clifford: I would refrain from bringing about incidents in the DMZ.
We finally have Saigon in Paris. Why start this up?
General Wheeler: Only way to identify them.
The President: If you don't do this we may be caught with our pants down.
General Wheeler: That's right.
The President: Ask General Abrams to minimize incidents. If there are men involved and he needs superior force, you use it.
Secretary Clifford: When we talked about halting the bombing we were worried about an increase in danger to the men in I Corps.
We don't have any evidence of infiltration through the DMZ into South.
First Air Cavalry pulled out of the DMZ into the 3rd Corps.
Secretary Clifford: Sending men into the DMZ was a result of request from Paris. It is unwise to send our men in. We accomplish this through aerial reconnaissance.
The President: Do you agree with that, Bus?
General Wheeler: I do not, sir.
Secretary Rusk: We asked do they understand three facts of life--DMZ, cities, GVN.
If the enemy gets away with the DMZ, what else do we let them get away with?/6/
/6/In a personal memorandum of December 14, Harriman discussed Rusk's hard-line position. He commented: "Murrey Marder told me that Rusk had said to him in a very impetuous tone that he shouldn't bother to go to Paris because nothing would happen there as long as he was Secretary of State and Johnson was President. He would see that nothing was done there. The only thing I can gather about Rusk is that he wants to end his career as the strong Cold War warrior, with all the guns firing, with Nixon giving in and being the appeaser. Of course I believe in loyalty to President Johnson that we should start the negotiations for mutual reduction of violence, for reduction in American casualties and begin movement of troops home. His historic position will then be justified as the man who was primarily responsible for bringing this unhappy conflict to a close." (Ibid., Subject File, Rusk, Dean, 1968-69) Murrey Marder was a Washington Post reporter.
Ambassador Harriman: I don't want an argument, but I was surprised they pulled out enemy troops from the DMZ.
The President: I do not want to endanger our men. I want my military commander to do this probing if it's necessary.
If he needs bigger force to help them he has it.
The President: Let's do one thing at a time.
Secretary Clifford: In November of '67 there were 4399 sorties against Laos. In November of '68, 12,803 sorties against Laos.
Total: In November '67 28,000--In November '68 31,000 sorties.
B52's hit them in November '67 816 times, in November '68 1786 times.
249. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Saigon, December 9, 1968.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Files, Pacification File, GVN Liaison File: 1968. Confidential. Prepared on December 10. The meeting was held at Independence Palace. Copies of the memorandum were sent to Abrams, Bunker, Berger, Goodpaster, and Major General Charles A. Corcoran, Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS. Abrams had reviewed the military situation with Thieu the previous day. (Telegram 44409 from Saigon, December 9, and an attached memorandum from Rostow to the President, December 9, 11:15 a.m.; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, July-December 1968 [1])
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Colby
1. The meeting consisted of a general review of pacification strategy, history, and organization. The President showed particular interest in the organizational structure of pacification and the role of the pacification effort in relation to the Paris talks and the possibility of a cease fire.
2. After an initial discussion of the President's visits to III and IV Corps, we talked a little about the overall strategy of pacification. I drew the contrast between Sir Robert Thompson's thesis of gradual and careful development outwards from an oilspot, and the alternative of rapidly asserting the Government's authority throughout the land./2/ I pointed out the first strategy might be appropriate when the enemy was particularly strong a few years ago, but that the second strategy is the only possible approach at this time, when the enemy main forces have been pushed out of the way and the enemy is moving to a political phase. This discussion included some historical references to the strategic hamlet program, the President commenting that if the strategic hamlet program had been started in 1957, there would not have been a war. I agreed in general with the thesis, although I said that the weakness of the Diem regime during its early stage came from lack of a politically participating population, and only after 1960 inadequate territorial security forces. I pointed out that the strategic hamlet program afforded a good lesson in organizational principles as well. Certain programs can be delegated to field commanders and local authorities and only general supervision maintained from the center. On new and different programs, however, a vigorous projection of central government guidance and detailed supervision is necessary. The strategic hamlet program benefited from this until the time of the Buddhist explosion, at which time the Government's attention was diverted and the program began to deteriorate. I drew from this the need for a strong, central management of the present pacification program, a rather complex affair which is not entirely familiar to the local authorities who will be carrying it out. I illustrated this with a few examples of adjacent provinces having obviously uncoordinated plans. I thus suggested that the planning process this year should be very carefully looked at from a central point of view and detailed approval be required of province pacification plans. The President was in accord with this overall approach.
/2/Thompson was a British General who had led a similar pacification effort against Communist insurgents in Malaysia. His theories on how to fight the Vietnam war were published later in No Exit From Vietnam (New York: David McKay, 1969).
3. We then discussed in general the 1969 Guidelines, which I said were currently before the Prime Minister for consideration. The President said that he expected to be consulted on them before they were actually issued. I pointed out the somewhat conservative goals of several of the programs, such as 20,000 Hoi Chanh and resettlement of only 300,000 refugees, and suggested that a somewhat more vigorous effort might be appropriate. In this connection I referred to General Abrams' negative reaction to the goal that 90 percent of the population be relatively secure, stating that it is necessary to include reference to the extension of Government authority, if not relative security, over the remaining 10 percent as well. I made a particular point of urging the necessity of activating the political process, moving upwards from popular participation at the village to the government rather than merely downwards through the government administration. This again brought up a contrast with the Diem period and the President was fully in accord with this approach.
4. The President raised the question of organization, which quite apparently was one of the major things he wished to discuss with me. He said that six months ago when the Government was changed, he had considered eliminating the Ministry of RD and moving it into a general directorate under the Prime Minister, working directly with the Presidency. The function would be to give overall direction to the pacification program as a whole, rather than allowing it to be lost as only one of a number of equal ministries working on the overall national situation. He said he had thought of putting a Minister of State in as the head of the pacification program. He asked my views. I concurred fully with the need for a strong staff and individual to give overall direction and control to the pacification program. I pointed out the necessity that the program fully involve a number of ministries, not just RD. I suggested, however, that the execution [executive?] functions of the RD Ministry, in the Cadre and Self Help fields, might be separated from this overall programming and planning function. These functions could perhaps be transferred to another ministry (e.g., the RD Cadre to the Interior), or these two functions could be left in the Ministry of RD, while overall programming and planning be moved to the central staff. The President seemed somewhat attracted to this idea, and evidenced a reluctance to eliminate the RD Ministry due to the misunderstandings this would create that the Government is turning away from the whole RD program. I emphasized the need for an effective Minister of State to do this overall coordinating and planning job, and suggested that he should have a military background. We did not discuss precise names.
5. The President asked whether I thought that plans were adequate for pacification in case of a cease fire. This led to an extended discussion of the role of the VC Liberation Committees and appropriate counteraction, especially as exemplified in the current Accelerated Pacification Campaign. I stated that I had read LTC Be's plan for the establishment of Cadre teams in one of three neighboring hamlets,/3/ with instructions to move rapidly into the adjacent ones in case of cease fire. I said that I found this somewhat artificial and impossible to apply, pointing out the map of Long An with its great collection of VC controlled hamlets covering a large portion of two districts. I then described our efforts to accumulate information on GVN village governments, those elected, those appointed, those in exile, and those without any government. I pointed out that the villages with either elected or appointed governments cover a great portion of the land, although some of these are in exile. This brought out the importance of not only reestablishing Government presence in all these villages, but also of actually conducting elections, in order to secure legitimacy for the GVN's claim. I suggested that considerably greater discussion and emphasis on villages, rather than on hamlets, would give the GVN an advantage in the contest for legitimacy, as the GVN could easily admit certain hamlets to be minority controlled within the overall village, but assert that village government is the basic structure of the state, despite a possible minority VC presence within the villages. This would effectively meet any claim to legitimacy or right to coalition by the enemy, who was actually assisting this tactic by putting his claim primarily into village Liberation Committees.
/3/GVN pacification training chief Nguyen Be's plan has not been found.
6. We then discussed the modalities of a cease fire, and ended up pretty well agreeing at the difficulty of defining a cease fire which would be acceptable to both sides, especially with respect to the role of territorial security forces and police. During the course of this, we discussed the possible reassignment of the territorial forces to the Ministry of Interior, in a separate directorate and not as members of the police, in order to meet any contention that military forces be frozen in place. The conclusion of this discussion was the importance of continuing a vigorous effort to assert GVN presence and authority in all the villages, hold elections therein in order to provide a base of legitimacy and involve the population, establish real territorial security (including an ending of the accommodation in many areas by which the VC rules the countryside at night and the GVN by day), and prosecute the Phung Huong campaign. The President fixed on the point that the GVN even in the Tet period had not actually been driven out of most of the rural areas, but when the VC had attacked the urban areas, the GVN had itself withdrawn its forces from the rural areas, abandoning them to the enemy. He stated that his recent emphasis on the need to be prepared to meet a resumption of the VC general offensive was designed to require local province chiefs and commanders to be prepared to maintain themselves in the countryside while they fought off any possible renewed attack on the urban areas.
7. The President asked what I saw as the major problems facing pacification in the coming months, and how the pacification plan should be managed. I referred to several obvious problems such as: the quality of leadership; the necessity of careful supervision and direction of province planning and execution required by the central authorities; bringing about the active participation of the population; the danger of a psychological setback in Vietnam and abroad from a new enemy offensive, if we built up a state of euphoria on our side; the necessity to develop a base of law and legal procedure for the Government's actions, especially in the process of detention, etc. In the course of this the President commented on the impact he had had on the Corps Commanders in recent months, referring to the spring when they had alleged that they had no responsibility for "civil matters" in contrast to the current period in which they were fully engaged in pacification planning and execution. I stated that one of the major problem areas was the need to convince the population of a psychology of success and to develop confidence that they could take more and more of the responsibility of the war upon their own shoulders. I commented that the President's strong emphasis on People's Self Defense was very much along this line, but that it would have to be followed up by an insistence on elections and a deference to the elected authority of village councils, etc.
8. In the course of the discussion, the President indicated much interest in the Malaysian rural development system and its derivation from the wartime emergency committees. He appreciated the key role played by Deputy Prime Minister Razak and his frequent, random, and rigorous inspections. He was interested in this technique of management, but aware that he did not have the same ability to circulate nor to preempt the Government's role. We agreed, however, that a vigorous Minister of State could perhaps develop this capability, and that the central planning and programming staff discussed above could also carry out this kind of specific inspection. I pointed out that we are preparing some suggestions for a systematic way of presenting information on pacification to command levels and showed him a couple of our examples. He was interested and expressed appreciation for the documents he had already received, and I led him through a working study of one of the provinces in order to show him how to utilize them.
9. The President asked how the situation in Thailand seemed. I drew the obvious comparison between Vietnam and Thailand's overall religious and national unity, institution of the monarchy, and lack of a colonial background, to say that the Thai had nowhere near the same serious problems as the Vietnamese. I then stated that at the national level the Thai have developed a fairly full structure to carry on counterinsurgency and national development, but that at the local level it began to thin out and that the process of involvement of the population and deference to their political initiatives was perhaps even less developed than they were here in Vietnam.
10. In the course of the discussion we talked about the possibility of a year-end roundup on the status of pacification for the press. I suggested that it might be put together by the Central Pacification and Development Council as a report to the President. It could then be released to the press by Vietnamese sources. I stated that I would be glad to background our press on the situation, but that I thought that the basic source of information about the program should be Vietnamese. The President indicated approval of this idea and I said that I would prosecute it further. We agreed that the presentation should be in low key, bringing out the fact that a conscious program had been developed, but that the enemy was still around and might well come back and fight us again.
11. I regret that this memorandum indicates that I did most of the talking, but this appeared to be the President's intention, as he would throw out a subject and ask me to discuss it. He was obviously in the process of adding one more source for his ideas for decision making.
W.E. Colby
DEPCORDS/MACV
250. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Paris, December 11, 1968, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis/Harvan. Drafted by Holbrooke. The meeting was held at the GVN offices. The previous day, the U.S. delegation briefed the GVN delegation on the procedural arrangements agreed to by the DRV, as well as those still to be settled. (Memorandum of conversation, December 9; ibid.)
PARTICIPANTS
GVN: Ambassadors Lam, Diem, Phong, Bac and Minister An
US: Ambassador Vance, Messrs. Habib and Holbrooke
Ambassador Vance began the meeting with a complete summary of his meeting with Lau on December 10./2/
/2/The delegation transmitted the full report of this meeting in telegram 25136/Delto 1039 from Paris, December 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-December 1968)
Ambassador Lam interrupted only once, to ask if Lau had agreed to use the "Qui Vi" form of address.
Vance said that they had not answered.
After his résumé, Vance said that he wanted to draw the GVN's attention to the fact that at 9 p.m., December 10, the North Vietnamese has issued a statement about the Vance-Lau meeting, claiming credit for making new proposals and generally portraying themselves as seeking progress.
Vance said at this time the press play on procedures was running in their favor. Vance said he was disturbed with this and said that it was important for us to discuss how we should proceed, what alternate seating plans we could suggest which were consistent with the our side-your side formula and how to appear flexible and not be accused of being intransigent.
Lam said that he agreed that we should not lose the initiative to the Communists. The two-sides principle must be maintained. Lam then said that any arrangement for seating other than the already proposed one--two long tables facing each other--represented a basic change in the two-sides principle which would cause difficulty in Saigon and was therefore unacceptable.
Vance said that there were other seating arrangements which could preserve the two-sides principle.
Lam asked whether Hanoi had ever accepted the two-sides formula.
Vance said that they had not, nor had we ever accepted their characterization of the meetings as four party.
Lam said that the GVN's presence in Paris was based on the declaration of the United States Government of November 26./3/
/3/See Document 238 and footnote 4 thereto.
Habib said that the November 26 declaration does not demand that the other side accept the two-sides formula.
Lam repeated that the GVN was in Paris on the basis of the November 26 statement and on the principle of two sides.
Vance said that US participation here was also based on the two-sides formula.
Lam said that Hanoi is trying to put into dispute the two-sides formula.
Vance agreed saying that Hanoi is trying to make it look like a four-party conference.
Lam said that he understood that after having accepted the two-sides formula, Hanoi's propaganda machine was trying to make this into a four-party conference. He said this was not a question of propaganda but of principle.
(At this point there was considerable confusion as to what Lam had meant by the above remark. After some confused discussion, Phong interrupted.)
Phong said that the US and GVN delegations understood that:
1) The US and Hanoi never reached an agreement on the two-sides principle; and
2) There was a clear US-Hanoi understanding that the ambiguity in the two-sides formula was deliberate in order to allow a way out of procedural impasse for both sides.
Vance and Habib agreed with Phong's remark.
Lam then said that the GVN has accepted the two-sides principle and all its consequences. If the other side doesn't accept this principle, Lam did not see how we could go much further. As the US has explained it to the GVN, Lam said, the two-sides principle meant it could make its propaganda as it wishes.
Vance intended to say that was not correct; each side could organize as it wishes.
Lam repeated that if the other side did not accept the two-sides principle, he did not think we could go any further. He said that the GVN could accept the fact that the other side could make whatever propaganda it wishes on the two-sides formula and could organize itself as it wishes, but it is essential that the two-sides formula be accepted in principle by Hanoi first. Then, Lam said, we can discuss the shape of tables.
Vance said he did not understand what Lam meant.
Lam said that the US and the GVN had had discussions which had resulted in acceptance by the GVN of the two-sides formula. If the Communists would also accept the two-sides formula, the procedural matters could easily be decided.
Vance said that the two-sides formula was deliberately ambiguous and permitted each of the sides to regard the situation in a different way, thus allowing the discussions of peace to continue.
Vance said we would get lost in semantics and abstractions unless we concentrate on concrete matters and relate the our side-your side formula to specific issues. We now have a concrete problem on arrangements and we must concentrate on that.
Lam said that the GVN accepts the two-sides principle, even with its ambiguities; but the other side doesn't accept it even with its ambiguities.
Bac repeated Lam's views.
Bui Diem asked if we were proposing concessions on the question of seating.
Habib said that we were not talking of concessions but alternatives, which would be consistent with and preserve the principle of the two-sides formula.
Habib sketched alternative seating arrangements which he said were consistent with the two-sides principle: two semicircles; four tables, two facing two; a diamond broken in two places; and a round table.
Habib said that he wanted the GVN to consider all of these so that we could consider proposing alternate arrangements which were consistent with the formula. Habib pointed out that the North Vietnamese had already retreated from their opening position of a square table by the two proposals they had made yesterday.
Lam said that the two long table arrangement was not a starting position but rather their firm position. For the DRV, he said, a square table was only a starting point.
A discussion followed in which Vance and Habib pointed out again that there were other seating arrangements which were just as consistent with our side-your side as the two long table arrangement.
Lam finally said that he agreed with Vance that our alternatives were in a juridical sense consistent with our side-your side. But, he said, until now the two-sides formula has been reported to the Vietnamese people and to the Congress by President Thieu and Foreign Minister Thanh as manifested by the seating arrangement we have proposed, and this cannot be changed easily. Our starting position was that this was a three-sided conference on the basis of the November 26 US statement, the GVN was participating in these negotiations.
Lam said he was showing the position of his government clearly with these comments. He said he would report our conversation and discuss the matter further with us as soon as possible. (At first he did not specify whether he would report to Ky or to Saigon. However, he indicated later that Saigon would have to be consulted.)
Vance said that we must come to grips with this matter. Perhaps we can meet with Ky and resolve it.
Bac said that the GVN believed that the two long table arrangement had been accepted by both sides.
Vance said that if we were going to be so rigid, we could not get anywhere.
Lam said this was a delicate and sensitive public relations matter.
The GVN was not here to block progress, but they had to make their point of view understood. Lam said he would try to be in touch with us after referring the matter to his government.
Vance said we should plan to meet the morning of December 12 and it would be helpful if Ky were present.
Lam said he thought Ky would not want to meet in this large a group.
Vance asked if there were any other matters to discuss.
Bui Diem raised the question of the order of speaking.
Habib said that this point was clearly related to seating.
Phong said that he wished to draw attention to the fact that Ky had made a moderate and reasonable arrival speech and the GVN delegation has behaved correctly and properly since its arrival. The other side has not reciprocated. Phong asked us to tell the North Vietnamese that the GVN expects them to act correctly and properly.
Lam added that this should be not just in the meetings, but also in public, particularly at this time.
Bui Diem said that the GVN had come here seriously, but if Hanoi keeps up its dirty attacks, the GVN will have to warn them and to respond.
Vance said he would convey this message to Lau.
Habib said that Ky's arrival statement had had a very good impact and cited the New York Times as an example./4/
/4/Stories on Ky's December 8 arrival were published in The New York Times on December 9, 1968; a related editorial appeared on December 10.
Vance said that the Secretary of State had asked him to tell Ky that he had read Ky's arrival statement and was pleased by its constructive tone.
251. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, December 12, 1968, 0824Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 13 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. No receipt time is indicated.
44649. Subject: Lien Minh.
1. Having recently concluded a complete Embassy reassessment of the Lien Minh, I decided to raise that subject with President Thieu when I saw him December 11. I started by setting out for him our analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of that organization and our conclusion that the balance still comes out on the positive side although there are a number of problems, weaknesses and deficiencies. I said that in spite of these difficulties we still believe that the basic concept is sound and that the Lien Minh can command the people's attention and can do things with the participation of the people.
2. I then went on to say that while we respect the President's judgment that he should avoid over-identification with the Lien Minh, we believe it is clear that an enterprise of this kind is not going to gather momentum, let alone become a powerful non-Communist popular movement challenging the NLF/VC apparatus, unless there is a greater expression of Presidential interest. We do not believe this needs to be in the form of an aggressive public (or even private) application of pressure; but there might be a more active, if quiet, demonstration of the President's desire that the apparatus of government should specifically encourage the Lien Minh in appropriate ways. I cited as an example that General Lam in I Corps had repeatedly told our people that he could make a significant contribution to political unity among the divided political elements there if he knew just what the President expected of him on that score.
3. Thieu said he agreed with what I had said. The only reason he was going a little slower was that he did not wish the Lien Minh to be an artificial creation or hot-house plant, but he wanted it to grow more naturally so that people will regard it as something genuine. This required a little time. People are skeptical about organizations of this kind, he said, since so many have sprung up only to wither away. He agreed, however, that he had to become more active in showing his support and he intended to take some action along these lines. But the Lien Minh must not be looked upon as an exclusive creation of the government; the people must be led to see it as something that is important for their own future and the future of the country and that is earning their confidence and their support.
4. Picking up this remark, I turned to the question of financing. I said we had noted that there are certain liabilities in replying on paid cadres, and it seemed that Thieu himself had emphasized the importance of getting people to volunteer their services. I said we thought that volunteer cadres would become available when it became clearer that the Lien Minh enjoyed support from the top and that there would be political benefits, even if not financial ones, for those who work in the organization. On the other hand some paid cadre would always be needed, and we were wondering if the time had not come to get some financing from private individuals, for instance from wealthy Vietnamese businessmen. Thieu said this was another reason for letting the organization grow naturally. If people saw that the Lien Minh was something solid, then they would gladly contribute money to it. He realized that this was an important problem, that private financing must be enlisted, and he intended to look into it.
Bunker
252. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 12, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Nixon and Transition. Secret. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to the President, December 12, 3:15 p.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith notes covering all the items you asked me to prepare, plus Pueblo, in this order: Vietnam; Paris; Arab-Israeli dispute; NPT; Pueblo. I have not put anything down on the Summit because I do not know where you came out last night with Sec. Rusk and what precisely you wish to say to Mr. Nixon today. I don't know whether Nixon will be bringing with him any of his staff; but you may wish to talk alone with him about the Summit. I made these notes rather lengthy but have marked key passages to permit you to proceed more tersely if you wish to do so." The President's Daily Diary records the President's meeting with Nixon. The entry for 5:35 to 7:25 p.m. reads: "President departed Oval Office to meet President-Elect and Mrs. Richard M. Nixon and daughter Tricia. President met the Nixons on the South Grounds, proceeded from there to Oval Office with President-Elect Nixon. Mrs. Nixon and Tricia went to the Mansion." During the meeting, the President made a telephone call to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. The meeting ended at 7:25 p.m., when the President and Nixon proceeded to the White House Mansion. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting between Johnson and Nixon has been found.
Mr. President:
Herewith notes for 5:30 p.m. briefing of Mr. Nixon.
1. Viet-Nam
A. "Facts of Life"
--no attacks yet on major cities.
--little or no shelling from or across the DMZ.
--no massing of forces at the DMZ.
--DMZ being violated by presence of small North Vietnamese forces, which we attack heavily when spotted. We also run patrols into southern half of DMZ, in part to capture personnel and demonstrate in Paris that it is North Vietnamese and not NLF forces which are violating the DMZ.
--We have protested strongly to Hanoi, and plan, as first order of business when the new talks begin, to take up DMZ.
--Reconnaissance being intensively conducted up to the 19th parallel and by drones and high-level aircraft north of the 19th parallel. The enemy has been firing on our aircraft. Our military are empowered to strike back on air-to-ground as well as on air-to-air basis. We have thus far lost four recce manned aircraft over North Vietnam.
--Thus, the enemy has partially complied with our understandings. Abrams does not believe there is any substantial danger at the DMZ and at I Corps at the moment. The major cities have not been attacked. But when talks start, we obviously have a major job in getting at the problems of DMZ violation and recce.
B. Military Situation
For several months many of the enemy's main force units have been pulled back into North Vietnam, Laos, and the Cambodian border area. This gave the ARVN and Abrams a great opportunity to extend government control of the countryside, which they have done at a rate of better than 3% a month for the last two months. (It was actually 3.5% in November.) VC-controlled population has apparently dropped to 13.4%; the contested areas are about 13.3%. Therefore, more than 73% of the population lives in relative security under government control. Pacification progress is moving about three times our best sustained period in the past. The pacification offensive has been accompanied by systematic attacks on the VC infrastructure.
The President would underline that the fact that we can move against the enemy in this way, while negotiations are going forward, is the major difference between this negotiation and Panmunjom, where military action around the 38th parallel in Korea could not affect significantly the enemy's bargaining assets.
It now looks as though--at any moment--the enemy is about to kick off an offensive. Elements of five divisions have been assembled opposite Saigon to the west. Abrams' intelligence has been excellent and precise. We shall now see whether the offensive occurs and what happens.
It could raise two major issues for decision:
--Should we permit hot pursuit some modest distance into the Cambodian sanctuary where many of these forces have been assembled?
--If they actually get into Saigon--or shell Saigon substantially--should we resume bombing for, say, a 48-hour interval?
Our intelligence people believe there are two major reasons for this enemy effort if it takes place. First, they have, since 1954, always accompanied a new phase of negotiations with a military offensive to demonstrate their strength. Second, they may well feel they must slow up this pacification offensive, or negotiate with indecent haste in Paris--since their political assets in the South are draining away. But the risk they are taking is that Abrams and the ARVN will throttle this offensive in a way which will look to the world like a major setback. That is Abrams' intent and mission; but they have concentrated a very high proportion of their usable forces opposite Saigon, and it may be quite rough.
2. Paris
The opening of the new phase of the talks is hung up on two procedural matters which have considerable symbolic and political meaning to Hanoi and Saigon:
--The Order of Speaking.
It is agreed that names will be drawn at random from a hat; but Hanoi wants four names drawn and the order of speaking determined in that way, to underline this as a "four power" conference. We and the GVN want only two names drawn, symbolizing our view that this is a "your-side-our-side" conference. The two members of each side would then speak.
--The Shape of the Tables.
Hanoi wanted four separate tables--a rectangle, or four segmented arcs to symbolize a four-power conference. We want two parallel tables. Hanoi suggested a round table. We have not yet finally decided our position, and will be talking it over with the GVN in Paris.
There is some inconclusive intelligence that Hanoi is rather anxious to get down to serious substantive discussion; but that is not evident in the way they have been handling these procedural issues. Thus far, Ky and his delegation have behaved correctly and spoken temperately in public. There is no basis for today's story that the US and GVN delegations are split; although some differences--at some stages in the complex negotiation--would be quite normal.
[Omitted here is a review of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the status of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the issues surrounding the return of the crew of the Pueblo.]
W.W. Rostow
253. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 12, 1968, 7:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VII. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only.
Mr. President:
Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and I met in the Cabinet Room from 6 to 7 p.m. The meeting broke up because Sect. Rusk had to go home to dress for the Kuwaiti dinner tonight./2/
/2/The State dinner, which began at 8 p.m., honored Kuwaiti Amir Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
1. There was extended discussion of the evidence in Abrams' cable./3/ The general view was that, while we had had other false alarms, this evidence looked pretty solid, coming from many sources. The "unusually reliable agent" who was the source of the first page of evidence is, indeed, well placed and has furnished good information in the past. We all agreed that Abrams was right to take every precaution as a matter of prudence and we should assume that the attack will take place. Sect. Clifford raised some questions about:
/3/A copy of Abrams' telegram is ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 110. Rostow summarized and assessed the telegram in a December 11 covering memorandum, and in telegram CAP 82954 to the President, December 30. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Vol. 110 and Vol. 112, respectively)
--whether the enemy might be planting false intelligence on us; and
--on the scale of the attack.
We all agreed that we would just have to see, monitoring things closely in the days ahead.
2. It was agreed that Gen. Wheeler would dispatch, at Sect. Rusk's request, a copy of Abrams' cable to Paris requesting that Harriman and Vance be briefed on it first thing tomorrow morning Paris time. That was the only action taken.
3. With respect to hot pursuit back into Cambodia, there was an extended discussion. Sect. Rusk suggested that Wheeler might, on a contingency basis, prepare orders which would permit hot pursuit up to 5 kilometers on the ground, and air attacks up to 10 kilometers. This would be not pre-emptive attacks but, strictly, hot pursuit.
4. Sect. Clifford, on the other hand, thought that this would be a bad time to broaden the war and that hot pursuit would not provide much military advantage since the units would be broken up and dispersed. He summarized that the military return would not warrant opening up "a new phase of the war" with possible consequences for the Paris talks, the Soviet attitude, etc.
5. Sect. Clifford added that if the President decided to go, he would much prefer that the action be taken without explicit orders from the President--but rather as a local matter. There was considerable discussion of the kind of language that might go into an order that would protect the government from the charge of ordering our troops into Cambodia and leaving us free to regard the incidents as a by-product of the melee of battle. It was agreed that Gen. Wheeler would give some thought to how such orders might be drafted if the President were to receive from Abrams a request for this authority and should grant the authority./4/
/4/In memorandum JCSM-742-68 to Clifford, December 13, Wheeler, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs, recommended that authority be granted for pursuit of enemy forces into Cambodia if the NVA and VC began offensive operations from base areas located there. (Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 880/520 (11 December 1968), IR 6154) In a December 21 memorandum to the Joint Chiefs, Clifford deferred a decision on granting such authority pending receipt from the JCS of a risk assessment, as well any other proposals for military operations against enemy forces inside Cambodian territory. He noted: "This broad spectrum of possible military actions against enemy forces in Cambodia and your appraisal of the military effects and risks thereof will provide a basis for a review of the objectives of our military operations in Cambodia and their possible relation to the broader question of our diplomatic objectives in Southeast Asia." (Ibid.) In the Tuesday Luncheon of December 10, Wheeler noted: "There is a strong possibility that General Abrams will review his recommendation that we move on base areas." (Notes of Meeting, December 10; Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)
6. With respect to an attack on Saigon, Sect. Rusk said that if Saigon were attacked, it was absolutely essential that we respond, or our credibility with Hanoi and Moscow would be finished.
7. Sect. Clifford sought clarification on what we mean by: "an attack on Saigon." Attacks on towns in the direction of Saigon? Attacks in the suburbs? Shelling of Saigon? Ground force attacks into the city? No action was, of course, taken on this point.
8. Sect. Rusk initiated some discussion of a Summit. He was much concerned with the problem of:
--bringing the new Administration aboard;
--briefing our allies.
Perhaps the job could be done if the meeting were about Christmas time; but he comes back to the notion of exchanging principles and papers at a lower level./6/
/6/At the end of this paragraph, Rostow wrote: "(Sect. Rusk will talk to you tonight about this. I put your position to him over the phone.)"
9. Sect. Clifford thought that there was danger, if we did not get started now, that the talks would be postponed for a very long time since the new President, Sect. of State, and Sect. of Defense would be dealing with exigencies and would not be able to put themselves soon in a position to launch such talks.
Walt
254. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8I, Taylor Memos-General (1 of 2). Secret. According to two attached memoranda, one from Rostow to the President, December 14, 12:40 p.m., and one from Smith to Rusk and Clifford, December 17, Taylor's recommendation was one of the principal topics of the December 17 Tuesday Luncheon. See Document 257.
Mr. President:
You are well aware of the indications of a possible renewal of offensive action by the enemy in the Saigon area and have seen General Abrams' cable describing his preparations./2/ I hope that we are equally prepared here in Washington to respond quickly and decisively if, indeed, the enemy launches a significant attack.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 253.
In such a case, in addition to our action against the attacking forces in South Viet-Nam, my own judgment would be to respond quickly with a reprisal air attack against one or more key logistic installations north of the 19th parallel, the magnitude of our attack being proportioned to that of the enemy. No one seems to believe that we are capable of such a drastic step--certainly Hanoi does not as the exposed disposition of supplies all over North Viet-Nam gives evidence. While the "doves" at home and abroad would be aghast, the shock effect on Hanoi could produce not only better behavior in South Viet-Nam but a more cooperative attitude in Paris. You will recall that we never got action in Panmunjom until we broke off the discussions a couple of times--at that moment, our only recourse in responding to Communist intransigence.
I would think that Harriman and Vance should make clear to their counterparts the risks they are running if they renew the offensive or if they stall the negotiations. Our government spokesmen, in backgrounding the press, should get out the word that our restraint is no more permanent than the good behavior of the enemy and that we are quite prepared to revert to bombing for good cause at any time. Our air weapon is an asset either as a reprisal for a violation of our "understandings" with regard to Hanoi restraints or as a response to foot-dragging at the conference table. We should be prepared to use it without compunction for either purpose if it is in our interest, and the enemy and the public should know it in advance.
M.D.T.
255. Memorandum Prepared by Ambassador at Large Harriman/1/
Paris, December 14, 1968.
/1/Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips & Missions, Paris Peace Talks, 1968-69, Chronological File, Dec. 1968-Jan. 1969. Absolutely Personal.
GENERAL REVIEW OF LAST SIX MONTHS
In June while Cy Vance and I were both in Washington, the President received a message from Kosygin./2/ It was shortly after Le Duc Tho's stopover in Moscow en route Paris, in which the press had indicated he had had a talk with Kosygin. Kosygin's message to the President stated, "I and my colleagues believe and with good reason. . ." and then continued to the effect that the DRV was prepared to negotiate seriously for a peaceful settlement, providing the bombing of North Viet-Nam stopped and no U.S. interest would be adversely affected.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VI, Document 262.
Rusk called a meeting in his office which Clifford, Vance and I, Bill Bundy and Ben Read, as I recall it, attended. Clifford took the position that the President should take Kosygin at his word and state that he was prepared to stop all the bombing, providing the DRV did certain things, on the assumption that the Soviet Government was assuring him of the good faith of the DRV, etc. I supported Clifford, pointing out that I did not recall any Soviet leader taking such a direct position as "I and my colleagues have reason to believe".
Rusk asked a few questions, but did not at that time oppose Clifford's proposal.
We thereupon got into automobiles, drove to the White House to discuss the reply with the President./3/
/3/See ibid., Document 265.
Rusk started in with a carefully worded analysis which cut the ground out from under Clifford's proposal, and in fact took the position that of course we couldn't take what Kosygin said seriously.
The President turned to me and I said that I believed the Secretary of Defense had an answer which I thought he ought to consider, that I was in support of that, and mentioned again these opening words of Kosygin were more definite than anything that I could recall. (Abe Fortas later had something to say, negatively.)
Clifford was then turned to and asked by the President for his proposal after a negative atmosphere had already been prepared. He did the best he could under the circumstances. Clifford made the point clearly, however, that if the President took Kosygin at his word he would have a chance to insist upon Soviet Government assurances.
The President turned over the reply to Fortas and Rusk to make. They brought back a negative reply, pretty much demanding action to be taken by the DRV along the standard lines.
The net effect of this was extremely hard line, turning Kosygin down, and Clifford and I both thought we lost an opportunity to get the Soviet Government on the hook in a way that would be most valuable in future negotiations.
What appalled me was that Rusk took this negative position without telling Clifford that he was going to do it, and without indicating to the President that Clifford had a different point of view. He clearly attempted to cut the ground out from under Clifford before he had a chance to present his position. I have never participated in any discussion in the White House where there was such a clear attempt made on the part of one member of the President's Cabinet to destroy the position of another before the second man had a chance to present it.
This, I believe, exposed to me the kind of attitude that Rusk took with McNamara and his proposals, and evidently was the manner in which he had reduced Clifford's credibility with the President since Clifford took over the Defense Department.
I went back with Rusk to the Department and he said, "The trouble with Clark is he has lost his nerve since he has been over in the Pentagon." I replied that I didn't agree, that I thought an opportunity had been lost, and that ended the conversation. I feel Dean must have used this attack on Clark's character with the President. To me, this kind of attack on a colleague is contemptible.
This was the first opportunity since our discussion in Paris started in May, of stopping the bombing under conditions which, in my judgment, would have placed the President in a strong position to obtain a reasonable settlement.
The second opportunity came in July.
After we had made a major issue of indiscriminate shelling of Saigon, and stirred up world public opinion (editorials in Indian newspapers, Manchester Guardian, Norwegian, Mexican newspapers, as well as the first critical statement about Hanoi by U Thant), the DRV stopped the shelling on June 18th.
In July, the general tempo of all military action was down and there was public discussion of whether this lull was the kind of indication of restraint that the President had asked for in his March 31 statement. After full consultation here in Paris and discussions with both Bill Bundy and Katzenbach, who happened to be here over the weekend, Vance and I sent a telegram recommending to the President that we stop the bombing on the assumption that this lull was the restraint asked for./4/ It was a well thought out detailed plan, and we strongly recommended it. I have been told that it arrived in Washington the same day as the Times editorial making a similar suggestion. Later I found out that Hubert Humphrey had prepared a memorandum of his own position which included stopping the bombing.
/4/See ibid., Documents 169 and 312.
The President went through the roof, and instructed the Secretary of State to hold a press conference on Monday, July 30./6/ This was the hard line press conference that cut the ground out from all the work Vance and I had been doing in Paris since early May. It was interpreted by the DRV as a change in position. In fact, Ha Van Lau asked Vance, since the Secretary of State's statements were at variance with what Vance and I had been talking about, whether we in fact did talk for the President. (Vance had been carrying on private discussions with Ha Van Lau for some weeks.)
/6/See ibid., footnote 2, Document 312.
The next backward step was the President's trip to Honolulu to meet President Thieu./6/ As Clifford was in South Viet-Nam at the time, he joined the party from there. I urged that Vance return to Washington to discuss the questions and explain our position. He got nowhere. I had urged Vance to insist that he go to Honolulu, but since he was not invited, did not do so.
/6/See ibid., Document 302.
There was no reason for the Honolulu Conference. Out of it came a hard line communiqué which didn't advance anything and set us back again in Paris. Even Bunker reported one of the leading Saigon politicians as saying, "The communiqué sounds too good to be true." What motivated the President, or who put in the oar to encourage it, I don't know, presumably Rusk and Rostow and Fortas.
There is no doubt in my mind that if the President had taken this opportunity to stop the bombing about three weeks before the Democratic Convention, the Democrats would have been united, without serious divisions, Humphrey would have been nominated without conflict over the plank on Viet-Nam, and as the polls had been showing in June and July, would have started a campaign in which he would have been elected comfortably.
I can see no benefit from the President's actions or the manner in which he behaved. Even if the President had not stopped the bombing but avoided going to Honolulu, and Rusk had not had his unnecessary press conference, things would obviously have been better. I do not know the details of the attempt to get a compromise plank on Viet-Nam at the Convention, but Freeman told me that Humphrey went to the Convention with a compromise initialed DR (Dean Rusk), which later President Johnson repudiated. He sent a message to Charles Murphy to insist on holding to the hard-line plank that was finally adopted by a 60-40 vote after the odd telegram from Abrams./7/ This, of course, split the Party wide open and led to Humphrey's nose dive in the polls.
/7/See ibid., Documents 339 and 337.
I went home in early September for Mrs. Norton's funeral, and took the occasion to go to Washington. I saw Clark Clifford first in order to get a feel of the way things stood. In that conversation I asked him bluntly whether he felt the President wished to see Humphrey defeated. He waited for a moment and then replied, "If you agree it is just between you and me, I believe you're right: the President wants to see him defeated." I asked this question of several others, including Hale Boggs. Hale said he made a great issue with the President and feels he had some influence in getting the President to change his position.
There is no doubt in the very last period of the campaign he did take his coat off and did contribute to the Humphrey comeback. It was too late. He had done a number of things which seemed obviously damaging; i.e., when Humphrey suggested the possibility that troops might be brought home, a few, even before the end of the year, he took the occasion to make a speech at one of the veterans organizations, denying any possibility of troop withdrawals this year (or near future).
For some reason, Humphrey seemed to be baffled and unsure of himself. Some of his friends say he found someone blocking him in every direction. The President in one direction; McCarthy in another. John Bailey, and Mayor Daley, and others appeared to be opposing any position that he might take. As a result, the campaign got off to an impossible start with no money, largely because of the disastrously negative polls.
George Ball came to Paris on September 20 and told me he was considering seriously resigning, and supporting H.H.H. I applauded his doing it, but we agreed that I should not do so, as there was always a chance we might work something out here which would have an effect on the election. Something happened with Ball's joining campaign which changed the tide favorably. The Salt Lake speech was well received./8/ George took his coat off in New York and began to get some money and a new direction appeared in the campaign. I was told that he was the one man around Humphrey that took a definite position. Others were advising him in one conflicting direction or another. Humphrey had been confused by conflicting advice. Whatever the reason, the campaign did take on a new impetus.
/8/See Document 40.
In the meantime, we were pressing our discussions privately with the North Vietnamese in Paris, and finally got to a point on October 18 when we had achieved the points that Washington had instructed us to take. The only remaining question was the date for the serious talks. We reported that the DRV said the NLF representatives couldn't get here as quickly as we had asked, but that it would be as soon as possible-- "the sooner the better." They explained it would take some time for the NLF Delegation to travel to Paris. We argued that they could have one of their representatives already in Europe represent them for the first ceremonial meeting, and the South Vietnamese would be represented probably only by their observer, Ambassador Lam, so that neither side would be at a disadvantage. The North Vietnamese refused, saying they had no authority. Vance and I recommended that this reply be accepted, namely, as soon as possible, the sooner the better./9/ We got a telegram back which arrived early next morning, instructing us to tell the North Vietnamese that we insisted on holding the meeting within 24 hours after the bombing stopped./10/ We had no alternative but to go to the meeting and did propose it. It was of course rejected, and we continued to work between then and October 29, when it was finally agreed that if the President announced the stopping of the bombing that night, the other side would meet November 2. The Russians played a major role in getting some of the minor points cleared away. Much to our surprise, Thieu then ran out. The facts stated by Clark Clifford in his press conference of November 12 (attached)/11/ in answer to questions, give an account which we here agreed was accurate. Of course, much of this was between Washington and Saigon, and how much of the blame is due to Bunker's mishandling or Thieu's double-crossing, we cannot tell./12/
/9/See Document 84.
/10/Telegram 258650 to Paris, October 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files:Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968)
/11/Not attached; see Document 213.
/12/Inserted here is the following notation in Harriman's handwriting: "Note--Nov. 12, 1969--Bunker sent a telegram which I did not see to the effect that Thieu had reneged & could not be trusted again. WAH"
In the early period, October 18, Bunker had supported the President's position that the meeting had to take place the next day./13/ What motivated Bunker in making this recommendation, unless he was sure that Thieu agreed, I cannot say. When Bunker, after October 29, asked three times for an extension in time in order to get Thieu aboard, the first two were granted, the third was not. Vance and I had made the point the President had taken a commitment on October 29 to stop the bombing, and that commitment should be honored. Clark Clifford's press conference points that out. In any event, on October 31 the President did order the cessation of the bombing, and it had a noticeable effect in the U.S. even though Thieu was balking. I have no idea how much of an effect it had on the voter reaction. Some people say, little. I do know that strange Democratic Senatorial candidate (Paul O'Dwyer) finally came out in support of Humphrey after this event, which may have had some influence to unite the Democrats in New York.
/13/See Document 87.
Senator Percy told me when he came to Paris that the floor was falling out of Nixon's campaign. Two or three days more, and it would have been finished. He based this on his experience in Michigan, where he had been told to go to stem the tide, and he had been told nothing could be done.
For several years, I have taken the position that Viet-Nam was important in U.S. policy, but that other things were more important. When asked what was more important, I always gave as my first point, not permitting it to elect Nixon as President. There is no doubt that the manner in which Viet-Nam was handled, with Rusk's and Rostow's advice or urging, elected Nixon. Of course, I had a number of other subjects which I thought were also more important. One was that Viet-Nam was not worth the deep division that it was causing among the American people. Second, it was developing an attitude of isolationism which would cripple us in dealing with future world problems in other areas, and then I felt that it was diverting our attention from other issues in other areas which were being neglected. Fundamentally, I felt the loss of American prestige was perhaps the most important. Before Viet-Nam, the U.S. was the standard bearer of moral principle in world affairs. This was being greatly shattered by Viet-Nam because of the people's misunderstanding of the issues, or perhaps the arrogant manner in which we were going it alone. I want to add that I feel strongly it is essential we recognize the sensibility of non-communist Asia, and that a settlement of Viet-Nam should be of such a nature that it would not destroy the confidence of other Asian countries in the U.S. But I did not feel this included a commitment to Thieu and Ky. We have achieved that objective which led the President to send American troops into Viet-Nam: namely, prevented the North Vietnamese from taking over the South by force. The President's second objective--that the people of South Viet-Nam be able to decide their own future on the basis of one man, one vote, is the political objective. This does not include the present position of Bunker and others that we must support the present Constitution, and the present elected officials. The present Constitution is in violation of the President's one man, one vote principle, as Article IV does not permit communist members or communist sympathizers to vote. In addition, the election laws are untenable. Anyone who has ever done anything to help the communists is excluded from running for public office. Hardly anybody could qualify under such a definition if reviewed by an unfriendly committee--McCarthyism at its worst.
In any event, Thieu/Ky were elected by 34% of the people living in the part of the country secure enough to participate in the election./14/ Komer figures this at 67%. Two-thirds of 34 is less than 23% of the people. For us to try to maintain that these officials are the free choice of the South Vietnamese people cannot be maintained. A new election must be held under appropriate conditions. The NLF must be compelled to renounce the use of terror and the election should be voided unless this is strictly adhered to.
/14/The election was held in September 1967.
All of these matters will be dealt with by Nixon, as it is too late for us to make any real progress. Based on our experience with the North Vietnamese in not having kept the Laos Agreement for one day, it seems obvious that the U.S. must come to an agreement with Hanoi to "leave its neighbors alone." (This I have said publicly.) This agreement can only be reached with Moscow's help and can be based on Hanoi's desire to be independent of Peking's domination, as well as interest in establishing friendly relations with U.S. which would give it access to American and other Western technology and equipment. In other words, it must be an agreement which is in the interests of Hanoi to keep. I am satisfied from my talks with Kosygin and other developments, that the Soviet Union wants a Southeast Asia non-aligned to check China's advance to the South. This is the same position the Soviet Union is taking in the subcontinent (India/Pakistan), and there is no reason to believe that for a number of years they would not have the same attitude towards Southeast Asia.
To me, the great tragedy of President Johnson is that he had a superlative record which out-achieved Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy put together, on domestic issues, civil rights, education, medical care, poverty, cities, etc., etc., issues which were never hit squarely before. He said they must be achieved now. However, he got bogged down and was sold the idea that it was his duty to fight Viet-Nam through. I think one of the historians in Columbia wrote him that he was like Lincoln, and urged him to have courage and faith. Abe Fortas took the same position. As far as I know, except for Rusk, not many, if any, in the State Department did. Ball and Katzenbach urged a Viet-Nam settlement. So did both McNamara and Clifford.
To me the tragedy was that a man who had little knowledge of international affairs should have been induced to become so deeply involved.
The basic error of Viet-Nam started with not taking Roosevelt's advice, in permitting the French to return to Viet-Nam, but the most appalling mistake was Dulles taking on the French responsibility in the southern half of Viet-Nam, which everyone knew was politically unstable. There was no real chance of maintaining it as an independent country without strong military assistance from the outside. Just where we made our basic mistakes, history can decide.
I have stuck with the Administration, hoping that since the President had given me the job of peace, I could bring about negotiations which would end the war. Unfortunately, it came too late to help Humphrey, but let us hope Nixon will find a way to negotiate a reasonable settlement. I certainly want to do all I can as a private citizen to help, if his policy indicates a sincere effort to arrive at such a solution. President Johnson has given him the start through initiating these negotiations in Paris./15/
/15/In a personal memorandum assessing military and political objectives in the Paris talks, January 7, Harriman described two factors that would allow for an agreement to be achieved with the DRV: the nationalistic desire of the North Vietnamese to remain independent of outside domination by other Communist powers and the interest of the Soviet Union in a strong Vietnam as a counter to Chinese expansionism. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips & Missions, Paris Peace Talks, 1968-69, Chronological File, Dec. 1968-Jan. 1969)
256. Editorial Note
On December 16, 1968, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, sent Rostow a copy of the CIA Saigon Station's field assessment of the Phoenix program, the effort to challenge the Viet Cong infrastructure. The Phoenix program was run by an inter-agency group in conjunction with South Vietnamese programs. The summary of the report reads:
"A. The attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) has made encouraging progress, but has not yet produced a significant reduction of the Communists' ability to carry out essential activities. VCI operations have been disrupted in several geographic areas; an increasing Chieu Hoi rate points to morale problems--at least among lower ranking personnel; and a noticeable attrition has resulted from a combination of losses in combat and from anti-infrastructure activities.
"B. VCI attempts to revitalize and strengthen their organizations in the major cities often have been disrupted by aggressive police work. But government intelligence on the VCI and targeted operations against their activities diminish significantly as one gets further from the secure urban areas. What losses the VCI has suffered apparently have not unduly hampered its functioning. Recent moves have been made to streamline the infrastructure by reclassifying cadres according to their effectiveness and by transferring numbers of low level or inefficient cadres into military units. It seems that VCI personnel losses are not approaching the critical stage, nor do they appear likely to do so in the near future."
The report concludes:
"Are there, then, steps which can be taken to improve our combined effort to destroy or neutralize the VCI. The answer is 'yes,' and of course some of these already are under way.
"1. We must continue the present strategy of combined, coordinated action to destroy or drive back VC/NVA Main Forces, to extend and consolidate territorial security and pacification, and to destroy or neutralize the VCI. These actions are interdependent.
"2. We need still further GVN command emphasis on Phung Hoang operations, particularly to insure the assignment and allocation of top-flight personnel and reaction forces to exploit intelligence against selected targets.
"3. Concurrently with increased emphasis on targeted operations (as opposed to programming, organization and facilities), the GVN must, with our assistance, provide stepped-up training and indoctrination of personnel earmarked for Phung Hoang roles.
"4. Concurrently, we must somehow see to it that both civilian and military U.S. personnel designated as Phoenix advisors are qualified intelligence officers with backgrounds in counterintelligence, positive intelligence collection, or police intelligence investigation operations. A maximum number of these individuals should be trained in the Vietnamese language. The absence of language ability, particularly at the DIOCC level, is the greatest single bar to effectiveness.
"5. We must give greater heed to providing necessary, flexible support to operations at district and province level, in terms of temporary or short-term detention facilities adjacent to DIOCCs or district police offices; of intelligence and support contingency funds; of assignment of additional intelligence NCOs in priority areas of heaviest operational activity; and of additional helicopter support for sustained operations.
"6. We must take and are taking urgent measures to instruct and orient Vietnamese, U.S. and other free world personnel in the identification and modus operandi of the VCI, and in the roles which our various forces and agencies can best play, and in the techniques found by current experience to be most productive in VCI neutralizations.
"7. Finally, and possibly most important, the lessons learned by all GVN agencies participating in the Phung Hoang program now may serve as the glue to hold them together when they are forced to fight the political machinations of the VCI in the post hostilities period." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, Executive Registry Subject Files, Vietnam)
An assessment of the potential impact of the Phoenix program on the Paris peace negotiations is in a memorandum by Carver prepared for Helms, January 10, 1969. (Ibid., Job 80-R01720R, George Carver Files, GAC Chrono., December 1968-February 1969, #2)
257. Editorial Note
From 1:27 to 3 p.m. on December 17, 1968, the President met with Clifford, Rusk, Moorer, and Christian at a Tuesday Luncheon Meeting. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) The topics of discussion included the return of the crew of the captured ship Pueblo and Vietnam. Christian's notes of this meeting read:
"The President: What's happening in Vietnam?
"Admiral Moorer: The 2d NVA Division is active--but not much special happening.
"Secretary Rusk: Do we want to warn Hanoi on the consequences of an attack on Saigon?
"The President: Yes, we ought to tell them to give these talks a chance to succeed. After we've stopped the bombing all this time and they hit Saigon, what kind of people are we if we don't respond?
"Secretary Clifford: If they've made a policy decision to hit Saigon, then that says the deal's off. That's why we ought to tell Hanoi and Moscow. They ought to know before they take this course.
"The President: Dean, get that off to them. Don't threaten--be diplomatic." (Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, 7/68-12/68)
Bundy reviewed this meeting's Vietnam-related discussion topics in a December 17 memorandum to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Secretary-President Luncheon (2))
In a telephone conversation with Secretary Rusk later that evening, the President commented on the related issue of compelling GVN attendance at the Paris negotiations:
"Well, I didn't open my mouth today, if you'll observe. I think that we ought to quit--I honestly think that we don't get anything by baiting the South Vietnamese. I think that what the Communists would like for us to do is to be at war with our allies, and that's the shape we're getting in if we're not careful. That's my own judgment. I didn't want to get into it. I just didn't feel like getting into a discussion of it, and I didn't. I think we've just got a few days and I don't believe we'll do any wonders in those few days one way or another. But I would--I don't want [sic] to avoid getting into a fight with them if we can help it." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, December 17, 1968, 5:26 p.m., Tape F6812.02, PNO 11)
258. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the Paris Delegation to Ambassador at Large Harriman and Ambassador Vance/1/
Paris, December 19, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips & Missions, Paris Peace Talks, 1968-69, Memoranda of Conversations. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Plus.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Vice President Ky
Summary: Vice President Ky wishes to cut through the procedural wrangle and get into substantive talks quickly. He is tired of having himself and his government attacked as the principal obstacles to movement. What he is considering is a proposal for immediate talks as follows:
--A "first-phase" discussion that would focus on reestablishing the integrity of the 17th Parallel (note: he used the 17th consistently rather than the DMZ) and arranging for the withdrawal of both North Vietnamese and American and allied forces from South Viet-Nam;
--a "second phase" that would involve two steps, direct discussions between Saigon and Hanoi concerning arrangements for the movement of persons, commerce, and eventual reunification, and direct discussions between the Saigon government and all other political groups in the South, including the NLF, regarding the political future of the country.
If the other side would agree to enter into serious talks on this basis, Ky said, we could forget about the size and shape of the tables and who speaks first and "all these other procedural matters."
Ky said he has asked Ambassador Bui Diem to discuss the above approach with Secretary Rusk (possibly today)./2/ He has promised to give me an English text of the draft statement he is considering making.
/2/Rusk, Bundy, and John Burke of EA/VN met with Bui Diem from 10:38 to 11:18 a.m. at the State Department. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969) Notes of this meeting have not been found.
He will not move in this direction, he said, until he gets a report from Ambassador Diem on the Secretary's reaction. He also indicated a willingness to hold off further should Ambassador Vance wish to discuss this with the President on his return to Washington.
Ky stressed the importance of secrecy in this matter. He also said it was absolutely crucial that if this approach is to be adopted that it come from the Vietnamese themselves.
He anticipates great trouble with some elements in Saigon, particularly from the ultra-nationalists in the Assembly, but he said he was prepared to face that and take the heat himself. He proposes to return to Saigon as soon as he has made his statement here so that he can win the backing of the military, the politicians and others for this approach to a peaceful settlement.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Vice President Ky saw me at the Vietnamese reception last night and invited me into a separate room for a chat. He knew me from several previous meetings in Saigon. With a number of reporters looking on through the door and ambassadors paying their respects, we decided the setting was too obvious. He asked me to come to his residence later in the evening. We agreed on 10 p.m.
I was shown into a sitting room in the Blvd. Maillot house. When the Vice President came in, members of the staff departed and we were alone for the remainder of the talk--which lasted an hour and a half.
Ky asked me how I saw the present situation. I said I thought we had been winning the propaganda war beginning with the limited cessation of bombing in March. We had suffered a setback when Saigon failed to send a delegation to Paris in early November. That had been largely offset by the arrival of the Vice President and his delegation. But we were now slipping badly because of the procedural wrangle. People in the U.S., elsewhere in the world, and I thought even in Viet-Nam itself, could not be expected to understand our arguing over table shapes and who would speak in what order while the fighting and dying continued. The sooner we could get over procedural hurdles and into discussion of bringing the war to an end, the better our position would be. I said I thought we would have no great difficulty in making our case on such things as the DMZ and withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. But I didn't think we could make a nickel by arguing procedural fine points./3/
/3/During a televised interview on December 15, Clifford noted that both the GVN and the DRV had caused the delay and that the United States had no objections regarding procedural details and was ready to begin expanded negotiations. See The New York Times, January 16, 1968. In response, Ky charged that Clifford had "shown a gift for saying the wrong thing at the wrong time" and insisted that there was no divergence between the GVN and U.S. positions. See ibid., December 17, 1968. Thieu's reaction was "one of shock and anger." (CIA informational memorandum, December 21; Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Face the Nation--December 15, 1968) In a December 17 memorandum to Rusk, Bundy assessed the impact of this dispute on the peace talks: "I must say frankly that if I were in Hanoi's shoes I would let us stew for several days more in the juice of the Clifford/Ky public disagreement; as a rule of thumb, I think we can say that public criticism in either direction delays our chances of progress by several days." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Secretary-President Luncheon (2)) A December 24 CIA memorandum reported the statement of Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Minh, Ky's Executive Director, that the differences between the U.S. and GVN delegations at Paris "stem from a lack of understanding and communication between Ky and Ambassador Harriman." (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
Ky said he could not agree more. He was fed up with talk about this kind of table or that. He noted he had stuck his neck out by going along with us on the "dividend doughnut" and on drawing lots by sides to determine speaking order. But he would stand by these agreements. The important thing, he said, is to move the discussion from this kind of trivia into real substance.
He had given this a great deal of thought. He was prepared to make an offer that would, he hoped, break the logjam. What he had in mind was a two-phased proposal for serious talks. If the "other side" would agree to his approach, he couldn't care less about who spoke first or what kind of tables we sat at.
His proposal was as follows:
In the first phase of the new talks, the subject matter would be re-establishment of the 17th parallel (he repeated this several times and avoided use of the term "DMZ"), and arrangements for the phased withdrawal of North Vietnamese and American and other allied forces from South Viet-Nam. He mentioned the need for effective policing machinery for the 17th Parallel.
Once these two matters had been settled (he did not specify whether he meant agreement on them or completion of the actions contemplated), there would be a "second phase" of talks. This phase would involve two separate steps:
--First, direct talks between the Saigon and Hanoi governments regarding their relations, movement of persons, and eventual reunification of the country by peaceful means. Reunification would have to be by the freely expressed will of the people, North and South. In connection with the movement of persons, Ky said there should be some arrangement whereby anyone now in the South who wished to go to North Viet-Nam would be permitted to do so and, by the same token, those in the North who wished to move South should have that chance.
--Second, direct talks between the GVN and "all other political groups in the South, including the Liberation Front." Ky thought these talks could take place in Paris or "anywhere else."
Ky thought this was a reasonable package./4/ It would get us into the heart of the central issues and get us away from haggling over minor matters. If the other side agreed to this approach, he didn't care what kind of tables we had or who spoke first.
/4/Smith summarized Ky's plan in a memorandum to the President, December 19, 8 p.m. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VIII) In a telephone conversation with the President on December 23, Clifford praised Ky's two-part plan. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, December 23, 1968, 9:30 a.m., Tape F6812.02, PNO 13)
Ky said he had asked Ambassador Bui Diem to discuss this approach with Secretary Rusk in Washington (probably today). He claimed that he had President Thieu's approval as well as that of the National Security Council in taking this initiative./6/
/6/According to a CIA memorandum of a December 26 conversation with Bui Diem, Ky did in fact have this approval. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) According to a December 30 CIA memorandum, Dang Duc Khoi, Ky's aide, confirmed that "Thieu and Ky are in general agreement on this approach." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, Executive Registry Subject Files, Peace Talks)
Nonetheless, he anticipated some serious problems in Saigon. He thought that some of the ultra-nationalists would balk, especially at the idea of direct contacts with the Front. But Ky felt he could handle the situation. In any case, he was prepared to take the heat. He thought it would be vital for him to return to Saigon as soon as he made this approach, presumably in a public statement. He would have to talk things over with friends in the military, with members of the National Assembly, and with other groups. He felt confident he could bring them around.
He underlined the importance of this being a totally Vietnamese initiative. It would be a grave mistake if the above came from the American side.
Ky promised to supply me with an English text of his draft statement. He agreed that President Johnson should be aware of this proposal before it was made, and he assumed that Secretary Rusk would be discussing it with the President after Ambassador Diem raised it. Informed of Ambassador Vance's plan to return to the U.S. this weekend, Ky said he presumed the Ambassador might wish to discuss this with the President as well. But I had the clear impression Ky was thinking in terms of getting his initiative into the public domain early next week at the latest, and that he would then go to Saigon in time for Christmas./6/
/6/Following an appearance on an American TV network's interview program in which he detailed the plan and stated publicly that the GVN would be willing to negotiate with the NLF directly, Ky left for Saigon on December 22 and did not return to Paris until January 24, 1969. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 6-13, 1969, p. 23551. In a December 22 memorandum to Clifford, Warnke commented: "General Ky's statements on 'Face the Nation' put him in agreement with much of what has been proposed by you in your press conference of 12 November and your TV appearance on the 15th." (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 093.2, (December) 1968)
WJJ
259. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, December 19, 1968, 1136Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 9:10 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 629-635.
45163. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my seventy-fourth message.
Viet-Nam: Continuing Progress and Some Problems Ahead.
1. I reported in my last message on November 30th/2/ that, despite preoccupation with the problem of negotiations, the government and people of South Viet-Nam continue to make steady, indeed accelerating, progress in many ways. This has continued to be true.
/2/See Document 242.
2. The forming and dispatch of the delegation for Paris was a matter of great concern involving the necessity of obtaining Assembly approval and requiring a Supreme Court decision. Thieu handled this matter, I think, in an impressive fashion, displaying respect for the institutions set up by the Constitution, and at the same time seeing to it that they worked effectively. During this period, some impressive gains were scored in pacification while relentless military pressure was kept on the enemy. Both the gains and the pressures have continued.
3. Vietnamese leadership is, of course, well aware that success in the pacification and military sphere will have a direct effect on the negotiations. By extending territorial control and driving enemy forces across the border into Laos and Cambodia, the South Vietnamese greatly strengthen their position at Paris. This is obviously a strong incentive, and Thieu is pushing his people to get on with the war effort and pacification faster and with better effect than at any time since I arrived.
4. The current difficulties with Hanoi over procedural matters are part of the same problem we had to resolve when the GVN held back right after the bombing halt. It took several weeks of arduous, and patient, negotiations to persuade them to go, and in the course of those negotiations, the GVN made some points which in their view go to the very heart of the problem, especially that they must not be placed on the same footing as the National Liberation Front. We accepted these points, first in the statement of November 13 and later more formally in our statement of November 26./3/ It was on this basis that the South Vietnamese delegation finally left here December 7.
/3/See footnote 8, Document 217 and footnote 3, Document 236, respectively.
5. The GVN regards these matters as of the utmost importance. They see the initial moves as critical, believing the enemy will conclude from them whether he can get us to make important concessions on matters of substance and whether he can divide the us and the GVN. As the North Viet-Nam analysts within the inter-agency planning group in Washington correctly observe (State 274223),/4/ "Hanoi will probably be rather sticky on procedural matters. To the North Vietnamese--as to the South Vietnamese, procedure is substance, because procedure can determine substance." The South Vietnamese fear that we may be over eager to make concessions. The Clifford interview of December 15,/6/ in which the Secretary said that we need not work out common positions with our Vietnamese allies, that we could discuss military matters, including troop withdrawals, unilaterally with the North Vietnamese enemy, and hinted in fact that we had already done so, and deprecated the importance of the seating arrangement, has tended to confirm those suspicions in the minds of the Vietnamese.
/4/Dated November 19. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Chronological, Vol. XXIV)
/6/See footnote 3, Document 258.
6. I think we must face the fact that the GVN simply does not agree that the present situation requires us to act with undue haste. They consider that time is on our side, the war is going well (thanks to our help as well as to their increased efforts), they are getting stronger and the enemy is getting weaker. I think they are right in their assessment of the effect of premature concessions on the climate here in South Viet-Nam. If our side caves in during the first preliminary round, there could be a serious decline in morale here. People will judge the chances of freedom in South Viet-Nam, and the firmness of our commitment to that freedom, by how we handle ourselves--the US and the GVN together--during the opening phase of the talks.
7. The enemy said for years he would not negotiate while the bombing went on, then he did negotiate while the bombing went on, said we had to meet in Phnom Penh or Warsaw, and then he agreed to meet in Paris. He said he would not accept conditions in return for the bombing halt; finally he did accept conditions. He insisted on a secret joint minute, and abandoned that in the face of our firm rejection. He now says that he will not sit down unless the "four-sided" character of the negotiations is recognized. Since we are not going to recognize that, he will settle for less. With the Communists (indeed, in my experience, this is not confined to the Communists), fruitful negotiations are rarely advanced by being accommodating, especially at the beginning. In fact, I believe that by showing ourselves too eager for early results, we may make the achievement of a viable solution to the conflict more difficult and more time consuming in the end.
[Omitted here is Bunker's report on political, military, and economic matters.]
Bunker
260. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, December 19, 1968, 1510Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Paris Todel-Paris Delto, Vol. XVII(a). Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Received at 11:22 a.m. Repeated to Saigon. The delegation transmitted the full report of the meeting in telegram 25574/Delto 1080 from Paris, December 19. (Ibid.)
25548/Delto 0177. From Vance. Subject: Summary Report--Vance/Lau Dec. 19 Meeting.
1. This morning Habib and I met with Lau and Ky for about two hours at our house in Sceaux. The same people as usual were present on both sides.
2. I opened the meeting by presenting the substance of the instructions contained in State 288751 (Todel 1804)/2/ with some modifications in language. Lau took careful notes and asked that certain points be repeated so that he could get the points precisely.
/2/Dated December 18. (Ibid., Vol. XVII(b))
3. I then turned to the outstanding procedural issues. I said that it was high time we resolved our differences on procedures so that we could move into the new meetings and get down to discussing the vital subject of peace in Viet-Nam. I pointed out that from the outset we had made it clear that we regarded the new meetings as meetings of two sides, with each side free to organize itself as it chose. I said we would not depart from this important principle and that the other side has indicated that it will not depart from its point of view that it is a four-delegation meeting. I said that we had made constructive and reasonable proposals on seating arrangements and order of speaking which should be acceptable to both sides as meeting their respective positions.
4. I then went over in some detail the three outstanding issues (flags and nameplates, seating arrangements and order of speaking) and our position with respect to each of them. I concluded by urging Lau to reconsider his position. And to agree that our proposals represented a practical solution to the differences between us.
5. Lau met privately with Vy for about one-half hour before responding to what I had said. He first addressed what he called my remarks concerning the situation in South Viet-Nam. He stated that the us had launched aggression against Viet-Nam and that so long as the aggression continued, the Vietnamese people would exercise the right of self-defense. He said that the NLF has the competence to settle all questions involving South Viet-Nam and that the US must talk to the Front. He said that the representatives of the NLF came to Paris on November 4 for meetings which have not yet been held, and he added that the responsibility for the delay must be borne by the US and the RVN.
6. Lau charged that the RVN had deliberately delayed the holding of the meetings and that the US must bear part of the responsibility. He said that when the bombing was stopped, the US had urged that the meeting be held promptly and that the DRV had agreed to the date of that meeting, but that the meetings still had not been held.
7. Lau said that it was not yet time to discuss the questions we had raised with respect to the situation in South Viet-Nam. He said that we are discussing procedures and that when we sit at the conference table other questions can be settled.
8. Lau said in order to get to the first meeting the DRV had made a final proposal for seating arrangements, namely, a round table. He asked us to give our reply on that proposal, saying that if we could settle the seating, other questions relating to procedural matters would be discussed later.
9. Lau then referred to the statement I had made that if the impending attack on Saigon took place, we would have to take appropriate military actions and that the responsibility for this would rest with the DRV. Lau said that they had been fighting for many years and that we should know that our threat cannot swerve the determination of the Vietnamese people to struggle for independence and freedom.
10. I responded by first rejecting Lau's statement that the US was the aggressor and responsible for the war. I said, concerning the impending situation around Saigon, that I hoped the statements Lau had made were not an indication of a lack of recognition of the seriousness of what I had said. I stated that what I had said was not a threat but a clear statement of the US position so that there could be no misunderstandings between us. I said it was a matter of direct concern to the DRV, and that I could not accept the DRV's attempt to abandon responsibility. I underscored the seriousness with which we viewed the matter and the consequences.
11. In reply to Lau's charge that the US had not shown serious intent, I reminded Lau that the US had stopped the bombing and all other acts involving the use of force against the DRV.
12. I then took up Lau's remarks on procedural arrangements, dealing first with seating. I then asked for Lau's comments on the other procedural matters.
13. Lau replied that he had nothing further to say for the time being on the situation in South Viet-Nam. He said, as to the procedures and arrangements, if we would accept his proposal of the round table, we would find a way to come to agreement on the other procedural questions. I pressed Lau to clarify what he meant. He said he did not for the time being, have any new ideas on the remaining questions, but that if we could come to agreement on the table he thought these questions could be settled. I pressed further on what he meant, but only received the answer that if the seating were settled, they would show goodwill in resolving the other issues.
14. We adjourned, agreeing to take under consideration what each of us had said and to be in touch whenever either of us had something further to say.
15. During the tea break I raised with Lau the statements attributed to Hanoi, reported by Moscow and Tokyo, that the DRV would be releasing additional pilots at Christmas. I said that I hoped the stories were accurate. He said he had no information to give me. I pressed him further without success.
Harriman
Source:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21903.htm
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969
Released by the Office of the
Historian
Documents
261-287
261. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, December 20, 1968, 1752Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-December 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Plus. Received at 3:21 p.m. Repeated to Saigon.
25633/Delto 1084. From Harriman to Vance.
1. This afternoon we met with Vice President Ky for private talk at our request for about one hour and a quarter at his house. Only the three of us were present./2/
/2/In Washington, Bui Diem also presented Ky's views on resolving the procedural impasse in a meeting with Rusk and Bundy, as reported in telegram 290751 to Saigon and repeated to Paris, December 20. (Ibid., HARVAN-(Outgoing)-December 1968)
2. We opened the meeting by saying that Vance was going home tomorrow for consultations and we wished to get the benefit of Ky's latest thinking before Vance's return. We asked how Ky viewed the situation and how he felt we would proceed from here.
3. Ky said that he was very concerned about the continuing impasse on procedures. He said that the longer the issue dragged on, the worse it became; it had become a matter of great importance to both North Vietnam and South Vietnam. He said he had been searching for a way to leap over the procedural problem and had come up with the idea of releasing a three-phased peace plan. (See Paris 25590, Delto 1082.)/3/
/3/Dated December 20. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Paris Todel-Paris Delto, Vol. XVII(a))
4. Ky said the first phase would be concerned with discussions of military matters leading up to the withdrawal of all external forces from South Vietnam. In this phase, the 17th parallel would be re-established as the dividing line between North and South Vietnam, and all North Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn north of the 17th parallel. Presumably, allied forces would also be withdrawn according to the Manila formula.
5. He said the second phase would be concerned with the internal political problems of South Vietnam. It would deal with the question of the future of the NLF and would involve discussions with them.
6. The third phase would be concerned with bilateral discussions between North and South Vietnam concerning the question of peaceful reunification, trade and similar matters affecting the two countries.
7. Ky asked our views with respect to the proposal. We said that we first wished to ask a few questions for clarification. In response to questions, Ky said that the first phase would involve discussion between the DRV, the RVN and the US. The NLF would be excluded and, thus, there would be, three-cornered talks. He said that the problem of withdrawal of external forces had nothing to do with the NLF. We asked what he had in mind with respect to the withdrawal of NVA fillers from NLF units, and he replied he really hadn't given much thought to the problem because he was concerned with the withdrawal of North Vietnamese divisions and regiments.
8. Ky said that the second phase, i.e., discussions of a political solution, would not begin until all North Vietnamese forces had been withdrawn from South Vietnam. Ky added that perhaps he might be willing to start discussions with the NLF at an earlier date, but that he did not believe that Thieu and other members of his government would agree to such a position.
9. Ky also said he contemplated that either he or Thieu would put forward this peace plan as a way of overcoming the procedural questions and did not contemplate holding it until the Paris talks got under way. He expressed belief that his plan would receive favorable reaction in world opinion.
10. In response to Ky's question, we said that we foresaw serious problems with the proposal if the plan were to be made public prior to the first plenary session. We said we believed that the plan would be turned down flatly by the other side because it excluded NLF participation in the discussion of military matters. Further, it would repudiate the "our side-your side" formula which was the basis on which the GVN had agreed to come to Paris. And it would still leave us with the same old procedural problems. We said, on the other hand, if he was talking about making a peace proposal in the substantive discussions in the new meetings, that would be an entirely different case and serious consideration might be given to it in that form.
11. We said that we were sure that Ky understood that the American people simply did not understand why we could not resolve the question of procedures, and would certainly not understand any action which could break up the proposed peace talks. We said this was a reality which had to be dealt with. Ky replied that he understood this very well and that that was the reason that he had come up with the idea of trying to jump the procedural question. He said that, as we knew, he had already exceeded his instructions in trying to solve the procedural problem and that he could go no further unless he got further authorization from his government. He said that it was because of this that he planned to return to Saigon tomorrow to consult with President Thieu and others.
12. We said that Ky would recall that it has been said many times in the US that we will discuss any proposals and consider the views of any group. In this connection, we referred to the President's 1966 State of the Union message in which he said, "We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals--four points or forty--and we will consider the views of any group."/4/
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document 19.
13. We reviewed with Ky the facts leading up to the GVN delegation's coming to Paris and said that we understood when the GVN came to Paris they were prepared to enter into discussions with the other side, and that they knew the other side included the NLF. Ky acknowledged this fact but said that they had never thought that they were going to be a separate delegation. We reminded Ky that it had always been understood that either side would organize itself as it wished and that, although we did not view the other side as one of two delegations, that the other side would claim that it was composed of two delegations.
14. Ky referred to the November 26 statement of the US that we would treat the other side as a single delegation./6/ We pointed out to Ky that what was said in the US statement was that we would regard and treat all the persons on the other side of the table--whatever they might claim for themselves--as members of a single side, that of Hanoi, and, for practical purposes, a single delegation. We underscored the fact that the words "whatever the other side might claim" were recognition of the fact that they would claim they were two delegations. Ky acknowledged this fact but said it didn't lessen the problem he had at home.
/6/See footnote 3, Document 236.
15. We repeated again that we thought it would be a mistake to put forward his proposed peace plan prior to the first plenary session for the reasons which we had given, but that, without commenting on the specifics of the proposal, it would be entirely different if the substance of his proposal were to be put forward by the GVN at the first substantive session.
16. Ky said that he was going home either tomorrow or the next day, depending on when he could get a plane, to consult with his government and hoped to be back within a few days.
Harriman
262. Personal Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Henry A. Kissinger/1/
Washington, December 23, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Nixon & Transition. Secret; Personal. In an attached note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to the President, December 23, 7:40 a.m., Rostow wrote: "Henry Kissinger has asked me for my view of the key problems and possibilities ahead. I have done the attached memorandum on a wholly personal basis. He is coming in today and I should like to give it to him. But I do not wish to pass even such a personal document to him on a personal basis without your knowledge and assent." At the bottom of the note, Rostow provided the President with options to check, including "No" and "See me." The President checked "You may give it to Kissinger." On December 2 President-elect Nixon had named Kissinger to be Assistant to President for National Security Affairs in the new administration.
These should be understood, Henry, as wholly personal notes and reflections.
I. Set out below are some critical issues that will require decision in the weeks and months ahead. But I should perhaps begin by saying simply that if the new Administration is patient and steady, the following are objectives within its grasp, looking ahead over the next 12-18 months.
[Omitted here is a list of other recommended U.S. policy objectives, including regional security in Asia, normalization with China, peace and development in the Middle East, measures for European unity, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, arms control, Latin American integration, and revamping of the international monetary system.]
II. The Vietnam Settlement. Here are things to watch:
--An early reaffirmation by President Nixon of President Johnson's instruction to General Abrams is required. President Johnson gave an instruction to go with the ARVN absolutely flat out in a pacification offensive. Without momentum inside South Vietnam, our leverage for a settlement in Paris or elsewhere is minimal. Vague talk of "de-escalation" could easily take the heart out of the ARVN and, indeed, adversely affect the morale of U.S. forces.
--Clarity about general shape of a political settlement inside SVN. Only those who have lived with a succession of SVN governments can understand how precious [precarious] the present government is, notably with its constitutional basis rooted in the election process. The understanding with Thieu-Ky is that they will have to face a popular front party running against them at some time. That is why they are working to build a big national political party./2/ That is why at Honolulu Thieu said that those who give up violence can "run for office as well as vote." There are all sorts of complexities that lie ahead in negotiating this outcome; but, if we continue to extend population control on the ground at something like the present 3% a month rate and chew away at the infrastructure, such a settlement is, I believe, within our grasp. We achieved a reasonably good understanding with Thieu at Honolulu. One of the most essential first tasks of the new Administration will be to reaffirm this basic understanding so that the struggle in Paris and elsewhere will not pull us apart and set in motion a disintegration of the political process in Saigon. Although we must leave the details of the negotiations to the South Vietnamese, a fundamental understanding on where we both wish to come out inside South Vietnam is essential.
/2/See me. [Footnote in the source text.]
--Keep your eye on Laos. It is almost certain that Hanoi will try to negotiate its position on the ground in Laos to the maximum. There must be a contingency plan if they try to extend their situation in Laos down to the Mekong. (You should know that the only rational military riposte that any of us can think of is to seize some ground north of the 17th parallel and hold it until they get out of Laos--if they, in fact, should play this card.) In any case, a Vietnam settlement without a Laos settlement would bring no peace to Southeast Asia. Another anxiety is the road building by Communist China in Northern Laos. Some of us have feared for years that the Chinese might make a land grab in Northern Laos in the context of a Vietnam settlement. The truth is we do not have a good feel for Communist Chinese intentions toward a Vietnam settlement. I suspect there will be a test of will over Laos before we're finished. The Russians may be helpful, if they are sure we'll be tough.
--Monitoring the settlement. You should bear in mind that the only new policy made in Paris was on the first day when Harriman was instructed that in a Vietnam settlement the governments of Southeast Asia should play a part, in monitoring terms. We have stimulated the Thais, Japanese, Indonesians, and others to think about their role in a settlement. Specifically, some of us feel we need an Asian force (using the new sensors, helicopters, etc.) to monitor against renewed infiltration. We would like to get the Japanese and Indonesians into this role since, unlike the Indians, Canadians, and Poles, they would have an abiding interest in the stability of a settlement. The optimum is to bring the Japanese out of the islands into a security role in Asia as part of a multilateral peacekeeping exercise.
--U.S. troop withdrawals. Don't be too surprised at some stage if Hanoi and Moscow indicate they do not want total U.S. troop withdrawals from SVN. There is some body of intelligence which suggests they may want a U.S. military presence in South Vietnam (as well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia) as a counter to Chinese Communist pressure on Hanoi.
[Omitted here is discussion of the other issues facing the incoming administration.]
W.W. Rostow/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
263. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, December 24, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 72-207A, DDO/IMS Files, AA-3 FE Division, 1968. Secret.
SUBJECT
Conversations With United States Delegation to the Paris Talks
1. En route to Christmas leave in Washington, I stopped in Paris for discussions [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] primarily on the question of organizing Agency support for the United States Delegation to the Vietnam Peace negotiations. During the stopover on 16 December 1968, I briefed and was debriefed by Mr. Philip Habib, Governor Harriman and Ambassador Vance in three separate sessions involving a total of four hours. The focus of the discussions was the political and psychological situation in South Vietnam and its relationship to events in Paris and Washington.
2. Principal Political and Psychological Factors in Vietnam Today:
A. There is discernible and significant momentum in a forward direction on virtually all fronts. (I described some of this progress in detail including such items as GVN efficiency, Phoenix, ARVN performance, political institutions., etc.) A clear cut military and political victory is not in sight, but there is a sense of accomplishment at having prevented an enemy takeover. There is a gathering confidence on the part of the South Vietnamese in their own capacity to govern, to fight, to talk, and ultimately to deal politically with the residual communist organization in their midst.
B. The gathering sense of confidence should not be exaggerated. There is also an evident fragility between this "strong side" and the "weak side" of anxiety about American intentions. Decreasing confidence in the willingness of the United States to stay the negotiations course puts South Vietnam on a kind of tight rope. It is obvious that the prospect of precipitous massive withdrawal of American troops (real or imagined) without verified and guaranteed reciprocity from North Vietnam, will move many Vietnamese to reinsure with the Viet Cong. Acceptance of cease fire conditions which dilute GVN sovereignty, talk of amending the Constitution and other possible concessions which suggest eventual communist ascendancy all tend to reinforce this movement. Disdainful and critical public statements by American officials can aggravate this fragility.
C. Actually both sides have this tight rope to walk and are trying to push the other off. The enemy line is: The Americans are pulling out and quickly. The GVN is nothing without the Americans. We are strong in the country. We will take over, rewarding friends and punishing enemies. It is not too late to make your deal with us. Do it now. And why get killed when peace is coming. The US/GVN line is the converse, to wit: The NVA is pulling out, leaving you to the mercy of the GVN. Come over now, etc. It is not clear which side is enjoying greater success but it is clear that the balance of advantage is a delicate one and is affected by signs of United States intentions.
D. The essential thrust of the NLF/VC/DRV in the political and psychological war is advocacy of a "peace cabinet" wherein elements more amenable to a compromise with the communists would exert decisive influence on the GVN side. The ideal arrangement for the communists would, of course, involve the removal of Thieu and Ky. This is often, but not always stated as essential. Addition of more "peace minded" individuals is, however, definitely desired.
E. The burden of this ploy is being carried by the new Movement to Struggle for Peace, a coalition of Buddhist, Student, Intellectual, and non-CVT labor forces. As an organization it does not yet demonstrate real muscle. It must be watched however since this kind of amalgam could make serious trouble especially if active enemy proselytizing in the armed forces produced resonance there.
F. A crucial point for the United States Government is the gathering consensus in the GVN and among key political leaders in South Vietnam that there must be a political settlement, that it will be sooner rather than later, that it will involve some form of negotiations with and recognition of the NLF as a political entity, that elections will be held with communist participation, that real risks will have to be accepted by the GVN. (This was born out in a sense by the [name not declassified]-Ky conversation and Ky's CBS interview.)/2/
/2/The conversation between [name not declassified], who had previously been the Saigon Station's primary contact with Ky, and Ky has not been identified. Regarding Ky's TV interview, see footnote 6, Document 258.
G. Properly handled, the GVN, given the above development, can be brought to a truly joint position with the United States on all key negotiation issues. The GVN must be made to feel, however, that we have not in fact abandoned our original purpose in the Vietnam intervention, namely, the denial of communist domination of the South. If so reassured, the GVN leadership will and can bring its own citizens around to acceptance of considerable political risk.
H. Whether the South will succeed in its political confrontation is another matter. Thieu is more successful and impressive as a president than as a politician. He has not yet been able to bring unity out of traditional political diversity. He must exert himself more strenuously and creatively to this end. There are signs that many Saigon and provincial political leaders are more susceptible than ever to a major effort by Thieu to unite nationalist political forces in a grand coalition to face the communists under post-hostilities conditions.
The following opinions, advanced partly in response to questions, were presented as the personal views of the undersigned:
I. The proper "mix" for United States/GVN policy (strategy and tactics) would involve (among other things) the following:
1. Crystallization of concrete American views on the shape of the political settlement and discussion thereof with the GVN. The GVN NEEDS to KNOW what we have in mind.
2. Application of necessary pressures on the GVN in a private, rational, and diplomatic manner, one which reflects appreciation of the Vietnamese character and style. This kind of pressure can be effective.
3. Conversely, the avoidance of blatant public pressure which is bound to be counter-productive and provides "contradictions" for enemy propaganda and political exploitation.
4. Adherence to a basic, clear, militant, yet flexible line in the negotiations which manifests both our absolute determination to arrange a settlement through negotiations and our refusal to hand the enemy a victory at the table which they failed to win on the ground. This also involves, and here we move closer to the American domestic political problem, avoidance of any suggestion that we have a timetable for withdrawal and settlement. To do so will surely convince the communists that we will meet their positions eventually, that they need only hang on in obstinate certainty of this while our political pressure clock ticks away. It is important to understand that the enemy also desires a negotiated settlement and is willing to accept some risks in connection with same.
J. The above suggestions were made in the context of what kind of posture will permit the GVN to continue to build its own administrative and political strength in Vietnam during the "fight and talk" stage. They are based on an assessment of the underlying psychological climate in the country.
3. There was no diametric disagreement with any of the above points. However, it may be useful to note a few of the observations made by Messrs. Habib, Harriman, and Vance during the discussions.
A. There is a feeling that the GVN is stalling for time through its insistence on procedural niceties. The GVN probably still hopes that the Nixon Vietnam team will change both the substance and the style of the approach in Vietnam and Paris, to wit: will be tougher with the enemy on all counts, less in a hurry to settle the affair.
B. This is probably erroneous as the new Nixon team will be under the same instructions to get on with the talks and on to a settlement involving prompt American troop withdrawal without delay.
C. If the GVN had any sense, it would understand that the only hope for gaining the time needed to prepare for the political confrontation lies in moving into serious negotiations quickly and in an early significant United States troop reduction. Under these circumstances, it is possible that the American public opinion would permit a more deliberate playing out of the negotiating process. The amount of time which might be gained under these circumstances is one year more or less.
D. Since the GVN still seems not to grasp completely the imperatives of the American intention, some kind of pressure is essential. We cannot be held back by our allies. Perhaps public pressure is to be avoided, but the essence of Mr. Clifford's position is correct.
E. Governor Harriman acknowledged that we had never really described to the South Vietnamese our views on the shape of the future, what we might find acceptable as conditions for withdrawal and for a political settlement. While we say that the Vietnamese must work this out for themselves, the issues are clearly interrelated. The DRV is unlikely to withdraw its troops and keep them out of the South unless and until it has some idea of the kind of political deal which is in the offing. Governor Harriman believes that we should be more candid with the GVN on this score.
F. The North will never abide by any settlement unless they feel it in their interest to do so. They broke the Laos agreement immediately. They will break any Vietnam agreement unless they find it in their interest not to do so. Governor Harriman was not explicit on the kind of agreement which they might respect. He stressed his view that we are dealing with an aggressive nationalist form of communism out of the North. Thus, he believes that a key point in common among the USA, the USSR, and the DRV is the wish to avoid Communist Chinese domination of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. A sound settlement should play on this common ground. If this is true, some fraction of the United States troop presence could perhaps remain in South Vietnam after the major withdrawals have occurred.
G. Governor Harriman believes that we should try to negotiate a prompt reduction of the "violence" in South Vietnam, e.g., stop B-52 strikes if the Viet Cong will desist from all acts of "terror". He saw little point in further attempts at pacification and in "killing a few more communists".
4. Governor Harriman asked that I convey the following additional observations to the DCI:
A. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] efforts to strengthen its capacity to support the Delegation are commendable. He hopes the DCI will endorse the Station's requests for additional manpower. He believes that the principal need, however, is for better intelligence on NLF/DRV plans in the negotiations. He regrets the paucity of intelligence on the enemy negotiating positions. The Governor was not critical, as he so stated several times, since he fully appreciated the operational difficulties. It was clear that he greatly appreciated the existing support rendered. His regard for [name not declassified] of the DDI was very evident.
B. A related problem and possibly not immediately susceptible to covert action is the role of the French in influencing the negotiations. The communist side has continuing contact with French officials who have already been asked for their views on the shape of the future political settlement. It is possible that French influence could be used either for good or evil in this context. Governor Harriman did not express concrete ideas on the implications of this phenomenon either diplomatically or covertly.
C. I had the distinct impression that Governor Harriman felt frustrated and disappointed at the prospect of leaving the Paris talks in such an inconclusive state. He has told the new President that he was ready to help in any way after returning to Washington on or about January 20th and asked that this be reported to the DCI.
D. The Governor asked that his views not be repeated outside the Agency, but that he planned to speak "totally frankly" now that he was about to leave his present post. It is clear that he is deeply disillusioned with the United States military failure to understand the nature and true purpose of the Vietnam conflict and its constant ill-based optimism both of which he considers largely responsible for the over commitment of United States resources to this ill-fated enterprise.
[name not declassified]
Chief
Political Operations Division
Saigon Station
264. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador at Large Harriman/1/
Washington, December 24, 1968, 2058Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VIII. Secret. [text not declassified] Repeated to Saigon.
CAP 82919. I am sending this back channel because it is the afternoon of December 24 and this is a convenient way to make a memorandum of conversation which I believe you should have promptly available.
Bui Diem and Khoi came in this morning with Bill Jorden.
1. On the question of modalities, I took the line in State 291645:/2/ Namely that we ought to have an early agreement before Congress got back and we had more of the kind of pressure represented by Senator McGovern. I explained that it was hard in the context of American traditions to be against a round table. They asked about flags and name plates. I took the position of paragraph 8 of the referenced cable. They asked about speaking order. I said I was not an expert but I believed some formulae were open for discussion.
/2/In telegram 291645 to Saigon, December 24, the Department urged Bunker to impress upon Thieu the need for some degree of leeway on procedural issues. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Paris Talks/Meetings, Paris Talks/Nodis/Paris Meeting Plus, Vol. I)
2. Their main point--underlined by Khoi--was this: if we came to an agreement on modalities, would it stick? If the other side refused our next position, would we again come back at Saigon for still another compromise? Vital issues were involved for the GVN in the matter of modalities. I said that clarity about our sticking position was an understandable question for them to present. I hoped that Amb. Bunker and President Thieu would come to grips with an agreed position while Vice President Ky was in Saigon--in the days ahead.
3. I then underlined how helpful Vice President Ky's television broadcast had been and talked about the favorable surprise of Mary McGrory, Chalmers Roberts,/3/ etc., who had telephoned me. I said the optimum position for our side was to have the burden put on the shoulders of Hanoi and the NLF for not talking to the GVN. I recalled to both of them that I had often said to Bui Diem that it was important for the GVN to take the lead in peacemaking and to do so from a position of confidence as an elected constitutional government.
/3/Mary McGrory was a syndicated columnist with the Washington Evening Star, and Chalmers Roberts was a reporter for the The Washington Post.
4. Bui Diem then said that since the anxiety in Saigon was whether we were putting GVN on to a slippery slope in Paris, where they did not know what next concession would be asked of them, would it not be useful to agree at an early time what our basic negotiating strategy might be. Political figures in Saigon would then know what lay behind an agreement on modalities and where we would next proceed.
5. The following four headings emerged as their notion of the basis for an agreement with us on the substance of a negotiating strategy:
--Nail down the DMZ. This would be done in Paris on a your-side our-side basis.
--Negotiate the framework of troop withdrawals, including troop withdrawals from Cambodia and Laos, plus international monitoring against the return of North Vietnamese forces across their frontiers. This also would be done on your-side our-side basis in Paris.
--Following upon Ky's TV statement, Honolulu, etc. reassert the willingness of the GVN to talk with the NLF "as a reality" about a political settlement in the South. This would be done bilaterally in Paris or elsewhere.
--Saigon-Hanoi discussions of normalization of relations between North and South Vietnam. This would be a bilateral in Paris or elsewhere.
6. Making it quite clear that I was speaking personally, and not for the U.S. Government, I said that I thought there might be wisdom in our coming to grips with (and letting Saigon announce) some such simple framework for the substantive negotiations at the same time that we came to a private agreement on the unresolved questions of modalities.
7. Bui Diem and Khoi said they would report our conversation to Saigon as a personal conversation.
265. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, December 28, 1968, 0940Z.
/1/Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Paris Talks/Meetings, Paris Talks/Nodis/Paris Meeting Plus, Vol. I. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Plus. Received at 8:19 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission. Telegram 45708 from Saigon, December 28, contained Bunker's report on additional topics discussed during this conversation. (Ibid.)
45710. 1. In my talk with Thieu this morning, he said he would like to talk a little about questions of substance, how these might come up after procedures are settled, and how they might be handled in a very preliminary and tentative way. (He said that Ky had reported to him day before yesterday and to the Security Council yesterday, and what follows may have been stimulated by Ky's report.)
2. Would Hanoi want to tie a political settlement to withdrawal? Thieu said he believed Hanoi strategy in Paris would be to try to obtain recognition of the NLF as equal to Saigon and to insist on a package solution. Hanoi may be willing to talk, after mutual withdrawal, to Saigon about normalization of relations, reunification, etc., but will want to be sure what we (GVN) will give to the NLF; in other words, they would not want to "abandon the child in the market place."
3. There are, therefore, two separate problems: 1) Invasion of South Vietnam by the DRV which must be solved by the withdrawal of NVN troops followed by allied withdrawal under the terms of the Manila Communiqué, and 2) the situation of the NLF before and after NVN withdrawal.
4. In the case of withdrawal, this will involve not only the withdrawal of main force units, but the more difficult problem of identifying and withdrawing NVN in VC units, the problem of Laos and Cambodia, and of verification and supervision. Thieu expressed the possibility that since Hanoi would not agree to admit to world opinion that they have had troops in South Vietnam, they might want to discuss the problem of withdrawal confidentially on a bilateral basis with us, agreeing to "fade away" so that we could then also withdraw.
5. On the question of the NLF, Thieu foresaw three possible solutions: 1) coalition; 2) a general election before 1971 (the date under the Constitution when the next general election would be held) in which the South Vietnamese people will determine the make up of their own government on the basis of one man, one vote; 3) authorize the NLF members to organize a non-Communist political party under the Constitution and engage in local and national elections as these were scheduled (for example, one third of the Senate is to be elected in 1970 and other local elections may take place before 1971).
6. Thieu observed that the first alternative, i.e., coalition, the GVN could not accept, but that the other two offered possibilities. He rather leaned toward early general elections on the ground that it would be advantageous to the GVN to hold elections before giving the NLF too much time to organize, which they were already trying to do through efforts to establish liberation committees. On the other hand, Thieu said, he had expressed the view as long ago as 1965 that once the GVN became strong, they could absorb the NLF into the body politic. He thought the GVN was approaching the position now when "the system could absorb some bacteria" and that by the time a settlement might be reached in 1969, they would be in a position to do this. As continuing preparations for such a situation, the GVN would emphasize strongly in 1969, along with pacification and revolutionary development, the consolidation and strengthening of hamlet and village administrations and a dramatic land reform program. This latter, the Cabinet was actively working on now and he hoped to announce something shortly.
7. At the end of our discussion, he referred to a matter he had mentioned once before to me, i.e., the need on the part of the US in response to public opinion to withdraw some troops in 1969. He would like to know our views in order to discuss with us how further Vietnamization of the war could be worked out, what the nature of the withdrawal might be, and how the GVN would fill the gap. If, for example, we planned on withdrawing say 100,000 troops, what would be the nature of the withdrawal? Would this be apportioned on a basis of say 50,000 logistical troops and 50,000 combat troops? He said that he would like to pursue this question with us on a very secret and secure basis.
Bunker
266. Letter From Ambassador Vance to Henry A. Kissinger/1/
Paris, December 31, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK--Administrative & Staff Files--Transition, Vietnam. Secret; Nodis. A review of the status of current issues in the Paris talks was prepared for the next administration and placed into a briefing book. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S-S Files: Lot 69 D 217, General Briefing Book for the Secretary-designate, Volume V: Vietnam, December 1968)
Dear Henry:
This letter contains my suggestions on the main points on which the new negotiators will need immediate guidance.
There is, of course, the possibility that we will be still bogged down on procedural matters. If so, the first thing will be to try to break through the impasse. This will require sufficient flexibility on the part of the GVN to allow us to resolve the issues. We have already made our proposals to the Department in this regard, and the matter is under discussion in Saigon with the GVN. If it is resolved before the 20th, then the new administration need be concerned only with the questions of substance. If not, then the new administration will have to pick up the argument over procedures with the GVN.
If, despite all efforts of persuasion, the GVN continues to insist on a position which postpones negotiation on matters of substance, we will have to consider alternatives. One alternative which should be high on the list is to seek to open bilateral negotiations with the DRV on such matters as the DMZ, withdrawals, prisoners of war, Laos, postwar relations between the US and the DRV, etc. We would remain ready to engage in full plenaries with all parties concerned but would try to make progress bilaterally on matters of substance which directly affect the United States. We would not propose to discuss an internal political settlement in this context, but rather leave that to the Vietnamese./2/
/2/Kissinger's ideas on a dual-track negotiating strategy appeared in his article actually published in mid-December, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47 (January 1969), pp. 211-234.
If it is possible to overcome the procedural impasse and to get into plenary sessions on matters of substance, then the initial negotiating instructions should contain clear guidance on the following questions:
a. Will we follow one or two tracks? As you know, I strongly favor two tracks.
b. What is our policy concerning troop withdrawals? Must they be mutual, and over what time period should they be phased? What is the maximum number of troops which we should seek to take out before the end of 1969?
c. If the GVN dig in their heels, what items of leverage should we use, e.g., troop withdrawals, cease-fire, etc.? How far can we go bilaterally, or perhaps trilaterally (include the NLF), under such circumstances?
d. What is our position on reducing the level of hostilities? Are we going to follow a policy of all out pressure on the ground? If so, what part will US forces play? If we do not follow a policy of maximum pressure, what kinds of de-escalation should we propose?
e. What is our position on a cease-fire?
With all these questions in mind, I suggest that the negotiating instructions define specifically the basic objective along, such lines as the following:
"To negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam problem under conditions which provide the people of South Viet-Nam the opportunity to determine their own future free from external aggression."
In terms of specific objectives, the initial negotiating instructions should speak to the following:
a. Restoration of the DMZ.
b. Withdrawal of external forces from South Viet-Nam.
c. Reduction of the level of hostilities--including the question of a cease-fire and phased de-escalation.
d. The creation of a situation in which the contending Vietnamese forces within South Viet-Nam can work out a political settlement.
e. Prisoners of war.
There are in existence policy papers on these issues, but they should be reviewed, reaffirmed, or modified.
There are, of course, a number of other important items on which guidance will be required, but they can await further thought and study.
Finally, I would like to stress that the negotiating instructions should be stated in over-all objective terms and the maximum flexibility should be left to the negotiators to operate within such broad guidelines. We should seek to avoid a situation in which every move the negotiators wish to take must be approved in Washington and Saigon. The general rule should be maximum flexibility on tactics consistent with the over-all policy objectives./3/
/3/Before assuming his position as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs on January 20, 1969, Kissinger began secret contacts with the North Vietnamese in December 1968. The primary conduits were Jean Sainteny, a retired French official with long experience in Vietnam, and Mai Van Bo, the DRV's official representative in France. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Vietnam, 1969-1970.
Warm regards,
Cy
267. Editorial Note
Contacts between the United States and the National Liberation Front (NLF) regarding military issues occurred at the end of 1968. On December 19 the NLF offered to release three American prisoners of war. Following meetings on December 25, 1968, and January 1, 1969, between Viet Cong and U.S. military officers in an area of Tay Ninh Province where a temporary stand-down had been ordered, the three soldiers were released. Seven North Vietnamese seamen were subsequently released by the U.S. Navy on December 16. Despite this successful "exchange," the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments refused to recognize a Viet Cong-sponsored New Year's truce due to enemy violations of an earlier Christmas truce. Documentation on the prisoner release is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 D (1), Prisoners of War (General Material), 1/66-1/69; and in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17-5 US-VIET S and POL 27-7 VIET.
268. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, January 2, 1969.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VIII. Secret. No transmission time is indicated.
CAP 9026. Cy Vance reports by telephone:
--He had a meeting of 4 hours and 15 minutes with the North Vietnamese on modalities;/2/
/2/The delegation transmitted a summary of the meeting in telegram 38/Delto 1116 from Paris, January 2. (Ibid., HARVAN Paris Todel-Paris Delto, Vol. XVIII) The full report of the meeting is in telegram 75/Delto 1119 from Paris, January 3. (Ibid., HARVAN Chronological, Vol. XXVI)
--They insist on a simple round table;
--They caved on the flags and name plates;
--On drawing they shifted from one of our proposals (in which the U.S. and Hanoi would draw, determining the first speaker, with subsequent speakers following in a sequence we could determine) to a proposal in which the GVN and the NLF would do the drawing for the two sides.
If we are to get a simple round table, Thieu tells us he will have to go back to the Vietnamese NSC. Moreover, Saigon will not like at all the drawing to be done by the NLF and the GVN for the two sides. Therefore, we have had important movement (on the flags and name plates) but we still do not have a deal.
269. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, January 3, 1969, 1028Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-January 1969. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Plus. Received at 6:20 a.m. Repeated to Saigon. In telegram CAP 9031 to the President at his Texas Ranch, January 3, Rostow included the full text of the delegation's telegram, prefacing it with the following sentence: "Herewith Harriman and Vance's recommendation on modalities." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. VII) The notation "ps" on Rostow's telegram indicates that the President saw it. The President left the Ranch and arrived at the White House at 3:20 p.m. that day. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Paris, January 3, 1969, 1028Z.
42/Delto 1117. From Harriman to Vance. Ref: Paris 0038 (Delto 1116)./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 268.
1. After reviewing carefully our lengthy meeting of last evening, we have reached the following conclusions and make the following recommendations.
2. We believe we have a good chance of closing out the procedures at the next meeting, if we have flexibility to move to an unmarked, circular table, which we believe will be required. Without this flexibility, we do not believe that we can wrap it up.
3. We have achieved what the GVN has agreed is the most important issue--that is, that there be no flags or nameplates. We believe strongly that it will not be difficult to maintain the principle of two sides by the manner in which we seat ourselves and conduct ourselves without a line of demarcation on the table. We can arrange ourselves on our side of the table in a manner which will make clear that there are two sides. We find it difficult to understand GVN contention that an unmarked round table (without flags or name plates) somehow gives NLF greater status than if there was a baize strip dividing the sides. We therefore recommend strongly that we be authorized to accept a circular table without a line of demarcation.
4. We also recommend that we be given the additional flexibility which we originally requested on order of speaking, as set forth in State 291645/3/ paras 9-12, all of which preserve the principle of two sides.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 264.
5. With the achievement of their prime objective--no name plates and flags--the GVN should be in a position to agree to a circular table while maintaining the "our side-your side" formula.
6. We urge that Embassy Saigon raise the matter immediately with Thieu and obtain the flexibility which is requested.
Harriman
270. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 4, 1969, 1230Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-January 1969. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Plus. Received at 6:20 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission.
154. Ref: A. Paris 0038 (Delto 1116);/2/ B. Paris 0042 (Delto 1117);/3/ C. State 00954 (Todel 1911)./4/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 268.
/3/Document 269.
/4/Dated January 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Paris Todel-Paris Delto, Vol. XVIII)
1. I realize the need to get more flexibility into Vance's instructions and will do what I can. I do not think it advisable for me to see Thieu as the next step here. Instead this morning I sent Berger and Herz to talk to Foreign Minister Thanh and Presidential Assistant Duc on the results of the Vance-Lau meeting (see septel)/6/ and this afternoon I called on Ky, accompanied by Berger./6/ I thought it better to prepare the ground with them before seeing Thieu, and let them work on him for a day or so.
/6/Regarding this meeting, see Document 268.
/6/Bunker reported further on this meeting in telegram 160 from Saigon, January 5. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Chronological, Vol. XXVI)
2. I don't think we shall be able to get Thieu to agree to the full authority we asked for in the original statement we submitted to the GVN, but it may be possible to get him to agree on a continuous circle without baize, and perhaps go a little further on the speaking order in the direction of including ABAB, as an additional alternative. Ky remarked that the difference between a piece of baize and no baize is hardly something we can fight for, and he also mentioned that the easiest solution to the speaking order problem is simply toss a coin, or let the other side speak first. He said he would discuss both with Thieu.
3. At the morning meeting with Thanh and Duc, they at first took the position that the other side was intransigent and we should wait before making any further move. By the time the meeting ended, however, they saw the danger of this course. Berger asked them to take another look at our original proposed instructions to see how much further they could go, arguing that the greater Vance's flexibility the better would be the outcome. They promised to have another look, particularly at the unbroken circular table and at the ABAB formula, and to discuss the whole matter with Thieu this afternoon, if they could get to him.
4. I hope to hear something from the Foreign Minister or Ky tomorrow, but if by Monday morning we have heard nothing I will ask to see Thieu, or ask for a joint meeting. I told Ky, and Berger told the Foreign Minister, that we would like a joint meeting on next steps as soon as they have finished studying the Vance-Lau exchange, and the NLF statement.
5. Given Thieu's past performance, his caution and stubbornness, he may land us, and himself, in trouble again by taking too long to come to a decision. Even if we can persuade him to give Vance more room for bargaining, he may feel he cannot do this without first going to the NSC and the leaders of the Assembly.
6. There is a feeling here in top GVN circles that we have not sufficiently publicized to the American public the importance we attach to the two-sided nature of the new talks, and that in the argument over table shapes this fundamental issue is being lost. I think we should be making a strong public case that the war in Viet-Nam is between two sides and not between four sides, and that the conference arrangements must reflect this. If we make this public case, if we show why the enemy's attempts to put the NLF on a basis of equality with the GVN go the heart of the conflict, I think the GVN will find it much easier to go along in accepting the round table because they will be better convinced that we stand with them on the principle that is involved in the current impasse. The Secretary's press conference, just received, is very helpful in this connection.
7. I have two further thoughts. I think we might propose to Thieu that as between the circular table divided by baize, and the unmarked table, this is not an issue on which we can long stand, and we might propose to Hanoi that we draw lots on the two. My second proposal is to push Ky's thought that the other side can start on the AABB formula. Would like Paris and Washington views.
Bunker
271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, January 4, 1969, 1539Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, Delto Chron., January 1969. Secret; Flash; Nodis/Harvan. Drafted and approved by Bundy, and cleared by John P. Walsh of S/S.
1359/Todel 1915. 1. You should have Saigon 154/2/ reporting useful step and thoughts.
/2/Document 270.
2. In line with the fundamental GVN desire to depict the solution in terms of two sides, it seems to us that an order of speaking arrangement could be worked out that would give both the GVN and ourselves ample support for a two-sided interpretation, assuming we go along on the continuous and unmarked round table. We think you were wise on January 2 not to get deeply into this, and thus to leave our hands reasonably free.
3. Specifically, it is simple common sense--both for private argument with the North Vietnamese and for public exposition--for the order of speaking to be clearly by sides. Just as so many lawyers and others familiar with adversary proceedings have found it extremely difficult to understand our apparent rejection of the round table, so the same influential groups will readily see that in any multi-party litigation the common sense way to proceed is for all the parties on one side to present their views, and then for all the parties on the other side to respond. In short, a position on order of speaking that calls for two lots and then each side completing its presentation would have wide appeal and could become very difficult for Hanoi to stick on.
4. The thought this leads to is that we should seek to get Thieu's concurrence on accepting the continuous and unmarked round table but insisting at the same time on two lots and an AABB order of speaking. With the indication that Ky might advise even letting the other side go first, we would have even more of a persuasive case.
5. Could you advise at once your judgment of such a proposal, in substance and in terms of its being accepted by the North Vietnamese? We would like to send additional instructions to Bunker with your advice in hand.
6. While you are at it, it would help to have in writing a statement of the additional physical elements that tend in the direction of two sides already. For example, we understand that it has become a regular practice for our delegation and the North Vietnamese to use separate entrances to the conference room and to reach their seats, in effect, on a two-sided basis. There may be other elements that are likewise useful both in explaining the position to the GVN and in describing the ultimate result publicly as entirely consistent with two sides.
7. Please reply to Department only. We can repeat if necessary./3/
/3/In telegram 113/Delto 1127 from Paris, January 4, Harriman and Vance replied: "We agree that order of speaking by sides is sensible and defensible. With a continuous, unmarked round table in hand we believe our chances would be good to get DRV to accept lots by sides and speaking by sides." They also noted additional means by which to "promote a two-sided image," such as the particular manner in which the combined U.S./GVN delegation arranged itself at the negotiating table and public and private references to the DRV/NLF delegation as the "other side," "your side," or "their side." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969, Delto Chron., January 1969)
Rusk
272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, January 4, 1969, 2231Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969, Todel Chron., January 1969. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Smith and Lowell Kilday of S/S, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1917.
1411. For Ambassador from Secretary.
1. We have reviewed the report in Paris 0038, the recommendations in Paris 0042, and the progress report and comments in Saigon 154./2/ News stories here reflect excellent backgrounding in Paris and some expectation of progress. We believe this has improved our position somewhat for the moment. Nonetheless, we continue to believe--and to surmise that Hanoi believes--that their proposal for an unmarked and continuous round table appears plausible and reasonable to American and significant third-country opinion.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 268, Document 269, and Document 270, respectively.
2. Hence, we continue to believe that we must make every effort to resolve this matter without further delay on some reasonable basis, and we accept the thrust of Paris 0042 that Thieu's concurrence in our accepting in the last analysis the unmarked continuous round table is crucial. Like Paris, we reject totally any thought of changing the present agreed format (Paris 110),/3/ and likewise believe that there is no effective way to cushion the effects of delay by any form of useful bilateral in Paris that would not become rapidly disruptive in Saigon.
/3/Telegram 110/Delto 1124 from Paris, January 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969, Delto Chron., January 1969)
3. On the table shape, our reading is that further progress is most unlikely if we stay where we are. Although we can understand that the GVN may well read Hanoi's dropping of flags and nameplates as proof that standing firm gets results, we note from Paris 0038 that the dropping of flags and nameplates remains conditional on our acceptance of a continuous round table and was only put forward after we had shown motion in our position on tables. We come back to the basic judgment that Hanoi thinks it has a good thing going, in terms of American public opinion, in resisting any physical demarcation of a round table.
4. At the same time, we believe that accepting the unmarked continuous round table would put us in a very strong position to get strong two-sided flavor on the order of speaking. While our maximum objective in Saigon should be Thieu's concurrence in the full range of possibilities contained in paras 9-12 of State 291645,/4/ we are concerned that these complexities may delay our next move in Paris. Moreover, we feel that--just as it is almost impossible to explain our resistance to a round table--a position that calls for two lots and for each side completing its presentation before the other side speaks (AABB) is an extremely persuasive one for public opinion here and elsewhere. It is simple common sense, conforms to the normal practice in any multi-party litigation, and fits the basic fact that there are two sides both in the fighting and in our concept of the arrangements for the meeting.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 264.
5. In sum, I believe that you must seek to see Thieu as soon as possible, hopefully Monday at latest, to go over the situation with the following maximum and fall-back objectives:
a. As a maximum objective, to get his concurrence in the full sweep of authority covered by Paris 0042.
b. If in your judgment he simply will not agree to this--or will not do so without significant further delay--to get his concurrence to a further meeting in Paris at which Vance would accept the continuous and unbroken round table, contingent upon the dropping of flags and nameplates and also upon Hanoi's acceptance of a two-lot draw and an AABB order of speaking. You could further suggest that Vance might open by offering to let the other side speak first under a two-lot draw and an AABB order, provided that Hanoi accepted the baize strips.
6. In seeking to get the maximum possible freedom, you should of course reiterate all the arguments concerning the state of opinion here. Moreover, you may make clear that we would certainly join with the GVN in stressing the fact that, even with the unbroken and continuous round table, space would be allocated on a 50-50 basis--i.e., by sides--and the definitely two-sided flavor that any of our proposed order of speaking arrangements--but particularly two lots and AABB--would have. As we see it, the total deal would be taken not only as more two-sided than anything else, but as representing a serious and sober arrangement in which Hanoi backed down heavily, first on the flags and nameplates and finally on its unrealistic and now public position on order of speaking.
7. If you should move to the position described in para 5-b above, you should of course make clear that we cannot be sure this will produce agreement, and that it would be necessary to consult further if it did not. In other words, we must not get into a flat and final position at least at this stage.
8. This instruction reflects discussions at highest levels today. As I am sure you realize, we all feel a very great sense of urgency in getting these procedural matters resolved./6/
/6/In a January 4 meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House, the President, Rusk, Clifford, Bundy, Christian, and Tom Johnson discussed the Vietnam peace negotiations. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Although notes of this off-the-record meeting have not been found, Clifford discussed it during a meeting with his staff 2 days later. He noted: "We wallowed around. Pres didn't show any particular impatience, so I surmise Walt & Dean had gotten to him. I only stated that I thought we ought to act promptly on Harriman request for decision. I said I thought LBJ shld approve the Harriman plan/convention. The record shld show decisions & so tell Saigon & order Bunker to get Pres Thieu's concurrence. Finally Pres told Rusk to get out a cable to Bunker (it did not get out [until] 10:00 p.m. Sat nite)." Clifford added: "Bunker's answer is 'miserable'. He's not pressing hard; it's too bad. No movement. I had hoped we could get movement for Pres. J's record & so the new administration would have something moving. 'They' want Lodge & Nixon & so they'll not move at all before the 20th." (Ibid., George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2])
Rusk
273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 6, 1969, 1045Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Paris Todel-Paris Delto, Vol. XVIII. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Received at 6:57 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission.
245. Ref: A. Saigon 154; B. Saigon 160; C. State 1411./2/
/2/See Document 270 and footnote 6 thereto, and Document 272.
1. Having given them two days to let our message (Ref A) sink in, I had Herz telephone Thanh this morning to ask what the GVN proposed to do next. Thanh made it clear that Thieu would not take the initiative to see me, and so I did two things: I sent Berger and Herz to call on Thanh to prepare the ground further, and meanwhile I immediately asked for an appointment this afternoon with Thieu.
2. The word from the Palace is that Thieu was sick this morning and that we would be informed if he was able to see me this afternoon. Word has just come from the Palace, in response to my further inquiry, that Thieu is still not feeling well and is unable to see me. If he is well enough to go to II Corps tomorrow, as scheduled, I have asked to see him on his return, but I conclude that it may be Wednesday/3/ before I am able to see him.
/3/January 8.
3. Meanwhile, the conversation with Thanh served to bring out the attitude with which we will have to contend. Thanh said the President "is not satisfied" that Vance put forward all the six new proposals in one session, just to have them turned down one after the other. He (and Duc, who was also present) indicated that the GVN would like us to mark time, put pressure on the other side, and make it clear that we are waiting for them to call the next meeting. They also felt that after the Secretary's press conference we are in a good position and all that is required is to hammer away at the theme that the table is not a procedural but a substantive question.
4. We quickly disabused Thanh of the idea that the Secretary shares his view that we are in a good position. We stressed that there is no chance at all that the American public, or world opinion, would feel that the difference between a circular table with and without a baize strip is worth delaying the inception of serious negotiations. We explained that the other side has made important (though conditional) concessions, including the important statement that they do not regard a round table as expressing their contention that the meetings are four-sided. We went over the elements of the present situation as compared to that in which we would be if we made a reasonable proposal along the lines of Ref C.
5. The upshot of this meeting was that Duc undertook to convey to Thieu what we had said and also to give him a paper that we had brought for the occasion. (Thanh left for Dalat immediately after our meeting.) So the stage is somewhat better set for the meeting I hope to have with the President tomorrow or Wednesday.
Bunker
274. Editorial Note
On January 6, 1969, Secretary of Defense Clifford met with representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, and nearly two dozen other Department of Defense officials. The Vietnam-related portions of the notes of the meeting drafted by R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary to Clifford, read:
"2. Paris Talks.
"Mr. Clifford said that today marks about the 66th day that has passed since the President stopped the bombing of North Vietnam on 1 November. The President stated that he was willing to stop the bombing if prompt and productive talks started. So far there haven't been any prompt or productive talks. In behalf of the Saigon Government we have submitted to Hanoi 9 proposed table shapes and in each case the table is divided into two sides. Each has been refused by Hanoi who insists that there are 4 rather than 2 representatives. They have, however, come forward with a proposal along the following lines. Let's agree on a table which will, as soon as possible, eliminate the entire controversy--an unmarked round table. Mr. Clifford's view is that it will be ultimately impossible to turn this proposal down, first because it does not divide the parties and second, it is so traditional and historical an approach to a conference. Hanoi has also suggested other plans to get the talks started which appear quite reasonable. Mr. Clifford is personally concerned about Saigon's attitude. They continue to find reasons to delay. He feels that Hanoi's new proposals are reasonable and he feels that when they are known, the world opinion will also think them so. Saigon proposes that they will have to submit them to their National Security Council and after that to their National Assembly. He thinks our hope of getting the talks started prior to 20 January is diminishing. He feels it is still important to get them started. If the present negotiating teams have the talks started we should be able to make headway more promptly. We would have the procedural basis for the talks out of the way and be able to proceed on substantive issues. He would assume that Mr. Nixon's Administration would rather have the talks going with the procedural controversies behind them. There will be a whole new team, Harriman will be out and Lodge in, the current State team will be out and the new one in, and these cannot help but run into natural delays while they become acquainted will all the elements of the controversies. Mr. Clifford finds it difficult to know what to do about it.
"He has said publicly and privately that the talks should proceed along two lines--one between Hanoi and the U.S. on military matters and towards mutual disengagement and the second between Hanoi, the National Liberation Front and Saigon on political matters. There has been an editorial or two this past week saying that this would constitute a move on our part to 'cut and run.' There is nothing further from the truth. These two efforts could be conducted simultaneously. There is a clear difference between the goals of the Saigon and the U.S. Government. He doubts they would start negotiating until they are convinced that a mutual withdrawal of troops would occur. If we wait until a political settlement is reached he could see our troops in Vietnam for years.
"Mr. Clifford noted with interest and comfort that Mr. Rusk in his Friday [January 3] press conference emphasized that there was no personal feud between him and Mr. Clifford, as some have suggested. He wants everyone here to know that there is no personal animosity between the two. When the President consults with him and other advisors, there are differences of opinions expressed. If not, the President would be in the unfortunate position of not hearing various sides of issues. He emphasized that there is no personal animosity whatsoever.
"3. Military Situation in Southeast Asia.
"General McConnell reported that this past week that 104 U.S. were killed compared to 113 the week before. Total Allied killed is 270 and North Vietnamese/Viet Cong 1,957. This is a ratio of 7.25 to 1 in favor of the Allies. During the week ending 28 December 2,253 enemy were killed, a ratio of 6 to 1 in the Allies' favor. We continue to destroy extremely valuable caches of food and ammunition. In November 1968, we found 62 caches, totaling 380 tons; in December, 65 caches totaling 311 tons; and so far in January 1969, 14 caches totaling 98 tons.
"With regard to the reconnaissance situation we have flown 453 tactical reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam since 1 November. A total of 108 have been fired upon with 4 aircraft lost. Of 77 drone missions flown during the same period, 10 were lost. This is not a bad ratio. Supplies continue to move down the North Vietnamese Panhandle and through Laos. The infiltration of personnel continues. We have identified 30,000 personnel on their way to South Vietnam from North Vietnam since 1 December. It appears that about 17,000 could reach the two Northern Provinces of South Vietnam between now and 1 April 1969. About 12,000 appear destined for the III Corps area and 3,500 for Kontum/Pleiku in Region V. The enemy continues to put antiaircraft sites into the Laotian Panhandle. We have identified 143 AAA threat areas. We think that there are some 85-mm guns there but have not confirmed their presence. The North Vietnamese still have 35 surface-to-air missile battalions, with 30 of the battalions still north of the 20th Parallel. We have indications of SAMs in Laos but no indications of radar capability.
"Yesterday the enemy attacked Qui Nhon tank farm. During the shelling and attack the enemy suffered 7 killed and 2 captured. We had 4 U.S. personnel wounded and 134,000 gallons of fuel destroyed. (At this point General McConnell discussed some other items listed below, after which the discussion returned to Vietnam, as follows.)
"General Walt said that morale continues high among the Marine Corps personnel in Vietnam. In December 1968, over 3,000 extended their tours of duty there. General McPherson said that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are beginning to zero in against our pacification actions. They are beginning to see its effects. General McConnell said they are beginning to send their own civilian teams into the various populated areas.
"Mr. Clifford said he asked the question last Monday [December 30] and will ask it again. Around 1 December we started getting full intelligence reports on an enemy winter-spring offensive. These reports were from unusually reliable sources. Dates were estimated for it to start and then the dates slipped. It is now 6 January 1969 and he is at a loss to know what has happened. Have they tried to get these attacks going and had them spoiled?
"General McConnell said that it is his personal opinion that they had tried to get these offensives going, particularly in the III Corps. They can't get them underway because of their losses of matériel and food and the high casualties they are taking. General Abrams and his troops keep pounding the hell out of them. General McConnell personally feels that if they are going to attempt an attack before Tet that it would come about 20 January. Tet occurs around 15 February. However, he does not believe they will get it off the ground.
"Mr. Clifford said how are we doing with the bombing in Laos. General McConnell said that it is going well. We are not killing as many trucks but we have blocked the access routes. We have had a considerable number of secondary fires and explosions from the bombing. There have been over 3,800 secondary fires and 4,200 secondary explosions in the present campaign. He believes our bombing is quite effective. There is a lot of truck movement going on but it is mainly shuffling between supply points. Admiral Moorer said our analyses show that supply movements are running about 28 tons a day. With regard to the mounting of attacks, he would emphasize that the enemy does not have the kind of communications that we do. The authentic documents that we capture are probably plans rather than orders. He asked General Palmer if he wouldn't agree. General Palmer said yes. General McConnell said that we also killed about 200,000 enemy last year and they haven't recouped their losses. Dr. Brown said what they are saying is the documents that we capture are plans which they have been unable to execute.
"General Palmer said the enemy continues to overestimate his capabilities. He makes grandiose plans but they don't come to pass. He looks for the enemy to shift more and more to political type targets, particularly in III Corps, and do most of the fighting in I Corps.
"Mr. Clifford said that our casualties are following a hopeful trend. For the week ending 14 December, there were 222; 21 December--151; 28 December--113; and 4 January--104. We can all hope that they will continue downward.
"General McConnell reported that the car of the Minister of Education [Nguyen Van Tho] was attacked in Saigon. He was wounded and several other casualties occurred. The Minister was a strong anti-corruptionist and it is possible that the attackers may not have been Viet Cong." (Johnson Library, Papers of Clark Clifford, Minutes of Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, October 1968-January 1969)
At his January 3 news conference, Rusk had stated: "I don't recall that I have ever wrestled on the rug with Secretary Clifford. The instructions which the President has sent to Ambassadors Harriman and Vance and to Ambassador Bunker go out with the full agreement of the Secretary of Defense and myself." For full text of Rusk's remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, January 20, 1969, pages 45-52.
275. Editorial Note
On January 7, 1969, President Johnson along with Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, Director of Central Intelligence Helms, General McConnell, Walt Rostow, and Tom Johnson met for their regular weekly Tuesday Luncheon Meeting. The meeting lasted from 1:40 to 2:50 p.m., and Vietnam was one of the issues discussed. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Although no formal record of this meeting has been found, Clifford recounted the meeting for his staff at its morning conference on January 8 as follows:
"LBJ opened by saying, 'What do you have to say Dean?' Rusk admitted no progress, Hanoi has turned down all our proposals. It appears we shld stay with it--when Hanoi learns/accepts our firmness there will be progress. LBJ wanted to know what WAH & Vance say [?] Rusk said they were critical of Hanoi--Bunker reports no action. LBJ then asked CMC 'to add' any comments. CMC said he had nothing to add--rather, a diff't interpretation.
"CMC: Hanoi has said it will accept--it has a reasonable offer--they will sit at a round table, they will give up nameplates & flags, & they will accept our proposal on who speaks. I said we [have] not given any attention to 9 diff't table sizes, we're way past that, we have a situation that parties can agree to. Saigon knows this proposition is acceptable to US & Hanoi, so they just stall--Thieu says he's 'sick,' yet he's able to go on inspection trip. All this is just part of deception & deliberate dilatory tactics. They just stall, delay, devious--for 67 days they've hamstrung us. We have a reasonable proposition--But we can't move because we have let Saigon have a veto. 'I think it's wrong'--we pay, we fight, we owe it to ourselves & U.S. to get talks started--before 20 Jan--It'll take weeks & months for a new team to start. It's wrong--to go on killing Am. boys week after week, by sitting supinely by.
"LBJ asked sharply to Rusk-- 'Is the argument fair?' Rusk said yes. LBJ asked Rusk to defend any objections--Rusk couldn't defend Saigon. LBJ asked CMC what he should do. CMC said, 'Look at last Bunker cable' (all did). CMC: LBJ shd send a private letter to Thieu saying this is eminently fair--we believe Hanoi will accept. Leave no flexibility, no options, no choices--It'll be fair, & leave an excellent record--tell Thieu support is eroding. Second, order Bunker to sell this; Congress is back & wild. Do it today. If Thieu is negative, we shld convene at once & decide next step.
"LBJ asked Rusk--Rusk says lv it up to Bunker. CMC broke in--Bunker doesn't deliver the message! Only way to get it across is from you. LBJ sat. Finally said, 'I'm getting fed up!' (CMC said this is the first time he ever so said) 'It's apparent to me, "they'll" toss anybody to sharks. They are planning delay. We are shut out of it.' He turned to Dean Rusk: 'I want these talks to start before Jan 20 even if we have to admit Clark has been right.' CMC (It was not rec'd happily by Rusk & Rostow) LBJ asked how to get talks going--CMC says he cautioned about 'grand-standing.' If Thieu is negative, take another step. Rusk sat still & numb--this is not what he wants or likes. CMC played on--Why not get support out of Nixon admin. To get talks started--It'll be to their advantage
"LBJ not sure that'll work--'I'm completely disenchanted about Nixon, they'll pull the rug out from under us--They've thrown a wrench into SALT, they've screwed up Paris before the election.' LBJ--says--'It's actually a possibility Saigon is acting under instructions from Nixon.' [LBJ] ended: to Clark and Dean: 'Get talks started!'" (Ibid., George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2])
276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, January 7, 1969, 2350Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Paris Todel-Paris Delto, Vol. XVIII. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Plus. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Rostow and John Walsh of S/S, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris as Todel 1930 literally eyes only for Harriman and Vance. In telegram 4101/Todel 1944 to Saigon, January 10, the Department reported: "Highest levels desire that you definitely deliver Presidential letter. I am sure you are fully aware of the great importance President attaches to satisfactory agreement from Thieu at this critical time. Good luck and all best wishes." (Ibid.)
2624. Saigon Eyes Only for Bunker from Secretary.
1. To give added force to your presentation to Thieu, or to speed up his seeing you by notifying him of its existence, the President has authorized you--in your complete discretion--to deliver the following personal message from him to Thieu:
Dear Mr. President:
I have asked Ambassador Bunker to deliver this personal note to you, concerning the dangerous implications that I see developing from the situation in Paris.
The simple fact is that a continued stalemate on present lines can only have most serious effects on basic American public support for our whole effort to assist your country to preserve its independence. You and I must rapidly reach a common position that will produce agreement--or that will at the very least put the public blame squarely on Hanoi for failure to do so.
Specifically, neither the American public nor the American Congress can understand our inability to accept a continuous, and if necessary unmarked, round table. Such a table is not inherently four-sided in any way. With space at the table divided, as it would be, on a 50-50 basis, the table would indeed have a clear two-sided tendency even if it were not marked.
As you know, Hanoi has already said that it could drop its demand for flags and nameplates if we agree to a round table. As we have previously agreed through Ambassador Bunker, this was the most important single element for us to obtain, and it is now clear to the public that it is within our reach.
Moreover, I have every confidence that if we are prepared to accept a round table, we shall be able to get a clearly two-sided order of speaking arrangement. If Hanoi should reject this, on any of the several lines Ambassador Bunker will be putting to you, then the burden would shift to them and we would both be in a much stronger position.
Hence, I see no reason why we cannot agree to a reasonable position that can produce arrangements which we could convincingly depict as two-sided and in full accord with the statements made public on November 27./2/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 236.
In my judgment, this would be the proper course for us to take at any time, and regardless of public opinion factors. But these factors cannot be left out of account either by you or by me. At the present moment, the situation in the Congress and in the American public is as dangerous and volatile as I have seen it at any time in the last four years, or indeed in my 40 years of public service. Failure to make these reasonable adjustments in our position can only mean a real avalanche of criticism directed in part at the American Government, but far more acutely and damagingly at the image of your government in the American Congress and with the American people.
As I come to the close of our official relationship, I have no regrets for the course we have followed, and I have every hope that I and my associates will be in a position to support your cause effectively into the future, so that we may emerge with an honorable settlement that preserves your country's right to determine its future without external interference. You and I have a long history of close and constructive collaboration. We have tried always to do the right thing, and this is what I am asking you to do now--in the firm belief that it is right, and in the equally firm belief that it is essential if my country is to go on with the basic course of action which I have supported throughout. Please do not force the United States to reconsider its basic position on Viet-Nam.
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson.
Rusk
277. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 10, 1969, 1250Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN-Double Plus, Chronological Papers and other Misc. Material. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Received at 10:15 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission.
527. Subject: Morning Meeting with President Thieu January 10.
1. Before handing President Thieu the letter from President Johnson,/2/ I briefly reviewed with him what had happened since the Vance-Lau meeting in Paris on January 2,/3/ especially how we had unsuccessfully tried to engage a dialogue about next steps with Foreign Minister Thanh, and I recalled that I had tried to see Thieu since January 6.
/2/See Document 276.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 268.
2. I then handed him the President's letter, which he read carefully. When he had finished I said to him that President-elect Nixon and Mr. Rogers associate themselves with what I would now be saying.
3. There is no basic disagreement between the US and GVN, I said, on procedural issues. Both of us want to get the best possible deal. Where we have a disagreement is on the assessments of our mutual interests in making the next tactical move./4/ If I was not mistaken, I said, Thieu seemed to feel that he has a problem with Vietnamese opinion while President Johnson has a problem with American opinion. I suggested that this is not the way to look at the matter. Both of us, the USG and the GVN, have the same urgent problem--to avoid a situation where American opinion will make it impossible to continue our commitment here.
/4/In a conversation with a senior CIA officer in Saigon on January 9, Ky said that Thieu could not accept a round table without some sort of division, a point that Thieu would not concede. (CIA memorandum, January 9, attached to a memorandum from Helms to Rostow, also January 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE 9(a), 10/68-1/69, Post-Tet Political Activity) In a conversation on January 10, Ky's Special Assistant Dang Duc Khoi told a CIA officer that he convinced Ky to try to persuade Thieu to accept the round table formula. (CIA memorandum, January 11; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/IMO Files, Job 80-R01580R, Peace Talks)
4. This problem is totally unrelated to the changeover from one administration to another on January 20, I said. Mr. Nixon will be faced with it just as much as the present President, and Mr. Nixon had asked me to inform Thieu that he regards a round table, and any formula for speaking order based on two sides, as acceptable. He wants to get the preliminaries out of the way so that we can move to substantive negotiations immediately after January 20 if they have not started before that time.
5. I then said, further drawing on instructions, that Mr. Nixon's reason for taking this stand is as follows: the deal in getting substantive negotiations started is so rapidly eroding American Congressional and public opinion that if we are to stay in Viet-Nam and continue to give the GVN our support, we simply have to move to substantive negotiations at once. We mean to continue to negotiate and fight at the same time, and to stand firm with the GVN on matters of principle, but the American public and Congress will not at this stage tolerate fighting alone when there is an opportunity to negotiate, and they have no patience with arguments over procedure that seem to them unreasonable. The Government of Viet-Nam must be careful not to drive the United States Government into a position where it is compelled to move ahead on its own.
6. I said as Thieu had seen from the President's message, he supports the GVN completely on the principle that the meetings must be two-sided, but he points out that the arrangements that we propose protect their essentially two sided character. I called Thieu's attention to one key passage of the letter in which President Johnson said that the situation in the Congress and in the American public "is as dangerous and volatile as I have seen it at any time in the last 4 years, or indeed in my 40 years in public service," and I also read to Thieu the next following sentence which warns against a "real avalanche of criticism directed in part at the American Government, but far more acutely damaging to the image of your government in the American Congress and with the American people." I also called special attention to the last two sentences of President Johnson's personal message. For good measure I added a remark, which I characterized as a personal one, that Thieu will very much need Mr. Johnson's support also after the President leaves office. I reminded him that the President has been a great friend of South Viet-Nam, and I said Thieu should be careful to keep him as a friend.
7. Because Foreign Minister Thanh (Saigon 245)/6/ had favorably referred to Secretary Rusk's January 3 statement/6/ that procedural problems contain elements of substance, I stressed that Mr. Rusk likewise personally believes that it is imperative that we resolve the procedural impasse immediately, noting again that Mr. Rusk's successor takes the same position. I then read to Thieu the key passage of the Secretary's personal message to me including the sentence: "I hope the Vietnamese Government is not taking undue comfort from the fact that (the time being saved in Paris) may be well used on the battlefield, because the damage to their cause by adverse reactions here could be irreparable."/7/
/6/See Document 273.
/6/See Document 274.
/7/See Document 276.
8. Next I turned to the decision that now needs to be made. I explained that we propose a package deal of which the most important element is to nail down the two-sided nature of the talks through the order of speaking AABB. The drawing of lots is to be by sides. There are to be no nameplates and flags, and we would accept the unmarked circular table at which they arrange themselves on their half and we arrange ourselves as we want on our half. I said this is what we propose to put up to the other side if they are not forthcoming at the next meeting.
9. I emphasized that we are not in any way receding from our statements of November 13 and November 27,/8/ that these are two-sided meetings. (I noted that the two-sides principle would also be maintained if we had to fall back on the ABBA order of speaking.) We will take measures to make clear that the table arrangement is essentially two-sided. This can be done in several ways. One way, which we had discussed earlier, involves leaving a space between our side and their side, by removing one chair at each mid-point or leaving it unoccupied. Another way is to put a pile of books or files of briefing papers on top of the table between our side and their side. Both of these things, and others as well, such as our addressing them as "your side" or speaking of "the other side," would further mark the two-sided nature of the new meetings. I said the total package which I had described is certainly more two-sided than anything else. By Hanoi's own admission the round table does not reflect their contention that the talks are four-sided. If they do not accept our package, we will have placed them on the defensive. At the present time, no matter what we may say publicly, it is we who are on the defensive. Hanoi wants to keep us in this position. We have to break out of it.
/8/See footnote 8, Document 217 and footnote 3, Document 236.
10. Winding up my presentation, I said it is now more than two months since the final bombing halt, over a month since the GVN delegation arrived in Paris, eight months since the talks began in Paris between the United States and DRV, and in the view of my government the time has definitely come when we must move to substantive matters on which we can together present a firm united front. The issue of the shape of the table is a liability for both of us.
11. Thieu, who had taken careful notes of my presentation, replied that I knew him to be no "super-hawk". He recalled that as long as two years ago, he had outlined to me how he saw the evolution of the conflict, that he did not expect it to end with a clear military victory and that eventually there would have to be political settlement involving competition with the Communists, a competition which would be decisive. He had then said that the people had to be prepared for that contest and that that would take time. Many issues would have to be resolved, and one of them would be how to arrange the contest. Meanwhile he had steadily moved ahead, he publicly enunciated the principle of "one man, one vote." This showed how far we had come in those two years. The Vietnamese people now understand that there will be peace without victory, that they must expect a difficult contest with the Communists, and that the US also wants and expects this.
12. The question, therefore, has become how to make South Viet-Nam politically strong enough to win that looming contest. In this situation, Thieu said, the battle of propaganda is of the utmost importance. This has become a crucial factor in the relationship between the GVN and its allies. If they will help to "push the enemy back," both militarily and in the field of propaganda, they will make it possible for the South Vietnamese people to solve the political problems by themselves after the end of the war. This is not only a matter of substance, it is equally, and sometimes even more, a matter of appearances, of face, of prestige. Pushing back the enemy's propaganda claims affects the morale of the people and of the troops, and the strength of the government depends on the support of the people and of the troops.
13. Thieu now turned to the question of the tables. Of course the shape itself is not important, he said. What is important is that the people must not get the impression that the NLF is accepted as an equal of the GVN in the forthcoming talks. If that should happen, it would have a very dangerous effect on morale in South Viet-Nam. If people feel that the North Vietnamese can get anything they ask for, that our side is giving ground before the enemy, that the enemy gets the table he wants by just holding out for it, what will be the effect? The people will come to feel that this may also happen in the issue of a coalition government, that our side may make concessions in such vital matters, too.
14. I interrupted the President. I certainly did not agree, I said, that the enemy has gotten everything he wants so far. He wanted Phnom Penh or Warsaw as meeting place, and he had to settle for Paris. He insisted that the bombing halt must be unconditional and then had to accept what are virtual conditions. He wanted nameplates and flags, and now he is ready to give in on them. In fact, we can get 90 percent of what we want in the matter of procedures. In negotiations one cannot expect to get 100 percent unless the other side surrenders. The order of speaking which we propose is clearly two-sided, and if we accept the round table we will have half the area and can arrange ourselves in such a way, and pile files at the ends of the diameter, so as to make still clearer that the talks are two-sided. I repeated that we stand by our public statements of November 13 and November 26. We intend to refer to the other side as "your side" or "the other side," thus constantly emphasizing the two-sided character of the meetings. Again, I said the American people simply cannot understand why we should get hung up because of a dispute over a line on the table.
15. Thieu said the question is how all this can be explained to the Vietnamese people. He said he understood the problem with American opinion. I said I wasn't sure that others understand it the same way. Some seemed to think it is just President Johnson's problem. Actually the next President will have the same position. Thieu said our common problem is how to win the political war and how to develop a propaganda position that will support that war. I said there is no reason why we should be less effective than the Communists. The basic question that he and the Vietnamese have to ask themselves is this: How important is US support to them? Is it important? If it is, then they have to take American opinion into consideration.
16. Thieu said, of course American opinion is very important for American support is essential for a successful outcome, but he had to explain to his people. He said the time that was spent in November was well spent in preparing the ground to enable the GVN to send a delegation to Paris. If the GVN had rushed to Paris it would have created an exceedingly difficult position here. He said, "I don't know how I could have governed the country. We needed that time." I agreed that the delay in November was useful here, but it was not useful in the United States where it had a seriously adverse effect on the image of South Viet-Nam and its President. Thieu agreed. He also agreed when I said once more that we have mutual problem now and that we must solve it.
18. Thieu said he has a dilemma how to satisfy American opinion and at the same time maintain the morale of the Vietnamese people and armed forces in order to win in a political settlement. He again said the Vietnamese people had come a long way, but they had to be brought along gradually. He had to move carefully and skillfully in making the people face the need for political compromise. I said once more that Thieu need not feel that the American people wouldn't support Viet-Nam on matters of basic principle. But they will not support continuation of the fighting when they see that an opportunity to negotiate is not being used. Thieu asked how we could be sure that the enemy would negotiate on matters of substance. I said the enemy would be forced to face up to questions of substance as soon as we got over this last remaining procedural hurdle. The negotiations will be long and arduous and complicated. We have to make a beginning now. Thieu said he agreed. I said: All right, what are we going to do?
19. Finally, Thieu said he wished to talk about the next move at our afternoon consultative meeting in the presence of his colleagues./9/ He had asked for a report from Ambassador Lam in Paris on where we stand on the tables, speaking order and other matters after the last Vance-Lau meeting. He said he hoped we would be able to work up a package this afternoon.
/9/The full report of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 592 from Saigon, January 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-January 1969)
Bunker
278. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 10, 1968, 1500Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN-Double Plus, Chronological Papers and other Misc. Material. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan Plus. Received at 11:39 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission.
530. Ref Saigon 529./2/ Subj: Suggested Joint Instruction for Paris.
/2/In telegram 529 from Saigon, January 10, the Embassy reported on that day's consultative meeting to decide positions on procedural issues at the Paris negotiations. (Ibid.)
1. Following is the agreed text, confirmed by Foreign Minister Thanh, of what we undertook to submit to Washington for approval as joint instructions to US and GVN delegations in Paris, in an effort to resolve the procedural impasse:
2. Begin Text.
We have agreed on a two-stage strategy. We will make a serious effort to get the other side to agree to one of two proposals at the next following meeting. If that serious effort fails, and in agreement on the timing, we would fall back on the second stage proposal.
3. At the next US-DRV meeting in Paris to prepare for the new meetings, the US representative will first inquire whether the other side has given serious consideration to our most recent proposals (the final one of which was a circular table with baize strips, no flags and nameplates, and lots to decide which side is to begin under an AABB order of speaking, with two lots, possibly four, representing sides and not delegations, i.e. lots in two colors). Should the other side refuse to move, he may table two alternative proposals:
A. The circular table with baize strips, no flags and nameplates, but the other side to begin without any drawing of lots; or
B. Round or circular table with thin but visible line separating the two sides, no flags and nameplates, and drawing of lots by sides with two colors.
4. If efforts to obtain acceptance of these proposals prove unavailing, we would make a further proposal at a next meeting whose timing is to be decided by mutual agreement. At that meeting our representative would first make another attempt to get the other side to accept one of our previous proposals, and if this is unavailing, would propose the following fall-back position:
A. Unmarked circular table;
B. No flags or nameplates;
C. Order of speaking by sides, the side that begins to be decided by drawing from two lots, e.g. one red and one yellow. The drawing to be by a third party (possibly a French official), with the first lot drawn determining which side begins.
5. Should the other side accept our fall-back position, each of us will make a concerted effort to explain to our own public opinion and to world opinion that the agreed arrangements will be essentially two-sided. Should the other side not accept our fall-back position, we will make a concerted effort to explain to our opinion and to world opinion that we have proved our good faith and serious intent and that the other side is responsible for the failure of substantive talks to begin.
6. It is essential that complete security be preserved about the existence of a fall-back position. End Text.
7. In clearing foregoing with Thanh, Political Counselor elicited the following comments:
A. The terms "round or circular" in para 3B above are understood to mean that our representative will have flexibility to move from round to circular shape. (GVN had originally proposed round and we had argued in favor of circular shape.)
B. Absence of mention of the number of lots in paragraph 3 means that our representative should have flexibility enabling him to settle for four lots (of two colors) if this is helpful in obtaining agreement. This flexibility would not be given, however, if we go to the fall-back position in paragraph 4.
C. Most important, when we expressed concern that provision for timing of second meeting "by mutual agreement" might involve further delay, Thanh said it was his impression that Thieu was chiefly concerned that fall-back position not be used at the next meeting but that he would not expect to have a long interval between that meeting and the subsequent one if the positions outlined in paragraph 3 above do not result in agreement./3/
/3/In telegram 4935 to Saigon and Paris, January 10, the Department instructed the delegation in Paris to proceed along the basis of the two-stage strategy, with the caveats that the marking system for lots would not necessarily be limited to colors and there would be no insistence that a third party draw these lots. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-January 1969) In a January 12 meeting with Lau, Vance proposed both the package proposals, first without the caveats and then with the caveats. Lau rejected the proposals as mere variations on a two-sided formula that the United States and Vietnam were attempting to impose upon the DRV and the NLF. (Telegram 434 from Paris, January 12; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Paris Talks/Meetings, Paris Talks/Nodis/Paris Meetings Plus, Vol. I)
Bunker
279. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 13, 1969, 1040Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Paris Talks/Meetings, Paris Talks/Nodis/Paris Meetings Plus. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Harvan Plus. Received at 6:49 a.m. Repeated to Paris literally eyes only for Harriman and Vance.
683. Literally eyes only for the Secretary from Bunker.
1. President Thieu asked that I transmit the following letter to President Johnson. The letter was transmitted to me today although it is dated January 11th.
Begin Text
Dear Mr. President:
I have received your letter of January 8th,/2/ transmitted to me by Ambassador Bunker, and have given very thoughtful consideration to the points you made concerning the implications you saw developing from the situation in Paris.
/2/See Document 276.
At this time, I am hopeful that the preliminary difficulties will be awaiting our two governments after the talks begin, but I am also confident that our two countries will be able to meet them together successfully, in the pursuit of our common goals which are the defense of freedom and the establishment of an honorable and durable peace. The outcome of the present events will affect generations to come, and the Vietnamese people are proud to be with the American nation in meeting this crucial challenge.
As you know, side by side with the American Government, our government has made the utmost efforts in the search for a peaceful and honorable settlement of this conflict, and to give an early start to the peace talks. Among our major concessions to that end, the Vietnamese Government has accepted the presence of the so-called NLF at the talks, the possibility for the other side to organize itself as they wish, the absence of flags and nameplates (while at an international conference governments and only governments could and should have their flags and nameplates), and finally the round shape of the table which the Communists proposed.
We regret that the American public are not fully aware of the extent of our good will because, as Secretary Rusk pointed out in his press conference of January 3rd, "These procedural matters do conceal important questions of substance," and "The delegates of Hanoi are trying to accomplish something indirectly, by means of procedural arrangements, which they are not entitled to do."
In any case, now as before, you have always, as you have had in the past, our fullest cooperation, because our two nations are shoulder to shoulder in this vital struggle for freedom, and the Vietnamese Government as well as the Vietnamese people remain deeply grateful to you for the courageous decisions you have taken in meeting the challenge of Communist aggression in Viet-Nam.
We know that without the noble and courageous help of the United States under your leadership, the Republic of Viet-Nam may have been overwhelmed by Communist forces in 1965. American support has been also instrumental in the Vietnamese building of democratic institutions in recent years.
But the Vietnamese people are also proud people, and with the wholehearted support of the National Assembly of the Republic of Viet-Nam I have stated our purposes to make increasing efforts to alleviate gradually the burdens nobly assumed by the United States in this struggle. To that effect, I hope that a beginning of execution can be made this year.
Again, let me assure you, Mr. President, of our abiding gratitude for what you have done for Viet-Nam and the free world in the recent crucial years during which I have had the privilege of being in close and cordial relationship with you.
Sincerely,
Nguyen Van Thieu
End Text.
Bunker
280. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, January 13, 1969.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Misc. & Memos, Vol. III [1 of 2]. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Plus.
Ambassador Vance called on the Secure Phone at 10:30 a.m.
1. Oberemko called on Vance and Harriman this morning at Oberemko's request.
2. Oberemko said that he was putting forward a procedural compromise proposal. He said it was authorized by his Ambassador but not by the Soviet government and it was simply a personal initiative by Zorin and Oberemko designed to break the deadlock./2/
/2/In telegram 376/Delto 1139 from Paris, January 10, Harriman and Vance reported that in a January 9 meeting Zorin promised to help get the expanded talks started by proposing to the DRV delegation that it accept an unmarked round table. (Ibid., HARVAN Chronological, Vol. XXVI)
3. Oberemko suggested a round table with two small rectangular tables adjacent at opposite sides--the closer to the round table the better from the U.S. point of view, the further removed the better from Hanoi's point of view./3/
/3/As reported in the delegation's summary of this meeting with the Soviets, transmitted in telegram 474/Delto 1146 from Paris, January 13, Oberemko proposed that the separation distance between the two separate tables and the main round table be "far enough for Bogomolov to walk between." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969, Todel Chrons, January 1969) In telegram 5746/Todel 1959 to Paris, January 14, Bundy noted that "the Oberemko proposal has echoes of Geneva [Conference on Berlin] in 1959, when the final seating arrangement for the two German delegations was in terms of one or two hand-widths from the main table." (Ibid.)
4. He said that Lau was coming to see him tonight and he asked if Harriman and Vance had any reaction to his proposal./4/
/4/In a meeting the previous day, Lau had rejected both Vance's initial proposal of a baize strip across the table and his alternative package proposing instead a thin line. (Telegram 434/Delto 1143 from Paris, January 12; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Chronological, Vol. XXVI)
5. Harriman and Vance said they could not get a Governmental position on this proposal or commit the GVN on the matter today. They pressed Oberemko to make sure that his proposal was part of an overall package deal in which the drawing of lots for the order of speaking was satisfactorily resolved as well, and Oberemko said he considered it a part of an overall solution. Harriman and Vance did not encourage him but asked him to put the matter to Lau without any commitment on our part at this time.
Comment:
The delegation suggests that we not advise the GVN on this move at this time but let Bunker continue to press Thieu to go to the fall-back proposal of a round unmarked table until we know whether Oberemko's idea is acceptable to the DRV--which they doubt.
281. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, January 14, 1969.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN-Double Plus, Chronological Papers and other Misc. Material. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Plus.
Ambassador Vance called on the Secure Phone at 10:00 a.m.
1. Oberemko came in this afternoon to see Harriman and Vance./2/
/2/The delegation transmitted an account of this meeting in telegram 521/Delto 1150 from Paris, January 14. (Ibid.)
2. Oberemko saw the DRV delegation last night after he saw Vance and he reported that he had "good reason to believe" that the following proposal would be acceptable to the DRV and the NLF:
(a) Seating--A circular unmarked table with two rectangular tables at opposite points of the circle 45 centimeters from it (the same proposal he made yesterday to Vance except for specification of the distance of the two smaller tables)./3/
/3/See Document 280.
(b) No flags or name plates.
(c) Order of Speaking--France would draw lots to determine which side spoke first. They would inform the side that had the winning lot and that side would speak first with two speeches permitted. The order of speaking would then alternate--other side, our side, etc.
3. Oberemko indicated that he was pressing hard to have agreement reached on these procedural matters tomorrow, and he indicated that time is of the essence.
Comment:
Harriman and Vance, based on past experience, think Oberemko's report can be taken as accurate. They recommend that we authorize Bunker to mention this new proposal to the GVN and get its concurrence (a) to accept the Oberemko proposal, and (b) to authorize the fall back to an unmarked circular table in case Oberemko is unable to deliver the other side on his proposal. The Paris delegation believes the GVN will readily accept this new proposal and they would like to be able to inform Oberemko of this fact tomorrow morning (Paris time).
Benjamin H. Read/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
282. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, January 15, 1969.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN-Double Plus, Chronological Papers and other Misc. Material. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Plus.
Ambassador Vance called on the Secure Phone at 9:45 a.m.
1. Vance reported that he had just reached agreement with Lau on procedures./2/ Seating would be arranged as set forth in the Soviet proposal. There would be no name plates or flags. On the order of speaking Vance and Lau agreed that each would send a subordinate officer to see Manach at the French Foreign Office at 6:00 p.m. (Paris time) today. In the presence of the US and DRV officers Manach would be asked to determine by chance, either by lots or flip of a coin which side would speak first.
/2/The delegation's account of this meeting was transmitted in telegram 608/Delto 1156 from Paris, January 15. (Ibid.)
2. Lau told Vance that he would have to get the agreement of the NLF delegation to this arrangement before it could be considered final and he would call Vance as soon as this had been done.
3. At that time Lau and Vance will go together to see Manach to spell out the above arrangements.
4. After the winner is determined on the question of order of speaking by Manach, it was agreed that the US and DRV officers would telephone Vance and Lau from the Quai and that two hours later the US and DRV delegations would make separate public statements about the procedural agreement.
5. Part of the understanding reached is that the first US/GVN-DRV/NLF meeting--which would be devoted to procedural questions--would be held at 10:30 a.m. on Saturday, January 18.
6. Vance had talked to Lam when GVN concurrence to these arrangements was cabled from Saigon and Lam had not raised any problems. Vance intended to see Lam again, after hearing from Lau, to report developments.
Comment:
Vance urged greatest precaution in handling this information until NLF concurrence is obtained and the arrangements are carried out as outlined above.
BHR
283. Situation Report by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, January 15, 1969.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN-Double Plus, Chronological Papers and Other Misc. Material. Secret; Nodis/Harvan Plus.
Vance Phoned at 11:45 a.m.
1. Vance had not yet heard from the DRV about NLF concurrence. Our delegation had heard that the "other side" had asked to see Manach at 5:30 p.m. (Paris time), but does not know if the Front or the DRV or both are involved.
2. Lam just called Miller to say that he had phoned Thieu with the information which Vance had given him on earlier developments. Lam wanted Miller to come over right away to the GVN delegation headquarters and asked Miller to tell Vance to "stop everything he is doing."
3. Secretary Rusk got on the phone and advised Vance to inform Lam that it was too late to stop action and to tell him that Vance was proceeding with Lau and Manach in accordance with the instructions approved by President Thieu.
Vance Called at Noon
1. Vance said the DRV delegation had just phoned to advise us that the NLF delegation concurred in the Vance/Lau arrangement as agreed upon earlier in the day.
Vance Called at 12:25 p.m.
1. Vance and Lau are scheduled to meet with Manach at 7:30 p.m. (Paris time). Harriman and Vance have sent an officer to see Lam to find out what the GVN problem is but have not heard back from him.
Vance Called at 1:00 p.m.
1. The GVN problem is a minor one--Thieu does not want the drawing or flip of the coin to be at the Quai. He prefers that it be done at the Hotel Majestic, but Lam raised no other problems.
2. Accordingly Vance plans to see Manach and Lau at 7:30 Paris time and propose the change in site of the drawing and suggest a new time schedule so that the drawing would occur at 10:00 a.m. Thursday/2/ (Paris time) and the announcement to follow at noon Thursday (Paris time). He thinks Lau will agree to these changes, but if the delay is a serious problem for the DRV he will agree to set it up for this evening at a later hour.
/2/January 16. For the meeting with Manac'h, see Document 284.
BHR
284. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, January 16, 1969, 1420Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan-Double Plus, Chronological Papers and Other Misc. Material. Secret; Flash; Harvan/Nodis. Received at 9:41 a.m. Repeated to Saigon. Read also reported the sequence of events described in this telegram in situation reports based on telephone calls from Vance at 3 p.m., 6 p.m., 6:45 p.m., and 10 p.m. that day. (Ibid.)
642/Delto 1160. From Vance. Ref: Paris 608 (Delto 1156)./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 282.
1. As Department aware from telecons during past 12 hours, our agreement with DRV became slightly unglued after they informed us of NLF concurrence (reftel). Things are now back on the track after this morning's meeting with Lau (septel)./3/ The first procedural meeting at the Majestic will be held at 10:30 am Paris time Saturday./4/
/3/In telegram 757 from Paris/Delto 1174, January 17, Vance reported on the meeting he had with Lau in the DRV's safe house in Choisy on the morning of January 16. Lau proposed that, in lieu of the French drawing lots or flipping a coin, his government was prepared to let the United States or GVN speak first in whatever order they desired, and then the order of speaking would be reversed and rotated henceforth. Vance agreed to the proposal. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Peace Talk Material for Ginsburgh-Hold for Ginsburgh)
/4/January 18. Regarding the first procedural meeting of the expanded talks, see Document 286.
2. The sequence of events following yesterday's meeting with Lau, to the extent that we know them, is as follows: DRV delegate Mai Van Bo went to see Quai Assist Direct Manac'h at about 5:30 pm to inform him of our agreement. The fact that Bo did this before the DRV informed us at 1800 of NLF concurrence was contrary to what we had agreed. Moreover, Bo gave Manac'h an inaccurate account of what had been agreed between us. When I later met with Manac'h at 7:30 pm, he said that Bo had at first suggested that the meetings would be in the large rather than the small conference room as agreed. Bo had also neglected to tell Manac'h that the table would be a solid circle and, finally Bo had insisted that in deciding the speaking order the French should draw lots in a manner which reflects the four party concept.
3. I told Manac'h that Bo had given him an incorrect account of our agreement and suggested that he contact him again promptly to set things straight. Manac'h met again with Bo and the minor misunderstandings about the conference room and the table were eliminated. Bo, however, insisted on his version of how to determine the speaking order. After receiving Manac'h's account of his second meeting with Bo, I asked Oberemko to join me shortly after midnight and told him where things stood. Obermeko confirmed our understanding of the agreement on speaking order reached with Lau and said that he had seen Lau at 6 pm and Lau reported his meeting with me in a manner consistent with our understanding. At my request Oberemko then met with Lau at the Soviet Embassy and about three hours later sent First Secretary Bogomolov to report to me on the conversation. According to Bogomolov, there was a "misunderstanding" and it would have to be cleared up directly between me and Lau in the morning. I asked several times what kind of misunderstanding there had been and Bogomolov's replies were rather cryptic, but he did express the view that "everything will be all right."
4. At about 8 this morning Paris time, Lau called us seeking an immediate meeting, and the remainder of the story has been reported in a separate telegram. While it is not clear what happened between yesterday's meeting with Lau and today's meeting, we suspect that the "misunderstanding" was either Bo's misunderstanding because of lack of familiarity with the agreed procedures or the NLF's objection to the drawing of lots in our presence with only one winner. Perhaps it was a combination of both.
Harriman
285. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 16, 1969, 1200Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission. Printed in full in Douglas Pike (ed.), The Bunker Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 636-652.
894. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my seventy-fifth message.
A. General
1. In this, my last message to you as President, I shall try to sum up the progress and the shortcomings of the past year in our effort to move forward toward the achievement of our objectives in Viet-Nam. These I take it to be: A) a just, durable, and honorable peace through negotiations; B) a chance for the Vietnamese people to choose freely the form of government under which they wish to live; C) to help them develop their own stable political institutions and a viable economy; D) to make credible our obligations under the Charter of the U.N. and SEATO to resist aggression; and E) eventually to develop regional organizations through which the Southeast Asian countries can carry on joint undertakings in economic development and mutual cooperation. I shall try to give an overview in the first section, followed by more detailed accounts of political developments, Communist trends, military and pacification activities and the economic situation.
2. 1968 was in many ways a momentous year. Two events which proved to be major watersheds from which much else flowed were the Tet offensive and your speech of March 31./2/ In retrospect, they were the source of many constructive developments; and although some immediate problems, material and psychological, followed in their wake, I think they can be judged as major factors in stimulating the very substantial progress that took place in 1968.
/2/For documentation on the Tet offensive of 1968, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume VI. President Johnson's speech announcing the partial bombing halt and reporting his decision not to seek re-election is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 469-476.
3. Ironically, from a political point of view, the Tet attacks were a failure within Viet-Nam, and a brilliant success in America. It is true that very heavy material damage was inflicted by the enemy during the Tet and May/June attacks; 150,000 homes were destroyed or damaged, a million temporary evacuees created, substantial damage was done to the industrial plants, the economy set back and business confidence impaired. Yet there was no panic here. The people rallied, not to the Communists but to the government. There were no uprisings, no defections in the armed forces, the Vietnamese military units fought well, the government did not fall apart; on the contrary, it reacted with great determination and vigor. Operation Recovery was carried out with great energy and skill. By September, the million evacuees had been resettled, homes rebuilt and new housing provided. The establishment of a reconstruction fund and war risk insurance made possible the reconstruction of industry, business confidence returned, and in the last quarter of the year, commercial import licensing was running at a record rate. The decline in the relatively secure population, which had dropped from 67.2 percent in January to 59.8 percent as a result of the Tet attacks, was not only made up but at the year end the figure reached a record high of 76.3 percent. The population under VC control dropped from 16.4 percent in January to 12.3 percent at the year end. Even if one discounts these figures, the trend is clearly up and the situation substantially better than a year ago.
4. Your speech of March 31 and the partial bombing halt brought the Vietnamese Government and people face to face with the fact that we would not be here indefinitely and that one day they would be on their own. The realization of this fact and the confidence created by the successful reaction to the Tet attacks tended to inspire the Vietnamese with greater determination, a greater willingness to sacrifice, a new confidence in their own government and armed forces. From this fact flowed other constructive developments. It resulted in general mobilization and an ambitious self-defense program. Military and paramilitary forces now number well over a million men. Of the increase of 220,000 in the forces this year, 160,000 have been volunteers. (A force of comparable size in the United States, based on our population, would require 18 million men under arms.) In addition, more than one million men and women have been organized in civilian defense groups, more than half of these trained, and 100,000 armed.
5. Given the small population base of South Viet-Nam, these figures represent a prodigious effort to mobilize the entire population for the war effort. Coupled with a substantial improvement in RVNAF weaponry and greatly improved performance--General Abrams has said, "They are paying the price, and exacting the toll"--it means that the GVN faces Hanoi today with a military machine greatly superior to the one it had at the beginning of 1968.
6. A further development flowing from the two watersheds I have mentioned was the continued strengthening of constitutional government, the formation of a more popular and more effective cabinet under Tran Van Huong, and Thieu's consolidation of his constitutional powers as President. The Assembly proved itself by and large a responsible body meeting its constitutional responsibilities while working quite effectively with the executive to meet the demands of recurring crises. The Thieu/Ky rivalry, while not entirely resolved, declined greatly in importance as Ky's power was reduced and Thieu's increased. Their relationship today is probably better than at any time since the inauguration of the present government.
7. The large increase in money supply brought about by the impact of general mobilization contributed to inflationary pressures. In spite of an increase of nearly 60 percent in money supply, price increases were held to about 30 percent for the year, a tolerable increase if not a comfortable one. In a year that saw the heaviest fighting of the war, the steady decline in the rice deliveries from the Delta, which had continued since 1963, was finally reversed. The IR-8 rice program was initiated, proving more popular even than had been anticipated, resulting in plans for an accelerated program in 1969. Progress was also made in poultry and other protein production. Recovery from the setback of Tet has been achieved and the economy has resumed its forward movement.
8. Beside these very substantial achievements of 1968, I set forth some important shortfalls, weaknesses, and hazards. Thanks to his safe havens and external support, the enemy probably still retains the capability to prepare and mount further attacks. Pacification gains would be inevitably set back if the enemy proved able to mount another even partially successful offensive. Such an offensive would also have adverse effects on American opinion, probably its main purpose, since the enemy must be aware of the fact that any real military success is no longer possible.
9. On the political side, very little progress has been made toward the development of a strong and united nationalist political organization. While the Thieu/Huong alliance has resulted in the best and most effective Vietnamese Government in many years, the GVN is still plagued by inefficiency and corruption. While popular support for the government has improved, it is still not strong enough.
10. Probably as important as the major accomplishments and shortcomings of 1968 are the chief political trends of that eventful year. While all of those trends may not continue into 1969, I believe it is reasonable to expect that most will. I think we can identify at least four:
(a) Increasing Vietnamese recognition that the American commitment is not open ended. This in turn has led to a growing Vietnamese willingness to accept a political settlement, and also a realization that it will be necessary to deal with the NLF in some way. At the beginning of the year, most nationalist leaders still felt it was impossible even to talk about negotiations in public. Now they are not only openly willing to negotiate with Hanoi, but they are thinking--often out loud--about how to talk with the NLF. I think Thieu must be given much credit for bringing people gradually to the awareness that the contest will change some day from a predominantly military one to a predominantly political one.
(b) Decline in confidence in the strength of the U.S. commitment. While most responsible leaders do not believe the U.S. will deliberately turn its back on Viet-Nam, many have grown doubtful of our determination to stay the course long enough to achieve an honorable peace. This, of course, is a critical factor which could affect everything else.
(c) Increasing Vietnamese willingness to make sacrifices and carry a heavier war burden. The Tet attacks, general mobilization, the threat of American withdrawal, and growing confidence in their own capabilities led to a significant increase of involvement of the entire population, urban and rural, in the war effort.
(d) Increased SVN military and political strength. With the development of democratic institutions and the consolidation of Thieu's power, the political stability of South Viet-Nam has increased markedly. The growing strength and improved performance of RVNAF complemented and increased SVN political strength. Improved political stability was also coupled with a marked decline in the influence of the military in the making of policy and the administration of the government.
11. Adding up the plusses and minuses, I think we can say objectively that 1968 has been a year of very substantial progress. We have seen the development of a government that is more stable and effective than any since the early days of the Diem regime. The military situation has greatly improved, the RVNAF has made significant progress in leadership, morale, and performance. At the same time, there are growing evidences of the decline in enemy morale and leadership. Security has improved and pacification accelerated; so has the Chieu Hoi program and the attack on the VC infrastructure. In almost all areas, the government is moving with determination and vigor. In the last half of the year, progress has accelerated in almost all areas. It is my view that if, as a result of the present negotiations, a true, verifiable, and properly supervised mutual withdrawal of North Vietnamese and allied forces can be worked out, the Vietnamese Government and people will be capable of handling their internal domestic problems with the Viet Cong on their own. A true withdrawal obviously will be a difficult undertaking involving as it will not only verification and supervision, but among other things identification of North Vietnamese in Viet Cong units, and prohibition against the use of the Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries. It is nevertheless a hopeful situation.
[Omitted here is Bunker's report on political issues, areas of shortcomings, the Paris negotiations, possible Communist strategy, pacification, and military and economic issues.]
I. Conclusion
35. I believe it can fairly be said that substantial progress toward the objectives I mentioned at the beginning of this message has been made during the past year. An encouraging element is the fact that this progress has accelerated, especially in the last half and even more particularly during the last quarter of the year.
Determination on the part of the Vietnamese Government to maintain the momentum is evident. Plans to sustain the tempo of the pacification program and for a dramatic land reform program in 1969 have already been announced. The Vietnamese Government has made clear its intention to assume an increasingly large share of the war effort. With a modicum of patience, I believe that the goals and objectives we have set for ourselves will be reached. Whatever success we in the American Mission here, civilian and military, may have had has been due to your steadfast and unswerving support and your determination to stay the course. For this all of us are deeply grateful.
Bunker
286. Editorial Note
By the end of the Johnson administration, substantive peace talks had finally been arranged. After successful conclusion of an agreement on procedural matters on January 16, 1969 (see Documents 282-284), President Johnson issued the following statement on the Paris talks:
"We are all pleased that certain basic procedural problems in Paris have been solved and new talks on the substance of peace in Southeast Asia can open. There are three lessons of our experience since March 31st. First, we must be clear and firm in pursuing with our allies the limited but vital objectives we seek in Southeast Asia. Second, we must be patient and face the hard fact that fighting is likely to continue as the negotiations are carried forward. Third, we should be confident that an honorable peace is possible if we here at home remain steady. We have had three crises in these negotiations since they opened 9 months ago: on the place for the talks, on the terms for a bombing cessation, and on the procedures for the new talks. In each case, patience, firmness, and fair-mindedness achieved a satisfactory result. We must pursue peace as diligently as we have fought aggression. And this year we have made steady progress toward the peace we all devoutly pray for. I deeply believe that if we only remain united and stay together on this path we will achieve honorable peace in Southeast Asia. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, page 1308)
In his last press conference on January 17, the President commented:
"We think that we have had a move forward. We have got a breakthrough now with what kind of a table we will have and perhaps we can get on with the substantive talks that we envisioned back in March when we took what we thought were rather far-reaching and dramatic steps in that direction, and certainly what we anticipated in October when we made those decisions. If I could have one thing presented to me today that I would rather have than anything else in the world, it would be that I could bring back from Vietnam all the men I sent out there and that we could have peace in the world so that those men could come and enjoy being with their families again and enjoy the benefits of our affluence in this great society that we have." (Ibid., pages 1360-1361)
At 10:30 a.m. on January 18, 1969, the first procedural meeting of the Paris peace talks was held at the Majestic Hotel. In accordance with the procedural arrangements, the delegates of the United States, Republic of Vietnam, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front sat around a circular table with two rectangular tables for secretarial purposes on opposite sides of the circular table 45 centimeters from the mid-point of the circular table. Also as agreed, the Delegate of the Republic of Vietnam, Phong, spoke first, followed by U.S. representative Vance. Madame Binh, representing the National Liberation Front, spoke next; she was followed by delegate Lau of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The U.S. delegation transmitted its detailed report of the meeting in telegram 788/Delto 1186 from Paris, January 18. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Peace Talk Material for Ginsburgh--Hold for Ginsburgh) A full transcript of the first procedural meeting was transmitted in telegram 852/Delto 1200 from Paris, January 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, I/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969, Delto Chrons, January 1969)
287. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 19, 1969.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips and Missions, Paris Peace Talks, 1968-1969, Memoranda of Conversation. No classification marking. Drafted by Harriman. At 3:30 p.m. on January 19, Rusk met the returning Harriman at Andrews Air Force Base outside of Washington. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-69) From 5:55 to 6:04 p.m. that evening, President Johnson met with both Harriman and Rusk at the White House, primarily as a photographing opportunity for the press. The next day the President awarded Medals of Freedom to Harriman, Rusk, Rostow, Clifford, and journalist William S. White. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT
The President asked me to come to the White House Sunday evening. Dean Rusk showed up as well. I heard afterwards that he was told he could come if he wished.
I told the President that Cy and I were gratified that we could get the new talks on the track before the end of his Administration, not only because of our deep sense of appreciation for him, but we thought it was useful for the new Administration since there were certain forces, particularly from the Saigon Government, that wanted to break up the talks./2/ Therefore, it might have been more difficult for the new Administration to get things started.
/2/During separate meetings with Herz on January 15, Thanh expressed several concerns regarding the course of the peace talks. (Telegrams 814 and 845 from Saigon, both January 15; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Peace Talk Material for Ginsburgh--Hold for Ginsburgh) In a personal message to Bunker transmitted in telegram 759 from Paris, January 17, Harriman urged that "it be pointed out to Foreign Minister Thanh in a diplomatic manner that he should stop seeing ghosts and to realize that we are embarking on serious and sober discussions here. Difficulties are created by fertile, devious and terrified imaginations. It is important that the GVN act with the dignity and confidence of a sovereign government. If they don't, how can they expect others to treat them as such?" (Ibid.)
I said Cy had done a yeoman's job in settling the other administrative matters at one meeting, on Saturday January 18th. The President said he was pleased. He said a polite word or two about Cy and myself.
Rusk mentioned a few matters that were on his mind. Then photographers were called in, and I repeated part of what I said to the President in the hearing of the reporters that came along; namely, that we were gratified that, carrying out President Johnson's initiative, we had been able to settle all matters which would permit the new talks to begin on substantive questions by the new Administration./3/
/3/In a meeting with incoming delegation head Henry Cabot Lodge at his home in Georgetown on November 19, Harriman encouraged Lodge to treat his deputy Lawrence Walsh as a co-equal head of the delegation as Harriman had treated Vance (since it would make an impact on the North Vietnamese). He also urged Lodge to have his negotiating team develop close contacts with their Soviet counterparts in Paris. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips and Missions, Paris Peace Talks, 1968-1969, Memoranda of Conversation) Previously, on January 14, Harriman, Vance, Habib, and Negroponte met with Thuy, Tho, and Lau at the U.S. safe house in Sceaux and discussed the likely policies that the incoming administration would follow, personalities in the new delegation, and specifics on various procedural and substantive issues in the expanded talks. (Telegram 734/Delto 1173 from Paris, January 17; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Paris-Delto-Todel, Codeword, TDCS and Memos and Misc., etc-BAMBOO)
WAH