Event: Major General Shaffer, USAF (ret.)

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Participants – non-Commission: Major General Shaffer, USAF (ret.)

Participants – Commission: Kevin Scheid, Bonnie Jenkins, Gordon Lederman

(U) BACKGROUND

(U) Gen. Shaffer served as Joint Staff J2 from July 2002 until June 2003. He was Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance on the Air Staff from Spring 1999 to June 2002. He was J2 of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) from mid-1997 until Spring 1999. From 1996-7, he was Assistant Deputy Director of Operations (ADDO) of the National Security Agency (NSA) and supported Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) Barbara McNamara. Prior to that, he served in various intelligence-related positions in the USAF.

(U) RELATIONS BETWEEN THE JOINT STAFF J2 AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (IC)

(U) He could call the operations chiefs at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), etc. at will and also could call Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet at any time. His general point of contact for the CIA was Assistant DCI for Military Support Soup Campbell, whom Gen. Shaffer described as his equal in rank although there really were not comparable ranks in the IC. Relations with CIA were good but needed constant attention. He talked to the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI) more than the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO).

(U) Gen. Shaffer described relations between himself and other senior officials in the IC as good, and that their objective was to make sure that the CIA’s and the Department of Defense’s activities were deconflicted. Gen. Shaffer wanted to make sure that DIA’s Joint Intelligence Task Force – Countering Terrorism (JITF-CT) was made aware of what the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) was doing. Gen. Shaffer himself was made aware of what CTC was doing, but he wanted to make sure that DIA and JITF-CT were made aware.
(U) The biggest issue between J2 and CIA was getting DIA analysts access to the operationally-relevant intelligence - contained in HUMINT operational cables - for DIA's analysts to be able to analyze al Qaeda. DIA was only receiving finished intelligence (FINTEL), but there was a large gap between what the FINTEL reporting said and what information was contained in the operational cables. But CIA and the Defense HUMINT Service would not circulate operational cables.

9/11 Classified Information

(U) Mr. Lederman noted that some observers have argued that the intelligence that analysts want from operational cables can be separated cleanly from sources-and-methods information. Gen. Shaffer disagreed and said that it is precisely the sources-and-methods information that the analysts seek. The sources-and-methods information allows analysts to gauge the veracity and reliability of the source. The short time that Gen. Shaffer had access to operational traffic, which concerned Iraq, was like "night and day" - the operational traffic is more timely and complete, with less of a need to "read into" the information, than the FINTEL. More analysts today are gaining an appreciation for the information contained in operational cables, and he predicted that more J2s and 3s will insist on seeing operational cables.

(U) Mr. Scheid asked Gen. Shaffer whether he was briefed by CTC before becoming EUCOM J2, and he replied that he went to CIA for briefings before becoming EUCOM J2 but did not receive a briefing from CTC.

(U) Also, there was an "awkward" division of labor between CTC and DIA regarding counterterrorism (CT). CTC's mission was clear: leading the CT effort. Yet within the Department of Defense (DoD), JTF-CT's mission is similar; indeed, force protection bleeds into going on the offensive against terrorism. JTF-CT was started after the attack on the USS Cole, when it was determined that DIA's CT arm needed to be improved. He
concurred with Mr. Lederman's statement that JITF-CT was created to provide a global CT capability, which pre-Cole had been done on a Combatant-Commander, regional basis.

(U) He is pretty sure that he knew about the DCI's December 1998 "declaration of war" memorandum, but he probably did not see it. He was aware of stepped-up activities against al Qaeda around that time, but those activities were all intertwined with other activities such as force protection in the Balkans (which was against both al Qaeda and the Serbs). He saw the most activity when, after the East African embassy bombings and the EIJ arrests in Albania.

(U) WARNING

(U) He has always been "cranky" since being at NSA that the IC does not understand the nature of warning. The IC is well-prepared to warn people when the IC has specific information. However, the IC does not factor in "unknowns," but it is from the "unknowns" that attacks come. As EUCOM J2, he was mostly worried when he did not know very much about the danger. He would keep his warning-levels very high when he sensed that he analysts did not know very much about the threat. The IC only knows how to do warning based on what it knows, not based on what it does not know. The IC does not factor-in voids in intelligence and the implications of those voids.

(U) The IC did not know very much about al Qaeda. There were large void in the intelligence, so he kept the warning level high. There was more reporting and more sit-reps, but the IC did not put the information in context.
(U) He had a gut feeling in the summer of 2001 that al Qa'ida would attack the U.S. domestically and that al Qa'ida would try a suicide assault, which we knew al Qa'ida had been training for.
(U) Mr. Scheid asked why the DCI is on the same level as the Directors of NSA and NIMA. Gen. Shaffer responded that in the war on terrorism it is hard to differentiate operations from intelligence. Also, the "DCI is synonymous with CIA" Director. He is not surprised that the DCI did not call the meetings.
(U) MANAGEMENT OF THE IC

(U) The jargon is to refer to George Tenet as the “DCI.” The distinction between “DCI” and “CIA Director” is “blurry.” As J2, he never worried about that distinction. When he thought of the “DCI,” he thought of the person who built the budget and did “policy” (it was unclear what Gen. Shaffer meant by “policy”). He also thought of the DCI as “CIA Director,” and it was hard to separate the two roles.

(U) We are at the same stage now as at the end of World War II. At that time, we sort of understood the importance of joint warfare, but we were not sure what it was, and it took an act of Congress – the Goldwater-Nichols Act – to dictate it. Normandy was merely a “kluged” operation. The issue at the end of World War II was, how do the military Services work together. Today, the issue is how to ensure that various agencies work together. Today, interagency cooperation is largely “kluged.” But for the global war on terrorism, we need the same approach on an interagency basis as we needed for joint warfare.

(U) His vision is that joint task forces be established that would include elements of various government agencies. For example, elements would be taken out of the DoD, DCI, and FBI chain of commands and placed into the joint task force. CTC is a small example of this model. We need to take the CTC model and apply it to more cases. For example, he liked the idea of creating a national counterterrorism center. Mr. Scheid noted that CTC is part of the DO, and Gen. Shaffer responded that CTC needs to be broken out of the DO. Counterterrorism is bigger than the DO or CIA. We will be at this fight for decades, and we need to step up to the new threshold. We need to learn the lessons of joint warfare, which the Services are now able to do. We need regional joint task forces to execute part of the counterterrorism strategy. We also need a national-level planning function. The departments will be the biggest opponents of this approach – just as the Services were opponents of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

(U) The role of the USD/I is still developing. Creation of the position was long-overdue because DoD has so much intelligence. The USD/I covers the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) as well as DoD’s intelligence-relate TIARA and GDIP programs. The USD/I’s position could be interpreted as having broader authority than the DCI, but no one would interpret it that way. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is more interested in and understanding of intelligence than most prior Secretaries of Defense, and if a USD/I in a Rumsfeld-Pentagon is not going to push the boundaries of the position, then we do not have to worry about subsequent USD/Is doing so.

(U) In general, DoD and the IC work well together with respect to NIMA and NSA. Mr. Scheid commented that some observers have argued that NIMA and NSA take advantage of the dual chain of command and basically work for no one. Gen. Shaffer responded that that is a cynical view but that he has stated it himself on occasion.
(U) Mr. Scheid noted that some observers have said that there is a trend in DoD that intelligence is key to defense transformation and that intelligence assets are being pulled more and more into DoD. Gen. Shaffer responded that we should not be worried about NSA and NIMA being pulled into DoD and rather he was concerned about how the USD/I would relate to the Services. If the USD/I does what he is supposed to do, then he will become more involved in the Services' intelligence programs.

(U) NSA could not be easily pulled into the IC completely because of its connections to the Service Cryptological Elements (SCEs). Also, the Deputy DCI for Community Management is the counterweight to the USD/I. The intelligence oversight committees in Congress also need to keep an eye on the USD/I. Mr. Scheid noted that some observers have said that the basis for the DCI's consent to DoD establishing the USD/I was that the USD/I would focus on TIARA and JMIP, but that it may turn out that the USD/I finds it easier to fight the DCI for control over the NFIP than to fight the Services for control over TIARA and JMIP.

(U) There is no one accountable for the performance of the U.S. intelligence capability before 911 and no one today. To the extent there is someone, it is the DCI because he has control over NSA and NIMA with respect to counterterrorism.