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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: (FBI Miami Field Office JTTF) Interview Type of Event: Interview Date: October 3, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Lance Cole Team number: 6 Location: FBI, Miami Field Office Participants Non-Commission: FBI Assistant General Counsel Robert S. Sinton Participants - Commission: Lance Cole and Christine Healy Background. is a Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA") "INSCOM" representative on the FBI Miami Field Office Joint Terrorism Task Force is from New York City and attended college at the University of ("JTTF"). Maryland. He graduated from the University of Maryland 9/11 Closed by Statute and then was assigned to Panama and "reclassified" as an Army counterintelligence officer. initially worked a "passive source operation" focusing on In Panama. potential threats to U.S. forces, He also helped establish a Latin American "control office" for Army military intelligence. In 1986 attended advanced foreign counterintelligence training school at the Army's Fort Meade facility In February 1988 joined the Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program ("MICECP"), which is a program that is open to both ex-military personnel and non-military applicants. Later in 1988 became a supervisor in the Army's foreign counterintelligence program. After about a year in that became an offensive counterintelligence operations officer, "running program

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double agents" in the U.S. said that all of the military's counterintelligence operations in the U.S. are run jointly with the FBI and that prior to the 9/11 attacks those operations were focused on identifying foreign espionage agents in the U.S.

Counterintelligence Experience. described two types of double agent counterintelligence operations. The first type is "reactive ops" in which foreign agents approach U.S. government personnel and those personnel then report the contacts to U.S. authorities. U.S. intelligence agents then control the relationship and the flow of information in order to achieve their own objectives, which may include providing false information or determining the amount of information the foreign intelligence agency already has. The second type of operations are "proactive ops" or "dangles" in which U.S. personnel are intentionally put in contact with known foreign agents to try to "entice" those agents to recruit the U.S. personnel as agents. A great deal of effort is required to identify and prepare the U.S. personnel who will participate in "dangle" operations. did this kind of operational work until 1991, when he went to Europe to work on military counterintelligence operations in Germany.

DIA Authority and Activities. said that DIA did not come into the intelligence "operational picture" – as opposed to intelligence analysis – until 1995, when Congress combined Department of Defense ("DOD") intelligence activities under DIA. Defense Human Services, which had always done analysis, then began to do intelligence collection.

[Chris – I'm not sure I got into my notes everything he said on these points, and I recall that you questioned him about some of his assertions – would you please check this section against your notes and add/correct as necessary? – Thanks!]

Central America Military Intelligence Activities. took an early retirement buy-out when the U.S. reduced its counterintelligence activities in Europe, going from 365 offices to 22 offices according to He stayed in Europe in the private sector and started doing firearms training for police agencies in Florida. He was also doing private security consulting, but he "got bored" and in 1998 arranged to be called back from the reserves by the Southern Command to serve as an operations officer for After working as an operations officer for became a contractor [to the Southern Command] and worked in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. He also served a one-year stint on active duty in Guatemala working with their military to improve their criminal justice system.

Pre-JTTF Work with the FBI. In May 2000 returned to Miami on reserve status and worked for the Southern Command. In 2001 he set up the Miami INSCOM office, which initially was a "one-man office" working force protection and counterintelligence [counterterrorism?] operations. In that capacity he worked with the FBI on joint counterintelligence [counterterrorism?] operations. When the 9/11 attacks occurred, went to the FBI field office to help the FBI with investigative leads. Two other INSCOM agents drove down from Alabama to assist the FBI, and they and

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"worked sixteen hour days for a couple of months" helping the FBI with the 9/11 attacks investigation. commander then assigned him to work full-time with the FBI.

INSCOM Participation in Miami JTTF. In November 2001 prepared a draft memorandum of understanding ("MOU") for participation in the Miami JTTF. That MOU is "still being redrafted" and has not yet been executed. said that at present he is operating under DOD regulations promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 12.333. He is now doing "100% counterterrorism" with the exception of some work in which is terrorismrelated because of the involvement of elements in that country with international terrorism. said that under Executive Order 12,333 INSCOM [DIA?] is allowed to collect, maintain, and disseminate information on "U.S. persons" if it fits into one of thirteen categories [specified in DOD regulations]. work product is "reviewed up the chain" in DIA and DOD, and copies go to the FBI. said that the current operating arrangement for participation on the JTTF does not restrict his ability to conduct counterterrorism activities,

Views on FBI Counterterrorism Activities. With regard to counterterrorism intelligence analysis ________ thinks the FBI "doesn't currently do analysis." FBI analysts are frequently reassigned from one position to another and therefore lose continuity. Analysts in one FBI office don't talk to analysts in other offices, so there is insufficient information sharing. Moreover, FBI analysts don't communicate with analysts at other intelligence agencies. __________believes that the FBI's intelligence analysis capability also is hampered by a lack of concern with matters outside the geographical jurisdiction of a particular field office. He believes it "will take years" for the FBI to develop satisfactory analytical and reporting capability. He emphasized that the FBI "must stop moving them [analysts] around all the time." This point is critical because in intelligence work it takes time to develop the necessary expertise in a particular area.

With regard to investigative [collection] activities, believes FBI agents are developing the expertise they need to be effective. Agents are not moved around as much as analysts, so they are better able to stay in place long enough to develop expertise. thinks that the FBI's law enforcement responsibilities are complementary to its domestic intelligence collection responsibilities. would not be in favor of creating a new, separate "MI-5 type" domestic intelligence agency because doing so would "unnecessarily create more bureaucracy." Based upon his experience in Germany, thinks that a domestic intelligence collection agency would not communicate well with law enforcement agencies. did note, however, that the Army splits its intelligence and law enforcement functions; the arrangement works well and the Army does not want to combine the two functions.

on FBI [counterterrorism] cases:

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