WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFTED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6 050-ex. 91:2108 MR08-05 #3: Otabe Yee Gay108

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

BY dal NARA DATE 3/17/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs General John Wickham, Military Assistant to

Secretary Schlesinger

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, August 2, 1973 8:00 a.m. (Breakfast)

<u>Schlesinger:</u> These, I see it, are the key aspects. One, what are the prospects for control of escalation? What are the constraints? In Europe, for example, we could warn them we will hit within 10 miles of the FEBA.

Wickham: The planners have not had any national-level objectives against which to plan.

Schlesinger: Second, what is the effect of changes in employment policy on deterrence? -- We decided that flexibility strengthened deterrence. -- We tried to codify the target system -- to hit things which destroyed the regime; to get military forces, including conventional forces which could attack after a nuclear exchange.

We do not target the industry of friends.

We want to look at the political details. For example, Russians are less than 50% of the population of the USSR. Should we say we will hit Russians and let the "Golden Horde" take over? Targeting is ag nst the Party, economics, the Army.

Third, what is the anticipated Soviet/Chinese reaction?

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

Damage limitation by force of arms is not likely, given the possibility of secure second strikes. Therefore there is an inducement toward this method of limiting damage.

Soviet declaratory policy would probably oppose on this.

We have broken the targets into packages to play with. There is no practical way to get complete flexibility.

If the policy is approved, it will take two years to complete the change in plans.

Fourth, allied reaction. They will be concerned about any possible decoupling.

The Europeans think an attack on Soviet cities is not a very credible option for an attack on Europe. Therefore they would support broadened options which are credible.

<u>Kissinger:</u> What we need are options which the President has beforehand. When a crisis comes, there is not time to figure these things out. We can't wait two years either.

<u>Schlesing er:</u> There is the big problem with the troops that executing the options will degrade the SIOP.

Kissinger: I am impressed with your work. What we need is the details.

Our declaratory policy is now ahead of our ability to execute.

I am comfortable for the moment with what the Secretary has said as declaratory policy.

Schlesinger: We myst leave uncertainty in the Soviets' mind that we might be willing to use nuclear weapons for something less than direct defense of the United States.

Kissinger: We need a meeting next week on current plans.

Schlesinger: We need a couple of European packages -- an interdiction strike in East Poland, a strike within 10 miles of FEBA.



THE WHITE HOUSE 2 Gray postoper

WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE

800 AM 2 and 3

PLE PROPERTS for Executably of Exculation

Our French for execute of Exculation

Our will birt w/m 10 might bear.

Our Floring have not had any watt lind

Objective against which to plan,

The first of changes in Employment

Policy on Detwence

We devided flywhilly strugthoused

dutinence

We devided flywhilly strugthoused

to get with clothing at a regime

To get with forces, inc. conventing

force which could attack offer a me

up him would attack offer a me

up him would attack of friends.

S- We want to look at political details

DECLASSIFIED

BY MARA, DATE 8/14/09



For example, Russians are borthon
50 To gO'S Repoportation. Say we will
bit a Russians & let a "Griden Good"
Take own.

Tangeting as against party, economis, any
(3) Anthoughth USSR/PRC reaction.

D. L. by force of arms is not likely,
quin severe 2 of Stubes. I than
is inhument toward this method of
Imiting durnage.

USSR declarating poling would pertak
of port.

[We have broken targets into packages
to play w. There is no procticil way
to get complete flipitation.]

I poling is approved, will take I good
complete a change in plans.

4 Allied reaction
They will we emerced allower
possible already in plans.

S- Europeans think an attack an Sweether is write any credith of the prime for an attack on Europe. If they would suggest broadened options which are creditle.

K-What we mud an options which chus has refere hand, when a crisis comes, other is no trine to figure these thing out was carried to you, either.

S- There is a brig problem up a troops that executing options will depend a STOP.

K- Larm impressed up your work.

Whatever wend is a abturb.

Declarating Poling - It is now opend of and of arm about to execute.

K- 'fam comportable for a woment or)
what when has said as declarating
policy
so we must leave uncertainty in
your that are might en withing

to use une organs on for tourthing less than chief dyears of c US.

H- Welce outy myt with an connect plans.

S- We need a coupled E corpus particle time state of interesting states in East Polane - State wijing 10 mi, of FEBA.

