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TO: Team 2 Files
 CC: Kevin Scheid and Bruce Berkowitz
 FROM: Gordon Lederman
 DATE: June 2, 2003
 RE: Interview with [redacted]

This memorandum summarizes Bruce's and my discussion with [redacted] on May 30, 2003 in his home. The interview was not recorded. Our objective was to have [redacted] describe his efforts to modernize how CIA performs analysis – particularly [redacted] proposal for the use of virtual teams and information technology.

I. Proposals to Reform the IC's Analytical Process.

[redacted] worked for the CIA from 1977 to 1998. In 1994, he was among a number of individuals who saw that the IC had not changed to compensate for the end of the Cold War. He said that the IC's budget in 1994 [redacted]

In 1986, he wrote a paper or monograph about the use of multiple scenario analysis, but the CIA did not adopt his methodology. After the end of the Cold War, he and others formed an informal group called the Global Visions Group (funded by CIA) to study the forces shaping global society and potential resulting threats to the U.S. In 1996, the group identified seven potential threats – including terrorism – to the U.S. even though the U.S. would be the hegemonic power.

[redacted] noted that, in order to figure out what intelligence we need, we must understand how the world has changed, what new threats result, and thus what the IC must be able to do.

He said that, in general, analysts should engage policymakers in thoughtful discussions and highlight uncertainty. In 1995, he proposed that the DI use information technology to develop ad hoc working groups (including policymakers, who he said may have information that analysts lack) using an online SECRET system. (This was a lower-classification network, for information sharing and teaming, separate from the CIA's TS/SCI system.) The initial proposal called for developing a virtual structure to link intelligence officers and policymakers [redacted] his proposal was thus sometimes called [redacted]. The advantages of his proposal were; (1) it provided an interactive format so that analysts could help policymakers figure out what they really wanted to know and what questions they should ask, and (2) it allowed for consideration of uncertainty and multiple outcomes. After three years (1996-1998), he abandoned the effort and subsequently retired from CIA. He attributed his project's failure to the DO security office's resistance, as the DO security office was reluctant to permit non-DO individuals to have access to DO reports. [redacted] also may have said that DO security was reluctant to have its people on the network for security reasons. In his words, "The DO never said 'no' but never said 'yes.'" Certain elements of the State Dept. also resisted. [redacted] supported his proposal. [redacted] does not

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seem to have appealed to higher-level CIA authorities regarding the DO security office's stance.

II. IC Management.

He criticized the NIE process as too adversarial. He also criticized PDD-35 and said it should never have been issued. He said that everyone in the IC wanted to work on the top issues listed in PDD-35 (which included terrorism along with over ten other issues) but that the nature of the world is such that a tier 4 issue could quickly rocket to tier 1; presumably, he meant that that IC must maintain an analytical capability in a host of areas that are not currently tier 1 but that one day might become tier 1, yet analysts are naturally adverse to working on non-tier 1 issues. He criticized PDD-35 as keeping people and resources focused on old issues rather than new issues.

He criticized the IC as "not being able to say no to any policymaker." He said that he assumed that the IC's budget had been cut – and he said that a lot of support personnel disappeared. More generally, he criticized analysis as being too focused on short-term production.

Bruce asked whether a senior analyst could go directly to a policymaker and offer assistance and suggested that perhaps analysts needed to show initiative. [] agreed that that is one reason.

[] said that he thought that the DCI was very weak, even regarding the CIA and particularly the DO. He said that the DO is very good at convincing the DCI what to do, and that in any event the rapid turnover of DCIs means that DCIs have shorter time to affect the IC.

[] cited two primary missions of the IC: (1) to support policymakers in making the best decisions possible to protect the national interest, and (2) warning of threats. [] commented that he thought of intelligence differently than others (presumably, other analysts) in that he thought that intelligence should be policy-relevant. He noted that CIA's location in Langley gives it some distance from policymakers.

He said that, after the Indian nuclear test, the CIA (possibly the IG; perhaps the Jeremiah report?) said that the CIA needed to alternative analytical methodologies. However, he noted that the IC has a lot of cultural inertia and that the status quo has a lot of support.

In general, he offered the following metrics for judging the efficacy of analysis:

- (1) Is analysis helping policymakers ask the right questions?
- (2) Is analysis predicting trends or issues in the future?
- (3) Is analysis providing information that is useful to policymakers?

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III. Counterterrorism.

With respect to the USG's failure on counterterrorism, he blamed interagency rivalry. He said that agencies declined to share information with each other because each agency wants to maintain a monopoly over information and to avoid another agency getting credit (he cited FBI unwillingness to have the CIA get credit for information acquired by the FBI). [] recommended that analysts on terrorism meet every three months to share ideas.

He also noted that, while terrorism received a high level of attention, factors driving terrorism did not. He also noted that Afghanistan had not received much focus prior to September 11th.

IV. Documents to Obtain, and Individuals to Interview.

[] recommended that we talk to the following individuals:

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V. Comments.

He mentioned the journal Competitive Intelligence Journal, which we should try to obtain. He also gave us a number of articles and documents.

Query whether, if CIA had adopted his proposal for a virtual team, the IC would have been able to detect the September 11th attacks. How can information technology be used to improve analysis related to counterterrorism?

[] SECRET-level network would have been similar to SIPRNET in the number of people who could have used it; CIA is just beginning to get SIPRNET.