The Intelligence Community
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121. Memorandum From the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (Canine) to Secretary of Defense Lovett

Washington, July 8, 1952.

SUBJECT
Brownell Committee Report

REFERENCE
Your Memorandum of 23 June 1952

1. After a careful study of the report of the Brownell Committee, I have concluded that it presents a fair and essentially accurate picture of the history and development of COMINT and of its present functioning. I have followed closely the work of the Committee throughout their investigation and have been greatly impressed with their objective approach to and deep penetration of the extremely complicated problem which confronted them. It is my opinion that they have reached eminently sound conclusions.

2. In those portions of the report containing historical and other background information, there are a few errors in fact, and also certain statements which may convey erroneous impressions. While these appear to have had no significant effect on the Committee’s obviously thorough understanding of the essentials involved, and their whole background, it is desirable that certain of these errors be set straight for the record; this is done in inclosure 1.

3. In my opinion the organization of COMINT activities proposed by the Brownell Committee is both workable and practical at all three levels, subject to the comment given below. It would constitute an extension on a joint basis of the vertical principle of organization which, as the Committee points out, now exists in each of the three Armed Services separately. I regard as particularly important the degree of authority which the Committee proposes to vest in the Director of AFSA, an authority which, for the first time since the creation of the Agency, will be commensurate with his responsibilities.

4. It is noted that the Committee apparently intends that the responsibilities of the Director of AFSA be extended in the Communication Security field to embrace the production and protection of the


2 See Document 99.

3 Not found.

4 Not printed.
codes and ciphers of the entire U.S. Government, rather than merely the Department of Defense as is now the case. I consider such an extension of jurisdiction in the Communication Security field to be desirable. However, the Committee has not seen fit to elaborate upon this proposal and, in fact, has included in its report very little comment on the problems involved. Moreover, the proposed directive contains no specific provisions as to organization above, within, or below AFSA for the purpose of conducting communication security activities on a national basis. In this connection it is desirable to invite to your attention two facts:

a. There is in existence an Executive Order dated 3 July 1945, which created a National Cryptographic Security Board charged with responsibility for the efficient coordination and supervision of all cryptographic systems and related procedures of the Federal departments and agencies. This Board was established as a body apart from the then existing Communication Intelligence Board for the reason that different interests were involved.

b. The United States Communication Intelligence Board (USCIB) has considered at some length the advisability of extending its responsibilities to include communication security matters but has thus far failed to reach agreement.

In view of the foregoing facts, I believe that further study is required to determine the best national structure for communication security activities. Accordingly, the comments and proposed changes set forth herein have to do with COMINT activities only. I will have a separate study made of the communication security problem with a view toward preparing a separate directive. It is believed advisable to treat the two categories separately, and this can be done without detriment to either. An attempt to combine the two in a single directive would probably introduce complications which could result in delaying implementation of the Committee’s clear-cut recommendations on COMINT.

5. With respect to the latter recommendations, the following comment is submitted in response to paragraphs 3 and 4 of your memorandum:

a. Recommendations as to Changes in Organization Above AFSA

(1) Retention in USCIB of the principle of decision and action on certain matters by unanimous agreement would serve to perpetuate one of the chief difficulties which according to the Committee now hamper USCIB, since the matters where this would apply are essentially those to which the Board has confined its attention in the past. This would particularly affect the protection of COMINT sources. The net result would be to preserve for each Department and Agency
virtual autonomy in the application of COMINT security measures, despite the fact that the maintenance of such security is vital to all. It is true that the right of appeal to higher authority is provided for in the proposed Board procedures. Nevertheless, this would place the burden of such appeal on the majority, where it would be reluctantly exercised, whereas in matters involving the common interest the burden of obtaining exception should rest on the minority. Extension of the majority-rule principle to all of the Board’s decisions and actions would not only accomplish the latter but would also simplify the Board’s procedures. Certainly it would appear desirable to extend this rule at least to security matters.

(2) Paragraph d. (5) of the proposed Presidential Memorandum provides for certain special consideration in matters of appeal which involve the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent. These responsibilities pertain to those matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Director of AFSA. The propriety of according this consideration to appeals made by the representative of the Secretary of Defense is appreciated; nevertheless, since the Director of AFSA is also directly under the Secretary and is the individual immediately responsible, it would appear a less complicated arrangement to have the Director rather than the representative of the Secretary of Defense, given this special consideration in appeals. Accordingly, it is suggested that consideration be given to the advisability of this change.

(3) Experience has demonstrated that the special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. If this is not done the protection of COMINT sources is seriously jeopardized. In recognition of this fact, the current charter of USCIB (see paragraphs 6 and 8 of National Security Council Intelligence Directive #9) contains certain provisions which I strongly urge be carried over into the new directive.

b. Recommendations as to Organization within AFSA

(1) The introductory statement to this section of the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations appears to imply that there are serious weaknesses in the present organizational structure of AFSA. I agree in general with what are apparently intended to be supporting comments of the Committee, but it strikes me that these comments are not, in fact, criticisms of structure but are remarks pertaining to personnel policies applicable to AFSA. They actually deal with incumbency of the Directorship and other key positions, the alleged high rate of turnover of personnel, and various other personnel problems. I assume therefore, that the Committee found no basic faults in the AFSA structure as such.

(2) With regard to the recommendation that the Director should have a civilian chief technical assistant who would have under him all research and development in the cryptanalytic field, it is to be noted that the Chief of the Office of Research and Development, one of the

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three principal subdivisions of AFSA, has been a civilian since January 1952. As a result of recommendations of the Special Cryptologic Advisory Group (SCAG) a plan for improving the organization of these activities is now in the process of development with the assistance of SCAG members.

(3) It is noted that paragraph 2. a. of the Committee’s proposed Presidential Memorandum excludes from the meaning of COMINT and the mission of AFSA the evaluation and dissemination of information obtained from intercepted communications, and its synthesis with information from other sources. It is noted further that paragraph 2. c. (2) of the same memorandum states that the responsibility assigned to the Director of AFSA does not contravene the responsibilities of the departments and agencies in respect to these same functions. Whereas the former statement is positively preclusive, the latter appears to afford the Director some freedom of action provided he does not interfere with the legitimate work of other agencies. Some latitude in this is essential for technical purposes, especially in the field of traffic analysis. It is, therefore, recommended that the former statement be omitted and the latter be retained, with a slight modification, as a separate and final provision of the proposed memorandum.

c. Recommendations as to Changes in Organization Below the AFSA Level (In the Service COMINT Organizations)

(1) While the meaning of “COMINT activities” as used in Public Law 513 is probably clear from the context of that Law it may be well to define more specifically the scope of the term for the purposes of the proposed directive. When read out of context, the definition of Communication Intelligence contained in the Law could be interpreted to include postal censorship and the monitoring and processing of foreign press and propaganda broadcasts. It is believed advisable to make it clear that such activities are not to be included under the provisions of the new directive.

6. Attached hereto as inclosure 27 is a suggested redraft of the proposed Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. In addition to certain substantive changes which are recommended on the basis of the foregoing comment, there is some rearrangement of the section which deals with the directive to USCIB. This rearrangement is considered advisable because of the recommended change in Board procedure. I consider that the proposed executive memorandum contains no information of classification higher than Secret, and have reclassified the proposed revision of Exhibit K accordingly.

Ralph J. Canine

Major General, US Army

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7 Not printed.
8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
2. Upon the completion of the foregoing studies there will be prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence in collaboration with the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to injure the Continental United States.

3. The summary evaluation referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be completed as soon as possible and shall be forwarded to the National Security Council. Access thereto will be restricted to as few individuals as possible and only on an absolute need-to-know basis.

132. Memorandum From President Truman to Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Lovett

Washington, October 24, 1952.

SUBJECT
Communications Intelligence Activities

The communications intelligence (COMINT) activities of the United States are a national responsibility. They must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources in all participating departments and agencies and to satisfy the legitimate intelligence requirements of all such departments and agencies.

I therefore designate the Secretaries of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT, which Committee shall, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, establish policies governing COMINT activities, and keep me advised of such policies through the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

I further designate the Department of Defense as executive agent of the Government, for the production of COMINT information.

I direct this Special Committee to prepare and issue directives which shall include the provisions set forth below and such other provisions as the Special Committee may determine to be necessary.

1. A directive to the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB). This directive will replace the National Security Council In-

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Intelligence Directive No. 9,\(^2\) and shall prescribe USCIB’s new composition, responsibilities and procedures in the COMINT fields. This directive shall include the following provisions:

a. USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and under the Special Committee, and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of the new directive. Only those departments or agencies represented in USCIB are authorized to engage in COMINT activities.

b. The Board shall be composed of the following members:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the Chairman of the Board.
2. A representative of the Secretary of State.
3. A representative of the Secretary of Defense.
5. The Director of the National Security Agency.
6. A representative of the Department of the Army.
7. A representative of the Department of the Navy.

c. The Board shall have a staff headed by an executive secretary who shall be appointed by the Chairman with the approval of the majority of the Board.

d. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the following procedure, with respect to any matter relating to communications intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of NSA.

1. The Board shall reach its decision by a majority vote. Each member of the Board shall have one vote except the representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall each have two votes. The Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, will have no vote. In the event that the Board votes and reaches a decision, any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from such decision within 7 days to the Special Committee. In the event that the Board votes but fails to reach a decision, any member of the Board may appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee. In either event the Special Committee shall review the matter, and its determination thereon shall be final. Appeals by the Director of NSA and/or the representatives of the Military Departments shall only be filed with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

2. If any matter is voted on by the Board but—

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\(^2\) Dated March 10, 1950; see *Foreign Relations*, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 435. NSCID No. 9 Revised is printed as Document 257.
(a) no decision is reached and any member files an appeal;
(b) a decision is reached in which the representative of the Secretary of Defense does not concur and files an appeal; no action shall be taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decided, provided that, if the Secretary of Defense determines, after consultation with the Secretary of State, that the subject matter presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action, his decision shall govern, pending the result of the appeal. In such an emergency situation the appeal may be taken directly to the President.

(3) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance with the foregoing procedures shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense. Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, the Director of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) The Director of NSA shall make such reports and furnish such information from time to time to the Board, either orally or in writing, as the Board may request, and shall bring to the attention of the Board either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him.

e. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters not falling within the jurisdiction of NSA;

(1) To coordinate the communications intelligence activities among all departments and agencies authorized by the President to participate therein;

(2) To initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and subject to the provisions of NSCID No. 5, to supervise all arrangements with foreign governments in the field of communications intelligence; and

(3) to consider and make recommendations concerning policies relating to communications intelligence of common interest to the departments and agencies, including security standards and practices, and, for this purpose, to investigate and study the standards and practices of such departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT information.

f. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the matters described in paragraph e above shall be binding on all departments or agencies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of the members of the Board. Recommendations approved by a majority, but not all, of the members of the Board shall be transmitted by it to the Special Committee for such action as the Special Committee may see fit to take.

g. The Board will meet monthly, or oftener at the call of the Chairman or any member, and shall determine its own procedures.

3 Document 255.
2. **A directive to the Secretary of Defense.** This directive shall include the following provisions:

   a. Subject to the specific provisions of this directive, the Secretary of Defense may delegate in whole or in part authority over the Director of NSA within his department as he sees fit.

   b. The COMINT mission of the National Security Agency (NSA) shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and control of the communications intelligence activities of the United States conducted against foreign governments, to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto. As used in this directive, the terms “communications intelligence” or “COMINT” shall be construed to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications other than foreign press and propaganda broadcasts and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients, but shall exclude censorship and the production and dissemination of finished intelligence.

   c. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who shall serve for a minimum term of 4 years and who shall be eligible for reappointment. The Director shall be a career commissioned officer of the armed services on active or reactivated status, and shall enjoy at least 3-star rank during the period of his incumbency.

   d. Under the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with approved policies of USCIB, the Director of NSA shall be responsible for accomplishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all COMINT collection and production resources of the United States are placed under his operational and technical control. When action by the Chiefs of the operating agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is required, the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to COMINT operations through them. However, due to the unique technical character of COMINT operations, the Director is authorized to issue direct to any operating elements under his operational control task assignments and pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such elements to accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, and direct communication with, any elements of the Service or civilian COMINT agencies on any other matters of operational and technical control as may be necessary, and he is authorized to obtain such information and intelligence material from them as he may require. All instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory, subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of Service or head of civilian department or agency concerned.

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4 See Public Law 513–81st Congress 1950. [Footnote in the original.]
e. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include the following:

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies for the conduct of the U.S. COMINT activities.

(2) Conducting COMINT activities, including research and development, as required to meet the needs of the departments and agencies which are authorized to receive the products of COMINT.

(3) Determining, and submitting to appropriate authorities, requirements for logistic support for the conduct of COMINT activities, together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.

(4) Within NSA’s field of authorized operations prescribing requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of COMINT material within and among the COMINT elements under his operational or technical control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance with the regulations.

(5) Subject to the authorities granted the Director of Central Intelligence under NSCID No. 5, conducting all liaison on COMINT matters with foreign governmental communications intelligence agencies.

f. To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, the Director shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT functions for which he is responsible. It is recognized that in certain circumstances elements of the Armed Forces and other agencies being served will require close COMINT support. Where necessary for this close support, direct operational control of specified COMINT facilities and resources will be delegated by the Director, during such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to military commanders or to the Chiefs of other agencies supported.

g. The Director shall exercise such administrative control over COMINT activities as he deems necessary to the effective performance of his mission. Otherwise, administrative control of personnel and facilities will remain with the departments and agencies providing them.

h. The Director shall make provision for participation by representatives of each of the departments and agencies eligible to receive COMINT products in those offices of NSA where priorities of intercept and processing are finally planned.

i. The Director shall have a civilian deputy whose primary responsibility shall be to ensure the mobilization and effective employment of the best available human and scientific resources in the field of cryptologic research and development.

j. Nothing in this directive shall contravene the responsibilities of the individual departments and agencies for the final evaluation of COMINT information, its synthesis with information from other sources, and the dissemination of finished intelligence to users.
3. The special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. Orders, directives, policies, or recommendations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the collection, production, security, handling, dissemination, or utilization of intelligence, and/or classified material, shall not be applicable to COMINT activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by competent departmental or agency authority represented on the Board. Other National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence shall be construed as non-applicable to COMINT activities, unless the National Security Council has made its directive specifically applicable to COMINT.

5 Pursuant to this revision of NSCID No. 9, the National Security Agency was established on November 4.

133. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board

PSB D–34

Washington, October 30, 1952.

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

[Omitted here are a title page, a copy of the November 3 transmittal memorandum from Director Alan G. Kirk to NSC Executive Secretary Lay, and a Table of Contents.]

I. Significant Psychological Activities During the Period Under Review

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of psychological activities during the reporting period on the part of the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations.

Capabilities by Area

2. Some progress toward our psychological goals has been achieved in certain areas. Wide geographical gaps remain, however, in

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Communications-Electronics
Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT
Implementation of NSCID No. 9 Revised

REFERENCES
(a) NSCID No. 9 Revised, dated 24 October 1952
(b) Memorandum of 4 November 1952 from Secretary of Defense subject:
   Interim Implementation of NSCID No. 9 Revised

1. This Directive is issued for the purpose of implementing the provisions of reference (a) and supersedes reference (b).

2. The National Security Agency (NSA) is hereby established as an agency within the framework of the Department of Defense with the mission assigned to it in reference (a). For the purposes of this Directive, NSA will be understood to consist of the Headquarters, subordinate units, and facilities, including the personnel thereof, that are specifically assigned or attached to, or provided for, NSA by the Secretary of Defense or other competent authority, and over which the Director, NSA, exercises administrative, operational and technical control.

3. Pursuant to the provisions of reference (a), all Communications Intelligence (COMINT) collection and production resources of the Department of Defense are hereby placed under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA.

4. The Director, NSA, will arrange with the appropriate authorities of other departments and agencies of the government for his assumption of responsibility for the operation of the NSA.

5 Top Secret; Security Information. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The date is handwritten on the enclosure.
of operational and technical control of the COMINT collection and
COMINT production resources of those departments and agencies.

5. All military and civilian personnel, funds, records, equipment,
facilities, and other support available to or authorized for the Armed
Forces Security Agency (AFSA) are hereby made available to and au-
thorized for the National Security Agency. Arrangements heretofore in
effect for the provision of personnel, fiscal and other support for AFSA
shall continue in effect for NSA unless otherwise modified.

6. All directives, orders or instructions relating to COMINT mat-
ters issued by any authorities within the Department of Defense in-
consistent or at variance with the provisions of reference (a) will be im-
mediately brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense by the
initiating authorities and / or the Director, NSA.

7. In fulfilling his assigned responsibilities, the Director, NSA, will
be guided by the provisions of reference (a) and he will:

   a. Transmit the budget estimates and civilian manpower require-
      ments of NSA, as approved by the Secretary of Defense, to appro-
      priate authorities for inclusion in designated appropriations of the Mili-
tary Departments or the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These
      approved estimates and manpower requirements will not be subject to
      review by the Military Departments.

   b. Conform to the personnel, fiscal, and property accounting poli-
cies of the Secretary of Defense. A departmental property account is
      authorized for NSA.

   c. Review COMINT requirements, programs and budget estimates
      of the Military Departments, insure the provision of an adequate bal-
      anced program, and support these items in cooperation with the De-
      partments concerned.

   d. Establish procedures for production and procurement of spe-
cialized COMINT equipments under the cognizance of NSA.

   e. Assure to the maximum practicable extent, in consonance with
      Department of Defense policies, standardization of specialized COMINT
      equipments and facilities.

   f. Determine and make known to the Director, Communications-
      Electronics, the requirements for rapid communications to meet the
      needs of NSA. These will include a statement of anticipated traffic loads
      and such additional data as will assist in fulfilling the requirements.

   g. Determine and make known to appropriate authorities courier
      service requirements as needed for the expeditious handling of
      COMINT traffic and material.

   h. In consonance with the policies of the Department of Defense,
      provide means for review, coordination, and approval of all COMINT
      research and development requirements.

   i. Establish a research and development program adequate to ac-
complish the COMINT mission, and control the assignment and im-
      plementation of all COMINT research and development projects.

   j. In consonance with the policies of the Department of Defense,
      provide technical guidance and support for COMINT training con-
ducted by the Military Departments and, to insure necessary levels of
      technical competence, prescribe minimum standards for their COMINT
      training curricula.
k. Conduct necessary specialized and advance COMINT training.

8. With reference to paragraph 7f above, the Director, Communications-Electronics, with the assistance of the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee, shall have the authority and responsibility for insuring that the Military Departments, within their capabilities, fulfill the military communications requirements of NSA.

9. The COMINT responsibilities of the Military Departments will include, among others, the following:

   a. Providing the necessary COMINT facilities and resources for the support of military operations and of the National COMINT effort in accordance with assigned responsibilities.

   b. Procuring, organizing, training, equipping, administering, budgeting, and providing logistic support to their respective COMINT units. This will include provision of adequate reserve programs to meet emergency or wartime requirements.

   c. Within the limits prescribed by public law and Department of Defense policies, assigning military personnel to NSA for a minimum period of thirty-six months. Longer assignment of specially qualified personnel is authorized as may be arranged with the Department concerned. The Military Departments may add, withdraw, or substitute personnel within the authorized personnel strength of NSA, subject to approval by the Director, NSA.

   d. Advising the Director, NSA, regarding close support matters and recommending the number and composition of COMINT units needed to fulfill the close support requirements of the Departments.

   e. Performing COMINT collection and production tasks as specified by the Director, NSA.

   f. Submitting COMINT research and development requirements directly to the Director, NSA, for his action, and accomplishing such COMINT research and development and service testing as approved or assigned by him. This does not preclude the Military Departments from initiating and pursuing, subject to prompt notification to and approval by the Director, NSA, such research and development as may be necessary to support their COMINT activities.

10. Where delegation of control is required in close support of a military commander, the Director, NSA, will normally delegate operational control of specified COMINT facilities and resources to the COMINT agency of the appropriate Military Department for assignment to a subordinate unit.

11. The Director, NSA, is authorized to make requests of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and all other government agencies and activities for information and assistance which his functions and responsibilities may require and to furnish such agencies and activities with information and assistance as appropriate.

Lovett

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Lovett signed the original.
Enclosure

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Lovett

Washington, undated.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Communications-Electronics
Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT

Interim Responsibility for Communication Security

Pending the issuance of additional instructions, the responsibilities for Communication Security (COMSEC) activities and related matters assigned to the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, shall continue to be assigned to the Director, National Security Agency.

Lovett

1 Top Secret; Security Information.
2 Printed from a copy that indicates Lovett signed the original.

137. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (Amory) to Director of Central Intelligence Smith


SUBJECT

Senior Staff Action on the Summary Evaluation

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Job 80–R01440R, Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was prepared in the Office of National Estimates. A stamped notation indicates that Smith saw the memorandum on November 26.
Letter From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover)

Washington, December 17, 1952.

My Dear Mr. Hoover:

On October 31 you formally advised this office of certain observations in connection with National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 (NSCID 9) as revised on October 24, and you requested that they be brought to the attention of the appropriate members of the NSC. Those observations were, in effect, as follows:

1. The Attorney General, as Chief Legal Officer of the Government, should be a member of the Special Committee of the NSC whenever matters of interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are before that Committee; and it should be made explicit that the FBI is to assist the Attorney General and the Special Committee when such matters are before the Committee.

2. The right granted to the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) “to investigate and study the standards and practices of its member agencies and departments in utilizing and protecting COMINT (communications intelligence) information” is too broad and may lead to abuse.

3. The authority granted to the Director, NSA “to have direct access to . . . any elements of the . . . civilian COMINT agencies on any matters of operational and technical control as may be necessary” also is too broad, as is the Director’s authority “to obtain such information and intelligence material from (those agencies) as he may require.”

With reference to the first point above, I am informed that it was the understanding when the Directive was drafted, that the Attorney General, under the established procedures of the NSC, would be a member of the Special Committee whenever matters of interest to the FBI were before that Committee; and that in such instances, the Attorney General could, as a matter of course, have the assistance of the Bureau. That understanding has been confirmed by the President when, in approving this Directive, he directed that this procedure is to be followed. NSCID 9 will be revised accordingly regarding the membership of the Special Committee.

In connection with your second and third points, the Secretaries of State and Defense acting as the Special Committee of the NSC for

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1 Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Series XVI, C.6 (Other Staff Papers). Top Secret; Security Information. Ellipsis in the original.
2 See Document 132. Hoover’s comments have not been found.
COMINT with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, have directed me to advise you as follows.

It is understood that your concern regarding these latter two points is that they might result in encroachment upon or interference with the unique responsibilities of the FBI in the internal security field and that, consequently, you desire that the FBI be granted explicit exemption from those portions of the Directive.

With specific reference to your second point, paragraph 1f of the Directive states that the Board’s authority in the matter under discussion shall be binding only if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of the members of the Board. Furthermore, this paragraph prescribes that any recommendation of this sort approved by a majority, but not all, of the members of the Board shall automatically be transmitted by the Board to the Special Committee. No such action of the Board therefore can be binding on you unless you agree to it and, in the event of disagreement, the matter would be considered by the Special Committee, augmented by the Attorney General, as a matter of course and not as a matter of formal appeal on your part.

With specific reference to your third point, above, paragraph 2f of the Directive recognizes that elements of the Armed Forces and other agencies will require close COMINT support and that necessary direct operational control of specified COMINT facilities and resources will be delegated by the Director to the chiefs of other agencies. The types of operations contemplated by the FBI undoubtedly would fall within the meaning of a close support requirement for the accomplishment of your mission, in which case it would be possible for you to arrange with the Director, NSA, for the assignment to your Bureau of such facilities as are needed for this requirement.

In connection with the authority granted to the Director, NSA, to have direct access to any elements of civilian COMINT agencies and to obtain information and intelligence material from those agencies, such access is always established through mutually prescribed channels. However, the vital element of security would be eliminated if normal channels of interdepartmental exchange were prescribed for the conduct of COMINT business. On the other hand, all members of the Board would be handicapped severely if they could not participate laterally in all phases of the COMINT operation through mutually acceptable channels.

With reference to your reservation regarding the allocation of votes in USCIB, which was raised orally by your representatives in addition to the points made in your letter, this device was only designed as an administrative mechanism to provide a reasonable dividing line between civilian and non-civilian issues if such were to arise. In view of your reservation, however, the Special Committee has decided that the
FBI representative should cast two votes at Board meetings—as is provided for the representative of the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence—and that the representative of the Secretary of Defense should also cast two votes. This would equalize your voting strength with that of the other civilian members and still provide the possible advantage of the reasonable dividing line. NSCID 9 will be amended accordingly.

It may be pertinent in conclusion to review the reasons for the existence of NSCID 9. That Directive was issued for the following reasons:

1. To set forth with exactitude the fundamental principle that the COMINT activities of the U.S. are a national responsibility rather than a matter of primary interest to any one of the departments or agencies concerned.
2. To delineate clearly the broad lines of policy which will govern this mutual assumption of responsibility.
3. To reconstitute USCIB in a manner which will assure an orderly, precise, secure and effective complex of COMINT activities.
4. To set up the most rapid and equitable system which not only would give full protection to the individual agencies and departments on the Board but also would provide final adjudication, as needed, by the Chief Executive.

The Directive, amended as indicated above, would appear to accomplish the foregoing as regards all agencies participating in COMINT activities. On the other hand, excepting the FBI from adherence to portions of the Directive would weaken the Directive to a point where it would have little meaning or value because the fundamental principle of its creation would have been destroyed. Since COMINT must be set apart from the normal operations of Government and a special mechanism created to handle COMINT activities, those activities must be coordinated by the bodies which have been created to handle them—namely, the Special Committee and USCIB—on a basis of mutual responsibility with equitable representation of all interested departments and agencies.

In summary, however, nothing in the directive should be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal security. This will be made explicit by adding a paragraph to this effect in NSCID 9.

Sincerely yours,

James S. Lay, Jr.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Recommendation 1 (page 46): That NSC direct USCIB to establish COMINT requirements in the light of COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This operational guidance to NSA should be so clear and succinct as to require minimum interpretation of what is required and of its degree of importance. USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products and the Director, NSA, should determine the best way of producing same. If USCIB fails after a reasonable length of time to provide more adequate guidance to the Director, NSA, the latter should be made a member of the IAC.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers the first part of this recommendation to be in hand in that a revised COMINT requirements list, prepared with NSA participation, has been approved by a Working Committee within USCIB and will soon be presented for USCIB approval. With respect to the second part of the recommendation, USCIB does not believe that NSA membership on the IAC should be related to the development of or failure to develop USCIB directives or requirements. DOD concurs, but is doubtful that the problem to which the latter part of the recommendation is addressed would be solved by making the Director, NSA, a member of the IAC. DOD is presently crystallizing its views on the general subject of intelligence and on the ultimate organization of the top structure of U.S. intelligence. DOD proposes to discuss the matter with State and CIA and hopes in due course, together with those agencies, to arrive at an agreed proposal for submission.

Additional Action Required: As to COMINT requirements—none. As to NSA’s membership on the IAC—defer decision pending a determination as to whether USCIB’s revised COMINT requirements constitute sufficient guidance for NSA. (In the interim consideration should be given to granting observership status on the IAC to the Director, NSA.)

Recommendation 2 (page 48): That the Director, NSA, be given clear cut directives which will enable him to make much greater and continuing effort to produce high level communications intelligence. This is of such great importance that monetary considerations should be waived and an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project should be exerted at once. (It is noted that in forwarding Appendix I, Part 1, the

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14 This section of Coyne’s report was classified Top Secret; U.S. Eyes Only; Handle Via COMINT Channels Only.
Task Force indicated that “the importance of the adoption of Recommendation 2 is especially emphasized—this is believed to be vital to the intelligence effort.”

Agency Comment: USCIB does not concur in the implication that guidance or lack thereof has adversely affected the production of high level communications intelligence. USCIB notes that “emphasis upon the guidance factor has tended to obscure the real, and critical, weakness which does exist, namely, [4 lines not declassified]. As to the proposed initiation of efforts in this field along the lines of the Manhattan Project, USCIB states that it is not now in a position to determine the nature and scope of the increased effort which might be applied to the solution of COMINT’s chief problem [less than 1 line not declassified]. USCIB believes it will be in a better position to decide this matter as a result of NSA’s plan for implementing the new COMINT objectives list, or as a result of a special study which is being undertaken by highly qualified, technical experts in an effort to [less than 1 line not declassified] problem referred to above. USCIB is convinced that maximum assistance would be provided to NSA in the solution of its major problem by the [2 lines not declassified]. Based thereon, the Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT (Sec/State and Sec/Def) has agreed that an optimum, if not indeed a prerequisite, step toward [2 lines not declassified] and should be accorded maximum priority. To that end the Special Committee has authorized marshalling of all relevant [less than 1 line not declassified] resources of the intelligence agencies.

Additional Action Required: Reconsideration by NSC’s Special Committee for COMINT of the recommended expansion of NSA’s efforts.

Observation: Such reconsideration should be deferred pending completion of the study and related steps referred to by USCIB and summarized above.

Recommendation 3 (page 49): That ELINT and COMINT be integrated to the extent of placing ELINT under NSA for analysis of the product and guidance and coordination in the collection and dissemination of ELINT. The authority of operational commanders over the integral ELINT resources, however, should not be abridged. USCIB or the combined board which is recommended in this report to replace it should exercise only policy control over ELINT matters.

Agency Comment: USCIB believes this recommendation has been overtaken by the issuance of NSCID No. 17\textsuperscript{15} and by the DOD Direc-

\textsuperscript{15} Document 259.
tive on ELINT dated July 13, 1955. USCIB believes no further action should be taken on this recommendation until these recent directives have been implemented and tried.

Additional Action Required: Following a reasonable trial period the reference directives should be re-examined in the light of this recommendation.

Observation: The USCIB response is unclear. By inference it appears that ELINT has not been placed under NSA, as recommended by the Task Force.

Recommendation 4 (page 50): That the military services and NSA continue to strive for a higher degree of cryptographic security; that the problem of communications security be restudied by USCSB (or the combined board as recommended in this report) with a view to reducing to the lowest practicable level the quantity of information released through telecommunications; and that NSC 168 be re-examined to ascertain if the Director, NSA, has sufficient authority to carry out his COMSEC responsibilities.

Agency Comment: USCIB agrees with the need for a higher degree of communications security and feels that efforts to attain this end should continue; however, it does not consider that the recommendation falls within the purview of USCIB.

USCSB reports that, at all times, the military services and NSA keep the problem of cryptographic security under thorough review. USCSB concurs in the recommended review of NSC 168, but notes that in essence this review is already underway pursuant to the provisions of NSC 168 itself.

Recommendation 5 (page 51): That a single board with appropriate technical subcommittees have policy guidance over communications intelligence and communications security. If the recommendation to place the evaluation and analysis of ELINT under NSA is adopted, then policy guidance for ELINT as well as COMINT and COMSEC should be exercised by the proposed single board.

Agency Comment: USCIB is not now willing to recommend establishment of a single board “because the basic functions and organizational arrangements within a number of the interested agencies are sufficiently divergent to justify the continued separate existence of USCIB and USCSB.” USCSB opposes the recommendation because of the difficulties of implementation which would result from the establishment of a single board, as proposed.

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16 Document 230.
17 The title of NSC 168, November 1953 was “Communications Security.” Documentation on this NSC paper is in the National Archives, RG 273, Policy Papers.
Recommendation 6 (page 51): That DOD study the organizational structure and proper positioning within its respective services of the three cryptologic agencies—AFSS, ASA, and NSG—with a view toward improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengthening their personnel assignment policies and logistic support.

Agency Comment: USCIB endorses the aim of this recommendation but considers it a problem internal to DOD. DOD believes that one means of achieving the objective of this recommendation is to constitute the service cryptologic agencies as major commands. The Air Force Cryptologic Agency (AFSS) has been so constituted for about seven years. The Army Cryptologic Agency (ASA) was designated as a major command following the submission of the Task Force Report. The Navy Cryptologic activity (NSG) is not so constituted at present; DOD will in the near future ask the Secretary of the Navy to review his cryptologic organization to determine whether it might be re-established on a basis paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force.

Recommendation 7 (page 52): That the military services give greater attention to selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign regular or “career” reserve officers to the maximum extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT prior to sending them to command field stations, and establish career opportunities for specialists equal to those of the line or general service officers. Rotation and replacement procedures should be improved. The feasibility of using civilian intercept operators should be tested. It is also recommended that Congress enact legislation to authorize NSA to employ especially qualified retired military personnel with no restriction on the number so employed. Such legislation should also permit Sec. Def. to recall active officers to duty with NSA and have those officers counted against the authorized strength of NSA, but not of the respective military services.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in this recommendation. DOD reports that full consideration of these proposals is currently in progress within DOD.

Recommendation 8 (page 54): That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration to the allocation of an appropriate number of “super grades” and positions under Public Law 313 to NSA; to the possibility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultants; and to privileges extended to civilians overseas.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in this recommendation. DOD also concurs and is taking the steps it deems appropriate in an effort to accomplish the objectives of this recommendation.

Recommendation 9 (page 55): That USCIB or its successor board clarify the objectives and functions of intelligence liaison detachments with NSA, establish uniform procedures to be followed for such detachments in their relationship with NSA, and specify maximum numbers
of personnel to be assigned for liaison duties after examining the extent of interest of each agency concerned. Intelligence personnel assigned to liaison duty with NSA should be required to attend an indoctrination course conducted by NSA.

Agency Comment: USCIB does not concur in this recommendation. It agrees that mutual familiarization with the requirements, capabilities and operations of both NSA and consumer agencies is desirable; it feels, however, that because the necessary functions of intelligence liaison detachments vary continuously with the missions of the consumer agencies and the character of COMINT production activities, the arrangements called for by this recommendation cannot successfully be rendered uniform.

Additional Action Required: Decision as to whether the view of the Task Force or the view of USCIB should be adopted.

Observation: USCIB’s view is most sound. The Task Force recommendation should be rejected.

Recommendation 10 (page 56): That NSA and the three cryptologic services give greater emphasis to, and continue to develop mutual cooperation in, improving the technical factors of intercept stations.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs. Greater emphasis has been given this matter and USCIB considers the arrangements which have been undertaken in this regard to be satisfactory.

Recommendation 11 (page 56): That more thorough periodic reinvestigations of personnel be made. Particular effort should be concentrated on persons occupying the more sensitive positions.

Agency Comment: USCIB has established a special committee to investigate the matter, and USCIB is prepared to act on whatever recommendations are made by that committee.

Observation: See “Observation” Section of Chapter X, Recommendation 3.

Recommendation 12 (page 57): That the Director, NSA, be given authority to inspect the service cryptologic schools and make appropriate recommendations for improvement where COMINT is affected.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs.

Part 2—Communications and Electronics in Support of Intelligence Activities (Pages 1–44)

Recommendation 1 (page 37): That an Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee (ICES) to the Combined Intelligence Board (this assumes that USCIB and USCSB have been combined into a single board, as proposed elsewhere in the report) be established to review and produce recommendations to the Combined Intelligence Board with respect to all communications and electronics proposals
from intelligence activities which call for facilities, equipments, or additional personnel which cannot be obtained from existing resources; and to supply technical advice to the Board on such matters as it might request.

Agency Comment: USCIB does not agree. It believes that the spirit of this recommendation is being accomplished by expert communications and electronics advice provided from within the agencies concerned with the subject.

Additional Action Required: None, assuming the USCIB comment on this recommendation is accurate.

Recommendation 2 (page 38): That more effective use be made within DOD of the high potential value and know-how available in the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deal with communications and electronics problems related to the broad intelligence field. Responsibility should be placed on that group for reviewing and commenting on communications and electronics requirements that the NSA considers necessary to meet the intelligence objectives, and the demands being placed by NSA on the special communications and electronics groups in the military services under NSA operational control; and for submitting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on ways and means to insure maximum coordination and effectiveness in the over-all communications and electronics effort in support of intelligence.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers that existing procedures for reviewing and commenting on NSA requirements are satisfactory.

Recommendation 3 (page 38): That more effective technical advice be injected into USCIB deliberations to permit development of more appropriate statements of the intelligence objectives to be accomplished by communications or electronics means.

Agency Comment: USCIB agrees with the spirit of this recommendation and believes that it is now being carried into effect.

Recommendation 4 (page 38): That the present basic policy for the provision of point-to-point communications services to intelligence community activities from existing governmental or civil communications services be continued. That any attempt to set up separate, duplicate, or paralleling point-to-point communications facilities be authorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee recommended in Recommendation 1, above.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in the first sentence of the recommendation. It agrees with the second sentence to the extent of believing that no separate facilities should be established for intelligence use without full consideration by appropriate authority.
Recommendation 5 (page 39): That a basic policy of utilizing existing facilities, services, and equipment to the maximum degree be applied wherever it is determined to be technically feasible in the COMINT, ELINT, and COMSEC operations (this applies particularly to certain aspects of the technical training phases, operational procedures, and logistics); that exceptions to this policy be authorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee recommended in Recommendation 1, above.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers that the spirit of this recommendation is now being carried out. It does not agree that the additional review (called for in the last sentence) is either necessary or desirable.

Recommendation 6 (page 39): That any arrangements with respect to centralized control of ELINT give adequate consideration to the immediate and vital interest of the military in this field and the need to keep electronic countermeasures (ECM)—a tactical weapon—clearly under military operational control.

Agency Comment: USCIB believes that this recommendation has been overtaken by the issuance of NSCID 17 and the related Department of Defense Directive of July 13, 1955.

Recommendation 7 (page 39): That all planning and operation of communications and electronics efforts in support of intelligence activities include full consideration of the following to meet national emergency conditions:

a. Day-to-day operation and training be based on realism in light of the situation and facilities expected to be available in time of war or national emergency. This applies in a special manner to planning operations to be effective in case of heavy jamming operations.

b. Key intelligence installations, served by costly, hard-to-replace electronics equipment and associated records be located outside established target areas. That these installations have integrated plans for national emergency or disaster operations. That all agencies involved in planning new, alternate, or emergency locations for Federal agencies expedite action to assist NSA in its current efforts to obtain a suitable site.

c. Pending accomplishment of b, that effective interim disaster plans be developed promptly for each key intelligence installation to include as a minimum (1) alternate site, (2) installed and tested minimum equipment with necessary basic records at the alternate site, and (3) adequate knowledge of disaster plans by key personnel.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-a and considers that it is now being carried out. USCIB agrees in principle with Recommendation 7-b but notes that the great extension of target areas by fallout hazards would require relocation at such great distances that reduction in operational efficiency would be unacceptable and the agency concerned would be unable to retain or attract key personnel.
USCIB reports that plans for the location of alternate NSA sites are now being developed by DOD. USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-c and reports that it is being carried into effect except for bulky, costly, and complex cryptoanalytic machinery.

**Recommendation 8** (page 40): That the present basic communications (cryptographic) security plan, providing for centralized control with effective decentralization of operations, be continued; that each agency and service maintain effective inspection and vigorous training programs to reduce to the minimum cryptographic operational security violations.

**Agency Comment:** USCIB concurs, noting that the Communications Security Plan referred to represents, in reality, a number of communications security arrangements each of which is considered satisfactory.

**Recommendation 9** (page 40): That NSC determine ways and means to control more effectively release of valuable intelligence to potential enemies via clear text messages being transmitted over government and civil communication networks.

**Agency Comment:** USCIB considers that the policy responsibility for control of governmental clear text messages falls within its charter. It reports that it has long recognized this problem and is working toward its solution. It does not believe that the problem is one for NSC consideration. USCIB considers that the policy responsibility for control of nongovernmental clear text messages over civil communications networks is outside its purview.

**Additional Action Required:** Referral of the nongovernmental aspects of the subject to Commerce for consideration in the light of its NSC-assigned responsibilities relating to the safeguarding of unclassified strategic information.

**Recommendation 10** (page 40): That the general tendency within the communications intelligence and the communications security agencies to overemphasize the special security facets of their operations with respect to basic communications and electronics features be examined objectively and comprehensively by [a] competent, technically qualified authority to insure that such overemphasis is not producing unnecessary duplication of facilities and operations in peacetime which will grow to completely unrealistic figures in wartime, and producing a system which may fail in an emergency because it will require considerable readjustment of basic operational practices at a critical time.

**Agency Comment:** USCIB believes existing procedures for review of communications requirements are adequate. USCIB does not believe that the security aspects of COMINT are significantly overemphasized. Accordingly, USCIB opposes creation of the special committee called for by this recommendation. USCIB, in essence, concurs in USCIB’s view; it believes that no separate examination of the problem is required.
Recommendation 11 (page 41): “SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION”:
That the President set up a special commission composed of technically qualified civil and military communications and electronics representatives, to survey and produce recommendations as to ways and means to insure the more effective utilization of all communications and electronics resources of the United States in the national interests in case of war or national emergency. (This recommendation was singled out by the Task Force as one worthy of special emphasis and as one believed to be of great importance.)

Agency Comment: ODM expressed the view (7/6/55)\(^{18}\) that the Report which was shortly thereafter to be made to the NSC by the Science Advisory Committee would contain organizational recommendations somewhat more far reaching than those suggested in the Task Force Report and, if adopted, would probably satisfy the recommendations of the Task Force Report.

Additional Action Required: DOD, ODM and CIA views should be obtained on this recommendation, including recommendations as to its implementation. (The ODM comment of 7/6/55 is not specific enough to assess the validity of the Task Force recommendation.)

Appendix II\(^{19}\)

The Clandestine Services of the Central Intelligence Agency

Recommendation 1 (page 42): That the “covert intelligence” and “cold war functions” of the Deputy Director/Plans be assigned to separate Deputy Directors whose areas of responsibility should be administratively and logistically self-supporting.

Agency Comment: CIA does not concur, noting that the recommended system had been tried prior to 1952 and abandoned; that CIA’s experience during the period of separate operations proved the operational disadvantages of attempting to conduct on a secure and efficient basis two worldwide clandestine organizations, each compartmented from the other.

Additional Action Required: See Chapter II, Recommendation 1, Page 1, above.

Recommendation 2 (page 42): That the part of CIA’s July 15, 1952 Directive appointing area division chiefs as executives of the DCI and providing for their direct dealing with him and senior overseas representatives\(^{20}\) be rescinded.

\(^{18}\) Not found.

\(^{19}\) This section of Coyne’s report was classified Top Secret.

257. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 Revised


COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 and Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and to the Presidential directive approved October 24, 1952, which

a. Stated that the communications intelligence (COMINT) activities of the United States are a national responsibility, and that they must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources in all participating departments and agencies and to satisfy the legitimate intelligence requirements of all such departments and agencies;

b. Designated the Secretaries of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT, which Committee shall, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, establish policies governing COMINT activities, and keep the President advised of such policies through the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (The President in approving this directive also directed that the Attorney General shall be a member of the

1 Source: Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File. Top Secret. The March 10, 1950, version of NSCID No. 9, is Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 435. For the original July 1, 1948, version, see ibid, Source note. This version was originally issued on October 24, 1952. (Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File) After its issuance, on October 31 the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover wrote to Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Lay with three “observations.” First, Hoover wrote, the Attorney General should be a member of the Special Committee whenever matters of interest to the FBI were before the Committee. Second, the right of the USCIB “to investigate and study the standards and practices of its member agencies” was too broad. Third, the authority of the NSA Director to “have direct access” and “technical control” of “any elements” of the member agencies also was too broad (Ibid.) In his December 17 reply, Lay informed Hoover the decision of the Special Committee to amend NSCID No. 9. There were three changes. First the sentence in parentheses at the end of preambular paragraph “b” was added. Second, in paragraph 1 d. (1) the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were added to those who were given two votes. Finally, paragraph 4 was added. (Ibid.) Montague has an interesting account of the interagency sensitivities involved in this episode in General Walter Bedell Smith As Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-February 1953, p. 253.


3 By memorandum of October 28, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Lay informed the Secretaries of State and Defense that President Truman had approved this revised version of NSCID No. 9 on October 24. (Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File)
Special Committee whenever matters of interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation are before that Committee; and

c. Further designated the Department of Defense as executive agent of the Government, for the production of COMINT information;

the Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. Directive to the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).

   a. USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and under the Special Committee, and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of this directive. Only those departments or agencies represented in USCIB are authorized to engage in COMINT activities.

   b. The Board shall be composed of the following members:

      (1) The Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be Chairman of the Board.
      (2) A representative of the Secretary of State.
      (3) A representative of the Secretary of Defense.
      (4) A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
      (5) The Director of the National Security Agency (NSA).
      (6) A representative of the Department of the Army.
      (7) A representative of the Department of the Navy.
      (8) A representative of the Department of the Air Force.
      (9) A representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

   c. The Board shall have a staff headed by an executive secretary who shall be appointed by the Chairman with the approval of the majority of the Board.

   d. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the following procedure, with respect to any matter relating to communications intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of NSA:

      (1) The Board shall reach its decision by a majority vote. Each member of the Board shall have one vote except the representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall each have two votes. The Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, will have no vote. In the event that the Board votes and reaches a decision, any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from such decision within 7 days to the Special Committee. In the event that the Board votes but fails to reach a decision, any member of the Board may appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee. In either event the Special Committee shall review the matter, and its determination thereon shall be final. Appeals by the Director of NSA and/or the representatives of the Military Departments shall only be filed with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

      (2) If any matter is voted on by the Board but
Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

(a) no decision is reached and any member files an appeal;
(b) a decision is reached in which the representative of the Secretary of Defense does not concur and files an appeal;

no action shall be taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decided, provided that, if the Secretary of Defense determines, after consultation with the Secretary of State, that the subject matter presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action, his decision shall govern, pending the result of the appeal. In such an emergency situation the appeal may be taken directly to the President.

(3) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance with the foregoing procedures shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense. Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, the Director of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) The Director of NSA shall make such reports and furnish such information from time to time to the Board, either orally or in writing, as the Board may request, and shall bring to the attention of the Board either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him.

e. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters not falling within the jurisdiction of NSA:

(1) To coordinate the communications intelligence activities among all departments and agencies authorized by the President to participate therein;
(2) To initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and subject to the provisions of NSCID No. 5,4 to supervise all arrangements with foreign governments in the field of communications intelligence; and
(3) To consider and make recommendations concerning policies relating to communications intelligence of common interest to the departments and agencies, including security standards and practices, and, for this purpose, to investigate and study the standards and practices of such departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT information.

f. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the matters described in paragraph e above shall be binding on all departments or agencies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of the members of the Board. Recommendations approved by a majority, but not all, of the members of the Board shall be transmitted by it to the Special Committee for such action as the Special Committee may see fit to take.

g. The Board will meet monthly, or oftener at the call of the Chairman or any member, and shall determine its own procedures.


a. Subject to the specific provisions of this directive, the Secretary of Defense may delegate in whole or in part authority over the Director of NSA within his department as he sees fit.

4 Document 255.
b. The COMINT mission of the National Security Agency (NSA) shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and control of the communications intelligence activities of the United States conducted against foreign governments, and to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto. As used in this directive, the terms “communications intelligence” or “COMINT” shall be construed to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications other than foreign press and propaganda broadcasts and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients, but shall exclude censorship and the production and dissemination of finished intelligence.

c. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who shall serve for a minimum term of 4 years and who shall be eligible for reappointment. The Director shall be a career commissioned officer of the armed services on active or reactivated status, and shall enjoy at least 3-star rank during the period of his incumbency.

d. Under the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with approved policies of USCIB, the Director of NSA shall be responsible for accomplishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all COMINT collection and production resources of the United States are placed under his operational and technical control. When action by the Chiefs of the operating agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is required, the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to COMINT operations through them. However, due to the unique technical character of COMINT operations, the Director is authorized to issue direct to any operating elements under his operational control task assignments and pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such elements to accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, and direct communication with, any elements of the Service or civilian COMINT agencies on any other matters of operational and technical control as may be necessary, and he is authorized to obtain such information and intelligence material from them as he may require. All instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory, subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of Service or head of civilian department or agency concerned.

e. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include the following:

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies for the conduct of the U.S. COMINT activities.

5 See Public Law 513, 81st Congress, 1950. [Footnote in the original. P.L. 513, May 13, 1950 (64 Stat. 159) deals with the safeguarding of communications intelligence information.]
(2) Conducting COMINT activities, including research and development, as required to meet the needs of the departments and agencies which are authorized to receive the products of COMINT.

(3) Determining, and submitting to appropriate authorities, requirements for logistic support for the conduct of COMINT activities, together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.

(4) Within NSA’s field of authorized operations prescribing requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of COMINT material within and among the COMINT elements under his operational or technical control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance with the regulations.

(5) Subject to the authorities granted the Director of Central Intelligence under NSCID No. 5, conducting all liaison on COMINT matters with foreign governmental communications intelligence agencies.

f. To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, the Director shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT functions for which he is responsible. It is recognized that in certain circumstances elements of the Armed Forces and other agencies being served will require close COMINT support. Where necessary for this close support, direct operational control of specified COMINT facilities and resources will be delegated by the Director, during such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to military commanders or to the Chiefs of other agencies supported.

g. The Director shall exercise such administrative control over COMINT activities as he deems necessary to the effective performance of his mission. Otherwise, administrative control of personnel and facilities will remain with the departments and agencies providing them.

h. The Director shall make provision for participation by representatives of each of the departments and agencies eligible to receive COMINT products in those offices of NSA where priorities of intercept and processing are finally planned.

i. The Director shall have a civilian deputy whose primary responsibility shall be to ensure the mobilization and effective employment of the best available human and scientific resources in the field of cryptologic research and development.

j. Nothing in this directive shall contravene the responsibilities of the individual departments and agencies for the final evaluation of COMINT information, its synthesis with information from other sources, and the dissemination of finished intelligence to users.

3. The special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. Orders, directives, policies, or recommen-
dictions of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the collection, production, security, handling, dissemination, or utilization of intelligence, and/or classified material, shall not be applicable to COMINT activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by competent departmental or agency authority represented on the Board. Other National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence and related implementing directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence shall be construed as non-applicable to COMINT activities, unless the National Security Council has made its directive specifically applicable to COMINT.

4. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal security.

258. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 16\(^1\)

Washington, March 7, 1953.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947,\(^2\) as amended, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (c) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall insure the coordination of the procurement of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes, it being understood that captured documents are excepted from this provision.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide, as a primary responsibility, for the following services to the IAC agencies.

   a. Preparing and disseminating English language excerpts, summaries, abstracts, and compilations from foreign language publications.

   b. Developing and maintaining indexes, accession lists, and reference services regarding foreign language publications of intelligence interest.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSCIDs. Confidential. NSCID No. 16 received NSC approval by memorandum action on March 7 (NSC Action No. 732). (National Archives, RG 59, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)