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Event: Frank Anderson

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Prepared by: Gordon Lederman

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
Location: Commission's K Street Office

Participants -- non-Commission: Frank Anderson

Participants -- Commission: Lloyd Salvetti, Gordon Lederman


(U) BACKGROUND.

(S) He retired from the CIA in January 1995 as Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division (NE) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Operations (DO).



(U) COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY.

(S) When he was Chief of NE, the counterterrorism strategy was both to prosecute and to destroy. Law enforcement activity was oriented toward Europe. With respect to the Middle East, the U.S. was most successful when it dealt with countries' domestic intelligence services, and most Middle Eastern countries do not distinguish between law enforcement and paramilitary operations. The U.S. response to the Pan Am 103 bombing was clearly law-enforcement-oriented, while the U.S. responded to the La Belle disco bombing with a military raid on Libya.



But he never paid much attention to the bottom-line strategy.

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(S) Iraq, the Arab/Israeli conflict, Iran, weapons of mass destruction, and counterterrorism all overlapped as priorities. The recent Defense Science Board report on counterterrorism stated that the U.S. needs to terrorists' *intentions, motives, means,* and *opportunity*. Working on these other topics affects terrorists' means, motives, etc.

(S) The 9/11 attack was perpetrated by Zawahiri and the Blind Sheikh's people, not by Usama bin Ladin (UBL). UBL came on the scene during the Afghan War, but in general Arabs were under-the-radar in that conflict. There were reports of brutality by Arab volunteers called "Wahabis" during the 1989 battle for Jalalabad. He heard of UBL only after he retired. CTC may have had a line on UBL being involved in the 1992 Yemeni bombings.

(S) When he was in NE, terrorism was directly or indirectly related to the Cold War. By 1975, the only Palestinian groups trying to commit international terrorism were directly tied to the Soviets and their patrons (e.g., the PFLP and the PDFLP). Their ability to operate outside of the Arab/Israeli conflict area depended on direct support for Soviet bloc countries or European socialist groups. The good news is that the end of the Cold War means that the Soviet bloc no longer provides succor to terrorists. State-sponsored terrorism is on the decline. Terrorism is now committed by organizations that are not aligned with a state or are separate from them. Hizballah is supported by Iran and Syria but is separate from them. Afghanistan was a terrorist-supported state, not a state supporting terrorism. Terrorists need to find an area with no state. The lack of state sponsorship of terrorism is a much better situation than the state-sponsorship of terrorism during the Cold War – terrorists' *means* have thus declined.

(S) It was rare that a terrorist threatened the U.S. Mr. Lederman asked whether Usama bin Ladin's fatwa proclaiming the religious duty of killing Americans should have been viewed with more alarm by the CIA.

(S) THE COUNTERTERRORIST CENTER AND THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS.

(S) When he was Chief of NE, there was a division of labor between geographic divisions and CTC on counterterrorism. Virtually every station in NE had capabilities to contribute to counterterrorism. Desk-officer support for an operation was just as often in CTC as it was in a geographic division.

(S/HCS) Regarding decisions on allocation of case officers

[REDACTED]

there is only a finite set of officers

[REDACTED]

there is no systematic process for allocating case officers.

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Personnel decisions were made on an intuitive basis. The Chief of CTC played no role in assignments. There were a few instances in which he talked to the Chief of CTC about deployments – but there was no institutional process for such consultations.

(S) As Chief of NE, the first chunk of his time was spent on administrative matters (leading the Division, managing personnel, and allocating resources). Then he spent time on

[redacted] everything else. [redacted]

(U) HOW TO ATTACK THE TERRORISM TARGET.

[redacted]

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[redacted] Case officers are less willing to do what they do not want to do. The DO should not have to negotiate with case officers to get them to accept to certain assignments.

(U) DEFINING "INTELLIGENCE FAILURE."

(S) Senator Shelby defines an intelligence failure as whatever happens. A more useful definition is that intelligence is an important part of security, and there is an intelligence when there is a dramatic breach of security. Intelligence failed in 9/11. The failure may have had justifications, but it is indefensible. The fact that 9/11 occurs means that it was a failure. The Intelligence Community (IC) lacks structures and processes for counterterrorism.

(S) With respect to accountability, former DCI Judge Webster used to say that there is an inverse relationship between how much authority/responsibility you have and how much you want to punish someone.

(U) MANAGEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(S) The military has learned the lessons of jointness. However, there are too many barriers between the Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department, and the IC – the national security establishment is insufficiently joint. There needs to be joint training. The IC and the State Department are operationally engaged constantly, while DoD spends most of its time training. If DoD interacts with State and the IC for training purposes, it may drain the IC's ability to act.

(S) The CIA can act quickly – for example, it takes 40 days for the CIA to make a procurement, while it takes the Agency for International Development 444 days to make the same procurement.

(S) The Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) cannot be effective due to operational rules – the Secretary of Defense must make decisions on DHS operations, which stymies DHS's ability to act quickly. CIA is 40 percent responsible for DHS's ineffectiveness; [redacted]

(S) Finally, the DCI needs more authority, and there is a need for greater consolidation of the IC.

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